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Out of the ShadowsJoseph Morrison SkellyPublished online: 14 Aug 2007.

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Out of the Shadows

JOSEPH MORRISON SKELLY

Efraim Halevy: Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led

the Mossad

St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2006, 292 p., $24.95.

If the turbulent events in the MiddleEast have seemed at times like astorm, Efraim Halevy has beensituated at the eye of this hurricaneover the past four decades. In hiselegantly written memoirs, Man int h e S h a d o w s , h e p r e s e n t s a nunprecedented view of the windsswirling around the region, or howhe has, in his words, ‘‘seen theMiddle East crisis from the inside.’’Halevy began his distinguishedcareer in Israeli intelligence whenhe joined the Mossad in 1961,serving ‘‘as a combination analyst,c a s e o f f i c e r , a n d e x e c u t i v edepartment head until 1967,’’ whenhe was appointed deputy divisionchief. A member of the governingbody of the Mossad for more thantwenty-eight years, he retired, forthe first time, in 1995 at the rank

of deputy chief of the organization,and took up the diplomatic post ofa m b a s s a d o r t o t he E u r o p e a nUnion. In 1998, Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu recalled himto Jerusalem to head the Mossad, aposition he held until 2002. He wasthen named nat iona l secur i tyadvisor to Prime Minister ArielSharon, and served his country inthis capacity until his retirement in2003.

In Man in the Shadows Halevyfocuses ‘‘on thirteen integral years,the years 1990–2003, which havechanged the face of the world andhave catapulted us into a new andfrightening era.’’ He provides accessto the inner sanctum of the Israelig o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g , i nfascinating detail, the intersection ofintelligence, policy formulation, and

Dr. Joseph Morrison Skelly is an Associate Professor of History at the College ofMount Saint Vincent, Riverdale, New York. An Academic Fellow with theFoundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C., and a soldier inthe United States Army Reserve, he was on active duty in Iraq in 2005. Aspecialist on the troubles in Ireland, Dr. Skelly’s writings on military andforeign policy matters have appeared in numerous newspapers, magazines, andacademic journals.

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diplomacy. Turning to his owns p e c i a l t y , h e a s s e r t s t h a t‘‘Intelligence is an art, rather than ascience,’’ and utilizes the pages ofhis book like a canvas to sketchaspects of the Middle East that areoften clouded in obscurity. In hisskilled hands these features emergefrom the shadows, and intriguingfigures come to life , includingEfraim Halevy himself. What ismore, his book is not just a portraitof the recent past, but a blueprintfor the future, since the threats thatHalevy dealt with during his tenureas head of the Mossad—especiallymass Islamic terror—have alsoemerged from the darkness of theMiddle East to endanger, in hisview, the liberty of the free world.Halevy’s diagnosis is somber, hisprognosis is solemn, and the gravityof both is underscored by his longcareer in intelligence. His policyprescriptions merit the most seriousconsideration, for the well-being ofthe West may very well depend onthem.

INSIDE THE MOSSAD

The Mossad has been deeply engagedin the fight against terrorism fordecades. When Halevy was namedhead of the agency in 1998, his firstp r i o r i t y w a s t o r e t o o l t h eo r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h i s b a t t l efollowing a temporary decline in itsperformance and prestige due to twohigh-profile failed operations inJordan and Switzerland. In theimmedia te te rm, he sought toaccomplish three tasks: restore the

Mossad’s operational expertise;restore the public’s faith in it; andrestore the morale and standards ofits personnel. He righted the shipwithin months, while putting outnew fires, such as the arrest ofIsraeli agents in Cyprus and falsepress reports of a Mossad role in thearrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the headof the Kurdish terrorist group theKPP, which sparked off violentp r o t e s t s b y K u r d s i n s e v e r a lEuropean cities. His deft handlingof the latter predicament sidelined apotential Kurdish terrorist campaignagainst Israeli interests in Europe.

