order & violence (political economy of development) · war between states; the last sixty years...
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Order&Violence(PoliticalEconomyofDevelopment)
Week7:ArmedinterventionsChrisBlattman
Week7objectives
• Thereisalogicbehindmuchviolence– Civilwarsasbargainingbyothermeans,andmassatrocitiesasanattemptby
thepowerfultoimprovebargainingpositionspermanently
• Wecanunderstandinterventionsthroughtheirabilitytofacilitatebargaining,provideinformation,anddevelopself-enforcingcommitmentsorexternalenforcecommitments– Negotiationandmediationasfacilitatingelitebargains– The”corrupt”useofaidasanincentiveforpeace– Peacekeepingasinformationprovisionandexternalenforcement– Trusteeshipasatemporaryformofexternalenforcement– Sanctionsormilitaryinterventionasameanstoincreasethecostsofatrocities
• Interveners,however,tendtomakesomeconsistentmistakes– Underestimatingthetimethatstateandinstitutionaldevelopmenttakes– Underestimatingthepowerofelitesandthedifficultyofchangingthebalance– Misreadingthesituationandtheirownabilitiestoplanandimplementchange
I.Apresentdayexample:SouthSudan
Sudan:ConflictbeforeIndependencein2011
• ColonialpowersunitedanArab-dominatednorthwithablackandnon-MuslimdominatedSouth
• Southernarmedgroupsfoughtforindependence1955-72and1983-2005
• Alsomotivatedbyoilrents,with75%ofreservesintheSouth
• Gainedindependencein2011
• Asaresultofwarandneglect,oneoftheleastpoliticallyandeconomicallydevelopedcountriesontheplanet
• Oilrevenues98%ofbudget
ThecurrentconflictinSouthSudan
• EvenbeforeIndependence,severalethnicgroupsandleaderscompetedfordominanceintheSouth
• In2013,thisdissolvedintoacivilwar
• Alsowidespreadkillingofciviliansbyethnicmilitias
• Aboutaquarterofthe12millionpeoplehavebeendisplaced,andperhaps300,000killed
• Asmallpeacekeepingmissionhassofarfailedtostemtheviolence
Incontrast…
“WhyshouldaninterventioninDarfurnotturnouttobeatriggerthatescalatesratherthanreducesthelevelofviolenceasinterventioninIraqhasdone?”
—MahmoodMamdani, LondonReviewofBooks(2007)
Theseterribleeventsprovokesomeofthemostdifficultquestionsintheworld,andanswersarelimited
Therearelogicallyconsistentreasonstofavorinterventioninoneplacebutnotanother(e.g.SouthSudanvs.Darfur)
Oughtneighbors,militaryallies,aiddonors,andresponsiblegovernmentsrespondtocivilwarsoratrocities?
Thismoralquestionisaffectedbyaverypracticalquestions:
• Doanystrategieswork,underwhatcircumstances,andwhy?– Sanctions– Peacekeepingmissions– Regimechange– Internationaltrusteeship– Brokereddeals
• Whataretheunintendedconsequences?
II.Someperspectiveonmodern-daycivilwars
UnfortunatelyconflictslikethatinSouthSudanhavebeenenormouslycommonsinceWWII
Civilwarshavebeenespeciallycommonandlong-lastinginpost-colonialcountries
Likewise,thedecadesafterIndependenceinLatinAmericawerefollowedbyseveraldecadesofpoliticalinstability,warbetweenstates,andwarwithinthem
Bates, R.H., J.H. Coatsworth, and J.G. Williamson. "Lost decades: Post-independence performance in Latin America and Africa." Journal of Economic History 67.4 (2007): 917.
Howmightwethinkoftheseconflictsthroughthelensofelitebargaining?
