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Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

OUTPOST WARU.S. Marines from the Nevada

Battles to the Armisticeby Bernard C. Nalty

About the Author

Bernard C. Nalty, a memberof the Marine Corps histor-

ical program from October1956 to September 1961, col-laborated with Henry I. Shaw,Jr., and Edwin T. Turnbladh onCentral Pacific Drive, a vol-ume of the History of U. S.Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II. He also com-pleted more than 14 short his-torical studies, some of which appeared inLeatherneck magazine or the Marine Corps Gazette.He joined the history office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffin 1961, transferred in 1964 to the Air Force historyprogram, and retired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written oredited a number of publications, including Blacks inthe Military: Essential Documents, Strength for theFight: A History of Black Americans in the Military,The Vietnam War, Tigers Over Asia, Air Power and theFight for Khe Sanh, and Winged Shield, WingedSword: A History of the U.S. Air Force. In addition tocontributing to this series on the Korean War by writ-ing Stalemate: U.S. Marines from Bunker Hill to theHook, he took part in the Marines in World War IIcommemorative series, completing two pamphlets,Cape Gloucester: The Green Inferno and The Right toFight: African-American Marines in World War II.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marinesin the Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department ofDefense observance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costshave been defrayed in part by contributions from members of theMarine Corps Heritage Foundation. To plan and coordinate the KoreanWar commemorative events and activities of the Sea Services, the Navy,Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have formed the Sea Services KoreanWar Commemoration Committee, chaired by the Director, Navy Staff.For more information about the Sea Services’ commemorative effort,please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean War CommemorationCoordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265 (DSN288-7265), E-Mail: [email protected], Website: www.histo-ry.usmc.mil.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402002

PCN 190 0041 0400

SourcesThe best account of operations by

Marines during 1953, their role in estab-lishing the Demilitarized Zone, and theireventual withdrawal from South Koreaappears in Operations in West Korea,volume five of U. S. Marine CorpsOperations in Korea, 1950-1953(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972),by LtCol Pat Meid, USMCR, and MajJames M. Yingling, USMC.

The Marine Corps historical programalso has dealt thoroughly with the treat-ment received by Marines held as pris-oners of war, their reaction to depriva-tion and hostile pressure, and theirrepatriation. James Angus MacDonaldhas made extensive use of interviewswith former prisoners in his TheProblems of U. S. Marine Corps Prisonersof War in Korea, published by theHistory and Museums Division,Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, in1988.

Walter G. Hermes discusses Marine

Corps operations in his contribution tothe official history of Army activity dur-ing the Korean War, Truce Tent andFighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Officeof the Chief of Military History, 1966), avolume that deals with negotiation aswell as fighting.

Martin Russ, a wartime Marine Corpsinfantryman, has written the best knownand most revealing memoir covering thefinal months of the fighting, The LastParallel: A Marine’s War Journal (NewYork: Rinehart, 1957).

Personal accounts by other Marinesappear in Korean Vignettes: Faces ofWar (Portland, OR: Artwork Publica-tions, 1996), a compilation of narrativesand photographs by 201 veterans of theKorean War, prepared by Arthur W.Wilson and Norman L. Stickbine.

Valuable insights and first-handaccounts are also available in TheKorean War: The Uncertain Victory; TheConcluding Volume of an Oral History(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1988), by Donald Knox with additionaltext by Alfred Coppel.

William H, Jantzen, a participant inone of the fiercer actions of 1953, haswritten a riveting account of that fight in“A Bad Night at Reno Block,” in theMarch 1998 issue of Leatherneck maga-zine.

The Marine Corps Gazette has ana-lyzed the tactics and lessons learned ofthe Korean War in three especially use-ful articles: Peter Braestrup’s “OutpostWarfare” (November 1953) and “Back tothe Trenches” (March 1955); and“Random Notes on Korea” (November1955) by LtCol Roy A. Batterton. Also ofuse was the article by MSgt PaulSarokin, “Going Home,” in the May 1955issue of Leatherneck.

The personal papers collection of theMarine Corps history program containsjournals, photographs, letters, memoirs,and at least one academic paper, a mas-ter’s thesis on outpost warfare by aMarine, Maj Norman W, Hicks. Forevents of the year 1953, the most valu-able of these items were the submis-sions by Eldon D. Allen and Gen VernonE. Megee.

hen 1953 began, theJamestown Line hadbecome, in thewords of MarineCorporal Robert Hall

who fought there, “a messy, ram-bling series of ditches five to sevenfeet deep” that linked a successionof bunkers constructed of sand-bags and timber and used for shel-ter or fighting. The trencheswandered erratically to preventChinese attackers who penetratedthe perimeter from deliveringdeadly enfilade fire along lengthy,straight segments. As for thebunkers themselves, since “pilesof trash, ration cans, scrap paper,and protruding stove pipes”revealed their location, the enemy“must have known where everybunker was.”

A bunker, therefore, could easi-ly become a death trap. As aresult, the Marines had learned todig and man fighting holes outsidethe bunkers. Hall described such ahole as “simply a niche in the for-ward wall of the trench, usuallycovered with planks and a fewsandbags.” Within the hole, acrude shelf held hand grenades

and a sound-powered telephonelinked the hole to the companycommand post. Along with thefighting holes, Hall and his fellowMarines dug “rabbit holes,” emer-gency shelters near the bottom ofthe trench wall that provided “pro-tection from the stray Chinesemortar round that sometimesdropped into the trench.”

Some bunkers contained firingports for .30-caliber or .50-calibermachine guns and accommoda-tions for the crews. Chicken wirestrung across the firing ports pre-vented Chinese assault troopsfrom throwing grenades inside,but fire from the machine gunssoon tore away the wire, whichcould be replaced only at nightwhen darkness provided conceal-

ment from Chinese observers.Other bunkers served as living

quarters for five to 10 Marines andmight also provide a brief respitefor those standing watch in therain or cold. Because of theemphasis on fighting holes, theliving bunkers that Hall remem-bered had no firing apertures andsometimes a curtain of blanketwool or canvas instead of a door.Candles, shielded so they wouldnot attract Chinese fire, providedlight, and kerosene or oil stoves,vented through the roof, suppliedheat. The more elaborate livingbunkers to the rear of the mainline of resistance had electriclights, the power produced bygasoline generators.

By night, during the early

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OUTPOST WARU.S. Marines from the Nevada Battles

to the Armisticeby Bernard C. Nalty

ON THE COVER: Spotting targets ofopportunity, a Marine crew fires its75mm recoilless rifle directly againstenemy bunkers. National ArchivesPhoto (USMC) 127-N-A170206AT LEFT: A Marine packs his gearbefore leaving Korea following thesigning of the armistice in July 1953.National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626452

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167141

By the end of 1952, the 1st Marine Division defended a static main line of resis-tance and its outposts, fighting from trenches, covered holes, and bunkers likethese manned by Company E, 2d Battalions, 7th Marines.

months of 1953, a cold wind usuallyblew from the north, sometimesbringing with it the sound ofChinese loudspeakers broadcast-ing English-language appeals tosurrender, interspersed with coun-try music. The enemy’s propagan-da tended to reflect Communistideology, urging members of theUnited Nations forces to escapetheir capitalist masters. The

Chinese, however, also tried totake advantage of the fact that thecombatants in Korea were dis-cussing a ceasefire even as theyfought. Since the summer of 1951,truce talks had taken place atKaesong and later at Panmunjom,with the United Nations delegationtraveling to the site of the talksthrough a carefully marked demil-itarized corridor. When the talks

seemed to be making progress,the Chinese used a more subtleapproach, trying to persuademembers of the United Nationsforces not to risk their lives in a warthat had almost ended.

Despite cold-weather clothingand insulated boots, the chill ofthe winter night could numb thesenses. As a result, a Marine usual-ly stood nighttime watch in a fight-ing hole for 30 to 45 minutesbefore warming himself in a near-by bunker. On some nights,Corporal Hall recalled, an outgoingsalvo or ripple of 4.5-inch rocketsmight swish overhead to explodeon some distant hill. “All throughthe night,” he said, “there weresporadic shots, grenades going off,artillery fire”—as outposts cameunder attack, ambushes were trig-gered, and patrols drew fire—and“at first light a ripple of randomshots would greet the new day,”as visibility improved revealingtargets previously hidden by dark-ness.

From time to time, Marinesmanning the Jamestown Line got abrief respite from the danger, ten-sion, and discomfort. “One of themost pleasurable things” in movingoff the line, said Corporal Hall,“was to walk back to battalion fora hot meal and a shower.” AMarine just come from the battle-field could sit down to the kind ofmeal he might have been served ata mess hall in the United States,eat at his own pace instead of thetempo set by the mess sergeant,have a hot shower in tents modifiedfor that purpose, and exchange afilthy uniform for a clean one. Alaundered utility jacket, formerlyworn by a staff sergeant whosechevrons remained in place, mightbe issued to a corporal like Hall.After a trip to the shower, he said,“you could never be sure about aperson’s rank unless you knewhim.”

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Marines on the battle line, whocould not be reached with foodprepared at field kitchens andbrought forward in insulated con-tainers, relied on C-rations easilytransported in cardboard boxesand quickly prepared. The C-ration featured canned foods likesausage patties in gravy, cornedbeef hash, or beans and frank-furters that could be heated over aSterno flame, along with candy, acookie, crackers, instant coffee,cigarettes, canned fruit, toiletpaper, and an ingenious can open-er. Although the object of many ajoke, C-rations were “quite re-markable” in the opinion of oneMarine. “Everything was used,” hesaid, “even the oiled cardboardbox into which a person couldrelieve himself.”

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Inside view of one of the cramped sleeping caves, whichsheltered two to four Marines, on Outpost Carson (Hill 27).A majority of the outpost’s strength stood watch and worked

on fortifications at night, while a small security team was onduty during the day.

Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, enjoy hot chow on the reverseslope of the main line of resistance. These field mess areas, where Marines got atleast one hot meal a day, were set up 50 to 100 yards from the frontlines.


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Refinements in Position Warfare

Experience on the JamestownLine in 1952 inspired innovations instatic warfare, although not allwere immediately applicable tothe battlefield. The concept of amain line of resistance and its pro-tecting line of combat outpostspersisted into 1953, but the idealplacement and construction oftrenches and bunkers changed.Chinese mortar and artillery firedemonstrated that trenches had tobe deeper, fighting holes betterprotected, and bunkers stronger.Moreover, the military crest of ahill or ridgeline—the position onthe forward slope with the longestfields of observation and fire—need not be the best location forthe defenses protecting vital ter-rain. The topographic crest—the

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC428270

In February 1953, LtGen Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, left, who led the 101stAirborne Division at Normandy during World War II, replaced Gen James A. VanFleet, USA, center, in command of the U.S. Eighth Army. Standing to the right isGen Mark W. Clark, USA, commander of United Nations forces.

spine of a ridge or top of a hill—might be a better site for the mainline of resistance, provided thatfighting positions, readily accessiblefrom the main trench, were locateda short distance down the forwardslope. Formerly, machine gunstended to fire directly into drawsthat the Chinese might follow toattack an outpost or a portion of themain line of resistance; now themachine gun crews, protected asnecessary by riflemen, would dig innear the tips of fingers of highground extending outward fromthe main line or its outposts andplace interlocking bands of fireacross the front. Moreover, units inreserve immediately behind themain line of resistance could movethrough trenches on the topo-

graphical crest without crossingthe skyline and risking direct firefrom flat trajectory weapons.

Those Marines who could shiftfrom the military crest to the topo-graphical crest would enjoy cer-tain advantages. Plunging fire,directed by mortars or howitzersagainst trenches on the topograph-ic crest, proved difficult for theChinese to register or adjust, sinceobservers could not see the explo-sion of shells that fell beyondMarine positions. In contrast,when firing against the militarycrest, the enemy could spot shellsthat detonated both beyond andshort of the target and adjust his fireaccordingly.

Another defensive innovationproved as effective as it was simple.

Instead of two aprons of barbedwire separated by about one yard,the Marines adopted the so-calledCanadian system, which featuredrandom strands of wire connectingthe parallel aprons in the voidbetween them. Artillery or mortarfire, which might rip apart the oldaprons, merely churned and tangledthe wire between the aprons, thusmaking the barrier harder to pene-trate.

These changes could easily beincorporated in the fall-back posi-tions, the Wyoming and KansasLines, to the rear of the main line ofresistance. Major changes to theJamestown Line itself and its com-bat outposts proved all but impos-sible when in contact with anaggressive enemy able to makedeadly use of artillery and mortars.The frontline Marines could rarelydo more than put out the addi-tional wire, dig deeper, and addtimbers and sandbags to the exist-ing defenses.

Daylight Raids

Besides strengthening the de-fenses, especially of the Wyomingand Kansas Lines, Marines of thedivision’s reserve regiment contin-ued to undergo training whilepatrolling the rear area. On theJamestown Line and its outposts,the lull that settled in after thefight for the Hook ended whenone of the regiments on the mainline of resistance, the 5th Marines,raided Hills 31 and 31A in theUngok hill mass. Because theChinese had fortified this highground so strongly, the Marinesmade elaborate preparations,planning feints to divert attentionfrom the main thrust, bringing inpilots from the 1st Marine AircraftWing to visit observation postsand become familiar with the bat-tlefield, arranging for air strikesand artillery concentrations, recon-

5

A fire team from Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, sets out on a daylightreconnaissance patrol to one of outposts in front of the main line of resistance.Aggressive patrolling and improvement of the secondary defenses of theWyoming and Kansas Lines occupied much of the reduced wintertime schedule.


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noitering routes of attack andwithdrawal, and clearing minesfrom them. The complex opera-tion, named Clambake, required ahalf-dozen rehearsals, the last on 1February. Unlike Operation Wake-up in November 1952, which hadsought to take prisoners and gath-er intelligence on the Chinesedefenses, planners designed Clam-bake primarily to kill the enemyand destroy his bunkers andtrenches.

The raid began at first light on 3February, when three platoons oftanks roared toward the enemy-held high ground—Hill 104,Kumgok, and Red Hill—a shortdistance west of the real objective,Ungok. While the armored vehi-cles cut loose with 90mm gunsand flamethrowers, the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines, added tothe realism of the feint by shellingthe apparent objective.

Taking advantage of the diver-sion, two reinforced platoons fromCompany A, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines—armed with bangaloretorpedoes to breach barbed wireand flamethrowers, satchel char-ges, and 3.5-inch rocket launchersto destroy heavier fortifications—stormed Hills 31 and 31A. Thetanks taking part in the diversionprotected the left flank of theattacking Marines by crossing afrozen paddy to open fire on thetrenchline connecting Ungok withthe hills to the west. The Chineseblazed away at the Marine tanksthat either protected the flankfrom beyond the rice paddy oraccompanied the assault force and

succeeded in destroying a flame-throwing M-4 Sherman tank.Supported by air, armor, andartillery, the Marine raiding partyprevailed. Clambake captured noprisoners but accomplished itsmain purpose by collapsingbunkers, trenches, and caves, andkilling perhaps 390 Chinese beforethe attackers withdrew. Marinecasualties totaled 14 killed and 91wounded.

Operation Clambake demon-strated anew the value of planningand rehearsal, the ability of flame-throwing tanks to discourageChinese tank-killer teams armedwith shoulder-fired rocket launch-ers, and the importance of coordi-nating air, artillery, and armor insupport of an infantry assault.Colonel Lewis W. Walt, commander


Marine fliers batter Hill 67 with high explosives andnapalm on 3 February in support of the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines’ two-reinforced-platoon-raid on the Chinese-held

Ungok hill mass to destroy fortifications, inflict casualties, andtake prisoners. The air strikes were designed to divert enemyattention from the final objective area.

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of the 5th Marines, believed thatClambake taught his regiment howto forge an effective tank-infantryteam, a weapon he soon em-ployed.

On 25 February, Colonel Walt’s5th Marines conducted a raid simi-lar to Operation Clambake, attack-ing Hill 15, where the Chinese hadoverrun Outpost Detroit in earlyOctober. The commander of the2d Battalion, Lieutenant ColonelOscar F. Peatross, chose CompanyF, under Captain Harold D. Kurth,Jr., to execute the attack. Afterdetailed planning and carefulrehearsal, the raid, designatedOperation Charlie, kicked off onthe morning of the 25th. Tanks andartillery fired as planned, but badweather interfered with the sched-uled air strikes. The two assaultplatoons reported that the support-ing fire had isolated the objective asplanned, but they found that “the


After being examined at the company aid station, a Marine of Company A, 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, who was wounded during the battalion’s daylight raidon Ungok is put onto a helicopter for evacuation to a hospital ship for further treat-ment.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A170216

Officers of the 5th Marines assemble for a photograph dur-ing a lull in the fighting. Pictured in the front row, from left,are: LtCol Oscar F. Peatross, LtCol Jonas M. Platt, Col LewisW. Walt, LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler, LtCol Robert J. Oddy, andLtCol James H. Finch. Second row, Maj Harry L. Sherwood,

Maj Robert L. Willis, Capt Ralph L. Walz, Maj Jack M. Daly,Maj Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., Maj Robert H. Twisdale, CaptRichard G. Gilmore, and Maj William C. Doty. Third row,Capt James R. Schoen, Capt Dean W. Lindley, Capt James E.Hendry, and Capt Arthur J. Davidson.

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majority of enemy installationswere relatively undamaged,” per-haps because the Chinese bunkerswere so solidly built.

Although the raids that culmi-nated in Operation Charlie werethe most ambitious attacks duringFebruary, Chinese troops and theAmerican and South KoreanMarines conducted many smallerprobes. On the night of 12-13February, for example, a Chineseplatoon, supported by mortars andartillery, tested the defenses ofOutpost Hedy on Hill 124. Twonights later, hostile troops stalked apatrol from the 7th Marines that

was attempting to set up anambush and forced it to turn back.On 19 February, artillery and mor-tar fire frustrated a Chinese attack onCombat Outpost 33, manned bySouth Korean Marines.

The Marines, whether Americanor South Korean, exerted pressureof their own. On the night of 13-14February, two platoons of SouthKorean Marines had successfullyraided Hill 240, on the west bank ofthe Sachon River roughly threemiles upstream from its confluxwith the Imjin. On the morning ofthe 22d, the 5th Marines raided Hill35A, some 1,300 yards southwest

of the Ungok hill mass, usingflamethrowers to deadly effect. Onthe following night, a reinforcedplatoon from the 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, supported by four M-46tanks set out to raid Hill Yoke,southwest of Bunker Hill. Shortlyafter midnight, however, as theraiding party regrouped for thefinal assault, the Chinese struckfrom ambush. Another reinforcedplatoon went to the aid of the first,and the enemy broke off theaction; but not before the raid onHill Yoke had to be called off,even though the Marines accountedfor perhaps five times their own

Between 1 January 1953 and the end of the fight-ing in July, the strength of Marine Corps groundforces hovered between 25,000 and 28,000, fluc-

tuating as casualties occurred, tours of duty or enlistmentsexpired, and replacements arrived. In terms of organi-zation, the 1st Marine Division adhered to a triangular con-cept, with three organic infantry regiments—the 1st, 5th,and 7th Marines—an artillery regiment, the 11thMarines, and a variety of other combat and support ele-ments under control of the division or its components. Thecombat elements employed tanks, mortars, and otherweapons; the support units provided such specializedactivity as transportation, by truck or amphibian tractor,communications, engineering, reconnaissance, andcargo handling.

On the Jamestown Line, a fourth regiment servedwith the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Korean MarineRegiment, which had been organized, trained, andequipped with the assistance and advice of U. S.Marines. The Korean Marine regiment, with a maximumstrength in 1953 of 4,400, had been attached to the 1stMarine Division in time for the Inchon invasion ofSeptember 1950, but after the Chosin Reservoir fighting,the Korean Marines passed under the control of theRepublic of Korea’s Army. During 1951, however, theKorean Marine regiment was again attached to the 1stMarine Division and, along with the 5th Battalion thatjoined in 1952, remained a part of the American divisionfor the rest of the war. The Korean Marines assigned tothe division had their own organic artillery and armor. The2d Korean Marine Regiment provided troops to man theislands off the east and west coasts.

The basic infantry weapons of the 1st Marine Division

had seen action in World War II. Riflemen still used thesemi-automatic M1 or, if trained as snipers, the bolt-action M1903 with a telescopic sight. Although designedfor World War I, the Browning Automatic Rifle stillincreased the firepower of the Marines. Officers, orthose enlisted men assigned to crew-served weaponslike mortars or machine guns, carried the .45-caliber pis-tol or the lightweight .30-caliber carbine, which came inboth automatic and semi-automatic versions.

The standard crew-served infantry weapons had alsohelped fight World War II. The 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inchmortars were at best modifications of older weapons, aswere the machine guns, whether heavy .50-caliberweapons, water-cooled .30-caliber guns, or lightweight,air-cooled .30-caliber types. The 3.5-inch rocket launch-er, however, had replaced the 2.36-inch Bazooka ofWorld War II, which had failed to effectively penetrate thearmor of the Soviet-built tanks used by the NorthKoreans and Chinese.

Artillery and armor relied heavily on designs used inWorld War II or intended for that conflict. The 11thMarines, aided by a battery of 4.5-inch rockets on mul-tiple launchers, provided the division’s organic fire sup-port with three battalions of 105mm howitzers and onebattalion of 155mm howitzers. A battalion of tanksadded to the mobile firepower of the division withweapons ranging from rebuilt M-4 Shermans from WorldWar II, some of them mounting a flamethrower as wellas a 105mm gun, to new M-46 Pershings with a 90mmgun.

In short, the 1st Marine Division was using theweapons of World War II to fight the kind of trench war-fare characteristic of World War I.

The Marine Division and Its Weapons

losses of five killed and 22 wound-ed.

The succession of raids andambushes continued into March.In a restaging of Operation Clam-bake, Company B, 1st Battalion,5th Marines, attacked Hill 31A of theUngok massif on the 19th. Onceagain, air strikes, and artillerypreparations shattered the pre-dawn calm and forced the defend-ers to move to positions on thereverse slope until the attackingMarines withdrew. On the samemorning, however, the enemy hitOutposts Esther and Hedy andtried unsuccessfully to crack theJamestown defenses to the rear ofHedy, failing despite a lavishexpenditure of mortar and artilleryshells.

Improvements in Logistics

During the first three months of1953, the supply of howitzer

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1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

Three Marines from Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, who participated inthe raid on Hill 15 (Detroit), display captured enemy weapons and material. Theraid was launched during early daylight hours with a smoke screen in anattempt to gain surprise.


During February and March, as night fighting intensified,Marine M-46 Patton tanks assigned to Company D, 1st

Tank Battalion, fire their 90mm guns to harass the Chineseand disrupt their movement.

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ammunition increased, and therestrictions on artillery support, ineffect during the autumn, ceased.The availability of hand grenadesalso improved, but 81mm mortarshells remained in short supply.

Even as the ammunition shortageeased, the Marines had to imposerestrictions on the use of gasolineand diesel fuel. In January 1953,consumption of gasoline declinedby 17 percent from the previous

month, and diesel fuel by sevenpercent. Stocks were rapidlyreplenished, however, so that inFebruary consumption returned tonormal.

Refinements in equipment alsoappeared. A thermal boot wornduring the Korean winter of 1952-1953 afforded better protectionagainst cold and dampness thanthe footgear it replaced, but theleather combat boot wore out all

too quickly. Redesigned bodyarmor began arriving in November1952. The new model protectedthe groin as well as the upperbody, greatly improving morale asit reduced casualties still further.

Experiments continued in theuse of helicopters as flying packmules to deliver supplies over bro-ken terrain. In February 1953,Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey’sMarine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 (HMR-161) carriedout Operation Haylift II, resupply-ing two front-line regiments, the5th and 7th Marines. This opera-tion, lasting from 23 through 27February, proved more demandingthat Haylift I, conducted inSeptember 1952, which had resup-plied only one regiment. On thefirst day of Haylift II, Carey’ssquadron had to divert helicoptersfrom the 7th Marines to rushammunition to the other regiment,and on the final morning fog dis-rupted the schedule of flights.Nevertheless, Haylift II delivered1.6 million pounds of cargo; fivetimes the total of the earlier opera-tion.

Fighting Intensifies

When the winter of 1952-1953ended, the deployment of the 1stMarine Division remained essen-tially unchanged, although the uniton the right was now the U.S.Army’s 2d Infantry Division ratherthan the British 1st CommonwealthDivision. The American Marineregiments held the right of theline—the 5th and 1st Marinesoccupying the Jamestown posi-tions and the 7th Marines currentlyin reserve. Beyond the Panmunjomcorridor, South Korean Marinesdefended the portion that extendedto the north bank of the Han River.On the south bank of the Han, thedivision’s amphibian tractor battal-ion and the Kimpo Provisional


Cargo handling personnel prepare to hook a load of ammunition to a SikorskyHRS-2 helicopter of Marine transport squadron 161 during Operation Haylift II,the five-day experiment to resupply two frontline regiments carried out in lateFebruary.

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Regiment, the latter an improvised“United Nations” force usingarmored amphibian tractors asartillery, manned the defenses inaddition to controlling civilianswithin the regimental sector andregulating river traffic.

Except on the far left of the divi-sion’s line, where the Han Riverprovided a natural barrier, a seriesof combat outposts contributed tothe security of the main line ofresistance. From right to left, theprincipal outposts were EastBerlin, Berlin, Vegas, Reno,

Carson, and Ava, all manned at theend of March by the 5th Marines.The 1st Marines maintainedCorrine, Dagmar, Esther, Ginger,Bunker Hill, Hedy, Ingrid, Kate,and Marilyn. Beyond the Pan-munjom corridor, the SouthKorean Marines held, from right toleft, Outposts 39, 33, 31, and 51.

