oshin vartanian and marcos nadaloshin vartanian and marcos nadal recently, leder and colleagues...

CHAPTER TwENTY ONE

A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO A MODEL

OF AESTHETIC ExPERIENCE

OSHIN VARTANIAN AND MARcos NADAL

Recently, Leder and colleagues (2004) introduced an information-processingmodel to account for aesthetic experience. This model breaks the computationof the aesthetic response into five stages, associating each stage with a particularprocess of interest. In this paper we review results from recent neuroimagingstudies of visual aesthetics to determine the extent to which they support thismodel. In addition, we derive specific hypotheses from the model that remain tobe tested at a biological level. We argue that because all the cognitive andemotional processes that comprise the model are instantiated in the brain, oneshould in principle be able to test this model using biological methods. Weconclude that the model is a promising framework within which to conduct suchwork on aesthetics.

There is now general agreement that the aesthetic experience is the outcomeofa complex interplay ofcognitive and affective processes. Recently, Leder andcolleagues introduced an information-processing model to account for theinteraction of various component processes in the computation of aestheticexperience (Leder el al., 2004, 2005). Their model of aesthetic experience wasdescribed at the psychological level, and unlike other models (e.g., Chatterjee,2003) was not designed to account for the biological underpinnings of aestheticexperience per se. Nevertheless, the model of aesthetic experience has certaincharacteristics that make it amenable to neuroscientific investigation. First, itbreaks the computation of the aesthetic response into various stages, associatingeach stage with a particular process of interest. Because neuroscientists havestudied those processes in contexts other than aesthetics, rudimentary corticalmaps of their neural correlates have begun to emerge. This feature allows one totest hypotheses about whether any particular process of interest iSOlated withinthis model will map onto plausible cortical structures. Second, and critically,there are built-in temporal constraints in the structure of the model. In otherwords, information flows in specified ways through the system, and this orderly

430 Chapter Twenty OneA Biological Approach to a Model of Aesthetic Experience 431

flow has certain temporal characteristics associated with it. This feature allowsone to test the temporal dynamics of information flow using time-course andfunctional connectivity analyses.

The aim of this chapter is a~ follow.s. First, we will review some of the keyfeatures of the mo~el of aesthetIc expenence that are particularly relevant to ourarguments. We wIll not present a detailed account of the model as these existelsewhere ,(Leder el al., 2004, 2005). Second, we will compare this model toChatterjee s (2003) model of visual aesthetics, developed specifically to addressthe neur~phys.IOIogy of aesthetic experience. Third, we will review some workon the biOlogIcal bases of the aesthetic experience that speak to some of thepredlcllons and hypotheses derived from the model of aesthetic experience.Essenllally, we beheve that biOlogical approaches have the potential to informus about the vahdlty of thIS model, and that predictions derived from the modelcan 10 tum be tested at a biological level. Although in this paper we will focuson neuroimaging studies only, the arguments are also relevant toneuropsychological approaches involving patient populations (e.g., Chatterjee,2004). Fmally, we wIll assess the current status of the model of aestheticexperience based on the available biological data, and will outline specifichypotheses that can be used to test the so-called joints in the system.

A Model of Aesthetic Experience

Here we pre~ent a stripped down version of Leder el al. 's (2004, 2005)model of aesthettc expenence. The model of aesthetic experience is comprisedof five mformatlOn-processmg stages that are connected in sequence, as well asthrough. several feedback loops (see Fig. 21-1). Information flow isunldrrectiOnal lo some parts of the model and bidirectional in others such thatcertain phases involve bottom-up as well as top-<lown processing. fu addition,there IS an affecllve evaluation stream (Continuous Affective Evaluation) thatnms p",:"lIel to thIS sequenllal stream and receives its output. The input into thesystem IS the artwork Itself, which for the purpose of this paper will be limitedto vls~~l1 s~lmuh, speCifically paintings. Then, at each stage, a particularoperation. .IS perf~nned on the artwork, therefore extracting variouscharaclensllcs from It. The ftrst stage involves perceptual analyses. At this stagefeatures such as compleXJty or symmetry are distilled. For example, there ismU~h research. demonstrating that people prefer more 10 less symmetricaldeSIgn. Accordmg to the model of aesthetic experience, this information isprocessed rather early in the stream. This stage is not under the influence of topdown processes and IS sllmulus driven. The second stage involves implicitmemory IUtegratton, where the perceptual information is related to pastexpenence. For example, we know that people prefer colors that are more