• Ex-coloniesarelargelylimitedaccessorderswitheliteswhocontrolthemilitary,materialandmobilizationalpower
• Newlyindependenteliteswillhavetostrikebargainstodividepowerandtherentsinsociety– Therulesandorganizationsdevelopedwillshapewhoholdspowerand
controlsrentsnowandalsointothefuture
• Thesearehighstakesbargains,andthereisconsiderableuncertaintyaboutdifferentsides’power
• Itisalsodifficulttocrediblycommittobargains,ortoconstructtheinstitutions—thesystemsofrulesandorganizations—thatwillenablecrediblecommitmentstobemade
Anychangeinmaterial,military,mobilizationalpower,ortherentsavailable,threatenspastbargains
e.g.Considerthefollowingshocksinpost-colonialAfrica
• Abruptdepartureofacolonialpower
• Largespikesincommodityprices
• Economiccrisisandtheimpositionofausterityandstructuraladjustmentprograms
• Discoveryofnaturalresourcessuchasoil
• Supportforanoppositionorinsurgentgroupbyasuperpower
• SuddenendtoregimesupportwiththeunexpectedendoftheColdWar
• Warinaneighboringcountry
Bargainingcanbeespeciallydifficultinhighlycentralizedpoliticalsystems
• Colonialsystems,aswellaspost-Independenceinstitutionalchoices,meansthatmanycountriesarehighlycentralizedPresidentialsystems– Commitmentproblemsareespeciallydifficulttosolve
• Thepost-WWIIinternationalsystemgivesgroupsstrongincentivestotrytocapturethecentralstate– Principlesofterritorialsovereigntyandfixedborders– “Thethreehundredyearsbetween1648and1945constitutedaneraof
warbetweenstates;thelastsixtyyearsappeartobeanageofwarwithinstates.”—DavidArmitage,“CivilWars”(2017)
• Thus,inweaklyinstitutionalizedsystems,thePresidencyisahighstakesprizetobecaptured
ThisiswhyAmosSawyeradvocatedformulti-levelgovernanceinLiberia
Sawyer:Africa’sstatepredation,personalrule,andconflictarerootedinitspost-independence
concentrationofpower
• Electionsarenotenough
• Infactallnational-levelssolutionsareflawed
• Governmentmustbeaccountableatmultiplelevels– Empowerlocalgovernmentjurisdictions(elections,budgetarypower)– Independent,task-specificbureaucraciescrossingspace– Regionalsecurityandeconomicapparatus
• EchoeselementsofEuropeanandAmericanconstitutionalprinciples– Checksandbalances
III.Weighinginterventionsduring&aftercivilwar
Someforeigninterventionswewillconsider
1. Incentivesandopportunitiesfornegotiatedsettlements
2. Peacekeepingmissions
3. Trusteeships
4. (Inthenexttwoweeks)Fosteringstateanddemocraticinstitutionsafterwar
1.Providingincentivesandopportunitiesfornegotiatedsettlements
a) Mediation– Oneofthemostcommon
featuresofpostWWIIwarsettlements
– Aimistofacilitatebargaining– Doesnotpromiserewardsor
threatenpunishment– Doesnotemployforceto
suppressorguaranteethesettlementofaconflict
b) Rewardingpeace– Creatingpeacedividends– Promotingrentsharingand
bribery
(a)Mediatorsshapetheinformationavailableandthebargainingenvironmenttominimizebreakdowns
• Structurehowdisputantsinteractinabargainingsituation
• Provideaproceduralframeworkfordiscussions
• Ascertainfacts
• Relayinformationtoeitherside
• Facilitatecommunications
• Recommendconcessionsandproposepossiblesettlementsorcompromises
Beber, Bernd. "International mediation, selection effects, and the question of bias." Conflict Management and Peace Science 29.4 (2012): 397-424.
Sodoesmediationactuallychangeanything?
Mediationmorelikelyonsummervacations
• Mediatedandnon-mediatedconflictsresolveataboutthesamerate
• Butthereisaselectionproblem?whatifmediatorstackletheeasierormoredifficultconflicts?
