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BEING SINGULAR PLURAL

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M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

W e r n e r H a r n a c h e r

& D a v i d E . W e l l b e r y

Editors

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BEING SINGULAR PLURAL

T r a n s l a t e d b y

R o b e r t D . R i c h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

Jean-Luc Nancy

Stanford

University

Press

Stanford

California

2000

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Contents

S ta n fo r d U n iv er s i ty Pr es s

S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a

2 0 00 b y th e Bo a r d o f Tr us tees

o f t h e L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v e r s i r y

Being Singular Plural'was originally published as Etre singulier pluriel

1 9 9 6 , di t io n s G a l i l e .

As si st an ce fo r th e tr an sl at io n wa s p r ov id e d by th e F re nc h M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e .

Pr i n te d in th e U n ite d S ta tes o f A m er ic a o n a c id- fr ee , a r c h iv a l - q ua l i ty p ap er .

L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a

N a n c y , J e a n - L u c .

[ E tr e s in g ul a r p l ur ie l . E n g l is h ]

Bei n g s in g ul a r p l ur a l / Jea n - L uc Na n c y ; t r a n s l a ted b y R o b er t D . R ic h a r d s o n

a n d A n n e E . O ' B y r n e

p . c m . ( M er id ia n , c r o s s in g a es th et ic s )

In c l udes b ib l io g r a p h ic a l r e fer en c es a n d in dex .

I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 4 - 9 ( a 'k - p a p er ) I S B N 0 - 8 0 4 7 - 3 9 7 5 - 7 (pbk. : alk. p a p er )

I . O n t o l o g y . 2 . P h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y . I . T i t l e . I I . M e r i d a n

( S ta n fo r d, Ca l i f . )

B2 4 30. N36 3 E 8 71 3 2 00 0

1 9 4 d c 2 i 0 0 - 0 5 7 3 2 6

O r i g i n a l p r i n t i n g 2 0 0 0

L a s t f ig ur e b e l o w in dic a tes y ea r o f th is p r in t in g :

09 08 0 7 06 05 04 03 02 01 00

Ty p es et b y Ja m es P . Br o m m e r

in 1 0. 9 / 1 3 G a r a m o n d a n d L i th o s d is p l a y

Preface XV

Of Bein g Singular P lural1

Wa r, Ri g h t, S ov e re i gn ty Te c hn IOI

Eulogy for the Mle 145

Th e Surprise o f the Event 159

H u ma n Ex c ess 177

Cos mos Basel ius 185

Notes 193

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Lead, as I do, the flown-away virtue back to earth

yes, bac k to bo dy an d life ; that it may give the ear th its

meaning, a human meaning! May your spirit and your

vi rt ue serve the me an in g of the ear th. . . . M a n an d

man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered.Nietzsche

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Th is epigr aph is chosen qu ite deliberately. I ru n the risk of its

seeming to lend itself to a certain Chr ist ian , idealist , and huma nist

tone, a tone in which it is easy to recognize those well-meaning

vi rt ue s a n d va lu es th at ha ve lo os ed u p o n th e w o r l d al l th e th in gs

that have driven the huma nit y of our centu ry to despair over itself ,wh er e the se va lu es are bo th b l i n d to a n d c o m p l i c i t in th is le tt in g

loose. In his ow n way, Nietzsc he himse lf wo ul d have und oub tedl y

participated in this dubious, moralizing piety. At any rate, the word

"meaning" rarely appears in his work, and st il l more rarely in any

posit ive sense. One would do well, therefore, not to give any hasty

interpretations of it here. The above excerpt appeals to a "h um an

meaning," but it does so by aff irming that the human [l'homme]

remains to be discovered. 1 In order for the human to be discovered,

and in order for the phrase "human meaning" to acquire some

meaning, everything that has ever laid claim to the truth about the

nature, essence, or end of "ma n" mu st be undon e. In other words,

not hin g must remain of what, under the t it le of mea nin g, related

the earth [la terre] and the human to a specif iable horizon. Again, it

is Nietzsc he who said that we are now "on the hor izon of the infi

nite"; that is, we are at that point where "there is no more ' land,'"

and where "there is nothing more terrible than the infinite ." 2

A r e w e fi na ll y go i n g to le ar n th is les so n? A r e we pe rh ap s fi na ll y

able to hear it , or is it now impossible for us to learn anything

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l l Xlll

else? Can we think an earth and a human such that they would be

only what they are nothing but e a r t h a n d h u m a n a n d s u c h

that they wo ul d be none of the various ho rizon s often harbor ed

unde r these names, none of the "perspectives" or "views" in view

of whi ch we have disfigured hu mans [les hommes] and driven them

to despair?

"Th e horiz on of the infi nite " is no longer the hor izo n of the

whole, but the "whole" (all that is) as put on hold everywhere,

push e dto the out s idejustas much asit is pushed back inside the

"self." It is no longer a line that is drawn, or a line that will bedra wn , wh ic h orients or gathers the mean ing of a course of progress

or navigation. It is the opening [la brche] or distancing [lecarte-

ment] of hori zon itself , and in the openi ng: us. We happen as the

op eni ng itself, the dangero us fault line of a ruptu re.

I want to emphasize the date on which I am writ ing this. I t is

the sum me r of 1995, an d as far as spe cif yin g the sit uat ion of the

earth and humans is concerned, nothing is more pressing (how

co uld i t really be avoided?) t han a list of prop er names suc h as

these, presented here in no particular order: Bosnia-Herzogovina,

C h e ch nya, R w anda , B osnian S e rb s, T ut sis , Hut u s, T am il T ig e rs ,

Kra jina Serbs, Casamance, Chia pas, Islamic Jiha d, Banglad esh, the

S e cre t A r m y f or th e L ib e rat ion o f A rm e ni a, Ham a s, K azak h st an,

K h m e r s Ro u ge s , E T A m i l i t i a , K u r d s ( U P K / P D K ) , M o n t a t a i r e, t heM ove m e nt f or S e l f -de t e rm inat ion, S om al ia , C h icanos, S h i i t e s ,

F N L C - C a n a l H i s t o r i q u e , L i b e r i a , G i v a t H a g a d a n , N i g e r i a , t h e

L e ag ue o f t h e N or t h , A f g h anist an, I ndone sia, S ik h s, H ai t i , R o m a

g ypsie s o f S love nia, T aiwan , B u rm a , P L O , I raq, I s lam ic Front S al

v a ti on , S h i n i n g P a th , V a u lx -e n -V el in s , N e u h o f . . . . Of co ur se , it

w o u l d be di ff ic ul t to b r i n g th is li st to an en d if the a i m wa s to i n

clude all the places, groups, or authorities that constitute the the

ater of blo ody conflicts am ong identit i es, as we ll as wha t is at stake

in these conflicts. These days it is not always possible to say with

any assurance whether these identit ies are intranational, infrana-

t ional , or t ransnat ional ; wh e t h e r t h e y are " cul t ural ," " re l ig ious,"

"ethnic," or "historical"; whether they are legit imate or notnot

to mention the question about which law would provide such le

git imation; whether they are real, mythical, or imaginary; whether

they are independent or " instrumentalized" by other groups who

w i el d p ol it i ca l, ec o no m ic , a n d id eo lo gi ca l po we r. . . .

This is the "earth" we are supposed to "inhabit" today, the earth

for which the name Sarajevo will become the martyr-name, the

testimonial-name: this is us, we who are supposed to say we as if

we k n o w wh at we ar e sa yi ng a n d who we are talkin g about. This

earth is anythi ng but a sharing of human ity. I t is a wo rld that doesnot even manage to constitute a world; it is a world lacking in

w o r l d , a n d la ck i n g in th e me a n in g of w o r l d . It is an en um er at i on

that brings to ligh t the sheer nu mbe r and pr olifer ation of these var

ious poles of attrac tion and r epuls ion. It is an endless list , and

everything happens in such a way that one is reduced to keeping

accounts but never taking the f inal toll . I t is a l itany, a prayer of

pure sorr ow and pur e loss, the plea that falls fr om the lips of mi l

lion s of refugees every day: whet her they be deportees, peop le be

sieged, those who are mutilated, people who starve, who are raped,

ostracized, excluded, exiled, expelled.

W h a t I am ta lk in g ab ou t her e is co mp as si on , bu t no t co mp as si on

as a pity that feels sorry for itself an d feeds on itself. Com- pa ss io n

is the contagi on, the contac t of bein g wi th one another in this tur

moil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identif ication; it is the

distu rban ce of viol ent relatedness.

W h a t do es the ab ov e- na me d pr ol if er at io n re qu ir e of us, th is pr o

liferation that seems to have no other meaning than the indetermi

nate multipli catio n of centripetal meanings, meanings closed in on

themselves and supersaturated with significancethat is, meanings

that are no longer meaningful because they have come to refer only

to their ow n closure, to their hori zon of appr opr iati on, and have

be gu n to sp re ad n ot h i n g bu t d es tr uc ti on , ha tr ed , an d the d en ia l of

existence?

W h a t if th is au ti st ic mu lt i p l i c i ty , w h i c h tea rs o p en a n d is to r n

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XIV

open, lets us know that we have not even begun to discover what it

is to be many, even though "la terre des hommes" 3 is exactly this?

W h a t if it let s us k n o w th at it is it se lf th e fi rs t la y i n g ba re [mise

nu] of a wo rl d that is onl y the wo rl d, bu t wh ic h is the wo rl d ab

solutely and unreservedly, with no meaning beyond this very Be

ing of the wor ld: si ngular ly plural and plu rall y singular?

