outline a little on the pre-1994 japanese electoral system implications for the theory
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Comments on “Political Determinants of Government Loans in Japan” Anil Kashyap October 26, 2006 JFI/WB Conference on Bank Regulation and Corporate Finance. Outline A little on the pre-1994 Japanese electoral system Implications for the theory Interpretation. Main results…. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Comments on “Political Determinants of Government Loans in Japan”
Anil KashyapOctober 26, 2006
JFI/WB Conference on Bank Regulation and Corporate Finance
Outline
1) A little on the pre-1994 Japanese electoral system
2) Implications for the theory
3) Interpretation
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Main results….
Prefectural loans made by government financial institutions (but not by private banks) are higher when:
1. LDP representatives have longer tenure
2. LDP candidates are vulnerable to defeat
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Shigeo Hirano: Do Individual Representatives Influence Government Transfers: Evidence From Japan
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Implications and questions raised by Hirano’s work
• Does the LDP or the individuals control the pork?– Party’s interests and individuals might diverge
• Is using the prefecture data OK?– Maybe all that matters is the longest serving member’s
clout?
• What about other types of pork? – local allocation tax and national treasury disbursements
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Thoughts on the regressions• Plenty of well-placed concern about reverse-causality
– Instruments (at the district level): parent was an elected official, is it an open seat (perhaps due to death)?
• Does including fixed effects make sense here?
• Is it obvious that contemporaneous pork is relevant for buying votes?
( Would like some help with the magnitudes, are they reasonable?)
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Some parting questions
• Can you dig down and figure out which agencies were most pliant?
• If the government loans were so bad, how did the private banks still lose so much money?
• What was the return to using this type of bribe to buy votes?