oral history of col douglas b campbell retired

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FOREWORD

This oral history transcript has been produced from an interview with Colonel (Retired) Douglas Campbell, conducted by LTC (Retired) Brent Bankus, as part of the Academic Year 2013 US Army War College/US Army Military History Institutes Vietnam Company Commander Interview Program. Users of this transcript should note that the original verbatim transcription of the recorded interview has been edited to improve coherence, continuity, and accuracy of factual data. No statement of opinion or interpretation has been changed other than as cited above. The views expressed in the final transcript are solely those of the interviewee and interviewer. The US Army War College/US Army Military History Institute assumes no responsibility for the opinions expressed, or for the general historical accuracy of the contents of this transcript. This transcript may be read, quoted, and cited in accordance with common scholarly practices and the restrictions imposed by both the interviewee and interviewer. It may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, by any means whatsoever, without first obtaining the written permission of the Director, US Army Military History Institute, 950 Soldiers Drive, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013.

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DOUGLAS (DOUG) B. CAMPBELL

PROF AD

DOR: 2 FEB 1997

Professor Douglas B. Campbell is a native of New Jersey. He graduated from Rutgers

University, New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1965 with a Bachelor of Science degree in

Agriculture. He also holds a Masters of Public Administration from Shippensburg University,

Shippensburg, Pennsylvania.

He was commissioned into the Army in 1965 and retired from the Army in 1993 as a Colonel

after 28 years of service. His command assignments include Tank Platoon Leader and

Company Commander, 8th Infantry Division, Germany; Cavalry Troop Advisor, ARVN and

Troop Commander, 11th ACR, Vietnam; Cavalry Squadron Commander, 24th Infantry

Division; Commander Warrior Preparation Center, Germany. Key staff positions include

Instructor USA Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; Operations Officer, 11th ACR,

Germany; Special Assistant, Chief of Policy, SHAPE; Battalion Executive Officer and

Brigade Operations Officer, 5th Infantry Division, Fort Polk, Louisiana; Staff Officer, War

Plans division, HQDA, Pentagon, Washington, DC; Senior Live Fire Observer/Controller,

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

After arriving at the Army War College in July 1990, he served as the Director, Army

Planning, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. He has served in his

present position as Director of the Center for Strategic Leadership since 1993.

Professor Campbell's professional military education includes the Armor Officer Basic and

Advanced Courses, Army Command and General Staff College in 1980; the U.S. Army War

College in 1987; and selection for the Army's Advanced Management Program with

attendance at Stanford University.

His military awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with four Oak Leaf Clusters,

the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf

Clusters, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, the

Parachutists Badge, and the Army Staff Badge.

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Interview with Colonel Douglas B. Campbell, USA Retired

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword i Bio of Colonel Douglas B. Campbell, USA Retired ii Tape 1, Side 1 Introduction and Vietnam Assignments 1 Most Significant Personnel Problems 2 Utilization of Officers and NCOs 3 Training 4 Unit Morale 5 TO&E 6 Unit Communication in Combat 8 Environmental Impact on People and Equipment 9 Types of Missions 11 Re-supply and Maintenance 13 Unit Recovery Assets 14 Tape 1, Side 2 Night Vision Equipment 15 Night Operations 16 Living Conditions 17 The Most Difficult Aspect of Troop Command 18 Typical Day 21 Command Philosophy 21 Advice 22 Closing Thought 23

Appendix A Access Agreement A Colonel Douglas B. Campbell, USA Retired Appendix B Bio B Brent Bankus

U.S. Army Military History Institute

1

VIETNAM COMPANY COMMANDER INTERVIEW PROGRAM

INTERVIEWER: Brent Bankus

INTERVIEWEE: Colonel (Retired) Douglas B. Campbell

[Start C-351, Tape 1, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: My name is Brent Bankus. Im the Chief, Oral History Branch in

the Military History Institute [MHI]. Im here in Collins Hall interviewing Colonel (Ret.)

Douglas Campbell, Director for the Center of Strategic Leadership and

Development. Today Im conducting a Vietnam Company Commander Interview,

which is a topical program sponsored by MHI and sir, Id like to thank you for your

participation in our program. We really appreciate you passing on the knowledge

that you have from serving. Sir, could you give us a little bit of background on what

organizations you served with in the Republic of Vietnam?

COL CAMPBELL: I had three separate organizations, three separate assignments

in Vietnam. The first one was from July of 1968 to about January of 1969 I was the

II Corps liaison officer down at MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] East

down in Saigon.

INTERVIEWER: That would be the III Corps area?

COL CAMPBELL: It was in III Corps but it was in the Capital Military District. So I

was in Saigon. Then from January of 1969 to July of 1969 I was a troop advisor to

the troop in the 3rd ARVN [Army Republic of Vietnam] Armored Cavalry out of

Pleiku, II Corps Pleiku, Kontum, Dak Tho, Ben Het area.

INTERVIEWER: Just a little bit about that sir, did they operate, the South

Vietnamese Cavalry, operate like ours? Did they have similar missions?


