Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc.

Council of Europe

Conflict in Georgia

Director: Noah Gronlund-Jacob

© 2009 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)

This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2009. Use for other purposes is not

permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1 Chronology__________________________________________________________________ 2

Russian and Georgian Tensions Prior the Fall of the USSR – Historical Background _________ 2 1989-1992: Georgian and Ossetian Conflict____________________________________________ 2 1992-1994: The Georgian and Abkhazian Conflict ______________________________________ 3 September 2006: Russian Espionage Incident in Georgia ________________________________ 4 October 2006: Deportation of Georgians from Russia ___________________________________ 4 March and August 2007: Georgia Accuses Russia of Helicopter and Guided Missile Attacks___ 5 May 2008: Russia Lifts sanctions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia _________________________ 5 7 August 2008: Military Escalation___________________________________________________ 6 September 2008 - Present: Post Conflict South Ossetia and Abkhazia ______________________ 7

Actors and Interests ___________________________________________________________ 8 Russia___________________________________________________________________________ 8 Georgia _________________________________________________________________________ 9 Abkhazia and South Ossetia _______________________________________________________ 10

Projections and Implications___________________________________________________ 11 Prevention of Future Conflicts _____________________________________________________ 12 Promotion of the Reintegration of Separatist Regions into Georgian Politics _______________ 13 Return of Displaced Persons _______________________________________________________ 13

Conclusion _________________________________________________________________ 15 Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 16

Annotated Bibliography_______________________________________________________ 17 For Further Reading _____________________________________________________________ 17 Works Cited ____________________________________________________________________ 18 Works Referenced _______________________________________________________________ 21

PhilMUN 2009 1

Policy Dilemma In August of 2008, Russia invaded a northern region of Georgia known as South

Ossetia. This region and the region of Abkhazia have been attempting to declare

independence from Georgia since the early 1990s.1 The crisis was triggered by Georgia’s

launch of an aerial bombardment and ground attack against South Ossetia following a

series of clashes between the two sides. In response to the Georgian aggression, Russia

quickly mobilized thousands of its own troops to defend the people of South Ossetia.

Russia maintains a vested interest in the region because more than half of South Ossetia’s

citizenry desired to become Russian citizens. This desire is recognized by Russia as a

legitimate claim and Russia felt it was only acting in the best interest of its population. In

addition, Russia recognized the independence of both of these regions following the

conflict on 26 August 2008. The Council of the European Union (the Council) was quick to respond to the

attacks by both sides. On 1 September, “the Council expressed its grave concern at the

open conflict which had broken out in Georgia.”2 The Council’s response was to

establish a monitoring team, recognized as the European Unions Monitoring Mission

(EUMM), to ensure that Russian forces remove themselves from Georgia’s borders and

to investigate all war crime claims made by both sides.3 The monitors are unarmed and

solely responsible for reporting back to the Council regarding the situation on the ground

as it develops. Currently, the EUMM employs 225 monitors in four separate regions of

Georgia as well as the headquarters, located in Tbilisi.4 The EU mandate allows for

monitors to enter every region where they are welcomed. Currently, Russia, South

1 BBC News. “Q&A: Conflict in Georgia.” November 1, 2008. [Accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7549736.stm] 2 Council Join Action. “Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty.” September 15, 2008. 2008/736/CFSP. 3 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “EU Mission Head Explains Monitors’ Role in Georgia.” November 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Mission_Head_Explains_Monitors_Role_In_Georgia/1338281.html] 4 EUMM. “EUMM In Action.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.eumm.eu/en/eumm_in_action]

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Ossetia, and Abkhazia have refused to allow monitors onto their respective sides of the

administrative boundary.5

The problem of the Russian-Georgian conflict is of particular interest to the

Council because they are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the EU as a

whole. To this end, the Council can send the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with the goal

to protect the entire EU, in lieu of individual nations sending their own army. A second

or greater outbreak of violence between Russia and Georgia could require the Council to

strengthen their mission in the region. This is mainly because of member states’ fears

that a war between the two parties may spill into the surrounding area and because of

trade agreements that the EU has with both nations.

