I

MANAGEMEhT SCIMCEV d . 24 No. 2, Febmuy I982

?rwd ia U.S.A.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS:DETERMINANTS OF THEIR PERFORMANCE AND

BEHAVIOR*

GEORGE HUBERtThis paper is conEmral with organizational infomlation systems. Exampla of such systems

include intelligence system& communic.ations system& management infol7Mtion systemsdecision support systems, and administrative control systems. Systems such as these are criticalto UL orgaaixation’s functioning; indeed to its survival.

Tbe paper is intended to be of use to three typed of professionah those who sr+yorganizations; those who h&n information systems; and those who massage. T’bis fact causathe paper to differ in a number of ways from earlier works dealing with organihonalcommuniutioaa And related topics. For example, the paper draws on three different litera-tures: the psychological litmrure dealing with perception and cognition, the soci&psycbologiul litcnturc dealing with tie role of motivation in communications, and theorgaaixatiooal literature dealing witb behavior in information systems. Further. tbe paper givesgreater attention than do earlier works to logistical determhnts of information systemeffectiveness, such as tbe workload of tbc unit procuaing the message or tbe priority assignedto a mesaage, as wntraated with social-psychological determinants. Fiiy, the explicitintroduction of judgment and argument by analogy when direct evidence is unavailable is athird way in which the paper diffm from utlier works.

l-be paper focuses in pallicuhr 00 the de&zminan ts of the performance and behavior ofsystems such as those mentioned above. It discussa in some derail the impact of thesedetcrmhants on four processes that are of key importance ia tbc operation of information+ems. Two of these procesacs arr used to increase system efficiency. One. masage routingcauses any padulu message to be distributed to relatively few o~tionaf unit. and thusgrcdtly reduca tbe informatioo proa&n g load of the auny units that might otherwise beinvolved in receiving or relaying tbe message. The other. musup swfvwrhing. plays a similarrole. It has as its pqose reducing tbe sixc of the message while at the same time faithfullyreproducing its meaning.

The Wmaining Iwo procemes follow from the fact that organizational units necusAlyexercise some discretion in lbe way tlmt they handle messages. M-ge &by ia a wnscqucoaof the priority assignment given a mege, and in many cases enhances tbe effectiveness notonly of the operating unit but of tbt organktion a~ a whole. Murap nmfiificario refers tothe distortion of meauge meaning. Its source may k either the cognitive limitations or tbemotivations of the sender or receiver. Modifications may be conscious or unwnscious,well-intended or malicious.

Each of these four processu is discussed in some depth. More specifically, tbe severaldetermhanu of tbe probability or extensiveness of each process’s occurrence are identified.Tbe lituahue related to tbe various proceaAetermhn tpairingsistbenreviewed,andissummanzd in tbe form of propositions. Several pluu where additional rcaearcbisoeaiedarenoted and recommendations are made concerning what tbe nature of such raarcb should be.(ORGANIZATION DESIGN; INFORMATION SYSTJZMS)

1 . Ill-

This paper is concerned with the performance and behavior of organizationalinformation systems, (e.g. intelligence systems, communication systems, managementinformation systems, decision support systems, and administrative control systems).

In their traditional and noncomputer-aided forms, such systems are critical to

l Aacpted by kie Y. L&n; received June 2.1980. Tbis paper has been with the autbor 6 mootbs for I

=?ELty of wiiti-Muiison.

138

ORG

organizational functioningexternal environments, theorganizational units that “implementation-related irunits, and they transmit tt& monitoring and s&rperformance and behavio-ing that a number of orgainformation processing -Nadler, [76]; O’Reilly anof our knowledge cancerorganizational informatiorganizational informatic

Although the conceptit is to design or manageimportant to the thcoriwhose profession it is tcstanding organizationalconringency rheory (Chikof environmentally-relatmental uncertainty, a borganization’s current[79); Campbell and Priand valences or utilitiroutcome and payoffs abe affected by the n;components in theoriesof power, the availabdecisions. These variaimportant to the field.organizational conflict

In view of these maof information is impctional behavior, but tcthat the treatment of ior design of organktGaIbraith, [31]; Tush1this may be especial&Jemiscm, [4OD.

Givenallofth.&itliterature dealing witsystems, and in this vthe world of practicescience. This paper r

The paper differsuxnmunications (cf.[I6]; Redding, [63]:O’ReilIy and Pondy.logical literature dea

‘RadmiBcaacaiinwiabtorcfertotbetic

YSTEMS:0’“E AND

~mp1c.s of such systemsinformation system.%

1ch as Lhsc are critical

ld.3: thOSC Who JtlU+oqe. This fact causang with organwioMln three different litcra-cognition, the social-

nmunications, and theFurther, the paper givesof information systemor the priority assigned

3. Finally, the explicit.cncc is unavailable is a

mance and behavior of3il the impact of thepclaticm of information:y. One message routingliuticmal units, and thus *chat might othwise bevnwihg, plays a simihrthe same time faithfully

ational units necuwiiyse is a cmscqucncenc , effativenesa notage wuxiij?cation refers tognitive iimitations or themsciocs or unconscioug

: qxtcifically. the severaloccurrence are idcntifiai.is thc3 rwicwcd, and is

nal rcs%arch is needed are,I such .zscarch should be.

ehatior of or-tionaltion systems, management;trativc control systems).:h systems are critical to

50 with rhe aurhor 6 months for I

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSEMS 139

organizational functioning; they monitor and scan the organization’s internal andexternal environments, they transmit the resulting observations and interpretations toorganizational units that “decide” if actions are called for, they relay the decisions andimplementation-related information from these deciding units to the implementingunits, and they transmit the progress and results of these impiem+ations as part ofthe monitoring and scanning activities mentioned earlier. Indeed, organizationalperformance and behavior are so closely linked to organizational information prming that a number of organizational scientists have advocated viewing organizations asinformation processing systems (cf., Simon, (70); Galbraith, [31]; Tushman andNadler, (761; O’Reilly and Pondy, [58].’ These thoughts suggest that a summa&ationof our knowledge concerning the determinants of the performance and behavior oforganizational information systems would be useful, useful to those who designorgani&onal information systems and useful to those who manage such systems.

Although the concept of information is clearly important to those whose professionit is to design or manage information systems, we should note that the concept is alsoimportant to the theories and concepts employed by those management scientistswhose profession it is to develop, test, and refine theories for predicting and under-standing organizational performance and behavior. For example, a major thrust ofconringev theory (Child, [17]; Borsch, [461) concerns the processing and distributionof environmentally-related information. Other aspects of this theory deal with environ-mental uncertainty, a variable frequently viewed as a lack of information about theorganization’s current or future environment. Similarly, expecfuncy theory (Vroom,[79]; Campbell and Pritchard, (14D deals with variables (expectancies or probabilitiesand valences or utilities) that are thought to be affected by information about theoutcome and payoffs associated with certain behaviors. Other variables that seem to ,be affected by the nature or availability of information and that are importantcomponents in theories of organizational performance or behavior are the distributionof power, the availability of organizational slack, and the nature and quality ofdecisions. Th&e variables in turn have a considerable impact on other variablesimportant t6 the fields of organization theory and organizational behavior, such asorganizational conflict and organizational effectiveness.