Likewise, Halevy managed thefallout of the incident in Switzerland,where a Mossad officer arrested forthe w i re tapp ing of a te r ror i s tsuspect’s phone had been put ontrial, in a manner that hewed tointernational law while maintainingmorale among Mossad agents athome and in the field. What was theupshot of these cases? Halevy wasable to develop ‘‘a solid relationshipbetween the chief, as the personultimately responsible for the safetyof his men=women, and the lonelycase officer out in the cold.’’ Hemade it his business ‘‘to meet withindividuals and teams leaving onmissions, to brief them on their tasksand to look them straight in the faceand tell them in advance what mycapabi l i t i e s were , should theyg e t i n t o t r o u b l e , a n d w h a t Ipersonally undertook to do in suchan eventuality.’’

On an administrative level, Halevymodernized the Mossad. While shorton specific details due to security

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considerations, his discussion is longon insights into the revitalization ofan intelligence organization. Heinstituted new recruiting methods,initiated short-term contracts foragents, publicly advertised for newrecruits for the first time in theMossad’s his tory, and str ic t lyenforced all Israeli civil service rules.He reorganized divisions, appointednew divis ion chiefs , and put arobust operational division back onits feet. He also delegated authority.F o r i n s t a n c e , h e m a d e i t h i s‘‘business to brief every station chiefbefore he went abroad and to tellhim, inter alia, that once he was inplace, he should consider himself amini-Mossad chief, and shouldmake it his business to highlight theweaknesses of any proposal no lessthan its strengths.’’

Halevy went to great lengths toshield the Mossad from unnecessarypolitical interference. He regainedf u l l c o n t r o l f r o m t h e p r i m em i n i s t e r ’ s o f f i c e , w h i c h h a dencroached upon the agency’sauthority during its recent period ofcrisis. Overall, he ‘‘had to contendwith the transformation of theMossad from a ‘family’ into amodern enterprise.’’ What was theend result of his stewardship? He‘‘had assumed the leadership intimes of crisis, had put things backon track, and had been privileged tobe in command during a criticalperiod in the history of the country,at the height of the Palestiniancampaign, the intifada uprising,against Israel. The Mossad hadchalked up several operational

successes and its internationalreputat ion had not only beenrestored, but enhanced.’’ Halevy’sassertions are, indeed, accurate, andtoday the Mossad has recovered itspas t reputa t ion as one of thepremier intelligence organizations inthe world.

CROSSING THE JORDAN

As a high-ranking intelligence officer,Efraim Halevy carried out a series ofs i g n i f i c a n t c o v e r t d i p l o m a t i cmissions during his career. Onseveral occasions he met with thelate King Hussein of Jordan, forwhom he cont inues to expressgenuine respect. But their meetingon the eve of the Persian Gulf Wari n 1 9 9 1 w a s r a t h e r c o o l . T h emonarch had permitted Iraqi jets topatrol near the Jordanian–Israeliborder, ‘‘virtually within strikingdistance of Israel’s atomic reactor inthe area of Dimona. ’ ’ Halevydelivered ‘‘a stern warning’’ to theKing while laying the groundworkfor a clandestine meeting in Londonwith the Israeli prime minister,Yitzhak Shamir, that, alas, provedunsatisfactory. Hussein agreed notto permit Iraq to utilize Jordanianairspace for stories aimed at Israel,but rejected an Israeli request for‘‘acquiescence in the limited andperipheral use of Jordanian airspaceshould Israel be constrained toreta l iate against Iraqi attacksagainst Israel.’’

During the First Gulf War, Iraqlaunched no airstrikes from Jordan,but thirty-nine Iraqi Scud missiles

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passed through Jordanian airspaceand landed in Israel, which, as iswell-known, did not retaliate at theb e h e s t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sgovernment . Halevy offers animportant analysis of the impact ofIsrael’s restraint on its deterrentcapability. There were benefits, i.e.,it ‘‘prevented the collapse of thecoalition and the isolation of theUnited States in the Middle East.’’But, at the same time, there was asteep cost: ‘‘without doubt Israel’sd e t e r r e n t i m a g e h a d b e e ntarnished . . . an extremely heavyprice to pay for a state whose veryexistence has not been accepted byall the countries in the region tothis day.’’

