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bullor In ountain Warf~re
red School 1 60 bull
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bull _04 o
A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox Kentucky 1949 - 1950
Rmiddot 6
ARMOR IN MOUNTA IN WARFARE
A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
BY
COMMITTEE 28 ~ OFFICERS ADV1NCED COURSE
THE Afu~ORED SCHOOL
1949 - 1950
LIEUTENANT COLUNEL HENRY FRANKEL
NlAJOR KENliJETH A NOSECK
MAJOR VICTOR B FOX
IVIAJOR iiALTEH H WILLIAMS
WJJOR WELDON W WILSON
CAPTAIN JERRY G WALLACE
CAPTjHJ JOHN W HUGHES JR
CAPIAn~ JOHN H IRVING
CAPTAHT NJilURICE L YOUNG
FORT KNOX I KENTUCKY
MJY 1950
~~ ~---~ --~~
REFACE
This report h~s been orep~1ed by ~ cowmi~tee of students of the
chpter l3bout l3rmored WIlrflre for 8 proiected book The oridn81 8ssignment
spedfied thl3t the Committe3 would not limit its considertion to C1ne or two
l111oreO units wh jch bllrl eng sed in mountll in warffire because such reports
8lredv h~d been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11ittees of former clsses of The
ArIrored School Inste~d this ComlTittes ws t(l ~nqljre into the brol3d fjeld
of aJl l3rmored comhat in mount ins illustrl3tinS the re-port with eXlgtmples
lected from foreign l3S ~ell s American sources
--- bull t () obtl3 in It could be middotrlepned from the qftlr-action repC1rts of the
units jmrolvec subilet to the hherent eXl3~erdio1 of unit lchie-ement
common to suer publictirlns However the dehdls were l)SU~lly lcldnl
Frequent incidentl 1efarences trgt lIdifficult terrlt1 jn ll were common but the
moen possible the Cow~itte3 hls filJed in the olcture based upon
mllp study person8l interrjew or I remember bull bullbull11 8rticles in SI31I1iC9
iournl3ls even the lltter source TI11st remlin suspect The articles
freg1)ently extol the scintillptin T f5 re mlllneuver nd shock action (If the
excellent source of prlctic~l S1)IFlstjons Hovrevflr the seldoll1 Olve comblt
jLlustrlticms which the COImTlittee b3lievJd were sorely needed in order to nrel
3ent 3 Vell-r(lunoed picture
if
-It is hoped thJlt some futute oommittee will comple~middote this wotk
To do so will teqUit6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files Th~t m~teri~l
possibly to be lluPrrenteo by specifjc tnterrotqtion of GerWlin OifiC6tS who
f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily
Future Wtiters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures
the C(Imrrittee crnscienti(luslv h3s striven to follow in ttlis report thoroueh
d(lcllwentqti(ln of tl1e text limit~ti(l(l (If edjtorltll o--i Y1 1(ln to ttl6 conclusion
text is desired ind the jnclusion of I3ddition31 useful infortnltion in the
Jl ppe nO i xe s bull
iii
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bull bull
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-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
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CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
Rmiddot 6
ARMOR IN MOUNTA IN WARFARE
A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
BY
COMMITTEE 28 ~ OFFICERS ADV1NCED COURSE
THE Afu~ORED SCHOOL
1949 - 1950
LIEUTENANT COLUNEL HENRY FRANKEL
NlAJOR KENliJETH A NOSECK
MAJOR VICTOR B FOX
IVIAJOR iiALTEH H WILLIAMS
WJJOR WELDON W WILSON
CAPTAIN JERRY G WALLACE
CAPTjHJ JOHN W HUGHES JR
CAPIAn~ JOHN H IRVING
CAPTAHT NJilURICE L YOUNG
FORT KNOX I KENTUCKY
MJY 1950
~~ ~---~ --~~
REFACE
This report h~s been orep~1ed by ~ cowmi~tee of students of the
chpter l3bout l3rmored WIlrflre for 8 proiected book The oridn81 8ssignment
spedfied thl3t the Committe3 would not limit its considertion to C1ne or two
l111oreO units wh jch bllrl eng sed in mountll in warffire because such reports
8lredv h~d been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11ittees of former clsses of The
ArIrored School Inste~d this ComlTittes ws t(l ~nqljre into the brol3d fjeld
of aJl l3rmored comhat in mount ins illustrl3tinS the re-port with eXlgtmples
lected from foreign l3S ~ell s American sources
--- bull t () obtl3 in It could be middotrlepned from the qftlr-action repC1rts of the
units jmrolvec subilet to the hherent eXl3~erdio1 of unit lchie-ement
common to suer publictirlns However the dehdls were l)SU~lly lcldnl
Frequent incidentl 1efarences trgt lIdifficult terrlt1 jn ll were common but the
moen possible the Cow~itte3 hls filJed in the olcture based upon
mllp study person8l interrjew or I remember bull bullbull11 8rticles in SI31I1iC9
iournl3ls even the lltter source TI11st remlin suspect The articles
freg1)ently extol the scintillptin T f5 re mlllneuver nd shock action (If the
excellent source of prlctic~l S1)IFlstjons Hovrevflr the seldoll1 Olve comblt
jLlustrlticms which the COImTlittee b3lievJd were sorely needed in order to nrel
3ent 3 Vell-r(lunoed picture
if
-It is hoped thJlt some futute oommittee will comple~middote this wotk
To do so will teqUit6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files Th~t m~teri~l
possibly to be lluPrrenteo by specifjc tnterrotqtion of GerWlin OifiC6tS who
f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily
Future Wtiters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures
the C(Imrrittee crnscienti(luslv h3s striven to follow in ttlis report thoroueh
d(lcllwentqti(ln of tl1e text limit~ti(l(l (If edjtorltll o--i Y1 1(ln to ttl6 conclusion
text is desired ind the jnclusion of I3ddition31 useful infortnltion in the
Jl ppe nO i xe s bull
iii
----__
bull bull
--
-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
ARMOR IN MOUNTA IN WARFARE
A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
BY
COMMITTEE 28 ~ OFFICERS ADV1NCED COURSE
THE Afu~ORED SCHOOL
1949 - 1950
LIEUTENANT COLUNEL HENRY FRANKEL
NlAJOR KENliJETH A NOSECK
MAJOR VICTOR B FOX
IVIAJOR iiALTEH H WILLIAMS
WJJOR WELDON W WILSON
CAPTAIN JERRY G WALLACE
CAPTjHJ JOHN W HUGHES JR
CAPIAn~ JOHN H IRVING
CAPTAHT NJilURICE L YOUNG
FORT KNOX I KENTUCKY
MJY 1950
~~ ~---~ --~~
REFACE
This report h~s been orep~1ed by ~ cowmi~tee of students of the
chpter l3bout l3rmored WIlrflre for 8 proiected book The oridn81 8ssignment
spedfied thl3t the Committe3 would not limit its considertion to C1ne or two
l111oreO units wh jch bllrl eng sed in mountll in warffire because such reports
8lredv h~d been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11ittees of former clsses of The
ArIrored School Inste~d this ComlTittes ws t(l ~nqljre into the brol3d fjeld
of aJl l3rmored comhat in mount ins illustrl3tinS the re-port with eXlgtmples
lected from foreign l3S ~ell s American sources
--- bull t () obtl3 in It could be middotrlepned from the qftlr-action repC1rts of the
units jmrolvec subilet to the hherent eXl3~erdio1 of unit lchie-ement
common to suer publictirlns However the dehdls were l)SU~lly lcldnl
Frequent incidentl 1efarences trgt lIdifficult terrlt1 jn ll were common but the
moen possible the Cow~itte3 hls filJed in the olcture based upon
mllp study person8l interrjew or I remember bull bullbull11 8rticles in SI31I1iC9
iournl3ls even the lltter source TI11st remlin suspect The articles
freg1)ently extol the scintillptin T f5 re mlllneuver nd shock action (If the
excellent source of prlctic~l S1)IFlstjons Hovrevflr the seldoll1 Olve comblt
jLlustrlticms which the COImTlittee b3lievJd were sorely needed in order to nrel
3ent 3 Vell-r(lunoed picture
if
-It is hoped thJlt some futute oommittee will comple~middote this wotk
To do so will teqUit6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files Th~t m~teri~l
possibly to be lluPrrenteo by specifjc tnterrotqtion of GerWlin OifiC6tS who
f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily
Future Wtiters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures
the C(Imrrittee crnscienti(luslv h3s striven to follow in ttlis report thoroueh
d(lcllwentqti(ln of tl1e text limit~ti(l(l (If edjtorltll o--i Y1 1(ln to ttl6 conclusion
text is desired ind the jnclusion of I3ddition31 useful infortnltion in the
Jl ppe nO i xe s bull
iii
----__
bull bull
--
-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
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t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
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r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
~~ ~---~ --~~
REFACE
This report h~s been orep~1ed by ~ cowmi~tee of students of the
chpter l3bout l3rmored WIlrflre for 8 proiected book The oridn81 8ssignment
spedfied thl3t the Committe3 would not limit its considertion to C1ne or two
l111oreO units wh jch bllrl eng sed in mountll in warffire because such reports
8lredv h~d been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11ittees of former clsses of The
ArIrored School Inste~d this ComlTittes ws t(l ~nqljre into the brol3d fjeld
of aJl l3rmored comhat in mount ins illustrl3tinS the re-port with eXlgtmples
lected from foreign l3S ~ell s American sources
--- bull t () obtl3 in It could be middotrlepned from the qftlr-action repC1rts of the
units jmrolvec subilet to the hherent eXl3~erdio1 of unit lchie-ement
common to suer publictirlns However the dehdls were l)SU~lly lcldnl
Frequent incidentl 1efarences trgt lIdifficult terrlt1 jn ll were common but the
moen possible the Cow~itte3 hls filJed in the olcture based upon
mllp study person8l interrjew or I remember bull bullbull11 8rticles in SI31I1iC9
iournl3ls even the lltter source TI11st remlin suspect The articles
freg1)ently extol the scintillptin T f5 re mlllneuver nd shock action (If the
excellent source of prlctic~l S1)IFlstjons Hovrevflr the seldoll1 Olve comblt
jLlustrlticms which the COImTlittee b3lievJd were sorely needed in order to nrel
3ent 3 Vell-r(lunoed picture
if
-It is hoped thJlt some futute oommittee will comple~middote this wotk
To do so will teqUit6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files Th~t m~teri~l
possibly to be lluPrrenteo by specifjc tnterrotqtion of GerWlin OifiC6tS who
f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily
Future Wtiters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures
the C(Imrrittee crnscienti(luslv h3s striven to follow in ttlis report thoroueh
d(lcllwentqti(ln of tl1e text limit~ti(l(l (If edjtorltll o--i Y1 1(ln to ttl6 conclusion
text is desired ind the jnclusion of I3ddition31 useful infortnltion in the
Jl ppe nO i xe s bull
iii
----__
bull bull
--
-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
-It is hoped thJlt some futute oommittee will comple~middote this wotk
To do so will teqUit6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files Th~t m~teri~l
possibly to be lluPrrenteo by specifjc tnterrotqtion of GerWlin OifiC6tS who
f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily
Future Wtiters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures
the C(Imrrittee crnscienti(luslv h3s striven to follow in ttlis report thoroueh
d(lcllwentqti(ln of tl1e text limit~ti(l(l (If edjtorltll o--i Y1 1(ln to ttl6 conclusion
text is desired ind the jnclusion of I3ddition31 useful infortnltion in the
Jl ppe nO i xe s bull
iii
----__
bull bull
--
-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
----__
bull bull
--
-TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGECHAPIER
1INTRODUCTION bull ~ bull bull ~ 10 bull bull bull bull
Statement of Problem bull bull bull bull middot ~ ~ 1
1SdUrees bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ 10 ~
1 middot ~ 10bullbullbull bull
2Definition of Terms bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bullbullbull
3GENERAL bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullIt bull bull
Terrain and Weather bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull ~ II 3
Lo~1st ioa 1 Support bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot bull bull bull 8
Special Considerilltions ~ 20
ATTACK bull bull bull t middot middot bull bull bull bull bull middot~ 28
Specifll Cortsider~tions 28
bull ITechniques bull bull middot bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 32
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull it 45
4 DEFENSE bullbull bull bull middot bull bull 61 middot Techniques bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull to bull bull bull bull
Problems bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 CONCLUSION bull 94~ ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
APPENDICES ~ bull bull ~ bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull ~ ~ J bull J 4
I Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions bull 4 103
II Factors To Be Considered 107