Preface

The first and pr inc ipa l essay of this book, w hic h gives it its t it le ,

was no t c om p os ed in an al to ge th er se qu en ti al ma nn er , bu t ra th er

in a discontinuous way, repeatedly taking up several themes. To a

certain extent, then, the sections can be read in any order, since

there are repetitio ns here and there. B ut this is the result of a fun

damenta l diff iculty. Thi s text does not disguise its ambi tio n of re

doi ng the who le of "f irst phi los oph y" by giv ing the "singu lar

plura l" o f B e ing 1 as its foundation. This, however, is not my a m b i

t ion , b ut rather the necessity of the thi ng itself and of our history.

At th e ve ry lea st, I ho p e to m a ke th is ne ce ss it y fe lt . At th e sa me

time, apart from the fact that I do not have the strength to deliver

the treatise "of the singular p lura l essence of Bei ng, " the for m of

the ontological treatise ceases to be appropriate as soon as the sin

gular of Bei ng itself, an d therefore also of ontology, is in questi on.

This is nothing new. At least since Nietzsche, and for all sorts of

reasons that no doubt come together in the reason I invoke, phi

losophy is at odds with its "form," that is, with its "style ," which is

to say, f inally, wit h its address. H o w does thin ki ng address itself to

itself , to thinking (which also means: how does thinking address

itself to everyone, wit hou t its being a matter of a "co mprehe nsion "

or " unde rst and ing " t h at m ig h t b e cal le d " com m on" ) ? H o w is

thinking addressed? (The philosophical treatise, and "philosophy"

as such, i s the neutral izat ion of address, the subjectless disco urse of

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X V I Preface

Being-Subject [l'Etre-Sujet] itself.) Put another way, what is the "di

alogue of the soul wi th itself" that Plato talks about, whi ch de mon

strates that this que sti on, or this worry , has always been part of ou r

history? If thi nk ing is addressed, then it is because there is mea ning

in this address, a nd not in discou rse (bu t it is in the address of dis

course) . T h is ob e ys th e prim or dial , ont o log ical con dit io n o f b e ing -

w i t h or be in g- to ge th er , w h i c h is w ha t I w o u l d li ke to ta lk ab ou t. A

treatise, therefore, is not sufficiently discursive. Nor is it enough to

dress discourse in the form o f an address (for me to address you

w i t h th e fa m il ia r "y o u " [tu] the whole way through). The address

means that th in ki ng itself addresses itself to "me" an d to "us" at thesame t ime; that is, th in kin g addresses itself to the wo rld , to history,

to people, to things: to "us." Another ambition springs from this

or, better yet , another, more restricted, attempt: to allow thinking's

address to be perceived, an address that comes to us from every

wh er e si mu lt an eo us ly , m u l t i p l i e d , re pe at ed , in si st en t, a n d va ri ab le ,

g e st uring only t oward " us" and t oward our curious " b e ing -wit h -

one -anot h e r," [tre-les-uns-avec-les-autres], t oward our addre ssing -

one -anot h e r.2

(By the way, the logic of "wi th" often requires heavy-handed syn

tax in order to say "being-with-one-another." You may suffer from

it as you read these pages. But perhaps it is not an accident that

language does not easily lend itself to show ing the "wi th" as su ch,

for it is itself the address an d not what mu st be address ed.)

In this, there is an il lus ion that lies in wait , the il lusi on of wi lli ng

t h e ade quat ion o f " f orm " and " cont e nt ," o f wi l l in g t rut h i t se l f int opresence: as if I co ul d write to every addressee a seismo graph ical

account o f our upse t s , our ag it at ions, our t roub le s , a nd our ad

dresses without addressees. My only response is no: no will , "on

my life I did not know what it was to will" (Nietzsche). Or I might

say the following: willing (or desire) is not a thinking; it is a dis

turbance, an echo, a reverberating shock.

The latter essays were chosen because their subjects converge

w i t h th at of th e p r i m a r y essay . As y ou w i l l see, th e fi rs t tw o are c on

nected to the exact circ umsta nces of the most viole nt events of

these last years.

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Of Being Singular Plural

It is good to rely upon others. For no one can bear this li fe a lone.

H l d e r l i n

Si nc e hu m a n na tu re i s the tru e c o m m u ni ty o f m e n , tho se wh o

p ro d u c e the re by a f f i rm the i r na tu re , hu m a n c o m m u ni t y , a nd so c i a l

b ei n g w h i c h , ra th er th an an ab st ra ct , ge ne ra l po we r in o pp os it io n

to the i so la te d i nd i v i d u a l , i s the be i ng o f e a c h i nd i v i d u a l , h i s o wn

activit y, his own li fe, his ow n joy, his own ric hness . To say that a

ma n is a lienate d from h im sel f is to say that the society of this

a l i e na te d m a n i s the c a ri c a tu re o f h i s re a l c o m m u ni t y .

M a r x

We Are M e a n i n g

It is often said today that we have lost meaning, that we lack it

and , as a result, are in need of and wa iti ng for it. The "one " who

speaks in this way forgets that the very propa gat ion of this discour se

is itself meaningfu l. Regrett ing the absence of mea ning itsel f has

meaning. But such regret does not have meaning only in this nega

tive mode; de nyi ng the presence of mea ning affirms that one knows

wh at m ea ni ng w o u l d be , we re it th er e, an d kee ps th e ma st er y an d

trut h of mea nin g in place (which is the pretensio n of the human ist

discourses that propose to "rediscover" meaning.) Whether it is

aware of it or not, the conte mpo rar y discourse on mea nin g goesmuch further and in a completely different direction: it brings to

light the fact that "meaning," used in this absolute way, has become

the bared [dnud] name of our being-with- one-another. We do not

"have" meaning anymore, because we ourselves are meaningen

tirely, without reserve, infinitely, with no meaning other than "us."

Th is does not mean that we are the content of mea nin g, no r are

we its fu lf il lm en t or its re su lt , as if to say th at h um a ns we re th e

mean ing (end, substance, or value) of Bei ng, nature, or history. Th e

mean ing of this mea ni ng t ha t is, the significat ion to which a state

of affairs corresponds a nd co mp ar es i s precisely what we say we

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2 Being Singular Plural

have lost. But we are meaning in the sense that we are the element

in which significations can be produced and circulate. The least sig

nification just as muc h as the most elevated (the meani ng of "na il"

as well as the mean ing of "G od ") has no me ani ng in itself and , as a

result, is what it is and does what it does only insofar as it is com

municated, even where this communication takes place only be

tween "me" and "myself." Meaning is i ts own communication or

its ow n circulati on. The "me aning of Bei ng" is not some property

that will come to qualify, fill in, or finalize the brute givenness of

"Being" pure and simple.' Instead, it is the fact that there is no

"bru te givenness" of Bei ng, that there is no desperately poor there

is presented when one says that "there is a nail catching. . . . " Bu t

the givenness of Bei ng, the givenness inheren t to the very fact that

we u nd er st an d so m et h in g w h e n we say "t o be " (w ha te ve r it m ay

be a n d ho we ve r co nf us ed it m ig h t be ), al o ng w i t h th e (sa me )

givenness that is given with this factcosubstantial with the given

ness of Bei ng and the unde rstandin g of Being , that we understand

one another (however confusedly) when we say it, is a gift that can

be su mm ar iz ed as fo ll ow s:Being itself is given to us as meaning.Be

ing does not have mean ing. Bein g itself, the phenom eno n of Be

i n g, i s mean i n g that i s , i n turn , i t s own c i rc ulat i on an d we are

this circulation.

There is no me aning if mean ing is not shared,2 and not because

there would be an ultimate or first signification that all beings have

in com mo n, but becausemeaning is itselfthe sharing of Being.Me a n

ing begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence

comes apart [se disjoint] in order to be itselfa s such. This "as" pre

supposes the distancing , spacing, and div ision of presence. O nl y the

concep t of "presence" contai ns the necessity of this divi sio n. P ure

unshared presencepresence to nothing, of nothing, for no th in g

is neither present nor absent. It is the simple i mp lo sio n of a being

that could never have beenan implosion without any trace.

Th is is why what is called "the creation of the wor ld " is not the

produc t i on of a pure s omethi n g from n o thi n g whi c h woul d n ot ,

at the same time, impl ode int o the nothi ng out of whi ch it coul d

never have com e bu t is the explosion of presence in the original

Being Singular Plural 3

mul tip lici ty of i ts divi sion . It is the explos ion of nothing, in fact,

it is the spacing of mean ing, spacing as mean i n g an d c i rc ulat i on .

T h e nihil of creati on i s the truth of mean ing, but mea ning is the

originary sharing of this truth. It coul d be expressed in the follow

ing way: Being cannot be an ythi n g but be i n g-wi th-on e-an other ,

circulating in the with and as the with of this singul arly plu ral

coexistence.

If one can put it like this, there is no othe r mean ing th an the

mean ing of circul ation. But this circula tion goes in all directions

at once, in all the dire ction s of all the space-times[les espace-temps]

opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities,

everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants,

nails, godsand "humans," that is , those who expose sharing and

circula tion as such by saying "we," bysaying we to themselvesin all

possible senses of that expressio n, an d by saying we for the tot ality

of all being.