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COL CAMPBELL: Yes, very similar missions, very similar organizations, they were

all ACAVs [Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle]. They didnt have any other armored

vehicles within their organization. They had the 81mm mortar variant versus 4.2

mortar variant that we had in US cavalry units and they were all M113 base rather

than anything else.

INTERVIEWER: I was surprised they didnt have any light armor because they had,

if memory serves, like M41 Walker Bulldogs and those kinds of tanks.

COL CAMPBELL: The Squadron had a tank troop with M-41s, but they didnt

integrate them into the Cavalry troops. They had three regular reconnaissance

troops and then the tank troop. So it was sort of a mix between being like a US

Armored Cavalry Regiment with the three cavalry troops and a tank company. The

squadron didnt have a howitzer battery associated with it. And then from August of

1969 until February/March of 1970 I was the troop commander for K Troop of the

11th U.S. Cavalry.

INTERVIEWER: Sir during your tour there principally as the troop commander of K

Troop 3rd Squadron 11th Cavalry. What do you consider were your most significant

people problems?

COL CAMPBELL: Mid grade and senior grade noncommissioned officers. By that

point in the war the Army, based upon assignment policies, in Campbells opinion,

they essentially destroyed the noncommissioned officer corps, because my

experience is we kept sending them back again and again and again to Vietnam and

they were carrying a fairly significant and heavy load. Most of them were just getting

out so we were doing all sorts of things to create noncommissioned officers. We

had the shake and bake program which Im sure youre familiar with. It produced

some very good leaders. The only trouble is it was like having a second lieutenant

as a platoon leader and a second lieutenant as a platoon sergeant because they had

the exact same experience. You didnt get that leavening and the wizening effect of


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the senior platoon sergeant that you would have with a second lieutenant on that

platoon level so that is where the biggest problem was.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, how did you utilize your officers and senior NCOs

[noncommissioned officers] in your organization?

COL CAMPBELL: I look at that question and Im not quite sure where youre

headed. Again, we spent essentially all our time in the field. I think of six months

that I was commanding K Troop we were back from the field in a secure base area

for three or four days where we did a maintenance stand down. Essentially were

out in the field, so the troop exec officer and the troop mess sergeant, who by the

way was one of the strongest NCOs in the organization, ran the rear and everybody

else stayed out forward and so the organization functioned the way the organization

TO&E [table of organization and equipment] was supposed to function. So the

platoons operated with the regular TO&E [Table of Organization and Equipment] for

platoons. We had a first sergeant who had been an advisor to the Idaho National

Guard for the last five or six years before coming in as a first sergeant and left

something to be desired as far as the first sergeant was concerned. Then we had a

small cadre of folks who ran the CP [command post] but besides that everybody

performed the functions that they were supposed to perform in the TO&E.

INTERVIEWER: So essentially what youre saying is that because you had

inexperience in the ranks you really didnt have an opportunity to train these folks

before they went out to the sticks, true statement?

COL CAMPBELL: Well I took command in the sticks, turned over command in the

sticks and so we never did do formal organized training. I never thought it an issue.

Now it was interesting because we would do training when we had the opportunity,

but it was normally at the vehicle level. So it was like Table 8 kind of stuff for ACAVs

or for a Sheridan crew. Wed occasionally do that because your question has

caused me to liken it to essentially whats going on probably in Afghanistan and Iraq.


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I mean youve got this daily grind that youre going through so were either doing

search and destroy, busting our way through jungles to where we think theres

probably enemy concentrations or were doing highway security or something like

that, but essentially were kind of on a daily basis doing missions and so it would be

hard to break away to do anything bigger than that. We would occasionally set up,

especially if we were doing highway security, wed set up on the highway and then

do Table 8 kind of stuff for both Sheridan and ACAVs.

INTERVIEWER: So you did the best you could with what you had and because of

the OPTEMPO [Operations Tempo] being in the field all the time it was pretty much

catch as catch can as far as training would go then.

COL CAMPBELL: Yes, and again the perception, Im sure from senior leaders is

that since youre engaged in combat operations you remain trained and are trained

up. Im not sure, one of my funniest experiences from that because I was following

down an ACAV that was going down the lane and because again were constantly

getting replacements in so to get this brand new Private E Deuce who is in the crew

training and his vehicle commander tells him to get a grenade and throw it

overboard, so he pulls the pin on a grenade and it goes overboard. Its not good

with about five feet off the side of the vehicle and theyre running down and so when

it goes off were all ducking down inside because it goes off right next to our track

about five feet away. So yes it was an interesting period. As I said perception was

that we were training to the mission.

INTERVIEWER: Sir what was the morale like in your unit?

COL CAMPBELL: My initial comments on that, my initial thought was well that was

pretty good although there clearly were problems and it depended on where we

were. So if we were back close to civilianization there were a lot more problems.

Alcohol and drugs became a bigger problem because we were in that period of time

when the drugs were slowly becoming more and more prevalent throughout the


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Army and we were also seeing a general increase in racial problems. So out in the

woods far away from civilianization, everything was good and as we got closer to

bases or the civilian population it became more and more difficult because there

were more distractions for the Soldiers.