• Usingsummermonthstoinstrumentformediation,Beber (2010)findsthatthepresenceofamediatorraisesthelikelihoodofasettlement
(b)Theperilandpromiseofrewardingpeace
• Inbargaining,abiggerpiecanhavemixedeffects– Itcanmakeenforcingpeaceagreementseasier,sincethecostsof
defectingaregreater:ithelpsmakebargainsself-enforcing– Butitcanmakethebargainingstagelongerandmorefraught,because
thestakesarehigher
• Intheory,externalenforcementandincentives couldsmoothbargainingandfacilitateenforcement– Incentivestostayatthebargainingtable
• Cushylocationsandexpenseaccounts
– Incentivesnottodefectfromanagreementoncemade• Nobelpeaceprizes(fameandreputation)• Externaljudicialprocesses• Post-conflictreconstructionaid,tradedeals• Threatofsanctions
RecallMukhopadhyay’s takeonAfghanwarlords:Apatrimoniallimitedaccessorderasaself-enforcingalternativetoconflict
ThepoliticalcenterinKabulwasnot(andhasneverbeen)acollectionofformal,bureaucraticinstitutionsworkinginconcerttopenetratetheunwieldyperipheryofwaywardwarlords,defiantmullahs,andrebellioustribalchieftains.
Itwas,instead,apoliticalcenteroperatinglargelyintheneopatrimonialimage,and,muchlikemanyofitspredecessors,forginglinkstothecountrysidethroughpartnershipswithpowerholderswhocouldsometimesexpandthescopeofthestatebyengagingit.
“
Jamaluddin Badar,Nuristangovernor(prosecuted)Lutfullah Mashal,Langhamgovernor(journalist&poet)Gul AghaSherzai,Nangarhar governor(famousMujahideencommander)
AnotherexamplecomesfromtheformerSovietRepublics
“ Thecentralmechanismofcivilwarsettlementisbribery.
UnlikeAfricanandLatinAmericandecolonization,Sovietdecolonizationresultedinsomewhatfewerwars,andgenerally
muchshorterwars
Negotiatedsettlementsasdealsamongelitesandwarlords(i.e.limitedaccessorders)
• Someofthepost-Sovietcircumstancesmayhavehelpedthemsolvetheinformationasymmetriesandcommitmentproblems– Ahistoryofrelativelystrongstates– ThethreatofinternationalinterventionbyRussianforces,or
clandestineRussiandeal-making
• Driscollarguesthatthepost-Sovietgovernmentsskilfullybuiltacoalitionofviolenceelitesbybuyingjustenoughoff– Thestatewastooweaktodisarmallofitsopponents– Certainwarlordswereprovidedwithofferstokeeptheirprivatearmies
tosecuretheirholdings,givingthemthecrediblethreatofvoice(acoup)orexit(areturntoviolenceorpredation)
– Warlordswerealsogivenspoils,suchasministryappointmentsandlargeoffshorebankaccounts
– Someoftheaidthat(indirectly)fundedregimecamefromtheWest
Whatdrivesthestabilityofsuchpatrimonialelitedeals?
Self-enforcingexamples• Willbemorelikelyin
environmentswithfewershockstopowerdistribution
• Helpfultohaveinstitutionsforpowersharingthatareflexibletochangesindefactopower– Asopposedtowinner-take-all
personalizedPresidentialsystems
• Competinggroupsareallowedtomaintaintheireconomicormilitarypower
• Theseenableelitestomorecrediblysplitrents
Externallyenforcedexamples• Thirdpartypolicesagreement
• Orenforcementintheshadowofenforcement(i.e.crediblethreatofpolicing)
• Usessanctionsortheirthreat
• Canofferaccesstoprivileges,potentiallythroughaiddollarsorresourcerents
• Orofferinternationalrecognitionandesteem
2.Peacekeepingmissions
• Twokindsofmissions– Withconsentoffightingparties(ChapterVI)– Withoutconsent(ChapterVII)
• Lightestmissionsaretaskedwithmonitoringcease-fires,troopwithdrawals,orotherconditionsoutlinedinaceasefireagreement
• Overtimemissionshavebecome:– Moreaggressive(withoutconsent)– Widerinscope,goingbeyondobservationand
enforcementtoincludeelectoralsupervision,policeandsecurityforcesreform,institutionbuilding,economicdevelopment,andmore
• MostmissionscameaftertheColdWar
• VastmajorityofthesehavebeenstationedinAfrica
Fortna:Peacekeepingassociatedwithalowerriskofrenewedwarfare
Butdoespeacekeepingcausepeace?