iv
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
bull bull bull
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
T~nk on Icy Ro~d bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 5
Tank Bo~~ed in Snow ~ 16
E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter Re~r View bullbull bull II Igt bull 12
EV1cuation of SP Howitzer Front View bullbull bull bull bull bull 14
5 SP Howitzer in Mounts ins bull bull bull bull 35
6 Vill~ Verde Trail Luzon p I bull 37 41 bullbullbull ~ III bullbull
III bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _Plnorllmio View Vi11~ Verde Trail 41
8 Tanke on MountJl in ROlld OkinaWl 43
~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s OkinJlwa bull II 46
Sketoh MAp Monte C~ssino ItJlly bull ill bull r 50
MAP SJlV6rne ~p bull bull gt bull bull bull ie bull bullbullbull bull 54
12 Tllsk Force Howze bull bull bull bull bull middot 67
13 Sketoh ~P Eqst Centr~l Tunisill - 14 Aotion Ilt Mqlkino - 80
15 Tllnks Mount Be lvedere Itllly - - 82
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
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t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
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rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
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r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCT ION
This is the report of 3 comtlittee investi~l1ti on of the use of I1rmor
in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of
lHmored units of 1311 shes from section to d ivision It lMS the purpose of
this report to colleot for re3dy reference 111 3~il~ble ~teril3l describing
combt experienoe in mount3in operptions
Comblt in IIlountl3 ins is not unusui 1 in the IIistory of Wl3rfl re but it
represents ~n I3ctivity in which tl3n~s virtu13l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl1r
II A thoughtful cons iderltion of mountq inaus I1ral1t of the world -- the
Rockies Alps Vos~es Cqrpl3thi~ns Pyrenees Url31s Himl3ll3Yl3s I1nd the
~ C us -- will revell their str~tf3~ic importl3nce 1311 nlturll lnd p(1litic~l
bound13ries yit131 in globl31 wl3r Any future conflict m~y well see llrgeshy
sClle opertions for the control of mountltins involvlng- the use of I3rmored
units
This study WI3S b13sed on mteri131 obt13ined fro~ offioi131 documents
pedodicl31s lnd books I3~T~ihble t Fort Knox suppleented by interview qnd
pgt9rsonl31 9-rperience Limitl3tions of tj mEl Jlnd qVl j lqbte re ference mqterlll
pre-ented lny truly complete stud but it is believed tbqt 13 representptive
coverlee bl3s been obbdned~ suff5cient t(1 justify conclusions
In order to provide 13 lo~icql frl3mework for the presentltion of the
committee findings this study h~s been orgl3nized into three ch~pters (1)
q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 1311 mountqinous o~r~tions
(~~ specific discussion of those I3ddition131 fctors peculilr to tl1B ~ttl3ck
ln~ v) discussion of those c(1 l1 siderlitions prored by experience to be of
1
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
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FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
p bull try c0ncern to the defense
In genertl the tern mountllin l1 tnellns Ii hib elevBtion of l~nd liS
opposed to 13 IIhill which is Bccepted to be B lower elevl3tion HOwelTer the
eXllct use of these terms v~ries in different locllities for eXl3mple
bullbullbull in 10wlBnds where tbe e levl3ti(lns ~1e not numerous Bnd do not reach B greBt hei~ht 13 rise of eround of I3bout 100 to 20 feet is clliled B mountl3in while in 13 mountl3inous country ~n elevl3tion of 1000 feet to less thl3n 2000 is often clliled Ii hill bullbull bullbull 1
For the purpose of this study mountl3inous terrl3in hlls been defined
to include violent irregull3ritv of the elrth s surf-ace rJ3ther thlln mere
lltitude
Nount3in operltions were considered chiefly from the tllctlc131 point
of view d1scussin~ logistic-al 3ctivities only to the extent of their inshy
~nce upon the tllctical situJ3tion
Throughout this study the term lrmor h~s been interpreted to me3n
all Ilrmored units within the 1rmored division Brmored infntry Ilrmored
1rtillery J3rmored engineers -as well BS t~nk unjts However combllt
illustrBtions h8ve been limited t(l those oper8tions specificBllv involving
the use of t~nks or t8nk destroyers
Resellrch included the recorded experiences of 3rmored units from Illl
8rmies both Ilfriendlyl 8nd enemylf The comb4t illustrBtions presented in
thjs study were selected for re8sons of relevlt111ce to the P3rtjc11lqr pojnt of
discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne to show the overlll
supedority of one force or technique comptlred with Ilnother
------------------ --- ----___------------shyNOTES FOR C~PTER 1
l---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicaeo Americannll Corporl3tion~ 194f 531
2
~-------------------------
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL
Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous
operJltj (ms ere conducted in World )qr II lnd tCl1tas cert jn definite conshy
dit~ons comlTon to llll mountqin operltgttions re~prdless of mission or enemy
t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin include
visibility routes of qppropch observltltion fields of fire lnd communic13shy
tions Additionql flctors ire those lo~istictJl problems common to qll types
of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous wlrflre supply trlnsport~tion mqinshy
tennce -md the prob lems pe rtl in inf to mad icltl 1 se rvica s But thlOlt is not -
t hole picture Arising fr(lm mClunblinous cond itions lre spec i31 problems
obserlrltion ltlnd requiretOOnts for sp3cill equipment for weqlJons rehicles
ltlnd personnel ltis well s for th~ sl)pportinR 1rms rmd services All these
flt1ctors will be indhridutllly cOJsi(lllred in this ch~pter jnlsm11ch gts they
repr3sent m1or problems whjch ltJffect 1 rmorec1 onerltltions of I3ny chl3racter in
wount~inous terrljn
Terrain pnd Nellther
Americln doctrine concerning prmored operltion in mounbdnous warfare
recognizes tb~t
bull bull bull tlnks ClIJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllntlge in mountlinous terrlin llthough they mlY be used in llrge units in broad rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl3te~us iHth the exception of their use in such regions they csm be employed only in sm3ll units for
r-tmited objective opertlt ions 1
Th~~~ limit3tions 3re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions
3
lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins
Thqt these limitqtions 1re imposed by the rery nlture of mountlOinolls
terrqtn regl3rdless of its geollriphic loclltion is I3mply Ilttested by the
simihrity of reports from ill theqters of WlOr where mountinol1s t3rrtdn WBS
encountered by qrmored units For eXl3mple n observer in Itqly reported
bullbullbull the terrqin is mountqjnous interspersed with occsion~l nqrrow111l1eys The rOl-lds through the mountllins lre nllrrow steep Ind present innumerllble defiles ledge sections nd Ilre bridged over steep rJvines The vqlleys Imd plllins Ilre cut ~y saries of connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstlloles
Terrl3in in North Afric~ hJs been descrjbed lOS follows
bullbullbull The II Corps W8S to lttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy positinns in terrlin is difficult IS ol-ln be found in the wbole bflttle 1re~ A belt of rugCed hill country 15 to 20 miles in depth hy between the Americ1n lines ~nd MATElJRbullbullbullbull The high ground I v erllges 500 to 1000 fget lbove the nqrrow vf311eys Where
~trees I-lnd brush Ire RCllrce th3 ro(lry slopes steepen It time jnto )liffs Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no coverbullbullbullbull Only two htlrd surfllced rOlds cr08S th3 h5 lIs to lIIATEUR The se rOqds vere of more iIlPortqnce to the II Corns oper~tions is lines of supply trn lS routes of qccess to ~ATEJR3
From the Pqcific Theqter qn After Action Report gives l very similllr
picture of the terrlin encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk Blttlllion in Luzon
The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s gre1t qS 65 degrees up wh~c~1 tlnk-s were bulldoted It WlS even TIecess~ry on wet diYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in the sqTre Il1qnner Suitlble routes or trqils weI seldom Ilv Ul1ble to the qrmor l1nd steep rr~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow proshygress for the tqnks 4
The t8ctic81 effect of mount~inous terrllin cIOn b3st be summlt)rized by
the rpport of IIn Army Ground ForcJS BOl3rd Obserrer IIfter detJ) iled crnsultJ)shy
tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mpnders in Itqly
Doctrines set forth hive plwlYs fgt1vored the empl(lyment of t~nks in l8r~e numbers However from lessons leirned in Bctul3l
~oOIl1btlt here during inolement W61ther in mount~inous country emshy)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3n a comp~ny h~s its limit~tjons The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin
4
o
o
o
0 m~neUV8r in T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble
to move bull Throu~bout en~lP8ments in the mountl1 i ns t~nks
were used in sm~ll numbers The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf1ted suoh employment PS it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross
oountry vVhe re t1nks COll ld S 11Pport hlfqntrv sttflCK-S from fixed positions it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re but even then the field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so ntrrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used
It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incleshy
ment westher It is obrious th8t sellsons 1 ChS1nfes involvine cond itions of
icy surf~ces snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded ere~tly to the
hqz~rds of steep slopes f1nd sh 0 rp curves Where hieh flltitudl3s were inshy
volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wepthpr becqme even more m~enifjed
Snow COlrer beq~n e~rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lonel3r into the spring thus
prolonging the hlrdships of wint3r operPctions
Obserr~tjon too is erJ~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions
oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi shy
flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by
ds)y but left the vqlleys cOlrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of
the Tflorning 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the eood obs3rvp tion 1fhich
could b3 obt~ned on cOIDmflndln ground In this connection the possession
of hirh ~round does not t11w8Ys insurA excellent obsllrlrl=tion in the mount~ins
Eren the possession of t1 lone serj3S of ridges does not me8n complete
coverreo of the ground below bectt1Jse much decd sppce will be discorered even
where successive obs-lrvptlon posts with olrarlqpping fields of observl3tion
Russiln experience in Wnrld VV1r II indic~ted One condition esshy
sentill to success lies in fqlror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Poststt7 This
~W8S substpnti8ted by Americcn experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily
6
middot~
r )19 unusw~llv tugrred mountampdns of It31y forced modific8tion in our
t~ctjcs No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry
for observ~tion In some instqnces the best obS8rr~tion pojnts on the top of
mountnins could not be approlohed or occupioC so ~rmor lIlS 1imited to supshy
porting infqntry lotion on the slo~s
Under these conditions it would seem lOficAl to suppose tht Jlir
fould furnish the ide~l mens of observ~tion However e~rly in middotWmiddotorld Vifllr II
it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oorer of the Tunisiqn hills m13de locqtion
of smf11l tqreets such JS jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible
to the ground observer with elqsses let lone the lir observer Air obsershy
v)tion sorties therefore eaner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of conshy
firmin the pre sl3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def3d eround But here
p~ the CO16r 13 fforded 1nd bullbullbull lithe trfdnine of the enemy in ttIkine pdvanshy
tqpe of s1)ch cover frequently fl~d9 the reslJlts of Jllr observt1tjon noe~tbretl 8
A SUf ere ste d s olut ion to tl s nrob lew wou ld be q n 3 ir observS3t ion post
c~pqble of b3jne suspended imiddotmmobiJmiddot1 wbi le the observer scrutinizes the terr~in