As it had during the winter nowending, the 11th Marines providedartillery support for the infantryregiments manning the JamestownLine and its outposts, using thefirepower of three battalions of

105mm howitzers, a battalion of155mm howitzers, and a battery ofmultiple 4.5-inch rocket launchers.One battalion of 105mm howitzerssupported the 5th Marines andanother the 1st Marines. The thirdsuch battalion provided generalsupport of the division and stoodready to reinforce the fires of thebattalion supporting the 5thMarines, which held a critical sector.Both the 155mm howitzers and therocket launchers rendered generalsupport for the division. The SouthKorean Marines depended primar-

Air Support for the Division

Marine Corps aviation continued to play a criticalrole on the battlefield. Indeed, its value hadincreased as the Fifth Air Force, which exercised

operational control over land-based Marine airmen,shifted emphasis to targets on or near the frontlines andaway from industries, transportation links, and com-mand and control facilities, all of them already heavilybombed. Taking advantage of this change, MajorGeneral Vernon E. Megee, who in January 1953replaced Major General Clayton C. Jerome in commandof the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, persuaded MajorGeneral Glenn O. Barcus, commander of the Fifth AirForce, to abandon the practice of dealing directly withMarine aircraft groups or even squadrons and workthrough the wing headquarters. To facilitate planningwithin the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Megee revitalized andenlarged his G-3 section, which, he conceded, hadbecome “somewhat rusty.” General Megee alsoreplaced the lone Marine Corps liaison officer at theJoint Operations Center with an element drawn from ofthe wing’s G-3 section that could deal more efficientlywith requests for air support.

Barcus endorsed Megee’s plan to expand the role ofwing headquarters, but the Air Force general retainedcontrol over close air support, even though it was aMarine Corps specialty. Policy established jointly by theArmy and Air Force, to which the Navy assented,required that the Joint Operations Center, which now hada greater Marine presence, approve requests for thiskind of mission. In waging the air war, the JointOperations Center, paid stricter attention to requests forclose air support, tending to screen carefully theseurgent strikes while assigning Megee’s headquartersgreater responsibility for interdiction, armed reconnais-sance, and other missions, by day or by night, that hadbeen planned in advance against targets 3,000 yards or

more beyond the main line of resistance.The cautious attitude toward close air support

reflected the potential danger to friendly troops inherentin the kind of operations routinely flown by the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. Indeed, with a mere 14.5 percentof the available tactical aircraft, Marine airmen hadundertaken between 30 and 40 percent of all the closeair support missions flown for the United Nations forcesbetween January and October 1952. These attacks,some of them within 100 yards of United Nationstroops, could accidentally cause friendly casualties. Thebattlefield itself—a succession of similar hills andridges, separated by draws and intermittent streams,with few obvious landmarks except for major reservoirsor rivers—contributed to the possibility of error. Duringthe first nine months of 1952, Marine pilots figured in 18of 63 incidents in which air strikes killed or woundedfriendly troops.

News reports appearing in the United States duringFebruary 1953 focused on the involvement of Marine air-men in 28.5 percent of the recent accident attacks thatkilled or wounded friendly troops. Ignoring the dan-gerous nature of these strikes, which included almost allthe targets within 100 yards of friendly forces, the pressaccused the Marines of carelessness, a charge that hadno merit. Given the difficulty in pinpointing targets onthe Korean battlefield, effective close air supportinvolved danger to the troops on the ground, especial-ly those manning outposts that were surrounded orunder simultaneous attack from various directions.General Megee, when evaluating a January 1953 strafingrun by Marine jets that killed one Marine and woundedanother, concluded that the incident “resulted from theinescapable operational hazard incident to laying on areal close strike.” The same judgment applied to the othersimilar accidents.

ily on a battalion of 75mm guns,attached to the 11th Marines. U.S.Army artillery battalions, assigned toI Corps, could reinforce the fires ofthe 11th Marines anywhere alongthe line with 155mm howitzersand 8-inch howitzers. To protectthe bridges across the Imjin River tothe rear of the Jamestown Lineagainst possible aerial attack, theMarines deployed a provisionalantiaircraft artillery platoon armedwith automatic weapons.

The 1st Marine Division’s tankbattalion continued to support thedefenses of the Jamestown Line,mainly with M-46 tanks mounting90mm guns, though the older M-4sarmed with a 105mm howitzer anda flamethrower were available.

The battalion assigned one tankcompany to support each of theline regiments and designated athird as a forward reserve to rein-force the main line of resistance orspearhead counterattacks. Thefourth company became the rearreserve, undergoing unit trainingand conducting maintenance forthe entire battalion.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,now participating more directly inplanning air strikes, supported thedivision with an array of piston-engine and jet types, fixed-wingmodels and helicopters. Besidesconducting strikes, the wingplaced its helicopters and lightobservation planes at the disposalof the division. Helicopters evacu-

ated the wounded and deliveredsupplies, while the light planesflew reconnaissance and liaisonmissions, directed air strikes andadjusted artillery fire.

The coming of spring broughtrain and warmer temperatures thatmelted snow, thawed frozenrivers, and caused flooding. Roadsbecame all but impassible, andtrenches turned into streams ofmud. Water-soaked aging sand-bags, which rotted and split,undermined timbers already weak-ened by sustained Chineseshelling. In March, noncommis-sioned officers from the division’sengineer battalion inspected theJamestown Line and evaluated thecondition of the defenses, deter-

12

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mining which bunkers and fightingholes had to be repaired or rebuilt.Marine infantrymen did the actualwork under the supervision of theengineers, using materials man-handled into position by theKorean Service Corps. At the out-

posts or on those portions of themain line of resistance underenemy observation, the work hadto be done at night.

Warmer weather heralded theappearance of a beer ration—twocans per day for each Marine not

engaged in actual fighting.Although the beer issued toMarines had a lesser alcohol con-tent than that sold to civilians in theUnited States, it was welcomeindeed. Those who drank madefriends with those who did not,and a brisk trade in beer ensued.

Spring also brought the certain-ty that, as soon as weather permit-ted, the Chinese would renewtheir attacks on the JamestownLine and its outposts, duplicatingthe intensity of the fight for theHook (now a responsibility of the2d Infantry Division) that hadraged in October 1952. Theenemy’s capture of key terraincould yield political advantage aswell as immediate tactical gain.Chinese success might force theMarines back to the Wyoming orKansas Lines, both of them fall-back positions, or even open theway to Seoul. Smaller gains couldcombine to exert pressure on theUnited Nations to accept a truceand, if the ceasefire should fail,leave the Chinese in a stronger


After loading the 155mm howitzer, artillerymen of the 4th Battalion, 11thMarines, make a final check on the sights. The gunner stands by with lanyardin hand, waiting for the command to fire.


A Marine 4.5-inch rocket crew launches a fire missionagainst Communist positions. The launcher could dis-charge 24 rounds in rapid succession. Two helicopters from

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 wait in thebackground to airlift the crew and their rocket launcher tothe rear or a new position.

position to renew the fighting.Certain of the Marine combat

outposts had already demonstratedtheir importance, among themBunker Hill, the site of deadlyfighting during 1952. The list ofcritical outposts also includedReno, Carson, and Vegas, north-east of the Ungok hills, a massifthat had been the objective of anumber of Marine raids during thewinter. The importance of thethree outposts named for cities inNevada, which the 5th Marinesmanned, derived from their prox-imity to a potential invasion routeleading toward Seoul, a road thatpassed between Carson and theUngok hills. In addition, control ofthe three outposts provided obser-vation of the Chinese main line ofresistance and certain areas imme-diately beyond, while screening

portions of the Jamestown Lineand some its rear areas fromenemy observers.

Forty or fifty Marines, with twoNavy hospital corpsmen, mannedeach of the combat outposts. TheMarines, often drawn from various

squads in different platoons,formed composite units with num-bers and firepower comparable toa reinforced platoon. In additionto their rifles, Browning automaticrifles, carbines, and pistols, thedefenders usually were reinforced

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1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar53

Each spring, protracted periods ofrain and the seasonal thaw turn theearth into a quagmire, impedingmovement even in trenches. Althoughroad conditions became a seriousproblem, frontiline units were keptsupplied.

The Korean Service Corps

The government of the Republic of Korea drafted men already reject-ed for service in the army and assigned them to a labor force, theKorean Service Corps, organized into companies, battalions, and reg-

iments that carried supplies, food, ammunition, and building materials tocombat units and performed other necessary logistics duties. Although theservice troops wore a uniform, they were not issued weapons. On theJamestown Line, a Korean Service Corps regiment, usually numberingmore than 5,000 men, supported the components of the 1st MarineDivision. Besides forming human pack trains, these Korean laborershelped evacuate the wounded, buried enemy dead, and retrievedweapons abandoned on the battlefield.

After the Marines moved onto the Jamestown Line in the spring of1952, some 500 members of the Korean Service Corps helped cut timbersfor the construction of bunkers along the frontline and for the two fall-backpositions, the Wyoming and Kansas Lines. By July, the Koreans hadhelped cut and shape some 35,000 lengths of timber. Once the bunkers werecompleted, the Korean Service Corps carried new timbers, sandbags,barbed wire, and other materials to strengthen them and repair battledamage, along with food and ammunition. When manhandling cargo,each Korean laborer was expected to carry 50 pounds a distance of 10 miles,a burden affixed to an A-frame on the porter’s back. Over long distancesor rugged terrain, the laborers might adopt a relay system, dividing the jour-ney into manageable segments.

Two members of the Korean Service Corps work under the supervision of anexplosive ordnance disposal Marine and taught how to remove explosivesfrom bombs and artillery shells. Once the explosives were removed, the caseswere disposed of.


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with two portable flamethrowersand as many as five light machineguns. One or more forwardobservers adjusted the fire of60mm and 81mm mortars indefense of each outpost.

The three outposts of Carson,Reno, and Vegas differed from oneanother according to their loca-tion, the terrain to be defended,and the threat they faced. CombatOutpost Carson, on the left, guard-ed a largely barren hilltop where acave provided living quarters forthe Marines, who manned an ovalperimeter protected by barbedwire and including bunkers, tun-nels, and a main trench with fight-ing holes. Except for the slopenearest the Jamestown Line, wherea deeper entrenchment was beingdug, the main trench on Carsonaveraged five feet deep by twofeet wide. Most of the 28 fightingholes had excellent fields of fire,though the overhead cover onsome of them had reduced theopening for observation and firing.During darkness, two listeningposts covered the likeliest avenuesof enemy attack, from the Ungok

hills to the west and Hill 67 to thenorth.

Reno, in the center, was themost vulnerable of the three. It notonly lay closest to Chinese lines, butalso occupied a ridge that forcedthe defenders into a perimetervaguely resembling the wishbone ofa turkey, open end to the north. Asat Carson, a cave served as livingquarters and might also become alast-ditch redoubt. A tunnel pro-vided access to the cave from themain trench, which varied fromfive to seven feet deep, but oneMarine, Corporal James D. Prewitt,confessed that he hated to gothrough the entrance. As a boy, heexplained: “I had helped dig mybrother out of a collapsed playtunnel, and I was left with a realhorror of such things.”


Members of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,wait to be briefed on a night combat patrol involving the setting of an ambush.Since early March, the 1st Battalion had conducted nearly a dozen such patrolsto test the enemy in the Carson-Reno-Vegas area.

Two Marines at Outpost Reno make their hourly call to the company commandpost. Located more than 1,600 yards from the main line of resistance, the out-post was customarily manned by 40 to 43 Marines.


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The Marines at Reno built nobunkers, relying exclusively onfighting holes in the trenches and,as a last resort, the cave itself.Outpost Reno had limited fields offire in the direction of enemy-heldHill 67, also called Arrowhead Hill,but Outpost Carson, on the left,provided fire support in this area.As a result, the approach thatseemed to pose the greatest dangerto Reno’s defenders followed aridge extending generally south-ward from Hill 150.

Like the Marines defending theother outposts, those at Renorelied on C-rations and tossed the

empty cans into nearby gullies. Atnight, when the tin cans clattered,the source of the noise might beChinese moving close to attackbehind a sudden barrage or mere-ly rats scavenging for food.Members of the Korean ServiceCorps kept Reno supplied andperformed the unpleasant task, asafter the fighting in October 1952,of burying the Chinese dead, atask repeated whenever artilleryfire disinterred the corpses.Marines from Reno accompaniedthe Korean burial details to protectthem against ambush and also tokeep them at their grisly work.Enemy snipers, as well as mortar

and artillery crews, posed a con-tinuing threat, forcing the Marinesto remain under cover during day-light, insofar as possible. Indeed, asniper alerted by the reflectionfrom a forward observer’s fieldglasses, fatally wounded theMarine with a single shot. Becauseof the danger, tension, and dis-comfort, the Marines at Reno nor-mally stayed only for a weekbefore being relieved.

To the south of Reno lay RenoBlock, an L-shaped trench with asmall bunker at the end of theshorter leg and a machine gunposition at the point where the

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legs joined. At night a reinforcedsquad manned the blocking posi-tion, which served as a listeningpost, helped screen the movementof supplies and reinforcements,and provided a rallying point forrelief columns ambushed byChinese patrols. Perched on a hill-top, Reno Block afforded excellentvisibility, but conversely it couldeasily be seen from Chinese lines.Consequently, as a Marine whoserved there recalled: “We wouldlight a cigarette under cover of acoat or blanket, then when wetook a drag it was with both handscupped to hide the glow,” whichcould draw sniper fire. Marinesmanning Reno’s east-west trenchcould fire in support of the block-ing position, as could the garrisonat Carson.

To the right of Reno loomedCombat Outpost Vegas, whichattained a height of 175 metersand, as the tallest of the three,afforded the best fields of observa-tion. Barbed wire and a well-con-structed trench encircled theegg-shaped perimeter on Vegas,with its one warming and two liv-ing bunkers. Although the fields offire on Vegas were less than ideal,handicapped in places by a

steeply pitched slope too irregularfor grazing fire and also by thesmall firing apertures in some ofthe covered fighting holes,weapons there could supportReno with long-range fire. By day,Vegas proved a magnet for sniperfire and harassment by mortarsand artillery, forcing the Marinesto remain under cover. A tour ofduty at Vegas usually lasted threedays for infantry and no more thanfive for artillery forward observers.

Attack on Carson,Reno, and Vegas

Although the 5th Marines hadbeen active during March—raidingHill 31A in the Ungok hill massand patrolling by night, especiallyin the vicinity of Carson, Reno,and Vegas—the Chinese tended toavoid combat. The lull endedabruptly at 1900 on 26 March,when the Chinese shattered thespringtime evening with fire fromsmall arms, machine guns, mor-tars, and artillery. Almost everyChinese weapon within rangeraked the left and center of thesector manned by the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines.

Combat Outposts Carson, Reno,

and Vegas, each manned by acomposite platoon from the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, underwent asavage bombardment. An estimated1,200 60mm and 82mm mortarrounds exploded on Carson withinroughly 20 minutes, and theshelling continued at the rate ofabout one round every 40 secondsuntil 2200. The Chinese gunnersalso directed counterbattery fire atthe howitzer positions of the 11thMarines, sought to interdict move-ment behind the main line of resis-tance, and tried to sever thetelephone lines and routes ofmovement between the battalionand the threatened outposts.

The bombardment of Carson,Reno, and Vegas formed one part ofa general shelling of outposts allalong the Jamestown Line. To theright of the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, the Chinese lashed out atBerlin and East Berlin, manned byMarines of the regiment’s 3dBattalion. To the left of the 5thMarines, artillery fire and some-times infantry threatened the out-posts of the 1st Marines, likeHedy, Bunker Hill, Esther, andDagmar. Chinese troops alsoseemed to be positioning them-selves to attack in the sector of theKorean Marines.

On the night of 26 March, thegeneral bombardment fell mostheavily on Carson, Reno, andVegas, and just 10 minutes afterthe shells began exploding there,some 3,500 soldiers from the358th Regiment, 120th Division, ofthe Chinese 46th Army began con-verging on the three outposts.Taking advantage of the shelling,two platoons advanced from theUngok hills to attack Carson, whileone Chinese company stormedReno and another Vegas. Yetanother company—this one fromArrowhead Hill and nearby Hill29—crossed the road to Seoul toattack Reno from the northwest.


The trenchline on Outpost Reno; to the left of the “L” where the trench changesdirection lies Reno Block, the site of savage fighting on the night of 26-27 March1953.

Meanwhile, Chinese troops fromHill 190 outflanked Reno on its leftto hit the outpost from the rear,and others advanced from thehigh ground north of Vegas tostorm the outpost head-on.

The fight for Carson, a part of theenemy’s main effort, pittedChinese numbers, perhaps 20attackers for every defender,against a determined garrison thatcould be readily reinforced fromthe main line of resistance. In thefirst 35 minutes, the attackers pen-etrated the outer trenches atCarson, but the Marines fought theChinese to a standstill in a fiercehand-to-hand struggle. Movingtheir wounded to the shelter of thecentrally located cave, the defend-ers continued to fire from theirfighting holes along the maintrench. As squads from CompaniesC and D of Lieutenant ColonelJonas M. Platt’s 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, were moving out to rein-force Carson, the Chinese relaxedthe pressure on that outpost, shift-

ing their attention to Reno andVegas. The attack began to ebb atabout 2135, but mortars andartillery continued to pound theMarines on Carson. The violentthough brief assault, followed bysustained shelling, took a psycho-logical as well as physical tollamong Carson’s surviving defend-ers. For example, the outpost com-mander, First Lieutenant Jack F.Ingalls, who survived unwounded,seemed to have aged 10 years,according to a sergeant who knewhim.

Reno, where the terrain pre-cluded the establishment of a tightperimeter, proved harder todefend than Carson and, because itwas farther from the main line ofresistance, more difficult to rein-force. As at Carson, the Chinesegained a hold on the outer works,but at Reno they capitalized onthis early success and forced theMarines to fall back to the cavethat anchored the position. At2030, Outpost Reno reported by

radio that the enemy controlledeverything outside the cave, whichwas collapsing under the sus-tained shelling. According to themessage, death, wounds, and thelack of oxygen inside the cave leftonly seven Marines able to fight.

Supporting weapons did theirbest to save the doomed outpost.Aided by flares from an aircraftand illuminating rounds, machinegunners on the main line of resis-tance and rocket batteries just to therear fired into the Chinese swarm-ing over Reno, while variable-timeartillery shells burst overhead,showering the attackers withdeadly fragments. Two Marine M-46tanks, on the Jamestown Line justbehind Reno, joined in with their90mm guns. Radio contact withthe Marines fighting at the outpostfaded, and then failed entirely—never to be restored.

Chinese forces also seemed onthe verge of victory at OutpostVegas. The intensity of the bom-bardment and overwhelming num-bers forced the Marines from theirleast defensible positions. A break-down in communication ham-pered efforts to reinforce Vegas, asChinese artillery fire tore up tele-phone wires leading from the out-posts to the battalion commandpost. Radio had to replace wire.

While the defenders of Vegaswere undergoing attack, the 5thMarines sought to reinforceOutpost Reno, with the 1stBattalion assuming operationalcontrol of those elements of the 2dBattalion involved in the effort. At2015, advance elements of a pla-toon from Company F, 2dBattalion, set out from the mainline of resistance, fought their wayout of an ambush near Hill 47, butwere pinned down short of RenoBlock, which had yet to bemanned that night and had beenoccupied by the Chinese. Thereinforced 3d Platoon, Company

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5th Marines Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar53

Marines on Vegas huddle in the command post bunker as Chinese mortars andartillery pound the outpost. While Marine artillery responded with protective box-ing and variable-time fires on the outpost and routes of approach, defendinginfantry called down 60mm and 81mm mortar barrages.

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A Platoon at Reno Block

The 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion—rein-forced by an attached machine gun section—manned a portion of the Jamestown Line on the

night of 26 March 1953. The men of the platoon, led bySecond Lieutenant Warren C. Ruthazer, were standing theusual nighttime alert when they heard Chinese artilleryexploding along the combat outpost line. Soon the bom-bardment began battering the main line of resistance, andRuthazer summoned his noncommissioned officers tothe command post where he told them that a Chineseattack on Outpost Reno had driven the defenders into thecave there and might soon overwhelm them.

Each night, a reinforced rifle squad, occupied RenoBlock, a listening post about 100 yards closer to themain line of resistance than Reno itself. On this evening,however, the Chinese bombardment prevented thesquad from moving out. As a result, the garrison intend-ed for Reno Block, a reinforced squad from the 1stPlatoon of Company C, joined forces with LieutenantRuthazer’s 3d Platoon.

Shortly after 2000, the reinforced 3d Platoon, and itsadditional squad, received orders to drive the Chinesefrom Outpost Reno and bring back the survivingMarines. The men of the rescue force carried shovels andentrenching tools to free Marines trapped in the cave orin collapsed trenches, along with grenades for close-infighting. Ruthazer’s platoon started along a trail thatextended some 1,800 yards, served Reno Block, and ter-minated at Reno. The Marines had to remain close to thetrail because of minefields on both flanks, thus becom-ing more vulnerable to ambush. They avoided bunchingup, dropped to the ground when necessary to escapeenemy fire, and then jumped to their feet, rushing forwarduntil again forced to hug the muddy earth. One of themany mortar shells that exploded along the trail burstclose enough to Sergeant William H. Janzen, the platoonguide, to pelt him with dirt, and another landed direct-ly in front of Private First Class Bobby G. Hatcher as hesprawled for cover alongside the trail, but the roundfailed to explode. During this ordeal, as he laterrecalled, Sergeant Janzen kept his sanity, although his face“was buried in the dirt and mud,” by concentrating onrepeating the Lord’s Prayer.

To reach Reno Block, the force had to climb the steephill on which the trench and bunker lay. The Marines hadrigged a strong rope alongside the trail to help the heav-ily laden troops pull themselves upward. Chinese mor-tar and artillery fire had cut the rope, however, and theplatoon had to claw its way up the slope. Atop the hill,the men entered a trench so shallow that at times theMarines had to crawl toward the blocking position.

The Chinese concentrated on the head of the relief col-umn instead of trying to encircle it. Sergeant Janzen

believed that this decision enabled the platoon to clingto the segment of trench, making it the anchor of aragged perimeter. The arrival of Captain Ralph L. Walz andtwo platoons from his Company F, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, tipped the balance in favor of the Marines, atleast momentarily. The captain quickly mounted a bay-onet charge, described by Janzen as “magnificent, hero-ic, and ghastly,” that overwhelmed the Chinese at RenoBlock.

Two corpsmen with Ruthazer’s platoon, HospitalmanThird Class Paul N. Polley and Hospitalman Francis C.Hammond, struggled to care for the increasing numberof casualties at Reno Block. Temporarily blinded by dirtthrown in his face by an exploding shell, Polley contin-ued as best he could to tend to the wounded by senseof touch. Hammond, though already wounded, voluntarilyremained behind with Captain Walz’s Marines when theplatoon from Company C received orders to withdraw.Hammond, killed when a mortar shell exploded near him,was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor; Polleylived to receive the Navy Cross.

Casualty evacuation teams began arriving shortlyafter the 3d Platoon received orders to disengage. The sur-vivors able to move about on their own had gathered atthe base of the hill, when someone reported seeing amachine gunner, Private First Class Mario Lombardi,half-buried in a collapsed trench. A final search locatedLombardi, whose legs had been broken, and his comradesbrought him back. Of the 40 Marines in the reinforced 3dPlatoon, fewer than 10 returned unscathed to the mainline of resistance.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 13964

At a December 1953 battalion review, MajGen RandolphMcC. Pate, commander of the 1st Marine Division, presentsthe Navy Cross, the nation’s second highest award for mil-itary valor, to Hospital Corpsman Paul N. Polley.

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C, 1st Battalion—led by SecondLieutenant Warren C. Ruthazer—started toward Reno at 2030,together with the squad that hadbeen assigned to Reno Block buthad not yet deployed, and reachedthe enemy-held blocking positiondespite twice coming under long-range fire and twice beingambushed. Two platoons ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, followedin the wake of Ruthazer’s men,leaving the Jamestown Line at 2227and advancing toward Reno Blockuntil stopped by fire from theChinese holding the blocking posi-tion. Here these latest reinforce-ments, under Captain Ralph L.Walz, the commander of CompanyF, found Ruthazer’s Marines, the

elements of Company F dispatchedearlier, and a platoon fromCompany D sent to reinforceOutpost Vegas but stopped nearReno Block by Chinese fire.Captain Walz took command of thegroup and launched an attack thatdrove the enemy from the blockingposition.

The cobbled-together force ofMarines clinging to Reno Block,now commanded by Captain RalphL. Walz of Company F, tried gal-lantly but unsuccessfully to reachthe composite force from the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, thatmanned Outpost Reno when thebattle began. Chinese attacks onthe blocking position continuedwithout respite, forcing the

Marines to beat back three sepa-rate assaults by midnight anddenying them an opportunity tomount a strong attack of their own.While the fighting raged at RenoBlock, the Chinese marshaled rein-forcements of their own behindHills 31 and 31D. Fire from Marineartillery and from tanks on themain line of resistance scatteredone such group as it massed tojoin in attacking Reno, but theChinese prevailed, killing or cap-turing all the defenders. The sur-vivors consisted of just fiveMarines—among them the outpostcommander, Second LieutenantRufus A. Seymour of Company C,1st Battalion, 5th Marines—and aNavy corpsman. They became


Marines of the 4.2-inch mortar company, 5th Marines,unload ammunition in support of the assault to retakeOutpost Vegas. Because of the heavy incoming fire, trucks

were unable to get to the company’s mortar positions, so theMarines had to haul the ammunition up by carts.