(Let us say we for all being, that is, for every being, for all beings

one by one, each time in the singular of their essential plural. Lan

guage speaks for all and of all: for all, in their place, in their name,

including those who may not have a name. Language says what there

is of the world, nature, history and humanity, and it also speaks for

them as well asin view ofthem, in order to lead the one who speaks,

the one through whom language comes to be and happens ("man"), toall of being, which does not speak but which is neverthelessstone,

fish, fiber, dough, crack, block, an d breath. The speaker speaks for

the world, which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in or

der to make it a "world. "As such, the speaker is "in its place" and "ac

cording to its measure"; the speaker occurs as its representative but also,

at the same time (and this has all the values ofpr oin Latin), in an

ticipation of it, before it, exposed to it as to its own most intimate con-

sideration. Language says the world; that is, it loses itself in it and ex

poses how "in itself" it is a question of losing oneself in order to be of it,

with it, to be its meaningwhich is all meaning)

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4 Being Singular Plural

Circulation goes in all directions: this is the Nietzschean thought

of the "eternal return, " the affirmatio n of mea nin g as the repetitio n

of the instant, noth ing but this repe titio n, and as a result, no thi ng

(since it is a matter of the repet itio n of wha t essentially does not

return). But it is a repetition already comprised in the affirmation

of the instant, in this affirm ation/req uest {re-petitid) seized in the

lettin g go of the instant, affir ming the passing of presence and itself

passing with it , affirmation abandoned in its very movement. It is

an impossib le thought , a think ing that does not hol d itself back

from the circulat ion it thin ks, a th ink ing of mea nin g right at [

mme]3 m eani ng, where its eterni ty occurs as the truth of its pass

ing. (For instance, at the moment at which I am writing, a brown-

and-white cat is crossing the garden, slipping mockingly away, tak

ing my thoughts with it .)

It is in this way that the th in ki ng of the eternal return is the in

augural thought of our contemp orary history, a thin kin g we must

repeat (even if it means cal ling it so met hin g else). We must reap-

propriate what already made us who "we" are today, here and now,

the "we" of a worl d who no l onger struggle to have mea ning bu t to

be me an in g its elf . T h i s is we as the beginning and end of the worl d,

inexhaustible in the circumscription that nothing circumscribes,

that "the" not hing circumscribes. Wemakesense[nous faisons sens],

not by setting a price or value, but by exposing the absolute value

that the world is by itself. "W or ld " does not mean anythin g other

than this "nothing" that no one can "mean" [vouloir dire], but that

is said in every saying: in other words, Be ing itself as the absolute

valu e in it sel f of all t hat i s, but this absolute value as the being-with of

all that is itself bare and impo ssibl e to evaluate. It is neither me an

in g [vouloir-dire] nor the givi ng of value [dire-valoir], but value as

such, that is, "meanin g" whi ch is the mea ning of Bei ng only because

it is Being itself, its existence, its truth. Existence is with: otherwise

nothing exists.

Ci rc ulat i on or etern i tygoes i n a l l d i rec t i on s , but i t mov es

only insofar as it goes from one point to another; spacing is its ab

solute condition. From place to place, and from moment to mo

ment, without any progression or linear path, bit by bit and case by

Being Singular P lural 5

case, essentially accidental, it is singular and plural in its very prin

ciple. It does not have a final fulfillment any more than it has a

poi nt of ori gin . It is the originar y plura lit y of origins an d the cre

ation of the wo rl d in each singularity, creation con tinu ed in the dis

con tinu ity of its discrete occurrences. F ro m now on, we, we others4

are charged with this truthit is more ours than everthe truth of

this paradoxical "first-person plura l" wh ich m akes sense of the worl d

as the spacing and inte rtwi ning of so ma ny worlds (earths, skies,

histories) that there is a tak ing place of mea nin g, or the crossing-

through[passages]of presence. "We" says (and "we say") the unique

event whose uniqueness and unity consist in multiplicity.

People Are Strange

Everything, then, passes between us.'' This "between," as its name

implie s, has neither a consistency nor con tin uit y of its own. It does

not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue,

no cement, n o bridg e. Perh aps it is not even fair to speak of a "co n

nection" to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it

falls short of bo th; even better, it is that w hic h is at the heart of a

connection, the interlacing [Yemrecroisment] of strands whose ex

tremities rem ain separate even at the very center of the knot . Th e

"between" is the stretching out [distension] and distance opened by

the singular as such, as its spacing of mean ing. Th at whi ch does

not maintain its distance from the "between" is only immanence

collapsed in on itself and deprived of meaning.

From one singular to another, there is contiguity but not conti

nuity. There is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme close

ness emphasizes the dista ncing it opens up. A l l of bein g is in touc h

wi t h al l of be in g, bu t th e la w of to u ch in g is se pa ra ti on ; mo re ov er ,

it is the heterogeneit y of surfaces that tou ch each other. Contact is

be yo nd fu ll ne ss an d em pt in es s, b e y on d co nn ec t io n an d d is co n

nection. If "to come i nto con tact" i s to begin to make sense of one

another, then this "coming" penetrates nothing; there is no inter

mediate and mediating "milieu." Meaning is not a milieu in which

we are im me rs ed . Th er e is no mi-lieu [between place]. It is a mat-

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6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 7

ter of one or the other, one an d the other, one wi th the other, but

by no me an s th e on e in the ot he r, w h ic h w o u l d be so me th in g ot he r

than one or the other (another essence, another nature, a diffuse or

infuse generality). From one to the other is the syncopated repeti

tion of orig ins- of-t he- worl d, whi ch are each time one or the other.

Th e origin is affirmation; repetition is the condi tion of affirma

tion. I say "that is, that it is." It is not a "fact" and has nothing to

do wit h any sort of evalu ation . It is a sing ular ity taki ng refuge inits affirmati on of Bei ng, a touc h of mea ning . It is not an other Be

ing; it is the singular of Be ing by whic h the bei ng is, o r it is of Be

i n g, whi c h is beingin a trans itive sense of the verb (an unh ear d of,

inaudible sen sethe very meaning of Being). Th e touch of mean

ing brings into play [engager] i ts own singularity, i ts distinction,

and bring s into pla y the plural ity of the "each time" o f every touch

of mea nin g, " min e" as well as all the others, each one of wh ich is

" m i n e " in turn, ac cordin g to the singular turn of i ts affirmation.

Rig ht away, then, there is the repe titio n of the touches of mea n

ing, which meaning demands. This incommensurable, absolutely

heterogeneous repetition opens up an irreducible strangeness of

each one of these touches to the other. The other ori gin is in co m

parable or inassimilable, not because it is simply "other" but be

cause it is an or igin a nd tou ch of mea ning . Or rather, the alterity of

the other is i ts originary contiguity with the "proper" origin. 6 You

are absolutely strange because the world begins its turn with you.

We say "p eo pl e are st ra ng e. " 7 Thi s phrase is one of our mos t con

stant and rudimentary ontological attestations. In fact, i t says a

great deal. "People" indicates everyone else, designated as the in

determi nate ensemble of popu lat ions , lineages, or races [gentes]

from which the speaker removes himself. (Nevertheless, he re

moves h ims elf in a very particu lar sort of way, because the desig

n at i on i s s o gen era lan d thi s i s ex ac t ly the poi n tthat i t i n

evitably turns back around on the speaker. Since I say that "people

are strange," I incl ude m yse lf in a certain way in this strangeness.)

The word "people" does not say exactly the same thing as the

H e i d e g g e r i a n8 "on e, " 9 even if i t is partl y a mode of i t . W it h the

w o r d "o ne ," it is no t al wa ys ce rt ai n wh et he r or no t th e sp ea ke r i n

cludes him sel f in the ano ny mit y of the "one." Fo r exam ple, I can

say "someone said to me" ["on m'a dit"] or else "it is said that" ["on

dit que"] or else "that is how it is done" ["c'est comme a qu'on

fait"] or else "one is born; one dies" ["on nat, on meurt"]. These

uses are not equivalent and, moreover, it is not certain that it is al

wa ys th e case th at th e "o ne " sp ea ks of h im s e l f (f ro m a n d ab ou t

himself). Heidegger understood that "one" would only be said as a

response to the question "who?" put to the subject of Dasein, but

he does not pose the other inevitable question that must be asked

in order to discover who gives this response and who, in respond

ing like this, removes h ims elf or has a tende ncy to remove himsel f.

As a re su lt , he ri sk s ne gl ec ti ng th e fac t th at th er e is no pu re a nd

simple "one,"no "one"inwh ich "prope rly existing" existence[l'ex-

istant "pro prem ent existant"] is, from the start, purely and simpl y

imme rsed. " Peop le" clearl y designates the mod e of "one" by whi ch

"I " remove myself, to the po int of appea ring to forget or neglect

the fact that I my self am part of "peop le." In any case, this set ting

apart [mise l'cart] does not occur without the recognition of

identity. "People" clearly states that we are all preciselypeople, that

is, indistinctly persons, humans , all of a com mo n "k in d, " but of a

kind that has its existence only as numerous, dispersed, and inde

terminate in its generality. This existence can only be grasped in

the paradox ical simulta neity of togetherness (anonymou s, con

fused, and indeed massive) and disseminated singularity (these or

those "people(s)," or "a guy," "a girl," "a kid").