INTERVIEWER: Great segue into the next question, what was the entertainment

like? Im kind of leaning towards the Bob Hope kind of thing.

COL CAMPBELL: I found that part funny because except for the three or four days

where somebody set up 8mm projector or something like that there was zero

entertainment. I recall one time where we got to nominate two or three Soldiers to

send them back to some kind of USO show, but zero in entertainment except for the

daily ration of two beers a night and stuff like that. But again, it was different from an

infantry outfit. Were getting resupplied by Chinook twice a day because if the

Chinook didnt come in twice a day with parts and fuel and stuff like that we sort of

ground to a halt so in addition to parts and fuel we were getting hot meals.

Breakfast would be breakfast to order eggs and bacon and all the rest of that and

then there would be a hot evening meal because they would marmite the hot meals

out with the evening Chinook. So our Soldiers were not having the same kind of

difficulty or the same kind of incredibly hard life that infantry guys would have and

when we worked with infantry we were doing some big operation close to War Zone

C because supposedly Intel indicated that the North Vietnamese were going to come

across in great waves to try to break up some South Vietnamese operations. So we

worked with some American infantry and the first thing we did was set the link up

with them because there was a whole bunch of fighting going on around there. After

we linked up with them we just sat all day because they were getting resupplied and

this single Huey would come in and carry water to them and combat rations,

ammunition and other stuff they had requested. And that single Huey working for

most of the day accomplished what one of our morning or one of our afternoons

resupply runs would have accomplished.


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INTERVIEWER: Sir in regards to your TO&E was that adequate? If not, how did

you organize for operations?

COL CAMPBELL: I thought the TO&E worked very well. We had the resources that

we need. Some of the equipment could have been clearly better but I thought they

gave us what we needed. And I thought the ACAV was a great vehicle. We had

certainly matured the 113 were talking about diesel 113s as opposed to gasoline.

The ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] was running gas which was really

dangerous animals.

INTERVIEWER: So that was an A2 by that time?

COL CAMPBELL: That was an A2 by that time and so they did fine. ACAVs again

by that time wed also added belly armor to them so there could be a little bit of the

psychological issues associated with running over mines.

INTERVIEWER: How about the Sheridans?

COL CAMPBELL: The Sheridan was a very interesting animal. I love the track and

suspension system on the Sheridans.

INTERVIEWER: Christy suspension system?

COL CAMPBELL: Yes. We would not throw track. I had those guys down waddys

where the two tracks were at 45 degree angles going down the side of the wall to the

waddy and just staying on there without any problems at all, where 113s would have

thrown track a long time ago. So I think in six months we threw the track on only

one Sheridan. Now once you threw track on a Sheridan there was no chance of

walking it back on, you just broke track and put it back in and you didnt walk or do

anything else like that. But the turret, the electrical turret was difficult. And then

other components would constantly break because they were aluminum pieces,


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aluminum parts and aluminum frames and housings and stuff would crack based

upon the pressure. We were breaking jungle on a daily basis so were putting a lot

of pressure on the systems. The 152mm gun on the Sheridan almost universally

was shooting nails. Occasionally we would shoot high explosive rounds which

were useful for opening up bunkers and making a way through jungle.

INTERVIEWER: Sir just from my own interest you didnt see any tank on tank did

you?

COL CAMPBELL: Nope never.

INTERVIEWER: Just for the bunkers and so on?

COL CAMPBELL: I never saw them (NVA/VC) use anything bigger than RPGs and

occasionally recoilless rifle.

INTERVIEWER: You know your combat service support, what kind of internal

communication did your troop use during fire missions?

COL CAMPBELL: I found that an interesting question. The way I normally operated

was we would set up an NDP [night defensive position] and in that NDP would be

the headquarters, the maintenance elements and thered always be one platoon left

behind so that it would pull maintenance. So a platoon would be out two days, and

back a day conducting maintenance and with the two platoons that were out and

wed always work two platoons together in the column I would be in either the left

or right column and the fire support officer would be in the exact same position in the

other column so wed be right next to each other. So if we ever got into a fire fight

wed just come together. He would operate on both the troop net and his fire

support net because again we had the Howitzer Battery that belonged to the

squadron, and at that point in time all the mortars were stripped out of the Cavalry

troops and the squadron had a mortar battery so that we had six 155 Howitzers and


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nine 4.2 inch mortars operating as two separate organizations which were always

kept in a proximity to each other so that they could support each other, if the

Howitzer battery came under attack that the mortar battery would provide fire for it

and vice versa. So if youre in the fan of both of those organizations then you

significantly increased fire support capability. So if we had a request for fire support

coming in from platoons over the troop net or if I wanted fire support, we were close

enough to just yell across to each other.

INTERVIEWER: Well thats exactly the point sir that you had the latitude as troop

commander to organize and have out in an SOP [standard operating procedure] how

you were going to act if you had actions on contact and I just described a very

efficient way to make sure that you didnt lose troops.