Couldbeaselectionproblem• WhatiftheUNSecurityCouncil
picksthe“easy”cases?
• Thenpeacekeepingwouldcorrelatewithpeacebyconstruction
• Totest:collectdataonconditionslikelytoinfluencepeacekeeping
BUT,probablynotthecase• Historicaltiesandeconomic
interestsarenotassociatedwithpeacekeepingsupport
• Infact,peacekeepersseemtogotothetoughercases– Especiallywherebelligerents
can’tagreeonasolution
• Hence(ifanything)Fortnaunderstatestheimpactofpeacekeeping
Peacekeepingasrationalistwarfareinreverse
Createcommitment• Enforcecommitmentstopeace
– Militarydeterrenceandthreatofforce
• Providedirectincentivesforpeace– Conditionaidongoodbehavior– Providea‘peacedividend’
• Thecoreideaistoprovidetemporaryexternalenforcementofcommitmentsuntilself-enforcing commitmentscanbereached
Reduceinfoasymmetries• Reduceuncertaintyandmutual
fear– Monitoring,reporting,and
communication
• Preventandcontrolaccidents– Deterroguegroupsand‘spoilers’– Providelawandorder
SomeexperiencesfromLiberia:Peacekeepersrespondingtoriots
Peacekeepersandpacifyingoccupiedrubberplantations
Whydoesn’tpeacekeepingseemtobeenoughinSouthSudan?
• Peacekeepingcanfailtokeepthepeaceformanyreasons– E.g.Atleastonesidecontinuestoseestrategicadvantageinfighting
• OnelimitationoftheSSudanesemissionisrelativelylowlevelsofforcesize,especiallygiventhesizeoftheterritory
South Sudan 15,777 Since July 2011 126 2.5
3.Trusteeships
UN Mission in Liberia, 2008
Whatisatrusteeship?
• Broader,deeper,andlonger-lastingtypesofstatereconstructionefforts– Conceivedofasaninternationalpresenceoverperiodsofseveralyears
uptoseveraldecades– Includesthecreationofinternationalcivilianadministrations
• e.g.Liberia2003-08– UNoversawa2-yearperiodoftransitionalrule,a2005election,anda
2-3yeartransitiontoself-government– Setupparallelinternational-runbureaucraciesforeachgovernment
bureaucracy,needingapprovalfrombothformajordecisionsandspending,graduallyhandingoffcontrol
– Inlatestagessubsidizedsalariesofmanygovernmentbureaucratsinordertohelpattracttalent
– AtthesametimeUNpeacekeeperssubstitutedforanationalpoliceandmilitaryasbothwerereconstructed
WecanconsidertheU.S.roleinAfghanistanaformoftrusteeship
Whatistheproblemforwhichtrusteeshipsarethesolution?
• Ifelitesorsocietyagreetoanewsetofpost-warorganizationsinstitutions,intheorytheycouldbenefitfromprotectionandencouragementintheirinfancy,e.g.– Independentandtask-specificbureaucracies– Professionalizedmilitaryandpoliceforce– Peacefulelections– Activelycompetingpoliticalparties– Decentralizationoftaxationandspendingdecisionstoregionsortowns– Newconstitutionaldivisionsofpower– Freemedia
Differentmodels
• Fullstatetrusteeship(Fearon &Laitin)– Callfortherecruitmentof“leadstates”withsignificantnational
securityoreconomicinterestsinacollapsedstatetoruninterventions– anexitstrategythatfocusessquarelyondevelopinglocalownershipfor
missionsthroughtheestablishmentoftaxationcapacity.