In view of these many linkages, it is perhaps not surprising to fmd that the conceptof information is important not only to the fields of orga.n&tion theory and or@-tional behavior, but to that of orgonirpron design as welL Many would argue, in fact,that the treatment of information may be the key issue to be dealt with in the analysisor design of organizations (cf. Thayer, [73]; Wile*, [82]; Miller, [56]; Simon, 1701;Galbraith, 1311; Tushman and Nadkr, [76]; O’ReiIly and Pondy, (58D. It m thatthis may be qccially true when designing boundary spanning units (Tushman, [74]; -Jemiso~ [4OD.

Given all of this, it seem reasonable and important to examine and summariz thelitem~~~ dealing with the performance and -behavior of organizational informationsystems, and in this way enable management scientists to operate more confidently inthe worid of practice and to claim a fuller understanding of their field in the world ofscience. This paper reports the results of having attempted these efforts.

The paper differs in three ways from earlier works dealing with organizationcommunications (cf. Guetzkow, (351; Thaycr [73]; Voos, [78]; Ferencc, [28]; Carter,[ 16); Redding, [63]; Farace and McDonald, 127; Porter and Roberts, [613; andO’Reilly and Pondy, (58D. Fit, it draws upon three separate literatures--the psycho-logical literature dealing with perception and cognition, the social-psychologid litera-’

‘Readers intetwtal in a ntorc detailed analysis of the role of information systems in oqddoar mywish IO refer to the articla by Milk 1561 and Hubez (38).

140 GEORGE HUBER

ture dealing with the role of motivation in communications; and the organizationalliterature dealing with behavior in information systems.

Second, it gives somewhat greater attention than do earlier works to logisticaldeterminants of information system effectiveness, such as the workload of the unitprocessing a message or the priority assigned to a message, as contrasted withsocial-psychological determinants. This feature does not, of course, limit the scope ofthe manuscript to the formal information systems of bureaucratic organixations, asmessages transmitted within informal or ad hoc networks are also affected by theworkload of the people involved and by the processing priorities that these peopleassign to the various items of information that they encounter. Obviously bothlogistical and so&i-psychological variables affect both formal and informal informa-tion systems. In view of this, it seemed important to highlight the importance oflogistical variables, since the earlier works cited above had focused heavily onsocial-psychological variables.

The explicit introduction of judgment and argument by analogy when directempirical evidence is unavailable is the third way in which the paper differs fromearlier works, although the difference is more one of degree than of kind. Theusefulness of drawing on reasoning by analogy when attempting to identify relation-ships among variables in organizational information systems is made clear in Miller’sportrayal of the organization as a living system (Miller, [56D. In this classic work,Miller argues and demonstrates that the relationships among variables, that hold trueat one level of organizational analysis generally also hold true at other levels. Forexample, the effects of stress on the information processing effectiveness, of anorganizational unit are essentially the same whether the unit is a person, an ad hocgroup, or an established organ&tion (cf. Miller, [54], [55]; Meier, [52]; Driver andStreufert, [25D. As will be seen, the literature review leading to the present manuscriptidentified additional support for this position, and identified no evidence to thecontrary. As a consequence, the summarizing statements put forth on the followingpages are not qualified so as to pertain to only the levels of analysis (or organizitionallevels) for which empirical evidence is presently available. For example, in thesestatements the word “unit” is intended to be broadly defined, and subject to beinginterpreted as an individual, an ad hoc committee, or a formal work group, even acorporate division.

Thus the statements, which are labeled “propositions” are in general not conclusionsbased on empirical studies covering all possible levels of analysis. Rather they arestatements that represent what it seems reasonable to believe, based on the aggregateevidence available. In a few instances, the literature pertaining to the topic was quitesparse. In these instances, I have stated and supported with argument what I believethe literature wilI say when it appears. So that the reader will not be misled, these fewinstances are clearly identif&i2

By highlighting these facts, and by referencing under each proposition the support-ing evidence, I hope to aid those researchers interested in fiUing the voids in ourknowledge about the treatment of information in organizations. In addition, byexplicating with these propositoins what it seems reasonable to believe, based on theevidence at hand, I hope to be helpful to those management scientists who are beingasked to analyxe and “repair” malfunctioning information systems, and even to aid inthe design of such systems.

Let us turn now to a discussion of four processes that affect the availability, form,

‘If the ruder would like to reserve the term “propaitions” for relational rt~tanentn that are wellN~bythCempiriullirmtur+hCorrhC~ych~torrudrhCierrwellNpporcsdrrktionrlstatmmnta u “hyp~tha~,” or “cmjcctwa.” For sume rudera the las well supported rtatenmtr may bethe more intcrutin& as they may identify the mole likely oppommitia for significmt cmpiriul contribu-tions.

0

and meaning of messag-performance and beha.will be used in this antrefers to that which U rin the information the0ty-reducing potential ofwhich information is ccout of the ad hoc orassess, distribute, alter“organizational inform.to a broad scope of actanalyzing a report, a:includes activities thatas those that take plac:

2 . PA

Organizations acqui-the critical functionsrequires the processingother hand, becausecognitive and logisticathe information systemof organizational mess

Two processes thatsystems are messageparticular message tcselective distributionpotential receiving unintermediate units insummarizing plays a 5while at the Same timnumbers are replaceappropriately derivetreduce the cognitive c

Messages vary carattributes. As a conseunits responsible forthe way they handprocessing phenomermessage delay and m

There is no value _delay. Since the priortime it will be delaypart) a deiegated anjudgments about thethat the sources ofcategorized as ex=categories.

Message wwa?ficafeither the cognitive

‘The word klit” is tLpomm;wrr . rr--1 “.--

A; and the organizational

nrlier works to logisticalAl/ &load of the unit

*a’L rs contrasted withcourse, limit the scope oflucratic organizations, asare also affected by the

-iorities that these peoplecounter. Obviously bothal and informal informa-blight the importance ofhad focused heavily on

by analogy when direct;h the paper differs fromagree than of kind. The.pting to identify relation-s is made clear in Miller’s561). In this classic work,.g variables that hold true

true at other levels. For:ssing effectiveness of an2it is a person, an ad hocj; Meier, (521; Driver andto the present manuscripttified no evidence to theput forth on the followinganalvsis (or organizationalle example, in thesenet, and subject to beingormal work group, even a

i in general not conclusionsanaly&~ Rather they are

.ve, based on the aggregatening to the topic was quite:h argument what 1 believeill not be misled, these few

<h preposition the support-In filling the voids in ournizations. In addition, hyAe to believe, based on the:nt scientists who are beingsystems, and even to aid in

tffect the availability, form,

rlational statements that arc wellthe lcs well supported relational

VJeu sqportcd statements may befor sigificant empiricaT uxttribu-

and meaning of messages, and that consequently seem important to understanding theperformance and behavior of orgat&Wional information systems. Three definitionswill be used in this and later discussions. “Information” is used in the lay sense a.mjrefers to that which is received by the senses, such as words and numbers, rather thanin the information theory sense where it would refer to the diagnosticity or uncertain-ty-reducing potential of these words or numbers. “Messages” refer to the vehicles withwhich information is communicated, e.g., letters, reports, or phone calls. The carryingout of the ad hoc or prescribed activities through which organizational membersassess, distribute, alter or use organizationally relevant information is referred to as“organizational information processing.‘* The phrase, as used here, is intended to referto a broad scope of activities. It includes, for example, intrapersonal activities, such asanalyzing a report, as well as interpersonal activities such as conversing. It alsoincludes activities that take place in informal networks, or on an ad hoc basis, as wellas those that take place in formal networks or according to prescribed protocols.

