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Politics and Humanitarian Aid:

Debates, Dilemmas and

Dissension

By Devon Curtis

HPG Report 10April 2001

HPG Report

H U M A N I T A R I A NP O L I C Y G R O U P

The Humanitarian Policy Group atthe Overseas DevelopmentInstitute is Europe’s leading teamof independent policy researchersdedicated to improvinghumanitarian policy and practicein response to conflict, instabilityand disasters.

Report of a conference organised byODI, POLIS at the University of Leeds and CAFOD,London, 1 February 2001

Overseas Development Institute

ISBN: 0 85003 517 1

Overseas Development Institute, London, 2001

Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged.Requests for the commercial reproduction of HPG material should be directed to the ODI as copyrightholders.

Notes on the Author:

Devon Curtis is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School ofEconomics and Political Science. She was the coordinator for the ‘Politics and Humanitarian Aid’conference on 1 February 2001.

Acknowledgements:

ODI, CAFOD and the University of Leeds gratefully acknowledge financial support for the conferenceand for the production of this report from the Department for International Development (DFID), theDisasters Emergency Committee (DEC), CAFOD and Oxfam.

Valuable comments on an earlier draft of this report were made by Nicola Reindorp, Lucy Morris,Mark Duffield, Matthew Carter and Joanna Macrae. Special thanks to Margie Buchanan-Smith for herextensive comments and support.

Please send comments on this paper to:

HPGOverseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondonSE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300Fax: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399

Website: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: [email protected]

A copy of your comments will be sent to the author

Contents

1

Acronyms 1

Introduction 3

The Context of the Current Form of Politicisation of 5Humanitarian Action2.1 Geopolitical Changes 5

2.2 The Changing Nature of Conflict 5

2.3 New Definitions of Security 5

2.4 The Perceived Failings of Traditional Humanitarian Action 5

2.5 Domestic Policy in Donor Governments 6

2.6 Liberal Global Governance and the Search for Order 6

2.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management 7

The Coherence Agenda 9

3.1 The Structures of Coherence 9

3.2 Implications and Questions 9

‘Humanitarian Intervention’ and Civil-Military Cooperation 11

4.1 ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ 11

4.2 Civil–Military Cooperation 12

Humanitarian Principles 13

2

5

4

3

The Needs Versus Rights Debate 156.1 The Debate 15

6.2 Legal Instruments 16

Conclusion 17

Endnotes 18

Bibliography 19

ANNEX 1: Abstracts of Conference Papers 21

ANNEX 2: Conference Agenda 25

ANNEX 3: List of Conference Participants 27

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and Its Consequences for Afghans 2

Box 2: Psychosocial Intervention 7

Box 3: Exclusion in Serbia 10

Box 4: ‘Humanitarian War’ in Kosovo 11

6

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Politics and Humanitarian Aid:Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension

AcronymsCAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas DevelopmentCIMIC Civil–Military CooperationDEC Disasters Emergency Committee (UK)DFID Department for International Development (UK government)HPG Humanitarian Policy Group, ODIICRC International Committee of the Red CrossMSF Médecins Sans FrontièresNGO non-governmental organisationODI Overseas Development InstitutePOLIS Institute for Politics and International Studies (University of Leeds)UK United KingdomUS United States of America

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Chapter 1Introduction

This paper highlights the key themes discussed anddebated at a one-day conference examining newdimensions in the relationship between humanitarianaid and politics, held in London on 1 February 2001.

Humanitar ian assistance has always been a highlypolitical activity. It has always influenced the politicaleconomy of recipient countries, and has always beeninfluenced by the political considerations of donorgovernments. Despite the pronouncements and practicesof humanitarian actors seeking to ensure that theiractions confer no military advantage, and are drivensolely on the basis of need, the humanitarian principlesof neutrality and impartiality are under constant assault.Stark differences between the amount and type ofhumanitarian assistance given to various countries facingacute crises show that humanitarian aid has never beendisbursed solely on the basis of need.1

Nonetheless, the relationship between humanitarian aidand politics is changing. The key theme of theconference was how humanitarian action appears to beincreasingly tied to new political objectives, and to theoverall political response of donor countries to complexemergencies. Humanitarian aid is becoming an integralpart of donors’ comprehensive strategy to transformconflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for liberaldevelopment. This changing role of humanitarian aid isfrequently called the ‘new humanitarianism’. It hascharacterised international responses to many recentconflicts, including in Afghanistan, Serbia and SierraLeone. Examples of the closer integration with politicalobjectives include the forced repatriation of refugees,attempts at conflict resolution in conjunction withhumanitarian aid, and the withholding of aid to meetpolitical objectives.

Although an analysis of the interf ace betweenhumanitarian aid and politics is not new, recent workhas outlined and analysed different aspects of theevolving relationship between humanitarian aid andpolitics. On 4 February 1998, the Disasters EmergencyCommittee (DEC), Mercurial and the ODI organiseda one-day seminar entitled ‘The Emperor’s NewClothes: The Collapse of Humanitarian Principles’. Thegoal of the seminar was to understand the growingcriticisms of humanitarian aid, and their implications.2

The ODI has recently conducted extensive research intothe consequences of the increasing calls to enhance thecoherence of political and humanitarian action.3 On3–4 May 2000, ODI and the Centre for HumanitarianDialogue organised a conference on ‘Conditions andConditionality in Humanitarian Action’ to discussdifferent views on the ‘Terms of Engagement’ between

humanitarian and political actors.4 In June 2000, CaritasEurope commissioned a discussion paper on thepoliticisation of humanitarian aid.5

The February 2001 conference continued and expandedthe debate raised by earlier discussions and publications.The conference set out to review the changing role ofhumanitar ian assistance, and to understand theimplications of this change for aid agencies. The diverseviews and reactions of speakers and participants at theconference reflect the wider debate within thehumanitar ian community about the relevance oftraditional humanitarian principles, and the appropriaterelationship between humanitarianism and politics.

This paper is not a comprehensive account of theconference proceedings. Rather, it synthesises some ofthe key themes that emerged from the papers and thediscussion. It does not represent a consensus position,as this would not reflect the spirit or substance of thediscussions. Instead, it is intended to spark furtherreflection and debate on some of the most salient themesthat emerged from the conference.

While it is clear that many policy-makers and some aidpersonnel applaud the current form of politicisation ofhumanitar ian action, there are others who raisedimportant questions and concerns. Some of the mainquestions and areas of contention at the conferenceincluded:

• How can we best understand the changing nature ofconflict and the general context surrounding thecurrent politicisation of humanitarian action? Shouldthe emphasis be on internal causes of conflict, assuggested by Mark Bowden, or on external factors,as outlined by Mark Duffield and Joanna Macrae?

• Is the new relationship between humanitarian actionand politics character ised by the subsuming ofhumanitarian objectives to foreign-policy objectives,as indicated by Susan Woodward, Duffield and FionaFox? Or does it imply an ar rangement thatcomplements the roles of different actors in pursuitof common objectives, as described by Bowden? Ismilitary intervention using humanitarian justificationan extreme example of the new humanitarianism?

• How impor tant is it to uphold traditionalhumanitar ian pr inciples, such as neutrality,impartiality, independence and universality? Does thenew humanitarianism result in a loss of perceivedneutrality, which in turn may jeopardise the securityand independence of aid personnel?

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• From an ethical perspective, should preventinghuman suffer ing be the sole justification forhumanitarian action, or is it appropriate to engagein social-risk calculations, meaning that aid can bewithheld if it is thought to be detrimental to longer-term conflict resolution or development objectives?

• What is the relevance of legal instruments such asinternational humanitarian law and human rights law?Does one body of law take precedence over another?

• What is the appropriate basis for humanitarian action?Should the intent of humanitarian action be to meetneeds, as argued by Fox, or to uphold rights, asargued by Hugo Slim?

This paper does not attempt to answer these questions,but instead highlights the diversity of views associatedwith them. It is structured around the presentations atthe conference, although the issues and discussions oftenoverlap. Section 2 examines the context of the currentform of the politicisation of humanitarian action. It looksat the factors and motivations driving this politicisation,including the changing nature of conflict and theperceived failings of humanitarian action in recentemergencies. It looks at how using aid as a strategic toolto fulfil political objectives is sometimes viewed as partof the larger goal of donor countries: to establish a systemof liberal global governance.

Section 3 discusses the dynamics, outcomes andimplications of the ‘coherence agenda’ underpinningthe new humanitarianism, including the new set ofinstitutional structures that has been established betweenpolitical, military and humanitarian actors. Section 4highlights the final erosion of the dividing-line betweenpolitics and humanitarianism embodied in the conceptof ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘humanitarian war’. Itdiscusses concerns related to high levels of civil–militarycooperation, as well as other operational dilemmasarising out of changing techniques of aid delivery.

Section 5 reflects the diverging views on what constituteappropriate principles to guide humanitarianism. It askswhether the traditional ones – universality, impartiality,independence and neutrality – have failed, and whethernew kinds of problems associated with the newhumanitarianism are emerging. Section 6 examines thedebate between a needs-based approach tohumanitarianism and a rights-based one, and looks athumanitarianism’s legal basis.

The paper’s concluding section highlights the need forcontinued discussion and debate on the newhumanitarianism, and argues that the implications of thecurrent form of politicisation of humanitarian action

must be well understood. Finally, this paper appeals forabsolute clarity in the language of humanitarianism andin the roles, responsibilities and principles underpinninghumanitarian action.

The report’s annexes contain the abstracts of the paperspresented at the conference, the conference programmeand the list of participants. The full papers can be foundon the ODI website at <www.odi.org/hpg/aidandpolitics.html>. The papers will also be publishedin the December 2001 issue of the journal Disasters.