in er)tt datqll The Soriet hioh commstnd htJs studied the possibilities of
employing portA-ble helicopters not only to ~fford qn idel meJlns of lerinl
observ~tion but lilso for the leqdjne units in the mount~ins However the helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3ttenshy
tion of the pilot to 1= degrerJ whic 11 mBlres debliled obs3rv~tion virt1lqlly imshy
possible The two-plflce helicopter howoiTer hqs mAny possibilitj eurols for this
type of ope r8t jon
An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem
~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountfdns the heli shyoptf3r is superjor to cmDIrentjon11 ~ircrf3ft One importqnt fqctor
~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off
7
reJs usufll1y ~ITljlqble in IJ1(1unt~jnous terrqin The two-place helicopter (Typt I3B) c~rries Jn obs~rver who IDliY dl31rote his enshytire 13ttention to th 3 terrpin enjoying q wide Rr9j of vision due to tbe construction of the plqne Since no technicql skill in flying is regujre of him this observer m~y be qn officer thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situRtion on the ground A ~elicopter c13nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvfltion
post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere Howshyerer it is cl1pl1blo of belne operqt~d qt Ii much slOtver speed thRn ~ conlrentionql qircrB-ft Tbjs wold pertrit det1iled studv of the terr~in without presentine th8 wltremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for enemy ground weqpons which c0TIplete iwmobiljtv inlTobTIs Sjnce the ml3int3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten times thqt required for the lil3json type ~ircr~ft q greqter numshyber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt comiddotnmiddoter~ge of the sector9
In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3rlr1tion mountl1inous torrl1in
t~lltQS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of irforTItltion rog1rdloss of tlls ~enns of
corrlunic1tiol1 uS(1d Rrdio f00t or mounted messtJngors or liqison plttnes usod
for this purpose ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~l t3rr rdn This WflS espechtl shy~
ue of r~dio The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt
bullbullbull tho Tl~ountf1inous tJrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=dio communicqshyt j ons Thf) inti rf) renee I=S fl ro su It of b i eh ridge s pe s) k-s ~nd
hjll m~sses often necessitrt3o ~rept Cl4re in the solection of st~t on sit e s the 1T(ln-lrnf3 Yt of stpt i (Ins J1 nd rtl d j 0 r91q y Als 0
th) need of tld0jtionfil r~din te(hrdciQl1s Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtqin
f3ltIO
L0~j~~Jcql Support
Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperpble if troops ~re
properly equipped clothed supplied ~nd trqined Tbe bqsic principlos of
lopistics ~rt3 thl s~le whether COTTb~t be in mCuntqinous terroin or flClt
country howe1rer the technlquos --f lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent ( In mountinous IJV1=rfqre thj r1HRed terrl1in qncl extreme cliT18tic conshy
ditions pqke logistic~l support I0re difficult tind lirrited A study of exshy
~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht~t T1ountf1inous terrqin h8d q tlOfold effect
ofdsticql requircnflnts This effect Wf1S felt in ~n increpsed derM~nd for
~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of
those supplies
A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by
troops operating in mountq inous terrl3 j n reTea Is
1 More food is required because of the rueged work The norshym31 r~tion under qV8rqee conditi()ns is 3600 c131ories daily in mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum
2 Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of groqter cold
3 Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper erqd ient s bull
4 Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent reshyplacelTent bull
5 Marc fuel will be requirJd for cooking because of higher altitudcJs At 10000 feet it r0quires three times Innler to
cook food than at sea lem 1
~) Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due to the dispersion factor caused by exag~9rated tGrr~inll
The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the
sevare h~ndicqp in tho trqnsport~ti(ln of the increased alTount of supplies
It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a single av~il~ble supply
route and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the enshy
tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd Even whore a road net existed it Wf3S
often so narrow tlHlt only 0re-1J1TQY traffic could be perTlitted In North
Africe the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3ds
in its qrea one-way only ofton iq 1dpg extrBlTsly circuitous trips necesspry
Air trlnsportption of supnlios (ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob
lorn This means of transportfttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of
the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJltion
The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the
9
~ noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous
terrain ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the Hump end the subsequent success of
the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be
moved bv air Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re
found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther hi~h pee~s as well ~s the restrictions
on anailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satisshy
f~ctory for this l~tter purpose with oranee end cerise colored bundles and
chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry
Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late
~r and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower more difficult ~round supply
At ~ASSINO 36 A-20s dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes All were recovershy
ed Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required
12300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql eround lOOans --
If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13cb then we mey Sqv that armor
travels on its maintenance effort Reeardless of the technical skill or
blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit its collective combat efficiency is
in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy For an lirwored unit to
be efficient in mount~d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe
in oonventionql warfare Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils
comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi1r only
to mountains Even 11Yith limited b~ttle experience qn lrmored unit soon
learns those critiCll points of ~qintenqnce 1nd those essential items of supshy
ply th~t must h1V8 additjltnql qttentjon constqnt check-ine lnd stlff supershy
vision
The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mountlln operashy
-s is in conventionJ31 wtirfJire Time lnd sp~ce flctors become more imporshy
tlnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rOld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in
pl~nnin~ f~ctor it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the
personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end reshy
sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~
units prior comb~t experience bec~use thpt experience however limited
will indic~te those hj~h mort~lity pllrts thji)t require extr~ rtttention Thus
the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to
~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos nnd men required to resupply rtrmored units
in the mountqins 14
The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented upshy
~this fqctor bull
bull bull bull we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble overlolld of sp~re prtrts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would h~ve ti high mortqlity I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from METZ Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 miles This trip Wlts mflde with difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes congested ro~ds ~nd icy conditions If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of bo~ies tqnk trqcks whoeled vehicle tires ~nd b~tteries 0f ~ll types15
Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~
in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled
v~hicles The nountPojns with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly
hueing hills nd with rOld rBtinjn~ w~lls toe liehtly built for qrmored
vehicles presont problems ~11 tbeir own
The rory flot of positinnir-e t tqnk retrieer to pllll out ~ -uehicle
th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours
~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es oongested rOlds qnd l~ck of turnouts in
i1
~
o
o
tho ro~d will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr If
o telTDer~ture is considerq ll ly below fre ezj np thes ) dj fic1)ltios must be
weilhed qglinst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrieine I disqbled
16 Q hic]e before it freezes to the ground
CIptqin p J Linn forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of the 755th Tqnk
Bq ttqlion in It q ly relltes tllt when his unit WIlS stltltioned in the vicinity
of MOUNT PORCHIA Il Cqnltldi8n unit whom they were relievinl1 turned over to
his unit I plltoon of fie Mltt tmks thqt were in firinslt positions in ~n Ireq
8nd hqd ~lc ome com~letely frozen in Cqotqin Linns unit trie d intermittent-
I v for ql-)out fi e weeks ti Cet t he tll1k-s out of t gt- is pas ition but without
success Finqlly vhe n they V[orl pbout to le~nTe the qrell they were obliled
to turn the sqme t 1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit The tltlnks were still
tmiddot 17i n the SIlITe POSl 10nS
n tlnk-s stuck or knocke d out some of them with minor dpm8 ~e to the suspenshy
sion system All hld frozen fltlst to th8 g round To r e trieTe the se tllnks
it finllly becqTlie nocess qry to use four M 32s (blDk- retrieTers) on e8ch
tln~ with two lifting on eitte r e nd Thus throu ~h sheer physiclll force
tho t8nk WlS bro~en loose from th l ~round Severq I tons of frozen dirt were
lifte d in tre process Tlnk-s ltmd di rt were loqded onto I tqnk trllnsporter
hquled to fln ordnqnce de pot ltlnd unlolded in such mllnnet thllt they could be bull
winched inside I ~uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to enshy
In Je Tf1o-vement Ilnd repltl ir of the tll1ks 18
The prelt8nt te n-ton ~ l l1TTecker while I porerful ltlTId llseful vehicle
hls l imitl d usefulness in the Tf10untl1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither
whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks Attempts to use it on steep slopes frequontly
( 13
Fivure o 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff re Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds don the side of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile Philinnine I lampn otv~ ~er used
k
o
o 1
T
bull d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn Further h~ndic~ps were its
5 he I)nO limited xooneuverlbility JiS we 11 JiS its cCmplete hck Clf protection
llinst fire 19 The M32 series tlnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions
PS ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thln two of
th~ rrore serious limitqtions (1) the nFlrrow trlck prohibits its use in soft
t~rr~in ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire
An JldditiClMl hmdic~p tc vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred
units irG often det~ched in plptoon or section site units which frequently
~tt~ck ~long widely sep~rlted corridors This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible
for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plptoons or sections At
best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent
countormqrches tCl service theIl all
The mFlintenpnce orgJlnizFltion of Jiny unit frorJ Army tCl Comp~ny must
rI exible enough to qd~pt itsJlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll
orgltanizltion ltlnd use of tre unit it is suppCrtjne
In mountFlin ~rf~re the dispersjon of division bqttplion ~nd
cOrJpJiny size units in depth over Fl brold frCnt in SIT Flll grCllps (often reshy
inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mpintenFlnce flcilitios should likewise
be dispersod However this dispersion of fqcilities should not be conshy
fused with l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort The complny qnd bFlttqlion motor