COL CAMPBELL: As I said we would normally break jungle in a double column

which meant both platoon leaders needed to make sure they knew where each other

were as opposed to the second platoon just sort of following. So on contact the

platoon on the right would break right and the one on the left would break left and so

wed have two platoons so you got to about 22 to 25 vehicles online and you clearly

would be exceeding and turning the flanks of any enemy position that you ran into

and so put that much fire power online normally destroyed any kind of enemy

ambush or anything else that we would run into. Then as I said both the fire support

officer and myself were generally in the middle of being able to control the fire

support requested.

INTERVIEWER: Sir being it was in Southeast Asia Vietnam was there any kind of

impact from the temperature, humidity and all those kinds of things, on equipment,

or people? I mean you had to get used to it I would imagine.

COL CAMPBELL: I guess from the human being point of view the issue of the

temperature and the humidity and the rain depending upon what part of the season

you were in became difficult. Keeping the troops in flak jackets became difficult. I


9

always look at the operations ongoing now where they are wearing a much heavier

armored plate than we were using. Infantry never wore anything as an example and

we tried to keep all our Soldiers in flak jackets all the time because as theyre sitting

as opposed to walking makes a big difference. It did offer a level of protection I

recall where we were doing one search and destroy in a sort of a semi built up area,

a lot of rice patties around and we were out crossing and one of my platoon leaders

directed his guys through a cut in a gulley that had been bulldozed in there by some

Americans previously and I was commenting to him I said, You know if we run into

a mine anyplace today youve just picked the place where the mine is likely to be.

And he drove through it and I drove through it. The Sheridan behind us drove

through it and as the Sheridan behind us drove through it he exploded the mine. I

had a brand new guy from the CP who was with us because again the way we

operated meant that my crew and my artillery officers were out every day as

opposed to two of every three days like line platoon soldiers. So I would rotate

soldiers in from the CP in other places to man the ACAV guns and on this occasion

he wound up with about a 4 or 5 inch piece of shrapnel that went into his back from

the 105 or 155 shell that was part of the mine. He survived fine because he was

wearing that flak jacket. The flak jacket absorbed most of what he had. He had a

penetration of about an inch or so into his back and as opposed to all the way

through. So keeping the troops in flak jackets was important to do that but again it

just drove us crazy. On equipment, overheating was an issue. Number one, we

were operating at high external temperatures; number two, were busting jungle and

the biggest problem was keeping the engines cool because although both the

Sheridan and the 113s are water cooled soon all the air intake would fill with leaves

and other stuff and so we would have to stop and clean out to let the crews do that

so that they wouldnt be overheating. Probably the third interesting part would be

radios. By afternoon the fan on a radio would never stop going whether or not you

were transmitting or not; the fan would never stop running. It just ran constantly.

INTERVIEWER: Do you have AN/VRC 12, Vehicular Radio , and the AN/PRC 77,

man portable radio and the rest of that?


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COL CAMPBELL: Yes the AN/VRC-12 series in the vehicles and the PRC radios for

dismounted work. On all variants of the radio the fans would never stop going. After

that the biggest problem was the encryption gear because back then the encryption

gear was this big humongous thing and whether or not that worked was always

problematic again based upon the heat. When I would go into the squadron

headquarters they would have fans blowing out, regular commercial fans blowing

trying to keep that stuff cool.

INTERVIEWER: Did you find anything else that was peculiar to Vietnam?

COL CAMPBELL: The thing that strikes most is fire ants. The platoon leaders

would constantly rotate the lead track so as to change the lead guy breaking jungle.

When they hit a tree with a fire ant hive in it you would have to laugh but it isnt funny

at all for the kids involved. The drivers would pop out of their hatch or the TC [Tank

Commander] would pop out of the hatch and hed come screaming back throwing

clothes around and everybody else would be up there with spray cans of bug spray

trying to kill the ants that were just chewing the soldiers apart.

INTERVIEWER: Sir what missions did you carry out? Were they mostly search and

destroy or screen, guard and cover?

COL CAMPBELL: We did search and destroy and guard and cover doing road

security is really a cover mission. When things were critical we got pulled back to

road security. Wed operate on a series of old fire bases and convoys would come

in and out of it, but it was probably 65 or 70 percent of our effort would be search

and destroy and 30 or 35 percent would be road security because again unless you

had a specific objective road security was an incredible waste of the resources.

INTERVIEWER: Now you operated west of southern II Corps/northern III Corps,

Saigon and west of the Cambodian border, correct?


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COL CAMPBELL: We would work north of Saigon almost exclusively north of

Saigon all the way up to the Cambodian border from An Loc/Loc Ninh west to Tai

Ninh War Zone C area up to the Cambodian border. That is the picture thats

downstairs. The picture thats downstairs, is a bunker complex somewhere around

the Cambodian border. Im not sure exactly where. It was somewhere around the

Cambodian border.

INTERVIEWER: Just for my own interest was that a lot of what you ran into bunkers

that you had to clear?

COL CAMPBELL: We were constantly searching for the enemy and if we found

bunker complexes in areas where we assigned to search that was a good thing.