BOX 1: The Politicisation of HumanitarianAid and Its Consequences for Afghans

According to Mohammed Haneef Atmar, currenthumanitarian aid policies and practices inAfghanistan are determined by Western foreign-policy goals, rather than by the actual conditionsrequired for principled humanitarian action.Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan acts as a ‘fig leaf’for political inaction, and as a foreign-policyinstrument to isolate the Taliban. The humanitarianprinciples of humanity, impartiality, neutrality andindependence are secondary to foreign-policyinterests, and are abandoned when they conflict withthem. While Afghanistan received the highest percapita aid in its history during the Cold War,humanitarian budgets were cut dramatically afterthe Russian withdrawal in 1988–89, despitecontinued human suffering. While donors may havelegitimate foreign-policy concerns regarding theTaliban, argues Atmar, subordinating humanitarianprinciples to other political objectives has resultedin the loss of Afghan lives. For instance, Atmar statesthat, if humanitarian aid agencies were able toreceive unconditional humanitarian resources andallowed to work with the public health authorities,they may be able to save the lives of children; oneout of four children die before five years of age, and85,000 die each year from diarrhoea.

In response to the discriminatory policies andpractices of the Taliban, donors and some aidagencies have imposed punitive conditionalities,including on security, gender equality anddevelopment/capacity-building. The net impact hasbeen the restriction of the right to humanitarianassistance, and the inability of the internationalassistance community to adequately address short-term life-saving needs. According to Atmar, the ironyis that donors continue to use punitiveconditionalities, even though they have not producedthe desired political and social changes, and havehad negative humanitarian consequences.

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Chapter 2The Context of the Current Form of Politicisation of

Humanitarian ActionAccording to Bowden, the international failure toaddress the causes and consequences of these new kindsof conflicts has led to the belief that intervention canonly succeed as part of a wider framework of conflictprevention, reduction and resolution. Under thisargument, the causes of conflict are internal, so theexternal response should address internal factors as partof an overarching strategy. According to this view,humanitarian agencies should be core components ofthis strategy.

Authors such as Bowden who emphasise the internalcauses of conflict generally believe that aid can andshould be used as an incentive for peace, since the causesof conflict can be eliminated by changing states’behaviour. Others, such as Macrae and Duffield,question Bowden’s characterisation of conflict as beingrooted in internal factors such as under-development,and are therefore much less likely to embrace thecurrent form of politicisation of humanitarian action.

2.3 New Definitions of Security

The changing nature of conflict has contributed to anew definition of security, where under-developmentis considered a threat to international security becauseit can fuel drug-trafficking, the spread of terrorism andincreased refugee flows.

This ‘repackaging’ of security as a development concernmeans that enhancing security involves changing thebehaviour of populations within countries. As outlinedby Duffield and Vanessa Pupavac, domestic practices inrecipient countries are increasingly seen as potentialsecurity threats. This has led to a situation where aspectsof these practices, such as domestic economic policy,human r ights, the status of women, poverty andpsychosocial well-being, are open to monitoring by, andthe involvement of, donor states.

2.4 The Perceived Failings ofTraditional Humanitarian Action

Another factor contributing to the drive to reunitehumanitarian aid and politics is the sense that aidagencies have had difficulty in reacting to the changingnature of conflict and security. The well-known criticismthat humanitarian aid can prolong or exacerbate warand can help to sustain war economies has fuelled callsfor humanitar ian assistance to be subject to r iskassessments that weigh up short- and long-term levelsof r isk resulting from it. The withholding of

Several speakers at the conference looked at factorsexplaining why humanitarian assistance is increasinglybeing used as a strategic tool to fulfil political objectives.These include geopolitical changes; the changing natureof conflict; the redefinition of security that places under-development at the heart of global security concerns;the perceived failings of humanitarian action in recentemergencies; and domestic policy considerations indonor governments.

2.1 Geopolitical Changes

Macrae argues that geopolitical changes have set the stagefor the reunification of humanitarian aid and politics.The end of the Cold War resulted in the politicaldisengagement of major powers from the geopoliticalperiphery, often leaving development and humanitarianactors as the sole representatives of the Western powersin countr ies that had become ‘un-strateg ic’.Developmental and humanitar ian assistance wereexpected to fill the space left by the withdrawal ofdiplomacy. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War meanta decrease in the respect for state sovereignty, and a moreinterventionist approach to international relations.

2.2 The Changing Nature of Conflict

The changing nature of conflict has had an impact oninternational response strategies. Yet interpretations ofthe underlying causes of conflict are contentious. Forinstance, in his analysis of current African conflicts,Bowden focuses on internal causes, such as economicmarginalisation, the lack of secure access to land, andthe inability of some African states to provide minimallevels of service delivery. Bowden believes that this hasprovoked the fragmentation of the state, which inextreme cases has encouraged the formation of splintergroups, which have in turn divided into warring factions.

Bowden believes that factional warfare is different fromconventional warfare, and necessitates different kindsof international responses. Conventional wars are foughtby regular troops with military and strategic targets,while factionalised struggles are frequently opportunistic,rather than strategic. Factions seek to involve, exploitand control a significant proportion of the civilianpopulation in order to sustain the conflict. Thedistinction between combatant and non-combatant maythus be eroded. Factional warfare challenges currentconceptions of impartiality and neutrality that are criticalto the concept of humanitarian space. Furthermore, thescale and fluidity of factional conflict mean that agenciesmust make choices as to where they operate.

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humanitar ian aid can therefore become part of apolitical strategy of containment, and can be seen asethically defensible by an appeal to the argument of‘doing no harm’.6 If, on the other hand, humanitarianassistance is provided, it should be used as part of astrategy for conflict reduction, thus ensuring that it doesnot get into the hands of the ‘wrong’ people.

A second criticism of humanitarian assistance is thataid has not helped to reduce the overall vulnerabilityof populations. This ‘developmentalist’ critique arguesthat humanitar ian relief creates dependency, andreduces the capacity of communities and local groups.Relief does not address under-development. Theresponse to this critique has been a growing tendencyto link humanitarian assistance with poverty alleviation,environmental protection and institutionaldevelopment, in an overall integrated package of conflictmanagement and development.

Interestingly, operational agencies in the UnitedNations and the non-governmental sector firstadvocated a stronger role for humanitarian aid inconflict reduction. The growing convergence betweenhumanitarianism and conflict resolution would not havebeen possible without the active support of a numberof aid agencies.

2.5 Domestic Policy in DonorGovernments

The merging of humanitarian aid and politics also reflectschanges in domestic policy in some donorgovernments. Specifically, Macrae discusses the policyof ‘joined-up government’, which is intended toincrease the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of publicpolicy by coordinating and rationalising governmentactivities.

‘Joined-up government’ has extended into thehumanitar ian sphere. Bowden discusses one UKexample, the Africa Conflict Prevention Fund. The fundpools the resources of the Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID), the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice and the Ministry of Defence in support ofcommon conflict-prevention objectives. It outlinesspecific roles for foreign policy and development andmilitary actors in support of these aims.

In many donor countries, there has also been animportant redefinition of national self-interest. Macraeargues that this is no longer narrowly defined in termsof immediate commercial interests and security threats,but in terms of good international citizenship. This hasfacilitated a more interventionist and integratedapproach to humanitarianism and conflict resolutionin many recipient countries.

2.6 Liberal Global Governance andthe Search for Order

For policy-makers and others who define insecurity asunder-development, and who believe that the causesof conflict are internal, it is logical to conclude thatinternational responses should address and alter theinternal practices of countries undergoing conflict.Nonetheless, as Duffield points out, changing domesticpractices in what he calls ‘borderland’ (that is,developing) countries would be beyond the capacityand legitimacy of ‘metropolitan’ (Western developed)states. The convergence of aid and politics brings in theskills and resources of non-state actors and legitimisestheir growing role. This is the basic rationale for unitinghumanitar ian aid and politics. As aid evolves andexplicitly attempts to change behaviours and attitudesin recipient countries, the social concerns of aid agenciesmerge with the security concerns of ‘metropolitan’ states.

Duffield believes that this merger is at the heart of anemerging system of liberal international governance.Contrary to popular claims, globalisation and the riseof non-state actors and private associations have notresulted in a weakening of powerful ‘metropolitan’ states.Instead, in response to globalisation, these states havelearned to govern in new ways, through non-territorialand public–private networks. The reunification ofhumanitarian aid with politics is an example of the trendtowards the re-exertion of ‘metropolitan’ authority.Humanitar ian aid should therefore be seen as a‘technology’ of government. Viewed in this way, non-state and private associations do not constitute threatsto ‘metropolitan’ authority. Rather, they are essential inhelping ‘metropolitan’ states govern in new ways.

With such a multiplicity of private actors, governmentsface the problem of how to achieve policy coherence.Policy-makers have responded by extending thetechniques of public management to the new public–private networks of aid. As part of this process, Duffieldargues that it has become important to set targets, definestandards and cap budgets. The techniques of centralcontrol and public management have thus beenextended to humanitarian aid practice. Aid agencies haveestablished codes of conduct, and have begun toprofessionalise and standardise their activities. Whilemany people within aid agencies support and indeedpromote this process, Duffield cr iticises thisdevelopment, and argues that it exposes aid agencies tothe logic of central calculation.

The underlying objective of ‘metropolitan’ states is topromote and create order out of disorder. There is asense in Western policy circles that disorder stems fromnew types of conflict and under-development. At leastaccording to the neo-liberal view, order is achievedthrough free markets and prosperity. If functioning

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assistance, policy-makers may sometimes decide to donothing in the face of human suffering, rather than riskthe longer-term continuation of the conflict.

As Pupavac outlines, a risk-management approachapplies to a range of international policy decisions andinterventions, from psychosocial programmes todevelopment strategies. Social r isk managementquestions non-interference in the internal affairs of statesand the private lives of individual citizens, and impliesa radical reshaping of domestic and international order.

Therefore, Duffield argues that the newhumanitarianism, with its focus on risk analysis andintegrated liberal development, was put in place as anew way to govern the ‘borderlands’, given the changesin the global context and the perceived failure oftraditional humanitarianism in dealing with them. Onthe other hand, Bowden believes that it was the changingnature of conflict – sparked by unfavourable internalfactors and the inability of the international communityto adequately respond to these changes – that led to thenew strategy. Other participants put the explanatoryemphasis on changes in donor governments anddeclining overseas assistance budgets.

markets bring about order, it is thus essential to createthe conditions that allow them to exist. The rule of lawand countering impunity may also be central to thecreation of order, although this was a contested issue atthe conference. In any case, there was a feeling that fordonor states, order cannot be contemplated outside ofa liberal framework. From Somalia to Sierra Leone,international action and inaction have reflected thedominant preoccupation with promoting or protectinga state system of integrated capitalism. The consequencesdo not always correspond to the traditional values ofhumanitarianism.