"People" are si lhouettes that are both imprecise and singular-

ized, faint outlines o f voices, patterns of com por tme nt, sketches

of affects, not the anonym ous chatter of the "publ ic do ma in. " B ut

wh at is an aff ect , if no t ea ch ti me a ske tch ? A co m po r tm en t , if no t

each time a pattern? A voice, if not each tim e a faint outline? W ha t

is a singularity, i f not each time its "own" clearing, i ts "own" i m

minence, the im mine nce of a "propriety" or propri ety itself as im

minence, always touched upon, always lightly touched: revealing

itself beside, always beside. ("Beside himself" ["a ct de ses pom

pes " 10 ], as the saying goes. The co med y of this expression is no ac

cident, and, whether it masks an anxiety or liberates the laughter

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8 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 9

of the igno rant, it is always a matter of an escape, an evasion, a nd

an em pty ing out of what is closest, an odd ity presented as the rule

itself.)

"I " take refuge in an exce ption or dist inc tio n when I say "peo

ple," but I also confer this distinction on each and every person,

although in just as obscure a way. This is undoubtedly why people

so often make the judgment "people are strange" or "people are in

credibl e." It is not only, or even primarily , a question of the ten

dency (however evident) to set up our own habitus as the no rm . It

is necessary to uncover a more pr imi tive level of this particul arju dg m en t, on e wh er e wh at is ap pr eh en de d is n o t h in g ot he r th an

singularity as such. From faces to voices, gestures, attitudes, dress,

and conduct, whatever the "typical" traits are, everyone distin

guishes himse lf by a sort of sudden a nd head long prec ipitat ion

wh er e the str ang ene ss of a si ng ul ar it y is co nc en tr at ed . W i t h o u t th is

preci pitat ion there wo ul d be, quite simply, no "someone." An d

there would be no more interest or hospitality, desire or disgust, no

matter who or what it might be for.

"Someone" here is understood in the way a person might say

"it's him all right" about a photo, expressing by this "all right" the

cove ring over of a gap, mak in g adequate what is inadequ ate, capa

bl e of re la ti ng o n l y to th e "i ns ta nt an eo us " gr as pi ng of an in st an t

that is precisely its own gap. The photoI have in mind an every

day, banal photosimultaneously reveals singularity, banality, and

our curiosity about one another. Th e principl e of indiscern ability

here becomes decisive. Not only are all people different but they

are also all different from one another. They do not differ from an

archetype or a generality. The typical traits (ethnic, cultural, social,

generational, and so forth), whose particular patterns constitute an

other level of singularity, do not abolish s ingular differences; i n

stead, they bring them into relief. As for singular differences, they

are not only "individual," but infraindividual. It is never the case

that I have met Pierre or M ar ie per se, but I have met hi m or her in

such and such a "form," in such and such a "state," in such and

such a "mood," and so on.

Th is very hum bl e layer of our everyday experience contains an

other rudimentary ontological attestation: what we receive (rather

than what we perceive) with singularities is the discreet passage of

other origins of the world. What occurs there, what bends, leans,

twists, addresses, deniesfrom the newborn to the corpseis nei

ther primarily "someone close," nor an "other," nor a "stranger,"

nor "someone simil ar." It is an or igin ; i t is an affirma tion of the

w o rl d , an d we k n o w th at th e w o r l d has no ot he r o ri g in th an th is

singular multip licit y of origins. Th e worl d always appears [surgit]11

each time accord ing to a decid edly local tu rn [ of events]. Its unity,

its uniqueness, a nd its totality consist in a com bin ati on of thisreticulated multiplicity, which produces no result.

W i t h o u t th is at te st at io n, th ere w o u l d be no fi rs t at te st at io n of

existenceas such, that is, of the nonessence and non-subsisten ce-by-

itself that is the basis of being-oneself. T hi s is why the He idegg er-

ia n "one" is insufficientas the i n i t i a lun ders tan di n go fexistentielle

"everydayness." Hei degg er confuses the everyday wi th the undif

ferentiated, the anonymous, and the statistical. These are no less

important, but they can only constitute themselves in relation to

the differentiated singularity that the everyday already is by itself:

each day, each time, day to day. One cannot affirm that the mean

ing of Being must express itsel f starting from everydayness an d

then beg in by neglect ing the general different iatio n of the every

day, its constantly renewed rupture, its intimate discord, its poly-

mo rph y and its polyp hon y, its relief and its variety. A "day" is not

simpl y a unit for cou ntin g; i t is the tur nin g of the wo rl d ea ch

time singular. An d days, inde ed every day, coul d not be sim ilar if

they were not first different, difference itself. Lik ewis e "peopl e," or

rather "peoples," given the irreducible strangeness that constitutes

them as such, are themselves prima ril y the expo sing of the singu

larity according to which existence exists, irreducibly and primar

i l y an d an expositio n of singul arity that experience claims to

comm unicat e with, in the sense of "to" and "along wit h, " the to

tality of beings. " Nat ure " is also "strange," and we exist there; we

exist in it in the mode of a constantl y renewed singulari ty, wheth er

the singul arit y of the divers ity and d ispar ity of our senses or that

of the disco nce rti ng prof usi on of nature's species or its various

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10 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plura l 11

metamorphoses into "technology." Then again, we say "strange,"

"o dd," "curio us," "disco nce rt ing " about all o f bein g.

The mes of "wo nder " and the "marv el of Bei ng" are suspect if

they refer to an ecstatic mysticism that pretends to escape the world.

Th e theme of scien tific cur iosi ty is no less suspect if it boils do wn

to a collector's preoccupation with rarities. In both cases, desire for

the exception presupposes disdain for the ordinary. Hegel was un

doubtedly the f irst to have this properly modern consciousness of

the viol ent paradox of a thi nk in g whose ow n value is as yet un

heard of , and whose dom ai n is the grayness of the wor ld. Th is or

din ary grayness, the insign if ican ce of the eve ry da yw hic h the

Heideggerian "one" st il l bears the mark ofassumes an absent,

lost , or far away "grandeur." Yet , tr uth can be not hin g if not the

truth of being in totality, that is, the totality of its "ordinari ness,"

ju st as m ea n i n g ca n o n l y be ri gh t at [ mme] existence and no

wh er e els e. T h e m o d e r n w o r l d asks th at th is tr ut h be th ou gh t: th at

mea nin g is right at. I t is in the indefini te plura lity of origins an d

their coexistence. The "ordinary" is always exceptional, however

lit t le we understand its character as origin. What we receive most

co mm un al ly as "strange" is that the ord ina ry itself is originary.

W i t h ex is ten ce la i d op en i n th is wa y a nd the m ea n i ng of the w o r l d

be in g wh at it is , the ex ce pt io n is the ru le . (Is thi s no t th e te st im on y

of the arts and literature? Is not the first and on ly purp ose of their

strange existence the presenta tion of this strangeness? Afte r all, in

the etymolo gy of the word bizarre)1 whether the word comes from

Basque or Arabi c, there is a sense of valor, co mm an di ng presence,and elegance.)

Gaining Access to the Origin

A s a co ns eq ue nc e, g a in i n g acc ess to th e o r i g i n , 1 3 entering into

mean ing, c omes dow n to exposing oneself to this tru th.

W h a t th is me an s is th at we do no t ga in acc ess to the o r ig in : ac

cess is refused by the origin's conc eali ng itself in its mult ipli cit y. We

do not gain access; that is, we do not penetrate the origin; we do

not identify with it. More precisely, we do not identify ourselves in

it or as it, but with it, in a sense that must be elucidated here and is

noth ing other than the m eani ng of origin ary coexistence.

Th e alterity of the other is its being-o rigin. Conversely, the orig-

inar ity of the origi n is its being-other , but it is a being -other than

every beingfora nd in crossing through [ travers] all being. Thus,

the originarity of the origin is not a property that would dist inguish

a being from all others, because this being would then have to be

something other than itself in order to have its origin in its own

turn . Thi s is the most classic of God's aporias, an d the pro of of his

nonexistence. In fact , this is the most immediate importance of

Kant 's destructi on of the ontological argu ment, wh ic h can be de

ciphered i n a quasi-lite ral m anne r; the necessity of existence is

given right at the existing of all existences [l'exister de tout l'exis-

tant], in its very diversity and contingency. In no way does this

constitute a supplementary Being. The world has no supplement. I t

is supplemente d in itself and, as such, is indefi nitely supplemen ted

by the or ig in .

Th is foll ows as an essential consequ ence: the being- other of the

orig in is not the alterity of an "oth er-tha n-the- worl d." I t is not a

question of an Oth er (the inevitably "capitalized Othe r" ) 1 4 than the

w o r l d ; it is a qu es ti on of th e al te ri ty or al te ra ti on ofthe world . In

other words , it is not a ques tio n of an aliud or an alius, or an

alienus, or an other in general as the essential stranger who is op

posed to what is proper, but of an alter, that is, "one of the two."

This "other," this "lowercase other," is "one" among many insofar

as they are man y; it iseach one,an d it iseach timeone, oneamong

them, one among all and one among us all. In the same way, and

recipro cally, "we" is always ine vita bly "us al l, " where no one of us

can be "al l" a nd each one of us is, in tu rn (where all our turns are

simultaneous as well as successive, in every sense), the other origin

of the same wor ld.

Th e "o ut side " o f t h e o r ig in is " in si de " in an inside mo re int e

rior than the extreme interior, that is, more interior than the inti

macy of the world a nd the inti mac y that belongs to each "me." I f

intim acy must be defined as the extremity of coincidenc e with one

self , then what exceeds intimacy in inferiority is the distancing of

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12 Being Singula r Plural Being Singu lar Plural 13

coin cide nce itself . I t is a coexistence of the origi n " in " itself , a co

existence of origi ns; it is no acciden t that we use the wo rd " in ti

macy" to designate a relat ion between several people more often

than a relat ion to oneself . Our being-with, as a being-many, is not

at all accidental, and it is in no way the secondary and random dis

persio n of a prim ord ial essence. I t forms the prop er and necessary

status and c onsistency of orig inar y alterity as such. The plurality of

beings is at the foundation [fondment] of Being.