2. processes IntegraI to orga&3tionnl InformatIon systems

Organizations acquire and internally disseminate information in order to carry outthe critical functions of decision making and control. In many cases, this effortrequires the processing of a large number of information conveying messages. On theother hand, because a large number of messages may cause an overload on thecognitive and logistical capabilities of the individuals and work groups participating inthe information system, organizations are forced to seek efficiencies in their processingof organizational messages.

Two processes that organizations use to increase the efficiency of their informationsystems are message routing and message summarizing. Message routing causes anyparticular message to be distributed to relatively few organizational units3 Thisselective distribution greatly reduces the information processing load of the manypotential receiving units having little or no use for the information and of the manyintermediate units involved in summarizing or transmitting the message. Messagesummurizin~ plays a similar role. It has as its purpose reducing the size of the message,while at the same time, faithfully reproducing its meaning. For example, large sets ofnumbers are replaced by their average and multi-page reports are replaced byappropriately derived recommendations or conclusions. Summarization can greatlyreduce the cognitive or logistical load on the units having to process the message.

Messages vary considerably in relevance, length, accuracy, timeliness, and otherattributes. As a consequence of this fact and the need to control their work load, theunits responsible for routing and summarizing necessarily exercise some discretion inthe way they handle messages. Such discretion allows two other information-processing phenomena to occur in parallel with summarizing and routing. These aremessage delay and message modification.

There is no value judgment or negativism implied in the use of the phrase messagede@. Since the priority assignment given a message is a principal determinant of thetime it wilI be delayed, and since making such assignments is necessarily (at least inpart) a delegated and discretionary act, it would often be difficult to make objectivejudgments about the excessiveness of individual delays. This, combined with the factthat the sources of most delays are the same regardless of whether delays arecategorized as excessive or routine, suggests that we not distinguish between these twocategories.

Messuge nw&ficution refers to the distortion of message meaning. Its source may bieither the cognitive limitations or the motivations of the sender or receiver. Modifica-

?hc word “unit” is to be interpreted broadly, and may refer, for example, to an individual, an ad hocuxnmittce. a formal work group, or even a corporate division.

142 GEORGE HUBER

tions may be conscious or unconscious, well-intended or malicious. They range fromthe well-intended correction of minor errors to the extreme modification of substitut-ing one message for another. Message modification differs from message summark-tion in that it distorts a message’s meaning, whereas summarization does not. Althoughthese processes are often thought of as occurring in the context of a formal organka-tion they occur in informal organizations as well, as anyone’s analysis of the “messageboard” in their own household will show.

Let us turn now to examining the variables that determine the availability ofinformation in organizations. We begin with the process of routing, the process thatdetermines the organixational location of information.

3. RoutingThe red acuxnplkhment of modern Jeicnce and technology coma in taking ordinuy men,

informing them narrowly and dozply and then, through approptitc organiation, arranging tohave their knowledge combined with that of other spaiakd but equally ordinay men. Thisdispcnsa with the need for genius.”

This quote from Galbraith’s 27re New Zndurfriuf Store [30, pp. -611 highlights aprincipal rationale for speciaktion and consequent departmentalktion of manyorganixationa. A particularly important consequence of such specialization and de-partmentalization is that all organizationally relevant information does not have to berouted to all organizational units. Information routing, the process that principallyaccounts for certain messages being sent to some units and not to others, is a logicalmechanism for reducing the organizational resources devoted to information process-ing. This, and the fact that wisely selecting the destinations of messages allowsorganizational units to achieve proprietary as well as organizational goals, probablyaccounts for the fact that routing is so pervasive that we seldom notice its presence.

Although the term “routing’* is not frequently used in the organizational literature:it do& capture better than do terms like, “communicating” and “transmitting” theconcepts of direction, route, and destination that are integral to much of this literature,and so we use it in those propositions where these concepts play a role.

The literature identifies six variables that seem to affect the routing and transmissionof organizational information: (1) costs of communicating; (2) workload of themessage-sending unit; (3) message relevance; (4) repercussions from communicating“bad news;“Q) relative power and status of the sender and receiver; and (6) frequencyof previous communicationa. Although a particular author may have used termsdifferent from those of the previous sentence, in all cases the variables referred to wereequivalent to or subordinate to one of these six.

It is important to note that it is the perceived, psychological values of these variablesto which we refer,‘both here and in later sections as well. There are two reasons for theuse of perceived values. One, important to researchers, is that the objective values areoften unmeasurable, e.g., how would one measure “relevance” or “power,” whereasthese variables are almost always scalable. The other, important to managers, is thatthe perceived values can often be manipulated when the objective values cannot be,whereas the opposite is less often the case. Thus it would seem to be most useful toknow the ‘relationships between the system performance variables and the perceivedvalues of the performance determining variables. Indeed it may be that the perceivedvalues, in some cases, are the performancedetermining variables.

The following paragraphs summ24rk what the literature says about message routing.

htoPOslTIoN R. 1. The probability that a message will be routed to a unif ir inverselyrelated to the perceived costs of commamicating with that unit.

OF

In order to conserve L

more frequently with UTbe so if we could exuadirected toward (a) pen.(c) persons in the Samea more macro basis, antthat “In general the falonger the channels k:them” and “the less . _p. 31). In subsequent eBacharach and A&endeterminant of the fre.

The difficulty in cstructural, as observe.Schwartz [33] and as rtion from the super%great deal of informa:

Anticipating these fnication efficiency ofp. 167. Ference (281 cas a variable that dertion medium or infJohnston and Gibbs:

PROPoSITION R-2.inversely related to I):

It is reasonable tLwould be affected b!“destroy lowest pricsupporting this h>Tcand Driver and Sue

The empirical sttunder high load conprocessing capa+appropriate than +Ahighlight the fact tiwill cause occasiontransmission withirbeyond the unit’s c

Proposition R.2 1especially multipleone another.

PRo~osmo;u R.-related to the perct

The literanUr +contractual grievathat achieves 0rg.amessage-sending 1tional penaltie% p.in determining urelevance critcti:

ticious. They range frommodification of substitut-rom message sue-ration does not. Although:ez a f o r m a l o r - -, arhysis of the “message

mine the availability ofrouting, the process that

9 in ding ordinary men,,rganizacion, arranging toually ordinary men. This

1, pp. 60-611 highlights artmentalization of manyzh specialization and de-ation does not have to be: process that principallynot to others, is a logicald to information process-ions of messages allowsiizational goals, probably:Idom notice its presence.organizational literature,*‘* and “transmitting” theto much of this literature,.ay 9 role.:r g and transmissionlg; \A) workload of theens from communicating;ceiver; and (6)’ frequencyjr may have used termsvariables referred to were

~1 values of these variables:re are two reasons for theit the objective values areICC’* or “power,” whereasrtant to managers, is that>jective, values cannot be,eem to be most useful toriables and the perceivednay be that the perceivedrbles.ys about message routing,

puted to a unit is inversely

2, Chapter S].

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTFMS 143

In order to conserve their resources, we expect organizational units to communicatemore frequently with units easily contacted than with other units. This certainly wouldbe so if we could extrapolate the social-psychological findings that messages will bedirected toward (a) persons in close proximity, (b) persons in the same work group, and(c) persons in the same socioeconomic status (Collins and Guetzkow, [19. p. 187D. Ona more macro basis, and focusing on the concept of physical accessibility, Miller statesthat “In general the farther components of a system are from one another and thelonger the channels between them are, the less is the rate of information flow amongthem” and “the less . . . encoding a channel requires, the more it is used” (Miller, [56,p. 31). In subsequent empirical studies, Brenner and Sigband [ 111, Conrath [20], andBacharach and Aiken [7] found that either physical or structural accessibility was adeterminant of the frequency with which subordinates communicated with superiors.