2.7 Risk Assessment and RiskManagement

Under this new system of coherence and privatisation,‘metropolitan’ states interact with the ‘borderlands’through mapping their behaviour and analysing risk.Policy decisions are based on the calculation andmanagement of risk. These calculations are also madewith respect to humanitarian aid, since it is seen to entailrisks, as well as opportunities. When the logic of riskcalculation and management is extended to humanitarian

BOX 2: Psychosocial Intervention

Psychosocial programmes have become an integral part of the international humanitarian response to complexemergencies. Psychosocial activities include trauma counselling, peace education programmes and initiatives tobuild life skills and self-esteem. Describing a given population as having experienced the trauma of conflict issufficient for international agencies to judge that they are in need of psychosocial assistance. Under this model,individuals who have witnessed violent conflict are seen as being ‘at risk’ of becoming future perpetrators.Psychosocial intervention is believed to be required to rehabilitate victims and to break the cycle of violence andconflict. Pupavac shows that these types of intervention represent governance at a distance, a form of governmentthrough social risk management by a transitory class of global professional consultants.

Pupavac argues that this response is at best unhelpful, and at worst dangerous. It represents unprecedented externalregulation of societies and people’s lives. The effect is to construct whole populations as traumatised. Individualsare automatically seen as dysfunctional because they have undergone the experience of war. Yet Pupavac arguesthat the appearance of a traumatic condition in war is particular, not universal. We do not always know howpeople express their distress, and some of the mechanisms that have been developed to deal with distress inWestern countries may not be relevant in other contexts. Psychosocial intervention may hinder local copingstrategies and take away ownership of the process of recovery. The benefits of psychosocial intervention areassumed by aid agencies, rather than backed up by research, and there is a risk that such intervention deniesmoral capacity and personality to recipient populations.

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Chapter 3The Coherence Agenda

The dr ive for coherence dominates the newhumanitar ianism. According to Macrae, under acoherence agenda humanitarian action becomes part ofa comprehensive political strategy. Advocates of coherencebelieve that those involved in aid, politics, trade,diplomacy and military activities should work togethertowards common interests of liberal peace, stability anddevelopment. Supporters of the new humanitarianismbelieve that coherence is the most effective way ofachieving stability in the long term.

Critics of coherence argue that its pursuit can mean theabandonment of universality, one of the core principlesunderlying humanitarianism, in favour of political goals.They claim that the partnership betweenhumanitarianism and politics is not an equal one.According to Atmar, the politicisation of humanitarianaid is the ‘pursuit of domestic and foreign policies ofdonor states by humanitarian means’. The provision ofassistance is restricted to countr ies believed to befollowing the correct policies – that is, policies thatcorrespond to the poverty reduction and economic andpolitical liberalisation advocated by donors. Non-conforming countr ies may be excluded fromdevelopment assistance, shut out of politics and restrictedto conditional forms of humanitar ian assistance.Responsibility for managing these excluded countrieshas increasingly been left to humanitarians. As Macraestates, ‘the rich get diplomats, the poor get aid workers’.

3.1 The Structures of Coherence

A number of structural changes have taken place withinthe humanitar ian system to enable this g rowingcoherence. Many new mechanisms have been establishedto facilitate cross-agency and cross-departmentaldiscussions regarding international responses toemergencies, such as the creation of ExecutiveCommittees in the UN since 1997. Donors are alsoparticipating more directly in operational decision-making, which Macrae calls the ‘bilateralisation ofhumanitarian response’. This bilateralisation includescontr ibutions to donor coordination bodies, theearmarking of funds that have been destined formultilateral agencies, the monitoring of donor–partnercontracts and the development of donors’ ownoperational capacity. The justification for bilateralisationis rooted in the perceived failure of operational agenciesto account for their impact.

3.2 Implications and Questions

The emphasis on doing no harm and on conductingrisk assessments means identifying the conditions

required for the effective delivery of humanitarianassistance. There are important questions about who hasthe responsibility and the capacities to determinewhether or not those conditions are in place. Forinstance, are security assessments for field personnel besthandled in the field, or in donor capitals? After 1998,the UK government ruled that, because of securityconcerns, any NGO sending expatriates to Afghanistanwould be automatically disqualified from DFID funding.Atmar argues that this restriction was motivated moreby the wider policy of the US and UK to isolate theTaliban, rather than genuine concerns over security.Macrae states that it is easy for conditions for effectivehumanitarian action to be seen as political conditionality.

Another problem with risk assessments is that it isdifficult to prioritise between short-term humanitarianimperatives, and the longer-term goals of sustainabilityand peace. The lack of clarity regarding priorities andprinciples can have negative operational consequences.

There are also important ethical questions. As arguedby Macrae, the coherence agenda is assumed to beethical because it is part of a wider ethical internationalpolicy. Nonetheless, there are questions as to whetherit results in ethical action. For instance, states Macrae, itmay be problematic to assume that not engaging withcertain parties because of their human-rights record isan ethical approach. According to Macrae, this can becompared to the formation of consensus on policiessuch as structural adjustment, where the assumption wasthat a single economic prescription would necessarilybenefit every economy. Countries that did not acceptstructural adjustment were deemed ‘negligent’, and sodid not deserve to benefit from aid. Macrae argues thatthe mono-economics of adjustment have beensucceeded by the mono-politics of a liberal peace,thereby associating humanitar ian assistance with aparticular Western political framework. This can be seenin the attitudes of donors towards humanitar ianemergencies in the Balkans. As illustrated by MarinaSkuric-Prodanovic, the level of suffering of people inthe Balkans does not correspond to the level of aid theyhave received. Rather, aid funds have unevenly followedmajor population displacements depending on theperceived and portrayed causes of this displacement.

There are also technical problems associated withcoherence. It can lead to the abandonment of separatediplomatic and political action by political actors, leavinghumanitar ianism as the pr imary form of politicalengagement in conflict-affected countries. Macrae’sresearch shows that the leverage exerted by aid over thecourse of a conflict is marginal at best. By leaving aid

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workers to deal with conflicts, political actors areensuring that the political dimensions of conflicts arenot adequately addressed. In some situations,humanitarian aid workers are expected to be the primarysource of intelligence, as well as conflict-resolution anddevelopment specialists. Aid workers do not have theskills and resources to respond to these new demands.Furthermore, the expansion of the roles of humanitarianactors has negative implications for their perceived

neutrality and impartiality. When humanitarian actorscannot rely on international political actors being capableand willing to assume an effective role in managing thepolitical aspects of the crisis, they often find themselvesexposed to security risks, and are sometimes even deli-berately targeted because of their activities. Thus, withoutseeing their own legitimacy ser iously challenged,humanitarian agencies will find it difficult to fill thevacuum created by the lack of an effective political response.

BOX 3: Exclusion in Serbia

Skuric-Prodanovic shows that the political conditionality of Western aid policy in the Balkans led to distinctionsbetween vulnerable groups that did not correspond to their level of need, and that created patterns of inclusionand exclusion. Some donor governments saw humanitarian assistance to Serbia as being opposed to their foreign-policy interests. They feared that aid would be re-channelled into the hands of the government. Skuric-Prodanovicargues that, for many Western donors, especially NATO members, humanitarian aid was seen as supporting thelongevity of the Milosevic regime, and as counter-productive to their decision to intervene in Kosovo. Westerngovernments had difficulty separating the notion of humanitarian assistance from the political situation, when themajority of the population in Serbia seemed to be supporting the Milosevic government.

Even when humanitarian aid was delivered to Serbia, there were examples of inclusion and exclusion. Forinstance, there was a differentiation between people who had been displaced from Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, andpeople who had been displaced between 1992 and 1996, even though many lived in very similar conditions,often in the same refugee camps. Likewise, Skuric-Prodanovic shows that, by the second half of 2000, some urbanareas in central Serbia received large amounts of humanitarian assistance, while other more remote areas thatwere mainly controlled by the regime suffered a severe lack of aid. A distinction was also made betweendisplaced and non-displaced people, contributing to the alienation of internally displaced persons and refugees inlocal communities in Serbia, and causing tensions to rise.

This has led Serbs to see humanitarian aid agencies as tools of Western governments, rather than as neutral orimpartial actors. Skuric-Prodanovic believes that the politicisation of humanitarian assistance and the exclusionresulting from it has had a negative effect on the lives of vulnerable groups in Serbia, and has devalued thecurrency of humanitarianism in the eyes of Serbs.

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4.1 ‘Humanitarian Intervention’7

The dilemmas outlined by cr itics of the newhumanitarianism are particularly acute in emergenciesthat feature military intervention. ‘Humanitar ianintervention’ or ‘humanitar ian war’ represents anextreme form of coherence. According to SusanWoodward, it marks the final collapse of the distinctionbetween humanitar ianism and politics. Woodwardargues that the decision to use military force is justifiedin humanitarian terms. Yet humanitarian interventionscannot be understood or evaluated without analysingthe global politics surrounding the conflict. The shift to‘humanitarian wars’ such as that in Kosovo should beseen as part of the major powers’ struggle to reshapethe international regime of peace and security, and a

Chapter 4‘Humanitarian Intervention’ and Civil-Military Cooperation

response to the perceived failure to act in earlier crises.According to Woodward, politics is always at the coreof the effort. Despite the language of humanitarianism,Woodward argues that these types of operations arehighly political, and are conducted by states whosepolitical interests lead them to humanitarian action.

Woodward argues that, while humanitarian actorsremain on the sidelines of decision-making in theseinternational operations, there are important operationalimplications. The provision of humanitarian assistancedepends on the control of airports, the protection ofaid workers, the opening of strategic routes and the useof air power to protect them. The coordination betweenmilitary and civilian actors that is central to theseoperations raises a number of questions.

BOX 4: ‘Humanitarian War’ in Kosovo

According to Woodward, NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ intervention on behalf of the Albanian population of Kosovo inMarch–June 1999 represents the final collapse of the divide between humanitarianism and politics, with thegeneral consensus that Operation Allied Force was regrettable, but that there was no alternative.