A si ng le b ei ng is a co n tr a d i c ti on in te rm s. S u c h a b ei n g, w h i c h

w o u l d be its o w n fo u n d a ti o n , o r i gi n , a n d in ti m ac y, w o u l d be in c a pable of Being, in every sense that this expression can have here.

"Being" is neither a state nor a quality, but rather the act ion ac

cord ing to whic h what Kan t calls "the [mere] posi t ing of a thi ng " 1 5

takes place ("is"). The very simplicity of "posit ion" implies no more,

although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical sense,

o r i t s dist inct io nfrom, in the sense of with, other (at least possible)

positions, or its distinction among, in the sense of between, other

posit ions. In other words, every posit ion is also dis-posit ion, and,

cons ider ing the appea ring that takes the place of and takes place in

the posit ion, all appearance is co-appearance [com-parution]. T h i s

is why the mea nin g of Bei ng is given as existence, being-in-oneself-

outside-oneself , which w e mak e e xpl ic i t , we "h uman s," b ut wh ich

we m ak e ex p li ci t, as I ha ve sa id ,fo r the totality of beings.

I f t h e o r ig in is i rre duc ib ly p lural , i f i t i s t h e inde f in it e ly unf o ld

ing and vario usly mult ip l ie d int i macy o f t h e wo r ld, t h e n no t g aining access to the origin takes on another meaning. I ts negativity is

neither that of the abyss, n or of the forb idd en, nor of the veiled or

the conce aled , no r of the secret, nor that of the unpre sent able . It

need not operate, then, in the dialect ical mode where the subject

must reta in in its elf its own negation (since it is the negation of its

own origin). Nor does it have to operate in a mystical mode, which

is the reverse of the dialec tical m ode , where the subject mu st rejoice

in its negatio n. In b oth of these, negativi ty is given as the aliud,

wh er e al ie n at io n is th e pr oc es s th at m u s t be re ve rs ed in te rm s of a

re appro pri at io n. A l l f o rms o f t h e "capit a l iz e d O t h e r" pre sum e t h is

alienation from the proper as their own; this is exactly what con

st itutes the "cap italiz at ion " of the "Othe r," its unif i ed and brok en

transcendence. But, in this way, all forms of the capitalized "O ther "

represent precisely the exalted and overexalted mode of the propri

ety of what is prop er, wh ic h persists an d consists in the "some

wh er e" of a "n ow he re " a n d in th e "s om et im e" of a "n o ti m e , " th at

is, in thepunctum aeternumoutside the world.

Th e outside is ins ide; i t is the spac ing of the dis-p osi t ion o f the

w o r ld ; it is ou r d is p os i ti o n a n d o u r co -a pp ea ra nc e. Its "n eg a ti vi ty "

ch ang e s me aning ; i t i s no t co nve rt e d int o po si t iv i t y , b ut inst e ad

co rre spo nds t o t h e mo de o f B e in g wh ic h is t h at o f dispo sit io n/co -appe arance and wh ich , s t r ic t ly spe ak ing , is ne i t h e r ne g at ive no r

po sit ive , b ut inst e ad t h e mo d e o f b e ing - t o g e t h e r o r b e ing - with.

Th e o rig in is t o g e t h e r wit h o t h e r o r ig ins , o r ig inal ly div ide d. As a

matt er of fact, we do have access to it. We have access exact ly in

the mod e of ha vi ng access; we get there; we are on the br in k, cl os

est , at the threshold; we touch th e or ig in . " ( Truly ) we h ave access

(to the truth). . . . " , 6 [" la vrit, nous accdons . . . "] is Ba

t ai l le s ph rase , 17 the ambi gui ty of wh ic h I repeat even thou gh I use

it in another way (in Bataill e , it precedes the aff irma tion of an i m

mediate loss of access). Perhaps ever ythin g happens between loss

and appro priat io n: ne it h e r o ne no r t h e o t h e r , no r o ne and t h e

other, nor one in the other, but much more strangely than that ,

much mo re s imply .

"To re ach 18 [toucher] the end" is again to risk missing it , because

the orig in is not an end. E n d, l i ke Princ ipl e , is a form of the Other.To reach the origin is not to miss it; it is to be properly exposed to

it . Since it is not another thing (an aliud), the origin is neither

"missable" nor appropriable (penetrable, absorbable). I t does not

obey this logic. I t is the plural singularity of the Being of being. We

reach it to the extent that we are in touch with ourselves and in

touch w ith the rest of beings. We are in tou ch wi th ourselves inso

far as we exist . Be ing in tou ch wi th ourselves is what makes us "us,"

and there is no other secret to discover buried behind this very

t o uch ing , b e h i nd t h e "wit h " o f coe xist ence .

We ha ve acc ess to th e tr u th of th e o r i g in as m a n y ti m es as we are

in one another 's presence a nd in th e presence of the rest of being s.

,

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'4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 15

Ac ce ss is " c o m i n g to pr es en ce ," bu t pr es en ce it se lf is d is -p os it io n,

the spacing of singu larit ies. Presence is now here other than in

"coming to presence." We do not have access to a thing or a state,

bu t o n l y to a c o m i n g . We ha ve acc ess to an acc ess .

"Strangeness" refers to the fact that each singularity is another

access to the world. At the point where we would expect "some

thing," a substance or a procedure, a principle or an end, a signif i

catio n, there is noth ing but the manner , the turn of the other ac

cess, whi ch concea ls itsel f in the very gesture whe rei n it offers itself

t o u s a n d w h o s e c o n c e a li n g is the turning itself . In the singularity that he exposes, each child that is born has already concealed

the access that he is "for himself" and in which he will conceal

him self "w ith in him self ," just as he will one day hide under the f i

nal exp ressio n of a dead face. Thi s is wh y we scru tini ze these faces

w i th su ch cu ri os it y, in se ar ch of id en ti fi ca ti on , l o o ki n g to see w h o m

the chil d looks like , an d to see if death looks li ke itself . Wh at we

are looking for there, like in the photographs, is not an image; it is

an access.

Is this not what interests us or touches us in "literature" and in

"the arts"? Wh at else interests us about the disj un cti on of the arts

among themselves , by wh ic h they are wha t they are as arts: plu ra l

singulars ? Wh at else are they but the expo sit ion of an access co n

cealed in its own opening, an access that is, then, "inimitable," un-

t ranspo rt ab le , unt ranslat ab le because it forms, each t i me, an ab

solute point of translat i on, tran smiss ion, or transi t ion of the orig ininto origin. What counts in art , what makes art art (and what

makes hu man s the art ists of the wo rl d, that is, those wh o expose

the world for the world), is neither the "beautiful" nor the "sub

l ime "; i t i s ne i t h e r "purpo sive ne ss wit h o ut a purpo se " no r t h e

"ju dgme nt of taste"; it is neither "sensible manifest at ion" nor the

"pu tt in g into work of tru th. " Undo ubte dly, it is all that , but in an

other way: it is access to the scattered origin in its very scattering; it

is the plur al tou chin g of the singular ori gin. Th is is what "the im i

tat ion of nature" has always meant. A rt always has to do with cos

mogony, but it exposes cosmogony for what it is: necessarily plural,

diffr acted , discreet, a tou ch of col or or tone, an agile tu rn of phrase

or folded mass, a radiance, a scent, a song, or a suspended move

men t, exac tly because it is the bi rt h of a world (and not the co n

struction of a system). A worl d is always as m any world s as it takes

to make a world.

W e o n l y ha ve acc ess to o u r s e l v e s a n d to th e w o r l d . It is o n ly

ever a quest ion of the foll ow in g: fu ll access is there, access to the

wh ol e of the o r ig i n . T h i s is ca ll ed "f in it ud e" in He id eg ge ri an te r m i

nology. But it has become clear since then that "finitude" signifies

the infinite sing ularity of meaning , the infinite si ngulari ty of access

t o t rut h . F in it ude is the orig in; that is, it is an in fini ty of origins ."O rig in" do e s no t s ig ni f y t h at f ro m wh ich t h e wo rld co me s, b ut

rather the com in g of each presence of the wo rl d, each tim e singular.

The Creat ion of the Wor ld and Curi osit y

The conc ept of the "creation of the wor ld " 1 9 represents the origin

as originarily shared, spaced between us and between all beings.

