The

OstrichOstrichn the mid-

1990s, health-

conscious Americans

wanted their meat low in fat and

cholesterol. Ostrich, which tasted much like

steak but with less fat and calories than beef,

turkey or chicken, seemed like an investor’s

dream opportunity.

Unlike cattle, which typically give birth to a

single offspring a year, a female ostrich lays 30 to

60 eggs each breed-

ing season, and the

birds are far cheaper

to feed and care for.

As publicity about the

birds grew, ostrich burgers

appeared in supermarkets, delis,

and restaurants. Besides being tasty to eat, its

feathers made excellent dusters, and demand was

growing for boots, belts, and briefcases made

from ostrich leather. Even the enormous eggs

were sought after, eyed by collectors as well as

egg-art enthusiasts. A single egg went for as

much as $100. The ostrich went from being an

exotic bird seen only in zoos to a profitable mar-

keting prospect for ranchers.

An Investment ScamTargets Investors’

Nest Eggs

GroupGroupII

By Postal Inspector Debra A.

Rikli, Santa Ana Domicile,

and Postal Inspector Mike

McCarthy, Los Angeles Division,

U.S. Postal Inspection Service

The ostrich craze captured the atten-tion of another, less principled group ofopportunists. Led by Patrick L. Antrimand David T. Hudson III, The OstrichGroup hatched an investment schemeguaranteed to bring a profit from theflightless bird. Unfortunately for them,U.S. Postal Inspectors at the Los AngelesDivision had a problem with that: TOG’sonly goal was to feather its own nest withinvestors’ money—sent by victimsthrough the U.S. Mail.

Patrick Antrim and David Hudsonformed The Ostrich Group in 1995. Itwas an investment firm specializing in thesale of breeder ostriches and eggs, targetedto capture a share of the booming ostrichmarket. TOG rented offices in Santa Ana,California, and hired staff to help sellpairs of “breeder ostriches,” three-year-oldbirds with a successful breeding season.

Antrim and Hudson knew nothing aboutostriches, but they picked up enough toteach the essentials to their staff.

People were eager to cash in on aprofitable investment that required noeffort—except to mail their monthly fees.TOG sold its first pair of breeder ostrichesin May 1995 for $31,500.

Although guaranteed a minimum of20 eggs per breeding season, investorswere told it was more likely the birdswould lay 40 to 60 eggs. If they laid lessthan 20, TOG promised to make up thedifference with eggs from other ostriches.Interested customers received lettersdetailing an eight-year “projected incomeschedule” showing the immense profitsthey could expect to earn—and whichwould grow substantially each year.According to the letters, by year eight, onepair of birds producing 30 to 60 eggs a

season would realize areturn of more than$480,000.

All investors had todo was mail in theirmoney—The Ostrich

Group would handle the rest, includingfood and board for the birds. It soundedtoo good to be true. As usual, it was.

Following the initial investment for apair of breeder ostriches, investors had toboard their birds—$30 per month perbird—at a ranch owned or contracted byTOG. Some early investors were toldtheir birds were boarded at Vision ExoticsRanch in Lexington, Oklahoma, ownedby David Hudson. Others were told theirbirds were at TOG’s Las Plumas Ranchnear Reno, Nevada, or Indian PointOstrich Ranch in Tehachapi, California.The locations appealed to investors, wholiked the idea of visiting the ranches andshowing off the exotic birds to family andfriends. The Ostrich Group generouslyoffered to take care of all of the arrange-ments for the visits.

By late 1995, TOG had sold severalhundred thousand dollars worth of their“proven breeder ostriches.” Antrim andHudson expanded the business, movingto two offices on the fourth floor of anelaborate high-rise building called TheAtrium, located in one of the wealthiest

parts of OrangeCounty, California.Antrim even thoughtpeople might confusehis name with that ofthe building. The menspent thousands out-fitting their newoffices with fineleather furniture, con-ference tables, andnumerous phone lines.Loretta Antrim,Patrick’s mother,joined the team to

oversee daily operations. Antrim and Hudson taught their

employees how to hook clients. Theyprovided leads and told their staff toinvite clients to the luxurious offices ofThe Atrium, where investors couldwatch videos of ostrich ranchesowned, it was said, by TOG.

With high rent payments at stake,The Ostrich Group began an extensiveradio, television, and newspaper adcampaign. In November 1996, TOG

Patrick Antrrim, David Hudson III, andreporter Gayle Anderson from KTLA TV 5 atan ostrich farm in Winchester, CA.

Gayle Anderson rides an ostrich.

October 2003 13

Ostrich egg and ostrich leather boots.

14 United States Postal Inspection Service Bulletin

negotiated a 15-minute spot on KTLATV 5 News, a major Los Angeles station.Anchored by reporter Gayle Anderson,the video was shot at an ostrich farm inWinchester, California, two hours fromLos Angeles, and was broadcast severaltimes the week before Thanksgiving. Inthe clip, Antrim and Hudson are seen dis-cussing the selling points and marketingvalue of ostriches—and how to cookostrich for Thanksgiving dinner. The clipends with Gayle Anderson riding off onan ostrich and displaying a telephonenumber to call The Ostrich Group formore information on this up-and-comingopportunity.