prototypical (Martindale & Moore, 1988). However, we also know that what isdeemed prototypical depends in part on personal expenence. Essenllally, at thISstage people compare what they see to what they know, and this affects theirresponses to it. This stage is presumed to be under the indirect influence oftopdown processes. The third stage mvolves exphClt clasSIficatiOn, and this ISwhere expertise comes into play. At this point, the person analyzes contentinformation, and also explicit information about the style of the artwork. Thereis much evidence demonstrating that expertise affects the way in which artworksare processed (Hekkert & van Wieringen, 1990), and this is one of the stageswhere the difference between experts and novices would be apparent.

In some ways the fmal two stages of the model are the most interesting notonly because they tap higher-level cognition, but also because. they probablyexert the most influence on aesthetic experience. The penultunate stage 15

referred to as cognitive mastering, the moment at which interpretation ormeaning is imposed on the artwork. Thus, having already distilled its perceptualproperties and placed it within self-referential (implicit memory integrallon) andexplicit (explicit classification) contexts, we make sense of what It IS that wesee. Of course, what one observes is also influenced by experllse 10 the VIsualarts so that different cues become more or less important in giving meaning tothe'artwork (parsons, 1987). In the final stage referred to as evaluation weappraise the meaning or interpretation that was placed on the. artwork durmgmastering. This evaluative stage generates two outputs: aesthetIc judgment andaesthetic emotion, which are the endpoints of the aesthellc expenence. Ifcognitive mastering is successful and the subject has successfully mterpreted theartwork it will be evaluated as either a good or a poor work of art. Thoseaestheti~ judgments will be accompanied by po~itive and negative aestheticemotions respectively. On the other hand, If cogmtlve mastenng IS unsuccessful,the artwork will likely be evaluated as a poor work of art, accompanIed by

negative aesthetic emotion. . .In summary, the model of aesthetic experience has fiv~ cognitive stages that

are interwoven by an affective component, although the lOfluence of affect onthe computational process. varies along the stream. The model of aesthetIcexperience presents a hypothetical route for the generatIon of the two mostcommon dependent variables in aesthetic research: AesthetIC judgment andaesthetic emotion. Aesthetic emotion can be seen as the fmal affectIvebyproduct of successfuJ mastering, whereas aesthetic judgment can tap eItherthe cognitive outcome of the mastering stage (i.e., quahty), or Its affecllve

consequences.

432 Chapter Twenty One

A Biological Approach to a Model of Aesthetic Experience 433

Theoretical Links to Other Models

Chattetjee's (2003) model of visual aesthetics represents a recentneuroscientific framework for investigating aesthetic experience. Chatterjee(2003) has suggested that aesthetic experiences related to visual ohjects involvethree visual processing stages common to the perception of any visual stimulus,as well as an emotional response, a decision, and the modulating effect ofattention. In the frrst stage early visual processes hreak the stimulus down intosimple components, such as color, shape, and so on, which are extracted andanalyzed in different brain areas. The second stage, intennediate vision, includesa series of operations that segregate some elements and group others, formingcoherent representations. In late visual stages, included under therepresentational domain in this model, certain regions of the ohject are selectedfor further scrutiny. At this moment, memories are activated, and ohjects arerecognized and associated with meanings. This visual analysis leads to emotionsassociated with. the aesthetic experience, and it grounds decisions about thestimulus. However, this is not a strictly linear model. In fact, it posits animportant feedback flow of information via attentional processes, from highervisual and emotional levels towards early visual processing.