Thi s, in tu rn, c ontributes to ren dering the concept of the "author"

of the wo rld untenable. In fact , one could s how ho w the mot if of

creation i s one of those that leads directl y to the death of G o d un

derstood as author, f irst cause, and supreme being. Furthermore, if

one looks at metaphysics carefully, there is not a G o d who sim ply

and easily conform s to the idea of a producer. W heth er in Aug us

t ine, Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, or Leibniz, one al

way s fi nd s th at the th em e of cr ea ti on is bu rd en ed w i th an d m is re presented as a probl em of pr odu cti on, r ight up unti l the decisive

mom ent of the ontol ogica l argument's dow nfa ll. (Hegel's restoration

of the argument, the one to which S chelling assigned signif icant im

portance, i s not hin g but an elabora tion of the concept of creation. )

The di st inc tive character ist ic of the concept of creati on is n ot

that it posits a creator, but that, on the contrary, it renders the "cre

ator" indistinct from its "creation." (It has to be said, here, in a gen

eral way, that the dist inctive characterist ic of Wester n m ono theis m

is not the posi tin g of a single god , but rather the effacing of the di

vi ne as su ch in the tr an sc en de nc e of the w o r l d . W i t h res pec t to the

question of ori gin, this is surely the precise point at whic h the lin k

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i 6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 17

is forged that makes us un fail ingl y Jew-G reek in every respect. A nd ,

w i t h res pe ct to th e qu es ti on of d es ti na ti on , th is is the p o i nt fr o m

w h i c h we are se nt in to the "g lo ba l" sp ac e as su ch . 20 ) I n my t h o lo g i

cal cosmogonies, a god or demiurge makes a world start ing from a

situation that is already there, whatever this situation may be. 21 In

creat ion, however, it is the being-alrea dy-there of the already-there

that is of con cer n. In fact, if creat ion is ex nihilo, this does not sig

nify that a creator operates "start ing from nothing." As a rich and

complex tradit ion demonstrates, this fact instead signif ies two

thing s: on the one hand , it signifies that the "creator " itsel f is thenihil', on the other, it signifies that this nihilis not, l ogic ally speak

ing, something "from which" ["d'o"] what is created would come

[provenir], but the very origin [provenance], and destination, of

some thi ng in general and of everythin g. N ot onl y is the nihilno t h

ing prior but there is also no longer a "nothing" that preexists cre

ation ; it is the act of appea ring [surgissement], i t i s t h e ve ry o r ig in

insofar as this is understood only as what is designated by the verb

"to originate." I f the nothing is not any thing prior, then o nly the ex

re m ai ns i f o ne can t a lk ab o ut i t lik e t h i s t o q ual i f y cre at io n- in

action, that is, the appe aringo r arr ival[venue] in nothing(in the

sense that we talk about someone appearing "in person").

Th e nothin g, then, is n othi ng other than the dis-po sit ion of the

appearing. The origin is a distancing. I t is a distancing that imme

diately has the mag nitu de of all space-time and is also noth ing other

than the interst ice of the inti mac y of the world : the among-being[l 'entre-tant] of all beings. Th is am ong-bei ng itself is n othi ng but

[a] being, and has no other consistency, movement, or configura

tion than that of the being-a-bei ng [l'etre-tant] o f all beings. Be ing ,

or the amo ng, shares the singularit ies of all appearings. Cre ati on

takes place everywhere and alwaysbut it is this unique event, or

advent, on ly on the con dit ion of being each time what it is, or being

wh at it is o nl y "at ea ch ti m e, " ea ch ti m e ap pe ar in g si ng ul ar ly .

On e can unders tand ho w the creation, a s it appears in any Jewis h-

Ch rist ian- I s lamic t h e o lo g ico - my st ic co nf ig urat io n, t e st i f ie s le ss

(and certai nly never exclusively) to a prod ucti ve power of G o d

than to his goodness and glory. In relat ion to such power, then,

creatures are onl y effects, wh il e the love and glo ry of G o d are de

posited right at [ mme] the level of wha t is created; that is, crea

tures are the very brilliance [clat]11 of God's c om in g to presence.

It is necessary, then, to und ersta nd the theme of the "imag e of

Go d" and/or the "trace of Go d " not ac cordin g to the logic of a sec

ondary imitation, but according to this other logic where "God" is

itself the singular appearance of the image or trace, or the disposi

tion of its expo siti on: plac e as di vin e place, the div ine as strictly lo

cal. As a consequence, this is no longer "divine," but is the dis

location an d dis-p osi t ion of the wo rl d (what Spinoz a calls "thedivine extension") as that opening and possibility [ressource] wh ich

comes from further away and goes farther, infinitely farther, than

any god.

If "creation" is indeed this singula r ex-posit ion of being, then its

real name is existence. Existence is creation, our crea tion ; it is the

be gi nn in g an d en d tha t tw ar e. T h i s is the th ou gh t tha t is th e mo st

necessary for us to thi nk. If we do not succeed in thi nk in g it, then

we w i l l ne ve r ga in acc ess to w ho we are , we w h o are no mo re th an

us in a wor ld, wh ich is itself no more than the wo rl d bu t we wh o

have reached this point precisely because we have thought logos (the

self-presentation of presence) as creation (as singu lar com in g) .

This thinking is in no way anthropocentric; it does not put hu

man ity at the center of "crea tion" ; on the contrary , it transgresses

[traverse] humanity in the excess of the appearing that appears on

the scale of the total ity of bei ng, but wh ic h also appears as that excess [dmesure] which is impossible to totalize . I t is being's infinite

original singularity. In humanity, or rather right at [ mme] h u

manity, existence is exposed and exposing. The simplest way to put

this into language would be to say that humanity speaks existence,

bu t wh at sp eak s th ro ug h its sp eec h says th e w ho le of be in g. W h a t

Heidegger calls "the ontico-ontological privilege" of Dasein is nei

ther its prerogative nor its privilege [apanage]: it gets Being on its

way [//engage l'tre],but the Being ofDaseinis noth ing other than

the Bei ng of bein g.

If existence is exposed as such by huma ns, w hat is exposed there

also holds for the rest of beings. Th ere i s not, on the one side, a n

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18 Being Singular Plural

originary singularity and then, on the other, a simple being-there of

things, more or less given for our use. On the contrary, in exposing

itself as singula rity, existence exposes the singular ity of Bein g as such

in all bein g. Th e difference between huma ni ty and the rest of be

ing (w hich is not a concern to be denied, but the nature of wh ich is,

nevertheless, not a given), w hil e itself bein g inseparable from ot her

differences within being (since man is "also" animal, "also" l iving,

"also" physio-chemical), does not distinguish true existence from a

sort of subexistence. Instead, this difference forms the concrete co n

dit i on o f singularity. We wou ld not be "huma ns" if there were not

"dogs" an d "stones." A stone is the exteriority of singu larity in w hat

w o u l d hav e to be ca ll ed its mi ne ra l or me ch an ic al ac tu al it y [litter-

alit}. But I wou ld no longer be a "hu ma n" if I di d not have this

exteriority "in me," in the form of the quasi-mineral ity of bone: I

w o u l d no lo ng er be a h u m a n if I were not a body, a sp acin g of all

other bodies and a spaci ng of "me" i n "me. " A singu lari ty is always

a body, and all bodies are singularities (the bodies, their states, their

movements, their transformations).

Existence, therefore, is not a property of Dasein; it is the origi

nal singularity of Being , whic h Dasein exposes for all being. This

is why humanity is not "in the world" as it would be in a milieu

(why would the milieu be necessary?); it is in the world insofar as

the wo rl d is its own exter iority, the prop er space of its being-ou t-

in-the-world. But it is necessary to go farther than this in order to

avoid giving the impression that the world, despite everything, re

main s essentially "the wo rl d of hum ans ." I t is not so mu ch the

w or l d of hu m an it y as it is the w or l d of the n on h u m a n to w hi ch h u

manity is exposed and which humanity, in turn, exposes. One

could try to formulate it in the following way: humanity is the ex

posing of the world; it is neither the end nor the ground of the world;

the world is the exposure of humanity; it is neither the environment

nor the representation of humanity.

Therefore, how ever far hum ani ty is from b eing the end of na

ture or nature the end of hu ma ni ty (we have already tried al l the

va ri at io ns of th is fo r mu la ), th e en d is al wa ys be i ng -i n- th e- w or ld

and the being-worl d of all being.

Being Singular Plural 19

Even supposing one still wished to take the world as the repre

sentation of hum anit y, this wou ld not necessarily impl y a solipsis m

of hum ani ty: because, if that is the case, th en it is the representa

tion itself that instruc ts me ab out what it necessarily represents to

me, an irrefutable exteriority as my exteriority. The representation

of a spacin g is itself a spaci ng. An intuitus originarius, wh ich wo uld

not be a representation but rather an immersion in the thing-itself,

w ou ld exi st al on e an d w o u l d be for it se lf the or ig i n a nd the th i ng :

this was shown above to be contr adic tory. Descartes hi ms elf testi

fies to the exterior ity of the wor ld as the exteriorit y of his body. Because he hardly doub ts his body, he makes a fiction of do ub tin g it,

and this pretension as such attests to the truth of res extensa. It is

also not surp risi ng that for Descartes the reality of this wor ld,

about which God could not deceive me, is maintained in Being by

the continuous creation on the part of this very God. Reality is al-

way s in ea ch in st an t, fr om pl ac e to pl ac e, ea ch ti m e in tu r n , w h i c h

is exactly how the reality ofres cogitans attests to itself in each "ego

sum ," wh ic h is each time the "I am" of each one in tur n [chaque

fois de chacun son tour].