Chronology Russian and Georgian Tensions Prior the Fall of the USSR – Historical Background Prior to the 19th Century, Ossetians were forced into Georgia from Russia by

Mongol invaders. This time represents the beginning of the conflict surrounding South

Ossetia and Abkhazia. During the nineteenth century, Georgia was absorbed into tsarist

Russia after it had been passed between the Ottoman and Persian empires. Georgia was

able to declare independence for three years, 1918 – 1921, but was annexed by the Soviet

Union and remained a member until the breakup of the USSR in 1991.6

1989-1992: Georgian and Ossetian Conflict Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Georgia found itself in a political and

social conflict. The underlying issue of the tension is that “Georgians see South Ossetia

as one of the oldest centers of ‘the material and spiritual culture’ of the Georgian people

5 EUMM. “Press Conference.” October 24, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081024-Press_Conference_HoM_Haber-transcript.ed.pdf] 6 CIA Factbook. “Georgia.” December 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html]

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that has been an indivisible part of Georgia for centuries.”7 Essentially, Georgian

politicians felt that the South Ossetians had no claim to the land on which they were

living. This sentiment was mirrored by South Ossetian officials, who simply wanted to

return to Russia’s control. However, the demarcation of borders within the USSR and the

borders created after its breakup left the South Ossetian population entirely within

Georgia’s borders.

In response to Georgia’s new policies of suppression, the South Ossetian

independence movement reformed itself to better express its views toward sovereignty.

This movement quickly severed all ties with the Georgian politi-sphere, leading to an

unofficial declaration of independence. Georgia responded by refusing to recognize this

independence and promptly created the Georgian National Guard to take back control of

the region. In 1992, a peace agreement, brokered by Russia, was reached between the

two sides that resulted in South Ossetia gaining a de facto state of independence.

1992-1994: The Georgian and Abkhazian Conflict The people of Abkhazia have always recognized themselves as neighbors to

Georgia, a sentiment that was long held by Georgians as well. They contain their own

language, culture, and historical identity, each of which is wholly separate from

Georgia’s. Following the breakup of the USSR, however, a political movement within

Georgia was created that sought to make Abkhazia a part of Georgia. To this end, laws

were established to enforce discrimination against the Abkhazian language and culture,

forcing them to conform to Georgian society. The Abkhazians staged a massive

resistance to the new policies, similar to the movement in South Ossetia. The war that

broke out cost almost 20,000 people their lives and caused over USD $11 billion in

damage.8

November 2003: The Rose Revolution 7 Cvetkovski, Nikola. “The Georgia-South Ossetian Conflict.” Danish Association for Research on the Caucuses. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm] 8 Kyrlov, Alexander. “The Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: The Security of the Caspian Sea Region.” Oxford University Press, 2001. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.circassianworld.com/Georgian_Abkhazian_Conflict.html]

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In November 2003, the people of Georgia gathered in outrage for the bloodless

Rose Revolution. The president of Georgia at the time, Eduard Shevardnadze, began

instituting massive policy changes toward a more controlling government. In 2001,

Shevardnadze attempted to shut down the independent television station, Rustavi-2. This

action caused groups that once supported the president to form opposition parties that, in

2003, sought to simply improve their standing for the 2005 elections. Due to electoral

fraud, Shevardnadze’s refusal to compromise, and the discipline of the opposition groups,

Shevardnadze was ousted from control the following year. In 2004, the Georgian

parliament created more checks for the executive branch by adding a cabinet and prime

minister.9

September 2006: Russian Espionage Incident in Georgia Four Russian military officials were arrested in Georgia and convicted of

espionage in September 2006. They were sentenced to be held in a Georgian detention

center for two months. In addition, during the trial, a Russian lawyer was not allowed in

the court room to speak on their behalf.10 Georgia believed that Russia was attempting to

subvert the Georgian government in an effort to gain a stronger foothold in the region.

Following this event, Russia increased its self-imposed restrictions on Georgia. The

Russian government first requested that Russian citizens avoid travelling to or through

Georgia, but quickly strengthened this by suspending all travel along the roads that lead

to Georgia.11

October 2006: Deportation of Georgians from Russia Since October 2006, Russia has deported more than 1,000 Georgian nationals

from her borders. Russia claimed that these individuals were illegal immigrants and

9 Kandelaki, Giorgi. “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective.” United States Institute for Peace. Special Report No. 167. July, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr167.html] 10 Finn, Peter. “Dispute Between Georgia, Russia Escalates.” Washington Post. September 30, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901451_pf.html] 11 Myers, Steven Lee. “Russia Severs Transport Links with Georgia.” New York Times. October 2, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/world/europe/03russia.html]

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forced them to return to their state of origin. Reports from those affected indicate that

Russia used extraordinary means to round up Georgian citizens, including asking schools

to look for students with Georgian surnames (citation). This action was taken in response

to the espionage incident from the previous month and represents Russia’s disapproval of

what they feel are Georgia’s anti-Russian policies aimed at improving Georgia’s relations

with the West (citation).