The difficulty in communication may be interpersonal as well as physical orstructural, as observed by Brenner and Sigband [ll], and Goldhar, Bragaw, andSchwartz [33] and as noted by Jam [39), “If the subordinates perceive the communica-tion from the supervisor as generally positive, they would be encouraged to exchange agreat deal of information about task related matters . . . *’

Anticipating these findings, March and Simon argued that “the greater the commu-nication efficiency of the channel, the greater the communication channel usage” [49,p. 1671. Ference [28] offered similar propositions that focus on avoidance of time lossesas a variable that determines routing. Studies concerning the choice of a communica-tion medium or information source are also supportive of this proposition (cf.,Johnston and Gibbons, [41)).

PROPOSITION R.2. The probability that a message will be transmitted from a unit isinversely related to the workload of the unit.

It is reasonable to expect that the transmission behavior of organizational unitswould be affected by their workload. Meier, for example, found that overloaded units“destroy lowest priorities’* when carrying out their functions [52, p. 5351. Researchsupporting this hypothesis for individuals and small groups is reported by Miller [54]and Driver and Streufert [25], respectively.

The empirical studies relevant to this proposition have found support for it onlyunder high load conditions where the unit seemed to be near or beyond its informationprocessing capacity suggesting that the phrase “work overload” might be moreappropriate than “workload.** We call attention to this issue of word choice in order tohighlight the fact that the nonuniform arrival of demands for message transmissionswill cause occasional work overloads, and thus temporarily lower the probability oftransmission within time periods where the average workload observed would not bebeyond the unit’s capacity.

Proposition R.2 highlights the usefulness of providing for multiple message sources,especially multiple sources whose workload magnitudes are somewhat independent ofone another.

~OPOSITION R.3. The probabihty that a message will be routed to a unit is positivelyrelated to the perceived relevance of its contents for that unit.

The literature on management by objectives, on personnel evaluation, and oncontractual grievance procedures suggests that organizations tend to reward activitythat achieves organizational goals and to punish activity that does not. It follows that ,message-sending units, in order to achieve organizational rewards and avoid organiza-tional penalties, would use the relevance of a message for some other unit as a criterionin determining whether to route the message to that unit. Certainly it seems that ifrelevance criteria were formalized with standing orders directing certain types of

144 GEORGE HUBER

messages to certain units, it is more likely that the message would be sent to thedesignated units than to undesignated units. In addition, our everyday encounters withoverworked colleages suggest that the receiving units themselves tend to providepenalties in the form of cornpaints to units that send irrelevant messages. An earlystudy by Davis (231 offers strong support to this proposition, and a later study bySutton and Porter [72] offers weak support.

Relevance, is, of course, influenced by tasks, assignments and responsibilities.Tushman found that, for high performing units, the greater the task interdependence,the greater was the frequency of communication (Tushman, [75D. We should note,however, that while relevance influences routing, this influence is not entirely dictatedby formal considerations, as shown by Festinger, Schachter, and Back [29] and byWickesburg 1811, who found that individuals seek information “‘wherever in theorganization information, advice counsel, and expertise may be found . . . . Formalorganization boundaries and levels yield to the demand of the task and situation”(Wickesberg, [81, p. 25fD.

~oPosrnoN R.4. The probabiliq that a message will be routed to a unit is inverse@related to the decrearr in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will occur as aresult of the routing.

As a result of his survey research in three industrial organizations, Read concludedthat “Individuals in power hierarchies tend to screen out information passed upward,and to withold or refrain from communicating information that is potent$lly threaten-ing to the communicator” (Read, (62D. i

Direct support for this proposition comes from three lines of empirical research. Oneis the social-psychological research dealing with the suppression of “bad news” ininterpersonal communications (cf., Rosen and Tesser, [65); Rosen, Johnson, Johnson,and Teaser, [66D. A second is the field research dealing with the suppression ofinformation that reflects adversely on the organizational performance of the unitcontrolling the information (cf., Carter, [IS]; Ullman and Huber, [771; and McCleary,[SOD. The third is the research on bargaining (cf., Cummings and Hamett, [21D andorganization power (cf., Pfeffer, [6OJ) indicating that information is a critical resourceto joint decision situations and that withholding information from one’s competitors isoften useful in attaining one’s goals in a competitive environment.

As we will see when we discuss message modification, a good deal of researchindicates that individuals distort those messages that might adversely affect their goalattainment (cf. the laboratory studies of Cohen, [18], and O’Reilly and Roberts, [59],and the field studies of Mellinger, [53]; Gore, (341; Read, [62]; Athanassiades, (61;Kaufman, [42]; Roberts and O’Reilly, [64]; and O’ReilIy, [57]. Since message suppres-sion (nonrouting) is an extreme form of distortion, it may be argued that this body ofliterature also supports the present proposition.

~OPoSrTtON R.5. The probabili~ that a message will be routed to a unit b patitivebrelated to the perceived power and statw of the unit (except for the situation describedunder Proposition R .4).

This proposition follows from the findings that (1) persons of low status and powertend to direct messages to persons with more status and power, and (2) persons of highstatus and power tend to communicate more with their peers than with persons oflower status and power (Bamlund and Harland, 181; Collins and Guetzkow, 119, p.1871; Allen and Cohen, [3D. The proposition might also be inferred from the findingthat persons in high organizational positions, positions which often have more powerand status, are better informed (Davis, (231; Zajonc and Wolfe, [83]; Sutton andPorter, [72J), although other variables such as seniority or perceptiveness may also playa role in this finding.

ORGX

Some nonsupportive eviccommunications within ancommunication flow was domight be a consequence ofi.n reality initiated by lowerroutmixed technologies mascheduled quality control rfmanagement by exception,

PROPOSITION R-6. The prrelated to the jrequency wilrecent past.

This proposition followsthat the sender’s perceptiorshort term interval. It also

channel usage Len& tocharacter, develops sidctchannd for either kind oSimon. [49, pp. 167- 1681

Let us t&n now to aavailability of information

The time that elapsessummarized or modifiedchain we will call “de!necessary to process theother tasks, and (3) thewaiting perhaps for itsinclusion as a combinatof these components issender assigns to prccescourse, be influenced bmatter of timing.

The next several pardelay: (1) timeliness ofnumber of links in theassociated propositionsassessing their usefulne

~OPOSTTtON D.1. Tjto the perceived rimelin

out every&y obsrGerstenfeld and Bergsending messages in simpact, such as whenreceiving the message

Assuming that orEsending units would tdelay least those mesway of putting thesendinguniutowtmessages.

lge would be sent to theeveryday encounters with

mselves tend to provideev messages. An early,a .d a later study by

ems and responsibilities.the task interdependence,n [75]). We should note,Ice is not entirely dictated:r, and Back [29] and bynation “wherever in they be found. . . . Formalf the task and situation’*

7uted to a unit is inversely(nit believes will occur PP a

libations, Read concluded‘ormation passed upward,Iat is potentially threaten-

If empirical research. Oneession of “bad news” ‘inRosen, Johnson, Johnson,with the suppression ofperformance of the unitlber. [77]; and McCleary,:S Hamett, [21]) andI&._ d a critical resourcefrom one’s competitors isment.a good deal of research:dversely affect their goal*Reilly and Roberts, [59],[62]; Athanassiades, [6];

1. Since message supprea-argued that this body of

rated to a unit is positiveiy‘or the situation described

of low status and powerr, and (2) persons of highzrs than with persons ofs and Guetzkow, [19, p.nferred from the findingI often have more powerWolfe, [83]; Sutton andreptiveness may also play

ORGANIZATIONAL MFORMATION SYSTEMS 143

Some nonsupportive evidence is the conclusion of Davis [23]. in his study ofcommunications within an industrial management group, that “the predominantcommunication flow was downward or horizontal.” It seems, however, that this findingmight be a consequence of (1) higher organizational levels issuing directives that werein reality initiated by lower level staff groups or (2) the fact that in organizations withroutinized technologies many upward “messages” are uncounted by observers, e.g.,scheduled quality control reports or the absence of “out-of-stock” reports which is, viamanagement by exception, a message in itself.