Woodward questions this acceptance of the use of force in the Kosovo operation, and exposes some of the linksbetween politics and humanitarianism. She says that the stated goal of NATO officials was diplomatic andpolitical – to force Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet accords of February 1999. Furthermore, once NATO hadthreatened bombing in June 1998, it faced a loss of credibility if it did not take action.

Nonetheless, the situation in Kosovo was deliberately and successfully redefined as a potential humanitariancatastrophe. Woodward claims that the specific approach to conflict resolution undertaken in Kosovo was not aresponse to Kosovo, but to the perceived failure to act in Bosnia and Rwanda. Lobbyists advocating bombingincluded human rights organisations and some humanitarians, who did so in the interests of internationalhumanitarian and human rights regimes. Woodward argues that the conflict in Kosovo was only derivativelyabout human rights, and primarily about the rivalry between Albanians and Serbs over statehood and the right torule the territory. Second, events in Kosovo show that parties to the conflict learned to emphasise terms such as‘victims of aggression’, ‘oppressed human rights’ and even ‘genocide’ in order to attract international support fortheir cause. Third, Woodward states that the decision to call the operation in Kosovo a humanitarian interventionwas made at the insistence of Britain, which argued for a legal basis for it. By contrast, the US believed thatMilosevic’s failure to comply with earlier demands was sufficient grounds to intervene.

Humanitarian intervention as seen in Kosovo has a number of operational consequences for humanitarians. Whenan agency becomes a lobbyist for forceful action in support of humanitarian goals, it becomes more difficult todeal with what Woodward calls the ‘downside risks’. For instance, she argues, UNHCR and other agencies couldnot prepare for the possibility that the NATO operation might result in a humanitarian emergency, for fear ofsending signals to Yugoslav civilian and military officials that could have undermined the strategy of coercivediplomacy. UNHCR officials announced prior to the bombing campaign that the potential refugee exodus wouldtotal between 80,000 and 100,000 people, even though the real figures approached 800,000. Knowing Macedonia’sobjections to refugee camps on its border, UNHCR wanted to avoid sending signals that would enable Skopje topresent obstacles to the NATO operation.

Woodward suggests that humanitarians should accept that the line between the humanitarian and the politicalwas crossed in Kosovo, and should no longer stand behind an apolitical mandate. Rather, she believes thathumanitarians are best placed to develop the debate about the options and alternatives for addressing actual orimpending humanitarian catastrophes.

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4.2 Civil–Military Cooperation

While interaction between civilian and military actorshas traditionally been marked by a duality of roles andmutual suspicion, civil–military cooperation (CIMIC)is now becoming codified, bureaucratised andinstitutionalised. Growing cooperation mirrors theincreasing coherence under the new humanitarianism.Michael Pugh argues that this growing cooperationcould make it more difficult for civil groups to developnon-statist ‘emancipatory’ responses to conflict.

According to Pugh, the separation of civilian and militaryactors rests on their different philosophical allegiancesand their different relationships with the state. Thesedistinctions have limited the extent of cooperation. Asdescribed by Pugh, military and police forces are ‘stateservants’ with hierarchical structures, regular funding andlogistics capabilities. In contrast, many non-governmentalagencies have diffuse allegiances and divided loyalties.These have placed them at a disadvantage in theconfiguration of civil–military relations.

Non-governmental organisations have the potential towork in local communities in ways that reach groupswithout power, while the military is not concerned withempowering the vulnerable. Pugh therefore argues thatcivilian organisations represent non-statist, cosmopolitanapproaches to humanitarian emergencies. A cosmo-politan approach emphasises individual rights over stateinterests, and gives voice to groups that are ignored ordisadvantaged. Cosmopolitanism is based on civil societynetworks, epistemic communities and regional associations.

There was disagreement at the conference with thecharacterisation of civil groups as emancipatory, and themilitary as hegemonic and hierarchical. One participantasked about the hegemonic tendencies in some non-governmental groups. Pugh believes, however, that eventhough hegemony does exist in some non-statistorganisations, these organisations are still more likelyto be able to identify non-statist groups in othercountries that could be empowered and given voice.Empower ing people who do not have voice isemancipatory in that it can counteract some of therepressive features of states.

Pugh therefore believes that the erosion of the distinctionbetween military and civilian and the increased level ofcooperation represent a problem in terms of theemancipatory and cosmopolitan potential of civilorganisations. He argues that the institutionalisation ofCIMIC has been dominated by military approaches thatemerged in the responses to crises in Bosnia andSomalia. When dominated by the military, as in thesetwo cases, coordination is hierarchical and hegemonic.In addition, the military cannot uphold humanitarianprinciples while simultaneously enforcing a peace, orfighting a war.

Civilian groups have made efforts to professionalise andcollaborate with their military counterparts, but this hasnot resulted in a more cosmopolitan baseline of non-state allegiance. Rather, as outlined by Pugh, Macrae,Woodward and Duffield, humanitar ian actors areincreasingly co-opted into an aid paradigm dominatedby neo-liberal statism and politics.

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Chapter 5Humanitarian Principles

Neutrality is the most debated and contestedhumanitarian principle; at the conference, there wasdisagreement about its meaning, effectiveness andmorality. The traditional notion of neutrality may havebeen associated with silence, but agencies such asMédecins Sans Frontières (MSF) claim to work in the‘spirit of neutrality’. They will denounce parties thatbreach international humanitarian law and commithuman-rights abuses, but will not put themselves into aposition of solidarity with any particular side in theconflict.

According to Pasquier, in an operational contextneutrality means that humanitarian workers must standapart from the political issues at stake in a conflict. Yetthe expansion of the sphere of humanitarian work toinclude conflict resolution, peacebuilding and peaceenforcement gives rise to ambiguities and necessitatesthe abandonment of neutrality. Pasquier and others fearthat a loss of neutrality risks compromising humanitarianimmunity and threatens access to victims. Someparticipants at the conference believed that humanitarianaction might not be possible once neutrality is lost. Forinstance, Pasquier points out that the neutrality principledoes not oblige agencies to remain neutral under allcircumstances, but that agencies need to recognise thatif neutrality has to be abandoned, doing so signals togovernments that other kinds of action beyond the scopeof humanitarians are necessary.

However, conference participants who tended to supportthe move towards increased political and humanitariancoherence felt that agencies should abandon the conceptof neutrality altogether, and side with the victims.According to this view, neutrality can actually be anunethical position. But, according to Macrae, the ‘side’in question is increasingly defined by the ethics of liberalpeace.

There was, therefore, agreement at the conference thatthe traditional principles of humanitarian action do notcorrespond to the new pr inciples underlying themerging of humanitarian aid and politics. There wasdisagreement, however, about whether a change inhumanitarian principles is necessary and/or desirable.Some participants felt that there was a need to rethinkthe traditional principles, and to create and clarify newones based on solidarity and rights. Others believed itnecessary to breathe new life into old humanitarianprinciples, rather than abandon them altogether. Fox, forinstance, believes that politicians should do politics,human-rights organisations should do human-rightswork, and humanitar ian aid should be based ontraditional principles of humanity, neutrality and the

At the heart of the debate over the place of politics inhumanitar ian assistance is the question of whichprinciples should guide humanitarian action. A key issueis whether the traditional principles of humanitarianismhave failed, as suggested by Bowden and Slim, or whetherthere are more serious problems associated with the newprinciples, as argued by Fox and André Pasquier.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)has an ethical framework known as its fundamentalprinciples, or principles of humanitarian action. Theseprinciples – universality, impartiality, independence andneutrality – define and delimit the humanitarian spacewithin which the ICRC operates. These Red Crossprinciples have had a profound impact on wider human-itarianism. Within humanitarian agencies, there has beenagreement on the ‘humanitarian imperative’ – the idea thathuman suffering necessitates a response. There is also wideagreement on the principles of impartiality and universality.The principles of neutrality and independence have alsobeen borrowed by other humanitarian agencies, althoughmore equivocally, and by fewer organisations.8

According to Pasquier, the new form of politicisation ofhumanitar ian aid may challenge all four of theseprinciples. Universality and impartiality imply thathumanitarian action should reach all conflict victims, nomatter where they are, or which side they support.Impartiality means that humanitarian response shouldbe guided by need alone, and that there should be nodistinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ beneficiaries. Yetby subordinating humanitarian objectives to political andstrategic ones, some victims may be seen as moredeserving than others, and impartiality is foregone. Forinstance, Skuric-Prodanovic shows that the level ofhumanitarian response in Serbia in the second half of1999 was much lower than in Albania and Macedonia.In Montenegro, humanitarian aid was also more thanabundant. These differences did not correspond todifferent levels of need. Skuric-Prodanovic argues thatfew donors were willing to fund humanitarian assistancein Serbia, and few international NGOs were willing toface the difficulties of working there, and therefore chosethe more prominent and ‘politically correct’ Kosovo,Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.

The principle of independence contradicts the growingcoherence between political objectives and humanitarianaid. Many humanitarian agencies remain dependent onfinancial support from major donor states, thus violatingthe independence principle. Yet without independence,Pasquier claims that humanitar ian action cannotlegitimately assert itself as a moral counterforce vis-à-visthe belligerents, and impartial action is made more difficult.

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universal right to relief. She argues that there may be aneed to reform the humanitarian system in response to

the changing context of conflict, but not to abandon theprinciples and values underlying it.

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6.1 The Debate

One of the most contentious issues at the conferencewas whether responding to needs or upholding rightsshould be the basic approach governing the work ofhumanitarians. There are contradictory views on thiswithin the humanitarian community, and many of thesedivergences were reflected in the discussion. In particular,there was debate about whether humanitarian actionshould be considered an act of char ity, or aninternationally and legally agreed obligation.

Slim sees human rights as the appropriate basis for thelegitimacy of humanitarianism. He makes a distinctionbetween humanitar ianism based on char ity andhumanitarianism based on rights, and applauds the shifttowards a more rights-based approach in the 1990s. Hesees this as a ‘move from the sentimental, paternalisticand privileged discourse of philanthropy and charity, tothe political, egalitarian and empowering ideology ofrights and duties’.