March and August 2007: Georgia Accuses Russia of Helicopter and Guided Missile Attacks In early March of 2007, Georgia accused Russia of using helicopter gunships to

attack the only region within Abkhazia that was still under the control of the Georgian

government, the Kodori Gorge. Russia immediately denied these accusations as a

fanciful story created by the Georgian government to exacerbate an already tense

situation. An independent UN commission in the area, along with representatives from

Abkhazia, Georgia, and Russia, investigated the site and found enough shrapnel to

account for 20 missiles.12 Following this event, Georgia accused Russia of sending a

plane over Georgian airspace and firing a single missile, which landed undetonated in a

field. Russian officials were again quick to deny any involvement and accused Georgia

of making up claims in an effort to rally the support of Western nations to increase

involvement.

May 2008: Russia Lifts sanctions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia Following years of accusations of military attacks by both sides, Russia lifted

sanctions and created legal ties with the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia. The UN asked Moscow to respect Georgia’s territorial boundaries, but

Russia continued on its course. Some experts believe that Russia was not leading toward

military action, but actually testing the limits of Georgian politicians. Liz Fuller, an 12 Chivers, CJ. “UN Finds Evidence that Russian Gunships Aided in Missile Attacks in Georgia.” New York Times. March 14, 2007. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/europe/14georgia.html?pagewanted=print]

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expert on the region, believed that Russia had elevated baiting Georgian politicians to an

art form and that any action made by Russia was an attempt to get the emotional

president of the nation to take drastic action that would lower his status with the West.13

7 August 2008: Military Escalation On 7 August, Georgian troops launched a surprise attack against South Ossetia

immediately after agreeing to a ceasefire with region. Russia was quick to respond by

bringing its troops stationed in Iraq to South Ossetia in support of the de facto state. On

August 8th, Russia troops and armored vehicles began entering Tskhinvali, the capital of

South Ossetia. Following this, separatist groups in Abkhazia launched their own attack

against Georgian forces in the Kodori Gorge, which is still under the control of Georgian

forces. The Georgian government, however, assumed that Russia was responsible for the

attacks at Kodori, even though the foreign minister of Abkhazia declared that the attacks

were aimed at pushing Georgian forces out of Abkhazia’s land.14

Reports from both sides accusing the other of war crimes were almost immediate.

Russia claimed that Georgian forces had killed 2,000 civilians in their surprise attack,

while the Georgian government condemned Russia for hitting civilian targets in Gori and

killing 60 people. Georgia also made sure to point out that both South Ossetia and

Abkhazia are within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders and that Russian

military troops had no business being stationed there. Russia is allowed to maintain a

small amount of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, however, to protect the thousands

of Russian citizens who live in the region.15

President Bush and the United States responded by condemning Russia’s actions,

saying that the twenty-first century has no place for a nation that is willing to invade a

neighbor with a democratically elected government. The United States also requested

13 EurasiaNet. “Georgia: Long Simmering Abkhazia Conflict Heating Up… But Why Now?” May 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp050408.shtml] 14 BBC News. “Russian Jets Attack Georgian Town.” August 9, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7550804.stm] 15 Ibid.

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that both militaries stand down to their positions as they were prior to the conflict.16

Following President Bush’s condemnation, Georgian citizens reported that attacks by the

Russian military continued, killing at least five more civilians. Georgian citizens also

said they witnessed 135 military vehicles moving toward Abkhazia. The Georgian troops

sent to Abkhazia were likely headed to meet separatist forces in that region, actions that

were approved by the Abkhazian foreign minister.17

By 15 August, Russia was in control of the region (which region?) and

international law dictates that they became responsible for curtailing militia violence

against civilians. Human Rights Watch also asked that Russian forces facilitate

humanitarian aid to the thousands of displaced people within the region. Georgian

citizens travelling in the area reported cases of forced abduction and kidnapping, both of

which are prohibited by international law, and the international community began asking

Russia to begin controlling the separatist groups responsible for the attacks.18

September 2008 - Present: Post Conflict South Ossetia and Abkhazia Following the military action taken by both sides during the summer, the Council

established the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia on 15

September 2008. The EUMM was charged with assessing the situation on the ground in