The enemy would have to be in camp where there was a source of water and

therefore the squadron staff would be sending us to areas along streams and along

areas that were where water was there so that we could likely find the enemy. The

only trouble is of course is that that meant we were going to areas which were the

most inhospitable to armored vehicles so we had this constant tension. One of the

assigned mission areas was an AOR [area of responsibility] that was about a

thousand yards on either side of a waterway that went for about 10 kilometers and

that was where I was supposed to patrol and we spent the entire day pulling stuff out

of the mud. That was the whole dichotomy between what was logical to find the

enemy and where we could actually go.

INTERVIEWER: Did you find that the enemy would -- knowing they were getting a

good feel for what you were out there doing set you up for a bush whack?

COL CAMPBELL: Initially yes, but the problem for them, I dont know if I can

describe it right, the problem for them was the firepower differential between what

we could bring to bear and what they could bring to bear was just so enormous. It

wasnt a fair fight. I mean you roll the platoons online. The platoon has about ten


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vehicles. In those ten vehicles are 30 machine guns, plus three 152s so it is nothing

like what happens if they ambush an infantry platoon. I mean the firepower ratio

was just so enormous. The standard SOP for the wing gunners, the .30 caliber

gunners was the first burst was 100 rounds. Do not stop pulling the trigger until 100

rounds have gone down range and the .50 cal guys are, first burst is 50 rounds. So

the initial firefight is just an overwhelming amount of ammunition coming out. I was

in one firefight, heavy jungle to start with and when we finished it was like

somebodys front lawn. Everything had been cut, from six inch trees down. Just cut

because of the enormous amount of firepower that youve got when you start

shooting all those machine guns and then shooting nails. It just wipes away

everything.

INTERVIEWER: In the area of supply and maintenance did you have any difficulty

with repair parts? You discussed this a little bit before but if theres anything that

stands out in your mind.

COL CAMPBELL: I thought the supply of repair parts was good. Some vehicles

were perennially difficult to keep going like 548s. We had a 548 to replace the

trucks because we certainly couldnt get trucks into the jungle and for some reason

or other they had taken a perfect good M113 and adapted it into an M548 and ruined

it. Besides that, repair parts were adequate, the supply time was okay as I said the

normal Chinook missions would involve repair parts in the morning, anything else

that we would need during the day especially for the platoon that would stay in back

and pull maintenance during the day would be available. When the platoons would

come back in the evening we would order repair parts and the evening Chinook

would bring fuel and water. We would get 500 gallons of fuel and 500 gallons of

water and then hot chow and then the stuff for breakfast in the morning and anything

else that we had established a need for during the day. Again the XO [executive

officer] and the mess sergeant who were running the rear would do a great job of

assembling those packages and hauling them out to the LZ [Landing Zone] at Quan

Loi and sending them out to us.


13

INTERVIEWER: Now did you have the recovery asset 578s, 88s with you or did you

have to call back and get them?

COL CAMPBELL: We had a 578 and our maintenance operation traveled with us,

we also had a great maintenance NCO and crew with us. They did not go out and

do missions but they would be the combat trains that were with us in whatever NDP

(night defensive position) that we would set up. So we would normally set up a

position. Wed stay in that position somewhere between 48 and 72 hours depending

upon how things felt and then wed pick up and move that position someplace else

and stay 48 to 72 hours. The field trains, the headquarters CP, cooks would stay in

that position together with a platoon that would be there all the time and then the

other platoons would be out and then every third day a platoon would stay in.

Based upon this schedule the troops had a incredibly high motivation to maintain

their vehicles and they keep them operational.

[End C-351, Tape 1, Side 1]

[Start C-351, Tape 1, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: Sir youre talking a little bit about the maintenance. Did you have

many problems with the 578? Because as a battalion maintenance officer myself I

found that youd have to circle X that thing because theres a spade on the front of it

and the hydraulic hoses were hanging out there in the jungle or underbrush could

catch on that a lot.

COL CAMPBELL: No I dont recall the issue and again it wasnt leading anything so

its pretty well broken down by the time it was coming down a trail. Most of the issue

of the 578 was using it as a wrecker as opposed to a recovery vehicle. Almost all

our recovery was self recovery and I never recall pulling the 578 out of the defensive

position to come out to the field.


14

INTERVIEWER: I was going to say 113s and Sheridans both, its not like youre

trying to pull out an M60. You could pretty much do it on your own and even if you

needed the 578 you could get out there real quick and get back.

COL CAMPBELL: I dont ever remember pulling it out of the defensive position or

the maintenance effort.

INTERVIEWER: I see. Sir with regards I know we talked about the TO&E and what

came to mind was did you folks have any access to night vision goggles and did you

go after them? Did you request them?

COL CAMPBELL: Night vision equipment was sort of just at the cusp of coming in.

Sheridans came in with night vision i.e. IR [Infrared] sights and we were working IR

and we were seeing some weapons sights, either IR or night vision stuff, but it was

really big and really clumsy and wasnt really a key piece of what we did and how we

did it.

INTERVIEWER: Well then did you conduct a lot of night ops or not?