• Morespecific“sharedsovereignty”contracts(Krasner)– Createjointauthoritystructuresinspecificissueareas,suchasnatural
resourcemanagement(e.g.oil)– Combininginternationalactorswithdomesticinstitutions– Createcommitment
• Ideaistoexternallyenforceabargaintemporarily– Togetthroughaperiodwhendefectionislesscostly– Toallowformalandinformalrulestosolidify
Questionablewhetherinternationalactorshavethecapacityandwilltomaintainthecommitmenttoremainmorethan3-5years
Andworthasking:Whatseparatestrusteeshipfromimperialismorcolonialism?
• Theylikelyrequireaconsensusbetweenlocalandinternationalactorstosucceed– SomethingthatdoesnotappeartoexistinSouthSudanatpresent,but
didexistinLiberia
• Thisnarrowsthenumberofcaseswhereatrusteeshipcanbesuccessful
• TheUSAfghanmissionillustratesoneoftheperilsofatrusteeshipwithouttheconsentofallactors– Reducedlegitimacy– Potentialtobecomeatarget
Sustainedinterventionsalsocarrytheirownrisks
Allinterventionsareintrinsicallyunpredictable,chaotic,anduncertainandwillrapidlyconfoundwelllaidplansandcarefulpredictions
…sustainedintervention,therefore,oftenpreventslocalleadersfromtakingresponsibility;itdoesnotputpressureonpoliticianstosettlewiththeirenemies,orbroadenthekindsofdealstheycouldoffer.
Instead,itsometimesstrengthensthelegitimacyandpopularityofinsurgents.
“
Whatistheendgoal?Oneviewisthecompletetransformationofsociety:Nation-building
Themoresweepinga[nation-building]mission’sobjectives,themoreresistanceitislikelytoinspire.
Resistancecanbeovercome,butonlythroughawell-consideredapplicationofpersonnelandmoneyoverextendedperiodsoftime.
—RANDCorporation
“
Onbalance,thereisareasonableargumentforlimitedtrusteeships,atleastwhenmostpartiesaresupportive
• e.g.IninterveninginBosnia,thechairmanoftheUSJointChiefsofStaffexplainedtoCongress:“IFOR[theinternationalImplementationForce]willnotberesponsiblefortheconductofhumanitarianoperations.Itwillnotbeapoliceforce.Itwillnotconductnation-building.”
• In1996theNationalSecurityAdviserexplained:“Itisadangeroushubristobelievewecanbuildothernations.Butwhereourowninterestsareengagedwecanhelpnationsbuildthemselves—andgivethemtimetomakeastartatit.”
IV.Understandingmassatrocitiesandtheirprevention
Masskillingsversuscivilwars
• Almostallmasskillingsinhistorywereperpetratedbygovernmentormilitarilypowerfulrebelgroupskillinglargenumbersofanidentifiablegroupintheircountry
• SinceWorldWarIIsome50episodesofmasskillingshaveledtobetween12and25millionciviliancasualtiesandby2008haveinducedthedisplacementof42millionpeople
• Mostmasskillingeventshavetakenplacetowardstheendorafterwars,especiallycivilwars– Between1960and2000roughlyathirdofallcivilwars(50outof152)
featuredmasskillings,whileinnoneoftheinterstatewars(23)weretheremasskillings
Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner. "Strategic mass killings." Journal of Political Economy 123.5 (2015): 1087-1132.