Antrim and Hudson next spent$50,000 to produce a 30-minute infomer-cial. This time, a well-dressed Antrim andHudson are shown walking from thesculptured glass entrance of The Atriumas if they’re the owners of the luxurioushigh-rise. The men are filmed at work intheir plush offices, discussing the hoursthey spent daily monitoring the interna-tional ostrich market. Testimonialsendorsing The Ostrich Group (laterfound to be unauthorized) from veterinar-ians, ranchers, bankers, satisfied ostrichowners, and even the president of TheOstrich Association were spliced into thefilm. In one scene, Antrim and Hudsonare at the airport, strolling alongside alimousine and a Lear jet and discussingtheir plans to meet investors at the air-

port, so they could fly them to the ranchto check on the birds.

Antrim hired Michael Whitney ofThe Whitney Group in August 1996 as aconsultant for day-to-dayoperations. Whitney tookover the boarding agreementsand sent monthly boardingbills to clients, who were toldto mail their monthly checksdirectly to The WhitneyGroup. He also sold ostrichpairs, telling his clients thebirds were boarded at hisranch in Whitney, Texas.

Between 1995 and1997, The Ostrich Groupsold 247 ostriches to 83investors for more than$820,000. Clients were giventhe name of the ranch wheretheir birds were boarded andsigned bills of sale and board-ing agreements. A few dayslater, they received in the mail aCertificate of Ownership identifying theages, gender, and registration numbers oftheir birds, which supposedly hadmicrochips implanted for identification.The birds were said to be African Blacks,one of the finest breeds of ostrich. Eggproduction reports were mailed regularly,advising investors that their birds werehealthy and flourishing.

There was really only one problem

with The Ostrich Group: It had noostriches.

Despite promises to the contrary,TOG salesmen became uncooperative

when investors asked to visittheir birds. There were manyreasons why they couldn’t:The ostriches were breedingand couldn’t be bothered, thebirds were “stressed,” or theroads were too muddy andcould be accessed only by afour-wheel drive vehicle orhelicopter. When people lostpatience and threatened todrive themselves to the ranch,TOG announced a group tourwould be arranged in a fewweeks. But at the last minute,the birds had to be moved to aranch in Texas—or Oklahoma,or Nebraska, or San Diego.

The Ostrich Group’spoor recordkeeping raised thenext red flag. Investors began

seeing inconsistencies in monthly bills.The registration numbers for their birdsvaried from one month to the next. Somewho had bought one pair of birds werebilled for three ostriches, or vice versa.

In response to growing complaints,the Securities and Exchange Commissionbegan investigating The Ostrich Group inNovember 1996 for securities fraud. SECofficials filed a cease-and-desist order

Loretta Joan Antrim

Michael S. Whitney

Victims’ checks arrived in the mail, but TOG never handed over a singleostrich, or ostrich egg, in return.

The Ostrich Groups’s infomercial included testimonials endorsing the group—but Inspectors later found the endorsements were bogus.

October 2003 15

against TOG to stop selling ostriches as asecurity. When TOG ignored the order,the SEC mailed questionnaires toinvestors to gather more facts about thegroup’s activities. When investors calledThe Atrium to get answers, TOG movedits offices, in the middle of the night, toan undisclosed location.

But TOG’s troubles had just begun.Postal Inspector Debra Rikli received a callin 1996 from Inspector Pamela Durkee atthe Omaha, Nebraska, Domicile. InspectorDurkee was working a fraud case againstPatrick Antrim and his mother Loretta,accused of running an advance-fee loanscheme. Durkee was analyzing financialpapers from the case when she noticed thatvictims’ checks were deposited to anaccount for The Ostrich Group. Aftersome preliminary coordination, the U.S.Postal Inspection Service launched a crimi-nal investigation of TOG.

Former SEC Attorney Renee Lee andNina Yamamoto, a CPA with the SEC,provided voluminous files related to theircivil case. Lee and Yamamoto workedwith Inspectors throughout the investiga-tion, supplying financial analyses and,much later, assistance during the indict-ment and trial preparation stages in thecase against The Ostrich Group.

Inspectors contacted TOG’s investorsand listened to similar stories. They hadseen or heard ads about the ostriches andspoken with staff at The Atrium. Thehigh-rent location, plush offices, salespitch, and purported ranches seemedcredible. The projected income schedulewith its eight-year return of $480,000 perbreeder pair and guaranteed egg mini-

mum were big selling points. Best of all,customers didn’t have to do a thing—except buy the ostriches and pay theirmonthly boarding fees. Investors believedthe meat, eggs, feathers, and hides of theirbirds were marketable and could turn aprofit. And they were excited at theprospect of showing off the birds to theirchildren and grandkids, expecting to passa growing nest egg to the next generation.