COL CAMPBELL: We did. We would send some dismounted patrols out from

where we were. So wed put out dismounted listening posts from where we would

be both the troop NDP and the platoon NDPs. Two platoons and the HQ element

would be wed be out all day, they would come back to the troop position in the late

afternoon, you would do maintenance, you would feed, you would do whatever

resupply was necessary to do and then two platoons would go out to platoon

positions, far enough out so theyre outside the direct fire weapons range so you

wouldnt be shooting each other, but theyd be out in two different directions so that if

somebody wants to attack the troop NDP theyve got to deal with the fact that there

are now three locations that they have to fight so it made the entire equation much

more difficult for the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong as they were trying to do


15

reconnaissance of and what they wanted to attack, based on that we didnt do get a

lot on night attacks against our positions. One of the platoons that went out for the

night was the one that spent the day conducting maintenance. Both those platoons

would come back in after stand-to and eat breakfast and then go out on patrol. We

would occasionally do night thunder runs to keep roads closed to the enemy. We

would just drive down the roads with no lights on at all ready to engage forces if we

found anybody on the road and things of that sort, people laying mines. Most of that

effort was on small trails not big roads.

INTERVIEWER: Sir NDP what does that stand for?

COL CAMPBELL: Night Defensive Position.

INTERVIEWER: Sir you talked a little bit about it before but what were the general

conditions like for your living conditions?

COL CAMPBELL: Well again in the field all of the Soldiers would have cots so

theyre either sleeping alongside their vehicle on a cot or inside the vehicle or on top

of the vehicle with a cot and sleeping bag or whatever it is depending upon the

temperatures. The days were warm but the nights were reasonably cool so that

caused them to go into sleeping bags. I would sleep on a cot inside the tent

extension of the 577, so that I would be always available to immediately go into the

577 in case something took place that required my attention. It was considerably

better than an infantry outfit but we never saw clean sheets or beds for the entire

period.

INTERVIEWER: That brings up a good point because we havent covered anything

on the 577 command vehicle. Were there any issues with that communication wise

or anything with those?


16

COL CAMPBELL: No, I thought the 577 was a very good vehicle again, they did a

good job of the 113 conversion compared to the 548s.

INTERVIEWER: Im sorry what is a 548?

COL CAMPBELL: The 548 was like a track originally designed for artillery outfit to

haul ammunition.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, okay a track?

COL CAMPBELL: Its a 113 that you cut, right behind the drivers position you cut it

off and do a flatbed so in size its about a 2.5 ton truck. But its a 113 track vehicle

with a cabin up front with glass windows and stuff like that. I think we immediately

took the glass windows out of them because of the danger of broken glass and

reflections inside the vehicle. With the dust it was impossible to see through the

glass.

INTERVIEWER: I dont believe Ive ever seen one. That was the reason I asked.

COL CAMPBELL: Oh, ok. So the 577 worked fine but again the 577 is moving

every two or three days. The principal problems were generators because youre

working a 4.2 KW generator. For some reason the Army had a difficult time getting

good generators. I dont know why, they were also very noisy. The only other issue

wound up being communications because traditionally we were really far from

squadron HQ, and again its one of the hallmarks of the Cav units spread out all over

the place. So wed traditionally have to put up multiple AN 292s to be able to

communicate on all the different radio networks that we would have to work.

Sometimes going back to the artillery fire support stuff sometimes wed have to do

relays to get what we would need in fire support because of the distance that we

were covering and the difficulty to get through jungle.


17

INTERVIEWER: Sir what would be the most difficult aspect to command that you

encounter when you were K Troop commander?

COL CAMPBELL: Probably again Soldier behavior problems as I said were starting

to see the issues of drugs and we were starting to see the issues of racial problems

and as we got close to civilization; do road security stuff then you have the local

Vietnamese people selling stuff to Soldiers so that opened up the potential for drugs.

Tactically probably the most difficult problem winds up being land navigation, where

are you, how do you get where you want to go.

INTERVIEWER: I was going to say were the maps fairly good or not?

COL CAMPBELL: I thought the maps were fine. Probably my biggest problem with

the platoon leaders is the question of who thinks theyre in the right place and who

isnt in the right place.

INTERVIEWER: Sir since you had more experience say then at being in country as

it were when you had your platoon leaders how did you reconcile that? Was there

anything you did especially with them or just say hey look, time to get with it? How

did you find being in country for a while to read a map?

COL CAMPBELL: I guess I always considered myself pretty good at being able to

operate on maps and work with maps. I would take special care to plot where we

were going and things of that sort. Again as one of the reasons I established the two

platoon formation was because it required both platoon leaders to track where they

were because they may be shifted to a different place. The platoon leaders didnt

especially like that solution, nor did the soldiers, because it put both platoons at risk,

but it keeps both platoons in the action. They cant just be watching the end

connectors go by as the trail or second platoon. So that became an issue and

probably the only other time that I really got upset with a platoon leader. We were

coming back from a deep jungle penetration where we had been up against the


18

Cambodian border. We are coming back down on a break (we had knocked down

the jungle to create a trail, a break) that we had just made earlier in the day and we

got to a position and the platoon leader started to turn right and I stopped him and I

said, No, the direction is left. Get the platoon going left. The next thing I saw was