Once again, this is the way in which there is no Other. "Cre

ation" signifies precisely that there is no Other and that the "there

is" is not an Other. Being is not the Other, but the origin is the

punctua l and discrete spacingbetween us,asbetween us and the rest

of the world,asbetween all beings.25

W e fi nd th is al te ri ty p r i m a r i l y a nd es se nt ia ll y i n tr i gu in g. It i n

trigues us because it exposes the always-other origin, always inap

propriate and always there, each and every t ime present as inim

itable. This is why we are primarily and essentially curious about

the world and about ourselves (where "the world" is the generic

name of the object of this onto logi cal c urio sity ). The correla te of

creation, understood as existence itself, is a curiosity that must be

understood in a completely different sense than the one given by

Heidegger. For hi m, cu rios ity is the frantic activ ity of passing fro m

be in g to be in g in an in sa ti ab le sor t of wa y, w i th ou t ever be in g ab le

to stop and think. Without a doubt, this does testify to being-with-

one-another, but it testifies to it without being able to gain access to

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2 0 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 21

the existent opening that characterizes Dasein in the " instant." 2 4 It

is necessary, then, to disco nnec t the most primi tiv e layer of curi os

ity, the level on which we are primarily interested by what is inter

esting par excellence (the origin), from this inconsistent curiosity

and also fr om the attentio n that takes care of others (Fiirsorge). At

this leve l, we are intereste d in the sense of bein g intri gue d by the

ever-renewed a lterity of the orig in and , if I may say so, in the sense

of hav ing an affair wi th it. (It is no accid ent that sexual curiosi ty is

an exemp lary figure of curio sity and is, in fact, more t han just a fig

ure of it.)

As En gl is h [a nd Fr en ch ] al lo ws us to say, ot he r be ing s are curious

(o r bizarre) to me because they give me access to the origin; they

allow me to touch it; they leave me before it, leave me before its

turning, which is concealed each time. Whether an other is another

person, animal, plant, or star, it is above all the glaring presence of

a place an d mom en t of absolute ori gin , irrefutable, offered as such

an d vanis hin g in its passing. Th is occurs in the face of a new bor n

child, a face encountered by chance on the street, an insect, a shark,

a pebbl e . . . but if one really want s to und ers tan d it, it is not a

matter of ma ki ng all these curio us presences equal.

If we do not have access to the other in the m ode just desc ribed ,

bu t seek to ap pr op ri at e th e o r i g i n w h i c h is so m et h in g we al way s

do t he n this same curiosity transforms i tself into appropriative or

destruc tive rage. We no longer loo k for a singula rity of the orig in

in the other; we look for the unique and exclusive origin, in order to

either adopt it or reject it. The other becomes the Other according

to the mod e of desire or hatred. M ak in g the other divi ne (together

w i t h o ur v o l u n ta r y se rv it ud e) o r m a k i n g it ev il (t og et he r w i t h its

exclusion or exterminat ion) is that part of curiosity no lon ger in

terested in dis-position and co-appearance, but rather has become

the desire for the Position itself. This desire is the desire to fix the

o r i g i n , or togiveth eorigin toitself, once and for all, and in one place

for all, that is, always outside the world. This is why such desire is a

desire for murder, and not only murder but also for an increase of

cruelty and horror, which is like the tendency toward the intensifi

cation of murder; i t is muti l ation , carvin g up, relentlessness, metic

ulous exec ution , the joy of agony. Or it is the massacre, the mass

grave, massive and tec hnol ogica l executio n, the book kee pin g of the

camps. It is always a matter of expe diti ng the transf ormat ion of the

other into the Other or making the Other appear in the place of

the other, and, therefore, a matter of iden tify ing the Oth er and the

origin itself.

The O the r is noth ing mor e than a correlate of this mad desire,

bu t ot her s, in fac t, are ou r originary interests. It is true, however, that

the possi bility of this mad desire is cont aine d in the very dispo si

tion of origin ary interests: the dissemina tion of the origi n upsets[affole] the origin in "me" to exactly the same extent that it makes

me curious about it, makes "me" a "me" (or a "subject," someone

in any case). (It follows, then, that no ethics would be independent

from an ontology. Only ontology, in fact, may be ethical in a con

sistent manner. It will be necessary to return to this elsewhere.)

Between Us: First Philosophy

W h e n ad dr es si ng th e fac t th at ph il o so ph y is co n te mp or an eo us

wi th the G re ek ci ty , on e en ds up l o si n g si gh t of wh at is in qu es

t i on a nd r i g h t ly s o . A s i s only f i t t i ng , h ow e ve r , los i ng s i g h t of

wh at is in qu es ti on re tu rn s us to th e pr o b l em in al l its ac ui ty aft er

these twenty-eight centuries.

It returns us to the que stion of the orig in of our history. Th ere is

no sense of reconstituting a teleology here, and it is not a matter of

retracing a process directed toward an end. To the contrary, history

clearly appears here as the movement sparked by a singular cir

cumstance, a movement that does not reabsorb this singularity in

a universality (or "universal history," as Marx and Nietzsche under

stood it), b ut instead reflects the impa ct of this singu lar ity in re

newed singular events. Thus, we have a "future" [avenir] and a "to

come" [ venir]; we have this "future" as a "past," which is not past

in the sense of bei ng the starti ng poi nt of a directe d process, b ut

past in the sense of bei ng a "cu rio sity " ["bizarre rie"] (the "Gr eek

miracle") that is i tself int rigu ing and , as such, remains sti ll "to

come." Thi s dis-position of history indeed makes there be a history

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2 2 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 2 3

and not aprocessus (here as elsewhere, the Hegelian model reveals

itself as un cove rin g the truth by way of its exact opposi te). O ne can

unders tand, then, Heidegger's "history of Bei ng, " and understand

that our relati on to this h istor y is necessarily that of its Destruktion,

or deconstruct i on. In other words, it is a matter of brin ging to l ight

this history 's singular ity as the disass emblin g law of its unit y and

under stand ing that this la w itself is the law of mea ning .

This clearly supposes that such a task is as demanding and ur

gent as it is impossible to measure. The task is to understand how

hist o ry as a s in gul ar , W est ern ac c iden t "b ec am e" w hat o n emight call "global" or "planetary" without , at the same t ime, en

gend ering itself as "unive rsal." C onseq uently , it is the task of un

derstanding how the West disappeared, not by recit ing the for

mulas of its generali zed unifo rmi ty, but by und ers tand ing the

expansion, by and through this "u niform ity," of a plural singularity

that is and is not , at the same t ime, "proper" to this "o/accident ."

A n d on e m us t un d er s ta n d th at th is fo rm id a b le q u es ti on is no ne

other than the quest io n of "ca pita l" (or of "capi talism "). If one

wa nt s to gi ve a fu ll a cc ou nt of " c a p i t a l " s t a r t i n g f r o m th e ve ry

f irst momen ts of history that began in the merchan t cit i es the n it

is necessary to remove it , far more radically than Marx could have,

from its own representat ion in l inear and cumulat ive history, as

well as from the representat ion of a teleologic al hist ory of its over

c o m in g o r re jec t io n . T his w o ul d ap p ear t o b e t he p ro b l em at ic

lesson of history. B ut we cannot unde rsta nd this task unless we first

understand what is most at stake in our history, that is, what is

most at stake in philosophy.

A c c o r d i n g to di ff er en t ve rs io ns , bu t in a p r e d om in a nt l y u n i fo r m

manner, the tradit ion put forward a representat ion according to

w h i c h p h i l os o p h y a n d th e ci ty w o u l d be ( w ou ld ha ve be en , m us t

have been) related to one another as subjects. Accordingly, philos

ophy, as the art iculat ion of logos, i s the subject of the city, wh ere

the city is the space of this art icu lat io n. L ikew ise, the city , as the

gathering of the logikoi, i s the subject of philos ophy, where phil os

o p hy is t he p ro d uc t io n o f t heir c o m m o n logos. Logos itself, then,

contains the essence or mean ing of this recipro city: it is the com

m o n f o un dat io n o f c o m m u n it y , w here c o m m un i t y , in t u rn , i s t he

foundati on of Bein g.

It is within this uniform horizon, according to dif ferent versions

(whether strong or weak, hap py or unhappy) of this pred omi nan t

mode of inqui ry, that we st il l understan d the famous "polit ic al an

i m a l " o f Ari stot le: it is to presu me that logos i s t he c o n dit io n o f

commu nity, whi ch, in turn , is the cond it io n of hum anity ; and/or it

is to presume that each of these three terms draws its uni ty and

consistency from [its sharing] a comm un ic ati on of essence wi th the

other two (where the world as such remains relat ively exterior tothe whole affair, presuming that nature or physis accomplishes itself

in humanity understood aslogos politikos,whereastechnsubordi

nates its elf to bot h).

But t his ho r i z o n t h at o f p o l i t ic a l p hi l o s o p hy in t he f ul l es t

sense (not as the "philo soph y of polit i cs," bu t philos oph y as po li

t ic s) m ight v ery w el l b e w hat p o in t s t o t he s in gul ar s i t uat io n

wh er e ou r hi st or y gets un de r wa y a nd , at th e sa me ti m e, bl oc ks ac

cess to this situat ion. Or instead, this horizon might be that which,

in the course of its history, gives an ind ica t ion of its own d econ

struct ion and exposes this situat ion anew in another way. 25 " P h i

losophy and polit ics" is the exposit ion [nonc] of this situa t ion.

But it is a disjunct ive ex posit io n, because the situat ion itself is dis

ju nc ti ve . T h e ci ty is no t p r i m a r i l y " c o m m u n i t y, " an y m or e th a n it

is primarily "public space." The city is at least as much the bringing

t o l ight of b ein g - in - c o m m o n as the dis-position (dispersal and dis

parity) of the com mu nit y represented as founde d in interi oriry or

t ran sc en den c e. I t i s "c o m m un it y " w it ho ut c o m m o n o r igin . T hat

be in g the cas e, a nd as l on g as p h il os op h y is an ap pe al to th e or i g in ,

the city , far from being philosophy's subject or space, is its prob

lem. Or else, it is its subject or space in the mod e of bei ng its prob

lem, its aporia. Philosophy, for its part , can appeal to the origin

only on the cond it io n of the dis-posit ion of logos (that is, of the o r i -

gin as just if ied and set into discourse): logos is the spacing at the

ve ry pl ac e of the or ig in . Co ns eq ue nt ly , p h i lo so p h y is th e p r o bl e m

of the city; ph ilo so ph y covers over the subject that is expec ted as

"c o m m un it y ."