A comparison of the models proposed hy Leder and colleagues (2004) andChattetjee (2003) reveals similarities and differences. Both models acknowledgethe importance of early and late visual processes in the generation of anemotional response and the elaboration of a decision. They also take intoconsideration the influence of complexity, order, grouping, and many othervariables familiar to experimental aestheticians, as well as the interactionbetween affective and cognitive processes such as the activation of memoriesand the search for meaning. Additionally, hoth models suggest two differentoutputs: an emotional response or aesthetic emotion versus a decision oraesthetic judgment. However, at a more specific level, these models haveemphasized different aspects of aesthetic experience. Chattetjee's (2003) modeldeals extensively with perceptual processes, hut makes little mention of highercognitive processes, such as interpretation or classification. In contrast, Lederand colleagues (2004) suhsumed all perceptual processes in a single stage anddid not explicitly consider a function for attention, instead specifying highercognitive processes in detail, and awarding them a central role in the aestheticexperience. Fig. 21-1 shows a comhined representation of both models,illustrating their similarities and differences.

There could be several reasons behind the differences between Chattetjee'sand Leder and colleagues' models. First, Chattetjee's (2003) ohjective was tocreate a framework for neuroaesthetics that was fumly based on frodings fromvisual neuroscience. In his mode~ the processes involved in visual ohject recognition

Elllliualioll

,


constitute the starting point for visual aesthetics, so it is not surprising that theyfigure so prominently in his modeL This is also the reason why attention is.awarded a central role: It is known to exert top--down modulation of earlyvisual processing. On the other hand, Leder and colleagues (2004) aimed topresent an information-processing model of the stages involved in the aestheticprocessing of visual artistic stimuli. In this sense, the starting point of the modelwas their analysis of modern art (Leder ef al., 2004, p. 491). They believe thatunderstanding plays a critical role in the aesthetic experience of modern art, inthe sense that comprehending an artwork alters the way in which it isexperienced,

However, there is also a deeper difference between the two models, and itrefers to the way in which they conceive of the aesthetic experience itself,Chatterjee (2003) believes the notion of disinterested interest adequatelycaptures the aesthetic experience such that "the viewer experiences pleasurewithout obvious utilitarian consequences of this pleasure" (Chatterjee, 2003,p.55). From this perspective 'judgments about an aesthetic object might beconsidered outside the core aesthetic experience" (Chatterjee, 2003, p. 56). Infact, the model seems to include a decision phase only as an approach tolaboratory settings, where participants are usually asked to state theirpreferences or make decisions about a certain aspect of the stimulus.Conversely, Leder and colleagues (2004) believe aesthetic experiences arisewhen "exposure to art provides the perceiver with a challenging situation toclassify, understand and cognitively master the artwork successfully" (Leder etaI., 2004, p. 493). This successful mastering of the artwork involves, cspeciallyin relation to modern art, style-related processing, which results from theacquisition of expertise, In this model, the judgment of the aesthetic object is animportant element; in fact, together with aesthetic emotion, it is the main output'of the model. In sum, whereas Chatterjee's (2003) proposal can be considered asa neuroscientific model of aesthetic preference for a broad range of visualobjects, Leder and colleagues' (2004) proposal is an information-processingmodel of aesthetic judgment of visual works of art. Here we chose to focus onthe model of aesthetic experience because we were particularly interested in thehigher-level cognitive and emotional processes that mediate aestheticexperience, and those are treated more thoroughly in the model of aestheticexperience,

Neurophysiology and the Aesthetic Experience

Why is the model of aesthetic experience useful for biological approaches tothe study of aesthetics? There are three reasons. First, the model incorporatescognition and emotion-broadly defined-in the computation of the aesthetic

response, and recently neuroscientists have made significant inroads indissociating the neural pathways belonging to those modes of informationprocessing. What we know from neuroscience can be used to test predictionsfrom the model. Second, at a more micro level, many of the componentprocesses that characterize each of the five stages, namely perceptual (visual)analyses, implicit memory integration, explicit classification, cognitivemastering, and evaluation have been studied extensively by neuroscientists aswell, and at least at a rather gross level we know a little about their neuralcorrelates. This makes it possible to test more specific hypotheses about thedifferential engagement of each of these processes in the computation of theaesthetic response, Finally, the structure of the model of aesthetic experienceplaces temporal constraints on the process. For example, by definition, onecannot engage in cognitive mastering unless one has carried out a perceptualanalysis first. This can be a valuable tool in neuroimaging because one canconduct time-course and functional connectivity analyses to see whether thetime courses of activation corresponding to various structures occur inaccordance with the predictions of the modeL

Next we will review some neuroscientific evidence that can be used toassess the validity of the model. Although we will discuss studies in visualaesthetics specificaIly, we emphasize that biological data collected in studies ofvision, memory, attention, and emotion can shed light on this process as ~ell.