But investors’ problems began aftermailing in their checks. TOG stoppedreturning phone calls. When clients tookmatters into their own hands and calledthe ranch to check on their birds, whatthey heard seemed wildly impossible: TheOstrich Group didn’t own the ranches.Worse, there weren’t any ostriches.

Postal Inspectors and SEC investiga-tors built their case. The Ostrich Groupwas no more than a façade. Investors’money was spent on promoting thefaçade, raising more money, and support-ing Antrim and Hudson’s high-profilelifestyle.

Patrick Antrim had a nice home atthe beach. Both Antrim and Hudsondrove a Mercedes, a BMW, or a Jaguararound town, wining and dining at thebest restaurants. True, there was a Whit-ney Ranch in Whitney, Texas, but TOG’sMichael Whitney didn’t own it. Whitneycollected roughly $30,000 in boardingfees from investors in addition to themoney he received from TOG, but henever spent any of it on ostrich food. Hebought a Mercedes and a lavish wardrobe.

By 1998, Patrick Antrim and hismother Loretta had been indicted inNebraska for their advance-fee loan

scheme. Patrick Antrim was convictedand sentenced to two years in jail, and wasordered to pay restitution to his victims.Loretta received probation and was alsoordered to pay restitution.

Investors filed a class action lawsuitagainst the four principals of The OstrichGroup and won. The SEC won their civilcase against the group on 11 counts ofsecurities fraud. Each of the four wasordered to pay a fine of $819,000, plusinterest. Sadly, neither investors nor theSEC have yet to receive a penny.

Patrick Antrim, his mother Loretta,David Hudson III, and Michael Whitneywere indicted on March 8, 2000, in theCentral District of California on six countsof mail fraud and six counts of moneylaundering for the fraudulent operation ofThe Ostrich Group. Patrick and LorettaAntrim pled guilty to the charges. Hudsonand Whitney went to trial.

Former SEC attorney Lee and Nina

Patrick Antrim, an unidentified male, and David Hudson IIIare shown walking out of the luxurious high-rise where theyrented offices.

David T. Hudson III The Ostrich Group limo and Lear jet—neither ofwhich were owned by TOG.

Ostrich egg and promotional material from TOG.

16 United States Postal Inspection Service Bulletin

Yamamoto worked with Inspector JulieLarson on the financial aspects of the caseand to explain TOG’s dealings to the jury.Inspector Larson located key witnesses,including the sad case of an investor whobecame homeless after losing all of hismoney to TOG. After finding the man,Inspector Larson convinced him to cometo California and testify at the trial.

Approximately 30 witnesses were onhand in Santa Ana to testify at the trial,which began in January 2003. The wit-nesses primarily consisted of the victims,ranchers, and sales staff of TOG. Theinvestors ranged from 40 to 80 years ofage and included doctors, dentists, andattorneys. Most were senior citizens.Ranchers testified they never had con-

tracts with or boarded birdsfor The Ostrich Group.

The testimony of aTOG salesman was particu-larly convincing. While hewas talking up the schemewith a couple of potentialinvestors, David Hudson IIIentered the room wearingcowboy boots and a cowboyhat. Hudson announced hehad just flown in from oneof the ranches, and “theostriches were lookinggood.” He was excited aboutwhat he referred to as a greattrio of ostriches, two femalesand a male, for sale. Thecouple took the bait and

wrote a check. But according to the sales-man, Hudson hadn’t even left the build-ing that day.

After hearing the evidence presentedby Assistant U.S. Attorneys KennethJulian and Douglas McCormick, the juryconvicted Hudson and Whitney. DavidHudson III, who suffered a massivestroke, received a reduced sentence of oneyear of home detention and five years’probation, and was ordered to pay restitu-tion of $822,046. Michael Whitney wasscheduled to be sentenced on October 27,2003. Patrick Antrim was sentenced inMay 2003 to five years in prison andthree years of supervised release, and wasordered to pay restitution of $822,046.His mother Loretta was scheduled for sen-tencing in December 2003.

Postal Inspectors Debra Rikli andJulie Larson were recognized by U.S.Attorney Debra Yang of the Central Dis-trict of California at the district’s annualVictim-Witness ceremony. The twoInspectors were honored for their exem-plary work in meeting the needs of thevictims and witnesses of The OstrichGroup scheme.

Postal Inspector Debra Rikli and Postal Inspector Julie Larsonwere each presented with a Victim-Witness Award from DebraYang, U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, in recog-nition of their exemplary work aiding victims of The OstrichGroup’s fictitious investment scheme.

Postal Inspectors proved that Patrick Antrim, his mother Loretta, David Hudson III,and Michael Whitney did not own any ostriches, did not own any ranches, and hadno contracts with ranches to board ostriches. The four principals used their clients’money for one thing only: to feather their own nests.

A Victim’s StoryPeggy Monroe was an employee of The Ostrich Group.