offic~rs should koep 1 centr~liz~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of 111 m~in-
tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direcshy
tion of Fll unit fl3cilit50s
Division lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir lnd supply units oust pursue 1
CllnstFlnt Fl~ rossiTQ r fl lr-to-frClnt effort not onlye1s lilison tc the front
)~units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms Cf rep~ir speci~lists doin~ onshy
15
-
0 1
0
the-spot third echelon work tht wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dCne in el~borqtely ~
Jued shops Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s ch~nzing tr~nsmission
be dCne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units
equipment thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor
required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well Ps cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by
vehicles ll Which in itseJf is (ne tf the mlior fJlctors in mountlin Wlrfl3re
pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the
bulk of the comp~ny
The estl3blishment (f vehicle coll3ctjn~ pojnts ltIt blttl3lion or lower
level frequently Jill be impossible due tC thfJ physiClll inlbility to find
sufficiiJIt llround spltce or tl suitltble Irel1 Artillery emphcs m3nts medicill
~middotClhtions tlssembly I1r61S lnc1 pttflck pCsitirns will 111 be competjng
f( grnund sPlce in the TI(Iuntltlins The individuJll mechpnic frequently will
be cinfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repqirs or lbllndonlJent Clf 1
vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing-in f the vehicle m~k-
ing its future rSlcovery expensi~re in time Ind eff0rt
Pr(lblems of medicill service f0r Ilrtnored units oper~tjng in mounshy
tlinous terrflin differ only in degree With thCse c0nfrnntinf units fivhth1e
on level eround Difficulty in pccompliahing medicpl su~port ~pp~rently inshy
cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground
The mqjor problems fqcn~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit
~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-
tion ~f tho medicpl fqcility In ree~rd to the l~tter tho meohqnics 0f
~upti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute
17
BefOre p~rticipqtiDpound in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l
s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1
hygiene Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~lshy
titudes mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in
respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for
soldiers to becntnO crnstiplted t h1iher lltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower
temperqtures This is br0ught Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persCnlll dislike for
incnnvenienco lttendpnt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit
trenches in cold wa~ther For this relSClD the soldier must be dven more
educ~tion concerninf his p3rslt1npl h~bits neC9SSqry for the [t~intenl3nce of
he~lth Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6
the will for continued eood helllth ll rests entirely with the soldier
-- Anmhe r cntnr1on tendency is to neglect W3shing ~nd clollnine the body
t- 111S of scegtrcity of wltlter r~sing oftentil11es frUl the soldiers dislike
in zoinK tn tre trrJble of Celtine snew for this purpose This neflect reshy
sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin When b~thshy
iDe is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol the
soldier must be touKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by
rubb ing with 1 rugh tltWro 1 th8 reby keepi r~ skin infct ins t 1 minitlUm
Tho feet require considerpblo speeilll lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite
lnd t(l pr0vont tronch foot1I One cr tbe tth8r of these SerlOllS lilments is
llWllYs present in hhh ID0untt ins Feet must be kept dry ilnd sClcks lnd shoe
inner solos chonged d~ily Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt
It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use f lower te~per~tures lnd fre6ting conditins
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
olled from l sluitlt ion st~ndpoint Sold iers must be t~ueht thtt l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny
ltitude is porl~ittcd sorirus illnesses rJIlY result
Evpcu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem
vl lor is DtlGni fieC t(l q oonsidertlble extent in mount inflls torrla in Most
it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rfu~h terr~jn Parsnnnel who
litter plltients beofuse (f dHfio111ty Inc oqin in WllkiM (Wer mountlinous
Speed of oVtiCUllt i(n is extrerre IV irp(rt~nt Sh(lck is incro~sod to 13
~rQlter dogree followiru oven slizht in1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr3~sod tem
per~turos of the ptmCsphero bull --
Tho conser~ti(n of ml1np01ll3r in clrine fer ctlsullltles 1J1so present
l m~jor problem Litters clnnot be hqnd-clrried oval mountqins tn the exshy
tent they c~n be cl3rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with(ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e
to the litterbol1rers In order t( decre~so these cllrryine dist~nces_ madi
C1l instpllptions sho1Jld be kept well fOrWlrd
Wounded parsnnne 1 shfuld bA loclted Clnd eVl)cuJlted durin dqvli~ht
hCurs becrmse tho decropsed tA11pGrtlturos laquoIt night w()uld tend to Ire~tly in
croqso f~t~litiQs Nizht ov~cu~tirn is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed
terrq in lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when in ltpportunity for P prerius
rope h~nd lines often must be pr(~ided Ni~ht ev~cul3tion ffiPY be the only
resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dpyli~ht hurs When
er-- tion must be cl1rriod ltut pt ni~ht the wounded should beurol brought to 11
19
erad centrll loc~tion durina the dfiY find mllde liS eomfortlble is possible
in prePrltion fClr the nizht movement Considerlticn tmy be dITen to eViCUlishy
tion by lir if the terrlin mfikes jt possible to lind l1lison liircrJlft 20
Spocll Considerltion
Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for
61Oci31 trqininc l3nd IicclimJlticn for Ill troops wh(l phn to operqte in m(lunshy
tfiin~ Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~ vehicullir oper~tion mfiintenfince
of wclpons ~nd obs~rvotion will pr~sent unusufil problems IS will speeill
oquipment for the rehicles we~pons for individulils liS well is those for
the supportins irms tlnd sarrices
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt
bullbullbulloperitions in tl(luntlinous terllin lire filWllYs compliOllteo lind ~ difficult They require tr~inod troops plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous md snow covgred terrp)n 2l
Even before Cur entry int World Will II it beclilmEl evident thlt spe
cil3l tlininll wltlS needed 1 Will De~rtment memorpndum for the Secretl3ry of
too G(Jn(r~l St~ rf st~ted
bullbullbull I) G 2 report bullbullbull lttributed tbe success of the Gerlllln Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored lnd other units specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions The Britisb fpilure in Nor~y on the oth0r h~nd ~s c~used in p~rt by htwinr no troops trlined to (Ipor~tQ in m()untlin terril in22
bdditionAl evidence of the need for specific trlining in mountlin(lus
~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from
~nothor source Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n
f~ilure in the rU~lled terr~in of Alb~ni~ s~id
The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized clothed equipped conshyditionod or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting
- The result wlts dissaster bullbullbull In sarmy which mlY hllve to fjght lnywhere in the world must h~~re tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~- ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed tr~ined ~nd equip~d for fi~htshy
nll in the mount~ins Imd in winter The Irmy Ilnd equipment must be on h~nd ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned fOE such units c~nshy
not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions 3
Blsed upon these consider~ti~ns the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The
Mount~in Trlini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson Cnlor~do on 3 Septgmber 1942 The
mneuvers in Februllry 1943 showed sever~l serious defects whioh tMy serve
t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentlll conditionin~ which
my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins A letter which
Generlll N~cNllir wrote to the Comm~nCinll Gene-rill of The Mountllin Trllinine Censhy
ter summ~rized theso weqknesses bull
bull~ bullbull TrlliniIll did not ~ppelr I3dequ~te to comition personnel for ~rchine Ind ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd
ldverso weether bull bull bull bull A high peroentlje of the personnel fell cut due to sickshy
ness f~ti~e frostbite Slnd fepr ~ bullbullbull Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicpted 1 le~i of bull bull bull exercise
ecessnry to properly condition menbullbullbullbull
The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morllle seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to
1 high lllnrbidity rde littributed to bullbullbull Ilt1tude ~nd l~ck of recrelltioml
fqcilities This m~pht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount1in sickness Ii peshy
culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high
mountlins
Field Mllnull 7010 Mount~in Operltions exphins
The nnvice no exoerienced climber q like fre sub ect to this mllldy (ie mountJlin sic1rn0ss) in 1J1titudes ~s lov qS 4000 to 5000 feet The cluse is l1su11y poor ohvsicJll condition llck of llccliml1tizqti(n or both Symptons mIly be heldllche nIU861l vomitinll llck of lippetite insomnill Ind irritpbility This conshydition my be relieved by r0st In rl1ra c~ses the pptient must bo t~ken to lower eltitudes25
Once ~cclilllted to high mountdns units Wly suffer if they 1ra suddenshy
21
Vplley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes It is the opposite of
mountJlin sickness While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en
Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe this increJlsed power is not ne~ded
~t sefl lerel IInd tho body literr11y hps too much blood The rasultin~ symptons Ire lflssitude heldl3che noises in the e~rs
ind1~ostion irrit~bility depr~ssien for~et~llness ~nd neushyrJllgiJl-like PJl in One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present lt the StU16 time Depending on the individull they disJlppelr within Jl few dtys to P few ~eks26
In iny CJlse even where the mounttlins fire not sufficiently hl~h to
CJluse eithl3r mountpin or gtlley sickness thoy hlll9 l definite effect on the
physiology md pqtholoey of th9 individulll This is beCluse bullbullbull the humAn
ore~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch1nges Ilnc differi~ climte
It is Jl eenerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be lble
t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torrlin but the prlctic~l interpretition of this
pr~ iple must c(lns ider tbe tvee (If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in
E he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must lelrn the
speciAl techniques of mountlin driving A driver rlted liS excellent on flJlt
l1nd driving mieht 61lsily be th8 c~use of frequent mechpl1iclll fqilure of his
~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country
In June 1944 the Germtm irmy rece ived A rlther llre3 consienment of
new Fqnzors from tho Reich Bec~uS3 (If tho extansi~ d3struction of the r3il shy
ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI some 80
kilometers ntlrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins
These new P~nzers hl1d been brokan in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11shy
trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny Tbe drivers experiences extended hCWe~rer
only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the
spechl domlnds which thn steep windine mountllin rnds of Itqly presented I shy uently much m3chllnicll dmPJeJ 19 sulted qnd qftcr i few dflYS the ~roup
22
C
~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip
ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n the m~inten~nce
urHs hH1 to rQpq ir ths btolren1own ~nzers on tho rOlld Beolluse of technishy
c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded Iln excessive Ilmount of