FoIlowing this review, we will highlight specific hypotheses that can be denvedfrom this model and tested empirically to validate the model at a blOlog!cal

level.

Components of the Aesthetic Experience

To date, five neuroimaging studies have appeared that have anc~pted toshed light on the cortical underpinnings of the aesthetic response. Four IOvolvedthe technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging (tMRI), and oneinvolved magnetoencephalography (MEG). Although none of the studIes wasconducted with the specific aim of testing any predIctIon denved from themodel of aesthetic experience, their results nevertheless inform us about theaccuracy of the model. We wiIl next review the key findings of each study, andtheir bearing on the model of aesthetic experience.

Aesthetic Judgment

Jacobsen ef al (2006) asked a fundamental question: What are the specificneural correlates that distinguish aesthetic judgment from other types ofjudgment? The "other" judgment in their study involved judgment of symmetry.



Recall from the description of the model of aesthetic experience that judgmentof symmetry occurs at the first stage involving perceptual analysis, whereasaesthetic judgment follows the fifth stage of the process-evaluation. Becausesubjects were presented with the same kind of stimuli in the symmetry andaesthetic judgment conditions but asked to make different types of judgments,Jacobsen el at. (2006) argued that the contrast between aesthetic and symmetrytrials would reveal the brain areas that are involved in aesthetic judgment, inrelation to symmetry judgment. This contrast revealed activation in severalfrontal, parietal, and temporal structures including the frontomedian cortex, theprecuneus, the temporal pole, and the t~rnporoparietal junction. According to themodel of aesthetic experience, the activation pattern that reflects aestheticjudgment must differ from the pattern that reflects symmetry judgment, andJacobsen el aI's (2006) results confirm this hypothesis. Recall that the activationpattern that was revealed in the contrast of aesthetic versus symmetry judgmentreflects multiple cognitive and affective processes that operate on the artworkfollowing the perceptual analysis at the first stage, until an aesthetic judgment iseventually fonned. These processes include implicit memory integration,explicit classification, cognitive mastering, and evaluation. From the vantagepoint of the model of aesthetic experience. what is interesting about Jacobsen etal.s (2006) resulls is that several of the activated structures have been linked tothe aforementioned component processes. Nevertheless, additional studies inwhich the design allows the comparison of successive stages of informationprocessing are necessary for determining the contribution of each corticalstructure 10 a specific component process.

Affect, Cognition, and Aesthetic Experience

No study to date has investigated differences in the neural correlates ofaesthetic judgment versus aesthetic emotion directly. At a rudimentary level,this would involve presenting subjects with the same stimuli under two differentconditions: In onc condition they would be asked to rate the stimuli on quality,thus tapping the cognitive component of aesthetic judgment exclusively (Lederel al., 2005; Vartanian & Goel, 2004a). In the other condition, they would beasked to rate the same stimuli on pleasure, thus tapping the affective componentof aesthetic emotion exclusively (Leder el al., 2005; Vartanian & Goel, 2004a).However, three fMRl studies to date have tackled facets of aesthetic affect oremotion, and can thus shed light on whether variations in aesthetic emotioncorrespond to variations in cortical and subcortical activation.

Vartanian and Goel (2oo4b) sought to determine whether aestheticpreference toward works of art is characterized by a "disinterested" or cognitivestance as presumed by some, or whether is it underwritten by an emotional

response toward properties of artworks. They hypothesized that if aestheticpreference were mediated by emotion, then it should involve brain structuresthat have been implicated in processing emotion. On the other hand, if aestheticpreference were primarily a cognitive process, then it should involve brainstructures that have been implicated in evaluation under emotionally neutralconditions. In the scanner, subjects viewed and rated paintings on aestheticpreference. Preference was defined as the degree of liking for a painling. Theresults demonstrated that activation in several cortical structures that have beenimplicated in processing emotion or reward covaried as a function of preferenceratings, including the visual cortex, the caudate nucleus, and the cingulatesulcus.