Why did Halevy carry out thism i s s i o n t o J o r d a n a n d o t h e rdiplomatic tasks, including a visit toNorth Korea at the end of 1992aimed at stemming ‘‘the influx oftheir missilery into the MiddleEast?’’ For a variety of reasons,which are made clear in his book.Israeli prime ministers occasionallyh a d c o o l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e i rministers of foreign affairs andwished to open direct channels tof o r e i g n l e a d e r s . T h e r e w a s atradition within the Mossad ofc o o p e r a t i n g w i t h r e g i o n a lgovernments that extended back tothe 1960s; it had, for instance,c ra f t ed c lose l inks wi th KingHassan II of Morocco. Halevyh i m s e l f h a d d e v e l o p e d s o l i dworking relationships with foreignoff ic ia ls that success ive primeministers wished to capitalize on.Most important, they recognized

that Halevy was profess ional ,capable, and discreet.

INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGNPOLICY

Halevy’s memoirs thus highlight animportant dimension of Israel’sforeign policy, namely, the quietcontribution of the Mossad, whichhas even been called the ‘‘shadowforeign office.’’ This asset proved tobe of use to Prime Minister YitzhakShamir in the 1990s , when heinitiated early contacts with thePalestinians. According to Halevy,‘ ‘ T h e i n t r i c a t e w e b o f c o v e r tchannels that had been spun andnurtured over the years had servedconsecutive Israeli leaders extremelywell in forging and consolidatingthe country’s strategic assets andc a p a b i l i t i e s . L i t t l e s u r p r i s e ,therefore, that when it came time tol a u n c h i n g a n d p r o m o t i n gmeaningful negotiations, Israelileaders preferred the covert routesto the overt ones.’’ Throughout theregion, ‘‘the heads of the Mossadwere instrumental in servicing thekey l inks of many of I s rae l ’ srelationships with the Arab world.’’

But there was also a downside tos e c r e t d i p l o m a c y . W i t h t h eascendancy of Shimon Peres (aboutwhom Halevy spares little criticism)a nd hi s r e l i a n ce o n ‘ ‘p e r s on sp o l i t i c a l l y a l i gn e d w i t h t h e i rprincipals’’ instead of professionalintelligence officers and diplomats,the secret Oslo (Norway) channel tothe Palestinians proved problematic.‘‘Rather than being a discreet and

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reliable way of conducting frankdiscussions,’’ laments Halevy, ‘‘itevolved into a strategy designed toenable the devoted negotiators toengage in dreams of peace ratherthan to confront the true facts oflife and to grapple with them.’’ Itbecame, in other words, ‘‘a vehiclefor the personal attainment of fameand glory.’’

THE CIA, THE MOSSAD, PALESTINE

Efraim Halevy’s vantage pointaffords him the opportunity to offerinsights into the role of intelligenceagencies in ameliorating the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. In late 2001, asterroris t act ivi ty continued tooriginate from the West Bank, heworked closely with George Tenet,t h e D i r e c t o r o f t h e C e n t r a lInte l l igence Agency (CIA), todevelop a new approach to thisp r o b l e m . T e n e t d e s i g n e d ‘ ‘ aprofessional blueprint addressed tothe security and military services’’of both the Israelis and Palestinians.While operational in nature, theimplications of each step in his planwere political, so this was ‘‘a cleardeparture from the clandestine rolet h a t t h e a g e n c y h a d p l a y e dthroughout the last fifty years, andit was the political level in theUnited States that had decided toa c t i n t h i s m a n n e r . ’ ’ T h i sa d j u s t m e n t h a d s e r i o u sconsequences. The CIA ‘‘became anovert player on the scene; ’ ’ i t‘‘assumed the role of an umpire inthe dispute;’’ and it coordinated‘‘the training of the Palestinian

security forces.’’ In sum, ‘‘the stake,the direct stake, of the agency insecuring a success of the wholeenterprise was clear for everyone tosee.’’