of course this platoon leader talking on the radio and he was talking to his platoon

and theres a big conversation going back and forth which of course a discussion of

the platoons leadership was over what the correct direction was. At which time I

called them up and said, Stop the discussion. I want you to turn left and I want to

start moving right now. I dont care what you think, you are going left. There was

no question in my mind on the correct course but clearly my platoon leaders were

not so sure. Lacking all of the kind of capability we have now, with GPS [global

positioning satellite system] and all the other system made everything like that

harder. Fire support was hard in heavy jungle as well it was also difficult because

with a single fire support officer, giving him a break meant you were down to a

specialist or maybe a buck sergeant to handle fires. Theyre suffering the same

problem because the skill levels associated from him down to his guys is a big job

because you dont have any of the experienced non commissioned officers. The

ops guy in my 577 was an E-6 shake and bake. A good kid, great guy who made

all the right decisions but hes still a shake and bake so he comes into the Army as

an E-6 having gone through basic, gone through AIT [advanced individual training],

sent off to shake and bake school and did very well at shake and bake school. So

they made him an E-6 immediately coming into the Army so in six months he was

doing an E-7 platoon sergeants job. Those are the guys who were operating at the

platoon sergeant to the track commander positions.

INTERVIEWER: The next question is what do you spend most of your time and

effort doing in your tour as the troop commander?

COL CAMPBELL: Again Im doing daily ops and out every single day with two

platoons. I dont recall that there was any single day, maybe when we were on road

security, I might have not been out and I might have just checked on the platoons,


19

but any time other than brief periods on the road security mission, I would be out

every day. So it would be breakfast, sunrise breakfast out with the platoon, the two

platoon group all day and then back in and then so it was a pretty constant

operation. The organization functioned because of key leaders knowing their jobs.

Again the second strongest noncommissioned officer we had and it was a close run

thing between him and the mess sergeant was the motor sergeant. The motor

sergeant was an E-7. So he basically was the senior guy even though the first

sergeant would be at the troop NDP. He would be the strongest guy to do make

sure that maintenance was being performed and that security was performed at the

NDP. All those things ran pretty well as far as maintenance and operations is

concerned. The only other thing that would be an issue was personnel management

business, promotions, all of the administrative kind of stuff that we would have to go

through and do.

INTERVIEWER: Sir thats pretty much a typical day what you did. What was your

greatest satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the troops command?

COL CAMPBELL: Probably watching junior leaders grow and mature because

again it was just a remarkable time because the people that youre dealing with,

mostly very junior folks taking on great responsibility. I still keep track and

correspond with the guys who were in my track and the guys who were in the

headquarters. I just saw where one of the wing gunners just recently died, Gary

Wells who lived out in California just recently passed away.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, what do you think would be your command philosophy as a

troop commander?

COL CAMPBELL: I think the philosophy is to make sure that the soldiers and

leaders understand what theyre trying to do and let them go do it. Give them as

much leeway as you can to accomplish their mission. But its difficult down at that

level where youre with them all the time not to engage them when you think theyre


20

doing wrong, but you keep trying to allow them to have as much freedom to do

things on their own as you possibly can. You caused me to think of one thing so I

can go back to it. One of the other issues that we had again during that period of

time was the Soldiers question of what theyre trying to accomplish, given what was

going on state side. I can recall were in War Zone C and its in December. We had

been out there for Thanksgiving and the squadron headquarters and the Howitzer

Battery were badly handled. The squadron had a whole bunch of little fights going

on and supposedly we were close where COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam)

Headquarters was, and they (NVA/VC) put the group together, came down a trail

and attacked the squadron HQ and the How Battery. But the point that I was aiming

at was, it is now December, the troop is back out in the same area alone and one

night a platoon leader came to me and said, You need to go talk to sergeant

whoever, because hes on top of his vehicle and hes got his rifle and he says hell

kill anybody who comes up near him. So I walked over to the vehicle, all the troops

are pretty much away from him and climbed up on the vehicle and we had this long

discussion and it was basically why am I wasting my time here given whats going on

back in the United States and this is a waste of time and a waste of effort and has no

value and all the rest of those issues. So it was also kind of a disheartening

philosophical issue that you had to deal with on the part of the Soldiers. It wasnt a

dominant philosophy for most of the time or a dominant issue most of the time but it

was something that was of concern.

INTERVIEWER: That was the 1970 time frame correct?

COL CAMPBELL: Correct.

INTERVIEWER: Sir what comments would you like to make about the senior

leadership? How that affected you and your unit. Who was the regimental

commander by that time?