According to Slim, grounding humanitarian action inrights, duties and laws, rather than in principles, makesthe values of humanitarian work explicit to everyone,and gives humanitarianism an integrated moral, politicaland legal framework to affirm universal human values.Rights also dignify individuals, rather than patronisingthem. Victims of conflict become claimants of rights,rather than objects of charity. Therefore, according toSlim, a rights-based approach allows humanitarians toconnect with a ‘proper politicisation’ that goes beyondhumanitarian protection, and that is grounded in naturalrights and justice.

Fox, on the other hand, lists some concerns aroundembracing a rights-based approach to humanitarianism.First, she believes that it conflicts with the universal rightto relief aid, and can mean that it becomes morallyjustifiable to leave individuals without aid for politicalreasons. It creates what Oxfam’s Nick Stockton has called‘undeserving victims’. A rights-based approach demandsthat all humanitarian aid be judged on how it contributesto the protection and promotion of human rights, thusallowing for conditionality in the delivery of relief. TheECHO discussion paper on this subject (ECHO, 1999)states that:

From a rights-based perspective, access to thevictims of a humanitarian crisis is not an endin itself, and will therefore not be pursued atany cost. Access will be sought if it is the mosteffective way to contribute to the humanrights situation.9

Chapter 6The Needs Versus Rights Debate

Second, Fox argues that a rights-based approach meansabandoning neutrality. Third, such an approach couldbecome a new form of colonialism, wherebyhumanitarian aid is to transform people, institutions andsocieties in the image of the West. Lastly, Fox argues thathuman-rights agencies such as Amnesty International arebetter placed and better trained to promote human rights.

Advocates of rights-based approaches and advocates ofneeds-based approaches disagree on accountability.Among supporters of needs-based humanitarianism,there is a belief that rights-based conditionalities canallow donors to get away with any negative humanitarianconsequences of politicisation, despite evidence of theineffectiveness of human-rights conditionality. Forexample, Atmar argues that aid conditionalities inAfghanistan have made little impact in terms of enhancingr ights, but they have had negative humanitar ianconsequences. Rights advocates, on the other hand, arguethat international humanitarian and human rights laware useful tools to hold governments, donors andindividuals to account.

There were questions as to what a rights-based approachwould mean in practice for humanitar ians. Someparticipants believed that the dichotomy between needsand rights was not necessarily useful, and that thisdistinction could take the debate backwards, rather thanpush it forward. While a rights-based approach isfrequently associated with coherence, and a needs-basedone with traditional humanitarianism, there are problemswith this simple distinction. For instance, does the rightto humanitarian assistance fall under the category ofneeds or rights? Under a needs-based approach it ismorally unjustifiable to disburse different amounts ofaid to different populations facing the same humanitarianneeds. Yet likewise, when humanitarianism is groundedin rights, Slim argues that it is impossible to justifywithholding aid in favour of some other political purpose,because this violates the right to relief.

There was also a degree of confusion about what kindof rights would be included in a rights-based approach.For instance, does everyone have the right to food, healthcare and shelter? While most participants seemed tobelieve that the right to relief was fundamental, thereare other more difficult areas. Is protection a key right?Some participants felt that the distinction between needsand rights sometimes makes it difficult to see howhumanitarian protection is secured.

The fundamental question about a rights-based approachconcerns the problem of what to do when some rightsrub up against others. Is there a hierarchy of rights? Do

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some rights take precedence over others, and if so, is itthe responsibility of humanitarians to work towards the‘higher priority’ ones? Who sets the order of priority?Can some rights be traded for others?

According to Slim, the answers to these questions lie ininternational humanitarian and human rights law. Ther ights enshr ined in these documents should takeprecedence. Slim acknowledges the risk that ‘rights-talk’can be co-opted by other political interests, but believesthat this can be rectified if humanitarian agencies areclearer about what is meant by the rights of victims.

6.2 Legal Instruments

Slim believes that the foundations for a rights-basedapproach to humanitar ianism lie in internationalhumanitarian and human rights law. He argues that theselaws can act as specific standards of practice against whicheveryone can be held to account. Among advocates ofrights-based humanitarianism, there is a belief thatgathering communities around these legal instrumentsis potentially much more powerful than relying on thetraditional pr inciples of humanity, impartiality andneutrality which underlie the needs-based approach.

In the case of the ICRC, Pasquier states that morallegitimacy is granted through the set of humanitarian

principles described above, and that legal legitimacy isgranted through the legal framework comprising theGeneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.Humanitarian treaties are the legal expression of thehumanitarian principles of humanity, universality andimpartiality. According to Pasquier, humanitarian spacemay need to be redefined, but this should be donethrough a reworking of the major humanitar ianconventions, without deviating from their underlyingprinciples.

In contrast to Slim and some other conferenceparticipants, who believe that the distinction betweeninternational humanitarian law and human-rights law ispotentially counter-productive, Pasquier believes that itis important. Humanitarian law sets limits on violencein war. It defines the responsibilities of states, and therights of victims and non-state actors, in terms of statespursuing their obligations to provide humanitarianassistance and protection. Human-rights law is primarilya code of behaviour for good governance in peacetime,rather than for the conduct of war. In a conflict, arguesPasquier, priorities are not the same as in peacetime. Thus,even though there is some convergence betweenhumanitarian and human rights regimes, there areessential differences as to their objectives, and thesituations to which they apply.

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Chapter 7Conclusion

Despite the different views on the appropriate place ofpolitics within humanitarianism, there was an overarchingcall for clarity and understanding. This referred both tothe language of humanitarianism, as well as the roles,interests and responsibilities of state and non-state actors.Humanitar ian agencies should be more politicallyconscious of their role. They must decide whether theywant to be co-opted by the state, act as a substitute for itwhere there is a vacuum, or contest its assumptions. Evenif organisations engage in activities such as the protectionof human rights, conflict resolution or peacebuilding,they need to be clear about who is doing what, andwhich principles are underlying their work.

Furthermore, humanitarian agencies need to clearlydefine and delimit their activities so that they can focuson doing their work without compromising the safetyof their staff, or the notion of humanitarian space andaccess. Agencies that adopt a political line could addressthe factors driving the crisis, as well as political constraintsin donor countries. The dilemmas of doing so, however,must be noted. It is difficult for humanitarian agenciesto remain operational, while simultaneously conductingactivities perceived as political by host governments andwarring parties.

The need for clarity also extends to the language ofhumanitar ianism. There was a suggestion at theconference that the word ‘humanitarian’ should betrademarked, and should refer only to actions that meethumanitar ian cr iter ia. Aid should only be calledhumanitarian when it is provided in accordance withhumanitarian principles. Agencies may choose to engagein political and conflict-reduction interventions, butthese should not be called humanitarian. Similarly, theterm ‘humanitarian intervention’ really refers to militaryintervention, and should not be confused withhumanitarianism.

Humanitar ianism comprises a core set of values,including a shared belief in accountability to the peoplewho are being helped. The key question is how to ensurethat this accountability exists, and how to placehumanitarian action on a moral footing, based on arespect for humanity. The changing context of conflict,as well as changes in the international system, have ledto forms of politicisation of humanitarian action that maybe problematic. This report, and the conference on 1February, have aimed to contribute to the debate on howto respond to such changes in a way that is consistentwith humanity, and with the interests of victims

This paper does not intend to present a consensusposition, or to offer concrete guidelines for action. Thiswould not be an accurate reflection of the discussion atthe conference, where very few concrete proposals andareas of consensus emerged. There was, however, a sensethat the discussion and debate around the coherenceagenda and the new humanitar ianism needed tocontinue, and that the encroachment of politics intohumanitarian space should be noted and understood.No matter what side of the debate one stands on, thereis a conflict between the principles of neutrality andimpartiality, and conflict management. Humanitarianactors should be conscious of their roles, and should beclear about which principles they wish to uphold.

Some participants believed that there is a need forhumanitarian agencies to speak out much more stronglyto push back the political voice in the cur rentpoliticisation of humanitarian assistance. According tothis view, humanitarian agencies have a responsibility tocraft a renewed consensus on humanitarian principlesto counteract the growing politicisation of aid.

Even among those who challenge the growingpoliticisation of humanitarian aid, there is a belief thathumanitarian aid should not be a substitute for effectivepolitical action. The debate around the merging ofpolitics with humanitarian aid is not a call for theabandonment of politics. On the contrary, as Macraeargues, politics should be strengthened and theidentification of new and effective methods of politicalintervention should be a priority. There needs to begreater investment in diplomacy in non-strategic areas.The merging of humanitarian aid and politics can maskthe absence of political action, but humanitarian aid wasnever intended to do more than relieve acute sufferinguntil others find a solution to the underlying crisis.

Other participants suggested that the dichotomy betweenthe old and new humanitarianism should be abandoned.Instead, the debate should be thought of in terms of aspectrum, with extreme political dominance overhumanitar ian issues at one end, and purehumanitarianism, with its emphasis on neutrality andindependence, at the other. Each humanitarian agencyneeds to find its own place on the spectrum accordingto its mandate and funding sources. An alternativesuggestion was to emphasise complementarity, ratherthan coherence. Complementar ity emphasises thedifferent tasks and roles of different actors. There werecalls for research to see whether complementarity ispossible, and to establish its ‘rules’.

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Endnotes1 OXFAM calculated that donor governments gave $207for every person in need in response to the UN appealfor Kosovo and the rest of former Yugoslavia in 1999,but only $16 per capita for targeted beneficiaries in SierraLeone in response to a UN appeal in the same year(OXFAM, 2000)

2 See the report on this conference: Dylan Hendrickson,Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New ReliefAgenda and Its Limits, RRN Network Paper 25 (London:Relief and Rehabilitation Network, April 1998). Thepapers from the conference can be found in a specialissue of Disasters, vol. 22, no. 4, December 1998.

3 See Joanna Macrae and Nicholas, Shifting Sands: TheSearch for Coherence Between Political and HumanitarianResponses to Complex Emergencies, HPG Report 8(London: ODI, August 2000).

4 Nicholas Leader and Joanna Macrae (eds), Terms ofEngagement: Conditions and Conditionality in HumanitarianAction, HPG Report 6 (London: ODI, July 2000).

5 Fiona Fox, ‘The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid: ADiscussion Paper for Caritas Europe’, June 2000.

6 This phrase gained currency with Mary Anderson, DoNo Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid(Boston, MA: Collaborative for Development, 1996).