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prisoners of war and were ulti-mately repatriated.

The Chinese capture of Renofreed one of the companies thathad helped subdue that outpost.The enemy assigned it the missionof delivering a coup de grace toReno Block, but Marine artilleryand tanks firing from the main lineof resistance caught the Chinese asthey moved south and frustratedthe plan. The blocking positionremained in Marine hands, at leasttemporarily.

During the struggle for Renoand Reno Block, Outpost Vegascontinued to hold out, but almostfrom the time the Chineseattacked, contact with Vegasproved uncertain. To facilitate therestoration of reliable communica-tions by wire, and if necessarywith runners, Colonel Walt, thecommander of the 5th Marines,shifted operational control of theMarines on Vegas, and thoseattempting to reinforce them, fromthe 2d Battalion to the 3dBattalion. Shortly before midnight,contact with Vegas ended. All theMarines there were either killed orcaptured; the dead included theofficer in charge, First LieutenantKenneth E. Taft, Jr.

Initial Counterattacks End

At midnight, after some fivehours of fighting, the Chinese con-trolled Vegas and Reno, althoughCarson remained under Marinecontrol. The Marines trying tobreak through to Vegas or Renohad thus far got no farther thanReno Block, but they kept trying. At0144, Captain Walz, in commandof Company F and in charge of thecomposite force at the blockingposition, reported that he had onlythe equivalent of one reinforcedplatoon to break through to Reno.Within an hour, Walz had launchedthree attacks, each one stopped by

fire from mortars and small arms.For now the outpost would remainin Chinese hands. The attempts toreach Outpost Reno on the nightand early morning of 26-27 Marchresulted in severe Marine casual-ties that Colonel Walt later estimat-ed as being “as high as 35 percent,with many dead.”

On the early morning of 27March, while the attempts to fightthrough to Outpost Reno wereending in frustration, two platoonsorganized from Companies D, 2dBattalion, and C, 1st Battalion, of the5th Marines advanced towardVegas. They worked their way asclose as 400 yards to the entrance tothe outpost’s trenches before afresh Chinese assault stoppedthem. This setback forced the 1stMarine Division to commit a part ofits reserve.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,commanded by Lieutenant ColonelAlexander G. Cereghino and func-tioning as part of the division

reserve, placed its Company Funder the operational control ofthe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, forthis new effort to reach Vegas. Theplatoon leading the way advancedto within 200 yards of the outpost,but could only confirm that theenemy had already seized it.Beginning at about 0300, theMarines who had made this earlymorning attempt to break throughto Vegas withdrew to the main lineof resistance, arriving there at0417. Earlier on the night of the26th, Colonel Walt had given his3d Battalion operational controlover the attempts to save Vegas;now he ratified the decision byshifting the boundary between the1st and 3d Battalions some 250yards to the west.

The eight-hour fight at Vegasand on its approaches cost theChinese an estimated 600 casual-ties, four times the total of Marineskilled or wounded. UnremittingChinese mortar and artillery fire


A Marine gives a wounded buddy a drink while others prepare him for evacua-tion. During the initial attempts to regain control of Outposts Reno and Vegas,both Marine and enemy casualties were heavy; an estimated 600 Chinese hadbeen wounded or killed while Marine losses were placed at more than 150.

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claimed most of the Marine vic-tims. A platoon from Company F, 2dBattalion, joined Company C, asdid a provisional unit assembledfrom the 1st Battalion’s Headquar-ters and Service Company. Ratherthan taking part in an attempt toregain Vegas, these latest rein-forcements helped evacuate thoseMarines wounded in the earlierfighting.

Marines wounded in the vicinityof Outpost Vegas followed one oftwo routes to a collection pointbehind the position held byCompany H, 3d Battalion, 5thMarines. From here, casualtieswent either directly to the 3dBattalion aid station or to a camp ofthe Korean Service Corps enroute tothe aid station of the 1st Battalion.The most severely wounded trav-eled by helicopter directly to ahospital ship, Haven (AH 12) orConsolation (AH 15), in InchonHarbor. The others received fur-ther treatment from the division’smedical battalion before beingtransferred to better-equippedfacilities in the rear.

Chinese Diversionary Attacks

On the night of 26 March, theChinese diverted attention fromCarson, Reno, and Vegas by jab-bing at Berlin and East Berlin inthe sector of Lieutenant ColonelRobert J. Oddy’s 3d Battalion, 5thMarines. Berlin occupied a round-ed hilltop roughly the same heightas the main line of resistance; a400-yard ridge linked the two.Supplies or reinforcements boundfor Berlin, unlike those destinedfor Vegas or Reno, were screenedby the hill from direct enemyobservation. Taking advantage ofthe concealment, carrying partiesof the Korean Service Corps shut-tled supplies to the entrance to theoutpost. The porters were notallowed to enter the trenches,

however, to avoid confusion thatmight prove advantageous to theenemy.

One reinforced squad fromCompany G held Berlin, andanother East Berlin. Both garrisonsbeat back the Chinese with thehelp of barrages that boxed-in theoutposts and variable-time fire thatrained fragments on the enemy’sroutes of approach. By midnight, asecond squad had reinforced eachof the outposts.

The Chinese also probed theoutposts held by the 1st Marineson the left of Colonel Walt’s regi-ment. The enemy bombarded fouroutposts—Hedy, Bunker Hill, Es-ther, and Dagmar—and tested thedefenses of all of them. Only atCombat Outpost Dagmar did theattackers break through the wire.The 27 Marines defending the out-post held their own against anapproximately equal number ofChinese. Some 300 rounds of mor-tar and artillery fire helped thedefenders, commanded by Second

Lieutenant Benjamin H. Murray ofCompany I, 3d Battalion, to containthe penetration until help arrived.Before midnight on 26 March,Second Lieutenant John J. Peeler,the executive officer of Company I,led a counterattack from the mainline of resistance that regainedcontrol over all of OutpostDagmar. The clashes at Dagmarand the other outposts—Hedy,Bunker Hill, and Esther—killedperhaps 10 Chinese and wounded17 at the cost of four Marineskilled and 16 wounded. A feeble jabat Outpost Kate proved an annoy-ance rather than a threat, andChinese troops massing in front ofthe Korean Marines did not attackat this time. Marine artillery againdemonstrated its importance duringthe outpost actions on the night of26-27 March. The 11th Marinesfired more than 10,000 105mm and155mm rounds at targets from EastBerlin and Berlin westward toOutpost Hedy. The bombardmentof Vegas and Reno, the outposts

A Marine mans the main trenchline on the forward sloop of Outpost Dagmar. Theoutpost was the site of a two-squad Chinese diversionary assault with automat-ic weapons and satchel charges that was beaten back with help from Marines onthe main line of resistance.


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the Chinese had seized, continuedinto the morning of the 27th inpreparation for a more powerfulcounterattack.

Marine Counterattack of27 March

Preparations for a major coun-terattack went ahead on theground and in the air. At 0345 onthe 27th, Lieutenant ColonelCereghino’s 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, an element of the divi-sion reserve, came under the oper-ational control of Colonel Walt’s5th Marines. Cereghino’s unit hadalready moved into an assemblyarea behind the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, and Company F hadtaken part in as unsuccessfulattempt to break through toOutpost Vegas.

By the time the Marines aban-doned the early attempts to fighttheir way through to Vegas and

Reno, observation planes fromMarine Observation Squadron 6(VMO-6) began flying missions todirect friendly artillery fire againstChinese batteries. Aerial observerscalled down some 60 fire missionsagainst targets that included mor-tars, artillery, and self-propelledguns. During the morning dark-ness, Douglas F3D-2 Skyknightnight fighters conducted radarbombing against Chinese gunnersand troop concentrations. As dawnapproached, the time chosen foran attempt to recapture Vegas andReno, air strikes intensified.Grumman F9F Panther jets ofMarine Fighter Squadron 115(VMF-115) arrived overhead at0650 to help neutralize theChinese defenders of the two cap-tured outposts. A breakdown ofcommunications forced a post-ponement, however; H-Hour forthe assault on Reno and Vegasslipped until 0900, but persistentproblems of coordination causedfurther delay. Airmen took advan-tage of the additional time; withtwo-dozen Marine fighter-bombersjoining Air Force jets in deliveringstrikes.

Marine tanks—which the divi-sion commander, Major GeneralEdwin A. Pollock, had ordered tojoin the rocket battery, mortars,and artillery regiment in supportingthe counterattack—made theircontribution to the preliminaryfires. Company A of the division’stank battalion spotted two groups ofChinese carrying logs for the con-struction of bunkers on the site ofOutpost Reno. The tank companywiped out one group with 90mmfire, but the other presumablyreached its destination.

Before the attack finally began,Major General Pollock agreed to achange of plan. Vegas would bethe sole objective; while attackingthere the Marines would neutral-ize Reno with fire. Smoke shells

bursting on Hills 57A and 90 blind-ed the Chinese observers thereand marked the launching of theattack, which got under way short-ly after 1100. Artillery, mortars,tanks, and aircraft hammeredVegas, Reno, and the enemy’s firingbatteries, including some locatedby Marine airmen earlier in theday.

As bombs, shells, and rocketsexploded on Vegas and the othertargets, Company D, 2d Battalion,5th Marines—an element ofColonel Walt’s regimental re-serve—advanced from the mainline of resistance. The assault com-pany, commanded by CaptainJohn B. Melvin, launched its attackat 1120 but immediately cameunder fire from Chinese mortarsand artillery. Within an hour, thecompany’s first platoon had beenreduced to just nine able-bodiedMarines, but Melvin’s survivorsslogged forward through floodedrice paddies and up a rain-soakedslope. Marine casualties andenemy reinforcements slowedCompany D, as the men workedtheir way from one depression orrocky outcropping to another untilthe counterattack stalled some 200yards short of the objective.Chinese fire raked the slope wherethe assault had bogged down, butMarine jet fighters and piston-powered attack planes joined the11th Marines and the 1st TankBattalion in trying to silence thehostile weapons.

Shells from Chinese 122mmartillery and 120mm mortarschurned the slopes of Vegas; mak-ing the detonations from 60mmmortar rounds seem like mere fire-crackers. Captain Melvin recalledthat the enemy fire “was so intenseat times that you couldn’t moveforward or backward.... You couldonly hope that the next roundwouldn’t be on target.” Despite thedeadly barrage, a handful of


A graduate of Stanford University andveteran of the British CommandoProgram, LtCol Alexander D.Cereghino spent most of World War IIin command of the 1st ProvisionalBattalion stationed in NorthernIreland. Following a three-year stintat Headquarters Marine Corps, he wasgiven command of 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, in Korea.

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Marines succeeded in entering theouter trench and making a brieflodgment there.

To sustain the counterattack,two forces set out shortly after1200 from the lines of Company H,3d Battalion, 5th Marines. CaptainFloyd G. Hudson led the way witha provisional unit made up fromthe 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.Captain Herbert M. Lorence com-manded the second, Company Fof the same battalion. These rein-forcements reached the slopewhere Melvin’s Marines wereundergoing their ordeal but couldadvance no farther. As a result,Company F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines—available from what hadbeen the division reserve—set outat 1530 under Captain Ralph F.Estey to lend its weight to thecounterattack on Outpost Vegas.

Captain Estey’s companyreached the fire-swept slope lead-

ing to the enemy-held outpost andrelieved the surviving elements ofMelvin’s Company D, 5th Marines,which returned to the main line ofresistance. While 90mm guns fromCaptain Clyde W. Hunter’s Com-pany A, 1st Tank Battalion, firedfrom the main line of resistanceagainst a Chinese strongpoint onthe crest of Vegas, Marine aircraftmaintained a smoke screen thatblinded enemy observers. Esteycombined his men with those ofCompany E of the 5th Marines,and formed the equivalent of threeplatoons. After a savage fight last-ing about an hour and a half, thecounterattack succeeded by 2000in overrunning the trenches nearestthe Marine main line of resistance.The Chinese who held the rest ofVegas contained the breakthroughshort of the summit and forced theMarines to fall back to the base ofthe hill and dig in. Fire from sup-

porting weapons in the rear, andalso from the site of Outpost Reno,helped the enemy prevail.

Pressure on the Marine footholdcontinued throughout the night.By midnight, Captain Estey’s menhad beaten off three attacks andclung firmly to the position at thebase of Vegas. Marine night fightersand attack planes made nineradar-controlled strikes betweendarkness on the 27th and 0115 thenext morning, dropping some 24tons of bombs on enemy positionsand supply lines. The bombard-ment of Estey’s perimeter gradual-ly abated, as Chinese gunnersshifted their fire from the base ofVegas to the main line of resis-tance.

During the counterattack onChinese-held Outpost Vegas,Hospitalman Third Class WilliamR. Charette—attached to CompanyF, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines—


Grumman F9F Panther jets taxi into position for takeoffagainst enemy concentrations. During the Marine coun-terattack on Outpost Vegas, Panther jets from Marine

Fighter Squadrons 115 and 311 not only attacked Chinesetrenches, bunkers, and mortar emplacements, but alsobombed enemy resupply points.

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repeatedly risked his life to carefor the wounded. While Charettewas giving first aid to a Marine, aChinese grenade landed next tothem. Charette pounced on thegrenade; his armored vest savedhim from serious injury, but theforce of the explosion tore awayhis helmet and his medical kit.Since he could not waste timesearching for the kit, he used hisclothing to improvise bandages.When he was tending to anotherwounded Marine, whose armoredvest had been blown off by theconcussion from an explosion,Charette removed his own vestand placed it over the woundedman. Without either a helmet or anarmored vest, he stayed with hisplatoon throughout the fighting.According to one of the Marineswho fought there, the corpsman“was everyplace seemingly at thesame time, performing inex-haustibly.” In recognition of hisbravery and devotion to duty,Charette received the Medal ofHonor. Of the corpsmen whoseservice in Korea earned them thenation’s highest award for valor, healone survived to wear it.

The Marines counterattackingVegas had seized a strong footholdat the base of the hill where the out-post stood, but the summit and theshell-battered complex of trenchesand bunkers remained in Chinesehands. Preparations for anotherassault up the hill began at 0335 on28 March when the 105mm and155mm howitzers of the 11thMarines fired the first of more than2,300 rounds directed at Chineseweapons positions and assemblyareas, as well as the defenses ofthe summit itself.

After half an hour’s bombard-ment, the men of Captain Estey’sCompany F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, who had entered the fightat mid-afternoon the previous day,worked their way to within

grenade range of the Chinesebefore being driven back by firefrom small arms and mortars.While the company regrouped,Marine aircraft joined in batteringthe enemy. After sunrise, Marinefliers laid a smoke screen to concealair strikes from Chinese antiaircraftgunners on Hill 67, north ofOutpost Carson. During the earlymorning, Marine aircraft conductedfour powerful strikes, the first of aseries that lasted throughout theday.

The second infantry assault ofthe morning, launched at 0600,failed to recapture Vegas, endingwhen Captain Estey’s Marines tookcover from enemy fire about 375yards south of the crest. After fur-ther air strikes, Estey’s Company Fattacked once again and by 1015penetrated to within 15 yards ofthe trenches, where it engaged in afirefight that lasted 22 minutes anddeprived the assault of its momen-tum.

When this latest counterattackstalled in front of a machine gun fir-ing from the base of a rock forma-tion, Sergeant Daniel P. Matthews,a squad leader in Company F, sawthat the weapon had pinned downa wounded Marine and the corps-man trying to bring him to safety.The sergeant crawled to the forma-tion, scrambled onto the rocks,opened fire with his rifle, andcharged the gun. Although wound-ed almost immediately, Matthewskilled two members of the guncrew and silenced the weapon. Hisbold action enabled the corpsmanto save the wounded Marine, butMatthews died of his woundsbefore members of his squadcould reach him. His heroismearned a posthumous Medal ofHonor.

Shortly after the one-manassault by Sergeant Matthews,Captain Lorence’s Company E, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, passed

through Company F, 2d Battalion,7th Marines. Captain Estey’s com-pany, reduced to just 43 able-bod-ied men after a half-dozenattempts to recapture Vegas, fellback to regroup at the base of thehill.

While the relief of Estey’s com-pany was taking place, aircraft,mortars, and artillery continued toscourge not only outpost Vegas,but also Chinese supply routes,enemy-held Outpost Reno, nearbyHill 25A, and other high groundfrom which hostile gunners couldfire in support of their comradesdug in on Vegas. Taking advantageof the savage bombardment—dur-ing a 23-minute period, aerialbombs fell at the rate of more thana ton per minute—the 1st Platoon ofCaptain Lorence’s companylaunched its assault at 1301. Led byStaff Sergeant John J. Williams,who had taken over when SecondLieutenant Edgar R. Franz waswounded, the platoon killed ordrove off the Chinese defendingthe former site of Outpost Vegas.The platoon took only one prison-er, the second the Marines hadcaptured during the day.

As soon as Captain Lorence’sMarines regained the ruins ofOutpost Vegas, the Chinese coun-terattacked, but fire from tanksdug in on the main line of resistanceand artillery helped break up theassault. Although the Marines con-trolled Vegas itself, a few Chinesestubbornly held out at the verysummit of the hill. The work ofpreparing to meet the next coun-terattack went ahead under thecommand of Major Benjamin G.Lee, who had earned the SilverStar and Purple Heart as a non-commissioned officer at Guadal-canal during World War II.Although Lee, operations officer ofthe 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, tookcommand, the resupply of Vegasbecame the responsibility of the

regiment’s 3d Battalion. To defendthe newly recaptured outpost, Leeat first could muster only 66Marines, eight of them members ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, who had not fallen back tothe base of the hill with the unit’sother survivors, and the rest fromCaptain Lorence’s Company E, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines. Fortunately,Captain Thomas P. Connolly’sCompany E, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, reached the hill with anadditional 150 men and prepared totake over from Lorence’s Marinesand spearhead a final attack.

Further Action on Outpost Vegas

The Chinese held the initiative,however, and at 1955 on 28 March,as darkness enveloped Vegas, theycounterattacked. The preparatoryfires included the usual artilleryand mortar barrages supplementedby 3.5-inch rockets fired from theChinese equivalent of the

American Bazooka antitank wea-pon. An enemy battalion advancedfrom captured Outpost Reno, butfell back after coming under dead-ly fire from Army and Marineartillery and the 1st MarineDivision’s 4.5-inch rocket battery.

Outpost Carson came under fireat about the same time from mor-tars and automatic weapons.Chinese patrols probed theapproaches to the outpost, but thegarrison, supported by weaponson the main line of resistance,drove off the enemy. The attack, ifone was planned, did not takeplace.

At 2130, Major Lee radioed fromVegas to report that a secondChinese assault was imminent, andwithin an hour the enemy struck.Box-me-in fires helped Lee’sMarines cling to their position, butthe Chinese struck again, launchingthe night’s third attack about anhour before midnight. At least 200Chinese soldiers tried to over-

whelm Lee’s perimeter but suc-ceeded only in forcing the Marinesto yield some non-critical ground.While aircraft dropped flares,howitzer batteries of the 11thMarines dueled with Chinese gun-ners, firing more than 6,000rounds by midnight. The attackcontinued until 0130 on the morn-ing of 29 March, when anothersavage bombardment by the divi-sion’s artillery and the fire ofCaptain Connolly’s Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, forced theenemy to relax his pressure. Thebulk of the Chinese assault force,totaling two battalions during thefight, withdrew behind a curtain offire from weapons emplaced onReno.

As Connolly’s Company E, 7thMarines, and Lorence’s CompanyE, 5th Marines, prepared to elimi-nate the Chinese die-hards stillclinging to the crest of the hill,artillery and 4.5-inch rockets kepton pounding the enemy. Morethan 4,000 rounds neutralizedReno while others tore into theChinese-held portion of Vegas. Afinal Marine assault secured thesummit of Vegas at 0450.

Chinese mortar and artillery firedirected at the Marines continuedafter the recapture of Vegas.Shortly after 0500 a 120mm mortarshell killed both Major Lee andCaptain Walz, the commander ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, who had led the charge atReno Block. Also killed in this flur-ry of shelling was First LieutenantJohn S. Gray, a forward observerfrom the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines.

Major Joseph S. Buntin, theexecutive officer of the 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, which wasresponsible for rebuilding the out-post, now took command.Replacements, including corps-men, arrived that morning, alongwith weapons, tools, construction

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1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar53

Although Vegas was retaken, Marines still had to keep low when moving aroundthe ruined outpost. Daylight hours were relatively quiet with only an occasion-al burst of machine gun or sniper fire, while night witnessed renewed Chineseattempts to overrun the outpost.

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supplies, and laborers from theKorean Service Corps. By noon,work was underway on trenches,fighting holes, and bunkers,screened as necessary by smokemissions fired by the 11th Marines,but the muddy, shell-churnedearth complicated the efforts ofthe Marines and the Korean labortroops helping them. As daylightfaded, rain and light snow added tothe discomfort of the men on theground and forced the aerialobservers, who had been directingthe maintenance of smoke screensand other artillery missions, toreturn to their airstrips.

The Chinese had not yet aban-doned their designs on Vegas. At1805 on 29 March, they advancedfrom assembly areas in the vicinityof Reno and Hill 153 and hit Vegason both flanks. This attack trig-gered the most violent single bar-rage of the battle for Vegas, asmore than 6,400 shells from fiveartillery battalions, plus tworounds from each launching tube in

the division’s 4.5-inch rocket bat-tery, exploded among the attackingtroops. Army 8-inch howitzers and4.2-inch mortars also helped breakup the assault.

After a brief flurry of activity atabout 2045, perhaps an attempt toretrieve men wounded in the ear-lier attack, the Chinese mountedanother major effort early in themorning of 30 March, again strikingfrom Reno and Hill 153. This latestattempt to isolate Outpost Vegasand destroy it also collapsedunder an avalanche of artillery andmortar shells.

Sunrise brought clearing skies,enabling Marine AU Corsairs todisrupt Chinese attempts toregroup for further assaults.Throughout the day, Marine air-men attacked troops, fortifications,and firing batteries on Reno andother hills that menaced Vegas. OnVegas, the Marines “were like rab-bits digging in,” said CorporalGeorge Demars of Company F, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, who added

that the replacements “jumpedright in,” as members of hastilyorganized squads worked together,even though “they didn’t knowhalf the people on the fire teams.”In the afternoon, Company G, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, relievedCaptain Connolly’s Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, and MajorGeorge E. Kelly, operations officerof the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,replaced Major Buntin.

At about 1100 on the morning of30 March, five Chinese soldiersapproached Outpost Vegas, givingthe impression they intended tosurrender. Instead they threwgrenades and cut loose with sub-machine guns in a suicidal gestureof defiance. Marine infantrymenreturned the fire, killing three ofthe intruders outright. Anotherdied of his wounds, and the sur-vivor was taken prisoner.

During the night, Army search-lights provided illumination forMarine artillery, including the half-track-mounted .50-caliber machineguns of the 1st Provisional

By daybreak on 31 March, the men on Vegas could relax in the partially recon-structed trench works. The five-day siege involving more than 4,000 ground andair Marines was the bloodiest action Marines on the Western Front had yetengaged in.



For “outstanding services performedin the line of his professional ser-vices,” Maj Joseph S. Buntin wouldlater receive the Bronze Star Medalfrom MajGen Randolph McC. Pate.The award was presented inDecember 1953.

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Antiaircraft Artillery Battery(Automatic Weapons), which tooka hand in the fighting on theground. Marine aircrews directedby Marine Corps radar made seven

strikes against Chinese positionson the night of the 31st, and aircraft,mortars, and artillery continued toharass the enemy on the followingday, as the 5th Marines and 1st

Marines continued to relieve thegarrisons at their combat outposts.

To prevent the enemy fromexploiting his conquest of OutpostReno, the Marines strengthenedVegas after its recapture, manningit with a company rather than aplatoon. The 1st Marine Divisionalso established a new outpost,Elko (named like Reno, Vegas, andCarson for a city in Nevada). Elkostood on Hill 47, southeast ofCarson and 765 yards north of themain line of resistance. During theunsuccessful attempt to breakthrough to the Reno garrison,Chinese troops had used Hill 47 toambush the rescue forces. Marinepossession of the hill improvedthe security of Carson, Vegas, andthe main line of resistance.

Outpost Vegas: Summing Up

The five-day battle that endedwith the recapture and successfuldefense of Outpost Vegas cost the


Members of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, take time out after returning from thefierce five-day battle for Outpost Vegas to eat chow and take a well-deservebreather. With a touch of sarcasm, they called the disputed crest of Vegas “thehighest damn beachhead in Korea.”

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC429583

Standing together at I Corps headquarters in early Aprilare, from left, BGen John K. Waters, Chief of Staff, I Corps,MajGen Bak Lim Hang, Commanding General, 1stRepublic of Korea Division, MajGen M. A. R. West,Commanding General, 1st Commonwealth Division,MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Commanding General, 1stMarine Division, LtGen Paul W. Kendall, departing com-

manding general, I Corps, MajGen Bruce C. Clarke, newlyappointed commanding general, I Corps, MajGen James C.Fry, Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, MajGenArthur G. Trudeau, Commanding General, 7th U.S.Infantry Division, and Col Pak Ki Sung, Commander, 101stKorean Service Corps.

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1st Marine Division 1,015 casual-ties or some 63 percent of those suf-fered by the division, including theKorean Marine regiment, duringthe entire month of March 1953.Chinese losses were estimated to be2,221, of whom 536 had beenactually counted. Whatever theexact toll, the Marines had crip-pled the 358th Regiment of theChinese army, which faced thetask of rebuilding before it couldagain take the offensive.