What do the results of Vartanian and Goel (2004b) tell us about the model ofaesthetic experience? Recall that the affective evaluation stream runs parallel tothe information-processing stream, and it receives continuous input from it. Thismeans that a subject interacting with a work of art can provide a preferencerating for that artwork at any given point along the information-processingsequence, and need not have processed the artwork up to a particular stage in thesequence before a rating can be generated. Therefore, one possibility is that theresults of Vartanian and Goel (2oo4b) shed light on the cortical and subcorticalstructures that mediate Continuous Affcctive Evaluation, and indicate the areasthal one should expect to see activated whenever subjects are asked to indicatetheir liking for given artworks. Another possibility is that the ratings offered bythe subjects in this study reflect aesthetic emotion, which can only occurfollowing the evaluation stage. An additional sludy in which ratings arecollected at specific time points can address this issue.

Kawabata and Zeki (2004) presented their subjects with paintings that theyhad rated as beautiful or ugly prior to viewing, and rated them again in thescanner. It is important to note that although beauty has affective and cognitivecomponents, it draws more heavily from the latter than from the. fonnercomponent (Leder el al., 2005). In contrast, preference also has affective andcognitive components, but it draws more heavily from the fonner than fr~~ t~elatter component (Leder el al., 2005). Their results demonstrated that acllvtly mthe orbital frontal cortex was greater for stimuli classified as beautiful, and theauthors argued that this activation in the orbital frontal cortex was due to thereward value of beautiful paintings.

In the third fMRl study on this topic, Skov el al., (2005) presented theirsubjects not with paintings, but with stimuli from the Inte~ation.al AffectivePicture System. The lntemational Affective Picture System IS an lDventory ofpictures that have been categorized as emotionally positive, ~egative, or neutral.Subjects were asked to view and rate each stimulus as beautiful, u~ly, or neu~alin the scanner. Compared to ugly pictures, beautiful pictures activated a Wide



network of areas including the occipital, parietal, and frontal lobes. However,when subjects rated pictures as beautiful despite the fact that they wereemotionally negative (e.g., finding a scene that exhibits death or injurybeautiful), there was activation in a somewhat different network than before,again including the occipital, temporal, and the frontal lobes, but in particularbilateral orbital frontal corlex.

What do the results of Kawabata and Zeki (2004) and Skov ef al. (2005) tellus about the model of aesthetic experience? Despite methodological differences,these studies share a critical feature: Both studies attempted to isoJate thosecortical structures that were activated relatively more by stimuli evaluated asbeautiful. According to the model of aesthetic experience, evaluations of beautytap aesthetic judgment. Thus, its computation can only occur followingprocessing along all five stages of the model, culminated by evaluation. In otherwords, activation in the orbital frontal cortex is likely not in relation toContinuous Affective Evaluation. Rather, it is more likely that certain affectiveproperlies of beauty are computed in the orbital frontal corlex. Activation in theorbital frontal corlex has in turn been linked to a wide array of processes, but inparticular to complex reward, hedonic, and emotion interactions (Kringelbach,2005; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004).

Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), Cela-Conde ef al. (2004) recordedbrain activity while subjects judged the beauty of a series of stimuli. Thegreatest difference between MEG and fMRI has to do with temporal and spatialresolution. Whereas MEG has a low spatial resolution compared with fMRI, itstemporal resolution is significantly greater. In addition to locating brain activityin space, this technique affords information about its temporal course. In CelaConde and colleagues' (2004) study, brain activity during the first second afterstimulus onset was broken down into two phases, early latencies (100--400 ms)and late latencies (400-1000 ms). The results demonstrated that during latelatencies activii)' in the left dorsolateral prefrontal corlex (DLPFC) wassignificantly greater when participants judged stimuli as beautiful as comparedto the non-beautiful condition.