When Peggy’s mother died and left money to her and herbrother, William McConico, Peggy mentioned the inheritanceto David Hudson III. She thought it was a wonderful invest-ment opportunity for her brother. Hudson flew directly toMcConico’s home in New Mexico and sold him a pair of“proven breeder ostriches” for $70,000.

McConico lost everything he had. The depressed mandropped all contact with his family and eventually ended uphomeless eight years later in Denver, Colorado. When PostalInspectors Julie Larson and Debra Rikli learned aboutMcConico, Larson traveled to Denver and was able to locatehim. The Inspector convinced William to come back with herto California and testify at the TOG trial.

The jury was moved by McConico’s testimony. Williamtold the court that, after repeated promises to visit his birdswere broken, he got a bad feeling about TOG. Told that hisbirds were at the Vision Exotic Ranch in Oklahoma,McConico called the ranch and spoke with owner FrankHague. He learned that it was Frank Hague who owned theranch, not David Hudson III. And McConico found out thathe didn’t have any ostriches at the Vision Exotic Ranch.

After the trial, Inspectors Julie Larson and Debra Rikliasked William McConico if he wished to see his family.William decided it was time, and the Inspectors arranged ameeting. After eight years of estrangement, William McConicowas reunited with his two sisters and their husbands, and methis nephews and nieces for the first time. The family reunionlasted several days and was filled with laughter, tears, and bar-beque ribs.

“You, sir, are a menace to soci-ety. This court hereby sentencesyou to life imprisonment.”

With these words, U.S. Dis-trict Court Judge CatherinePerry of the Eastern District ofMissouri halted a highly organ-ized, national cocaine distribu-tion ring run by Robert Francis.

Francis was brought to jus-tice by an Organized CrimeDrug Enforcement Task Force,dubbed Operation Cash Run,

that was headed by U.S. PostalInspectors. Operation Cash Runproved that Robert Francis andhis crew transported roughly 20to 30 kilograms of cocaine amonth, and mailed in excess of240 Express Mail parcels ofdrug payments from St. Louisto Los Angeles over a two-yearspan.

Where did Robert Francis gowrong? He based his illegalbusiness plan on the U.S. Mail.

OPERATIONOPERATION

INVESTIGATIVE

TEAMWORK

CLEANS UP

DRUG MONEY

FROM THE

U.S. MAIL

by Postal Inspector Dennis J. Simpson, St. Louis Division

CashRunCashRun

18 United States Postal Inspection Service Bulletin

The St. Louis ConnectionProhibited Mail-Narcotics (PMN)

Inspector Dennis Simpson pulled twoExpress Mail packages from the mail-stream at the St. Louis Airport Mail Cen-ter (AMC) on June 23, 1999. The pack-ages bore the same returnaddress—Gateway Productions in Clay-ton, Missouri—in identical handwriting.They were mailed from different PostOffices, but on the same day. They wereaddressed to differentcompanies in Los Angeles,California, but listed thesame phone number. ToPostal Inspector Simpson,trained to investigatemailings of illegal drugsand drug money, theparcels were suspicious.

Inspector Simpson knew the returnaddress belonged to a commercial mailreceiving agency. CMRAs are private mailbusinesses, such as Mail Boxes Etc., oftenused by people who want an anonymousaddress they can hide behind. Simpsonlooked up the phone numbers, but theyweren’t listed, so he called Los AngelesPostal Inspectors for more information onthe receiving end.

When L.A. Inspectors told him theseaddresses were also CMRAs, Simpson andhis PMN team members were granted asearch warrant and opened the packages.Inside each were three videotapes. In eachpackage one tape was hollowed out. The

empty cartridges concealed money:$6,500 in cash in one, $6,790 in theother. PMN Inspectors seized the money.

St. Louis Inspectors seized anotherExpress Mail package at the AMC thenext day. Like the first two, it wasaddressed to a CMRA in Los Angeles andhad a return address of a CMRA in St.Louis. Inspectors forwarded this one tothe PMN Team Leader in Los Angeles,Inspector Tom Dugan.

Inspector Dugan opened the packageunder a search warrant and found thesame set-up: three videotapes, one ofwhich was hollowed out and stuffed with$6,000 in cash. He documented themoney and resealed the package. Inspec-tors from his PMN Team performed acontrolled delivery of the package to get aglimpse of the recipients.

Days later, Inspectors interceptedtwo more, identical Express Mail packagesat the AMC—they were even mailed from

the same Post Offices at the same time ofday. These were forwarded to InspectorDugan, as well.

Dugan and his team opened the newarrivals under warrant and again foundthree blank videotapes in each. But theseheld no money.

The pattern was a familiar one: Themailers had sent “test” packages to see ifthey’d get through, instead of disappear-ing as before. Inspectors resealed them

and returned them tothe mailstream.

Express Mailrecords at the St. LouisAMC confirmedInspectors’ suspicions:They had uncovered amajor drug mailing net-work. There was a longlist of packages fromGateway Productions inthe past year, identicalin weight and alladdressed to CMRAs in

Los Angeles. Team Leader Dugan addedInspector Kim Gordon to the case.