Numberofmasskillingperpetrators,byregion
Numberoffatalities,excludingRwanda
TheRwandangenocidestandsout
Genocideversusmasskillings
• Thisislargelyaquestionofscaleandintent.Genocideisanattempttodestroyanentirepeople—usuallyanethnic,national,orreligiousgroup
Thelogicofmasskillingsandgenocide
• Masskillingsareusuallyanattempttoreducethesizeofopponentgroups,eitherdirectlyorbycausingrefugeeoutflowsanddisplacement
• Killinglargenumbersofagroupisonewaytoavoidhavingtobargainwiththeminfuture– Reducestherentsyouhavetosharewiththem– Thoughitcanreduceproductiveoutputthatdependsonlabor
• Thisislikelyonereasonmasskillingsaremorelikelyinnaturalresourcedependentcountries
• Masskillingsarealsosignificantlymorelikelyafterrecentdemocratizationandinsmall,ethnicallypolarizedcountries
Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner. "Strategic mass killings." Journal of Political Economy 123.5 (2015): 1087-1132.
Rwanda,April-July1994:Anattempttopermanentlychangethebalanceofpowerinthecountry
• In1990,aminorityTutsirebelgroup,theRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF),beginacivilwar
• In1993,internationalpressureleadstoaceasefireandbeginningsofapowersharingagreement
• HutuPresidentdiesinaplaneaccident
• ThenextdaytheHutueliteinitiateahighlyplannedmasskillingofTutsis
• Roughly70%(800,000)ofminorityTutsiswerekilledbymajorityHutus
• AsmallChapterVIUNpeacekeepingmissionisorderednottointerfere
• EndedwhenRPFtookthecapital
ThefailuretointerveneinRwandaandamasskillinginBosnia(Srebrenica)helpedtobuildaglobalpolitical
constituencytointerveneinmasskillings
PresidentBillClintonreferredtothefailureoftheU.S.tointerveneinthegenocideasoneofhismainforeignpolicyfailings:
“Idon'tthinkwecouldhaveendedtheviolence,butIthinkwecouldhavecutitdown.AndIregretit.”
Thefollowingdecadeseesanumberoffairlysuccessfulhumanitarianinterventionstoendlongrunningconflicts
• Bosnia– The1995Srebrenicamassacreof8000Bosniak civiliansisfollowedbya
militaryinterventionthatbroughttoanendthreeyearsofwar
• Kosovo– FromMarchtoJune1999,NATObombedYugoslaviatocompelitto
withdrawitsforcesfromthebreakawayterritoryofKosovo,afterwhichYugoslaviaagreestowithdrawtroopsandallowaforeignmilitaryin
• SierraLeone– InMay2000asmallBritishforcebolsteraUNpeacekeepingforceand
theSierraLeoneanArmyagainstrebels,helpingleadtoaceasefire
• Liberia– AunionofWestAfricanstatesandacrediblethreatofUSmilitary
interventionhelpstopersuaderebelgroupstoaceasefireandPresidentCharlesTaylortoenterexileinNigeria
Itispartlythesesuccesses,andthehauntingfailuresofRwandaandSrebrenica,thatleadtostrong“liberalinterventionist”supportfortheIraqWarandthetopplingofadangerousdictator,SaddamHussein
Ofcourseweknowhowthatturnsout,withsevereconsequencesforthereputationofhumanitarian
intervention
Documentedciviliandeathsfromviolencebyday,viairaqibodycount.org
Still,thereremainsaconstituencyforstoppingmasskillingR2P:Responsibilitytoprotect
• AcommitmentendorsedbyallUNmemberstatesin2005
• Recognizesthattherearelimitstosovereignnoninterference
• Aframeworkforemployingmeasuresthatalreadyexisttopreventatrocities– Mediation,economicsanctions,and
chapterVIIpowers,etc
• AuthoritytoemployforcerestssolelywithUNSecurityCouncil
• Incontrastto“humanitarianintervention”:theuseofforcewithoutSecurityCouncilauthorization
Thecaseforinterveningagainstmassatrocities
• Third-partyinterventiontostopatrocitiesaredesignedtomakeitmorecostlyandlesseffectiveforstatestocommitatrocities
• Thecrediblethreatofaninterventionshouldmeanthatstatesaremorereluctanttocommitatrocities
• Theaudiencefortheseinterventionsisnotjustthepresentkillersbutallfuturepotentialones
• Mostdiscussionfocusesonhowtomakethethreatsmorecredible
• Thenumberandlengthofcivilwarsandmassatrocitieshavedeclinedoverthepast20years,asthenormsupportinginterventionhastakenhold
Caution:Themoralhazardprobleminmassatrocities
• Theprospectofinterventioncouldencourageweakgroupstorebel,andeventoprovokestateatrocitiesinordertotriggerinternationalintervention
• Perversely,thiscouldactuallyincreasetheprobabilityofwarandatrocities
• KosovoLiberationArmy(KLA)leadersopenlyacknowledgedthattheywouldlosewithoutinterventionbuthopedtoprovokeSerbianatrocitiesinordertodrawintheinternationalcommunity.