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2 4 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural *5

T his i s w hy p hi l o so p hic a l p o l i t ic s an d p o l i t ic a l p hi l o so p hy regu

larly run agrou nd on the essence of com mu nit y or comm un ity as

o r igin . Ro usseau an d M arx are exem p l ary in t heir s t ruggl e w it h

these obstacles. R ousseau revealed the aporia of a com mu ni ty that

w o u l d ha ve to pr ec ed e it se lf in or de r to co ns ti tu te it se lf: in its ve ry

concep t, the "social contr act" is the den ial or foreclosure of the orig-

in ary d iv is io n [dliaison] between those singularit ies that would

have to agree to the contr act and, thereby, "dr aw it to a close." A l

though assuredly more radical in his demand for the dissolut ion of

polit ics in all spheres of existence (which is the "realizat ion of phi losophy"), Marx ignores that the separat ion between singularit ies

overcome and suppressed in this way is not, in fact, an accidental

separat ion imposed by "polit ical" authority, but rather the const i

tut ive separat ion of dis-po sit ion. How ever power ful it is for think

ing the "real relat ion" and what we call the "individual," "commu

nism" was st il l not able to think being-in-common as dist inct from

c o m m un it y .

In this sense, philosophical polit ics regularly proceeds according

to the surrep tit ious appeal to a metaphysics of the one-or igi n,

where , at t he s ame ti me , it nev ert hel ess expos es, volens nolens, the

situat io n of the dis-pos it ion of origins. Oft en the result is that the

dis- p o s i t io n is t urn ed in t o a m at t er o f exc l us io n , in c l ud ed as ex

clud ed, an d that all philo soph ical polit i cs is a polit ics of exclusiv

ity and the correlat ive exc lu si on o f a class, of an order, of a " com

m u n it y " t he p o in t o f w hic h is t o en d up w it h a "p eo p l e ," in t he"base" sense of the term. T he de ma nd for equality, then , is the nec

essary, ult imate, and absolute gesture; in fact , it is almost indica

t ive of dis-p osit ion as such . H oweve r, as long as this continues to

be a ma tt er of an "e ga li ta ri an d e m a n d fo un de d u p o n so me ge ne ri c

i d e n t i t y , "26 eq ual i t y w i l l never do justice [nefaitencorepasdroit] to

singula rity or even recognize the considerable dif f icu lt ies of want

in g to do so. It is here that the cri tiqu e of abstract rights co mes to

the fore. However, the "concrete" that must oppose such abstrac

t io n is n o t m ade up p r im ari l y o f em p ir ic a l det erm in at io n s , w h ic h,

in the capitalist regime, exhaust even the most egalitarian will :

rather, concretehete. pr ima ril y signif ies the real object of a thi nki ng

0 f bei ng- in- com mon , and this real object is, in turn , the singula r

plural of the origi n, the singular plur al of the ori gin of "c om mu

nity" itself ( if one st il l wants to call this "c omm unit y") . A ll of this is

undoubtedly what is indicated by the word that follows "equality"

in the French republican slogan: "fraternity" is supposed to be the

solut ion to equality (or to "equiliberty" ["galibert"]) 27 by evok

ing or invoking a "generic identity." What is lacking there is exact ly

t he c o m m o n o r igin o f t he c o m m o n . 2 8

It is "lack ing " insofar as one attempts to take account of it wi th in

the hori zon of phil osop hica l polit ics. On ce this hor izon is decon

structed, however, the necessity of the plu ral sin gular of the ori gin

comes into playand this is already under way. But I do not plan

to propose an "other polit ics" under this heading. I am no longer

sure that this term (or the term "polit ical philosophy") can con

t inue to have any consistency beyond this openi ng up of the hori

zon whi ch come s to us b oth at the end of the long his tory of our

We st er n si tu a ti on and as the reop enin g of this situa t ion . I on ly

wa nt to he lp to br in g ou t th at the c om bi n a ti on ph il os op h y- po li ti cs ,

in all the force of its being joined together, simultaneouslyexposes

and hides the dis-position of the originand co-appearance, which is

its correlate.

T he p hi l o so p hic o - p o l i t ic a l h o r iz o n is w hat l in k s t he d is- p o s i t io n

to a conti nui ty and to a com mu ni ty of essence. In order to be ef

fect ive, such a relat ion requires an essentializ ing procedure: sacri

fice . If one look s carefully, one ca n fin d the place of sacrifice in a llpolit ic al phi loso phy (or rather, one wi ll f ind the challenge of the

abstract, w hic h makes a sacrif ice of concrete singularity) . B ut as sin

gular origin, existence is unsacrif icable. 29

In this respect , then, the urgent demand named above is not an

other politica l abstraction. Instead, it is a reconsidera tion of the very

m ean in g o f "p o l i t ic s" an d , t heref ore , o f "p h i l o s o p h y " in l ight o f

the origina ry situat ion: the bare exposit ion of singular origins. T hi s

is the necessary "first phil oso ph y" (in the can onic al sense of the ex

pression). It is an ontology. Philosophy needs to recommence, to

restart itself from itself against itself , against polit i cal p hil oso phy

and philosophical polit ics. In order to do this, philosophy needs to

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2 6 Being Singular Plural Being Singular Plural 2 7

think in principle about how we are "us" among us, that is, how the

consistency of our Bein g is in bein g-in -com mon, an d how this con

sists precisely in the " in " or in the "between " of its spacing.

Th e last "f irst philosoph y," if one dare say anythin g about it , is

given to us in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is that which

has put us on the way [chemin]to where we are, together, whether

we k n o w it or no t. B u t it is als o w h y its au th or was ab le to , in a so rt

of retur n of Destruktion itself , com pro mis e himself , in an unpa r- i

donable way, with his involvement in a philosophical polit ics that

be ca me c r i m i n a l . T h i s ve ry p o i nt , th en , in di ca te s to us th at pl ac efrom which f irst philosophy must recommence: it is necessary to

ref igure fundamental ontology (as well as the existential analyt ic,

the histor y of Bei ng, an d the thin kin g of Ereignis that goes along

wi t h it) wi th a th or ough resol ve tha t starts from the plural singular

of origins, from being-with.

I want to retur n to the issue of "first phi los oph y" in orde r to push

it even further, but without claiming to be the one who can fully ac

complish such an undertaking. By definit ion and in essence, the

above "first philosophy" needs "to be made by all, not by one," like

the poetry of Ma ldo ror . Fo r the mo men t, I onl y want to indicate the

prin cip le of its necessity. Heid egger clea rly states that bei ng-wi th

#1 {Mitsein, Miteinandersein, an d Mitdasein) is essential to the consti

tut ion of Dasein itself . Given this, it needs to be made absolutely

clear that Dasein, far from being either "man" or "subject ," is not

even an isolated and unique "one," but is instead always the one,each one, with one another [l'un-avec-l autre]. If this determination

is essential, then it needs to attain to the co-originary dimension and

expose it without reservation. But as it has often been said, despite

this affirmative assertion of co-orig inarir y, he gives up on the step to

the considerat ion of Dasein itself. It is appropriate, then, to examine

the possibil ity of an explicit an d endless exposit ion of co-origina rity

and the p ossibil i ty of takin g account of what is at stake in the to

getherness of the ontolog ica l enterprise (and, i n this way, taking ac

count of what is at stake in its polit ical con sequences.) 30

It is necessary to add here that there is a reason for this exami

nation which is far more profound than what f irst appears to be a

simple "readjustment" of the Heideg geri an discourse. The reason

obviously goes much farther than that, since at its fullest, it is about

nothing less than the pos sibil ity of speaking " of Dasein'' in general,

or of saying "the exist ing" o r "existence." Wha t wou ld happ en to

philosoph y if speaking about Be ing in other ways than saying "we,"

"you," and "I" became excluded? Where is Being spoken, and who

speaks Being?

The reason that is foreshadowed has to do precisely with speak

ing (of) Bein g. The themes of being -with an d co-origina rity need

to be renewed and need to "reinit ialize" the existential analyt ic, exactly because these are mean t to resp ond to the que sti on of the

meaning of Bei ng, or to Bein g as meanin g. B ut if the mean ing of

Being indicates itself prin cipa lly by the putt in g into play of Bei ng

in Dasein and as Dasein, then, precisely as meaning, this putting

into play (the "there wi ll be" o f Be ing ) can o nl y attest to itself or

expose itself in the mod e of bei ng- wit h: because as relates to mea n

ing, it is never for just one, but always for one another, always be

tween one another. The mea ning of Bein g is never in what is s ai d

never said in signif icat ions. But it is assuredly in them that "it is

spoke n," in the absolute sense of the expression . "O ne speaks," " it

speaks," means "Being is spoken"; it is meaning (but does not con

struct meaning). But "one" or "it" is never other than we.

In other words, in reveali ng itself as what is at stake in the mea n

in g o f Bein g, Dasein has already revealed itself as bei ng-w ith an d

reveals itself as such before any other explicat ion . Th e me ani ng ofBeing is not in play in Dasein in o rder t o b e "c o m m un ic at ed" t o

others; its putt ing into play is identically being-wi