PROPOSITION R.6. The probability that a message will be routed to a unit is positivelyrelated to the frequency with which similar messages have been routed to the unit in therecent past.

This proposition follows from the Propositions R.l, R.3, and R.5, since it is unlikelythat the sender’s perceptions of cost, relevance, and status will change significantly in ashort term interval. It also follows from the argument of March and Simon that

Channel usage tends to be self-reinforcing . informal communication. much of it social incharacter, develops side-by-side with tasksrientcd formal communication, and the use of thechannel for either kind of communication tends to reinforce its use for the other (March andSimon. (49, pp. 167- 1681).

Let us turn now to a discussion of delay, another of the processes affecting theavailability of information.

4 . Deb&q

The time that elapses between when a message is received and when, in perhaps asummarized or modified form, it is passed on to the next link in the communicationchain we will call “delay.” The delay time has three components: (1) the timenecessary to process the message, (2) the time lost while the processing unit tends toother tasks, and (3) the time lapse while the processed message is held in storage,waiting perhaps for its relevance to increase or for another message to arrive forinclusion as a combination of messages to be transmitted simultaneously. The secondof these components is a function of, among other things, the relative priority that thesender assigns to processing the particular message. The sender’s prioritization may, ofcourse, be influenced by organizational directives. The third component is basically amatter of timing.

The next several paragraphs highlight three variables that seem to affect messagedelay: (1) timeliness of the message, (2) work overload of the sending unit, and (3)number of links in the communication chain. Because the empirical support for theassociated propositions is relatively weak, the reader should exercise some judgment inassessing their usefulness in fulfiig his or her needs.

PROFQSITION D. 1. The probability dr duration of message aWay will be inverse& relatedto the perceived time&tejs of the message for the receiving unit.

Our everyday observations and some research (cf., Ulhnan and Huber, [77);Gentenfeld and Berger, [32D suggest that message processing units tend to delaysending messages in situations where premature delivery would reduce the message’simpact, such as when the message receiver is overloaded or has a mental set againstreceiving the message.

Assuming that orwtions tend to reward good performance, it foilows thatsending units would tend to delay most of those messages that were not timely and todelay least those messages where delay would be costly to the receiving unit. Anotherway of putting the argument is that use of organizational sanctions would causesending units to use timeliness as a criterion for assigning priorities to the processing ofmessages.

146 GEORGEHUBER

~OmSlTION D.2. The probabiliry or duration of message delay will be positivelyrelated to the workload of the sending unit.

in labmato~ setting, Miller [54], [55] has observed that delay in processing ofinformation is one way in which individuals deal with information overload, and heargues that the delay would also be used by organizational units when faced withoverload. Additional evidence is the case study of work overload in libraries by Meier[52]. In a more clinical vein, as a result of his interviews with administrators inbureaucratic organizations, Downs concluded that “The most common bureau re-sponse to communications overloads is slowing down the speed of handling messageswithout changing communications network situations or transmission rules” [24, p.2701.

P~oposrrro~ D.3. The probabiliv or duration of message delay is pasitiveb related tothe number of sequential links in the communication chain connecting the receiver to themessage source.

This proposition relies on the reasoning, supported by Allport and Postman [4],Higham [36], and Miller [56], that the greater the number of sequential links in acommunication chain, the greater would be the overall effect of a phenomenon thattook place at each link.

Let us move on now to examining the variables that determine changes in the formand meaning of organizational messages. We begin by looking at those that affectmessage modification, as it is this process, rather, than message summarization, atwhich the greater amount of empirical research has been directed.

5. Modification

Altogether, eight propositions are presented that relate message modification toother variables. We begin with a few propositions concerning the motivational basesfor modification, then turn to those dealing with perceptual and cognitive bases, andconclude with a proposition identifying an organizational determinant of messagemodification.

In some cases a proposition could have been decomposed into subpropositions thatwould focus on a particular form of modification or form of the associated determin-ing variable. I have chosen to avoid extensive divisions of this nature and hope that Ihave thereby decreased the chance that either I or the reader would miss the forest forthe trees. The references identified with the propositions contain the more specificpropositions or findings from which these propositions were constructed.

PRoposmo~ M. 1. The probobiliry or extent of message modification is positivelyrelated to the increase in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will result fromintroducing the modification.

As a result of his extensive interviews with administrators, Downs concluded that“Each official ten& to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy,exaggerating this data favorable to himself and minimidng those data unfavorable tohimself’” (Downs, [24, p. 266D. His conclusion is strongly supported by the laboratorystudies of Cohen [ 18) and O’Reilly and Roberta [59] and the field studies of Mellinger[53], Gore [34], Read [62], Athanassiades [6], Kaufman [42],,Roberts and O’ReiUy [64],and O’Reilly [571. The independent variables in these studes were the receiver’s statusand influence over the message sender’s goal achievement, the sender’s trust in thereceiver, and the sender’s attitudes towards his own upward mobility. The dependentvariables were quite varied, and included revising the message format (the mildestform of modification) and eliminating the message or substituting an incorrect mes-

OR

Further evidence in Imanagers attempt to croverstating costs (Lowesenders do not trust themore than otherwise ((O’Reilly and Roberts,modification is influcncthe receiver (Watson anthe sender’s mobility EAthanassiades, [6D. 0’1variables of trusf influe

Additional support fcexample, Collins and C

communication from 1~status person has learnkow, [19, p. 187D.

Proposition M.2.related to the decreaseor her modification.

Some research suggreducing the stress onCampbell notes that behe (the sender) make:remembered detail thgaps are conspicuous’even after conuolhnsender and receiver .receiver against the sto not distress the rethat ‘%rformation, cperceptions of the re

PROPOS~OX M-3related to the discret.

It seems that thediscretion in chaos;empirical study relaextensive interview:distortion is to use(except through ounated definitions ari.e., they are of fiie&ings, the use 0discretion in the stthose instances whas in those where *

We turn now tOthey and the mot__I perceive is affectperceive-it is use

e delay will be positively

..t delay in processing ofmarion overload, and he-1 s when faced withoab ,.II libraries by Meiers with administrators in

,.ost common bureau re-ted of handling messagesansmission rules” (24, p.