During the loss and recapture ofVegas, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wingflew 218 missions in support of thecombat outpost line, most of themto help hold positions manned bythe 5th Marines. This total repre-sented some 63 percent of the 346close air support missions flownby the wing during March. Despiterain and snow that sometimesrestricted visibility, Marine aircraftdropped some 426 tons of bombsin support of Marines on theground, provided battlefield illu-mination, and laid smoke screens.In addition, helicopters evacuatedthe critically wounded.

Although Marine tanks not onlyfired some 9,000 rounds from themain line of resistance but alsoilluminated some targets usingtheir shuttered searchlights, ar-tillery proved the deadliestweapon in support of the infantry.Between 27 and 31 March, the11th Marines, the 1st MarineDivision’s rocket battery, and theArmy artillery and heavy mortarunits reinforcing their fires, deliv-ered almost 105,000 roundsagainst targets in the vicinity ofVegas, Carson, and Reno. Theheaviest artillery action took placeduring the 24 hours ending at1600, 29 March, when four Marinehowitzer battalions fired 33,041rounds and two Army battalionsanother 2,768.

The recapture of Outpost Vegasand the related fighting earned

congratulations from the Com-mandant of the Marine Corps,General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,who praised the “stubborn andheroic defense of Vegas, Reno,and Carson Hills coupled with thesuperb offensive spirit which char-acterized the several counterat-tacks.” The sustained and deadlyaction earned a respite for the 5thMarines, which on 4 and 5 Aprilmoved into division reserve,replaced by the 7th Marines after 68days on line. Meanwhile, on 28March the Chinese high command,perhaps motivated to some extentby the failure to hold Vegas andcrack the Jamestown Line, advisedArmy General Mark W. Clark, theUnited Nations commander, of itswillingness to discuss an exchangeof sick and wounded prisoners ofwar.

Shuffling Marine Regiments

After the battles for Reno,Carson, and Vegas, the 5th Marineswent into division reserve. Shortlyafterward, on 14 April, ColonelHarvey C. Tschirgi took commandof the regiment, replacing ColonelLewis Walt, who was reassigned tothe division staff. The 7th Marines,under Colonel Glenn C. Funk afterhe took over from Colonel Loren E.Haffner on 27 March, replaced the5th Marines on 4-5 April, movingfrom division reserve to man theportion of the Jamestown Line for-merly held by Colonel Walt’s regi-ment. The 1st Marines,commanded by Colonel Hewitt D.Adams from 1 November 1952until Colonel Wallace M. Nelsontook over on May 1, remained inplace, holding the segment of theline between the 7th Marines andthe Korean Marine regiment. Aftertruce talks resumed at Pan-munjom, the 1st Marines underColonel Adams provided a force of245 men and five armored vehicles

that stood by to rescue the UnitedNations negotiators if the otherside should spring a trap.

As the division reserve, the 5thMarines assumed responsibility formaintaining the fallback positionsbehind the main line of resistance.One of these, the Kansas Line, hadsuffered severe structural damagefrom torrential rains and the springthaw. Its restoration required thefull-time efforts of the regiment’s3d Battalion, which had to cancel itsscheduled training. The 2dBattalion, however, participated ina landing exercise at Tokchok-to, anisland southwest of Inchon, buthigh winds and rolling seas cutshort the training. While the 5thMarines was in reserve, its staffparticipated—together with staffofficers of the 1st Marines, theCommonwealth Division, and U.S.Army and South Korean forces—ina command post exercise stagedby I Corps.

Meanwhile, the Chinese testedthe 7th Marines. On 9 April, aftermortars and artillery battered theregiment with some 2,000 rounds,the Chinese launched an attack onCarson, followed by a series ofprobes of that outpost and nearbyElko. At 0345 on the morning of the9th, some 300 Chinese, advancingin two waves, hit Outpost Carson.After an hour, some of the assaulttroops reached the trenchline andfor another hour exchanged fire atpoint-blank range with thedefenders. A platoon set out at0530 to reinforce Carson but gotno farther than Elko, the newlyestablished outpost some 400yards southeast of Carson, beforefire from mortars and small armsstopped the unit until 90mm tankguns and Marine mortars broke upthe ambush. Howitzers and rocketlaunchers joined in, battering theapproaches to Carson until theChinese fell back.

To strengthen Carson’s defenses,

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Little Switch

During December 1952, when the truce talks atPanmunjom seemed to have reached a deadend, General Mark W. Clark—who in May of

that year had replaced another Army officer, GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, in command of the United Nationsforces—took note of a suggestion by the InternationalLeague of Red Cross Societies that the combatants inKorea exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war. On22 February 1953, Clark formally proposed an immedi-ate exchange, but, as he expected, the Chinese andNorth Koreans did not respond. On 5 March, however,the death of Joseph Stalin deprived the Soviet Union ofa forceful dictator and the People’s Republic of China ofa strong ally.

In this time of transition, as Georgei Malenkovemerged from the shadows to become Stalin’s successor,at least temporarily, the Chinese leadership began think-ing of Clark’s proposal as an anchor to windward in a gale

of uncertainty. Indeed, if Malenkov or some other rulerproved less supportive than Stalin, the limited exchangeof prisoners might enable China to revive the truce talksand perhaps bring to an end a long and thus far incon-clusive war. On 28 March, while the fight for Vegas andthe other outposts still raged, General Clark receivednot only a formal Chinese acceptance of the proposal toexchange prisoners, but also an offer to resume seriousarmistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

On 6 April, representatives of the two sides began talksat Panmunjom that resulted in an agreement for theexchange, Operation Little Switch, scheduled to begin onthe 20th. To prepare for the transfer, 100 Marines from the1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Shore Party Battalionbuilt the so-called Freedom Village at Munsan-ni, a tentcity complete with roads, a helicopter pad, and facilitiesfor emergency medical treatment, administration, andpress coverage.


Frontline Marines watch a U.S. Army ambulance convoybringing the first freed United Nations prisoners fromPanmunjom to Freedom Village. Following the long

one-and-a-half hour trip, each Marine prisoner receiveda medical check and a new utility cap with its MarineCorps emblem.

Company E, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, moved there from regi-mental reserve, more than makinggood the day’s losses of 14 killedand 64 wounded. The Marinescounted 60 Chinese killed in thefighting on the early morning of 9April. Another 160 may have beenkilled or wounded, which wouldhave brought the morning’s casu-alties to more than half theChinese assault force that triggeredthe action.

During the first day’s fighting onthe ground, Marine aircraft ap-peared overhead after 0715,attacking visually or with the helpof ground-based Marine radar. Bymid-afternoon, fighter-bombershad dropped more than 67 tons ofbombs on Chinese positions northof Carson. Radar-directed strikestook place after dark, and visualstrikes resumed after daylight on10 April.

As aerial action intensified,activity on the ground slowed. On

the night of the 9th, three Chineseplatoons, possibly searching forthe day’s casualties, advanced as

far as the ruins of a bunker just 50yards from Outpost Carson. TheChinese activity attracted fire that

31

When the exchange began on 20 April, Major GeneralEdwin A. Pollack, the division commander, stood by togreet the Marines among the 149 Americans released

through 26 April when Little Switch ended. The firstMarine welcomed by Major General Pollack, and by theother dignitaries that included General Clark, wasPrivate Alberto Pizzaro-Baez of Company H, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, wounded in the leg and capturedat Outpost Frisco in October 1952. During his imprison-ment, the leg became gangrenous and had to be ampu-tated. The men of the 1st Marine Division returned inOperation Little Switch totaled 15 Marines and threeNavy hospital corpsmen. Two of the Marines, CorporalJimmie E. Lacy and Private First Class George F. Hart, andone of the corpsmen, Hospitalman Thomas “Doc”Waddill, had been wounded and captured when theChinese overran Outpost Reno on the night of 26 March.The Communist forces released 684 sick and woundedcaptives from 11 nations, more than half of them SouthKoreans, in return for 6,670 North Koreans and Chinese.The disparity in numbers may have reflected the desireof the Americans to rid themselves of dedicated and dis-ciplined Communists among the prisoners like thosewho had seized a prison compound at the island ofKoje-do and briefly held the commander hostage. LittleSwitch did not address, let alone resolve, the question ofthe forced repatriation of prisoners unwilling to returnwhen a truce finally went into effect.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-480686

Marine Pvt Alberto Pizzaro-Baez talks with MajGenEdwin A. Pollock at Freedom Village following hisrelease. Pvt Pizzaro-Baez was among the 15 Marinesand three Navy Corpsmen who had been captured fromthe 1st Marine Division.

Not every veteran of the 1st Marine Division was a human being. The packhorse “Reckless,” shown here with her handler, took her name from the recoil-less (or rec-less) rifle, like the one next to her, for which she carried ammunition.The horse returned to Camp Pendleton, California, with the division in 1955.


definitely killed 15, may havekilled 15 more, and woundedbetween seven and 27. Shortlybefore midnight, some 70 Chineseadvanced from the Ungok hillsand attacked Carson, only to loseperhaps 20 additional men toMarine mortars, tank guns, andmachine guns. A couple ofChinese squads probed OutpostElko on the night of the 11th, butfor the most part, the enemy nowcontented himself with trying toexploit the renewal of truce talks byshowering the Jamestown Linewith propaganda leaflets warningthe Marines against risking theirlives because a ceasefire was athand. The Chinese reinforced theprinted message with loudspeakerbroadcasts, and on one occasionthey dropped leaflets from an air-plane to supplement those scat-tered from special mortar shells.

Into I Corps Reserve

On 5 May, the Army’s 25thInfantry Division, commanded byMajor General Samuel T. Williams,

and its attached Turkish brigadereplaced the 1st Marine Divisionon what had been called theJamestown Line. The practice ofnaming each separate segment ofthe line, like Jamestown, ended on28 April, after which the entire

front, from coast to coast, wasknown collectively as the mainline of resistance. At the sametime, the Eighth U.S. Army inKorea became simply the EighthU.S. Army.

While the bulk of the Marinedivision moved 15 miles eastwardover muddy roads to occupy thethree cantonment areas that com-prised Camp Casey, named inmemory of U.S. Army Major HughB. Casey, the 11th Marines and thedivision’s rocket battery remainedattached to I Corps Artillery, inposition to provide general sup-port and fire counterbattery mis-sions as necessary. The artillerybattalion of the Korean Marinesmoved into position to reinforcethe fires of I Corps Artillery. TheMarine 1st Tank Battalion cameunder the control of the 25thInfantry Division; two companiessupported the Turkish brigade,which had no armor of its own,another was assigned to the Armydivision’s 35th Infantry, and thefourth served as a reserve. TheKorean Marine tank company

32


Marine Cpl Dennis W. Burker, using a Browning automatic rifle, fires at enemypositions in front of Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines’ place on the main lineof resistance. Cpl Burker wears one of the 24,000 armored vests issued the divi-sion by 1953.

The first contingent of the 3d Turkish Battalion begins the relief of the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines. On 5 May, the U. S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division, towhich the Turkish troops were attached, took over from the 1st Marine Division,which went into corps reserve.


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Women Marines

The role of women in the Marine Corps during theKorean War was the result of a checkered series ofevents in the preceding years. When World War II

ended, there were 820 officers and 17,640 enlisted mem-bers of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve. They hadserved to “free a Marine to fight,” as the recruiting sloganproclaimed.

In one tumultuous year of peacetime demobilization,the number of women reservists plummeted to a total of298 in August 1946. Simultaneously, there was skepticismat the highest levels in Headquarters Marine Corps as towhether there should be any women reservists on activeduty, or, in fact, any women at all in a peacetime MarineCorps. With other branches of the Armed Servicesretaining women, the Marine Corps finally agreed to aminimum step, it would enlist former women reservistsin its Reserve and authorize their formation intoVolunteer Training Units (January 1947).

The decisive breakthrough occurred on 12 June 1948with the passage of the Women’s Armed ServicesIntegration Act. This led to women in the OrganizedReserve and, for the first time, in the Regular Marine Corps.They were now confirmed as a permanent part of apeacetime Corps, with authorization to seek 100 offi-cers, 10 warrant officers, and 1,000 enlisted women dur-ing the next two years.

To take charge of this rebirth, a superb leader wasessential. There would be endless problems and detailsin organizing this latest expansion, as well as a crucialneed for a firm but diplomatic style at HeadquartersMarine Corps. The right person emerged—Katherine A.Towle. She had been a captain in 1943 and had returnedto a college campus in 1946. General Clifton B. Cates,Commandant of the Marine Corps, asked her to return toactive duty and take charge. On 18 October 1948, she wassworn in as Director of Women Marines with the rank ofcolonel. It was she who would lead Women Marinesthroughout the Korean War. Progress came quickly afterthat—commissioning of women as regulars, with their titlechanged from women reservists to Women Marines.

The year 1949 saw a variety of activities, which,unknowingly, prepared women reservists and WomenMarines for the wartime demands which would erupt thefollowing year. Enlisted training began at Parris Island,South Carolina. Drawing on the Volunteer TrainingUnits, Organized Women’s Reserve platoons were acti-vated, with 13 functioning by February 1950. AtQuantico a Woman Officer Candidate Course and aWoman Officer Training Class were instituted, and 86, laterreduced to 27, appropriate military occupational spe-cialties were targeted as potential for women. By March1950, there were 28 Regular Women Marine officers, 496regular enlisted, 18 women reserve officers, and 41

women reserve enlisted on active duty.A bombshell exploded on 25 June 1950 when South

Korea unexpectedly was invaded. Now the trials andtribulations that Marine women had experienced in thepast years would bear fruit in a time of crisis. With thebrutal strength reductions that had been forced upon itin the preceding years, the Marine Corps suddenly need-ed all the personnel—hopefully trained—that it couldscrape together. And here were the women! Theirpotential went far beyond those on active duty and outinto a reservoir of civilians who would soon be joiningup.

The Marine Corps immediately called up its 13women reserve platoons, with 287 enlisted veteransgoing straight to active duty and 298 non-veterans beingsent to Parris Island. This mobilization was characterizedby President Harry S. Truman’s 19 July call up of allReserves for active duty, including the Marine Corps’Organized Reserve and Volunteer Reserve.

For women, the Marine Corps had strict standards: anage limit of 18 to 31 (with 20 as the minimum for a reg-ular); single with no dependents; and a high schooldiploma or its equivalent. Within a year, the eagerresponse had brought the total number of women in theCorps to 2,065.

The flow of recruits led to a battalion of women atParris Island and a similar company at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina, and the air base at El Toro, California, byOctober 1950. There they worked five days, spent a half-

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

The first post-World War II Women Marines arrived atQuantico, Virginia, in 1950 and were assigned to theAdministrative Section of the Landing Force Develop-ment Center. Although limited to a minute number ofoccupational fields, Women Marines numbered morethan 2,700 by mid-1953.

remained in its former sector,although now under control of ICorps.

The tanks on the main line ofresistance occupied fixed posi-tions, functioning mostly asartillery; they shifted as necessary toalternate sites to prevent Chinesegunners from zeroing in on them.The Army division providedarmored personnel carriers to haul

food, water, fuel, and ammunitionto the tanks. The presence ofMarine armor at the front provideda bonus in addition to firepower, forwhen Chinese artillery ripped uptelephone wires leading to therear, the tank radios ensured reli-able communications.

While in reserve, the 1st MarineDivision added depth to the ICorps positions by standing ready

to counterattack after occupyingany of the back-up lines—like theformer Wyoming and Kansas—behind the four divisions manningthe main line of resistance: the25th Infantry Division; theCommonwealth Division; the 1stRepublic of Korea Division; andthe 7th Infantry Division. In addi-tion, the Marines made improve-ments to Camp Casey, repaired the

34

day on instruction in military subjects, and finished offafter their evening meal with close order drill. It was notsurprising that the vast majority of their assignmentswere clerical and administrative, given the culture of the1940s and 1950s, when many civilians, and not a fewMarines, believed that a woman’s place was in thehome. This also was evidenced when family and friendswould often try to dissuade young women from enlisting.And then there were some Marines who made life diffi-cult for the women who did join up.

This narrow limitation of assignments for womenresulted in their being untrained for billets that neededthem, as well as strange anomalies such as a woman pri-vate first class filling a master sergeant’s billet.

Colonel Towle, alert as always, wrote a pithy memo-randum to the powers at Headquarters Marine Corps inJanuary 1951. She stated unequivocally that MarineCorps policies for women were “unrealistic and short-sighted, as well as uneconomical.” Thus, there was anurgent need, she continued for a “systematic, long-rangetraining [plan].”

As the number of women grew, so did the range oftheir activities. At their assigned bases, they organized ath-letic teams and had a variety of off-duty interests. Therewas also a modest expansion of duties, with somewomen now in billets for motor transport, recruiting,photography, air traffic control, public affairs, and basenewspapers. A few even made it to duty in Italy andGermany.

With the increase in active duty billets, womenreservists with minor-age children were released while,at the same time, applications for active duty rose.

In January 1952, women reserve platoons werereestablished and by the end of the year totaled 14. Inaddition to basic military subjects, they received indi-vidualized training in one of five occupational specialties:administration, supply, classification, disbursing, andcommunications. Besides regular “drill nights” thesewomen reservists had a two-week summer training peri-od.

In spite of these expanded roles for women in theCorps, billets for officers were still limited to 10 occupa-tional specialties in April 1952. Nevertheless, by May, there

were Women Marine companies at Cherry Point, CampPendleton, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Norfolk, SanDiego, and Quantico, with Kaneohe Bay added in 1953.

The year 1953 saw the establishment at Camp Lejeuneof a Staff Noncommissioned Officer Leadership School forwomen. Military occupational specialties available toofficers were expanded in March. Three more womenreserve platoons had been formed by April.

There was a change of command on 1 May 1953.Colonel Towle had reached the statutory age limit of 55for colonels, and she had to retire. She had been asuperb leader, and a Letter of Commendation from theCommandant and an award of a Legion of Merit medalrecognized her achievements.

Her successor as Director of Women Marines wasLieutenant Colonel Julia E. Hamblet. She was a graduateof the first training class for women officers in 1943, andwas only 37 years old when, after a wide variety ofactive duty, she was promoted to colonel in her newassignment.

When she took office, the Korean War was windingdown. June 1953 saw a total of 160 women officers and2,502 enlisted. Then, on 27 July, the war was over.

As one author summed up these years:

The Korean War era witnessed a brief, temporarysurge of interest in WMs [Women Marines] on theCorps’ part, but it did not result in major, long-termchanges in either the women’s standing within theCorps or in the duties they were assigned. In thewake of the war their numbers began to decrease,the sense of urgency that surrounded their reduxsubsided, and WM-related issues were shelvedindefinitely. The ambivalence the Corps felt aboutwomen in the ranks never really disappeared,even when the war was on the WMs were sorelyneeded.

Besides these institutional evaluations, there wasanother vital factor to record, the impact that duty in theCorps had on these women. Their later comments werenearly unanimous: “The best years of my life.”

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

back-up positions, especially theformer Kansas Line which hadbeen severely damaged by rainsand the spring thaw, and em-barked on a program of instruc-tion that emphasized night combatand began with the individual andsmall unit. The larger-unit exercis-es included the use of helicoptersin conjunction with a rifle compa-ny, proceeded to regimental land-ing exercises, and culminated in afield exercise. All of this training,which had to be somewhat cur-tailed, was to take place before thedivision returned to the main line ofresistance in early July.

Although the spring weatherthat had damaged the old KansasLine also turned roads to rivers ofmud, the division completed itsmove to Camp Casey andlaunched the programs of trainingand rebuilding. The 5th Marines,the reserve regiment when thedivision moved off line, under-

went a week of training for anamphibious exercise held atYongjong-ni, on the west coastnear Kunsan. Dense fog forcedcancellation of a planned rehearsalthat might have highlighted theimpact of a shallow beach gradientthat grounded landing craft farfrom shore and complicated thelanding of vehicles.

While Colonel Tschirgi’s regi-ment was carrying out this exer-cise, other elements of the divisiontook part in a combined commandpost exercise and firing exercisedesigned to help the division pre-pare for an Eighth Army exercise,then scheduled for the end of Maybut later canceled. The 7thMarines landed at the Yongjong-nitraining area on 5 June, employinga 144-foot pontoon bridge, sup-plied by the Army, to speed themovement of vehicles over theshallow-sloping beach. However,the possible need for amphibious

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Department of Defense (USMC) A171330

Marines of Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, set up their tents after mov-ing from the frontlines into corps reserve in the central area of the Casey com-plex. Although the division had been on line for more than 20 months, there wasa reluctance to turn over positions.

Members of the 81mm mortar platoon, Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, receive refresher instruction on the parts and nomenclature of the81mm mortar during the eight-week reserve period. Lectures such as this werekept to a minimum with at least 50 percent of the tactical training conductedat night.

Department of Defense (USMC) A171518

shipping to repatriate prisoners ofwar in the event of a truce causedthe cancellation of a landing exer-cise scheduled for the 1st Marinesbetween 14 and 23 June.

Marine aircraft participated inthe training program conducted

while the division formed the ICorps reserve. Fighter-bomberscovered the landing exercises, forexample, and helicopters of HMR-161 landed at Camp Casey for apractice redeployment of two sec-tions of 4.5-inch rocket launchers

from the division’s rocket battery,along with infantry from the 5thMarines.

The principal mission of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, although ittook part in the training program,remained the support of United

36

A New Commanding General

On 15 June 1953, Major General Randolph McCallPate took command of the 1st Marine Division,replacing Major General Edwin A. Pollack, who

became director of the Marine Corps Educational Center,Quantico, Virginia. A native of South Carolina who spenthis boyhood in Virginia, General Pate’s military careerbegan in 1918, the final year of World War I, when heenlisted in the Army, serving long enough to qualify forthe Victory Medal though he did not fight in France.After graduating from the Virginia Military Institute in June1921, he accepted in September of that year a commis-sion as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve.He received a regular commission in May 1922, afterwardcarrying out a variety of assignments in the DominicanRepublic and China, as well as at posts in the continen-tal United States and Hawaii.

During World War II, General Pate served as supplyofficer on the staff of the 1st Marine Division atGuadalcanal, where he was wounded, and held otherwartime staff positions. After Japan’s surrender, hebecame Director of Reserve at Marine Corps headquar-ters, served on the Navy’s General Board, and held theassignment of Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Schools,Quantico, Virginia. While at Marine Corps Schools, heachieved promotion to brigadier general in 1949 andduring the following year took over as Director, MarineCorps Educational Center at Quantico.

After an assignment with the Office of Joint Chiefs ofStaff as the Joint Staff’s Director for Logistics, General Patereturned to Marine Corps headquarters and in August 1952was promoted to major general, while serving his secondtour directing the Marine Corps Reserve. In September ofthat year, he assumed command of the 2d MarineDivision at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. After takingover the 1st Marine Division in June 1953, he com-manded the unit for the remainder of the Korean fight-ing, finally turning the division over to Major GeneralRobert H. Pepper in May 1954.

Upon leaving Korea, General Pate became AssistantCommandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff,advancing to the rank of lieutenant general. On 1January 1956, he received a fourth star and becameCommandant of the Marine Corps, succeeding GeneralLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. General Pate served asCommandant for four years, during which the Marine

Corps moved away from the trenches and bunkers andreestablished itself as a highly mobile amphibious forcein readiness. Following four years as Commandant, heretired in December 1959 with the rank of general.

Following a brief illness, General Pate died in 1961 andwas interred with full military honors in ArlingtonNational Cemetery. Pate’s military colleagues describedhim as: “A man of deep sincerity and untiring integrity,who is thoughtful and considerate of others—a true gen-tleman of the old school.”


MajGen Randolph McC. Pate, left, relieves MajGenEdwin A. Pollock in command of the 1st MarineDivision. The departing Pollock was presented theDistinguished Service Medal for his “outstanding successin the defense of Carson, Vegas, and Elko.”

Nations ground forces by day andby night. The crews of Marinenight fighters, Grumman F7FTigercats and Douglas F3D Sky-knights, learned to take deadlyadvantage of beams from search-lights along the main line of resis-tance that illuminated terrainfeatures held by the Chinese,bathing in light those on the nearslope and creating an artificialhorizon for air strikes against thoseon the shadowed slope fartherfrom United Nations lines.Artillery, firing time-on-target orvariable-time concentrations, blan-keted known Chinese antiaircraftbatteries within 2,500 yards of atarget. At first, this kind of bom-bardment, usually lasting about

three minutes, effectively silencedthe hostile gunners, but with repe-tition the technique declined ineffectiveness, serving to alert theChinese that an air strike wasimminent. Besides providing closeair support for the ground forces,Marine night fighters escorted AirForce B-29s on missions againstNorth Korea and flew long-rangeinterdiction.

On the Main Line of Resistance

While infantry, service, andsome support elements of the 1stMarine Division repaired the posi-tions that added depth to the ICorps front and underwent trainingto the rear, the Chinese exerted

renewed pressure on the portion ofthe main line of resistance that theMarines had formerly held. Theenemy struck first at the outpostsnow held by the Turkishbrigade—Berlin and East Berlin,Carson, Elko, and Vegas. Shortlybefore 0200 on 15 May, advancingbehind deadly mortar and artilleryfire, one Chinese battalionattacked Berlin and East Berlin,while another hit the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. The Turks heldtheir ground, thanks in part toaccurate fire from Marine tanks onthe main line of resistance, whichmay have inflicted 300 casualties,and from the 11th Marines and therocket battery, which fired some5,500 105mm and 155mm howitzer

37


While the division was in corps reserve in May and June, the1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery supported units manning the

main line of resistance, as it had in March when theMarines were fighting to hold Reno, Vegas, and Carson.