7 The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ refers to militaryintervention justified on humanitarian grounds. Someconference participants felt that the term should not beused since it had nothing to do with what they consideredto be humanitarian action.

8 See Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Principle: The Principlesof Humanitarian Action in Practice, HPG Report 2 (London:ODI, March 2000).

9 Quoted at the conference by Fox from the ECHOdiscussion paper Towards a Human Rights Approach toEuropean Commission Humanitarian Aid (May 1999).

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Bibliography

Anderson, M. (1996), Do No Harm: Supporting LocalCapacities for Peace Through Aid, Boston, MA:Collaborative for Development

Disasters (December 1998) Special Issue: The Emperor’sNew Clothers: Charting the Erosion of HumanitarianPrinciples. Vol. 22, No. 4

ECHO (May 1999), Towards a Human Rights Approach toEuropean Commission Humanitar ian Aid, ECHODiscussion Paper, Brussels

Fox, F. (June 2000), ‘The Politicisation of HumanitarianAid’ a Discussion Paper for Caritas Europe’

Hendrickson, D. (April 1998), Humanitarian Action inProtracted Crises: The New Relief Agenda and Its Limits,RRN Network Paper No. 25, London: ODI

Leader, N. (March 2000), The Politics of Principle: ThePrinciples of Humanitarian Action in Practice, HPG ReportNo. 2, London: ODI

Leader, N. and J. Macrae (eds) (July 2000), Terms ofEngagement: Conditions and Conditionality in HumanitarianAction, HPG Report No. 6, London: ODI

Macrae, J. and N. Leader (August 2000), Shifting Sands:The Search for Coherence Between Political and HumanitarianResponses to Complex Emergencies, HPG Report No. 8,London: ODI

OXFAM (May 2000), An End to Forgotten Emergencies,OXFAM Briefing, Oxford: OXFAM GB.

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Annex 1Abstracts of Conference Papers

The full text of each abstract is available on the HPG website at <www.odi.org/hpg/aidand politics.html>. Thepapers will be published in a special issue of the journal Disasters in December 2001.

The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and Its Consequences for Afghans

Mohammed Haneef Atmar

This paper examines the consequences of thepoliticisation of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.First, it looks at how the West’s response to thehumanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has been based onnar row domestic and foreign-policy concerns,characterised by a mixture of strategic withdrawal,containment and single-issue aggression. Second, itexplains how the principle of the impartiality ofhumanitarianism in Afghanistan has fallen victim to thepolitical considerations of donor states. Donors have tiedtheir assistance to the Taliban’s progress on policies and

practice, and issues of terrorism, drugs and peace. Punitivehumanitarian conditionalities – including on security,gender equality and development/capacity-building –are only punishing the victims, and have not significantlyenhanced the rights of Afghans. Lastly, the paper looksat how the establishment of systemic accountability iskey to a change in the current state of affairs inAfghanistan.Haneef Atmar works with Norwegian Church Aid inAfghanistan.

Responding to Conflict in Africa

Mark Bowden

humanitarian action can rarely be guaranteed by militaryintervention. Instead, it should be guaranteed by, andbased on, negotiation, and on an acceptance of theimportance and value of humanitar ian assistance.Governments and the international community as a wholeneed to develop a coherent strategy, while recognisingthat each actor has a unique role to play.Mark Bowden is the Conflict Management Adviser to the AfricaCommand of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Heis on secondment from Save the Children (UK), where he wasRegional Director for East and Central Africa.

Governing the Borderlands

Mark Duffieldmetropolitan states have not lost influence in this process;on the contrary, they have been innovative in shapingmetropolitan–borderland relations. With this in mind,the paper seeks to answer three questions.

1. Why do non-state actors dominate the internationalisationof public policy, especially at an operational level?Privatisation as a form of governmental rationalityhas grown in influence due to the changing nature ofsecurity. A new non-state security framework hasemerged. Within this paradigm, the threat is not inter-state conflict but instability in the borderlands; theaim is no longer to form alliances with borderlandstates but to change the behaviour of the people living

This paper looks at the international response to conflictin Africa, and argues that the current effort to achievegreater complementarity in the response of variousgovernment departments and non-governmentalorganisations is a positive development. The paper arguesthat the nature of war has changed, and that this haschallenged the ways that the international communitydeals with it. In response to new kinds of factionalwarfare, aid donors and humanitarian agencies havepursued strongly interventionist policies. These have,however, shown little signs of success. Access for

This paper examines aid as a technology of government– as something that has the power to reorder therelationship between people and things to achievedesired outcomes. Since the 1970s, metropolitan non-state and private actors have greatly increased theireconomic, social and political influence in theborderlands. Beginning with economic management,this governmental responsibility has progressivelydeepened to include development, social welfare and,during the 1990s, humanitarian action, governance andsecurity. In many respects, the management of publicpolicy in the ‘borderlands’ has been significantlyinternationalised and pr ivatised. At the same time,however, while the nature of their authority has changed,

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within them. Using the weapons of poverty reduction,conflict resolution and social reconstruction, the nameof this non-state security framework is development.

2. What special or particular way of understanding theborderlands best suits the needs of a governmental rationalitybased on privatisation? Instability in the borderlands isseen as originating in a developmental malaise ofpoverty and weak institutions; under-developmenthas become dangerous, and modernisation can nolonger be left to chance. Through the developmentof actuarial forms of analysis, populations are nolonger seen as combinations of individuals and socialgroups, but as hierarchies of risk. The borderlandshave been remapped and ranked according to suchrisk factors.

3. How do metropolitan states govern the borderlands throughnon-state actors? New forms of regulation andprofessional auditing have been introduced into non-

state organisations and, in particular, into themanagement of the public–private networks that linkstate and non-state actors. Performance indicators,codes of conduct and the benchmarking of standardshave made professional conduct transparent tooutside monitoring and evaluation.

While we can question the effectiveness of developmentas security, actuarial risk analysis and the new techniquesof network management, they all constitute a dynamicframework of inter-connected strategies and technologiesthrough which the borderlands are actively governed,and our common destinies shaped. If such radical anddisturbing words as ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’ are not to losetheir meaning, the certainties and assumptions ofinternational government must be questioned.Mark Duffield is Professor of Development, Democratisationand Conflict at the Institute for Politics and International Studies,University of Leeds.

The ‘New Humanitarianism’

Fiona Fox

agencies evaluate their humanitar ian-assistanceprogrammes on the basis of how they contribute tolonger-term sustainable development and peace. The‘new humanitarianism’ differs radically from traditionalprinciples of humanitarian relief, and is a move awayfrom the universal right to relief based on human need.This paper outlines several problems with this newapproach.Fiona Fox is Head of Media at CAFOD, UK.

The Politics of Coherence: The Formation of a New Orthodoxy on Linking Aid

and Political Responses to Chronic Political Emergencies

Joanna Macrae

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, aconsensus emerged between donor governments, theUN and many NGOs that there was a need to enhancethe ‘coherence’ between humanitarian and ‘political’responses to complex political emergencies. Closerintegration between aid and political responses was seento be necessary in order to address the root causes ofconflict-induced crises, and to ensure that aid did notexacerbate political tensions.

This paper explores the theory and practice of coherenceas it has evolved over the past decade. It argues that, bysleight of hand, the coherence agenda has beenreinterpreted such that humanitarian action has becomethe primary form of political action, rather than merely asubstitute for it. This integrationist approach has been

dr iven by geopolitical events, domestic policyconsiderations in donor countries and more parochialconcerns of aid policy, and is reflected in a number ofsignificant changes in the architecture of thehumanitarian system. Many of the tenets of this ‘newhumanitarianism’ have been embraced by the majorityof relief agencies, so legitimising it.

The paper concludes that political humanitarianism, asopposed to active engagement by international politicaland military actors, is flawed ethically and technically. Itwill provide neither an effective palliative for the ill-effects of war, nor address its causes.Joanna Macrae is a Research Fellow at the ODI, working inthe Humanitarian Policy Group.

This paper outlines the changing nature of humanitarianaction. It examines features of the ‘new humanitarianism’,under which humanitarian action has taken on a muchmore explicit political role. There are two main aspectsto the ‘new humanitar ianism’: human r ights anddevelopmental relief . The r ights-based approachdemands that all humanitarian aid be judged on how itcontributes to the protection and promotion of humanrights. The developmental approach demands that

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Constructing Legitimacy

André Pasquier

Today’s questioning of the legitimacy of humanitarianaction reflects the differences that exist within ahumanitarian community which now comprises a verylarge number of agencies with divergent views as totheir role. The resulting confusion can also be seen intheir dialogue with political players, who are themselvesdivided on the question of the role of states in crisismanagement, and that of humanitarian organisations inthe same crises. This situation mirrors a world whichnow operates in ‘deregulation mode’, where actionstaken by dominant states are governed by a pragmatismdictated by national and security interests, and an ethiccharacterised by ‘variable geography’. Another result ofthis state of affairs is that the humanitarian organisationseither find themselves alone in coping with situationsof chaos and unbridled violence that go beyond theircapacity for action and far exceed their mandates, or, atthe other extreme, see themselves relegated to thesidelines of operations conducted by those same statesin conflicts where their own political interests are at stake.Humanitarian action is therefore in danger of beingturned into an ‘all-purpose’ activity which, for lack of aclear framework, fluctuates with the fads and ideologies

of the day, with changes in state interests and with theevolution of conflicts.

To what extent can humanitarian action fill the vacuumcreated by the lack of a consistent and predictableworldwide political system, without seeing its ownlegitimacy seriously challenged? This paper looks foranswers in the vast accumulated experience of theICRC, an organisation which has played a key role inthe development of the modern concept ofhumanitarian action and of international humanitarianlaw. The ICRC’s legitimacy in providing humanitarianassistance and protection to war victims has traditionallybeen upheld by three elements. The first is a set ofprinciples whose raison d’être is to mark out and definethe humanitarian space within which it operates. Thesecond is a legal framework made up of the 1949Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of1977, which enjoys universal acceptance. The third isthe product of time, the legitimacy acquired throughactivities conducted in the long term.André Pasquier is Political Adviser at the ICRC.

Civil–Military Relations in Peace Support Operations:

Hegemony or Emancipation?