Previous studies can help us clarify the relation between these results and themodel of aesthetic experience. The literature suggests that the dorsolateralprefrontal corlex is involved in the process of decision-making based onperceptual (Heekereo ef al., 2004) and/or affective (Davidson & Irwin, 1999;Herrington ef al., 2005) information. Krawczyk (2002) provided an integrativeview of the role of this area: "The left DLPFC may playa privileged role indecision making that is better constrained, has fewer options, and which mayhave preexisting reward characteristics that make for a more confmed set ofrules for deciding" (Krawczyk, 2002, p.66I). Thus, dorsolateral prefrontalcortex activity seems to be related to conscious deliberation about different

options, influenced by emotional information from orbital frontal corlex andcertain limbic areas (Wallis and Miller, 2003).

The fact that activity in early latencies was unrelated with beauty ratings,coupled with results from previous studies, suggest that Cela-Conde andcolleagues' (2004) results reflect the neural correlates of the last two cognitivestages posited in the model of aesthetic experience. Itis during these stages thatthe success of cognitive mastering in producing satIsfactory understanding ISmonitored. Also, it is suggested that the subjective experience of success orfailure in understanding can initialize top-down information processing. In fact,monitoring other cognitive processes, as well as initiating top-down processes,has often been associated with dorsolateral prefrontal corlex activity. The taskthat Cela-Conde and colleagues' (2004) participants were asked to perform wasa quick judgment of the image. Images were presented for only 3 seconds, .andmost of the participants' response times were below 2s. Therefore, we behevethat it is plausible that as Leder and colleagues (2004, p. 503) anticipated, theirjudgments may have relied heavily on affect-based heuristics. Theseconsiderations reinforce the idea that the left dorsolateral prefrontal corlexmight be involved in a number of processes, including the evaluation phase, theinitiation of the feedback loops posited by the model of aesthetIc expenence,and the interaction between cognitive and affective states.

Summary

Vartanian and Goel (2004b), Kawabata and Zeki (2004), Skov ef at. (2005)and Cela-Conde ef al. (2004) were interested in determining the neuralcorrelates of preference and beauty, two variables that have affective andcognitive components. The areas activated by Vartanian and Goel (2004b) mayhave highlighted those cOrlical structures that mediate Contmuous AffecllveEvaluation, or those associated with aesthetic emotion. As expected, theyinclude the visual corlex, the caudate nucleus, and the cingulate sulcus. Theseareas have been shown to be activated by emotions, and in particular by sahentstimuli about which one can form an affective impression rather automatically,such as faces or pictures from the International Affective Picture System. Incontrast, the studies by Kawabata and Zeki (2004) and Skov ef al. (2005)attempted to isolate those cortical structures that are actIvated more when astimulus is evaluated as beautiful. Presumably, both studies tap aspects ofaesthetic judgments. According to the model of aesthetic experience? beauty basaffective and cognitive components and it results from an evaluallon that canonly occur following processing along all five stages of the model. The resultsindicate that evaluating a stimulus as beautiful was asSOCIated WIth mcreasedactivation in the orbital frontal cortex. Activation in the orbital frontal cortex has

440 Chapter Twenty OneA Biological Approach to a Model ofAesthetic Experience 441

in turn been linked to a wide array of processes, but in particular tn complexhedonic and reward-emotion interactions (Kringelbach, 2005; Kringelbach &Rolls, 2004). Finally, Cela-Conde et aI's (2004) results seem to reflect cognitiveprocesses included in later stages of the model ofaesthetic experience, includingcognllIve mastering and evaluation. Activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortexhas often been associated with monitoring and initiating top--<lown infonnationflow, as well as with decision-making. However, we suggest that in thisparticular instance these cognitive processes were also influenced by affectiveinformation received from orbital frontal cortex or subcortical structures.

Testing the model of aesthetic experience at a biological level

It goes without saying that the validity of the model of aesthetic experienceas an accurate explanatory framework for aesthetic experience must bedetennioed at the behavioral level flfSt. However, we believe that because 0/1the processes that comprise this model, including perceptual analysis, implicitmemory integration, explicit classification, cognitive mastering, and evaluationare instantiated in the brain, one can also ascertain the extent to whichhypotheses derived from the model can be validated at a biological level. Wehave already discussed the extent to which results from a number of tMRl andMEG studies fit general predictions from the model of aesthetic experience.However, none ·of those studies was designed to test predictions derived fromthe model of aesthetic experience. We believe that five issues in particular canbe tested effectively at a biological level, and that those results Can be used toassess the validity of the model.