New packagesarrived daily. Follow-ing the test run, Cross-roads Studios replacedGateway Productionsas a return address, butthis flimsy disguisefailed to fool theInspectors. By now,they could spot themailer’s handwritingimmediately.

St. Louis Inspec-tors continued to for-ward suspect packages

to Inspectors in Los Angeles. As agreed,the California team opened the packagesunder warrant, photographed and docu-mented the contents, and repackaged theillegal mailings before making controlleddeliveries to the recipients. There were noseizures and no arrests: Inspectors werebiding their time, collecting information.

The mailings continued through1999, with Postal Inspectors executing 26search warrants on suspect packages. Eachcontained three videotapes, with one of

“Sneak a peek” warrant onExpress Mail package.

October 2003 19

the three hollowed out to conceal between$6,000 and $8,000 in cash. Inspectorswanted to know who was running this ring.

Cameras, Pens, and PagersSurveillance cameras at the St. Louis

Post Office provided Inspectors’ firstglimpse of one of the mailers. They sentthe photo to narcotics officers in St. Louisand Los Angeles, hoping for a hit. Theygot one.

Robert Francis was known to LosAngeles police as a drug dealer, with pre-vious convictions on drug and guncharges. St. Louis Inspectors found him inMaryland Heights, Missouri, renting aroom in a large apartment complex. Acareful operator, Robert Francis put hislease in a woman’s name, bought carsunder aliases, and kept his cell phoneunder the name of girlfriend Janiece Dun-ning.

Inspectors presented their findings tothe U.S. Attorney’s Office. Because of thehigh number of mailings and suspects, theU.S. Attorney’s Office designated theinvestigation an Organized Crime DrugEnforcement Task Force case, naming itOperation Cash Run.

Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) JohnWare, a veteran with more than 10 years’experience prosecuting organized drugrings, was assigned to the case, along withDEA Special Agent Ken Williams and St.Louis Metropolitan Police Departmentnarcotics detectives Tom Lewellyn andRick Koenemann. Their goal was to get tothe source of the drugs. Operation CashRun wasn’t going to stop at a few seizedpackages and some arrests. They were

going to bring down the “big guys.”Team members set up a surveillance

of Francis. A man had recently moved inwith him who called himself “AnthonyWoods”—at least that’s what he said dur-ing a police stop set up as a ruse. Theroommates were obviously surveillanceconscious, using evasive driving maneu-vers to throw off a tail, parking in emptylots before continuing to a destination,doing “double backs” and U-turns onempty streets, driving down dead endsand stopping suddenly, running redlights, and walking through shoppingmalls for no apparent reason other than tocover their tracks. Francis even confrontedtwo agents he suspected were followinghim—in one case threatening to “shootup” their undercover surveillance van.

As investigators gathered evidence,

they discovered Francis serviced his cars ata local gas station. Station invoicesrevealed he used an alias of Mark Jirard,with a cell phone and pager as contacts. Aclone pager allowed them to track hiscalls. St. Louis Postal Police Officers kepta log of the time, date, and number ofevery page Francis received.

Inspectors subpoenaed Francis’ cellphone records and obtained a pen registeron the phone. Detective Tom Lewellynpored over the records, seeking commoncalls and researching numbers going tothe pager. More numbers led to more penregisters and phone records, and theprocess was repeated, leading to a growinglist of conspirators.

The team developed files on thosewho called or were called by the suspects.St. Louis police provided office space forthe Operation Cash Run Task Force.Inspection Service Security Engineering

Robert Francis mails Express Mail package atBallwin, Missouri, Post Office.

Robert Francis carriesshipping material intohis apartment.

Freddy Burgueno leavesFrancis’ apartment withExpress Mail packages.

Robert Francis enters hisapartment with anotherExpress Mail package.

Robert Francis and courierTiffany Barry leave Francis’apartment.

Travis Porter picks upExpress Mail package inLos Angeles at CMRA.

20 United States Postal Inspection Service Bulletin

Technician Bob Lamar installed a covertsurveillance camera, trained on the doorto Francis’ apartment.

Mostly they’d see Francis arrive withboxes and packaging material. He’d leavewith Express Mail packages, headed forthe Post Office.

Wanted for MurderIn October 1999, task force members

matched the Missouri driver’s license ofAnthony Woods—the man who hadmoved in with Robert—with a Californiadriver’s license issued to Anthony PakFrancis. Anthony “Woods” was Robert’sbrother.

Anthony was wanted on a drug-related murder charge dating from Octo-ber 1998 in Ingelwood, California. It wasthe same time he’d moved in with Robert.

Inspectors wanted to arrest AnthonyFrancis on the warrant for murder with-out alerting his brother. A call to theMaryland Heights Police Departmentsolved the problem.

The Operation Cash Run Task Forcebegan a concentrated surveillance of theapartment. When Anthony took off themorning of October 8, 1999, in a brand-new, 1999 Lincoln Navigator withoutplates, Inspectors paged a uniformedMaryland Heights police officer onstandby. Officer Mark Stohr waited untilFrancis was some distance from the apart-ment. Then he pulled him over on a traf-fic stop.