time pIlrticul~rly Ilt thqt perilld when only q few we ll-trtd ned rOPq ir men were
lV il1b 10
One Amariclln or~qnizlltion which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqinshy
ing Ilt Pine Cllmp New York prior to entering comb~t suffered Ilt leqst 30 pershy
cent less r8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did comPllrqble units without
this trllini~ The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC con
siderlltion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of
his vehicle -- either tr cked ~r wheel
- Undoubt~1dly 11 drilrers qnd crew membsre need more trllining in field
e) -1ients Qute often ~ mhicle stuck in the mud must ~it for mAinshy
teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle
with th8ir own equipment if tney hlld sufficient trqinine
A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id
I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin Only since I hllve worked in field expedients instr11ctiCn hlVG I come tC replize how lUlny times I could h~re kept ry tln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in lotion httd I mown even the rudiments (If field expedient work in vehicle recovery27
Night driving experienco 13SS1)mes more import~nce in mount in oper shy
tions not only bec13use ~n orrer tllry be ftpl tn the ind bridUtll vehicle ~nd
c~rgo but plso becpuse in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in
column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SIIblec ml~ht bloc~ the pd~nce of 1n entire
u~ In such opses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of
23
~
h ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d or
in the cpse of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow
the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mpge to the
rOl1d
An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos
It is felsible I1nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3t to clolr ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives To blow P mecium tlnk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100 ttl 400 pounds of explosbro dependine up(ln the fnglfJ If the Ireshyhiola nd the width of the rcltd The explosive should be phoed under the side nf the tllnk fJnl not under the trlok The exshyplosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety lnd with proper plltoernent would not dlm~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be effectod by men with picks nd shovels in ~ few minutes 28
Operltions in mCluntl ins during the IJlst W1r ho indicotod thlt the
g~est limitltions of th0 me dium tpnk were jts llck of flotlltin nd ltlck
01 Jility duo to the lbsenoe (If tlny tr1cti(ln devioes liJliny field expedients
were tried during World Wpr II including the so-o~lled duck bill turning
end oonnectors upside down welding bits of metll on the metll tr~ok nd
usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fllt rubbeT tT~ck Althlugh e~cb (If the expe~ients
bJld its (lwn merit ntme nf them VfflS c(111pletely sltisfpctory It Ippelrs
th~t those limihtirns with the 9xcgt9ptiln of flottltirm ire still present in
the T80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk ~nd the T-72 pnd T-85El
tr~oks prf3sontly found on the P24 tlnk It is believed thSlt the proposed T91
trmk trok to b8 used on the T-37 tl1nk with its thin continullus deep chevron
~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effecshy
tiveness in trlction for I tlnk
BecIuse of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d
w it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re
24
~ eol on Spch tllnk Evon thou1h tho tlnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry
tools to cbrmlto bordes or roqd wheols o~rryinlt the SPlre wheel would
flcilitltlJ the chl1ndnlt of tho whoel in thl1t only 3 mochmic with the
noceSllitry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq intenlnce It hps beon sueeostshy
ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew of it t~nk be responsible for ~ll
echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools
for this ml1intenitnoe should bo inoludeamp in the vehicle t s st~~e The proshy
posed Irmy truck itpplrently includes Ill or most of the desitlb1e ohllrqctershy
1
Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistioitl su~pbtt for units involved in
qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign
nrmios Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 mity be I1ttributed
~o the Finns I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mountlins I1nd extreme cold IS well
their I1bi1ity to hl1rlSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines One fl1ctor in
tho ItltJli8n fl ilure in the Blkllnf WI s inl1dequIte c lothine equioment lnd
conditioning As 11 result 25000 wero killed 8nd 10000 froze to doqth in
Germl1n successeuros 11pl1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rlt()ly tho result of
Germlm lbility to moe 1l1r1o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in
of the Ardennes_ Their difficulty m~y well serve ~s 8 sU~l1ry to this study
of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountllin oper~tions Gonerl11 KLEIST who
crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of
tl1nks Issembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II thus decribes his exshy
poriences
25
bull bullbull The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tllcticlll but qdministrltltive -shyche complic~ted movement pnc supply prrngeIl1ents It WIiS essQntipl to utilize ~ll rOllds stnd trlcks thllt were to qny do~ree prstcticqble bullbullbullbull The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd the rO1ds though they hqd PC0d surfqce were ofton steep qnd full of bends bullbullbull The opposition WlS not serjous ThlJt WlJS
fortunqte for my tJrtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bpttery -- tJS the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the rotlds through the Ardennesbull 28
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
~ountl1in Operltltions FM 70-10 (WtJshin~ton Wlr Depqrtment 1947) ptOlrllgrlpn 58
2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert lIObaervers Notes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembr 1943 Ltr Hq liGF FHa 3191103 GMGBI 7 Februqry 1944 p 30
3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 MlJy 1943 (Wqshi~shyton HistorictJl ivis ion Wqr Depprtment
4After-Action Report 775th TlnlrBn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
5Lessons from the Itlipn Cllmpqienll TM 2 Hq MlOUSA 15 Mqrch 1945
P 107
6Interview Lt Col J G Felbor hutomotive DepPrtment The Armored Scbool Ft Knox Ky
7Lt Generstl Kqsilowitch1 Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ1 Tho Militpoundlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 7273 (OriginlJlly printed in Red Stqr trqnslqted from Russistn to French to En~lish)
BnReport on 651 Air OP Squstdron RiF North Africq November 1942 to JflnuPry 1943 (Ltr by Com~ndintl Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF ]fIly 1943) P 2
9Interviow Cqpt J D wVells Armored Officers Adlrqnce Chss1 1949-50 Tho ~rmorec Schnol Ft Knox Ky
10llLessons from the ItqliSln Cimp~ignll TM2 Hq NlTO 10 MArch 19441 P 14
11ttJunr1e tnd Mcmntqin Operftions ll L-30 C(Immlnd lJnd Sttff Depqrtment The Armored School Ft KnDx Ky p 6
-- 12 Ib 1d middot 4D--
26
13Interview~ ~~i wH Willi~ms former ~inten~nco Officer 740th Bn ETO
14Feloor op cit
15Interlriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds former Ordnlnce Supply Officer 4th Armore d Di ris ion ETO
16Interviow Ms~t Troy E T~rpley Automoti~ Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Ky former CWO~ M~intenqnce Officer 781st T1nllt- Bn MTO
17 Interview Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer 755th T1nk En
lVilliqms ~ 0E cit
19Tqrp1ey op cit
20MountlJin Operqtions Fr 70-10 (W1shineton Wlr Deplrtment 1947) Pft ss im
21K~silowitch oE cit p bull
22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A Di1Tision in Hieh MCunt~in Terr~inl ywG-3 r~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen3rql Stqff bGO 353(8941) (c) 17
194 1) lI1 s s im
23uTrlinine in Mountltlin ltgtnd Winter Wirf1re study 23 HistcricSl1 Sectio~ AGF 1946~ P 3-4
24AGF Ltr SUbiect Inspection Trip 3311 (c) to CG MTC C~mp HlIle Colo 11 Mqrch 1943
25Moun~~ Operlltions FlliI 7010 (W1shinlton Wqr DeptJrtment 1947) P 60
26 Ibid P 60
27Interview Mr E B Smith former Phto(1n Sgt Co B 753d Tqnk Bn lITO
28 Int~rviow Lt Col John C H Lee J r Instructor Commlnd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt The Armored School Ft KnCx Ky
29Cqpt B H Lidcell Hlrt The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(rk Williqm Morrow qnd Comp~ny 1948) p 125
27
CFAPIER 5
ATTACK
Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree~rdless of mission or
enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter
In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the ltt~ok
will be presented They ~re (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the
~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck ~nd
(3) problems vmich mieht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain
Special Consider~tions
The restricted m8neuver limited firepower and difficult lodstical
support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re themshy
~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission
~ttackine q well org8nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further
obstqcles imposed by enemy orenizptjon of defensi~te positions
The elCoorience of the United Stptes Fjfth Army jn It13lv mly be tl1ron
liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prolress of
bull bull rhe Germpns bee~n the work of construct ine defenses in the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still eneleedbullbullbull 200 miles to the south Thl main line of the de fense nqmed by the Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line wqs sited to t~ke mqxshyimum ~drqntqee of the rugPed mountil ins ltlnd the Iilt1i ted number of roqds qcross them bull bullbull From his v~ntqee points on the hieh ground the enemy possessed excellent observlltion nd hroqd fields of fire for qntitln~ guns qnd 13utom~tic we~ponsbullbullbullbull el13borate preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cksbullbullbull reliance wqs placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows of ltmtitlnk m1nes hid in an 11most continuous b~nd for 13 d1stqnce of tvro milos bullbullbullbull It~lilln vorkers due A deep V-shaped lntitlnk ditch strenethened witb pine loe revetments The ditch Bxtended
~three and one quprter miles Coverine the mine fields ~nd qntishyAnk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd
28
unkers for ~ntitlnk 1uns iny of those hunlr9s v6(J dug deep inshyto the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six foet of reinforced concrete l1hich rendered th6m implrvious to ~ll but be~vy ~rtil18ry Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk turrets ~dtb only the lone-b~rr0led 75mtl1 puns ~nd the turrets showshyine lbove er0und levelbullbullbullbull Infqntry positions consisting of conshycrete pillbox9s tr~nches ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes to lrge ~ hellrily re jnforced personne 1 sbfll ters werfl protected by ltJntipersonnJl mine fields pnd one or more 20 to 30 font wide blnds of b~rbed wire Automltic W6ltJpons were sited to cover the entqneleshytl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire 1
As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1ly mlde skillful use of nJlturql obstAcles
which they rlndered more forrnidpble throueh ingenious use of explos irf3S They
de stroyed bddeo s culv1rts tlnd l00gr) ro~d s frequently lininl whltJtelTer by-
pSSi3S existed Nllrrow str6~ts in Criticlll villltJfGS werp b10cked by de-
terr~in mlde more forrridtlble by dcll1olitions ltind mine fields covered by fire
qnd in m1ny cgtses raq1Jlrq ~ direct hit from hevy 1rtillerv to put thlt9l out
fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures or ~ntr~nces
of these positi0ns Moreover itlfputry il~ne could nDt oope with the bmks
wbicb tr3 enerry hbitullly lrept cCnC9led in phtoon lna comoltJny she grC1Jps
for counterqtt8cjr intt The solutio1 to thlse problems Jqy in the US8 of our
tltJnks to 8CCOmpqny 311 tt1cks wtHJto jt WlS possible to overcome the terrqin
Amoricgt n doctrine couo0rning m0untr in W8rf8 re Sb3to s