First, Leder el 01. (2004) argued that the context in which an object is viewedaffects the way in which it is processed. For the predictions of the model ofaesthetic experience to hold, the input into the system must be designated as anartwork. Essentially, this is based on the argument that the cognitive andemotional processes that are brought to bear when processing an object as anartwork will differ from the processes that will be involved when the sameobject is not processed as an artwork. It is possible to test this hypothesis at abiological level, and to determine whether performing identical tasks on a set ofstimuli will activate different cortical structures depending on whether they aredeSIgnated as artworks or not. This could help determine whether a criticalassumption of the model holds true at a biological level.. Second, the model of aesthetic experience does not include top-downinfluences on perceptual analyses. However, several studies, such as Kaestnerand Ungerleider's (2000) or Poghosyan and colleagues' (2005) have shown thatattentton modulates the processing of relevant visual stimuli by enhancingneuronal responses at different levels of visual processing in the brain. Attention

seems to modulate neural responses to certain locations of the visual field,whole visual objects. or specific visual features, such as color or shape.Although it has been noted that these modulatory effects are stronger inextrastriate visual areas, it seems that different features of selective attention canalso affect activity in striate cortex. Furthennore, it has also been shown that theemotional valence of images can modulate activity in visual areas (Lang el 01.,1998; Schulman el 01., 1997). Hence, if future neuroimaging studies of aestheticappreciation include strategies to control affective and attentional processes,they might be able to detennine whether these processes exert top--<lowninfluences on early perceptual analyses.

Third it is well established that expertise plays an important role in the wayartworks' are processed. Numerous studies have demonstrated systematicdifferences in the ways experts and novices view artworks (Bekkert & vanWieringen, 1990; Nodine el 01., 1993). This hypothesis can be tested at abiological level. According to the model ofaesthettcexpenen.ce, differences dueto expertise become evident in the third stage. (ex!'"clt classificatton) when theperson analyzes content information and expliCit mformatton about the style ofthe artwork. This process should draw on categonzatlon and memory, anddifferent activation patterns should characterize those processes in experts andnovices.

Fourth, a critical topic in the early days of aesthetic research involved theaesthetic threshold, although interest in this topic has subSIded over the years(Jacobsen, 2006). Rather than calculating the aesthetic threshold, researchers areusing presentation thresholds that are appropriate for thelT particular Issues ofinterest (e.g., Leder el 01., 2006). By reliance on a combination of be?aviouraland neuroimaging techniques (especially MEG), the temporal dynanucs. of theaesthetic experience, as well as the engagement and disengage~ent of differentstages (processes), can be investigated.. For ex~mple, what IS the mmlJ~alamount of time necessary for explICIt classIlkatton, and does explIcitclassification in fact require more time than implicit memory ~t.egratlO~, as ~emodel suggests? Are implicit memory integration and expllclt clas~Ilicatlonassociated with different' patterns of cortical actIvation and lInked tocharacteristic time courses?

Fifth what is the relationship between the two major outputs of the system,namely ;"'sthetic judgment and aesth~tic emotion? This is a p~oblem that hashaunted philosophers and psychologISts at least smce the 18 cenDlfy. ThIsrequires a design in which subjects are instructed to process art stlfOuII .that canbe evaluated successfully under two different conditIOns: In one condltton th~ywill rate them on quality, broadly speaking, and in the other conditton they WIllrate them on a measure of liking, broadly speaking. If the model of aesthetIc


experience is correct, the neural correlates of these two outputs must bedifferent.

Conclusion

Th~re exist. several models in experimental aesthetics that deal with theaestheltc expenence along narrow levels of analysis. In contrast the model ofaesthetic expe~ence provides a general framework for aesthetic' experience atthe psychologIcal le~el, and yet can be tested experimentally using biologicalmethods at a more ffi!cro level (see also Martindale, 2001). We believe that themodel of aestheti~expcrience is a promising model for biological investigationsofaesthetic expenence.

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oshin vartanian and marcos nadaloshin vartanian and marcos nadal recently, leder and colleagues...

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