38

Events at Panmunjom

The fighting along the combat outpost line, whichcaused the commanding general of I Corps toshift the 1st Marines into position for a possible

counterattack, coincided with resolution of the lingeringissue of forced repatriation. By the end of May 1953, theUnited States was insisting that there be no forced repa-triation, as had happened in Europe after World War IIwhen American troops handed over refugees and pris-oners of war to Soviet authorities, the representatives ofa wartime ally. The alliance that defeated Hitler’sGermany soon collapsed, and the Soviet Union emergedas America’s principal antagonist in a Cold War thatburst into flame in Korea. China and the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea, at first indifferent to theissue, had come to insist on forced repatriation upon real-izing how many of their captured soldiers might preferto remain in South Korea.

In short, both sides faced possible embarrassment.American acceptance of involuntary repatriation wouldseem a repetition of the transfers of both captives andcivilians to Soviet control in the aftermath of World War

II. Widespread refusals to return to China or NorthKorea would shatter the image of a Communist paradiseand lend substance to Western propaganda.

On 25 May, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison ofthe Army, the senior American delegate at thePanmunjom negotiations, persuaded the Communistside to agree to a closed session. The absence of presscoverage, Harrison believed, would prevent posturingdesigned to influence world opinion and instead focus theattention of the delegates on progress toward a settlement.At this meeting, Harrison declared that there could be noforced repatriation and then offered compromises tomake this principle palatable to the Chinese and NorthKoreans.

The United Nations forces would neither force capturedCommunist troops to return to their homeland nor sim-ply release them. Harrison proposed instead that sol-diers who refused repatriation be turned over, as theCommunist delegates desired, to a Neutral NationsRepatriation Committee with representatives of five so-called neutral states—Switzerland and Sweden, with ide-


After a high wind blew down the tents in August 1952, theCommunist built a more substantial wooden structure forthe armistice meetings at Panmunjom. The white tent on

the left is the Communist delegates’ tent, while the two darkones on the right are the United Nations delegates’ tent andpress tent.

shells and 4.5-inch rockets duringfour hours of fighting. In addition,the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 21strikes against Chinese positionsthreatening the Turkish troops.

Neither the successful Turkishresistance nor the continuing talksat Panmunjom—where negotiatorswere addressing both the issue ofrepatriation and South Koreanconcerns that a truce could placetheir country at a fatal disadvan-tage—dissuaded the Chinese fromintensifying their offensive. On 25May, despite signs of real progressin the truce talks, Chinese gunnersresumed pounding the Turkishbrigade, and three days later, theenemy launched a series of attacksalong much of the combat outpostline held by I Corps. At 1800 on 28May, the enemy’s 120th Divisionlaunched simultaneous attacksagainst Combat Outpost 2, to theeast of the Panmunjom Corridor,on Carson, Elko, and Reno, Berlinand East Berlin, and against theHook and its two outposts,Ronson and Warsaw, these lastthree held by the British 1stCommonwealth Division.

The major thrusts by theChinese division sent a battalion,advancing behind a mortar andartillery barrage, against OutpostsCarson and Elko, while anotherbattalion took advantage of a

smoke screen to storm Vegas, anda third menaced Berlin and EastBerlin. At the same time, still otherChinese troops attacked CombatOutpost 2, on the left of the 25thInfantry Division’s sector, and theHook, along with OutpostsRonson and Warsaw, on the right ofthe I Corps line.

The 11th Marines, commandedby Colonel James E. Mills—whohad taken over from ColonelHarry N. Shea on 22 February1953—fired some 9,500 roundsduring the night of 28 May, andMarine aircraft flew eight strikesagainst Chinese artillery positions.The Marine division’s 4.5-inchrocket battery, now firing from thevicinity of the Hook, supportedthe Commonwealth Division.Marine tanks, dug-in along themain line of resistance, provideddeadly fire from prepared posi-tions, especially in the sector ofthe Turkish brigade.

The deluge of shells and rocketsfrom Marine weapons helped the35th Infantry Regiment holdCombat Outpost 2 and theCommonwealth Division to main-tain its grip on the Hook, Warsaw,and Ronson. The Chinese, howev-er, succeeded in capturing Carson,although Turkish troops clungstubbornly to Elko and Vegas. Thethreat to Berlin and East Berlin

abated swiftly, suggesting that theenemy launched the probe todivert attention from the adjacentCarson-Elko-Vegas complex.

Marine air, artillery, and armorcontinued to support I Corps asthe fighting entered a second day.Attack planes and fighter-bombershit Chinese troops, artillery posi-tions, and supply points by dayand night. Additional tanks movedinto prepared positions on themain line of resistance until 33 ofthem supported the Turkishbrigade. After Chinese counterbat-tery fire silenced six Turkish how-itzers, the 2d Battalion, 11thMarines, took over the direct-firemission. By dusk on 29 May, thetotal rounds fired by Marine how-itzers and rocket launchers indefense of the outposts exceeded40,000.

This intense fire, and the tenac-ity of the Turkish soldiers who suf-fered 150 killed and 245 wounded,could not save the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. By mid-day,Lieutenant General Bruce C.Clarke, the corps commander, andGeneral Williams, in command ofthe 25th Infantry Division, decidedto withdraw from these outposts atleast temporarily. Carson had fallento the Chinese on the previousday, and fewer than 40 survivorscontinued to resist on Vegas. Since

39

ological ties to the West; Poland and Czechoslovakia,Soviet satellites at the time; and India, which followed anoften erratic political course determined largely by its ownself-interest. To minimize friction among the neutralnations—Poland and Czechoslovakia against Swedenand Switzerland—Indian troops would assume custodyof all newly released prisoners seeking asylum.

The Communist side, troubled by the prospect ofmass defections, insisted on an opportunity to persuadeits soldiers who refused repatriation to change theirminds and return. The United Nations, however, fearedthat persuasion would give way to coercion, and, as aresult, Harrison’s compromise specifically forbade thethreat or use of force and limited the time allotted for re-indoctrination to 90 days. Those prisoners who persist-

ed in refusing repatriation would then be turned over tothe control of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Communist negotiators demanded certainchanges. They called for an additional 30 days for re-edu-cation and the elimination of the United Nations GeneralAssembly from the repatriation process, since the inter-national organization, as a belligerent, could not serve asa disinterested guardian of the rights of Chinese orNorth Korean prisoners. On 4 June, however, theCommunist parties accepted the principle of voluntaryrepatriation, although without formally endorsing it, inreturn for the additional 30 days of persuasion and thesubstitution of India’s Red Cross organization for theGeneral Assembly as custodian of those prisoners whorefused to return to their homelands.

Elko could not survive if theenemy held both Vegas andCarson, the Turkish troops with-drew to the main line of resis-tance. By the time the withdrawaltook place, the attacking Chinesehad lost perhaps 3,000 men butshowed no signs of breaking offthe action.

In the meantime, GeneralClarke had ordered the 1st Marinesto prepare for a possible counter-attack. The regiment’s infantry bat-talions and antitank and heavymortar companies moved intoposition just south of the refur-bished defenses of the old KansasLine. In addition, the 1st MarineDivision’s reconnaissance companycame under control of the 25thInfantry Division, replacing a com-pany of that division’s 14thInfantry in reserve along the eastbank of the Imjin River.

The projected counterattacknever occurred. Torrential rains on30 May frustrated any ambitionsthe enemy may have had for tryingto crack the main line of resis-

tance. Moreover, a truce agree-ment that seemed on the verge ofacceptance dissuaded the UnitedNations Command from makingthe obviously costly effort torecapture Carson, Vegas, and Elko.

The Truce in Jeopardy

After the bitter fighting on theoutpost line at the end of May, a lullensued on the I Corps front. TheChinese, however, did not aban-don their attempt to improve theirmilitary position before a truceshould go into effect and lungedinstead at the South Korean IICorps, opposite the enemy-heldtown of Kumsong, attacking on 10June and in six days of fightingforcing the defenders to pull backsome 4,000 yards. A second blowdrove the South Korean 20thDivision back from the northernrim of the Punchbowl. By the timethe fighting died down after 18June, the South Koreans had suf-fered some 7,300 casualties, per-haps 600 more than the Chinese

attackers. The enemy, moreover,had pushed the South Koreansback as far as 4,000 yards on seg-ments of the frontlines totalingabout 15,000 yards in width. Theoffensive of mid-June proved themost successful Chinese thrustsince April and May 1951 whenthe enemy penetrated as deeply as30 miles at some points along theUnited Nations line.

Even as the negotiators atPanmunjom were resolving theoutstanding issues concerning therepatriation of prisoners, SyngmanRhee, the president of the Repub-lic of Korea, became increasinglyconcerned about the impact of aceasefire on the survival of hisnation. His dream of one Koreaunified under the government atSeoul was rapidly vanishing. Hehad little direct leverage on theChinese government; his onlyhope—a slim one, indeed—wassomehow to prod his war-wearyAmerican ally into turning its backon the Panmunjom negotiationsand exerting renewed pressure onthe battlefield. To achieve thisunlikely end, President Rheethreatened to pull South Koreanforces out of the United NationsCommand. The threat, howeverunrealistic, brought a formalAmerican offer to build up theSouth Korean armed forces andrestore the nation’s shatteredeconomy, provided that the Seoulgovernment accepted the settle-ment that was taking shape.Despite his weak bargaining posi-tion, the South Korean presidentignored the offer and demandedthe removal of Chinese forcesfrom the Korean peninsula, alongwith a formal military alliance withthe United States, the recentlyoffered program of military andeconomic aid, and the stationingof American air and naval forces inSouth Korea.

When progress continued

40


On 29 May, Col Wallace M. Nelson’s 1st Marines move up on foot in full gear toset up a hasty blocking position on the Kansas Line in case of a breakthrough byCommunist forces during their attack on 25th Infantry Division outposts.

41

The Offshore Islands

American Marines continued to provide essentialhelp in defending the islands off the east andwest coasts of the Korean peninsula that were gar-

risoned by their South Korean counterparts. The twodefensive organizations, formerly the East Coast andWest Coast Island Defense Commands, were redesignat-ed task units effective 1 January 1953. The 2d KoreanMarine Corps Regiment furnished the troops thatmanned these outposts under the direction of U.S.Marines.

Two battalions of South Korean Marines manned theWest Coast Island Defense Task Unit, while the U.S.Marine Corps contributed some 17 officers and 100enlisted men. The western task unit manned outposts onsix islands in close proximity to the 38th Parallel, whichhad separated prewar South Korea from the CommunistNorth. These islands, from north to south, were Sok-to,Cho-do, Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, Yongpyong-do,and Tokchok-to. An earlier attempt to occupy tiny Ho-dohad ended in failure when the Chinese overwhelmed thegarrison. The six surviving outposts served as bases forartillery, intelligence collection, the direction of guerril-la operations in North Korea, and training. At some of the

outposts, the South Koreans used their old-model radiosto call down fire from artillery or naval guns against hos-tile batteries on the mainland. American Marines direct-ed all this activity, although the language barrierhampered their role in training.

Late in 1952, Communist artillery batteries on thepeninsula opened fire more frequently against UnitedNations warships as well as the western island outposts.For counterbattery missions from Cho-do, two 90mmguns supporting a force of South Korean guerrillas wereshifted there from the island of Kanghwa-do at themouth of the Han River. Enemy light aircraft contributedto the increased pressure on the islands, conducting nui-sance raids against Cho-do, bombed as recently asOctober 1952, Sok-to, and Paengyong-do.

Besides using the two artillery pieces available atCho-do, the guerrillas provided valuable information onenemy activity. The South Koreans reported an increas-ing number of Chinese junks offshore and identifiedmajor military units on the peninsula itself. As the threatof an assault against one or more of the western islandsintensified, counterbattery fire from the outposts keptpace, only diminishing when the threat ebbed.


Two members of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire LiaisonCompany spot and correct gunfire laid down againstCommunist troops by the Dutch frigate Johann Maurits vanNassau.

42

From time to time, American or British pilots, low onfuel or flying damaged aircraft, landed on the beach atPaengyong-do. Unfortunately, obtaining the needed fuelor aircraft parts proved difficult because of tangled andunresponsive lines of supply. Logistics difficulties alsoposed a threat to the large number of refugees that hadfound asylum during 1952 on the islands protected by thewestern task unit. As winter approached, concernmounted that they could not be fed by air or sea andwould not survive the cold, but two supply-laden tanklanding ships arrived before the seasonal storms beganand eased the crisis.

By the spring of 1953, improving prospects for aceasefire generally along the 38th Parallel raised doubtsabout the future control of two west-coast islands, Cho-do and Sok-to, which lay north of the demarcation line.Colonel Harry N. Shea, the task unit commander and hissuccessor, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, carried outOperation Pandora, a plan for the evacuation of bothislands. Artillery on Sok-to and Cho-do—each of whichnow had its own pair of 90mm guns—pounded enemybatteries along the coast, and warships joined in, includ-ing the battleship New Jersey (BB 62) with its 16-inch guns.Despite the avalanche of American firepower, the enemystuck to his guns, firing some 1,800 rounds in Junealone. By the end of June, Operation Pandora began thesuccessful withdrawal first of the guerrillas and theirfamilies and then of the two island garrisons.

Whereas only two of the islands manned by the west-ern task unit were located north of the 38th Parallel, themost important of those garrisoned by the East CoastIsland Defense Unit—Tae-do, So-do, Sin-do, Mod-do,Ung-do, Hwangto-do, and Yo-do—lay just off the NorthKorean port of Wonsan, more than 100 miles north of thedemarcation between the two Koreas. The unit also boreresponsibility for two other potentially vulnerable outposts:Yang-do, off the town of Songjin, 150 miles northeast ofWonsan; and Nan-do, near the North Korean town of Kojo,some 40 miles south of Wonsan. A total of 1,270 SouthKorean Marines, 35 U.S. Marines, and 15 Americansailors manned the defense unit. The individual gar-risons varied from 300 at Yo-do, the largest of the islandoutposts and the site of unit headquarters and anairstrip, to the compact naval-gunfire spotting teams onthe smallest of the islets off Wonsan.

Like the western islands, those off the east coast—especially the ones nearest Wonsan—endured frequentshelling from batteries on the peninsula. BecauseWonsan had been a major port, the ability of the UnitedNations forces to blockade it served as an affront to theChinese and North Koreans, as well as a disruption of theircoastal supply line. Besides hammering the offshore out-posts, hostile gunners fired upon United Nations warships,as they had off the opposite coast. At Wonsan, however,the enemy employed a more efficient fire-control tech-

nique than in the west. When United Nations gun crewson the eastern islands, or warships nearby, fired coun-terbattery missions against an enemy weapon, it fellsilent and other artillery pieces took over the fire mission.

When winter gripped the east coast islands, tempera-tures dropped to 10 degrees below zero, Fahrenheit,and high winds disrupted the movement of supplyships. The Yo-do garrison, for example, survived oncanned rations for a week, and for several days thedefenders of Hwangto-do drank water from meltedsnow. When the weather improved, so did the determi-nation of Chinese artillerymen, who fired more than1,050 rounds against the island outposts in April 1953 andtwice that number against blockading warships. In addi-tion, United Nations sailors sighted 37 floating magneticmines that month, although the devices caused no dam-age. This was the greatest number of sightings in anymonth since the previous summer, when mines sank thetug Sarsi (AT 111) off Hungnam and damaged thedestroyer Barton (DD 722) off Wonsan.

As pressure mounted against the islands nearWonsan, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, increased the size ofits contingents at these outposts by some 40 percent,adding nine Marine officers and 44 enlisted Marines andsailors. A new unit commander arrived in the spring of1953. After a year in charge, Lieutenant Colonel RobertD. Heinl, Jr., entrusted the organization to LieutenantColonel Hoyt U. Bookhart, Jr.

Scarcely had this change of command taken place,when preparations began for a withdrawal from theeastern islands after the signing of an armistice. On 11June, the unit began retrenching by removing SouthKorean villagers, along with guerrillas and their families,from Yang-do, the farthest north and least defensible ofthe outposts, and withdrawing noncombatants from Yo-do, the site of the unit headquarters. Withdrawal of theother east coast outposts awaited the signing of thearmistice.

toward a truce that he considereddisastrous, President Rhee sought todisrupt the negotiations. On 18June, he ordered the release ofsome 27,000 Communist prisonerswho had refused repatriation,hoping to undo what the negotia-tors had accomplished in resolvingthe issue of repatriation. His gam-bit failed. The People’s Republic ofChina launched additional limitedattacks, perhaps in retaliation, butthe government in Peiping hadgrown too weary of the long andbloody war to mount an all-outoffensive. Similarly, the UnitedStates remained determined to endthe Korean fighting, regardless ofRhee’s objections. As an Americanspecial diplomatic mission madeclear, South Korea could expect nomore than a security treaty withthe United States and a combinationof military and economic aid thatwould include the presence ofAmerican troops.

On 24 June, six days afterPresident Rhee tried to sabotagethe truce negotiations, Chinesetroops attacked the sector held bythe South Korean II Corps, focusingon the South Korean 9th Division,which blunted the thrust after theloss of an outpost. On the follow-ing day, the enemy hit the SouthKorean 1st Division, to the right ofthe Commonwealth Division dugin at the eastern boundary of thesector held by General Clarke’s ICorps. Despite fierce resistance,the Chinese overwhelmed threeoutposts manned by the SouthKorean 1st Division. Efforts toregain the lost ground halted onthe 29th when General Clarkeended a series of gallant butunsuccessful counterattacks, re-peating the decision made amonth earlier during the fightingfor Outposts Carson and Vegaselsewhere on the I Corps front thatthe cost in lives would be prohibi-tive.

As it had during the battles of lateMay, 1st Marine Division’s the 4.5-inch rocket battery deployed east-ward at the end of June to supportthe hard-pressed South Koreansdug in to the right of the I Corpsline. The battery shifted about 20miles closer to the action and firedsome 25 missions that helped pre-vent a Chinese breakthrough. Sograve was the threat on the rightthat General Clarke alerted the 7thMarines to stand by to reinforcethe South Korean 1st Division,even though Eighth Army policyforbade American units from serv-ing under South Korean com-mand. The crisis abated, however,and the alert of the Marine regi-ment was canceled within 24hours. The 1st Regimental CombatTeam (less one battalion) of theKorean Marine Corps took overfrom the 7th Marines and relievedbloodied elements of the SouthKorean 1st Division.

Marine aviation took part in thefighting during June. Between the

14th and the 17th, when theChinese made their greatest gainssince 1951, American aircraft flew8,359 sorties, 1,156 of them byMarines. The air war again intensi-fied when the Chinese renewedtheir attacks. On the last day ofJune, for example, Marine airmenflew 301 sorties, which included28 percent of the day’s close airsupport and 24 percent of theinterdiction missions.

Marines Return to the Bunkers

The abandonment of the leastdefensible of the offshore outpoststook place as President Rhee wasattempting to wrest stronger guar-antees of future aid from hisAmerican ally, and time wasapproaching for the return of the 1stMarine Division to the frontline.The release of some 27,000 cap-tured North Korean or Chineseprisoners of war, who sought toremain in the Republic of Korea,and escape attempts by still oth-

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A .50-caliber machine gun covers the field of fire across the Han River on the KimpoPeninsula. Marines firing the weapon were members of the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion, which manned bunkers overlooking the river, and in mid-Junehad to deploy Company A to Ascom City to maintain order among the Chineseand North Korean prisoners.


ers, had an impact on the Marinesin I Corps reserve. The 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion, forexample, had to deploy one com-pany to a prisoner of war com-pound at Ascom City to maintainorder after escape attempts there.

By releasing the prisoners ofwar, the South Korean presidentcaused a temporary suspension ofthe truce negotiations and per-suaded the United States to agreeformally to a mutual defensearrangement that maintainedAmerican forces in South Koreaand provided economic and militaryaid. Since both the People’sRepublic of China and the UnitedStates were ready to end the fight-ing, the talks resumed atPanmunjom, where the delega-tions tried to obtain whateveradvantage they could, althoughwithout sabotaging prospects for aceasefire.

During the latter part of June,the 1st Marine Division completedits training and prepared toresume bunker warfare. The majorelements that had been in reservereturned to the segment of themain line of resistance that thedivision formerly held, relievingthe Army’s 25th Infantry Division.By dawn 7 July, the 7th Marinestook over on the right of the divi-sion’s line and the 5th Marines onthe left, while the 1st Marinesformed the division reserve, pro-tecting the bridges across the ImjinRiver and the Marine radar used todirect air strikes.

The tactical situation hadchanged for the worse since theMarines last occupied this sector.Chinese troops now controlled thethree outposts—Carson, Vegas,and Elko—that blocked the bestapproach to Combat OutpostsBerlin and East Berlin, now beingtaken over by the 7th Marines. AsGeneral Pate, the division’s com-mander, immediately realized:

“The loss of Outpost Ve-gas...placed Berlin and East Berlinin very precarious positions andnegated their being supported byground fire except from the MLR.”

The Chinese tried to takeadvantage of any confusion result-ing from the relief of the Armydivision by General Pate’s Marines.On the evening of 7 July, Chinesemortars opened fire uponOutposts Berlin and East Berlinand the nearby portion of themain line of resistance, the areathat Lieutenant Colonel AlexanderCereghino’s 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, was taking over fromTurkish soldiers attached to the25th Infantry Division. By mid-night, assault troops from theChinese 407th Regiment, 136thDivision, advanced from the vicin-ity of Hill 190, a frequently usedstaging area, then moved alongthe ridgeline broken by Carson,Reno, and Vegas—all of them nowin enemy hands—and pounced onBerlin and East Berlin.

At Berlin, Turkish soldiersstayed in place for a time after theMarines arrived, and a patrol dis-patched from Lieutenant ColonelCereghino’s battalion to set up anambush got no farther than theoutpost when the enemy struck.The remaining Turks and thenewly arrived patrol reinforced theMarines manning Berlin. Higherheadquarters soon lost contactwith both Berlin and the otherembattled outpost.

Because Berlin and East Berlinlay no more than 325 yards fromthe main line of resistance, theircapture could provide the enemywith a springboard for an attackdesigned to shatter the maindefenses. As a result, Cereghinoorganized a provisional platoonfrom members of his battalionheadquarters and sent the unit toreinforce the main line of resis-tance. Elements of Companies H

and I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,came under Cereghino’s opera-tional control and prepared tocounterattack if the enemy shouldbreak through.

Meanwhile, the mixed force ofMarines and Turkish soldiers suc-ceeded in clinging to OutpostBerlin. The Marines at East Berlinsuccumbed, however, to an over-whelming force that surged up asteep slope and seized the maintrench despite stubborn resistancefrom the outpost itself and accuratefire from the main line of resis-tance and beyond. Supportingmachine guns, mortars, andartillery—deadly though theywere—could not save East Berlin.

A squad from Company F, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, unsuccess-fully counterattacked Outpost EastBerlin at 0415 on 8 July, dispensingwith the usual artillery barrage inthe hope of achieving surprise. Asecond force of Marines fromCompany F moved out at about0440 to reinforce the squadalready committed to attackingEast Berlin. Chinese artillerycaught the reinforcements in theopen and wounded 15 Marines,but the attempted counterattackcontinued for another hour untilthe men of Company F receivedorders to fall back so the 11thMarines could fire a time-on-targetconcentration against the enemy-held outpost.

The Chinese who overran EastBerlin had advanced by way ofReno and Vegas, where additionalforces were now gathering toexploit this early success. The 1st4.5-inch Rocket Battery hammeredthe assembly areas and also theChinese attacking Berlin and con-solidating their hold on EastBerlin. Artillerymen of the 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, fired atime-on-target concentration thatshattered an enemy company as itwas organizing on captured

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Outpost Vegas to continue theattack. During the early morning’sfighting, all four battalions of the11th Marines took part in the firing,along with the seven U.S. Armyand Turkish artillery battalions stillin the area until the relief of the25th Infantry Division was com-pleted. These weapons matchedtheir Chinese counterparts almostround for round, and Army andMarine Corps tanks joined therocket battery and artillery battal-ions in battering the Chinese.

Despite the savage fighting thaterupted at Outposts Berlin andEast Berlin on the night of 7-8 July,the Marines succeeded in takingover from the 25th InfantryDivision and its Turkish compo-nent. The 5th Marines and 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, effected asmooth transition, but Lieutenant

Colonel Cereghino’s 2d Battalion,7th Marines, had to fight at Berlinand East Berlin. Not until 0630 didCereghino obtain confirmationthat East Berlin had fallen, andshortly afterward he learned thatBerlin, some 300 yards west of thecaptured outpost, still survived. Hepromptly reinforced Berlin insofaras its compact size permitted, dis-patching 18 additional Marinesand roughly doubling the numberof the outpost’s American andTurkish defenders.

To recapture East Berlin wouldrequire a strong force of infantrysupported by intense fire frommortars, tanks, and artillery. At1000, taking advantage of anartillery and mortar barrage totalingperhaps 1,600 rounds, a reinforcedplatoon from Company G, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, and anoth-

er from that battalion’s CompanyH—both companies now underCereghino’s operational control—launched the counterattack. Theplatoon from Company H led theway but encountered an accurateChinese mortar barrage thatpinned the Marines against thebarbed wire protecting the mainline of resistance and in 15 minutesreduced the force to about 20 menable to fight.