Georgia and the separatist regions. Designed to be an autonomous agency comprised of

both international and local experts on the region, the EUMM investigates all claims

made by both sides. 19 The head of the EUMM in Georgia is Ambassador Hansjoerg

16 McKeeby, David I. “Russian Attack on Georgia is Unacceptable, Says Bush.” August 11, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/August/20080811143333idybeekcm0.7039606.html] 17 Meikle, James. “Attacks on Georgia Continue Despite Russian President’s Calls to Halt.” The Guardian. August 12, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia.russia5] 18 Human Rights Watch. “Russia/Georgia: Militias Attack Civilians in Gori Region.” August 15, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/15/russiageorgia-militias-attack-civilians-gori-region?print] 19 The Council of the European Union. “Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP.” September 15, 2008.

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Haber, of Germany.20 After a month of investigations, Ambassador Haber discussed the

mission’s successes and failures, noting that the main purpose of the mission was to

remain objective and to prevent further conflict. Since the EUMM’s entrance into

Georgia, Ambassador Haber noted that the mission “could not fully ascertain the truth of

the Russian allegations [against the Georgians].”21 This complaint by the Ambassador is

made alongside the Ambassador’s recognition that Georgia had been cooperative in

fulfilling all requests made by the mission.

Actors and Interests Russia Viewed by the majority of the world as the main aggressor during the summer

conflict, Russia maintains that its actions were in response to military threats made by

Georgia against Russian citizens. The president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, even

expressed the idea that the war was an attempt by Russia to get Georgia to agree to

peace.22 Russia’s main goal in the conflict was to protect its citizens living in South

Ossetia. Therefore, Russia deployed troops to the region and “liberated” Tskhinvali,

although Georgia still claims that they control the city. Following deployment, Russian

Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, denied Georgian accusations that Russia was attempting

to carve up Georgia for itself. Mr. Lavrov also declared that Georgia forced aggression

by using military action in South Ossetia after signing a cease-fire that prohibited it.23

It appears that Russia’s main motivation is to protect its citizenry. All public

statements by Russia about the conflict cite that as the main reason for the Russian

military’s presence and deny all allegations made by Georgia as false. The optimal

outcome for Russia would be to have all Russian citizens living in the region return to

20 EUMM. “Hansjoerg Haber: Factsheet.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/CV_HABER_281008.pdf 21 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “EU Mission Head Explains Monitors’ Role in Georgia.” November 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Mission_Head_Explains_Monitors_Role_In_Georgia/1338281.html] 22 BBC News. “Russian Jets Attack Georgian Town.” August 9, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7550804.stm] 23 Ibid.

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within Russian borders, whether that means annexing South Ossetia or moving the

population north across the border.

There is little room for Russia to negotiate on the matter. The EUMM is charged

with ensuring the removal of Russian military forces from within Georgia, but aside from

setting a timetable for withdrawal with the EUMM, Russia has few areas and fewer

reasons to negotiate with Georgia. The conflict arose for numerous reasons, one of which

was that neither side trusts the other and both sides make constant accusations of crimes

committed by the other. In addition Russia will refuse to remove its forces from South

Ossetia until all Georgian forces leave the region.

Georgia Georgian political history indicates that Georgia’s main goal is to retain control of

the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both regions enjoy de facto

independence, much to the chagrin of the Georgian people and politicians. Georgia

would like to have Russian forces removed from within their borders as well as

acknowledgement from the international community that Russia was the aggressor in the

conflict. Georgia also has a strong desire to join NATO, a sentiment seconded by the

Bush administration, and feared by Russia.24

The optimal outcome for Georgia is very similar to their stated policy, which is to

remove Russian forces from their borders and regain control of the separatist regions. To

accomplish this, Georgia cooperates fully with the EUMM and lobbies NATO for any

support it may offer. Georgia’s optimal outcome in the situation also includes admittance

into NATO, something that Georgia feels would permanently end Russian aggression

within Georgian borders.25

The main motivation behind Georgia’s policy is to protect its land. This fact,

coupled with Georgia’s strong desire to join NATO, establish the nation’s political

24 Stinson, Jeffrey. “Questions Answered on Russia, Georgia Conflict.” USA Today. August 8, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-08-question-answer_N.htm] 25 Global Security. “South Ossetia – The Stakes.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-9.htm]