bullbullbull the inlldequte r01ld n~t found in sOlrsely settled tl10unbdn ~relS enhltlces thf3 militctry vltlue 0f existlng rOlds ~nd ldds itlportlnce to heights which domjtl3tc thembullbullbull Critic~l terrlin feAtures co~sist of reights which domiultcte Ttllleys lnd lines of cotrmunic1tiCns with obshy
~ervfjtion Ilnd fire 2
This grees in pdnciple with Russiln doctrine which h~lds thltt
29
bull bull one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla
choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good of tho qttJlck- with in p3rfect dew of th3 obectivebullbullbullbull The b-ttlEJ for highwIVs roqds of lpprolch vtlleys built up qrslS develops upon heiehts nd ridges 3
This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the
A mpior lesson from mount in fightini in Northern Tunis i~
pnd SicHy thqt dorrinl1tinl hejehts must bG slhed ~rqlleys ~nd
nllturlll ~pprOqCh0S must be llIroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~
high ridges qnd force thl enlmy from his posit jon WlS fPSlin demonstrqted in It~ly Some modifioqtions of this principle bflvn boen neoessry b(~CqUS6 of unusulllly rugeed mountt ins In some instlncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qpprolched or occupied ltnd th3 infltlntrv lction s~pported by rmor WilS oonshyfined to the slopos The n1turl of the mountltdn rJlnges ltlnd the orgrmizqtion ilnd construction of nemy positjons hqs h3en freshyquently mllde necess0ry the sljture of sell3cted terrltdn feltures ono ~ t q time 4
An excellent eXlmple of tho lJSe of tJ)nks in the Plcific is given by
754th Tqnk Bllttllion Aft r th9 b$tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th Tmlr
B~ttllion shifted to the hills 3~st of ViIAlHLA 1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE
PASS I1rel in North0rn Luzon Here thl terrSin ~s totfilly llnsuitlble for
t~n~ Iction yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting The role of the tllnk
WflS limited t firhw ~t the enemy CJ1ves md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions
In ml1nv i1istI1DCeS tho tltinlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g3t into
position but hpd to b3 toNEld into position bv 011e or tlore trllctors For the
most pJlrt thjs type of ~ction chpr0cterized th3 8rmorsd role in the mounshy
t~ins of Luzon 5
The use of t1nks in thl mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this
mruner
The use of hnlrs in thJ dtltJck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1ikeshy~wise presented spflcjl problems It wPS hoped thpt the qrmor TQuld gnt through th formidr b Ie de fens s q nd ole lt1 r the WW for
the infpntry however eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition
30
-shy the tarr13n itself would hp~re beeJ1 ltlTJ1ost irrpossible for cross country moireTJlent by tpnks First plpns cplled for COTJlpl1ny A 753d T~nk B13ttq lion t(l mo3 with the 14~d Inflntrv 13 10m the Sqmmurco slopes w911 13bov3 the SAN PIETRO-TEAFRO rOld The rr(llnd on either side (If th9 nlrrow rOld WfiS r s3ries of rockshywp11ed terrllces three to seeO feet hizh covJred with olive trees nd scrub ~rowth nd broken by streqm beds ~ullies find othltr irreguhrities One qtteTllpt W8S l1lde to get the Vnks hirh enough up on the slopes so thrt they could more forW8rd to th3 ~ttck qlone the upper terr~ces PI1SS through our forshyw8rd positions nd then drop down froTJl one trrqce to the next The lllth En~ineers broke down terrllce WfIlls to ml1ke Ii
trpil up to the cOmrrl1nd post (If the 3d Bqtt131ion 143d Inf~nshy
try On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route it eot only I1S fq r t)S th3 second terrqce repe~tGd e tforts to oershycorle the mud no the grqde r3S11ted only in the tlnlr throwine 11 trtlck 6
An extreme eXI1T1ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1rTIore d operq
tions in mount jns m$)y be formd in th3 following qccount conCBrnine Compqny
A 775th Tqnk Bl1ttrlion
___ Compllny A minus one phtoon Ittqched to the 43d Infqntry )ivision 8 Februqry 1945 Pt POZOHUBBIO Luzon were initilll shyIy employed to set up rOld bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry DishyrlSlon L~terJO on 18 Februllry the 3d pllltoon returned to camp-my control WhEln the 47)d Division WlS I9lierea by the 33d Division on 14 Februllrv the Tqnk C01npqny supDorted lttlcks throurrh the mount- jus northsllst of POZORUBB 10 Tlnks Wllre lseo f0r direct fire purnos3S Rlinst cq~Tes Bncl Eun posjtions The dri~e t(w~Ids BAG-UIC VflS hllted Ilt this point 8S flr I3S the tmks were concerned dUltI to efficient demolition of bridees o1eI hrQe rivers lnd Qorges bIT the f8n qticpl Jrpl1nese From SISON the compqny movrd into P bioUJic Ilrl3e in thf) ricinity of bGOO The plltoons lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Intqntry lnd protecting the Engineers buildine r08ds
Enemy rGS istlnce WlS intSlnse throughout thi s very mountl inshyoUs tArrrjn Mlny hnd mines 1vere encountered in the rqrjnes lna Ilrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense
In the first week of April thltl 12M Infqntrv W1S supnorted qlong the GALHIW rOld to ASIN This iIlS 6lCtremeIv hl1l1rdous work Tlt1nks were cltlTIllized bv high erollnd on the south ltmd Il dry rirer bed or the north Vision wcs limitec1 by hellVY iunde shrubs Ind trees Tho J$lplnese Ilttempted mlluy night infiltrltions in I3n effort to destroy tqnks Spotlights were instltllled on tlnks Ilnd the se when turned on temporllrj ly blinded the J~p~nese lud IDI3de them good tlrgets for Tlqchine
~un fire Throughout lieey the Comptny supported the 33d DjviS ion in
31
-ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mountiin trlil t~rd TRnIDADbull The rOlid ms ibout five miles in length nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine bull Ro~ds ~nd side rOlds or trqils were idePl for enemy liwbushes The 1st Plqtoon on the 24th of June working with In infpntry pqtrol from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers~s limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 JlPS 2000 Ylirds south of Cimp Thirty They used Mtchel chl3rees erenldes mee mortpra lnd mqchine guns The tJlnks viera helpless qS they could n(lt elevqte their euns to fire on the enemy on ridges lnd mlineuverine wqs impossible due to the mountqinous terrqin With the help of lilison lircrqft ilti llery fire ~s used on the enemy ~md they finllly withdrew Tlnk clsulllties Jlnd personnel clsullties were helV lnd the Tlnk Complny ~s eVlcuqted for rest ~nd rehibilitltion
These combqt illustr~tions qlthough they h~ve been selected from
widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertltions h1ve oertlin blsic fqctors in common
These speoill considerltions refGrence ~rmored Ilttlck in mountqinous terrlin
mllY be sumIDlrized lS follows 1) onemy orelnizltion of the terrqin will
greqtly mngnify th3 nlt1turll obstlcles 2) in Pl3nerll lttl-lckine forces will
h~ lS their obectires control of thl heights 3) inflntry must hlve Jlrmored
S Jrt to ~ssist the ldvqnce to repel enemy Ilrmor3d oounterqttlck lnd to
destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof locltions which only cpn be
lllched by direct fir~ wo 13 pons nd 4) to fqcilitl3te overcoming terrfl in obshy
stlc1os in the movlll113nt of tlnks IJneineers lrJ essentill to lny tllsk force bull
Techniques
Tochniques evolved for successful lttc~ by tpnk units in mountiinous
terril in merit detl iled cons iderftion This discussi on will include objectives
reconnp isslnce size of forces used security coord inltltion lnd control
SupportiDpound ~ir lnd s9rvices of supply m~intenqnce ltlnd cOIDmunicltions
In offensive comb~t in mountlins the qtt~cker se~rohos for l breqkshy
throueh llon rods plssble for 19hiclJs Ind oquipment This seqrch is
usu~lly conducted llong sev0r~1 rout~s simultlneously with the mjssion of - shy
1g the heights lnd ridg]s dominrtine high~ys routes or lporoch
32
-leys ltlnd built-up ~reIJS Dominpting heights thus bocome th3 obectives ~
O~ ~tt~ck Frequently becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive
ridges the objectiv9s of necossity ltllso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter
Thus the domin~tion lfforded by tny eivan obiecti-e is 1ntirely relPtive
to the position of the IJttltlcker
The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob-
i iectivGs on Okinlwfi The JlJplnese took full tadvOntltlge i~ren by the cOI1lmndshy
in ground Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr
to the Amerie~n ~dvpnce A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for elch successive
ridfte with the enemy defending both tht forwqrd pnd reverse slopes 8
As soon tS the ptt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt lny point he
rust hltlve l~illble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieqshy
tions in the re r of th~ enemy forces If this mfineuver succeeds the deshyrshy
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w FEre pgqin qrmor~d units using every
qvcil~ble route should be used bV the ttltlcker to outfllnk ~ny delqyi~ posishy
tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize ltlnd to lccelerlte the spoed of tho withshy
dr~wql A Russiln ~onerql officer oxplltlined
As soon ltlS the foo commences l withdrlwql mOT3IU6nt l plrltlllel pursuit begins on his fl1nks Very mobile troops even if n(lt vary numorous rJllko US) of trpils qnd p~ths in order to strike ~ft0~rds Pt eert~in points plong the rOld t~ken by tho withdr~wing troops This m~n~er of ltldv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~
withdrltlwpl into q rotrolt ltnd erontl~lly into l rout mostly on ~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment~
The s6lreh for w6lk p0ints in the enemy defensive position lnd the
determinltion of possible routes (If pppro~eh with terrflin obeotives which
dominlte those routes~ ph-cos lt frolter emphltsis upon reconnllissltnce
As etlrly ~s the Tunisill1 C3rnppign in VorldVlr II the vit~l 1mshy
-- nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units becltlme evid9nt Expert
35
reconnl issltmce of routes of ld~Tl3noe usu1311y with enzineer qdvice beclIOO - in pll3nn i ng phlses Se~rer~l times either side moved up llong whlt
they thou~ht ~s ~ zood clelr r~ute only to find q dry wllsh nine or ten
feet high blocking the ~y This frequently necessitllted withdrlwlllO
On the secondlry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to
USI tho reconnlisslnce of str3lm crossings presented Il considerlble probllm
especillly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WBl~ned und~r the
pressur0 of ice The checkin~ of 3 bridg~ took l long time
The enemy would plrtil311y SlW through bridgo supoorts then cover the cuts with ico The rOsult WlS l furthr dellY of the lttlck in order to check e~ch bricgo rerv thoroughly When l tlnk fe 11 through l br ichIJ into l m~untl in stropm the orewl usullly could not bl r~scued The Germqn policy finllly evolved WllS to use fords through str1fm heds whene~Ter possible If l
~tln1c- hqd tl crClCS 03 brid~e onIv thJ drirer remlined in th~ tlnk l1
One solution to the problem of route reconnlisslnce ~s to use tlnks
for thlt purpose The rOS1)ltnt report of which terrlin could bo used for
the PlSS8icO of tonks ws blsed upon qctu131 Qxpnrience rlthlr thln UdgTOOnt
This tochnique WlS used in tho P~cific Theltor with c~nsiderlble success in
loclting those routes whoro t~nks could or could n0t be used In terrlin
whmiddot)re no Intorl rO1ds exist nogltiwl rep0rts lre rery useful in pr3venting
unnOCosslry operptions of llrgmiddotr forces
An After Action Roport of thp 44th Tlnk Blttllion in Leyto notes
Tlnks wore used 13 NOTembor to 18 NOlTCmber (1944) on 1st Cqvplry Division order for terrlin roconnqissqnce to loclto torrlin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrellk through ltlnd wJre gi7on an qdditionll miss ion of seeking 13 PI3SS through the mountltdns beboreen MOUNT BIDIAN ~nd MOUNT LiJO (west of Highwqy 2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route to the ORMOC VJLLEY Mountltdn terrqin orohibited qdvlnoe lnd ~
34
o
o
o
I
-shyno pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in rlnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO
A medium tlnk section from B Complny WIlS ~iven a simillr mission in the ~rel south of MOUNT LAAO but llso turned bqck due to ru~~ed terrlin Reconnlisslnce proved the terrlin unsuitlble for t~nk operltions12
Mountrlinous terr$lin not only influences the ob1ective ~nd reconnlisshy
s~nce of the ltt1cker but llso exerts In lppreci$lble influence on the s he of
the force utilized The size of tpsk forces will V$lry of course with the
mission but 11 ~ener~l rule which ~ppelrs lpplicoble to lll units oper~tin~