Michael Pugh

Civilian agencies represent non-statist, evencosmopolitan, approaches to humanitarian emergencies.This distinctiveness safeguards the integr ity ofemancipatory responses to contemporary conflicts.However, the apparent trends towards the enfeeblementof international organisations and the integration ofNGOs into state-based relief efforts is a considerablechallenge to the cosmopolitan potential of civilianagencies. The institutionalisation of civil–militarycooperation (CIMIC) is one aspect of this trend. It seems

to manifest a military-driven hegemonic approach thatemerged from the interventions in Somalia and theBalkans. Practice may not yet demonstrate an overridingstate-centric and militarising trend, but CIMIC doctrineand the process of arriving at it implies a weakening ofthe cosmopolitan project for emancipating civil societyfrom abuse.Michael Pugh is Director of the International Studies ResearchCentre, Department of Politics, University of Plymouth.

Psychosocial Intervention: Governing at a Distance?

Vanessa Pupavac

This paper analyses psychosocial intervention as a newform of international therapeutic governance based onsocial r isk management. First, it examines theinternational psychosocial model and its origins in anAnglo-American therapeutic ethos. Second, it arguesthat psychosocial approaches jeopardise local copingstrategies. Third, it highlights the potential political, social

and psychological consequences of the pathologisationof war-affected societies. Finally, the paper concludesthat therapeutic governance represents the reduction ofpolitics to administration.Vanessa Pupavac is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Law and SocialSciences, University of Nottingham.

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Serbia: Exclusion and Its Consequences

Marina Skuric-ProdanovicThis paper considers the phenomenon of exclusion inthe allocation of humanitarian aid to Serbia betweenthe end of the NATO intervention in June 1999 andthe October 2000 revolution. During this period, thepolitical conditionality attached to Western aid policy,as well as excessive caution on a number of fronts, ledto distinctions being made between vulnerable groupsthat could not be justified by a comparison of their levelof need. The paper considers the comparative exclusionof Serbia in relation to other parts of the Balkans; thelevels of exclusion in relation to beneficiary groups andgeographical areas within Serbia (and the resultingalienation of vulnerable groups in local communities);

and the discriminatory exclusion and inclusion of localNGOs by drawing a comparison between Serbia andMontenegro. The tools for the inclusion and exclusionof certain groups from humanitarian aid were powerful,and easily manipulated so as to fit stated and unstatedpolitical aims. The paper concludes by raising somequestions to do with the long-term effects of exclusion,and providing recommendations for the future.Marina Skuric-Prodanovic is an independent consultant. Shehas contributed to the work of several local and regional NGOsin Eastern Europe, most recently with the regional networkTransitions to Democracy.

Not Philanthropy but Right: Rights-based Humanitarianism and the Proper

Politicisation of Humanitarian Philosophy

Hugo Slim

This paper traces the emergence of rights-basedhumanitarianism over the past decade. Following Kant,it draws a distinction between philanthropy and rightsas two different sources of humanitarian action – thefirst paternalistic and sentimental, the second politicaland empowering. It argues in favour of the latter as thepreferred practical expression of people’s moral andlegal rights in the face of organised violence and war.In particular, the paper identifies four main strengths of‘rights-talk’ in humanitarian action and diplomacy: itaddresses universal values; it dignifies rather thanpatronises those who claim their r ights; it activelyengages the duties and responsibilities of others; and itprovides objective measures of humanitar ianperformance by the violent and the humanitarian alike.

‘Humanitarian War’

Susan Woodward

The concepts of humanitar ian intervention andhumanitarian war emerged out of NATO’s bombingcampaign, Operation Allied Force, against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia in March–June 1999, as if aninvisible barrier had been broken and a precedent set.From Bosnia, by way of Somalia and Rwanda, toKosovo there has been an evolution in the way the majorpowers use humanitarian aid and its providers as a toolof power politics, and in the reordering of their relationsin a per iod of international realignment. Mostcommentary on the military action has focused on itslegality and legitimacy. If a precedent has indeed beenset, these issues matter. Far less attention has been paid,however, to the operational dilemmas of humanitarianassistance in conditions of war and national conflict, andthe evolving techniques of aid delivery by whichhumanitarian organisations became major actors in thisevolution.

This paper describes and analyses the relation between

The paper also highlights the risks of ‘rights-talk’ inhumanitarianism. It notes five in particular: an unhelpfulutopianism; the cultural and political contestation ofhuman rights; their legal bias; their lack of narrative;and their essential contingency when compared to morefundamental and less elaborated values, such ashumanity. The paper concludes that the move to rights-based humanitarianism should proceed in earnest tosupersede the colonial legacy of humanitar ianphilanthropy, and help to shape new forms of localpolitical contract to restrain violence in politics andeconomics. But at the same time, such moves should beaccompanied with caution, and with efforts to mitigatethe dangers of such an approach.Hugo Slim is Senior Lecturer in International Humanitarianismat Oxford Brookes University.

the Yugoslav wars and the humanitarian impulse as abetter way to determine whether a precedent has indeedbeen set, and a die cast. Are the concepts of safe havens/areas; the capture of capitals and their airports for aiddelivery; the food drops, no-fly zones, blue corridorsprotected by ‘peacekeeping’ soldiers, peacekeepingtraining with representatives of humanitarian agencies;aid conditionality on the grounds of justice; and refugeereturn to reverse ethnic cleansing all now part of theaccepted tool kit? Has their use as instruments of warbeen analysed sufficiently? What are the consequencesof the role of humanitarian agencies and NGOs inimplementing ceasefire agreements, peace agreementsand post-war nation-building?Susan Woodward is Professor of Political Science at the CityUniversity of New York’s Graduate School and UniversityCenter; a Senior Visiting Fellow at the International Institutefor Strategic Studies, London; and a Visiting Fellow at theLondon School of Economics and Political Science.

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Annex 2Conference Agenda

9.00–9.30 Registration

9.30–9.45 Opening Remarks by the OrganisersSimon Maxwell, ODIMark Duffield, POLIS, University of LeedsMatthew Carter, CAFOD/Caritas

9.45–10.30Session 1: Tales of the UnexpectedFiona Fox, CAFOD/Caritas

The seminar will open with an overview of the politicisation of humanitarian aid and its wider implications.Politicisation is not new. The issue, therefore, is not whether humanitarian aid is political, but how it is political, withan analysis of how it is being pushed into new political roles. This session will explore some of the unexpected andsurprising connections of such terms as ‘ethical humanitarianism’, ‘do no harm’ and a ‘rights-based approach’ withthe emergence of punitive aid conditionality, which can mean that humanitarian aid becomes donors’ principalform of engagement with some of the world’s poorest countries.

10.30–11.15 Session 2: The Politics of CoherenceJoanna Macrae, ODIMark Bowden, Save the Children UK

This session will explore the implications of attempts to forge greater coherence between humanitarian and politicalaction. As a result of the concern to better integrate political, military and humanitarian responses, to what extentis humanitarian aid being used as a strategic tool to fulfil political objectives? Is it appropriate to use humanitarianaid as a means of managing conflict? What are the implications for the traditional responsibilities and institutionaldivisions between humanitarian aid and foreign-policy departments? What should be the appropriate responses toaddress conflict?

11.15–11.45 Coffee/Tea Break

11.45–12.30 Session 3: Governing at a DistanceMark Duffield, POLIS, University of LeedsVanessa Pupavac, Nottingham University

Aid – both developmental and humanitarian – is associated with techniques for ordering relations between peopleand things to achieve desired aims. As a strategic tool, aid has found itself increasingly part of a new system ofsurveillance and risk management. Rather than helping under-developed countries to ‘catch up’, is aid now moreconcerned with equipping households and communities with the skills to survive scarcity and balance competingdemands in the interests of peace? What are the implications of using humanitarian assistance to support conflictresolution and social reconstruction? This session will explore these and other issues.

12.30–12.45 Summary/Morning Wrap-upPaul Smith-Lomas, Oxfam GB

12.45–2.00Lunch

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2.00–2.45 Session 4: ‘Humanitarian’ WarMichael Pugh, Plymouth UniversitySusan Woodward, City University of New York

Recent wars have brought together state and non-state actors in new ways. There has been much analysis of so-called war economies, based upon licit and illicit trans-border networks, as a means of survival and profit-seeking.More recently, we have witnessed ‘wars of value’, for example in Kosovo. What does this mean for the reworkingof public–private and civil–military relations? Specifically, what are the implications for humanitarian actors interms of how they are organised and mobilised? These developments go beyond our conventional understandingof what war is and how it is fought. They will be explored in this session.

2.45–3.30 Session 5: Constructing LegitimacyAndré Pasquier, ICRCHugo Slim, Oxford Brooks University

The legitimacy of humanitarian action can no longer be taken for granted. On the contested terrain of aid andconflict, ideas of neutrality and rights struggle to create an ethical framework for intervention. Constructing legitimacy– often by trying to establish the limits of the political – has become increasingly difficult. What are the implicationsof this for humanitarian space? Is the principle of neutrality still valid, and worth striving for? How can rights beestablished and protected?

3.30–4.00 Coffee/Tea Break

4.00–4.45 Session 6: Living with ExclusionHaneef Atmar, Norwegian Church Aid, AfghanistanMarina Skuric-Prodanovic, Independent Consultant/Transitions to Democracy

The consequence of development aid being used as a strategic tool to bring about political change, for examplethrough punitive conditionality, is that certain population groups are deemed fit for inclusion within internationalaid flows – while others are implicitly or explicitly excluded. At the extreme, in the form of sanctions and attemptsto control the movement of people, whole countries and their populations are contained and denied access toconventional economic, civic and political networks. What are the implications of this for the people in thosecountries?

4.45–5.30 Session 7: Conclusion – Refusing the ExpectedJohn Ryle, Independent Consultant (Moderator)

The concluding session allows for a more sustained response from the audience. The intention is to draw thevarious strands of the day together and to sketch the new politics of humanitarian aid and its consequences. Themain concern is to launch an informed debate aimed at establishing the limits of responsibility and dissent, andthus to begin to explore how humanitarian agencies might respond to the changing political context.

5.30–7.30 Closing Reception

There will be a closing reception hosted by the Department for International Development (DFID). Mr. ChristopherMullin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development, will give a short address.