The platoon from Company Gadvanced through the batteredunit and pressed home the coun-terattack. Shells fired by tanks andartillery exploded immediately infront of the infantrymen, enablingthe assault force to reach the maintrench on East Berlin and usegrenades and small arms fire tokill, capture, or drive off theChinese. At 1233, the platoon from

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Pilots of Marine Fighter Squadron 311, from left, Capt JohnA. Ritchie, Capt Lenhrew E. Lovette, 1stLt Marvin E. Day, go

over their upcoming combat mission step by step. Each mustknow exactly what to do.

Company I, reduced to fewer thantwo-dozen effectives, regainedcontrol of the outpost. Anotherplatoon from the same companyimmediately moved forward toreinforce the survivors.

Throughout the fighting atBerlin and East Berlin, storms haddisrupted the movement of sup-plies by sending the Imjin out of itsbanks and destroying a bridge.The bad weather also created mudthat hampered movement on thebattlefield and brought clouds thatreduced visibility from the cock-pits of supporting aircraft. At aboutnoon on 8 July, however, fourMarine F9Fs took advantage ofground-based Marine radar toattack targets a safe distance fromEast Berlin. Led by the commander

officer of Marine Fighter Squadron311, Lieutenant Colonel BernardMcShane, the jets dropped fivetons of bombs on bunkers andtroop concentrations.

The recapture of East Berlinenabled the last of the Turkishtroops to withdraw, in effect com-pleting the relief of the 25thInfantry Division. The 11thMarines, commanded after 5 July byColonel Manly L. Curry, resumed itsnormal mission of direct supportof the 1st Marine Division, as didthe 1st Tank Battalion. By 13 July,the company of amphibian tractorsthat had been guarding prisoners ofwar at Ascom City rejoined thebattalion under the control of thedivision. The ReconnaissanceCompany, the Kimpo Provisional

Regiment, and the Korean MarineCorps regiment also returned tothe division’s control.

Once it returned to the mainline of resistance, the 1st MarineDivision again assumed opera-tional control over VMO-6 andHMR-161. Cloud cover at firstimpeded the aerial observers fromVMO-6, but they successfullydirected four artillery fire missionson 8 July against targets behindenemy lines. On 10 July, Marinehelicopters from HMR-161 deliv-ered some 1,200 pounds ofrations, water, and other cargo toMarine outposts.

Ten Days of Patrols

Regaining Outpost East Berlinon 8 July, which coincided withthe resumption of truce negotia-tions at Panmunjom, did not endthe Chinese pressure on theMarines. After dark on the 8th,Colonel Glenn C. Funk, who hadassumed command of the 7thMarines on 27 March, moved aplatoon from the regiment’s 3dBattalion and four M-46 tanks intoposition to strengthen the mainline of resistance. The tanks hadjust arrived at Hill 126, an outcrop-ping just to the rear of the battleline, when the Marines heard thesound of trucks from beyondChinese lines. From the hilltop, theM-46s directed 90mm fire againstknown Chinese positions, and thenoise of truck motors ended.Chinese troops, who meanwhilehad advanced from the assemblyarea on Vegas, probed OutpostBerlin and struck a stronger blowagainst East Berlin. Fighting ragedfor almost two hours before firefrom mortars, artillery, and tanksforced the enemy to break off theaction at about 0315 on the morn-ing of 9 July.

After Lieutenant Colonel Ce-reghino’s Marines ended this latest

46


Whether on the frontlines or in reserve Marines were paid monthly in MilitaryPay Certificates, a substitute for U.S. currency used to curb black market activ-ities. With little to spend it on, most Marines saved their money or had allotmentstaken out.

threat to East Berlin, the Chineseremained content to jab at thedivision rather than try for aknockout. Entire days might passduring which Marine aerial orground observers and patrols sawfew, if any, signs of Chinese. Theenemy seemed to be improvinghis tunnels and bunkers instead ofventuring out of them to mount anattack. The Marines still under-went sporadic shelling, but thebombardments did not approachin ferocity those of 8 and 9 July.

Mines for a time proved deadlierthan artillery and mortars, as on 12July when these weapons killedfour Marines and wounded eight. Atleast one minefield contained anew type of Russian-designedweapon that could be detonatedby pressure or with a trip wire.Most of the fields employed minesfamiliar to the Marines, types thatmay have been newly planted orperhaps had lain dormant underthe frozen ground and becomedeadly when the weather grew

warmer and the earth softer. Although the enemy did not

attack on the scale of 7-8 July,Chinese patrols repeatedly clashedall along the division’s front withthose sent out by the Marines. Onthe night of 12 July, for example, a13-man patrol from the 5thMarines encountered a force ofChinese near Outpost Esther, and acombat patrol from the 7thMarines, looking for the enemynear Elko, engaged in an 18-minute firefight.

As the frequency of patrolactions increased, flooding againinterfered with the supply effort.On the night of 14-15 July, theImjin River reached a maximumdepth of 26 feet. Only the solidly-built Freedom Bridge, carrying theroad to Panmunjom across theswollen stream, could be useduntil the water subsided.

On the night of 16-17 July,patrols from the 5th Marinesengaged in two firefights, suffer-ing no casualties in the first, near

Outpost Hedy, while killing threeChinese and wounding one. Theregiment’s second patrol of thenight ran into an ambush near Hill90. The Chinese proved moreaggressive than in recent days,pinning down the patrol andunleashing a flurry of mortar andartillery fire that wounded everymember of a unit sent to helpbreak the ambush. Another groupof reinforcements succeeded,however, in reaching the embat-tled patrol. After two hours offighting and several attempts toisolate and capture individualMarines, the Chinese withdrew,having suffered 22 killed andwounded. When seven Marinesfailed to return to the main line ofresistance, a platoon from the 5thMarines searched the battle siteand recovered six bodies.

The third firefight of the nighterupted just after midnight in thesector of the 7th Marines, when a30-man patrol from Company A,1st Battalion, was ambushed after itpassed through a gate in thebarbed wire northwest of OutpostAva. Between 40 and 50 Chinese,supported by mortars, opened firewith grenades and small arms.After a 15-minute exchange of firein which as many as 18 Chinesemay have been killed or wounded,the ambush party vanished intothe darkness. As the Marines fromCompany A returned through thegate, a head count revealed fourmen missing. A recovery squadcrossed and recrossed the areauntil dawn drew near but foundonly three bodies. One Marinefrom Company A remained missing;three had been killed and 21wounded.

The actions near Outpost Elkoand in front of the Ava gate lent cre-dence to Chinese propaganda.Since the 1st Marine Divisionreturned to the main line of resis-tance, Chinese loudspeakers had

47

The never tiring doctors and corpsmen treat the wounded. At the forward aid sta-tions patients are examined and their wounds dressed; few are discharged andmost prepared for further evacuation.


gone beyond the usual appeals tosurrender, on at least one occasionwarning of the fatal consequencesof going on nighttime patrols. Thisthreat, however, probably reflecteda Chinese policy of maintainingoverall military pressure after theresumption of truce talks ratherthan a specific effort to demoralizethe Marines.

Whatever the purpose of theenemy’s propaganda, the Marinepatrols continued. On the nightafter the ambush of Company A, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, a combatpatrol from the regiment’s Com-pany C advanced as far as theUngok hills to silence a machinegun that had been harassing themain line of resistance and, after asuccessful 20-minute firefight, left aMarine Corps recruiting poster tomark the point of farthest advance.Meanwhile, the Korean Marineshad four patrol contacts with theenemy, none lasting more than afew minutes.

The combat outposts like theBerlins, Esther, and Ava hadbecome increasingly vulnerable.By mid-July, General Pate directedhis staff to study the possibility ofthe 1st Marine Division’s shiftingfrom a linear defense—the contin-uous main line of resistance andthe network of outlying combatoutposts in front of it—to a systemof mutually supporting defensivestrongpoints that would result ingreater depth and density. TheChinese attacks of 7 and 8 July onBerlin and East Berlin served as acatalyst for the study that GeneralPate launched. As the I Corpscommander, General Clarke, laterexplained, these actions demon-strated that American minefieldsand barbed wire entanglementshad channeled movement be-tween the main line of resistanceand the combat outpost lines intocomparatively few routes that hadbecome dangerously familiar to

the enemy. As a result, Chinesemortars and artillery could savagethe troops using these well-worntracks to reinforce an embattledoutpost, withdraw from one thathad been overwhelmed, or coun-terattack to regain a lost position.Indeed, General Maxwell D.Taylor, in command of the EighthArmy since February 1953, agreedthat the enemy could, if he chose topay the price in blood and effort,overrun any of the existing out-posts, and endorsed the conceptthat General Pate’s staff was study-ing. The change in tactics, howev-er, had not yet gone into effectwhen the Chinese next attackedthe Marine positions, but the newassault forced 7th Marines toadopt, in a modified form, theprinciples of depth and densitythat the division commander wassuggesting.

When the enemy againattacked, a ceasefire seemed immi-nent. President Rhee agreed on 11July to accept American assur-ances of future support and enterinto a truce. By the 19th, the nego-tiators at Panmunjom seemed tohave resolved the last of the majorissues. On this very date, however,the Chinese struck.

The Fighting Intensifies

Heavy downpours hamperedfrontline combat and groundedthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for atotal of 12 days early in July. Rainfell on 22 days that month, but thewing nevertheless reported 2,668combat sorties, more than half ofthem flown in close support allalong the United Nations line. Theairmen supported their fellowMarines on the ground with some250 missions, four-fifths of themusing ground-based radar by nightor day.

The weather improved aftermid-month, enabling aerial activity

to increase at a critical moment,for on the night of 19-20 July, theChinese again assaulted CombatOutposts Berlin and East Berlin—now manned by the 3d Battalion,7th Marines, which had relievedLieutenant Colonel Cereghino’s 2dBattalion—and also menacedOutposts Dagmar and Ingrid, heldby elements of the 5th Marines.The positions of the 5th Marinesheld firm, thanks in part to accuratefire from the 11th Marines, butBerlin and East Berlin were inperil almost from the outset.

After a savage bombardment ofboth Berlins and nearby segmentsof the main line of resistance,Chinese troops at 2230 on thenight of the 19th stormed theridgeline where the two outpostswere located, attacking East Berlinfirst and Berlin immediately after-ward. Company I, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, commanded by FirstLieutenant Kenneth E. Turner, gar-risoned both outposts, posting 37Marines at East Berlin and 44 atBerlin. Mortars, machine guns,howitzers, and 90mm tank gunsblasted the advancing Chinese insupport of Company I. Despite thefirepower massed against him, theenemy overran both outpostswithin three hours.

A duel between American andChinese gunners continued afterthe fall of the two Berlins. Theenemy fired some 3,000 roundswhile overwhelming the outpostsand trying to neutralize the nearbymain line of resistance and theartillery batteries behind it. OneTurkish and two Army artillerybattalions joined three battalionsof the 11th Marines—two of105mm and one of 155mm how-itzers—in responding to theChinese bombardment, batteringthe assault force, its supportingmortars and howitzers, and theassembly areas used by reinforce-ments in exploiting the early suc-

48

cess. Barrage and counterbarragecontinued into the morning of 20July; at 0520, for example, Chineseshells were exploding at the rate ofone per second on the main line ofresistance immediately behindOutposts Berlin and East Berlin.

Meanwhile, at 0400 LieutenantColonel Paul M. Jones, in com-mand of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, alerted Companies D andE of the regiment’s 2d Battalion,already under his operational con-trol, to counterattack Berlin andEast Berlin at 0730. Half an hourbefore the scheduled time, Jones

received word to cancel the coun-terattack. Rather than restore theoutpost line, General Pate shiftedelements of the division reserve,the 1st Marines, to strengthen themain line of resistance in the eventthe enemy should try to exploit hiscapture of the two Berlins.

While Colonel Wallace Nelson’s1st Marines reinforced the mainline of resistance, air power andartillery tried to neutralize the out-posts the Chinese had captured.Since a ceasefire seemed only daysaway and any attempt to regainthe lost ground would result in

severe Marine casualties, therewould be no counterattack torestore a position that seemedalmost certain to be abandonedwhen a demilitarized zone tookshape after the end of hostilities.Instead, air strikes and fire fromtanks and artillery scourged thelost outposts to prevent Chinesefrom using them to mount anassault on the main defenses.Especially effective were attacksby Marine airmen against Berlinand East Berlin and bombardmentby Army 8-inch and 240mm how-itzers, adjusted by Marine aerialobservers, which shattered bun-kers and collapsed almost all thetrenches on both enemy-held out-posts.

Colonel Jones’ 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, estimated that the deadlyfighting on 19-20 July had killedperhaps 75 Chinese and woundedas many as 300, thus crippling anenemy battalion that had to bereplaced by a fresh unit. The 7thMarines and attached units lost sixkilled, 118 wounded, and 56 miss-ing, but 12 of the missing men sur-vived as prisoners of war andreturned in the general exchangewhen the fighting ended.

Once the enemy capturedBerlin and East Berlin, the criticalterrain feature on the right of thesector held by the 1st MarineDivision became Hill 119, nick-named Boulder City, the segment ofthe main line of resistance nearestthe two lost outposts and thereforethe likely objective of any deeperChinese thrust. Company D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, (attached tothe regiment’s 3d Battalion) heldBoulder City itself. Company E ofthe 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, (alsoattached to the 3d Battalion)joined Companies H and I of the 3dBattalion in defending the highground extending from behindBoulder City—although withinsupporting distance—to Hill 111 at

49

the boundary between the 1stMarine Division and the Com-monwealth Division. The newly-arrived 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,under Lieutenant Colonel Frank A.Long, moved into positionbetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, on its right andLieutenant Colonel Harry A.Hadd’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,on its left. The 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, served as regimentalreserve.

The introduction of LieutenantColonel Long’s battalion, whichcame under control of the 7thMarines, served as the first step ina planned relief of the 7th Marinesby the 1st Marines. For now, thenewly arrived battalion added fur-ther depth and density to the mainline of resistance, organizing Hill126 and the other commandingheights in its sector. In effect, three

50


Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, board armored personnel carriers tobe taken to the front. As a result of the critical tactical situation and numberof casualties suffered during the Berlin operations, the battalion was positionedin the center of the regimental main line of resistance as the first step in the reliefof the 7th Marines.

battalions, rather than the two pre-viously defending the regimentalarea, formed a crescent of strong-points designed to contain anddefeat any offensive launchedfrom Berlin and East Berlin.

In the sector held by the 7thMarines, Outpost Ava, manned bya squad from Company A of theregiment’s 1st Battalion, survivedon the far left, near the boundarybetween the 7th and 5th Marines.Boulder City, formerly a compo-nent of a continuous main line ofresistance, now functioned as anoutpost of the reconstituteddefenses. By 22 July, Company G,3d Battalion, 7th Marines, hadtaken over Boulder City, from the

regiment’s Company D, whichreverted to the control of its parentbattalion, the 2d, in reserve.

The Last Battle

Signs of an imminent Chineseattack multiplied as July drew to aclose. The probable objectivesseemed to include Outposts Hedyand Dagmar, but instead of attack-ing either in force, the enemy sentonly a token force, wearing burlapcamouflage, that appeared nearHedy on 21 July. The defendersopened fire, killing three of theChinese, and the survivors fled.

Marine Fighter Squadrons 115and 311, released by the Fifth Air

Force to support the UnitedNations troops fighting in centraland eastern Korea, joined MarineAttack Squadron 121 in poundingthe Chinese threatening the 1stMarine Division. Recurring cloudcover produced frequent down-pours that interfered with opera-tions during the critical period of21-23 July, but the three squadronsnevertheless flew more than 15radar-directed missions that drop-ped some 33 tons of bombs.

As the threats to Outposts Hedyand Dagmar abated, Chineseforces menaced Boulder City,where Company G, 3d Battalion,1st Marines, commanded by FirstLieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr.,

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Men of the 1st Marines move toward the frontlines to rein-force other Marines fighting at Hill 119, known informally

as Boulder City. Little did they know that they would see thelast of the war’s heavy fighting.

manned the defenses after relievingCompany D, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines. On the evening of 24July, hostile mortars and artillerybegan hammering Swigart’s pe-rimeter. Marine artillery and 4.5-inch rocket launchers immediatelyresponded against targets thatincluded a Chinese regiment mass-ing behind Hill 139, northwest ofenemy-held Outpost Berlin.

At 2030, Chinese troops beganprobing the right of the 1st MarineDivision’s line. After a powerfulbarrage by mortars and artillery,the assault force hit Hill 111 at thefar right of the positions held by the7th Marines, then shifted toBoulder City near the boundarybetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and the attached 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. As he had on7 July, when he sought to capital-ize on the Marine division’s

takeover of the lines of the 25thInfantry Division, the enemysought to take advantage of therelief of the 7th Marines by the 1stMarines.

When the Chinese attack began,the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,attached to the 7th Marines, hadalready taken over positions thatincluded Boulder City. The 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Roy D.Miller, was relieving the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, as Com-pany H took over Hill 111 andCompany G defended the criticalground at Boulder City.

At about 1930 on 24 July theenemy attacked Hill 111 and sooncracked the perimeter nowmanned by Company H of Miller’sbattalion. For about 50 minutes,the Chinese clung to a salient on thehilltop, but then withdrew. After

this flurry of action, apparentlyintended to divert attention fromBoulder City, the enemy ignoredHill 111 until the morning of 25July, when artillery fire batteredthe perimeter but no infantryassault followed.

The two Chinese battalionsattacking on the Marine right hadtheir greatest success at BoulderCity, seizing a portion of thetrenchline defended by CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. In anattempt to exploit this foothold,the enemy attacked the Berlin andEast Berlin gates, passagesthrough the wire that the Marineshad used to supply and reinforcethe two outposts before both wereoverwhelmed. Cloud cover pre-vented aerial observers from sup-porting the troops protecting thegates, and the Chinese managed togain control of Berlin gate and

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mount a second determinedassault on the Boulder Cityperimeter. Hand-to-hand fightingraged all along the 700 yards oftrench that Lieutenant Swigart’sMarines still held. The company’sammunition ran low, and theplight of casualties becameincreasingly difficult as Chinesefire killed two of Boulder City’seight corpsmen and wounded

most of the others. By midnight,Swigart’s company could musterno more than half its earlierstrength, but it still clung to therear slope of Boulder City. In thewords of one of Company G’sMarines, “only a never-say-dieresistance was keeping the enemyfrom seizing the remainder of theposition.”

Casualties had further eroded

the strength of the Boulder Citygarrison, when Captain Louis J.Sartor, at 15 minutes after midnighton the morning of the 25th, ledCompany I, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, toward the hill to rein-force Swigart’s survivors. TheChinese intercepted and correctlyinterpreted the coded radio mes-sage ordering Sartor’s Marines for-ward, thus obtaining information

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Second Lieutenant Raymond G. Murphy

An ardent athlete with a major in physical education, Murphy was born inPueblo, Colorado, in 1930, and was commissioned in the Marine CorpsReserves in 1951. In Korea, he was awarded a Silver Star Medal for his actions

on 22 November 1952 in assaulting an enemy strongpoint. Then his heroism, againas a platoon commander with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on 3 February1953, resulted in a Medal of Honor with a citation, which read in part:

Undeterred by the increasing intense enemy fire, he immediately located casual-ties as they fell and made several trips up and down the fire-swept hill to directevacuation teams to the wounded, personally carrying many of the strickenMarines to safety. When reinforcements were needed by the assaulting elements,Second Lieutenant Murphy employed part of his unit as support and, during theensuing battle, personally killed two of the enemy with his pistol. With all the wounded evacuated and theassaulting units beginning to disengage, he remained behind with a carbine to cover the movement of friend-ly forces off the hill and, though suffering intense pain from his previous wounds, seized an automatic rifleto provide more firepower when the enemy reappeared in the trenches.

After the war, he joined the Reserves and was discharged as a captain in 1959.

Hospital Corpsman Francis C. Hammond

Born in 1931, Hammond enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1951. Assigned to theMarine Corps as a “Hospitalman,” he gave his life at Sanae-dong, Korea, serv-ing with Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on 26 March 1953. His Medal

of Honor citation reads, in part:

Hospitalman Hammond’s platoon was subjected to a murderous barrage of hos-tile mortar and artillery fire, followed by a vicious assault by onrushing enemytroops. Resolutely advancing through the veritable curtain of fire to aid his strick-en comrades, Hospitalman Hammond moved among the stalwart garrison ofMarines and, although critically wounded himself, valiantly continued to admin-ister aid to the other wounded throughout an exhausting four-hour period. Whenthe unit was ordered to withdraw, he skillfully directed the evacuation of casual-ties and remained in the fire-swept area to assist the corpsmen of the relieving unit[Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines] until he was struck by a round of enemy mortar fire and fell, mortal-ly wounded.

After the war, a school in his hometown of Alexandria, Virginia, a medical clinic at Camp Pendleton, California, andthe Knox-class destroyer Francis Hammond (DE 1067) were named in his honor.

–Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)


Navy Medicine Photo Collection

that enabled enemy artillery andmortars to wound or kill about athird of the reinforcements.Despite the deadly barrage, muchof Company I reached BoulderCity, joined forces with the rem-nants of Swigart’s garrison, andtook part in a counterattack led by

Captain Sartor that recaptured thehill by 0330. Further reinforce-ments from Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, andCompany E, 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, arrived by 0530 to con-solidate the position. A fewChinese, however, continued to

cling to positions on the slopesnearest their main line of resis-tance.

Since the enemy still controlledthe approaches to Boulder City, hewas able to mount another attackon that position at 0820, 25 July.Fire from Marine mortars and

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Hospital Corpsman Third Class William R. Charette

Anative of Ludington, Michigan, Charette was born in 1932 and enlisted in theU.S. Navy in 1951. For his actions during the early morning hours of 27 March1953 in the Panmunjom Corridor, while attached to Company F, 2d Battalion,

7th Marines, he was recommended for and later received the Medal of Honor. Hiscitation reads, in part:

When an enemy grenade landed within a few feet of a Marine he was attending,he immediately threw himself upon the stricken man and absorbed the entire con-cussion of the deadly missile with his body. Although sustaining painful facialwounds, and undergoing shock from the intensity of the blast which ripped thehelmet and medical aid kit from his person, Hospital Corpsman Third ClassCharette resourcefully improvised emergency bandages by tearing off part of hisclothing, and gallantly continued to administer medical aid to the wounded in his own unit and to those inadjacent platoon areas as well. . . . Moving to the side of another casualty who was suffering excruciating painfrom a serious leg wound, Hospital Corpsman Third Class Charette stood upright in the trench line and exposedhimself to a deadly hail of enemy fire in order to lend more effective aid to the victim and to alleviate his anguishwhile being removed to a position of safety.

Miraculously surviving his wounds, he rose to the rank of master chief hospital corpsman before retiring in 1977.A hospital facility at the Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia, is named for Corpsman Charette.

Sergeant Daniel P. Matthews

Born in Van Nuys, California, in 1931, Matthews enlisted in the Marine Corpsin 1951. After completing recruit training he was assigned to the 1stBattalion, 3d Marines, at Camp Pendleton, California. He sailed for Korea in

January 1953, joining Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. On 28 March 1953 hewas killed in a counterattack on Vegas Hill. His Medal of Honor citation reads, inpart:

Sergeant Matthews fearlessly advanced in the attack until his squad was pinneddown by a murderous sweep of fire from an enemy machine gun located on thepeak of the outpost. Observing that the deadly fire prevented a corpsman fromremoving a wounded man lying in an open area fully exposed to the brunt of thedevastating gunfire, he worked his way to the base of the hostile machine-gunemplacement, leaped onto the rock fortification surrounding the gun and, taking the enemy by complete sur-prise, single-handedly charged the hostile emplacement with his rifle. Although severely wounded when theenemy brought a withering hail of fire to bear upon him, he gallantly continued his valiant one-man assaultand, firing his rifle with deadly effectiveness, succeeded in killing two of the enemy, routing a third and com-pletely silencing the enemy weapon, thereby enabling his comrades to evacuate the stricken Marine to a safeposition. [He died of] his wounds before aid could reach him.

–Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)


Navy Medicine Photo Collection

artillery, and from the 90mmweapons of 10 tanks dug in on theMarine positions, played the keyrole in breaking up the newassault, although the last of theattackers did not withdraw untilafternoon. The M-46 tanks proveddeadly against advancing Chinesetroops, but also presented an invit-ing target for Chinese artillery andmortar crews, who directed some2,200 rounds at the armored vehi-cles. Aircraft also helped repulsethe 25 July attack on Boulder City,as when Panther jets flew ninemissions, guided by Marine radaron the ground, against hostilepositions threatening Boulder Cityand nearby defensive strong-points.

Before midnight on 24 July, in anattack perhaps loosely coordinatedwith the thrust at Boulder City,Chinese forces hit the positionsheld by the 5th Marines. Afterprobing the defenses of OutpostsDagmar and Esther, the enemyconcentrated against the latter,manned by elements of CompanyH, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. TheChinese tried to isolate Outpost

Esther by shelling and patrollingthe routes leading there from themain line of resistance and suc-ceeded in overrunning outer por-tions of the perimeter. Thedefenders, commanded by Second

Lieutenant William H. Bates, pre-vailed because of the skillful use oftheir own weapons, includingflamethrowers and the support ofmortars, machine guns, tanks, andthe always-deadly artillery. The 3d

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Staff Sergeant Ambrosio Guillen

Born in La Junta, Colorado, in 1929, Guillen grew up in El Paso, Texas; he enlist-ed in the Marine Corps in 1947. After sea duty and serving as a drill instruc-tor at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, he was assigned as a platoon

sergeant with Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Korea. He died of woundsincurred near Songuch-on 25 July 1953. Ironically, the ceasefire was signed two dayslater. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his unit pinned down, when the outpost was attacked under cover of dark-ness by an estimated force of two enemy battalions supported by mortar and artilleryfire, he deliberately exposed himself to the heavy barrage and attacks to direct hismen in defending their positions and personally supervise the treatment and evac-uation of the wounded. Inspired by his leadership, the platoon quickly rallied and engaged the enemy forcein fierce hand-to-hand combat. Although critically wounded during the course of the battle, Staff Sergeant Guillenrefused medical aid and continued to direct his men throughout the remainder of the engagement until theenemy was defeated and thrown into disorderly retreat.