Aay ir posirively refated tonecling rhe receiver to the

Uport and Postman [4],of sequential links in a

,zt of a phenomenon that

.nine changes in the formJ&g at those that affectG:ssage summarization, atrcted.

message modification to.g the motivational basesand cognitive bases, anddeterminant of message

inr, Jubpropositions thatthe associated determin-

IS nature and hbpe that Iwould miss the forest for

untain the more specificconstructed.

modification is positively.rir believes will result from

‘r, Downs concluded thatupward in the hierarchy,hose data unfavorable tosported by the laboratoryfield studies of Mellinger(oberts and O’Reilly [64],were the receiver’s statusthe sender’s trust in themobility. The dependent

sage format (the mildestltuting an incorrect mes-

-

_

Further evidence in support of the proposition follows from the findings thatmanagers attempt to create slack in their budgets by understating revenues adoverstating costs (Lowe and Shaw, 1471; Schiff and Lcwin, [67], [68D and that whensenders do not trust the motives of the receivers, they tend to modify the mes~g~more than otherwise (cf., Mellinger, [53]; Loomis, [48]; Read, [62]; Zand, [84];O’Reilly and Roberts, (591; Roberts and O’Reilly, (641. Related findings are thatmodification is influenced by the sender’s perception of the receiver’s influence overthe receiver (Watson and Bromberg, [80]; Alkjre, Collum, Kaswan, and Love, [2] andthe sender’s mobility aspirations (Read, [62]; Lawler, Porter, and Tenenbaum, [44];Athanassiades, [6]). O’Reilly [57] provides a particularly articulate discussion of thevariables of trust, influence, and mobility.

Additional support for the proposition follows from the small group literature. Forexample, Collins and Guetzkow’s review led them to conclude that ‘The content ofcommunication from low to high power-status persons will depend on what the lowstatus person has learned is most likely to obtain reinforcement” (Collins and Guetz-kow, [ 19, p. 1871).

~OFOSXTION M.2. The probabiliv or extent of message modification is positivelyrelated to the decrease in stress on the receiver that the sender expects will result from hisor her modification.

Some research suggests that message modifications are made for the purpose ofreducing the stress on the receiver. In his review of the early psychological research,Campbell notes that “through an anticipatory monitoring of his own intended output,he (the sender) makes an active effort to produce a coherent output, by suppressingremembered detail that does not now seem to fit and by confabulating -detail wheregaps are conspicuous” (Campbell, [ 13, p. 3423). Further, Rosen and Tesser [65] found,even after controlling for any possible prior or subsequent interaction between thesender and receiver and for the possibility of any punitive action being taken by thereceiver against the sender, that senders still attempted to modify their messages so asto not disttess the receiver. As a result of his reading of the literature, Ference statedthat “Information, once evaluated and integrated, will tend to fit the transmitter’sperceptions of the recipient’s needs” (Ference, [28, p. B-851).

htOF+OSlTION M.3. The probability or extent of message modijication is positivet’yrelated to tk discretion allowed in choosing the masage format.

It seems that the tendency to modiry messages would be less if the senders had lessdiscretion in choosing the format of their communications. I know of no specificempirical study relating to this proposition, but note that Downs concluded from hisextensive interviews with the administrators that “One way for officials to avoiddistortion is to use messages that cannot be altered in meaning during transmission(except through outright falsification). Such messages usually involve both predesig-nated definitions and coding or easily quantifiable information” (Downs, [24, p. 126]),i.e., they are of fixed format. It is interesting to note that predesignated definitions andcodings, the use of checklists and forms, and most other mechanisms for reducingdiscretion in the selection of message format would tend to reduce modifications inthose instances where the modifications were perceptually or cognitively based as weUas in those where they were motivationally based.

We turn now to the perceptual and cognitive bases of message modification. milethey and the motivational bases of message modification are interactive-what weperceive is affected by what we are and what we are is affected by what weperceive-it is useful for both administrative and research purposes to make diitinc-tions between them wherever possible. Propositions M.4 and MS identify modifica-

.-- --- - -¶

148 GEORGE HUBER

, tions introduced by the message receiver. Propositions M.6 and M.7 return again tomodifications introduced by the sender.

~OPOSl’TlON M.4. The probabiIiry or extent of message madification is positivebrelated to the difference between actual message content and its expected or desiredcontent.

_

In his review article, Campbell [ 131 notes that both cognitive limitations andpersonal motivations cause transmitters to imperfectly modify messages during assimi-lation, stating that the “tendency to distort messages in the direction of identity withprevious inputs is probably the most pervasive of the systematic biases” @. 346), and“that . . . the human transmitter is prone to bias away from input in the direction ofthe transmitter’s own attitudes” (p. 3%). As a result of his interview study, Downsconcluded that “Officials’ perceptions will operate so as to partially screen out dataadverse to their own interests, and magnify those favorable to their interest” [24, p.2721. These conclusions suggest that information inputs are transformed in the direc-tion of the receiver’s prior information, expectations, or wishes. McLeod (51, p. 2181reviewed a number of studies suggesting that the transformation is less if the senderexpects to receive further information on the subject.

PnoposmoN M.5. The probabiliry or extent of message modification is positivelyrelated to the perceived ambiguity of the data on which the message is based.

&una summarized the early work relating to this proposition in his review article“On Perceptual Readiness” as follows: “Presented with a complex stimulus, the subjectperceives in it what it is ‘ready’ to perceive; the more complex or ambiguous thestimulus, the more perception will be determined by what is already ‘in’ the subjectand the less by what is in the stimulus’* (Bruner, [12]). Porter and Roberts, in theirreview of findings related to this idea, stated that ‘These results would indicate thatthe more. tangible and objective the subject matter . . . the more likely it is thatsubordinates and their superiors will feel that they are communicating accurately,whereas when the messages involve more subjective opinions and feelings there isgreater doubt about accuracy” (Porter and Roberts, (6 11).

PRomsmoN M.6. The probability or extent of message modification is positivebrelated to the extent of the sender’s work overload.

It seems reasonable to believe that, if the sender is either cognitively or logisticallyoverloaded, message modifications would be greater. His early literature review ledCampbell to conclude that “Whenever human beings operate at near maximumcapacity, selective information loss-undesired reduction of message complexity-isapt to be involved . . . ” (Campbell, [13, p. 3363). Miller [54], [55] has given consider-able attention to information overload and found that a wide variety of modifications,e.g., filtering, approximation, and omission, and other devices, are used to deal with it.Of some interest was his observation that “At slow rates of transmission subjects usedfew adjustment processes. At mediumlrates they attempted them all. At higher ratesfiltering was preferred, but as the ma&mum channel capacity was reached, bothsubjects used chiefly omissions’* (Miller, [55, p. 941). Additional support is given to thisproposition by the empirical study of Lanzetta and Roby (431, the case study by Meier[52], and the review by Driver and Streufert [25].

PRomsmoN M.7. The probability or extent of message modification is inversehrelated to the cost that the sender expects to incur as a result of making the modif?cation.

If cognitive limitations were the cause of message modification, and if the antici-pated cost to the sender of these modifications was high, then it seems likely that thesender would put forth a greater effort not to make errors and that the modification

ORG

would be less. Empirical SCClosely related is the ideaand if the anticipated costOne contribution to antic:get the correct message frfor having made the mod:information channels mc(DOW-IS, [24, p. 2691). ‘Iheone might expect (cf.. Hs

~OPOSmON M.8. 7%related to the number 9:receiver to the message SC

More links in a COT-distortions to occur. Thathe rumor transmission[36]. Other writers have[56]. In their discussior.“Selective filtering takeevery state in the traniSimon, (49, p. lSSl>, arthrough many officials.the next, the final outpis, significant distortiohave addressed these c

A dramatic exampleA rCpOrtCr -aaS F

D$fision in 1967. Itbrigade was: “On no

l-he brigade rackabsolutely COntiUCe

The battalion ratCOng in tlxhade:

The company cc69D.