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Annex 3List of Conference Participants

Dahlia AbbasResearch and Programme AssociateInternational Alert, UK

Remi AjibewaResearch and TrainingCo-ordinatorCentre for Democracy andDevelopment, UK

Tim AldredEmergencies Co-financing OfficerCAFOD, UK

Robert ArcherDirectorInternational Council on HumanRights Policy, Switzerland

Mohammed Hanneef AtmarProgramme ManagerAfghanistan ProgrammeNorwegian Church Aid, Pakistan

Tamsin AyliffeSenior Civil Society SpecialistConflict and Humanitarian AffairsDepartmentDFID, UK

David BanksPostgraduate research studentSchool of Oriental and AfricanStudies, UK

Mikael BarfodHead of UnitPolicy CoordinationECHO, Belgium

Jose Antonio BastosOperational DirectorMSF-Holland, The Netherlands

Claes BennedichSenior Evaluation OfficerDepartment for Evaluation andInternal AuditSIDA, Sweden

William BensonCommittee SpecialistInternational DevelopmentCommittee, UK

Kimberly BoerEpidemiologistLondon School of Hygiene andTropical Medicine, UK

John BortonCoordinatorALNAP SecretariatODI, UK

Mark BowdenAfrica and CommonwealthDepartmentForeign and CommonwealthOffice, UK (also SC-UK)

Mark BradburyIndependent Consultant, UK

Stephanie BrigdenProgramme ManagerChildren in Crisis, UK

Jenny BrownProgramme Funding OfficerInternational Alert, UK

Maggie BrownConsultantSphere Implementation TeamSphere Project, UK

Margie Buchanan-SmithCoordinatorHumanitarian Policy GroupODI, UK

David CampbellProfessor of International PoliticsDepartment of PoliticsUniversity of Newcastle, UK

Matthew CarterHead, Emergencies SupportSectionCAFOD, UK

Lucy CarverDatabase and Website ManagerALNAPODI, UK

Jean-François CautinRepresentativeBioforce, France

David ChandlerResearch FellowPolicy Research InstituteLeeds Metropolitan University, UK

Sarah CollinsonResearch FellowHumanitarian Policy GroupODI, UK

Cathy CorcoranHead of External RelationsCAFOD, UK

Alex CostyIndependent Consultant, Italy

Dominic CrowleyEmergency PreparednessCo-ordinatorEmergencies UnitConcern Worldwide, Ireland

Mary CullenHead of Communications andEducationScottish Catholic International AidFund, UK

Devon CurtisConference Coordinator andRapporteurODI, UK

Mark CuttsSenior Research OfficerUNHCR, Switzerland

Alyoscia D’OnofrioDirectorInternational Rescue Committee,UK

Nicola DahrendorfSenior Research Fellow, Conflict,Security and Development GroupCentre for Defence StudiesKing’s College, UK

Florence DaunisExecutive DirectorAction Against Hunger, UK

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Larry de BoiceDeputy DirectorERDUNDP, USA

Chris DolanInternational Research OfficerACORD, UK

Antonio DoniniDirectorUN OCHA AfghanistanPakistan

Mark DuffieldProfessor of Development andConflictInstitute for Politics andInternational StudiesUniversity of Leeds, UK

Alastair DuttonCAFOD, UK

Paul EnglishChief ExecutivePenal Reform International, UK

Helen FoakesPolicy OfficerWorld Vision, UK

Matthew FoleyDeputy CoordinatorHPNODI, UK

Fiona FoxCAFOD, UK

Pierre GallienInternational Liaison OfficerAction Against Hunger, France

Judith GardnerRegional Manager for Africa andMiddle EastICD DepartmentCIIR, UK

Neill GarvieEmergency UnitChristian Aid, UK

George GelberCAFOD, UK

Carolina GottardoCAFOD, UK

Paul GradyLecturerInternational CommonwealthStudiesLondon University, UK

Martin GriffithsDirectorHenry Dunant Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue,Switzerland

François GrunewaldManagerGroupe Urgence-Réhabilitation-Développement, France

Valerie GuarnieriSenior Policy AnalystStrategy and Policy DivisionWorld Food Programme, Italy

Karl Joakim GundelResearch FellowCentre for Development Research,Denmark

Mary HallawayCAFOD, UK

Kate HarrissonDesk OfficerUNDForeign and CommonwealthOffice, UK

Mary HealyCoordinator – Emergencies andCo-financing OverseasTrocaire, Ireland

Dylan HendricksonResearch Fellow, Conflict, Securityand Development GroupCentre for Defence StudiesKing’s College, UK

Caroline HughesLeverhulme Trust Special ResearchFellowSchool of PoliticsUniversity of Nottingham, UK

Karim HusseinResearch FellowRural Policy and EnvironmentGroupODI, UK

Josephine HuttonSchool of Oriental and AfricanStudies, UK

Pat JonesDeputy DirectorCAFOD, UK

Puthycheary JuitaHenry Dunant Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue,Switzerland

David KeenDevelopment StudiesLondon School of Economics andPolitical Science, UK

Carolyn KerrAssistant to Secretary GeneralInternational Alert, UK

Lesley Anne KnightCAFOD, UK

Robert LambertDirectorRedR, UK

Nicholas LeaderIndependent Consultant, UK

Kirk LeechAssistant DirectorWORLDwrite, UK

Jurgen LieserHead of DepartmentEmergency Aid CoordinationCaritas, Germany

Sean LoughnaConsultant ResearcherUNHCR, UK

Rebecca LovelaceProject Administrator, HPNHumanitarian Policy GroupODI, UK

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Sean LowrieSphere Training Managerc/o CARE International, UK

David LoynJournalistBBC World Affairs UnitBBC, UK

Barbara LuckhurstRedR, UK

Margaret LynchHead of Overseas ProgrammesScottish Catholic International AidFund, UK

Neil MacFarlaneProfessor of InternationalRelationsOxford University , UK

Wayne MacdonaldHeadPlanning, Monitoring andEvaluationICRC, Switzerland

Norman MacdonnellChief of OperationsInternational HumanitarianAssistance DivisionCIDA, Canada

Joanna MacraeResearch FellowHumanitarian Policy GroupODI, UK

Camilla MadsenRelief Officer/HMA PolicyRelief DepartmentDanChurchAid, Denmark

Simon MaxwellDirectorODI, UK

Joel McClellanExecutive SecretarySteering Committe forHumanitarian Response,Switzerland

Maurice McPartlandHead of Africa SectionCAFOD, UK

Anita MenghettiNGO/IO/Donor Coordinator,Office of Foreign DisasterAssistanceBureau of Humanitarian ResponseUSAID, USA

Luis Morago-NicolasResearch and Programme LearningOfficerActionAid, UK

Kylie MorrisJournalistBBC World Service, UK

Lucy MorrisHPG Group AdministratorODI, UK

Chris Mullin MPUndersecretary of State forInternational DevelopmentHouse of Commons, UK

Victor NylundProject Officer, HumanitarianPrinciplesOffice of Emergency ProgrammesUNICEF, USA

Steph O’ConnellAsia Programme OfficerCAFOD, UK

Fiona O’ReillyCoordinator, Emergency NutritionNetworkDepartment of Community Healthand General PracticeTrinity College, Ireland

James OrbinskiFormer President of MSFInternational, France

Anne PaludanIndependent Consultant, Denmark

Alison PickupResearcherRights and Humanity, UK

Sylvia PivettaIndependent Consultant, UK

Geoff PrescottIndependent Consultant, UK

Michael PughUniversity of Plymouth, UK

Vanessa PupavacSchool of PoliticsUniversity of Nottingham, UK

Nicola ReindorpResearch FellowHumanitarian Policy GroupODI, UK

Dieter ReinhardtUniversity of Osnabruck, Germany

Erich RiedlerHeadDepartment of Humanitarian AidMinistry of Foreign Affairs,Germany

Nik RilkoffResearch and Development/Advocacy DepartmentInternational Alert, UK

Sylvie RobertIndependent Consultant, France

Kate RobertsonALNAP Network AdministratorODI, UK

Richard RumseyProgramme Funding Team LeaderWorld Vision, UK

Peter RungeCoordinatorVENRO, Germany

John RyleIndependent Consultant, UK

Tomoko SatoAssistant Resident RepresentativeJapan International CooperationAgency, UK

Kevin SavageSchool of Oriental and AfricanStudies, UK

Johan SchaarHead of DivisionDivision for HumanitarianAssistance and NGOsSIDA, Sweden

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Jim SimmonsHead of International DivisionCAFOD, UK

Marina Skuric-ProdanovicIndependent Consultant/Transitions to Democracy, Croatia

Hugo SlimCentre for Development andEmergency PracticeOxford Brookes University, UK

Paul Smith-LomasDirectorHumanitarian DepartmentOXFAM GB, UK

Egbert SondorpSenior Lecturer, Public Health andHumanitarian AidHealth Policy UnitLondon School of Health andTropical Medicine, UK

Nick SouthernRegional ManagerCare International, UK

Howard StandenPolicy Advisor, HumanitarianAssistanceProgrammesCARE International, UK

Frances StevensonCoordinatorHPNODI, UK

Stephen TullHumanitarian Affairs OfficerOCHA, Switzerland

Ulrike von PilarExecutive DirectorMSF, Germany

Graham WalkerEditorThe World Today, UK

Anne WalshProgramme DirectorChildren’s Aid Direct, UK

Joanna WellsEmergencies OfficerEmergencies Unit – InternationalDivisionCAFOD, UK

Philip WhiteResearch OfficerSchool of GeographyUniversity of Leeds, UK

Peter WilesIndependent Consultant, UK

Andrew WilsonEastern Europe Programme OfficerCAFOD, UK

Elizabeth WinterIndependent Consultant, UK

Susan WoodwardProfessor of Political ScienceCity University of New York, USA

Deepali YadavResearcherRights and Humanity, UK

Roger YatesHead of EmergenciesActionAid, UK

Karel ZelenkaHead, International CooperationDepartmentCaritas International, Italy

Anthony ZwiSenior Lecturer, Health Policy UnitDepartment of Public Health andPolicyLondon School of Hygiene andTropical Medicine, UK

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