• Intheory,thisshouldnotoutweighthereductioninkillingsfromintervention
Partialsuccessstories:Kenya2007/08
Coted’Ivoire2011
Libya2011
OfcoursetherearecasesthatcouldneverbeauthorizedbyUNSC,suchasSyria
V.Thecaseforincrementalisminintervention
Balancingtheevidenceandthemoralimperative
“WearecomfortablewithBillClinton’smottofrom1995:Wecannotstopallwarforalltimebutwecanstopsomewars.Wecannotsaveallwomenandallchildrenbutwecansavemanyofthem.Wecan’tdoeverythingbutwemustdowhatwecan.”
Howhaveyoudefinedtheproblemandtheobjective?
Incremental• Timelimited
• Aimingtofosterbargainsthatstophostilitiesbetweengroups
• Raisethecostsforarulinggrouptocommitatrocities
Ambitious• Deposingelitescoalitioninpower
• Nationbuilding
• Pursuitofdemocracy
• Endingcorruption
Someregimeswillbeeasiertooinfluencethanothers
Lowcapacity• Centralizedpowerstructure
controlledbynarrowelite
• Popularorganizationandsupportbaselimited
• Limitedresourcesorresourcesthatareeasilyshutoff(e.g.capturetherefinery,enddiamondtrade,cutoffremittances,etc.)
Highcapacity• diffusepowerstructurewitha
broad-basedelitecoalition
• Large,centrallycontrolledconventionalandinternalsecurityforcesembeddedinbureaucraticinstitutions.
• Accesstofinancethatishardtocutoff(e.g.fromastrongexternalbacker)
• Widespreadsocialorganization
Thisisaproblematicwayoflookingattheworld
Themoresweepinga[nation-building]mission’sobjectives,themoreresistanceitislikelytoinspire.
Resistancecanbeovercome,butonlythroughawell-consideredapplicationofpersonnelandmoneyoverextendedperiodsoftime.
—RANDCorporation
“
Internationalcommunityisnotalwaysawareofitsownweaknesses
• “Internationalpolicy-makersalwayshaveamuddledandhalf-understoodpictureofthecountrybeforeintervention,perhapsanequallymuddledandhalf-understoodpictureoftheirownsocietyintheWest,andsomegenerallydoubtfulguessesabouthowtogetfromonetotheother”
• Internationalcommunityismuchweakerthantheyimagine– Haveunparalleledresourcesandeducationanddriveand
resourcefulness– Isolatedfromlocalsocietyandignorantofcontext– Preytomisleadingabstracttheories– Lacklegitimacyandlocalsupport– Underestimateandmisunderstandlocalleaders,andmisundterstand
abilitiestocompromise
Knaus calls“principledincrementalism”andStewart,“passionatemoderation.”
“Thebestwayofminimizingthedangerofanyinterventionistoproceedcarefully,toinvestheavilyinfindingoutaboutthespecificcontext,particularlyaftertheintervention,andtodefineconcreteandnotabstractgoals.
Powerandauthoritymustbegiventolocalleadershipthroughelectionsassoonaspossible.Onlylocalleadershavethenecessaryingredientofknowingthesituationwell,overmanyyearsandinallkindsofconditions;onlytheycangetaroundthedangersthatcannotbeavoided,andskillfullyrespondtothem.”