In time, Tenet’s work plan raninto the sand, and all efforts weresuspended following the Palestinianterrorist attack in Netanya in thespring of 2002. In the light of thisoutcome, Halevy offers a sternassessment of the American politicaldecision to enmesh the CIA in thePalestinian imbroglio. It ‘‘served noreal interest of the United States.The prestige of the agency and itstrusted and highly respected chief inperson was on the block. Thefailure highlighted the obviousl imitat ions of one of the mostrevered arms of the United Statesgovernment . The profess ionalcapabilities of the agency weresimilarly compromised, at least inpart.’’ Halevy is essentially correct,but the leadership of the CIA, notjust the White House, also bearsresponsibility for wading into thePalestinian morass.

On the Israeli side, meanwhile, amore beneficial outcome resulted asthe Mossad was drawn into ‘‘theg r a y z o n e t h a t a l w a y s e x i s t sbetween the operational and policylevels.’’ In contrast to the CIA’sm o d u s o p e r a n d i , t h e I s r a e l iintelligence agency acted primarilybehind the scenes. Halevy and hiscolleagues became ‘‘emboldened inpromoting ideas and courses andactions’’ to their political superiors.Specifically, ‘‘given the realizationthat Yassir Arafat had no interest

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in any real accommodation withIsrael,’’ they realized that ‘‘the onlypossibility lay in promoting a movethat would produce an alternativel e a d e r s h i p i n t h e P a l e s t i n i a nAuthority.’’ The Mossad thereforesuggested the creation of a newpower center inside the Palestiniansystem, specifically, the office ofp r i m e m i n i s t e r . T h i s w a s amilestone of sorts, the ‘‘very firsttime that a proposal to bring abouta regime change in the Middle Eastwas tabled for the internationalcommunity.’’ It was definitely ‘‘thefirst time that such a concept wasproposed to the political level inIsrael’’ by one of its intelligences e r v i c e s . T h e I s r a e l i c a b i n e tsubsequently approved the plan,and President George W. Bushincorporated its principles into hisJune 2002 speech entitled ‘‘A Callfor a New Palestinian Leadership.’’Halevy writes how he ‘‘could notrecall another instance when theintelligence community had madesuch a strong showing in chartingstrategic trends in the region.’’

Thi s episode gives r i se to achapter-length discussion of thed y n a m i c s a m o n g i n t e l l i g e n c eo f f i c i a l s , p o l i c y m a k e r s , a n dpoliticians, especially when theirobjectives clash. Halevy asks aseries of tough questions on behalfof his profess ional col leagues:‘ ‘How can intel l igence officerspreserve their credibility? Who isthe intelligence officer’s real clientand who is the ultimate judge ofhow intel l igence can be put tooperational and political use? Who

bears the ult imate burden andresponsibility of protecting sourcesand methods?’’ He proceeds toaddress these and other complexi s sues in a se r ious , sus ta inedmanner. Both intelligence officialsand political leaders will benefitfrom reading his analysis.

S t i l l , t h e p r o p o s a l f o r a nalternative Palestinian leadershipran up against the ‘‘Road Map forPeace , ’ ’ which Pres ident Busheventually endorsed, and the Israeligovernment begrudgingly accepted,in the spring of 2003. Halevy writesthat ‘‘This was to become, in myassessment, the most grievous errormade on our side since the clearsuccess that had culminated in thePresident’s June, 2002 declaration inthe White House about the necessityof a l lowing a new Pales t in ianleadership to emerge.’’ The roadmap contained perilous proposals,such as the proviso that Jerusalems h o u l d b e d i v i d e d . M o s tproblematic, its four sponsors—theUnited States, Russia, the EuropeanU n i o n ( E U ) , a n d t h e U n i t e dN a t i o n s ( U N ) — w e r e g i v e n‘‘ultimate authority to determinewhether each s ide had met i t so b l i g a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o t h estipulations in the document.’ ’H a l e v y s u m s u p t h e I s r a e l iconsensus: ‘ ‘That Israel wouldforfeit its right to determine whetherthe Palestinians had fulfilled theirobligations on issues such as theirundertakings concerning terror andwould delegate this entirely to thequartet was considered by many tobe unthinkable.’’ What is more, the

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initial stage ‘‘of the map envisaged aconcerted effort on the part of thePalestinians to dismantle terroristinfrastructures. In order for them todo so, they needed to behave likeFinns, and this, of course, wouldnever come about.’’