This phenomenonexample, Kaufmancivilians by Americmilitary hierarchy tlevels had no idea o:for transmission ofdeclared that “eve:(Kaufman, 142, p. :

Message summzmilitary outpost Ccommand the nun

L truck traffic counttruck traffic evenaverage number ctaken in summar

and M.7 return again to

modij5cation 13 positively;d expected or &sired

cognitive limitations and‘y messages during assimi-direction of identity with

latic biases” @. 346), andI input in the direction ofs interview study, Downspartially screen out data

e to their interest” [24, p.transformed in the direc-

rhes. McLeod (51, p. 2181lation is less if the sender

8 modijication is positivelylessage is bared.

jsition in his review articlenplex stimulus, the subjectomplex or ambiguous theis already ‘in’ the subject

)rter and Roberts, in theirresults would indicate thatrhe more likely it is that:ommun.icating accurately,J O end feelings there is

P mocijkation is positively

r cognitively or logisticallyearly literature review ledlperate at near maximumof message complexity-is11, [55] has given consider-le variety of modifications,es, are used to deal with it.transmission subjects used

J them all. At higher ratestpacity was reached, bothInal support is given to this.3], the case study by Meier

:e modification is inverselyof rrraking the modification.

dication, and if the antici-hen it seems likely that the

I and that the modification

would be less. Empirical support for this belief is provided by Adams and Swanson [I].Closely related is the idea that if motivations were the cause of message modificationand if the anticipated cost of making them were high, then modification would be less.One contribution to anticipated cost would be the knowledge that the receiver couldget the correct message from another source, and would hold the sender accountablefor having made the modification. For example, Downs noted that “use of redundantinformation channels increases the probability of obtaining accurate information”(Downs, [24, p, 2691). The empirical support for this latter idea is more equivocal thanone might expect (cf., Hsia, [37]; Anderson, [S]).

PRoPOsXTtON M.8. The probabiliq or extent of message modification is positivelyrelated to the number of sequential links in the communication chain connecting thereceiver to the message source.

More links in a communication chain provide the opportunity for additionaldistortions to occur. That these additional distortions do occur was a central finding ofthe rumor transmission research by Bartlett [9], Allport and Postman [4] and Higham[36]. Other writers have also addressed the matter (cf., Downs, [24], p. 2691; and Miller,(561. In their discussion of organizational innovation, March and Sunpn stated that“Selective filtering takes place not only at the boundary of the organtzation, but atevery state in the transmission and elaboration of program proposals” (March andSimon, [49, p. 189]), and Downs concluded that “When information must be passedthrough many officials, each of whom condenses it somewhat before passing it on tothe next, the final output will be very different in quality from the original input; thatis, significant distortion will occur” (Downs, [24, p. 2691). Smart and Vertinsky (711have addressed these same ideas in the context of decision making under,crisis.

A dramatic example of what Downs was describing is the following:

.

A reporter was present PI a hamlet burned down by the U.S. Army’s 1st Air CavalryDivision in 1967. Investigation showed that the order from the division headquarters to thebrigade was: “On no occasion must hamlets be burned down.”

The.‘bripde radioed the battalion: “Do not burn down any hamlets unless you areabsolutely convinced that the Viet Cong are in them.”

The battalion radioed the infaavy company at the scene: “If you &ink there are any VietGong in the hamlet, bum it down.”

The company commander ordered his uoopr: “Bum down that hamlet” (Millet, [56, p.69D.

This phenomenon takes place in upward as well as downward communications. Forexample, Kaufman notes that “An official study of a mass kiIling of Vietnamesecivilians by American troops disclosed that at each successive higher level in themilitary hierarchy the reported number of victims was reduced, so that the highestlevels had no idea of the extent of ‘the tragedy despite two separate command channelsfor transmission of news about events in the field. A field commander subsequentlydeclared that “every large combat unit has similar episodes ‘hidden somewhere’”(Kaufman, 142, p. 14J).

6 . S-n

Message summarization can perhaps best be illustrated with an example. If amilitary outpost monitors enemy truck traffic, it may report to some higher levelcommand the number of trucks seen each day. The higher level command, recei+gtruck traffic counts from many such outputs and having to communicate a measure oftruck traffic even further upward through the chain of command, may’ well report theaverage number of trucks per day observed by this outpost. The fit step has beentaken in SUmmarizB tion-a frequency distribution has been reduced to a descriptive

11, 150 GEORGE HUBER

statistic, in this case the mean. The next higher echelon will receive many such reportsfrom its several subordinate units and may be required to conclude &ether enemytruck traffic in its area is increasing or remaining constant. When it does this, thesecond step has been taken-a statistical inference has been draw, a mean value hasbeen encoded as a 1 or a 0, depending on whether the null hypothesis was rejected oraccepted.

The echelon receiving this coded inference may receive such inferences about theincrease in truck traffic from many subordinate units, and may pass upward thedescriptive statement that “in twc+thirds of the sectors polled, truck traffic hasincreased.” Here, data in the form of binary digits were combined into a descriptivestatistic, a proportion. It may well be that proportions dealing with other variablessuch as rail traffic, construction of artillery sites, etc. would also be received by a stillhigher echelon and would be subjectively combined with the truck traffic proportionto facilitate the drawing of still another inference concerning whether or not the enemyis in the process of a major buildup of its forces in a particular region.

Depending on the number of echelons involved, we can envision the continuingrepetition of the following cycle: (1) data are combined into a descriptive statistic, (2)the descriptive statistic is compared to some standard and a statistical inference isdrawn, and (3) inferences are treated as data. It is not necessary that only one step inthis cycle takes place at any particular node in the communication network, or that asummarization takes place at every node.

It seems reasonable tomessage than an (2) the greater the summarization. On the senders seek and use cases, transmission Rather, only (1) where are transmission costs here the fact that the prc

I‘ ’

Of course summarization also occurs with qualitative information. For exampie,1 information obtained in an employment interview is subjectively aggregated and

t transformed into a descriptive rating, the rating is compared to some (perhaps implicit)standard, and a conclusion is drawn concerning the acceptability of the candidate.

As we noted earlier, message summarization is a process purposefully employed byorgan&dons and tends to have as an outcome a faithful representation of the originalmeaning These features are generally in contrast to those of message modification.Message summarization greatly reduces the cognitive and logistical loads on organk-tional units. In addition, in that the conclusions that follow from inference-drawingbecome guidelines and directives for organktional action, it aids considerably inplanning and coordination (cf., the discussion of “uncertainty absorption” in Marchand Simon, 149, pp. 165-1661). For these reasons, message summarization is apervasive organizational process. In spite of its pervasiveness, however, there is verylittle empirical literature that deals with the subject The relative shortage exists incontrast with the abundance concerning message modification. Perhaps the disparityexists because findinga of successful summarization, i.e., condensation without distor-

ition, are less tantalizing than are findings of modification, e.g., alteration with

I distortion. Whatever the reason, there is very little literature on which to basepropositions about message summarization.

iI have chosen, nevertheless, to offer four propositions on the subject. I hope that

their presentation will lead organizational scientists to undertake empirical studies ofI information summarization and that it will heighten the sensitivity of organization

designers and analysts to this organizational process.Ii There are four variables that it seems reasonable to believe would affect the

summaking of information in or&tions: (1) savings in transmission costs, (2) cost

tof summarGng the message, (3) workload of receiving unit, and (4) number of links in

i

the communication chain. It is important to note that “costs” include the expenditureof any resource, including time, space, and intellectual effort.

hOPOSmON S.1. The probabiliry or exzent of message summarization is positivelyrelated to the perceived savings in twwnission costs obtained from summarizing tkmessage.