Francis handed over his “Woods” dri-

ver’s license. When Officer Stohrinformed him he was under arrest for fail-ure to properly register a motor vehicle,things moved quickly.

Francis ignored Stohr’s orders to keephis hands out of his pockets, so Stohrgrabbed him by the arms and pinned himdown. A search by the officer revealedthat Anthony Francis was carrying a .22-caliber North American Arms derringer inhis pants pocket.

Francis was takento the MarylandHeights jail andbooked under thename of AnthonyWoods. According toplan, Officer Stohrwaited a few hoursand then told Francisthey had run his printsthrough the Auto-mated FingerprintIdentification System(AFIS). They knew hewas Anthony Pak Francis, wanted formurder in California.

A Perfect ProfileTeam members now focused on a

woman who appeared regularly at RobertFrancis’ apartment. She’d drive up in a redjeep and disappear for a short time in theapartment. When she left, she’d leave thejeep and take Robert’s Nissan Maxima,returning a few days later to switch carsagain.

A pen register on the cell phone ofTiffany Barry, aka Sheila Anderson,revealed she called Francis from the DruryInn in McAllen, Texas. Cell phone logsrevealed she was making roundtripsbetween St. Louis and McAllen, and hotelrecords indicated she stayed in McAllen foronly a few days at a time. Tiffany Barryhad made at least three trips to McAllen inthe last two months. She was a perfect fit

for the profile of adrug courier.

Postal Inspec-tors got a courtorder in December1999 to covertlyinstall a trackingdevice on Francis’Nissan Maxima.They “stole” thecar in the middleof the night anddrove it to theMaryland HeightsPolice Depart-

ment. Sergeant Ed Pfeiffer from the St.Louis Police Department installed thetracker, and Inspectors returned the car,unnoticed, to the apartment lot.

The tracker was configured to sendan automatic page to Postal InspectorDennis Simpson if the car left the St.Louis area. On January 21, 2000, Inspec-tor Simpson’s pager went off.

Barry drove to McAllen, Texas.Inspector Simpson, accompanied byInspector Jorge Concepcion and specialagents from the McAllen office of theDrug Enforcement Agency, watched herevery move, but learned nothing of whatshe was up to. A week later, Barry droveback to St. Louis.

The Missouri Highway Patrol hadbeen called in to conduct a “make yourown case” stop on the vehicle, as far fromSt. Louis as possible. As the Maximacrossed the state line from Arkansas, Mis-souri State Trooper Sergeant Rick Sandersobserved a moving traffic violation andstopped the car. Barry granted Sandersconsent to search the vehicle. The officerseized 9 kilograms of cocaine he found inan electronically controlled, hidden com-partment behind Tiffany Barry’s rear seat.

With the back seat removed, the cocaine isexposed during the Tiffany Barry stop byTrooper Sanders.

January 2000 seizure of 9 kilos of cocaine from Tiffany Barry. Left to right: DEA Special Agent KenWilliams, IRS Special Agent Chris Henry, Inspector Dennis Simpson, Sergeant Rick Sanders of the Missouri Highway Patrol, and Detective Rick Koenemann of the St. Louis Police Department.

October 2003 21

The U.S. Attorney’s Office and thestate prosecutor agreed to charge Barry instate court. State charges would be dis-missed when, and if, federal charges fol-lowed.

The Mechanics of DealingImmediately after Barry’s arrest,

Robert Francis moved to a new apartmentcomplex across town. He also changed cellphones. Inspectors recorded the newnumber by paging him to a trap-and-traceline, and obtained new pen registers.

Francis had no close friends and nosocial life. He flew between St. Louis andLos Angeles regularly. When he went outit was for business, either to mail packages(as many as seven in a day, each from adifferent Post Office) or fly to California.

The Operation Cash Run Task Forcedrew up an “organization chart” of thedrug ring. Robert (and until now,Anthony) Francis bought cocaine fromMexicans in Los Angeles and McAllenand shipped it via couriers—driving spe-cially equipped vehicles with hidden com-partments—to St. Louis. They sold thedrugs to Garrett Parker and Leo Muham-mad in St. Louis, and sent the proceedsthrough the U.S. Mail to 13 CMRAs inLos Angeles.

The Postal Inspection Service’s LosAngeles PMN Team reported that anotherFrancis sibling, Jimmy Pak Francis, and aman named Travis Porter picked up themoney-filled parcels. Inspection ServiceDatabase Information System (ISDBIS)records showed Travis Porter was a suspect

in another drug case under investigationat the Washington Division. Inspectorsthere reported seizing money that hadbeen concealed in videotapes and shippedvia Express Mail to Los Angeles.

Wire taps were needed to break intothe ring’s top echelon for evidence of itsactivities. It was a tight operation, soinformants or undercover officers werenot an option.

The investigation continued into2000, frustrating the team. They drew upaffidavits, only to have Francis changephones. Back at square one, they docu-mented calls from the new numbers toknown dealers, and continued with sur-veillances.