WORLD WAR III

Halevy opens Man in the Shadowswith his reaction to the attacks onthe United States of 11 September2001 (9=11). He himself had receivedno forewarning: ‘‘The informationlevel was at zero.’’ He soon, though,grasped the profound implications:‘‘Within a very short time it wasclear to each and every one of us atthe top of the intelligence communitytha t the event s o f 9=11 wouldbecome turning points in the historyof the world.’’ A couple of days afterthe attack he told a colleague that‘‘the Middle East war had penetratedthe shores of the American continentand that the United States was nowat war in the Middle East. It couldnot win this war on its own soil andtherefore, sooner rather than later,the United States would have tocome to the Middle East and engagethe enemy in order to win that war.’’

Halevy calls this conflict ‘‘WorldWar III.’’ He traces its start toal-Qaeda’s simultaneous attacks onthe American embassies in Kenyaand Tanzania in 1998. Soon afterbeing appointed the head of Mossadthat same year, he discerned that themain threats to global security werethe r i se of large -sca le I s lamicterrorism and the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. Assuch, ‘‘The world was confrontedw i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y t o g a t h e rinformation on these critical subjectsand one of the results of this needwas that Intelligence, with a capital I,suddenly became a key player in theequation of international relations.’’Political leaders immediately turnedto the intelligence community forinformation about the nature ofIslamic terrorist organizations.‘‘Dealing with these amorphouselements,’’ Halevy recalls, ‘‘rapidlybecame one of the most tantalizingand frustrating tasks ever undertakenin the realm of intelligence.’’

These same interrelated challengesloom today. Iran encapsulates severalof them, especially its pursuit ofnuclear weapons, its support forterrorist organizations, and itsdestabilizing impact on the MiddleE a s t . R a d i c a l i z e d I s l a m i ccommunities in Europe also pose aserious threat. Halevy first perceivedsigns of their alienation during hisstint as ambassador to the EuropeanUnion in the 1990s. How did theEuropean establishment approachthis challenge, as the numbers ofMuslims swelled from year to year?A l a s , h e w r i t e s , ‘ ‘ D e n i a l a n dpsychological suppression were theorder of the day.’’ Today, mostEuropean countries, outside ofBritain and Spain, continue to ignorethe problem. Such complacency mayevaporate should Islamic terroristattacks continue in the West. In fact,H a l e v y p r e d i c t s , ‘ ‘ t h e v e r yfundamentals of convent ionalinternational law will be swept away

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by the dictates of basic nationalsurvival. Governments and theirsenior executive officials will takeaction, the like of which has rarelyever been dreamed of in the past.’’There may be a silver lining: ‘‘If thecombination of all these measuresachieves the ultimate aim of defeatingterrorism and a safer world emerges,then all the reservations implied in aconservative, more minimal approachwill evaporate. The doubters will joinin to rejoice in the salvation ofhumanity.’’

THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION

Efraim Halevy has had extensiveexperience in Washington, D.C. Heserved there for four years as theNorth American stat ion chief ,dur ing which t ime he workedclosely with the Israeli ambassador,and later Prime Minister, YitzhakRabin. He includes a poignantaccount of his visit in 1987 to thedeathbed of James J. Angleton, theCIA’s counterintelligence chief, who‘‘ left no stone unturned in hispursuit of the ‘forces of evil,’ andalways sought to reveal the hiddenconnection between terrorism andclandestine hostile intelligence.’’