in mount~ins is thlt the tlsk force must be sm$lll We IDly consider lS qn exshy
ample the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d French Morocclln Infqntrv Division
Bec~use of the terrlin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder the individull tltlnk phtoon w~s the fiehtine unit The Division
~front -usull1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments These ~roupments norm1lly consisted of q medium tllnk comprlny Q light tqnk complny ~ tqnk destroyer compqny q reconnlisslnce comshy~nymiddotqn en~ineer compqny qnd qt lAqst~ b~ttqlion of infantry Within e~cr ero1Jprnent Wlre s1Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of infntry whicr furnished a company Because of these numrous sm~ll forces we slldom had more thpn one plptoon workin~ in the SCm8 ~re1l3
The 2d Armored Gro1p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terrlin
In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this qrmored ~rout hllr9 oper~ted in Itlly the employment of tlnks in mass hqs been impossible Seldom hqve tlctical units l~r~er
thln the tank complnYbeen used To dlte (July 1944) entire tPnk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct aroup control For the most pl3rt tmks and de stroyers hwo beon confin~d to existing ropds due to extremely steep qnd rocky terrl1in the presence of stono terrltlcos find wqlls deep gullje s 8nd soft streqll1 beds 14
Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their tlt1nks were lqrgoly roshy
stricted to r013ds qnd thqt 8S ~ result
it WflS often necessilry owina to the npture of tho errl3in to dopprt from the sound principle thl1t t8n~ should
36
o
o
o
be employed in mil ss md not decontr11 ied in ponnV Dtckets T3nks wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts 15
The 1st Armored ROlimont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division
hld Plitiou1qr success in f0rmine t11sk forces gener~l1y composed of one m3di
tim tlnk cornp~ny one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny one plqtoon of 1ight tqnks qi
ono phtoon of t1nk destroyers find one p111toon of eneineers These tpsk
forces Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVlllent of l reinshy
fgrcod p11ltoon s izo 16
It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torrlin fqctors thesemiddot
sm~ll tlsk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where
~tull support is impossiblo lnd whore they mly h~VB Ibsolutely no knowledlo
of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru in pllrpllel corddors This will requiro the
plrent heSidqultlrters to reullte closely the movemont of (PIch unit If one
-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be felsible to fllnk the enemy
with Oln ldiqcent uQ1t
Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned lS mllny IS fivo or morebull
rOlds be im usod by tho SllmEJ unit qt thG Slme time In c 1eqrinl the VOSlO s
MOllI1tq ins for eXlmp1e tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s mllny IS e iht
tlsk forces simultllneous1y in lction qnd mlde excellent lqins throulh ru~~od
terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJsullties~
Tho sml1ll tlsk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~
since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which
exceed their experience or qbility This WlS true even in the c~se of the
Garm~n Army in Itl1ly with tho benefit of 3t leltlst five ye1rs of w~rf~re be
hind it
~ Ameticln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins onerqlly
38
Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0novJr decontrfJlhlltion WAS IJxorcJsod it
domfJnded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit
comtrIlndar Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in Ilny ltlrn1Y Dotlchod
plfJtoon fJnd compltlny commllndors fJro sudd~nly cltlllod upon to mqko indopendent
dacisions of th1 typo which would usuPl1v be mlrle qt bqttSllion or higher
lev) I In qdditi(1 th1 smJlIl upjt commllnder is frequently out of touch with
his htghor hQltldqultlrtors ~nd hils limited knrwlod~a of tho ltlctivity of ~di~cent
units
In Itllybullbullbull sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl outshyst~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored combltlt Tho severity of fightshying~ anomy rosist~nce difficult ltlnd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship roshysuIting from tho wOlthl)r ltnd climltt9 flll imposod fl necossity for ~ highJr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility thlln evor bofore
The commllnder must uso avory mOllns ltlvltlilltlblo to control the operltltion
ho oloments of his commltlnd Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of
coordinlting tho movamont of his unit Thnrofore when thAr3 I1r0 wull
rocognizJlblo t1rrltlin fO1tures suitbly locgtt9d qlone th3 solocted routos of
ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis1blG t(l dJsign1tn thlJse torrl1in feturos ~s TIJrch obshy
ioctlvo s
wbonovor conditi~ns pormt In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho
cCntrol tb1t WOJld 0rdjnlrily be lost b3C1llse of tho difficult tlrrl_lin
Socurity in mount~in comb1t is I1n 0~r present problom Lone columns
moving llon~ lt sinflo route of lppr08ch gbrA thp on1my qn opportunity to
strike tho fl1nks of In ~dv~ncin~ forco Cross corridors provido oxcollont
~vonu(JS of Ilppro1ch on the flrmks ltnd br0kon tarr in plrmits m$lximum COTCr
-~ concof)lment Ambushos clln b3 propl1rcd in d1filos with ell-1SG To offsl3t
39
the dofonde~s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttncker usuqlly sends p~trols
-- high ground to srjcure tho 1dwlUce of his mlin bodybull
Tlnks should be protected in plssing throu~h dofiles
On Mfly 20-31 1944 one pl1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine with tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhepding In ndv1nce throurh mount ins M1neUT3r W1 s impos s ib hl ltIUd the roqd h1d nun3TOUS blown bridge s When 1nt i t1 nk fire W1S 13 co i rod or when the column encountered blown bridges the column W1S forced to h11t until the inf~ntry moved ltlhe1d to ddO qwtgty ltlntitlnk euns or COTElr the engine~rs repliring the rOl3d As l result the column moved no fltlster thln the infl3ntrv could ldvlnce in flct sloWBr since time ~s consumed in reor~lnizing the column qnd sending th3 t~nks Ilheld Two tlnks were destroyed by encountershyine the enemy in defiles wjthout inflntry suport It would hIll ve seemed perferlb le to hlrEl sent l corerinl force of dismount ed inflntry lho1d of the t~nks qS in overy Clse inflntry hd to oome up nnywy with ltl consequent loss of time HOWBvsrt no time WIllS infntry design8ted to clell the routes excl~t when I emphlticllly requested infnntry support qt CARPINGTO
Air support is usoful to the 1ttlckar IS l mcqns of extending his
reconn1iss1nce lS WBll IS for lttlck of Gnemy linJs of communic~tion Its
---101 WlS first demonstrlted to Am-oricn troops in tho Tunisiqn C1mp1ien A
urief sumrnl3ry of the highliehts of these eurol1rly lir operlltions mqy serve to
brinl out the strong points IS well ~s the limittions of this qrm
In Fobrulry of 1943 Amoricqn Ground Forces were generqlly stopped by
enemy control of th3 mountq ins which run roulhly north lnd south in Tunis ill
Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3t SIDI BOU ZID fl3oing I high w~ll
of mount~ihs defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt It ground reconshy
nllisslnce Vh1t lily behind th1t w111 WflS of prime imnort1nce but onlY1irv
reconnpisslnce would BobT6 th0 riddle However no such support W3S 1Ivail~blo
becquseurol our Air Corus wqs still strulgling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-
fie Ids Most q irfie Ids were b3ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$r to tho
west This in~rolvod much flight shlrply limitine qv~illble time over the 1reqs
of conflict Air supreurolmAcy hlld not yet been 1chie~red lnd no photo roconnl iss1nce-shy
40
bull
lOS lvorc T8il8blo to pierce the blrrier Flst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see
nothing in thelt brok-en terr~in As ~l result the Germqn pttpck through FAID
PASS W8S q completo surprise By 16 Febru8ry they hqd pushed lS f8r WEl~t ~s
KASSERIN~ PASS qnd penetrqted it~ lttlcking in the direction of THALA 8nd
TEBESSA Thon the 1middotvelther clorrpoundld nd more flir support beCIll11El lTltlilltiblo for
direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE
PlSS throuph which 1111 Germqn suppliAs tr1tT131od This thre8t to his supply
couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBrlttl1ck WS instrumentll in
19forcing Rom1ol to withdrllw
Tho probloTPs of providh flir suplirt by IDlior ir force units were
r~flectfJd in the difficulties fcjnc th3 oporltion of eren the smlllest Ilir shy
crdt An Artillery Officer in It 0ly exphined
Air strips WElre difficult to locto close to the frontline roops due to the restricted terr~in There WElre times thqt the ir strip hid to be locl1ted 40 miles to the reJir where ever sufficient level ground could be found With the dist~nces inshyV01-1Od between tre front pnd the 1ir strip there were times when the front b~d c 1etlr lll8ther but the strip wqs fogped in And 8g8in when the W88tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr while the ltIiI over the front b~d r131n or fog As B result conshytinuous iiI cover W3S hl3rd tcmiddot et
It ~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4s were of limited use in these 8r)8S ~fuere hrp6 distBTIces froTP the 8ir shystrip to the front wer irnrolred much difficulty W1S experienced due to the limited g3S c8plcity of the phne For tris rG1son L-5s with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8city were found more suitBhlo for this type of oper8tion 20
The logisticl support of J)ny unit l)dITpnc j ne in mount ins will h1tr0
to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous smlll columns 8dvlTIcing
8long widely sop8r8ted I1xes One solution is offored by the experience of
the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8nk B8tblion in the PBcific Theqter
The comp1ny W8S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for supshyplies 1IDrmmition 8nd g8so1ine to 811 comb1t elements The r8nsporttion pl8toon sent dri1rHs md trucks to h8ndle thD
42
r i I
o
o
o L )T_IIT T
--~----
bull
supply requiremants of the compqnios The motor rna int~nqnce
)l8toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 lnd ~re frequently sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce work WrtS requirod The job ws m 11 done J3S evidenced by the fnet thlt Service Compnny WqS qWlrded the Meritorious Service Pl~que bullbullbull for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign2l
Undor s~cial cold WGlther conditions which were ofton found in mounshy
tlt)ins~ such 8S the GorYl1lns met on the Russian Front snow fonces hld to be
built llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3ds since frequent storms
blew ~~y IDJ3ny d13Ys work in q fow minutes In the be~innin~ troops built the
f e nces too close to the rOtld They Sh01lld be set lbout ten metlJrs from tho
rolt)d Even when qn lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering
of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs
whon snow W8S over 18 inchos deep Tqnk units hpd to roly p~rtly on the use
of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies Two r08ds were used one for horses
one for vohicles Germ~n supply routes hqd to be s ~ cured J3t 811 times
uso Russit)n ski p8trols frequently would mine th~ supply rOlds 22
Mlt)into~nce support too will bo vory difficult bocquso of the disshy
bullporsion fqetor In ono 01S0 1 t8nk bltltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its
ID1intonqnce support lt)long tho main lt)xis of 1dv1nce E8ch small group had ono
mechqnic qtt1ched with tho mission of milking t)ny imroQdicte rep1irs which
woro within his capbilities Whore tho vohiclo repltlir ~s boyond his
CFlpllbilitios it WIlS loft en th9 13xis until the Ullintnwnco could ofeullto it bull
Other units using only three lXOS found it possibll3 to qtt1ch Fldditionql
maintont)nco personnel from 8n ordnlnce ~ainte n8nce plqtoon to ollch column
comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit Frequentshy
ly pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo 23
44
The problems of communic ~tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been disshy
cussed in some detqil They do not differ m~teriltllly for the Jltt8ock The