A break came in August from DEAagents at Springfield, Illinois. The agents

22 United States Postal Inspection Service Bulletin

were conducting a wire tap on a localcocaine dealer and discovered he was buy-ing his drugs from Garrett Parker. Taskforce members had already identifiedParker as a likely partner in the Francisring, so Inspectors were able to “spin-off ”the Illinois wire tap and get one onParker. It took less than 30 days to gatherenough probable cause for a Title III wiretap on Francis’ cell phone.

By December, investigators had bar-relled through four Title III wire taps tokeep up with Francis’ phones. But thetask force finally had the upper hand.

The wire taps revealed that Anthonyand Robert Francis were the ringleaders ofthe operation, buying cocaine fromFreddy Burgueno in Los Angeles. MalarieMacon, Tiffany Barry, and JohnnieMacon were couriers, driving cars withelectronically controlled, hidden compart-ments for the drugs. Each car carried from8 to 10 kilograms of cocaine, which theFrancis brothers bought from Burguenofor $15,000 a kilo. They sold it to GarrettParker in Illinois and Leo Muhammad inSt. Louis for $21,000 a kilo. Any moneynot sent through the mail was carriedback to Los Angeles in a suitcase by Timo-thy Doyle.

Investigators “stole” another car fromRobert Francis and installed another GPStracker in it. Not long after, Kansas StateHighwayTrooper KyleMoomaustopped courierJohnny Macondriving the caron a simpletraffic violation.The trooperarrested Maconafter finding 9kilograms ofcocaine in ahidden compartment behindthe rear seat. Still later, taskforce members seized morecocaine from ring membersthey had traced to Arizona.

Searching and ArrestingArmed with wire-tap transcripts,

cocaine seizures, and IDs of the majorplayers, task forcemembers were readyto shut down theFrancis ring.

On December11, 2000, PostalInspectors from LosAngeles and St.Louis, DEA agents,and local policeinvestigators simulta-neously executed 23search warrants inLos Angeles, St.Louis, and Alton,Illinois. They issued arrest warrants forthe three Francis brothers, Freddy Bur-gueno, Garrett Parker, Leo Muhammad,Travis Porter, Timothy Doyle, TiffanyBarry, Johnnie Macon, and MalarieMacon.

At the home of Robert Francis’ par-ents in Los Angeles, Inspectors seized$30,000 in cash from a safe. At RobertFrancis’ house they seized a Colt AR-15with a 90-round magazine. At anotherone of his homes in St. Louis, they took a1988 Oldsmobile Cutlass with a hiddencompartment that held $40,000 in anExpress Mail envelope. They later confis-

cated $30,000 in cash fromthe St. Louis residence ofLeo Muhammad, as well asguns, jewelry, more cash,and more cocaine.

Task force membersarrested Anthony Francis,out on bail despite his mur-der charge, in January 2001

at the St. Louis airport. Robert remaineda fugitive until March, when U.S. DeputyMarshals Tony Nelson and Tim Hamilton

tracked him to ahotel in O’Fallon,Illinois. Roberthad a false ID,seven cell phones,and five pagers.In a hidden com-partment behindthe rear seat of hiscar was a .45-cal-iber semiauto-matic handgunand $24,000 incash.

The Less-Than-Legal LawyerThe suspects ranged from low-level

couriers to the major importers of thecocaine. Eight pled guilty, while couriersTimothy Doyle, Tiffany Barry, MalarieMacon, and Johnny Macon agreed to tes-tify for the government. The remainingsuspects, Robert Francis, Anthony Fran-cis, Jimmy Francis, Leo Muhammad, WilEllis (a mid-level dealer), Tommy Macon(a courier), and Germaine Davis (a facili-tator) went to trial.

Robert Francis retained Los Angelesattorney David Dudley, a Harvard-edu-cated criminal defense lawyer specializingin drug cases. Dudley bragged to AUSAJohn Ware and Inspector Simpson aboutsome of his clients, including Hollywoodmovie stars, rap singers, and members of aColombian drug cartel.

The trial was set for February 11,2002. On February 1, AUSA Ware andInspector Simpson interviewed MalarieMacon, a drug courier and major witnessfor the government. Macon surprisedthem by first asking if David Dudley wasan attorney on the case. Then shelaunched into a story of sex and cocaine.

Macon claimed she’d had a sex-for-money relationship with Dudley since1995, when he was in St. Louis. Dudleywould page her to to his hotel room forsex and pay her $300 for the night. Shesaw him snort cocaine at least twice. Theirlast hook-up was on Superbowl Sunday inJanuary 2002, when Dudley paid her

The task force seized $30,000 in asafe in Anthony Francis’ residence.

An Express Mail package with $40,000was found in an electronically controlledhidden compartment behind the rear seatof a 1988 Cutless seized from RobertFrancis.

Weapons seized during the investigation.

October 2003 23

$500 and bragged about a major drugtrial he was handling. Macon thoughtthen he was involved in the Francis case.