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motivations as one of independence and freedom from Russian oppression. Georgia is

also strongly motivated by its reformist president, whose actions have placed Georgia in a

precarious position in the eyes of the Kremlin.26

Georgia, like Russia, has little room to negotiate regarding the post-conflict

situation. The status of the EUMM and Georgia’s inability to negotiate with the

separatist regions has caused Georgia to be incapable of exerting true force on the

situation. At this point, any deal brokered between Russia and Georgia will involve

information compiled by the EUMM. This means that the most Georgia can do, like

Russia, is cooperate fully with the monitors on the ground.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia The populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, located within Georgia’s

internationally recognized borders, seek a de jure state of independence from Georgia.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia has controlled these lands and enacted

policies that both populations feel attack their respective cultures. While a de jure state

of independence may not be feasible for each group, the stated policy is to remain

independent in at least a de facto state. Abkhazia’s foreign ministry “has said in a

statement that the recognition of the republic's independence was the main condition for

opening talks with Georgia.”27 South Ossetia, on the other hand, has openly stated that it

would like to rejoin with North Ossetia.28

The motivations for these positions follow the historical nature of the region and

the conflict. Both regions feel that their interests are more closely aligned with Russia

instead of Georgia. This likely causes the separatist movements to act according to

Russia’s urgings.

The conflict over the summer has given both regions advantages and

disadvantages when negotiating future deals between themselves, Georgia, Russia, and 26 McKeeby. 27 Global Security. “Abkhazia.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/abkhazia.htm] 28 Global Security. “South Ossetia – Background.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-3.htm]

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the international community. On the one hand, both regions are now recognized by

Russia and Nicaragua as independent nations and recognition by other nations is the first

step to de jure independence.29 Unfortunately, both groups have been accused of

committing war crimes during the conflict, something that lessens their stance in the eyes

of the greater international community. With their international recognition progressing

slowly, Abkhazia would be willing to settle for regional autonomy, a proposal backed by

Russia.30 South Ossetia, on the other hand, sees nothing less than independence and an

eventual merging with Russia as acceptable.31

Projections and Implications The future of this region is undetermined following the conflict during the

summer. With both sides accusing the other of war crimes and aggression, and with

baseless attacks, there is no way to determine what could send the region back into war.

What is clear, however, is that a return to a state of conflict has the potential to implicate

other states, including eastern European states and members of the EU. Currently, the

EUMM and the Council are responsible for organizing the EU’s opinion of the situation.

Similar to accession negotiations, the Council needs to now determine how to proceed

with the matter. The Council must determine what responsibilities each side must accept

and in what timetable matters need to be accomplished.

The Council is in a unique situation when compared to the rest of the world

because of its close proximity to the problem and possibility of future conflicts to spread

into EU states. It is now up to each member on the Council to determine the best way to

broker an agreement between Russia, Georgia, and the regions of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia.

29 DPA. “Nicaragua Joins Russia in Recognizing South Ossetia, Abkhazia.” Earth Times. September 3, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/229515,nicaragua-joins-russia-in-recognizing-south-ossetia-abkhazia.html] 30 Bryanski, Gleb. “Putin Backs Abkhazia Autonomy, Russian Troops Sent.” Reuters. May 31, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL31462201] 31 BBC News. “South Ossetia Votes for Independence.” November 13, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6140448.stm]

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Prevention of Future Conflicts A primary goal of the Council is to find a way to prevent any future conflicts from

occurring in the region. In addition to fears of the close proximity to EU member states,

a future conflict could escalate beyond the war that occurred in the summer. The Council

has the power to determine guidelines that EU member states’ policies must adhere to. In

order to prevent further conflict in the region, and any conflict from occurring between a

separatist movement and government in Europe, the Council must establish general

guidelines for conflict resolution before minor altercations become all out war.

Prior to the war, Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposed

the Steinmeier Plan to the region. The Plan was heralded as a successful beginning to

preventing any conflict because of Germany’s positive relations with both Russia and

Georgia. Unfortunately, the Plan was categorically rejected by Abkhazia because it made

no mention of their independence and Georgia found fault in the fact that Georgia’s

borders were not clearly established.32 Although this proposal did not prevent the

conflict, it still represents a major step forward in peace negotiations in the region.

More recently, representatives from Russia, Georgia, and the breakaway regions

of South Ossetia and Abkhazia gathered in Geneva to discuss a future plan for peace.