21

COL CAMPBELL: Lets see, I started out with Jimmy Leach. Then it changed to

Donn Starry. That is an interesting aside, because we rarely ever saw our fellow

troop commanders, almost never. It would be very big occasion when we did,

because what would normally happen is a Loach (Hughes OH-6 Cayuse) would

come around on a daily basis and drop off orders, and if you then had any issues

you would go up on the radio and talk to the S3 (operations officer) at squadron to

sort out the issue. It would have to be something major to bring together all of the

troop commanders. When we went into the War Zone C up against the Cambodian

border they flew us into the squadron headquarters and laid out the plans to us for

the operation, what we were trying to do and the overall mission and picture. The

only other time that occurred was when they flew around and picked up all the troop

commanders and flew it back for the regimental change of command. We walked

into our rear headquarters and the mess sergeant was there and says Heres a new

set of clothes. Heres a new helmet liner, helmet, and web gear. And, This kid is

going to be your guidon bearer, just go with him, he knows what to do. So we went

out there and with just troop commanders there, no troops behind them, and that

was the change of command as Donn Starry took over from Jimmy Leach. That was

only the second time that all the troop commanders saw each other in six months.

In retrospect Im not sure that they, just like me were so busy engaged in day to day

operations, that we didnt understand the bigger picture on what we were trying to

do. Again they were all doing a good job trying to do the best they could, trying to

understand what was going on. Intelligence was problematic. I had to laugh when

one day Regiment captured a Vietnamese private soldier who told them where their

base camp was and of course he told them on a map where their base camp was.

And of course this kid has no idea what a map is. He never gets to see one and so

we were directed to go here set up a blocking position and they then sent a patrol

in, the blues were walking in with NVA soldier, to where his base camp was as laid

out on the map and pretty soon the blocking units were being moved all over the

place because now the patrol was on the other side of the creek, so we would move

the blocking position and then the patrol was back over on the other side of the

creek. We were moving all over the place because they were again trying to


22

interpret intelligence. And they were trying to do a good job, trying to do a great job.

Jimmy Leach I think suffered from having to rebuild the regiment after George

Patton just ran the crap out of it and probably didnt do much maintenance on it while

he was there. We spent a lot of time doing maintenance on vehicles while I was

there, but we needed to accomplish that level to support our operations. I think that

Donn Starrys approach was somewhere in between Jimmy Leach and Patton.

INTERVIEWER: If you had the opportunity to do it over again what would you

change?

COL CAMPBELL: Im not sure at that level you can get to change very much at all

because you are given what our daily tasks were and we spent most of our time just

executing. Now knowing where the US strategy was going and what we were doing

as part of it was really not a concern. I think we should have spent more time doing

unit training because lets see three or four months after I left the regiment goes into

Cambodia. One of the things that we essentially had not done, nobody had done

because of the daily mission is be able to fight the troop as a troop because that

wasnt what we did on a regular basis so I probably would have spent more time

doing that although I am not sure I could have.

INTERVIEWER: Like you say its systemic to what kind of a mission you were

given. See again having done these interviews before, it depends on what

organization that the person had been with. Infantry is a lot slower. They move a lot

slower. Theyre able to reflect a little bit more I think but when you talk about

Cavalry and being out and doing the missions that the cavalry does and staying out

a lot, it is a little bit different story. So thats where some of these questions come

from. Sir what advice would you give any troop commander coming in that would

kind of help him on this type of a situation whether it be leadership, knowing the job?


23

COL CAMPBELL: Again leaders need to be tactically and technically proficient in

terms of the elements necessary to fight their unit. Map reading is one example. I

dont know what current capabilities are.

INTERVIEWER: Because they have a GPS.

COL CAMPBELL: Yes they have a GPS and all the computer equipment .

INTERVIEWER: What happens when it breaks?

COL CAMPBELL: Well it can. That is one of the things we are asked to

understand. As we take maps off the table as paper and give you maps as

electronics and all the other electronics support equipment, how do you operate

without it working? It also means tactically and technically proficient on the

capabilities of the weapons systems and equipment. Plus how do you maintain

them in the field. And then of course it really becomes a question of people and how

do you motivate people to do the most important things that need to be done and

that you build a decent organization where the people work together to accomplish

what you want. Part of that becomes what is the bigger mission that youre trying to

do and how does what you do fit into it? It is easy to lose sight of that question.

What should you be preparing your organization to do in the future becomes another

question and what is it that they could be called upon to do versus what you are

actually doing? Its all those things, but its an incredibly complex business because

what youre trying to do is focus on what the daily mission is to keep people alive

while youre doing all the other aspects as well. Sometimes thats just all

consuming.

INTERVIEWER: Well stated. Anything else that youd like to comment on that we

havent touched on very well?


24

COL CAMPBELL: I dont think so. Again, being a cav troop commander in Vietnam

was a really incredible experience. Probably the most interesting piece was the first

time in a firefight where you suddenly consider the fact that those people are actually

trying to kill you. It is a very sobering point. Once you get over that the rest of it

becomes easier to compartmentalize and understand.

INTERVIEWER: Again we want to thank you for participation in our program here.

We appreciate it.

COL CAMPBELL: Okay Brent, thank you.

[End Tape C-351, Tape 1, Side 2]

front cover Campbell Vietnam 2013foreword Campbell Vietnam 2013bio Campbell Vietnam 2013TOC Campbell Vietnam 2013text Campbell Vietnam (subj editl 22 Oct 2013) (2)appendix Campbell Vietnam 2013back cover Campbell Vietnam 2013 print

oral history of col douglas b campbell retired

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