Perpetualpeace…isnoemptyideabutataskthat,graduallysolved,comessteadilyclosertoitsgoal.
—ImmanuelKant,“TowardPerpetualPeace”inPractical
Philosophy
“
VI.Warandpoliticaldevelopment
WhilethereislittlereasontobelievethatwarwouldhaveexactlythesamedomesticeffectsinAfricatodayasitdidinEuropeseveralcenturiesago,itisimportanttoaskifdevelopingcountriescanaccomplishintimesofpeacewhatwarenabledEuropeancountriestodo.
Iconcludethattheyprobablycannotbecausefundamentalchangesineconomicstructuresandsocietalbeliefsaredifficult,ifnotimpossible,tobringaboutwhencountriesarenotbeingdisruptedorundersevereexternalthreat .
—JeffreyHerbst,“WarandtheStateinAfrica”
“
“atsomepoint,therealityofdisintegratingdysfunctionalAfricanstatesstandsinsuchcontrasttothelegalfictionofsovereignstatesthatexperimentationwithregardtonewstatesisinorder.”
- JeffHerbst,StatesandPowerinAfrica,p.266
BasedonHerbst,Weinstein,Tilly: ShouldtherestoftheworldstepbackandallowthedisintegrationofAfricanstates?
RecalltheclassicanswerfromCharlesTilly:“Warsmadestatesandstatesmadewar”
Threatofwar:Rulersforcedtodefendborders
Increasetaxcollectionandmilitaryrecruitment
Expandrepresentative
ruleandbureaucracy
Strongstatessurvive, theweakperish
Warisaselectivesurvivalmechanism(Tilly1985,1990)
• TechnologygrowthàWarincreasinglycapitalintensiveandexpensive
• Statesneedlarge,effectivebureaucraciesto:– Administerevermorecomplexandexpensivewars– Organizerecruitment(includingconscription)– Raisetaxes
• Intheabsenceofstrongstatecapacitythereisapropensitytocollapseorbeconquered
• Statesthatcouldnotwagemodernwarfareweresimplyweededout
1962-86 1986-20??
WeinsteinasthemodernTilly?Ugandaasanexampleof“autonomousrecovery”
Conditionsunderlying“Autonomousrecovery”Tilly-esqueaccountofincidentalinstitutions
Needforrevenue
Statebuilding
Stateundermining
War Noexternalresources Termination
Raisetaxesbybuildingpopularsupport
Decisivemilitaryvictory
Negotiatedpeace
Raisefundsfromnaturalresources
Buildacoalitiontoconsolidate
power
Receivefundingfromexternalsources
Existentialthreat
Onlythestrong
organizationssurvive
Weakorganizations
muddlethrough
Sodoonly waranddecisivevictorymakethestate?
or
Aretherealternative,morepeacefulpathstostronganddemocraticstates?
Bates,Coatsworth&Williamson:Therearecoststothewarlikepath
• Whatdidwarandautocracydoin19thcenturyLatinAmerica?– Lostoutonglobaltradeandindustrializationboom– Aggressiveantitradeandantimarket policies– Waroccupiedmostofgovernmentspendingandbankruptedmany
nations– Sacrificedeconomicgrowth
• Nottomentionthehumancost
Arethereotherwaystosolvecommitmentproblemsandinformationasymmetries
Forexample…
• Negotiateddistributionofrents
• Institutionbuilding&democracypromotion
• Peacekeeping
• Trusteeship
Maybethe“technology”ofstate-buildinghasadvanced?
• Diffusionofgovernance“technologies”– Parliamentarysystems– Constitutionaldemocracies– Civilsocietyorganization– Democracypromotion
• Diffusionofnorms– Respectforhumanrights– Pressandcivilsociety
freedoms– Internationallymonitored
elections
• Training– Militaries– Parliaments
• Accesstofinance– Worldbankcreditforlong
terminvestments
• Internationalsanctionsandpressure