PROPOSZION s.2. Therelated to perceived cost

Working against therequires time and effoassociated with transmi:sion of unsummarixedobserved by Kaufmanmanagen to the U.S.Proposition S.2.

Because of the would expect an and the cost of difficult to validate the dependent variabltrelationship between difficulty of successfu:valid may explain relationships.

PROPOSITION S.3. related to the perceivec

A number of extent if it is known the sending unitmessage in accordantthought that the be desired, leads us by the sender and observation of becomes overloaded so &at the lower messages’* (Downs, of its workload reducreceiver.

~ROPOXT’ION

related to tk receiver to tk

It seems reasonatcommunication chatook place at [9j, Allport and

receive many such reportsj conclude whether enemyot. When it does this, the.n *’ w, a mean value has4. lesis was rejected or

such inferences about thend may pass upward thepolled, truck traffic has

,,mbined into a descriptiveAing with other variablesi also be received by a stillhe truck traffic proportion4 whether or not the enemy:ular region.n envision the continuingo a descriptive statistic, (2)d a statistical inference is

:ssary that only one step innication network, or that a

urformation. For example,.bjectively aggregated and1 to some (perhaps implicit)ability of the candidate.purposefully employed by

presentation of the original‘: of message modification.ogistical loads on organixa-JW n inference-drawing)n, aids considerably ininty absorption” in Marchssage summarization is aless, however, there is veryrelative shortage exists in

ttion. Perhaps the disparitymdensation without distor-ttion, e.g., alteration withzrature on which to base

jn the subject. I hope thatlertake empirical studies ofsensitivity of organization

believe would affect theI transmission costs, (2) cost, and (4) number of links ints” include the expenditureXT.

sutnmari2ution is positive+ined from summarizing the

It seems reasonable to believe that (1) if it is less costly to transmit a summarizedmessage than an unsummari& message, then the sender would summa&e, and that(2) the’ greater the reduction in transmission cost that is possible, the greater thesummarization. On the other hand in today’s technology where high volume messagesenders seek and use very low cost transmission machines, it may be that, in manycases, transmission costs are not important determinants of message summarization.Rather, only (1) where they are large and (2) where the sender is accountable for them,are transmission costs likely to be important determinants. In view of this, we highlighthere the fact that the proposition deals with perceived savings.

PROPOSITION S.2. The probability or extent of message summarization is inverselyrelated to perceived cost of summarizing the message.

Working against the impact of Proposition S.l are the facts that sum.marixingrequires time and effort, and that the resultant costs could exceed the savingsassociated with transmitting a summarized message. This could lead to the transmis-sion of unsummarized messages even when transmission costs are significant, asobserved by Kaufman in his study of the communications from individual forestmanagers to the U.S. Forest Service (Kaufman, (42D. This idea is captured inP r o p o s i t i o n S . 2 .

Because of the fact that summarization does take time and effort to carry out, onewould expect an inverse relationship between the extent of message summarizationand the cost of message summarization. If this inverse relationship exists, it would bedifficult to validate both propositions, since S.l posits a positive relationship betwetnthe dependent variables and the extent of summarization and S.2 posits an inverserelationship between the dependent variables and the cost of summarixation. Thedifficulty of successfully validating these two propositions, even if both are in factvalid, may explain the lack of reported empirical studies dealing with the statedrelationships.

PROPOS~ION S.3. The probability or extent of message sumnuui2ation is positivelyrelated to ,tk perceived work&d of rhe receiving unit.

A number of arguments suggest that the message will be summa&cd to a greaterextent if it is known that the receiving unit is heavily loaded. One argument is that ifthe sending unit wants the message to have an irnpacf it will attempt to format themessage in accordance with the desires of the receiving unit. This, combined with thethought that the greater the receiving unit’s workload, the more summarization wouldbe desired, leads us to conclude that a relationship would exist between summarizationby the sender and workload of the receiver. A final line of reasoning follows from the :observation of Downs that “when the topmost level of communication intermediariesbecomes overloaded for any reasou, it can react . . . by changing the tntnsmission rulesso that the lower levels in the network screen out more information before sendingmessages” (Downs, [24, p. 129D. Thus, an overloaded receiving unit might have someof its workload reduced with a directive that sending units condense their inputs to thereceiver.

PnomsmoN S.4. The probability or extent of message eation is positive&related to tk number of sequential link3 in tk commum ‘cation chain connecting tkreceiver to the message source.

It seems reasonable to believe that the greater the number of sequential links in acommunication chain, the more intense would be the effect of a phenomenon thattook place at each link. Evidence supporting this is suggested by the work of Bartlett[9], Allport and Postman [4], and Higham [36].

--- _-- _-7

152 GEORGE HUBER

7. summary

This paper reviewed the literature concerning the determinants of the performanceand behavior of organizational information processing systems. In most instances,these detemlinan ts and their impact were identified from an examination of theempirical literature, and thus most of the propositions are supported by this literature.The review did identify two areas, however, where there seems to be an especiallyacute need for further empirical research. One of these concerns message routing Thepresently available literature related to message routing deals primarily with informaland not necfss(iTily work-related messages. It may be that, in some instances, empiricalstudies of the more formal&d information systems that deal primarily with work-related messages would lead to somewhat different propositions than those thatfollowed from the presently available literature.

The second area in particular need of further empirical study concerns messagesumma&&ion. The literature pertaining to this topic is extremeiy sparse. It seems thatthe results of studies dealing with message routing in formal settings and with messageswtion would be quite useful to the designers and managers of informationsystems, since the availability, form, and meaning of messages are such importantdeterminants of. the quality of organizational decisions, and hence of the effectivenessand viability of the organization itself.

There is clearly much research to be done before management scientists can tellmanagers or information systems designers how to prevent or resolve any informationsystem malfunction that might occur. I hope that highlighting this fact fl acceleratethe amount of research that wiIl be brought to bear on the matter. In the meantime,however, management scientists are being called upon to address problems that havedeadlines for solution. They cannot ask the clients to wait for future research results,but mu& work with the knowledge that is available today. By searching out andgathering together this knowledge, by summarizing what we know, or think we know,about the determinants of the performance and behavior of organizational informationsystems, I have attempted to take a first step in responding to this need.

Two matters seem to be worthy of special mention at this point. One is that theforthcoming inclusion of extremely sophisticated computing and comminications tech-nology, irito our organizational information systems may affect the nature of theimpact of the determinants identified in the review presented here. Or, it may generateadditional determinants. Thus there will be a need for further research of a relativelybasic nature.

The second matter concerns a more immediate need, the need for applied researchto respond further to the needs of today’s managers and systems designers. I believewe can expect to see, and should see, studies that include the following steps: (1)developing normative guidelines for the design and management of informationsystems, guidelines based on behavioral research such as that reviewed here, (2)testing, revising, and retesting the usefulness of these guidelines in the actual designand management of organiz&ional information systems, and (3) reporting the resultsof these teats so that when the guidelines are valid, they may be adopted by others andso that when they are not, further and more targeted research can be initiated?

‘The ruthot would like to thank Chula O’ReilIy, Daniel Power, Michael Tubman, and the reviewers fortheir vay UsefIll comments on 8n earlier draft.

This reacuch was supported in put by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and SociJSciences end in part by the National Science Foundation’r Division of Infonnatioo Science and Tcchnolo@

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