The meeting has been largely regarded as a success because all parties involved sat down

at the same table to negotiate. Representatives in charge of the mediation noted that

while many issues of procedure had been solidified and the discussion headed toward

substantive debate, “thorny issues such as the independence or otherwise of the

breakaway regions did not feature on the agenda.”33

32 Twickel, Nikolaus von. “Steinmeier Promotes Plan for Abkhazia.” The St. Petersburg Times, Issue No. 1392 (56). July 22, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26612] 33 AFP. “Russia, Georgia Start Roundtable Talks Post-Conflict.” November 19, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Russia_Georgia_start_round_table_ta_11192008.html]

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Promotion of the Reintegration of Separatist Regions into Georgian Politics One of the focal reasons for the conflict between Georgia and Russia over the

summer of 2008 was separatist regions that felt disenfranchised by the greater Georgian

polity. Laws and regulations passed in recent years designed to prohibit the practice of

South Ossetian and Abkhazian culture led to increased feelings of distrust between the

regions and Georgia. In order to prevent the conflict in Georgia and others like it from

reoccurring, the Council must determine how to prevent governments from creating

greater animosity between themselves and separatist regions. This goal should be

designed for the region and EU member states specifically, but the ideals established

could also apply to other nations with separatist movements.

According to Timothy William Waters, a professor at Indiana University of Law,

the main problem with integrating separatist movements into a recognized government

centers on international recognition. According to Walters, Russia’s decision to

recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent was in direct response to the

United States’ recognition of Kosovo earlier this year. International law, according to

Waters, “doesn’t prohibit secession, but it strongly protects states’ territorial integrity,

and it forbids states from taking steps that threaten the territorial integrity or sovereignty

of other states.”34 This means that while Russia did not break any international laws in

recognizing the two regions, the decision exacerbated the conflict on the ground in

Georgia.

Return of Displaced Persons The conflict caused an estimated 160,000 people living in the regions to become

internally displaced. These people were forced to leave their homes because of military

actions taken by both sides of the war. There are several different procedures for

returning IDPs, including action from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN

34 The Times. “Russia-Georgia: The Separatist Regions, The Western Response.” New York Times. August 29, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/russia-georgia-the-separatist-regions-the-western-response/]

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Council on Human Rights, and various non-governmental organizations throughout the

world. With regard to this issue, the Council must determine the EU’s stance on how to

return these people to their homes. Something the Council must consider is that many

people living in the regions controlled by the separatist movements but are self-described

Georgians were forced into Georgian controlled lands. These people seek return to their

original home in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia and must be considered before any

deal can be brokered between governments.35

35 White, Robert. “ACT Appeal Georgia: Post-Conflict Relief and Recovery – EUGE-81.” Action by Churches Together International. www.Reliefweb.int. November 18, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JBRN-7LHJYK?OpenDocument]

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Conclusion Georgia and Russia have never enjoyed truly peaceful relations. This history of

the neighboring countries is wrought with annexation and independence movements.

Following the breakup of the USSR, the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia improved their relations with the Russian Federation due to political

attacks from Georgia. This history recently erupted in fifteen day war in the summer of

2008. The Council of the European Union has began taking action regarding the matter,

but now must determine how to best resolve the conflict and its secondary issues and how

to prevent future conflicts from occurring in the region.

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Discussion Questions • Do you feel that the European Union actually has jurisdiction to broker an

agreement to this conflict? • How have separatist movements formed or reshaped your nation and does that

history alter your perspective? • What does your nation feel is the most efficient way to remove Russian forces

from Georgia’s borders? • How can the Council impress upon Georgia the desire to not use force in the

region? • Who is responsible for the IDPs created because of the conflict?

PhilMUN 2009 17

Annotated Bibliography For Further Reading Chufrin, Gennadii Illarionovich. “The Security of the Caspian Sea Region.”

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford University Press, 2001.

This book contains an in-depth analysis of the ongoing conflict between Georgia and Russia. Beginning the eighteenth century, formally, but earlier socially, the essays contained in this collection represent the opinions of members of 12 countries from the region and provide “authoritative basic data” on the situation on the ground. While a major focus of the book is the energy and gas pipelines that link the Caucuses to Europe, the author and contributors focus on the politic implications based on the history of nations in the region. There is special attention paid to Georgia and Russia and the historical social, political, and military conflicts that have created the current situation.

PhilMUN 2009 18

Works Cited AFP. “Russia, Georgia Start Roundtable Talks Post-Conflict.” November 19, 2008.

[Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Russia_Georgia_start_round_table_ta_11192008.html]

BBC News. “Q&A: Conflict in Georgia.” November 1, 2008. [Accessed at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7549736.stm] BBC News. “Russian Jets Attack Georgian Town.” August 9, 2008. [Accessed on

December 10, 2008 at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7550804.stm]

BBC News. “South Ossetia Votes for Independence.” November 13, 2008. [Accessed on

December 10, 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6140448.stm] Bryanski, Gleb. “Putin Backs Abkhazia Autonomy, Russian Troops Sent.” Reuters. May

31, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL31462201]

Chivers, CJ. “UN Finds Evidence that Russian Gunships Aided in Missile Attacks in

Georgia.” New York Times. March 14, 2007. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/europe/14georgia.html?pagewanted=print]

CIA Factbook. “Georgia.” December 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html] Council Join Action. “Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty.” September 15,

2008. 2008/736/CFSP. Council of the European Union. “Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP.” September 15,

2008. Cvetkovski, Nikola. “The Georgia-South Ossetian Conflict.” Danish Association for

Research on the Caucuses. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm]

PhilMUN 2009 19

DPA. “Nicaragua Joins Russia in Recognizing South Ossetia, Abkhazia.” Earth Times.

September 3, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/229515,nicaragua-joins-russia-in-recognizing-south-ossetia-abkhazia.html]

EUMM. “EUMM In Action.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.eumm.eu/en/eumm_in_action] EUMM. “Hansjoerg Haber: Factsheet.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/CV_HABER_281008.pdf] EUMM. “Press Conference.” October 24, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081024-Press_Conference_HoM_Haber-transcript.ed.pdf]

EurasiaNet. “Georgia: Long Simmering Abkhazia Conflict Heating Up… But Why

Now?” May 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp050408.shtml]

Finn, Peter. “Dispute Between Georgia, Russia Escalates.” Washington Post. September

30, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901451_pf.html]

Global Security. “Abkhazia.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/abkhazia.htm] Global Security. “South Ossetia – Background.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008

at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-3.htm] Global Security. “South Ossetia – The Stakes.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008

at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-9.htm] Human Rights Watch. “Russia/Georgia: Militias Attack Civilians in Gori Region.”

August 15, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/15/russiageorgia-militias-attack-civilians-gori-region?print]

Kandelaki, Giorgi. “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective.” United

States Institute for Peace. Special Report No. 167. July, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr167.html]

PhilMUN 2009 20

Kyrlov, Alexander. “The Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: The Security of the Caspian Sea Region.” Oxford University Press, 2001. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.circassianworld.com/Georgian_Abkhazian_Conflict.html]

McKeeby, David I. “Russian Attack on Georgia is Unacceptable, Says Bush.” August 11,

2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/August/20080811143333idybeekcm0.7039606.html]

Meikle, James. “Attacks on Georgia Continue Despite Russian President’s Calls to Halt.”

The Guardian. August 12, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia.russia5]

Myers, Steven Lee. “Russia Severs Transport Links with Georgia.” New York Times.

October 2, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/world/europe/03russia.html]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “EU Mission Head Explains Monitors’ Role in

Georgia.” November 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Mission_Head_Explains_Monitors_Role_In_Georgia/1338281.html]

Stinson, Jeffrey. “Questions Answered on Russia, Georgia Conflict.” USA Today.

August 8, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-08-question-answer_N.htm]

The Times. “Russia-Georgia: The Separatist Regions, The Western Response.” New

York Times. August 29, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/russia-georgia-the-separatist-regions-the-western-response/]

Twickel, Nikolaus von. “Steinmeier Promotes Plan for Abkhazia.” The St. Petersburg

Times, Issue No. 1392 (56). July 22, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26612]

White, Robert. “ACT Appeal Georgia: Post-Conflict Relief and Recovery – EUGE-81.”

Action by Churches Together International. www.Reliefweb.int. November 18, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JBRN-7LHJYK?OpenDocument]

PhilMUN 2009 21

Works Referenced AFP. “Russia, Georgia Start Roundtable Talks Post-Conflict.” November 19, 2008.

[Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Russia_Georgia_start_round_table_ta_11192008.html]

BBC News. “Q&A: Conflict in Georgia.” November 1, 2008. [Accessed at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7549736.stm] BBC News. “Russian Jets Attack Georgian Town.” August 9, 2008. [Accessed on

December 10, 2008 at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7550804.stm]

BBC News. “South Ossetia Votes for Independence.” November 13, 2008. [Accessed on

December 10, 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6140448.stm] Bryanski, Gleb. “Putin Backs Abkhazia Autonomy, Russian Troops Sent.” Reuters. May 31,

2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL31462201]

Chivers, CJ. “UN Finds Evidence that Russian Gunships Aided in Missile Attacks in

Georgia.” New York Times. March 14, 2007. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/europe/14georgia.html?pagewanted=print]

CIA Factbook. “Georgia.” December 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html] Council Join Action. “Acts Adopted Under Title V of the EU Treaty.” September 15, 2008.