AUSA John Ware informed Dudleyof Mason’s allegations. The attorneydenied all of it, causing Inspector Simp-son and DEA Special Agent Ken Williamsto initiate an investigation a week beforetrial. They verified much of Macon’s story.

At a hearing in February before Hon-orable Judge Catherine Perry, DareylOliver (Malarie Macon’s pimp), a cabdriver, a waitress, hotel video surveillancetapes, hotel receipts, and answering-machine tapes of Dudley’s incriminatingcalls were presented.

Dudley took the stand in his owndefense, admitting he had sex withMacon, but claiming he didn’t pay for it.He denied using cocaine. Judge Perrydeliberated for one day, and then declaredthat Dudley had lied to her about payingfor sex with Macon, and had probablylied about using cocaine. She kicked Dud-ley off the case and out of her courtroom.

The Evidence Was in the MailThe trial was reset for May 1. There

were seven defendants, seven lawyers, andthree AUSAs—Tom Albus and TiffanyBecker were assigned to assist John Ware.The government had more than 300 trialexhibits and more than 70 witnesses, 35of whom were from out of town.

The government introduced as evi-dence 240 Express Mail labels, 33 PostOffice surveillance photos showing RobertFrancis mailing packages, covert surveil-lance photos of Robert Francis meetingwith his couriers, and photos of JimmyFrancis and Travis Porter picking up mailedpackages. It also presented more than 50wire-tap calls, more than 40 kilograms ofseized cocaine, and eight seized guns. Thedefense offered no exhibits and no wit-nesses. The case went to the jury on May21. Problems arose almost immediately.

The jurors submitted a note to thejudge. They wanted to know how to dealwith a juror who claimed her faith pre-vented her from sending people to prison.A second note claimed the jurors wereunable to get along.

As days went by, tensions increased.

Screams were heard from the jury room.They were sent back several times to resumedeliberations. It became evident that a sin-gle juror was the source of the problem.

Nonetheless, on May 24, the juryconvicted Robert Francis and Leo Muham-mad. They acquitted Jimmy Francis, WilEllis, and Tommy Macon, and announceda hung verdict on Germaine Davis andAnthony Francis. The jury was instructedto return on May 28, after the MemorialDay holiday, to resume deliberations.

That weekend, Special Agent KenWilliams, court security officers, andanother juror reported seeing juror num-ber 2 meeting with Jimmy Francis andGermaine Davis near the courthouse. Thejuror hugged and kissed the defendants,carried on an animated conversation, andwalked off with them.

On May 28, a hearing was held onthe actions of juror number 2. The jurordenied the allegations of misconduct, butJudge Perry dismissed the juror. She askedthe remaining 11 jurors to deliberate onDavis and Anthony Francis.

They convicted Germaine Davis, butwere again unable to reach a verdict onAnthony. His retrial was held in August2002. One week later, the jury returned aguilty verdict against him.

Hard Work Pays OffAll of the major players were con-

victed. Robert Francis received a sentenceof life in prison, Leo Muhammad was sen-tenced to 30 years in prison, Anthony

Francis received a sentence of 35 years inprison, Garrett Parker was sentenced to 17years’ imprisonment, and Freddy Burguenowas sentenced to seven years in prison.

Operation Cash Run required thefull expertise and resolve of the St. LouisPMN Team—Team Leader Marian Postand Inspectors Dennis Simpson, BryanWitt, Steve Dowd, James Ball, and JillGregg, and the Los Angeles PMNTeam—Team Leader Tom Dugan andInspectors Kim Gordon, Mark Mancuso,Vickie Martin, Jane DeFillippo, and DaveFocht, as well as Los Angeles PoliceDetectives Gary Milligan and DavidJones. The U.S. Postal Inspection Serviceextends its thanks to DEA Special AgentKen Williams for his invaluable knowl-edge of wire taps and surveillances, AUSAJohn Ware for his expert guidance,AUSAs Tiffany Becker and Tom Albus fortheir unflagging energy, and St. LouisPolice Detectives Tom Lewellyn and RickKoenemann for their contributions as sea-soned narcotic detectives.

Postal Inspectors Dennis Simpson,Tom Dugan, and Kim Gordon, DEAAgent Ken Williams, and St. Louis PoliceDetectives Tom Lewellyn and Rick Koen-emann received Distinguished ServiceAwards from the U.S. Attorney’s Office ofthe Eastern District of Missouri, and Mer-itorious Achievement Awards from theWest Central Region Organized CrimeDrug Enforcement Task Force, for theircontributions to the success of OperationCash Run.

Operation Cash Run: (left to right) AUSA Tiffany Becker, Detective Rick Koenemann, St. Louis PoliceDepartment, Inspector Dennis Simpson, Detective Tom Lewellyn, St. Louis Police Department, AUSA JohnWare. Missing from photo: DEA Special Agent Ken Williams, Inspectors Tom Dugan and Kim Gordon, andAUSA Tom Albus.