Halevy asks incisive questionsabout the run-up to 9=11. ‘‘Did theintell igence community’’ in theUnited States, for example, ‘‘focuson the real issues and did it devotethe major part of its resources togathering information on them andto foiling the aims of those whowere prompt ing internat iona lIslamic terror and the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction?’’He concludes that these items ‘‘werea t t h e t o p o f t h e a g e n d a . ’ ’Nevertheless, it was not in thepower of l ead ing in te l l i genceofficials ‘‘to affect a sea change inthe basic attitudes of the Americanpublic to matters at hand.’’

Halevy devotes sustained attentionto the reorganization of Americanintelligence in the years since 9=11.He is deeply concerned with itsdirection, and is right to be so. ‘‘Inour turbulent and dangerous times,one question has trumped all othersregarding intelligence services,’’ heasserts. ‘ ‘Who has the ultimateresponsibility for making intelligenceassessments and who should bejudged for them?’’ His reply restsupon a central operating principle ofintelligence organizations: ‘‘In thef i n a l a n a l y s i s , a u t h o r i t y a n dresponsibility must go together andthe chain of command must ensuret h a t h e w h o s h o u l d e r s t h eresponsibility for the product, fort h e a s s e s s m e n t , o r f o r t h eprocurement of information, hasdirect command of the troops. It isimpossible to hold an intelligencechief accountable if he does not havefull command of his subordinates.’’

Halevy, therefore, is ‘‘convincedthat the new intelligence structurethat has been put in place in thewake of 9=11 and the Iraqi warheralds an exceedingly difficult timein the conduct of intelligence in theUnited States.’’ The establishment ofthe post of Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) ‘‘immediately callsi n t o qu e s t i o n t h e po w e r s an d

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responsibilities of the director of theCIA.’’ He cuts right to the chase: ifthere is ‘‘another intelligence failurein the years ahead, who will bear theblame?’’ On the plus side, ‘‘It couldw e l l b e t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e a nimproved flow of information andthat coordination at al l levels,between agencies, may be advanced.’’Still, ‘‘this could have been achievedwithout imposing a heavy layer ofofficialdom at the top, thus removingt h e p r e s i d e n t f r o m t h a t m o r eintimate contact that he must havew i t h t h e t r u e l e a d e r s o f t h ecommunity.’’ Halevy may very wellbe right. A better approach wouldhave been for the President to makethe CIA more accountable by reiningin those elements of the organizationthat have resisted, often in an overtmanner, his counterterrorism policies.

International implications alsoabound. For foreign intelligencechiefs such as Halevy’s successor inIsrael, who will be the ‘‘vital pointof contact in Washington?’’ TheDNI? The Director of the CIA? Bythe same token, ‘‘the manner inw h i c h t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n tconducted its probes into both 9=11and the Iraq i war wi l l have anegative effect on the internationalnetwork as a whole for some timeto come.’’ Halevy does feel thatthe 9=11 Commission missed anopportunity by not recommendingthe creation of a full-fledged securityservice in the United States. Its‘‘prime and only mission should be

the prevention of terrorist or othersubversive activities in the UnitedStates.’’ He makes a powerful case,ques t ion ing the ab i l i ty of theFederal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) to carry out this task, whilea d d r e s s i n g t h e o b j e c t i o n s o fAmericans who fear possible threatsto their civil liberties.

OUT OF THE SHADOWS

Since the publication of Man in theShadows , via a series of essaysappearing in Israel, Europe, and theUnited States, Efraim Halevy hascontinued to challenge the freeworld to rise to the threat posed byIslamic terrorism. Having emergedpublicly as a distinguished voice onsecurity affairs, he is currently thehead of the Center for Strategic andPol i cy Stud ie s a t the HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem. The arc ofhis eminent career reveals him to bean Israeli patriot and a tirelesspublic servant. On this note, one ofhis stated aims is to encourage‘‘persons of good faith, vision,and ambition to go out and servetheir country with all their heart,brain and might in the never-neverworld of intelligence. The veryfuture of the free world depends onthem.’’ Indeed, it does. EfraimH a l e v y h a s s e t a n h o n o r a b l eexample, which, in his memoirs,emerges from out of the shadowsfor his intelligence colleagues toadmire and to emulate.

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