2008/736/CFSP. Council of the European Union. “Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP.” September 15,

2008. Cvetkovski, Nikola. “The Georgia-South Ossetian Conflict.” Danish Association for

Research on the Caucuses. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm]

PhilMUN 2009 22

DPA. “Nicaragua Joins Russia in Recognizing South Ossetia, Abkhazia.” Earth Times. September 3, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/229515,nicaragua-joins-russia-in-recognizing-south-ossetia-abkhazia.html]

EUMM. “EUMM In Action.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.eumm.eu/en/eumm_in_action] EUMM. “Hansjoerg Haber: Factsheet.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/CV_HABER_281008.pdf] EUMM. “Press Conference.” October 24, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081024-Press_Conference_HoM_Haber-transcript.ed.pdf]

EurasiaNet. “Georgia: Long Simmering Abkhazia Conflict Heating Up… But Why Now?”

May 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp050408.shtml]

Finn, Peter. “Dispute Between Georgia, Russia Escalates.” Washington Post. September 30,

2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901451_pf.html]

Global Security. “Abkhazia.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/abkhazia.htm] Global Security. “South Ossetia – Background.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-3.htm] Global Security. “South Ossetia – The Stakes.” 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-9.htm] Griffiths, Ryan. "Globalization, Development and Separatism: The Influence of External

and Internal Economic Factors on the Strategy of Separatism." Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides. San Francisco. March, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/2/7/8/p252789_index.html]

PhilMUN 2009 23

Human Rights Watch. “Russia/Georgia: Militias Attack Civilians in Gori Region.” August 15, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/15/russiageorgia-militias-attack-civilians-gori-region?print]

International Crisis Group. “Georgia: Risks of Winter.” November 26, 2008. [Accessed on

December 12, 2008 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5787&l=1] ITN. “Georgia: German Plan to Prevent Conflict Spiraling into a War is Rejected by

Abkhaz Separatist Leader.” July 19, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/RTV/2008/07/19/RTV2762808/?s=separatist]

Kandelaki, Giorgi. “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective.” United States

Institute for Peace. Special Report No. 167. July, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr167.html]

Kyrlov, Alexander. “The Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: The Security of the Caspian Sea

Region.” Oxford University Press, 2001. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.circassianworld.com/Georgian_Abkhazian_Conflict.html]

McKeeby, David I. “Russian Attack on Georgia is Unacceptable, Says Bush.” August 11,

2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/August/20080811143333idybeekcm0.7039606.html]

Meikle, James. “Attacks on Georgia Continue Despite Russian President’s Calls to Halt.”

The Guardian. August 12, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia.russia5]

Myers, Steven Lee. “Russia Severs Transport Links with Georgia.” New York Times.

October 2, 2006. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/world/europe/03russia.html]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “EU Mission Head Explains Monitors’ Role in Georgia.”

November 4, 2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Mission_Head_Explains_Monitors_Role_In_GeorgiG/1338281.html]

Socor, Vladimir. “Steinmeier’s Plan on Abkhazia: Benign Intentions, Limited Relevance,

Blocked by Moscow.” The Jamestown Foundation. July 22, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=33820]

PhilMUN 2009 24

Spolaore, Enrico. “Separatism and Integration: A Study in Analytical History – Book Reviews.” Economic History Services. January, 2006. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/1029]

Stinson, Jeffrey. “Questions Answered on Russia, Georgia Conflict.” USA Today. August 8,

2008. [Accessed on December 10, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-08-question-answer_N.htm]

The Times. “Russia-Georgia: The Separatist Regions, The Western Response.” New York

Times. August 29, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/russia-georgia-the-separatist-regions-the-western-response/]

Twickel, Nikolaus von. “Steinmeier Promotes Plan for Abkhazia.” The St. Petersburg

Times, Issue No. 1392 (56). July 22, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26612]

White, Robert. “ACT Appeal Georgia: Post-Conflict Relief and Recovery – EUGE-81.”

Action by Churches Together International. www.Reliefweb.int. November 18, 2008. [Accessed on December 12, 2008 at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JBRN-7LHJYK?OpenDocument]