A middle school in El Paso, Texas, is named for Staff Sergeant Guillen.–Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 407003

Aerial view of the pockmarked terrain in front of Boulder City taken from an HMR-161 helicopter. Although the monsoon rains of July limited normal support mis-sions, when weather conditions cooperated planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wingworked from morning to sundown unleashing tons of ordnance on Chinesepositions seen just beyond the Marine sector of the line.


Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 3,886rounds against Chinese troopsattacking Outpost Esther, and hos-tile gunners matched this volume offire. The Marines suffered 12 killedand 98 wounded in the fightingthat began at Dagmar and contin-ued at Esther, while Chinese casu-alties may have totaled 195 killedand 250 wounded.

Dawn on 26 July brought a lull inthese last battles. Chinese attemptsto revive their attack by infiltratingreinforcements through the site ofOutpost Berlin failed, thanks toaccurate fire from Marine riflemenand machine gunners. The 1stMarines completed its relief of the7th Marines at 1330. That night,

the enemy probed Boulder Cityfor the last time, sending a patrolfrom captured Outpost Berlin thatfailed to penetrate the defensivewire and shortly after midnightdispatching another platoon thatprowled about before Marine firerepulsed it.

Although the last of the Chineseattacks seized Outposts Berlin andEast Berlin, they failed to wrestBoulder City from its Marinedefenders. Had the enemy cap-tured Boulder City, he might haveexploited it and seized the highground to the south and east, fromwhich he could have fired directlyinto the rear areas that sustained the1st Marine Division in its positions

beyond the Imjin River. In fightingthe Chinese to a standstill duringJuly 1953, the division suffered1,611 casualties—killed, wounded,and missing—the most severelosses since October 1952 whensavage fighting had raged atOutposts Carson, Reno, and Vegas,and on the Hook. Chinese lossesduring July 1953 may haveexceeded 3,100.

The Final Patrols

During the last few nights ofcombat in July, Marines continuedpatrolling aggressively, eventhough a truce was fast approach-ing. The Last Parallel—a wartime

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A Marine holds a wounded buddy onto an armored per-sonnel carrier being brought to the 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines aid station during the heavy fighting in the Berlinsector.

memoir by Martin Russ, a corporalin Company A, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, in July 1953—describesan action that took place justbefore the truce, as the 1st Marineswas taking over from the 7thMarines. A Lieutenant fromCompany A, 7th Marines, led a 30-man combat patrol, made up ofmen from Companies A of bothregiments, that set out fromOutpost Ava near midnight and

crossed a rice paddy on the way toraid Chinese positions on the Hill104. A reconnaissance probe,which had preceded the raidingparty, reported the presence ofChinese on the approaches to theobjective.

The route to Hill 104 followed atrail flanked by waist-high rice,growth that not only impeded off-trail movement, but also mightconceal a Chinese ambush. The

soft muck in which the rice thrivedprovided poor support for sometypes of mines, thus reducing onethreat to the patrol, but movingthrough the paddy would havesnapped the brittle rice stalks andcreated noise to alert any lurkingambush party. Balancing lessnoise against greater danger frommines, the Marines decided to fol-low the trail.

The patrol’s point man, as heapproached the far end of the ricepaddy, found a trip wire stretchedacross the trail and followed it to aRussian-built, antipersonnel mineattached to a stick thrust deep intothe mud and aimed to scatterdeadly fragments low across thesurface of the trail. The patrol halt-ed, bunching up somewhat as themembers tried to see why the lieu-tenant was moving forward toconfer with the point man. At thismoment, Chinese soldiers crouch-ing hidden in the rice opened firefrom as close as 50 feet to theMarines.

The fusillade wounded thepatrol leader and within 10 sec-onds killed or wounded nine ofthe first 10 men in the patrol.Dragged into the paddy by mem-bers of the ambush party, the lieu-tenant disappeared until hesurfaced in the exchange of pris-oners after hostilities ended. Thepoint man proved luckier, howev-er, hurling himself to the ground assoon has he realized what washappening, finding cover besidethe trail, and escaping injury. Fromthe rear of the patrol, the othersurvivors fired at the muzzle flash-es of the Chinese weapons. Marinefirepower prevailed, silencing theenemy after five or so minutes,although not before six members ofthe patrol had been killed, 14wounded, and the wounded lieu-tenant carried off as a prisoner.The survivors regrouped andmoved forward, retrieving as many

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Two members of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, quickly clean a semi-automaticM-1 carbine with grenade launcher after firing in support of a night patrol. A thirdMarine take a break in one of the sandbagged culverts, which provided overheadcover along the trenchline.


as they could of the dead andwounded. A half-dozen Marinescovered the patrol’s withdrawal,preventing the Chinese from encir-cling the group. When the menwho had helped evacuate thewounded returned from the aidstation and reinforced the firepow-er of the hastily formed screeningforce, the Chinese vanished intothe night.

The Marines kept up theirpatrolling until the moment thetruce took effect. On the night of 27July, according to Martin Russ, hiscompany sent out a patrol sched-

uled to return shortly before thefighting would end at 2200. As theMarines prepared to move out,Chinese mortars fired on OutpostAva, through which the patrolstaged, and nearby portions of themain line of resistance. The bom-bardment wounded five membersof the patrol and two of theMarines defending the outpost.

The patrol returned as planned,and at 2200, Russ, who was not amember, watched from the mainline of resistance as white starclusters and colored flares cast apulsating light that set the shad-

ows dancing in ravines and paddiesand on hillsides, while the finalshells fired in the 37-month warexploded harmlessly. As Russdescribed the scene:

A beautiful moon hung lowin the sky like a Chineselantern. Men appeared alongthe trench, some of them hadshed their flak jackets andhelmets. The first sound weheard was the sound of shrillvoices.... The Chinese weresinging. A hundred yards or sodown the trench, someone

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Flanked on the left by Gen Otto P. Weyland, USAF, com-manding general of Far East Air Forces, and on the right byVAdm Robert P. Briscoe, Commander, Naval Forces Far

East, and VAdm Joesph J. Clark, Seventh Fleet commander,Gen Mark W. Clarke, commander in chief of United Nationsforces, countersigns the armistice agreement at Munsan-ni.

was shouting the MarineCorps Hymn at the top of hislungs. Others joined in bel-lowing the words. All alongthe battle line, matches flaredand cigarettes glowed, but nosnipers peered through tele-scopic sights to fire at thesetargets. The war had ended.

After the Ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement, whichwas signed on the morning of 27July and went into effect 12 hourslater, required that both the UnitedNations forces and the Communistenemy withdraw from the mostadvanced positions held when thefighting ended. In effect, the aban-doned area formed the trace of aMilitary Demarcation Line, as theopposing armies fell back 2,000yards to organize new main battlepositions, thus creating the 4,000-yard Demilitarized Zone betweenthem. The Marines built as theydestroyed, evacuating certain por-tions of the old main line of resis-tance, giving up some of its

outposts, and dismantling fortifica-tions simultaneously with theirconstruction of the new line and itsmutually supporting strongpoints.

A No-Fly Line supplemented thecontrols imposed by the Demilita-rized Zone. Restrictions on themovement of aircraft appliedthroughout the Demilitarized Zoneand in a corridor extending fromthe vicinity of Panmunjom toKaesong. Only helicopters couldfly beyond the No-Fly Line, pro-vided they remained 500 yardsfrom the Military DemarcationLine.

Establishing the Demilitarized Zone

The armistice document set atimetable for the creation of theDemilitarized Zone. Within 72hours after the ceasefire went intoeffect, the combatants were toremove “all military forces, sup-plies, and equipment” and reportthe location of “demolitions, mine-fields, wire entanglements, andother hazards” capable of impeding

the safe movement of the organi-zations that would oversee thearmistice—the Military ArmisticeCommission, its Joint ObserverTeams, and the Neutral NationsSupervisory Commission. For 45days following the initial 72 hours,the parties to the ceasefire wouldsalvage the materials still in thedesignated Demilitarized Zone,using only unarmed troops for thetask. Meanwhile, during the 10days after 27 July, Chinese orNorth Korean troops took over alloffshore islands, east coast andwest, that lay north of the 38thParallel. The United Nationsretained control of Taechong-do,Paengyong-do, Sochong-do, andYongpyong-do, along with U-do,Tokchok-to, and Kangwha-do, all ofthem off the west coast and southof the demarcation line.

Since the agreement of July 27called for a truce rather thanpeace—indeed, it sought to ensurea cessation of hostilities until “afinal peaceful settlement isachieved”—the possibility existedthat the fighting might resume.Despite the shower of flares and thesinging that marked the momentthe truce went into effect, somebattle-tested Marines fully expecteda Chinese attack in the hours afterthe ceasefire. As the skies light-ened on the morning of 28 July,Chinese commanders obtainedpermission to recover the bodies oftheir men killed in the finalassaults on Marine positions. Thesight of “the enemy movingaround within a stone’s throw ofour front lines” underscored thepossibility of renewed attacks, butnothing happened, and as themorning wore on, it became obvi-ous that the truce was holding—atleast for the present.

Like the Chinese, the Marinesused the first morning of theceasefire to recover the bodies ofmen killed in recent days. Most of

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Marines take a well-deserved rest after word of the armistice is passed. Less than24 hours after the signing of the armistice, Marine units began withdrawing fromthe Demilitarized Zone to their new battle positions.

the dead had fallen at Hill 111 andBoulder City. By the end of theday, all the bodies had beenretrieved and were on the way tothe rear.

In the three days immediatelyafter the armistice took effect,some 50 companies of Marineinfantry, both American and SouthKorean, began dismantling the olddefenses, with the help of ele-ments of the division’s engineers.Working day and night—takingfrequent breaks during the day-time heat, sleeping during thethree hours after noon when theheat was most enervating, and

using portable lighting to takeadvantage of the comparative coolof the night—the Marines and theKorean service troops helpingthem removed supplies andammunition, tore apart bunkers,and stacked the timbers for ship-ment to the new battle line. Someof the work parties treated thebunkers like trenches and filledthem with earth, which then had tobe shoveled out to provide accessto the salvageable timbers.

Dismantling the old battle linerequired the removal of somestructures on elements of both thecombat outpost line and the main

line of resistance, while at thesame time building the new mainbattle position and sealing off theDemilitarized Zone that the truceestablished between the contendingarmies. Some of the former Marineoutposts like Bunker Hill, Esther,and Ava lay north of the MilitaryDemarcation Line. As a result, theMarines could be sure of havingaccess to them only during the 72hours after the ceasefire began.Moreover, anything salvaged fromBunker Hill or nearby OutpostHedy had to travel over a primitiveroad described as “particularly tor-tuous,” which made the transfer

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Following the armistice, the commanding general of the 1stMarine Division, MajGen Randolph McC. Pate, his chief ofstaff, Col Lewis W. Walt, and the commanding officer of the

1st Marines, Col Wallace M. Nelson, survey the aftermath ofthe battle for Boulder City.

“of first the ammunition and thenthe fortification materials a physicalordeal.” Further complicating thedismantling of these distant out-posts, a horde of reporters, pho-tographers, and newsreelcameramen arrived, eager torecord the activity of both theMarines and the Chinese soldierswho could be seen tearing downtheir own defenses on nearbyridgelines or hilltops.

Salvaging building materialsproved to be hard work, whethertearing apart structures on thecombat outpost line or on themain line of resistance. The picks,shovels, and steel pry bars availableto the infantrymen could notremove timbers, measuring up to 12inches square and secured by

spikes 10 to 24 inches long, thatformed the skeleton of bunkersmeasuring perhaps 12 by 20 feet.Wherever possible bulldozers borethe brunt, but heavy trucks fittedwith power winches and even towtrucks helped out, as did mediumtanks, their guns removed so theycould enter the demilitarized area.The Marines found that the fastestmethod of dismantling a bunkerwas to uncover it, winch it out of itshole, and bounce it down the hill ithad guarded.

Once the bunker had been dis-assembled, the Marines manhan-dled the timbers onto vehicles,usually several two-and-one-half-ton trucks, although heavier vehi-cles saw service during the first 72hours until the ban took effect on

disarmed tanks, tank retrievers,and other vehicles that fit thearmistice agreement’s imprecisedefinition of “military equipment.”Fortunately, two-and-one-half-tontrucks could still be used over thenext 45 days, although restrictedto designated routes of access intothe Demilitarized Zone.

As the dismantling of the aban-doned defenses went ahead onschedule, the 1st Marine Divisionmoved into its new positions, atransfer completed by the morningof 1 August. The main battle posi-tion, to the rear of the former line,consisted of a succession ofstrongpoints. From the division’sright-hand boundary near theSamichon River, the new lineformed a misshapen arc encom-

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Marines begin the task of dismantling bunkers on the aban-doned main line of resistance after the ceasefire went intoeffect on 27 July. Trenchlines were filled in, tank slots bull-

dozed under, and usable timber carried to salvage collectionpoints.


passing the town of Changdan onthe north bank of the Imjin Riverand the bridges across that stream.The main battle position thencrossed to the south bank of theImjin, which it followed to theconflux of that river and the Hanbefore shifting to the Han’s southbank and continuing westward.The 5th Marines occupied theground north of the Imjin, organiz-ing strongpoints that in effectfunctioned as an outpost line for therest of the division. The 7thMarines dug in south of the Imjinand the 1st Marines provided areserve. The South Korean Marinesformed the left of the line, south ofthe Imjin and along the Han.

From the end of the 72-hourperiod until the 45-day deadline of13 September, the infantry compa-nies north of the Imjin sent outeach day work parties of from 25 to100 men to finish the salvageeffort begun immediately after theceasefire took effect. By the timethe task ended, the 5th Marineshad retrieved some 12 tons of mis-cellaneous equipment, 2,000 milesof telephone line, 2,850 rolls ofbarbed wire and 340 of concertinawire, 19,000 pickets for use with thewire, 339,000 sand bags, and150,000 linear feet of timber. Mostof the salvaged items were incor-porated on the positions beingbuilt by the regiment to defend thebulge north of the Imjin.

Maintaining Order in theDemilitarized Zone

At the outset of its salvage oper-ation, the 5th Marines marked theadjacent portion of the Demilita-rized Zone and began controllingaccess to it. After constructing aso-called No-Pass Fence some 200yards south of the near edge of theDemilitarized Zone, the regimentmarked the fence with warningsigns, engineer tape, and panels

visible from the air. Next, the 5thMarines established 21 crossingstations into the DemilitarizedZone, each one manned by at leasttwo Marines who denied access toanyone carrying weapons or lack-ing authorization. As the work ofsalvaging material drew to a close,the regiment closed the crossingstations it no longer needed.

Each person entering theDemilitarized Zone through thearea held by the 5th Marines had toshow a pass issued by the regi-

ment. The salvage operation gen-erated heavy traffic, especially in itsearlier stages; indeed, vehiclespassed through the crossing sta-tions more than 3,500 times. After13 September, when the salvageproject ended, I Corps assumedresponsibility for issuing passes.

Controlling access through itslines to the Demilitarized Zoneand maintaining order therebecame continuing missions of the1st Marine Division. The ceasefire

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

Marine Sgt Richard J. Thompson checks in on his radio at one of the checkpointsthroughout the 1st Marine Division’s front while patrolling the buffer zone southof the line of demarcation.

(Continued on page 68)

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The Prisoners Return

Like the earlier exchange of sick and wounded prison-ers, Operation Little Switch, the process of repatriationfollowing the ceasefire took place within the sector held

by the 1st Marine Division. Because the final exchange,appropriately named Big Switch, involved more than 10 timesthe number repatriated earlier, the medical facilities used inApril could not meet the new challenge. A large Armywarehouse at Munsan-ni, converted into a hospital byMarine engineers, replaced the old treatment center. Anewly created administrative agency, the Munsan-niProvisional Command, assumed overall responsibility for BigSwitch, with the 1st Marine Division carrying out the actu-al processing.

When Operation Big Switch got underway on 5 August,a Marine receipt and control section, functioning as part ofthe provisional command, accepted the first group of pris-oners at Panmunjom, checked them against the names ona roster the captors had submitted, and began sendingthem south along the Panmunjom Corridor. Returnees notin need of immediate medical care boarded ambulances forthe drive to the Freedom Village complex at Munsan-ni.Those requiring prompt or extensive care were flown toFreedom Village in Marine helicopters; the most seriouscases were then rushed either to hospital ships off Inchonor directly to hospitals in Japan.

Besides helping evacuate the sick or wounded, Marinehelicopters played the principal role in an airlift designedto placate President Rhee, who believed that India’s refusalto send troops to help defend his nation demonstrated sup-port for North Korea and China. The United States soughtto ensure his cooperation with Big Switch by promising thatno Indian troops would set foot on South Korean soil. As aresult, the Indian contingent involved in taking custody ofthe prisoners who refused repatriation flew by helicopterfrom ships anchored in Inchon harbor to a camp in theDemilitarized Zone.

Processing the Freed Prisoners

At Freedom Village—South Korea operated a LibertyVillage for its returnees—the newly freed prisoners under-went a medical evaluation, brought their records up todate, received new uniforms, mail, newspapers, and mag-azines, and ate a light meal. The steak that many of themcraved would have shocked weakened digestive systems andhad to wait until they had readjusted to American fare.Those former captives judged healthy enough could meetwith reporters at Freedom Village and answer questionsabout their experiences. After a brief period of recuperation,the former prisoners embarked for the United States.


Ambulances carrying sick and wounded United Nationsprisoners of war arrive at Freedom Village. The seriously

injured were transferred directly to hospital ships at Inchonor air-evacuated to Japan.

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During the voyage, or shortly after disembarking, theydescribed for intelligence specialists the treatment they hadreceived at the hands of the enemy.

The fifth former prisoner to arrive at Freedom Village on5 August turned out to be a Marine, Private First ClassAlfred P. Graham, captured in July 1951. Forced labor andmalnutrition left him too weak to meet with reporters atMunsan-ni, but later, at a hospital in Japan, he woulddescribe how he had routinely been compelled to carry fire-wood 11 miles for the stoves at his prison camp. Two otherMarines reached Munsan-ni on the first day: SergeantRobert J. Coffee, wounded and captured in November1950, and Private First Class Pedron E. Aviles, knockedunconscious by a Chinese rifle butt in December 1952 andtaken prisoner.

The stream of returning Americans continued until 6September, apparently with scant regard for time in captiv-ity, physical condition, rank, or duties. For example,Private First Class Richard D. Johnson, a machine gunner inthe 5th Marines captured on 25 July 1953, returned on 24August, two days before the repatriation of Captain Jesse V.Booker, an aviator and the first Marine taken prisoner, whowas captured on 7 August 1950. Some of the returnees hadbeen given up for dead, among them: First Lieutenant PaulL. Martelli, a fighter pilot officially listed as killed in action;First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, an infantry officer whosename did not appear on any list of prisoners; and Private FirstClass Leonard E, Steege, believed by his buddies to havebeen killed in the fighting at Boulder City.

Operation Big Switch continued until 6 September andresulted in the release of 88,596 prisoners, 75,823 of them


For the benefit of the press and distinguished visitors,Marines maintained a map showing the progress of road con-voys bringing former prisoners from Panmunjom toFreedom Village during Operation Big Switch.

Communist prisoners of war rip off their U.S. provided uni-forms and toss them contemptuously to the ground.Shouting Communist slogans and hurling insults at United

Nations forces, they put on a propaganda show for the ben-efit of world newsreel cameras.


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North Korean or Chinese. South Koreans, both soldiers andMarines, totaled 7,862, and those repatriated to other coun-tries in the United Nations coalition numbered 4,911, 3,597of them Americans, including 197 Marines.

Although the overwhelming majority of prisoners agreedto repatriation, more than 22,000 did not, entrusting them-selves to the custody of the Indian troops overseeing theprocess on behalf of the five officially neutral nations. TheIndians released 22,467 former prisoners; two-thirds ofthem Chinese, after a final attempt at persuasion allowed bythe armistice agreement was made. Most of the Chinese wereveterans of the Nationalist forces, who had been capturedon the mainland and impressed into the service of thePeople’s Republic. Once released, these veterans joinedthe Nationalists who had fled the mainland and establishedthemselves on Taiwan and its satellite isles. The NorthKoreans disappeared into the populace of the South.

A total of 357 United Nations troops refused repatriation,333 of them South Korean. Only 23 Americans—none ofthem a Marine—chose to stay behind, along with oneBritish serviceman, a Royal Marine. Two of the American sol-diers, swayed by the final efforts at persuasion, changed theirminds at the last minute. Over the years, another 12 recon-sidered their decision and returned to the United States.

Behind Barbed Wire

As had happened in previous wars, Americans capturedin Korea endured mistreatment from their captors, whetherinflicted deliberately or the result of callousness. In this war,unlike the earlier ones, prisoners served as pawns in an ide-ological contest in which the Chinese and North Koreanstried to convert them to Communism or, failing that, toforce them to make statements that would further theCommunist cause in its world-wide struggle against capi-talism. The methods of conversion or coercion varied fromunceasing lectures extolling Communism to threats and tor-ture, with the harshest treatment meted out for acts of resis-tance. By using these techniques, the prison staffs sought avariety of objectives that included maintaining order, per-suading prisoners to embrace Communism, obtaining mili-tary information, or extorting confessions to alleged warcrimes, statements designed to turn worldwide publicopinion against the United States. By 1952, the enemy wasfocusing in particular on forcing captured fliers of all theServices to confess to participating in germ warfare.

The vigor of the persuasion or punishment variedaccording to the camp, the whim of the guards, or the pol-icy of the moment. In July 1951, for example, the Chinese,

MajGen Vernon E. Megee, center, Commanding General, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, introduces former prisoner of war,Capt Gerald Fink, to MajGen Randolph McC. Pate,

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, at FreedomVillage.


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who had assumed custody of the prisoners, announced a pol-icy of leniency that offered organized athletic competitionamong the prisoners and promised better treatment inreturn for cooperation. The new policy aimed at winningover world opinion while converting “reactionaries”—those prisoners who resisted indoctrination—into “pro-gressives,” who did not.

The new leniency did not apply to Lieutenant ColonelWilliam G. Thrash, an arch-reactionary. Accused of“Criminal Acts and Hostile Attitude,” he spent eight monthsin solitary confinement. In January 1952, he was beaten,dragged outside, and exposed overnight to the deadlycold, an ordeal that nearly killed him.

To facilitate the indoctrination of the prisoners, aprocess that came to be called brainwashing, the enemy triedto shatter the chain-of-command. He separated officersfrom enlisted men and tried to place progressives in placesof leadership. The reactionaries fought back by creating anetwork of their own to frustrate the Chinese tactics by restor-ing military discipline.

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash of the 1st Marine AircraftWing and Major John N. McLaughlin of the 1st MarineDivision proved especially successful in creating solidarityamong the prisoners. After recovering from the effects of hisconfinement, Thrash stirred up resistance to the indoctri-nation effort and to a related attempt to encourage the writ-ing of letters that might serve as Chinese propaganda. Healso warned that interrogators would try to pressureaccused reactionaries into implicating fellow prisoners whoshared reactionary views. McLaughlin created a chain-of-com-mand using five veteran Marine Corps noncommissioned offi-cers and, like Thrash, helped form the escape committeesthat took shape shortly before the armistice.

Resistance to the Chinese might be passive, essentially aninternal rejection of Communist attempts at indoctrination,or active, with a range of actions that varied from symbol-ic to practical to defiant. Symbolic gestures included a cel-ebration of the Marine Corps birthday on 10 November1952, featuring a cake made from eggs, sugar, and flourstolen from the Chinese. A 22-inch crucifix, carved byCaptain Gerald Fink with improvised tools and given the title“Christ in Barbed Wire,” symbolized both hope and resis-tance. Captain Fink also fashioned practical implements, anartificial leg for an Air Force officer, Major Thomas D.Harrison, injured when his plane was shot down, andcrude stethoscopes for the medical personnel among the pris-oners.

Captain Fink’s handiwork also played a part in an effortto keep track of as many of the prisoners as possible. Thehollow portion of the artificial leg he had made containeda list of names, the dates of death for those known to haveperished, and details of treatment while in captivity. TheChinese forced Harrison—a cousin of Lieutenant GeneralWilliam K. Harrison, Jr., the chief United Nations trucenegotiator—to give them the leg when he was repatriated,but the information survived. The Air Force officer had acopy in the hollow handgrip of his crutch, and another pris-oner carried a copy in a hollowed-out part of his cane.

Escape was the ultimate act of defiance, and also the mostdifficult. No underground existed in the Korean War, asthere had been during World War II, to shepherd escapedprisoners or downed airmen through hostile territory tosafety. Moreover, the average American could not blend aseasily into the civilian populace of North Korea as he mighthave in Europe.

Despite the difficulty, captured Marines made severalattempts to escape from various prison camps.Unfortunately, most attempts ended in failure. SergeantDonald M. Griffith slipped away from a guard who had fall-en asleep only to be recaptured when he asked a peasantfamily for food. Captain Byron H. Beswick, although badlyburned when his aircraft was shot down, tried with four otherprisoners to escape from a column on the march, butguards recaptured them all. While being held prior to trans-fer to a prison camp, Private First Class Graham, the firstMarine repatriated in Operation Big Switch, joined anotherMarine in an escape attempt, but both were recaptured try-

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 627709

Marine prisoner of war 1stLt Richard Bell is dusted with DDTprior to his departure for Inchon. Dusting with DDT wasmandatory for all Marines leaving Korea for the UnitedStates.

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ing to obtain food. After one unsuccessful try, punished asusual by a period of solitary confinement, First LieutenantRobert J. Gillette, accompanied for a time by a SouthAfrican pilot, succeeded in remaining at large for 10 days.Lieutenant Colonel Thrash and Major McLaughlin, togetherwith First Lieutenant Richard Bell, got beyond the barbedwire, only to be cornered and forced to try to sneak backinto the compound; Bell, however, was caught and punishedwith solitary confinement. Captain Martelli, who wasreported killed but literally returned from the dead as a resultof Big Switch, escaped and evaded recapture for 10 days.The final attempt, the product of one of the recentlyformed escape committees, took place on 1 July 1953, butthe escapees remained at large for only a short time. Witha ceasefire, and presumably an exchange of prisoners,drawing nearer, escape planning was suspended.

On rare occasions, special circumstances enabled capturedMarines to escape and rejoin the United Nations forces. InAugust 1950, Private First Class Richard E. Barnett, drivinga jeep, took a wrong turn and was captured by NorthKorean soldiers, who confined him in a cellar. When his cap-tors took him along on a night attack, he managed to lagbehind, threw a rock to distract the guard nearest him, andbolted into the darkness. He avoided recapture andrejoined his embattled unit before it had reported himmissing.

Other successful escapes took place in May 1951. On the15th, four days after their capture, Corporal Harold L. Kiddand Private First Class Richard R. Grindle, both fromCompany B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, made their way toUnited Nations lines. Later that month, a group of 18Marines and an Army interpreter assigned to the 1st MarineDivision were forced to join Chinese troops near the 38thParallel. As the prisoners approached the frontlines, theArmy interpreter, Corporal Saburo Shimamura, reported tothe senior Marine, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold that theircaptors planned to release them near Marine lines. TheChinese issued safe-conduct passes, lending credence to thereport, but rather than wait to see if the Chinese would doas they said, the group took advantage of the distractioncaused by United Nations artillery registering nearby and fledinto the hills. They evaded the patrols looking for them;spread out improvised signal panels, and caught the atten-tion of an aerial observer who reported their location. On25 May, the day after their escape, two Army tanks clatteredup to the men and escorted them to the nearest UnitedNations position.

In the spring of 1951, the enemy actually did release twoprisoners, presumably as an overture to the policy ofleniency announced shortly afterward. Whatever the reason,Corporal William S. Blair and Private First Class Bernard W.Insco were turned loose near the frontlines. Captured on 24April, they regained their freedom on 12 May.

At times, captured Marines sought to invent fictitiousstatements that would ease the pressure on them by creat-ing an illusion of cooperation. Master Sergeant John T.

Cain, an enlisted pilot, had the misfortune of being mistak-en for a senior officer because of his age and military bear-ing, thus becoming a prized target for the interrogators. Hetried to satisfy them with elaborate details about a non-exis-tent logistics command in which he claimed to haveserved. The pressure continued, however, until he wastaken to a hillside one day, blindfolded, and subjected to amock execution. He spent 84 days in solitary confinementbefore the Chinese intelligence officers either gave up or real-ized their error.

Attempts to outsmart the enemy could end in tragic fail-ure, as demonstrated by the fate of Colonel Frank H.Schwable, the chief of staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,who became a prisoner when his aircraft was shot down ona reconnaissance flight in July 1952. Deprived of sleep andmedical care, subjected to relentless pressure to confess towar crimes, he tried to frustrate the enemy by making a state-ment so obviously false that it not only would fail to helpthe Chinese, but also demonstrate their use of coercion. Thisaction, however, merely whetted the appetite of interroga-tors determined to exploit his rank and position. Theyrewrote the document to create an illusion of truth, andforced him to choose between endorsing the revised versionor spending the rest of his life in prison. After he was freedas Operation Big Switch drew to an end, a Court ofInquiry—functioning like a civilian grand jury—recom-mended that he not face a court-martial for aiding theenemy because he had resisted to the best of his ability. Theinquiry also found that his future in the Marine Corps was“seriously impaired” by his conduct as a prisoner, thusputting an end to a once-promising career. Only oneMarine faced a trial, an enlisted man convicted of fraternizingwith the enemy and dismissed from the Service.

The 221 Marines captured in Korea endured an unex-pected ordeal. Prisoners in past wars had suffered malnu-trition, forced labor, and other acts of cruelty, but neverbefore had their captors tried systematically to coerce theminto participating in a propaganda campaign. Despite theharsh treatment the Chinese meted out, 197 Marines survivedcaptivity and returned in Operation Big Switch.

Five Marines received official recognition for their stead-fast conduct and strong leadership while prisoners of war.Lieutenant Colonel Thrash received a gold star signifying hissecond Legion of Merit. Major McLaughlin also earned theLegion of Merit, as did Major Walter R. Harris, another reac-tionary, who set up a communications network in onecamp by designating locations where messages could be hid-den and picked up. Harris also took advantage of the pol-icy of leniency by organizing Spanish-language classes ascover for providing information and encouragement to off-set Chinese attempts at indoctrination. Captain John P.Flynn, who refused despite torture to confess to war crimesand encouraged others to resist, earned the Navy andMarine Corps Medal. Master Sergeant Cain, who did not yieldto solitary confinement and threats of execution, receiveda Letter of Commendation with Ribbon.

agreement specified that eachside, Communist and UnitedNations, maintain a force of 1,000“civil police” to preserve the statusof the demilitarized buffer. Sinceno civilian law enforcement agen-cies existed to provide this man-power, troops had to function aspolice. For maintaining the securi-ty of the Demilitarized Zone alongits portion of the main battle posi-tion, the division on 4 Septemberactivated the 1st Provisional De-militarized Zone Police Company,drawing men from its infantry reg-iments. Attached to the 5thMarines, the police company,which initially numbered 104 menunder Captain Samuel G. Goich,took over the crossing stations,manned observation posts to mon-itor the demilitarized Zone, andescorted members of the Military

Armistice Commission, the JointObservation Teams, and theNeutral Nations Supervisory Com-mission along with other personsauthorized to enter the zone.According to a Marine Corps jour-nalist, the average enlisted manassigned to the police companyhad to know “map reading on anofficer level, first aid, radio, andunderstand the fine print of theceasefire agreement like a striped-trouser diplomat.”

Besides providing armed es-corts—usually one-half-dozenMarines carrying rifles and pis-tols—and staffing fixed observa-tion posts, the police companyoperated roving patrols. Travelingin radio-equipped jeeps thesegroups reported any unusual activ-ity in the Demilitarized Zone. Incase of a genuine emergency, aplatoon, standing by as a mobile

reserve, would respond.Marine Demilitarized Zone

police manning the observationposts monitored aerial activity aswell as events on the ground.Besides keeping a record of allflights, they made sure that lightreconnaissance planes had anappropriate clearance and thathelicopters operating in front ofthe 5th Marines also had obtainedpermission for each flight. Heli-copters responding to medicalemergencies need not obtain spe-cific approval from the groundcommander.

The truce specified that prisonersof war who had refused repatriationto North Korea and China wouldenter the Demilitarized Zone,where their fellow countrymen,joined by Polish and Czech mem-bers of the Neutral NationsSupervisory Commission, could try

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(Continued from page 62)

to persuade them to return. TheCommunist persuasion teamsrequired escorts from the policecompany, which therefore had tobe tripled in size.

Main Battle Position

After the fighting ended, the 1stMarine Division formed the left ofthe line held by I Corps. TheCommonwealth Division dug inon the right of the Marines then, in

succession, the 1st Republic ofKorea Division and the U.S. 7thInfantry Division. The Imjin Rivercontinued to challenge the ability ofthe Marines to move men andcargo, perhaps to a greater degreethan before the armistice. A shal-lower and less defensible crescentof Marine-controlled ground laynorth of the stream, which sepa-rated the supply center at Munsan-ni from the lines manned by the 5thMarines and forced the division to

rely on bridges and fords to trans-port material and reinforcementsacross the Imjin. Because thesalient was more vulnerable thanbefore, the division would have toreact faster and in greater strengthto repulse any new attack there.

The main battle position began atthe No-Pass Fence, which served ineffect as a trip wire to warn of anattack across the DemilitarizedZone, and consisted of successivelines of mutually supportingstrongpoints, each stronger thanthe one to its front, that extendedfrom the near edge of theDemilitarized Zone to the vicinity ofthe old Kansas and WyomingLines. Indeed, wherever possible,Marine engineers incorporatedportions of these two lines in thenew battle position. North of theImjin, the 5th Marines manned theequivalent of an outpost line ofresistance, in which firepowerfrom large numbers of automaticweapons took the place of man-power. Within the northern salient,Colonel Tschirgi, the regimentalcommander, placed the 3dBattalion on the right, the 1stBattalion in the center, and the 2dBattalion on the left. South of theImjin, the 7th Marines defendedthe right of the line, with the 1stRegiment of South Korean Marinesin the center and the 1st Marines,the division reserve, manning aseries of positions behind theSouth Koreans. The 11th Marinesemplaced its howitzers behind the7th Marines and prepared to firein general support of the division.

In October, however, a majorreshuffling took place south of theriver. The ongoing exchange ofprisoners—which brought to theDemilitarized Zone large numbersof North Koreans and Chinesewho had refused repatriation,along with their former comradeswho were trying to persuade thedefectors to return—raised the

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Machine gunners stand-by with loaded belts as riflemen take positions on the for-ward line. When the “Black Alert” siren sounded, Marines did not knowwhether it was “for real,” but truce or not, they were always ready.


specter of another South Koreanattempt to disrupt the settlement. Toguard against this eventuality,troops from the reserve regiment,the 1st Marines, took over the sec-tor manned by South KoreanMarines.

Clearly, the strongpoints man-ned by the 5th Marines formed themost vulnerable portion of thenew battle position. The regimentheld a frontage of 36,000 yards,about three times the usual widthduring the Korean War. UnderColonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins,who assumed command on 2

August, the 5th Marines fortifiedhills that included wartimeOutposts Marilyn and Kate, alongwith Boulder City and the Hook.Behind this arc of mutually sup-porting strongpoints, the regimentestablished bridgehead positionsto protect the vital river crossings.

Maintaining an adequate supplyof ammunition to defend thesalient posed a problem becauseof the reliance on automaticweapons and the range at whichthey would have to open fire. Notonly did the large number ofmachine guns devour .30-caliber

ammunition faster than the usualmix of these weapons, rifles, andautomatic rifles, the gunnerswould have to open fire soonerthan normal if they were to closethe gaps between outposts. As aresult, the amount of ammunition atthe outposts had to be increasedand the reserve stocks moved for-ward from regimental to battaliondumps. These changes, however,could not solve the problem ofdividing a finite supply of ammu-nition among the regiments andreplenishing the 5th Marines bybridges or ferries vulnerable to

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MajGen Randolph McC. Pate breaks ground for a newtuberculosis hospital donated and built by the 1st MarineDivision. The completed hospital eventually bore a highly pol-

ished brass plaque, bearing a Marine Corps emblem and thewords, “Built by the First Marine Division.”

flood, ice, or—if the fighting re-sumed—hostile fire.

The ceasefire provided an op-portunity for training to hone thecutting edge of the Marine forces.Within the division, individualsand small units practiced theirskills, and all but two of theinfantry battalions took part inlanding exercises. Besides remain-

ing on alert in case the fightingresumed, Marine airmen alsotrained, sometimes in conjunctionwith Air Force squadrons. Theypracticed bombing and ground-controlled intercepts and support-ed an amphibious exercise atTokchok-to Island involving the1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

The division, as part of the

Armed Forces Assistance to Koreaprogram, also undertook 51 build-ing projects—42 to them schools.As each school was completed itreceived kits containing instruc-tional supplies and athletic gear.These extras were made possiblesolely by the donations of 1stDivision Marines and matchingfunds from CARE, the Cooperative

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Courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

Men of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, poke holes in afrozen Korean stream and ignore the icy waters to scrub their

clothing before stowing it in their seabags for the trip backto the States.

72

for American Remittances toEurope.

The post-armistice activityincluded athletics that provided abreak from training and routinehousekeeping. Athletic competi-tion took place among Marineunits and between organizationsand bases. Indeed, some Marinesstationed at Pyongtaek played onan Air Force softball team repre-senting that airfield.

Routine housekeeping contin-ued, however. Each day, for exam-ple, latrines had to be burned out,primarily to prevent disease but

also to eliminate foul odors. AMarine poured a quart or so ofgasoline into the privy, tossed in alighted match, and stepped out-side. Too much gasoline couldproduce spectacular results, asCorporal Lee Ballenger recalled. Abuddy of his grew impatient whena succession of matches seemed tofizzle, poured gasoline directlyfrom the can and was knockeddown by a blast that splintered thewooden structure. Luckily, theflame did nothing worse thansinge the Marine’s hair and eye-brows.

The 1st Marine Divisionmanned its portion of the mainbattle position for almost twoyears after the ceasefire. GeneralPate, in command at the time of thetruce, was succeeded by MajorGeneral Robert H. Pepper (12 May1954 to 22 July 1954), MajorGeneral Robert E. Hogaboom (23July 1954 to 17 January 1955), andMajor General Merrill B. Twining,who took over on 18 January 1955and would bring the divisionhome.

The first hint of the division’sredeployment came from the


Two Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,show men of the U.S. Army’s 24th Infantry Division their newpositions near the Demilitarized Zone. The division’s attitude

about returning to Korea from Japan was summed up by twodisillusioned privates: “Man, sixteen months in this forsak-en place.”

White House when a reporter“blandly asked the President if hecould lend official credence to the‘authoritative sources’ announce-ment that the First Division wouldbe pulled out of Korea.” Thereporter gained a “grinning admis-sion” from President Dwight D.Eisenhower that the Marineswould be moved in the nearfuture.

When the news hit Korea, it wasgreeted with mixed enthusiasmand skepticism—every Marineknew that “in the near future”could mean months or years. Butsoon clippings sent by mothers,wives, and girl friends began toarrive, lending credibility to themove. Marines who had been warynow became convinced. However,

there was little spontaneous rejoic-ing; few celebrations or sayonaraparties were planned.

Soon there was a gradual switchfrom hours spent on training to thepacking and crating of gear. Mosttrucks, tanks, tents, clothing, andother “common” gear would stayin Korea, while all Marine Corps“peculiar” gear would accompanythe division to Camp Pendleton,California. Despite contemporarynewspaper reports to the contrary,there was no massive swapping oftroops from the 1st to the 3dMarine Division in Japan. The onlyexceptions were a Rocket Batteryand an Armored AmphibianCompany.

In mid-March 1955, the divisionturned its sector of the demarcation

line over to the U.S. Army’s 24thInfantry Division. Every Marinehoped that lugging water up steep,slimy hills, helmet baths, rations,sleeping bags, pot-belly stoves,long-handled skivves, parkas,DDT, and Mongolian “piss cutters”would become just memories.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,now commanded by BrigadierGeneral Samuel S. Jack, beganwithdrawing some of its compo-nents from South Korea in June1956. The wing remained in theFar East, however. General Jackestablished his headquarters atIwakuni Naval Air Station, Japan.Some of the wing’s elementsmoved to Japan, but others contin-ued to operate from bases in SouthKorea.

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The 7th Marines rode trucks to the Munsan-ni railheadwhere they wait to board trains for Inchon. Divided into

landing teams, the 7th Marines followed the 5th Marines,which was the first Marine unit to arrive in Korea.

The War in Perspective

Marine participation in theKorean War began with the des-perate defense of the PusanPerimeter, continued when the 1stMarine Division spearheaded adaring amphibious assault atInchon, and, after the Chineseintervention forced the UnitedNations to withdraw from the YaluRiver to the vicinity of the 38thParallel, ended in static warfarefought along a battle line thatextended across the width of theKorean peninsula. A highly mobileamphibious assault force thusbecame tied to fixed positions, acondition that lasted from thespring of 1952 until the armistice inJuly of the following year. Indeed,

by January 1953, defense over-shadowed the offense, eventhough defensive operations re-quired frequent and often bloodycounterattacks to maintain thepositions held by the UnitedNations. The Chinese succeeded incapturing and holding several out-posts, but the 1st Marine Divisionclung tenaciously to its segment ofthe main line of resistance, helpingforce the enemy to agree to theceasefire, with provisions for theexchange of prisoners of war, thathad become the overridingAmerican objective of the war.

Before North Korea invaded theSouth, American strategy focusedon the defense of Western Europeagainst the Soviet Union and itssatellites. The aggression in Asia

presented an unexpected chal-lenge, which the Truman adminis-tration decided to meet, althoughnot at the expense of weakeningthe newly formed North AtlanticTreaty Organization. As a result,the United States fought a limitedwar in Korea, withholding nuclearweapons and relying with fewexceptions on the weapons ofWorld War II or improved versionsof them.

In Korea, the Marines used todeadly effect the weapons theyhad, whether old or improved,massing artillery, supplementingthe howitzers with rockets, andwhen necessary employing tanksas pillboxes on the battle line, butnew weapons lay just over thehorizon. The weight of the stan-dard infantry weapons of WorldWar II—for example, the M1 rifleweighing 9.5 pounds, and theBrowning automatic rifle almosttwice as heavy—aroused interestin lighter, fully automatic weaponslike the sub-machine guns used byChinese infantry. A lightweightautomatic rifle, the M16, wastherefore developed but did notbecome the standard weapon forMarine infantrymen until theVietnam War. Although the steelhelmet remained essentially un-changed since World War II, bodyarmor had undergone improve-ment because of experience inKorea, as had the original antitankrocket launcher or Bazooka.

Infantry tactics changed to meetthe evolving demands of the war onthe ground. Fighting at night,especially patrol actions, receivedgreater emphasis, for instance.Also, by the time of the battles forBerlin, East Berlin, and BoulderCity in July 1953, the 1st MarineDivision was committed to adefense in depth, made up ofmutually supporting strongpoints, aprincipal followed in establishingthe post-armistice main battle line.

74


Packed on board small landing craft like sardines, Marines were carried out towaiting Navy transports where they easily climb the cargo net with a full packand rifle. They were homeward bound.

The construction of the bunkersand covered fighting positions thatmade up these strongpoints hadimproved greatly since theMarines took over their segment ofthe Jamestown Line in the spring of1952.

The most dramatic changestook place in aviation. The new jetfighters, which had barely seenaction against the enemy duringWorld War II, proved their worth insupport of the 1st Marine Divisionand also in aerial combat.Fourteen Marine pilots, flying air-craft of the 1st Marine AircraftWing downed 16 hostile airplanes,ranging from biplanes engaging innighttime harassment to modernjets. Eleven other Marine pilots,flying North American F-86 jetfighters in U.S. Air Force squad-rons, were credited with downing21 Chinese jet fighters. Moreover,the helicopter showed tremendouspotential in limited use during theKorean fighting; this potential,however, would not be realized

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Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

Marines of the 1st Division parade through downtown SanDiego following their return from Korea. A hero’s welcome

was furnished the combat-clad veterans as they marched upBroadway to Balboa Park.


Col Raymond L. Murray, who commanded the 5th Marines during its firstaction in Korea almost five years before, greets the regiment’s current com-manding officer, Col Robert H. Ruud, upon his arrival at San Diego, California,in March 1955.

fully until the Vietnam conflict. Because the Korean War had

demonstrated the importance ofintegrated action between air andground components, the MarineCorps in January 1953 establishedthe 1st Provisional Air-GroundTask Force at Kaneohe in Hawaii.This unit, built around an infantryregiment and an aircraft group,stood ready for deploymentthroughout the Pacific.

In short, the Marine Corps hadresponded quickly and effectivelyto the peculiar demands of theKorean War without losing sight ofits amphibious mission and its roleas a force in readiness. To Marineeyes, the use of one of itsamphibious divisions in anextended ground campaign seem-ed an aberration, a misapplication

of resources, no matter how wellthat division had fought. Because ofthis commitment to amphibiousoperations, the 1st Marine Divisionparticipated in landing exerciseswhenever possible during thecourse of the fighting, activity thatmay well have reminded theenemy of the abiding threat ofanother assault like the victory atInchon.

After the truce went into effect,amphibious training continued inthe Far East for the 1st MarineDivision, until its return of theUnited States. In August 1953, as theDemilitarized Zone took shape,the 3d Marine Division, teamedwith two aircraft groups, arrived inJapan. A program of amphibioustraining, which included regimentallandings at Iwo Jima and Ok-

inawa, got underway while the 3dMarine Division was based inJapan and continued after its rede-ployment to Okinawa.

The continued existence of aforce, normally one battalion,afloat with the Sixth Fleet in theMediterranean provided a furtherdemonstration of the abiding ori-entation of the Marine Corpstoward amphibious warfare. Since1949, a succession of battalionsdrawn from the 2d MarineDivision at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, had embarked with theSixth Fleet. Clearly, the Koreanfighting in 1952 and 1953 had notconverted the Marine Corps fromamphibious operations to extendedground warfare, from assault toattrition, or affected its dedication tothe air-ground team.

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A Douglas F3D is hauled on board ship after being ferriedout by two amphibious trucks, as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wingtransferred its headquarters and most of its aircraft from

Korea to Iwakuni, Japan, in June 1956. Postwar planscalled for the wing to occupy bases in both Korea andJapan.

About the Author

Bernard C. Nalty, a memberof the Marine Corps histor-

ical program from October1956 to September 1961, col-laborated with Henry I. Shaw,Jr., and Edwin T. Turnbladh onCentral Pacific Drive, a vol-ume of the History of U. S.Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II. He also com-pleted more than 14 short his-torical studies, some of which appeared inLeatherneck magazine or the Marine Corps Gazette.He joined the history office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffin 1961, transferred in 1964 to the Air Force historyprogram, and retired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written oredited a number of publications, including Blacks inthe Military: Essential Documents, Strength for theFight: A History of Black Americans in the Military,The Vietnam War, Tigers Over Asia, Air Power and theFight for Khe Sanh, and Winged Shield, WingedSword: A History of the U.S. Air Force. In addition tocontributing to this series on the Korean War by writ-ing Stalemate: U.S. Marines from Bunker Hill to theHook, he took part in the Marines in World War IIcommemorative series, completing two pamphlets,Cape Gloucester: The Green Inferno and The Right toFight: African-American Marines in World War II.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marinesin the Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department ofDefense observance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costshave been defrayed in part by contributions from members of theMarine Corps Heritage Foundation. To plan and coordinate the KoreanWar commemorative events and activities of the Sea Services, the Navy,Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have formed the Sea Services KoreanWar Commemoration Committee, chaired by the Director, Navy Staff.For more information about the Sea Services’ commemorative effort,please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean War CommemorationCoordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265 (DSN288-7265), E-Mail: [email protected], Website: www.histo-ry.usmc.mil.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402002

PCN 190 0041 0400

SourcesThe best account of operations by

Marines during 1953, their role in estab-lishing the Demilitarized Zone, and theireventual withdrawal from South Koreaappears in Operations in West Korea,volume five of U. S. Marine CorpsOperations in Korea, 1950-1953(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972),by LtCol Pat Meid, USMCR, and MajJames M. Yingling, USMC.

The Marine Corps historical programalso has dealt thoroughly with the treat-ment received by Marines held as pris-oners of war, their reaction to depriva-tion and hostile pressure, and theirrepatriation. James Angus MacDonaldhas made extensive use of interviewswith former prisoners in his TheProblems of U. S. Marine Corps Prisonersof War in Korea, published by theHistory and Museums Division,Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, in1988.

Walter G. Hermes discusses Marine

Corps operations in his contribution tothe official history of Army activity dur-ing the Korean War, Truce Tent andFighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Officeof the Chief of Military History, 1966), avolume that deals with negotiation aswell as fighting.

Martin Russ, a wartime Marine Corpsinfantryman, has written the best knownand most revealing memoir covering thefinal months of the fighting, The LastParallel: A Marine’s War Journal (NewYork: Rinehart, 1957).

Personal accounts by other Marinesappear in Korean Vignettes: Faces ofWar (Portland, OR: Artwork Publica-tions, 1996), a compilation of narrativesand photographs by 201 veterans of theKorean War, prepared by Arthur W.Wilson and Norman L. Stickbine.

Valuable insights and first-handaccounts are also available in TheKorean War: The Uncertain Victory; TheConcluding Volume of an Oral History(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1988), by Donald Knox with additionaltext by Alfred Coppel.

William H, Jantzen, a participant inone of the fiercer actions of 1953, haswritten a riveting account of that fight in“A Bad Night at Reno Block,” in theMarch 1998 issue of Leatherneck maga-zine.

The Marine Corps Gazette has ana-lyzed the tactics and lessons learned ofthe Korean War in three especially use-ful articles: Peter Braestrup’s “OutpostWarfare” (November 1953) and “Back tothe Trenches” (March 1955); and“Random Notes on Korea” (November1955) by LtCol Roy A. Batterton. Also ofuse was the article by MSgt PaulSarokin, “Going Home,” in the May 1955issue of Leatherneck.

The personal papers collection of theMarine Corps history program containsjournals, photographs, letters, memoirs,and at least one academic paper, a mas-ter’s thesis on outpost warfare by aMarine, Maj Norman W, Hicks. Forevents of the year 1953, the most valu-able of these items were the submis-sions by Eldon D. Allen and Gen VernonE. Megee.

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

OUTPOST WARU.S. Marines from the Nevada

Battles to the Armisticeby Bernard C. Nalty