s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJlUsmission I9spocillly Frequency
Modullt1tod Ilpply These fActors phce I speci80l promium upon wire communicqshy
tions or rlldio relqy In one cqse the 1st Armored Division operltinl1 in the
Apennines wsIS providod with pil1eons from the Corps loft in order to keep in
touch with hil1hor heqdqulrtl9rs under qny qnd Ill conditions 24
Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found thlt the use of wire comshy
municltltions in mountqins offered th e most relilblo IDe ltlnS of communicltions
The technique employed Wos to follow mqior qdvlncing units with wire As soon
l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3n qppreciqble period of time the wire 80rrived
~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished
A Field Artill~ ry bqtt~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-
r-oLience in keeping conmrunic ltt tions functioning in th3 Itllinn mountlins
The 125th Field Artillery Blttqlion depended prirnl3rily on r d io for communic lt) t ions The difficult t e rrll in pre cluded 113yilll1 wirl9 in mlny Clses ~p distrmces would show two miles to l unit lnd ground distqnce would frequently be six to eight miles
Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlwlYs good but generltll shyly r e quired 1 r o llY stqtion Relqy stqtiolls were qlWPYs locqted on high e round neqr the fire direction cent) r ltlnd WlS frequently c onnected to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone Forwqrd Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommunic ~ te one Wly with tho fire direcshytion cente r th ltlt is~ they c0uJd send or receie without r 9 1qy This cut down on r0113Y trq ffic 25
Problems
Impqsstlble torrltdn qlwlVs hls been th e nightmqre of the bmker Any
lttlckor must expect to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time Frequently~
movinl1 l tlnk lnto irnpqssl ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A tromendous qmount
of l qbor The cotlmpoundJnde r must r oq lize thltlt the presence of his tlnks beyond
r terrlin blrrier will exort l conside r l blo effect in lowerilll1 the eurolnemy1s
45
o
o
J
1 ~
ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops
Often 11 B inele tlnk lppeprine in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which
the enemy considered impassllble clused mJiny cJisullties The enemy is
usulllycounting on this terrlin obsblcle to ~uprd his flllnk lnd probpbly
will not be in q protective position to me~t middot the Ilttlck The result is to
bull d3morltJl ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the
trouble it took in i0ttine 1n improved route there 26
When Comblt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s pmbushed on the (
ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA Itlly it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in I wide
flqnking ttlck ovor fl stTllll trlil It succe3ded becJiuse bullbullbull 1iin the
GermJlns hld relied upon imPllss ltble terrllin to protect their fhnk At
y were not Trlltllllly supporting
The question frequently rose WIS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY -
to t11ro the tlnks with ynu in tho Ittlck The lnswor wns nlWys Yes -shy- -gtaoshy
boc lt us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whicn wlts multipliod by their
unexpoctod 1 ppo~rqnce
The TllEHSUres neCQSS 1 r - r tn brjnpoundr tqrks lcross t3rrl1 in ohst~ cl f3 s W3ro
numerous Pond lonithy I n ono C1S0 ~ 11 ST1l1l tltJsk force of Combltt Comrnlnd B
1st Armored Dhrision WlS movj r-C north t0wlrd VOLTERRA Itlly The lxis of
Idvnnco ~ s throuEh wry difficult t o rrltJ )n ltJnd vohic10s 1l3rn forcod to
t10re S inl110 fi Ie lt 101111 tho one rO1d leltd ine north
In spots the trn i1 W1 S so rnstrictod thltJt jt beclnJO necosslry to use picks 1U d showJls to die down the brnks llonesido the trllil bnfore thA tp~ks could pro~ross27
T1e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tertmiddot~ jn WS exposed in Inother cqse
41
flnk f)ction by the 1st Armored Divis ionbull
The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their pttqck through the CASTA MOllNTAINS The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks rnd the 162 Infqrtry Di1rision reinforced with self propelled l1uns Tho most 111~ring error tho Germll1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir r()li11~CO on qpoqrElntly it1ptlsslhle tortlin for fhnk protection Rlpo1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungultlrded only to disc0170r too hte thlt 3 complny of M-4s WlS sittjng on tho im~sslblo ~r l in In tho clpturo of ROCCASTRADA hC1~rily minod hill town in th 3 Comb- t Commllnd A s0ctor ~ ttlsk forco W1S sent up High~y 73 fl two-llno ro~d thtlt confinod tho column ri~idly to fl ~rch column fottltion Tho smlll Gormlln glrrison in tho tOVIl1 hld no difficulty stopping th~ lrmorod forco which could olploy only 1 tfl~k 0r tW0 0 t ~ timo Hovre1~r tho Comblt CO~llnd COnmJ1ndcr quickly sent gt second tlsk forca round to the loft A flint trdl which showod on the ll)rllll photoshygrllphs l a d north Plst ROCCASTRADA lnd intersocted Highw~y 73 lR ~ in lbov3 the town Tho trll ll Wf S so nllrrow rocky stoep 1nd twistod thlt tho Go rml ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it Tho rout o fOU Id hlv( boen difficult oven fnr l mule but tho tlnks mln l go d to worry th 0ir Wly through bull ~ The Germllns wero forced to oVBcunte their position with holVY cllsullti3s 28
Sinco the k()y terrltliD fJ fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f ins rr 1 primllrily i l flntry
oboctive s thJ routo of th3 p ttflcking force will tormllly b o I lone ridee
linos or other elov~t()d tnrr~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin tlctic~l surprise Ilnd
whoro they m~y )~roid th J costly losses ~ suI111y involved in 1n Ilttllck whore
tho IldYllntl gc of ons Hvption is poss 3 ssod by th l defender To p~llce tho
~lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p ttlck requir0s
) erellt dOlgt l of work in prepllrine c01Tored tr~ils md in m~dntfining the so
must be pll rt of lny forco opor~ting j n mountlinous tJrrdn An officor of
tho 760th Tflnk Blt ttlion r e lltLg his oxperienc0S in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE
) tt~ck in Itllly st p tod th ll t Engino3rs 1 r) fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~
numerous obstqcles The y should be pllrcelec out to tqnv units lS low IlS
----toon bull tngino ors 11 1s0 flcilit8ted thJ flow ~nd moumAnt of supplies 29
48
The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO It~ly from the south
presented special problems It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the
formidltible defenses md cleltir the ~y for the inflmtry However even if
there hltid been no enemy opposition the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-
most implsslhle for cross country movement of ~nnor bull First pllns c~lled for
Complny A 752d Tlnk B~ttalion to move with the 143d Regiment along the --__-
SMJiMURCO slopes well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road The ground on either
side of the narrow rOld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces three to seven
fe0t high covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream
beds gullies pnd other irre~ul~rities
One lttsmpt w~s mlde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that
they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alont the upper terrlces PIiSS throu~h our
~-wrd positions Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next The lllth
JJagineers broke down terrflce Wl1l1s to mllke l trl1il up to the commllnd post of
the 3d Bltta1ion 143d Infltintry Regiment On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank
of Company A 753d Tqnk Bllttqlion tried out this route it cOllld ~3t only
is flr lS the second terrflce Rep3slt f3d l1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the tlnk throwing its trlck However this operltion
ShOW0d thlt wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 tmk could not
mq ke Hs plsslge to go into th 1 lttflck
The diversity qnd extent of eTljineer support is refloct3d in tho
following compilfltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer
Blttalion 1st Armored Division
In a 21-dqy period this bqttllion constrtlctfld 37 trBldway bridglJ s repllir3d 12 bridgIJs surflced Flieht mtl ior fords lnd grldshyed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds 30
~
The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins
49
t
( M
onte
U ~W
O
2
50
0
bull
)6
bull bull -
~KtithM6~
Fler 0 ( loP bull 1
( CI bull A1 tl
bull
or inf~ntry As ~ consoquence nul ~rtillory fir~s WBro Pt pnint t~rshy
~ets r1th1r th1n It Ilrels Th3 torrlttin further derrlncs l considerSlble inshy
cr01S0 in tho ~mourrt of high 1n~lo firq duo to tho defilldec positi 0ns of
both gun lnd t~r~Gt
Tho prohloms of forwgtrd 0bseriTlrs lik-awls worl complic~tad by tho
difficult tcrrlttin A hif2her porcent~HlO (1f lost rounds W1S experienced
oven whorlt3 thn q rtillory ~s firine lt tl st~ti(nJry t~r-0t vyenhen thIJ tlrJot
WlS moving over r(lugh ~round (11 lIh0re tho ~1tj 110ry ~s firing in support
in mountltl ins r3 forced tll follow 8 wind i njt pqth wit1- C0nstqnt chl1ngos in
dirltlctions Ind Iltitude which complicltes computtion of support firos
Consider for oX1mple tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~
-- support of troops lttttgtcking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY in It11y By 6 Fobrulttry
~~44 United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS flr lS tho GARIGLIANO RI~R ~nd
hrld so izod h11f 0f tho t ovm of ClSS HJO Furthor propoundress WIS h10cked by
enemy clntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1BBEY sited on fl hill mlttss some 500 motors
qbcvo the vllicy Our forces thJref0ro executed 3n encircling T1o~rE)ment
precoded by succ0ssi~ b~ttllion concontrltions of qrtillory Those conC0nshy
trltltinns wer) phnned tC follow 1 spirll Pith risinlt il elo1Tltion from 35 to
517 rl0tors ltlnct with 11 chltinge sOCewhere llong th9 rOltld wherAby tho rieht kun
WltlS firing tho left portion of th0 concentrltltion (See skotch IDltlp Figure 16)
ThE) lt0mputltions which took five dys to complete mlY well S3r1TO 118 eloquent
testimony t(l the d i fficultios f fire oontrol in mountl inDus torr in
Sm~ll tl1sk forcosepltJrted fr0tJ th3 1i1fljn body fr3Quentlyw13re forced
~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in ltill types of situ~ti(lns Bec~usc of this
51
sopl3rl3tion from th0 ml3in body CIT(ln th8 sU1l3llest t3sk force 1IlJs coltlpased of
~ Infltlntry IIVllS essent1Jl to the successfullT6rql diffJrent typos oftroops
oporl3tion of 1311 tl3nk unite
Tho 755th Tl3nk Bttl lion for eXl1mple found thflt fl complrAtire ly
l~rge nmount of ihf3ntry WI18 required In the oporl1tion tow3rd TERELLE
It131y it WIl8 11 ClSO of too much Irmor confined to the rOltld Jnd too few inshy
fJntrYltlen OTer 1 wido lt)101) Consnquontly th3 tJtlK-S wore requirod to pro
Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-
moving pillboxes
An officor from this bltlttl1lion m3de the stl3tement
It h3s been demonstr3tod in every Jction thJt infJntrv support is indisponsJble to tqnk Jction in U1ountl3in fi~hting The inf~ntry must I3dVlnce close to tho tllnks so thJt the fire of the enemy mltlchine guns will disclose their positions I3nd then p8rmit the tJnK-s to locJtc their fire on these positions If the infJntry does not JcoompJny the tlnks the cnomy p~rmits the tJnks to tldTJIlCe without being fired on ind when th0 inftltltry comes within rlngG the U1Rohine e11nS fire on thom flnd pin them to thl ground Tho tl3nk-s hl1re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1Jchinl3 l1uns ltatld in most insbmces oqnnot turn ltaround lnd fire on theUl beCJuse of the nJrrow winding ro~ds they Ire opor3ting on in UlountJinous ~reJs3l
In other blitt3lions thr doctriW WI1S thlit In mountqinous fighting
tho primliry mission of the) t~mllts WIlS clOse support of infJntry by Clnnon lind
mtchine 1un firo 1I Tllnllts would stqy wi~h inf3ntry Either tltlnks or infqntry
might le3d but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID3inttined between these elemonts thlt
lin Itrtiller concentrotion on tho t3nks would not strike th9 infJntrY The
inflntrv elment WqS essenti3l in reTIovint the ml3in obst~cle to ttlnlr 8dVl3nce
in mount3ins the flntittnk guns These guns situoted on the fllnks to cOlrer
Jl smlll stretchmiddot of rO3d wore afton difficult to discover G~n lfter they
opened firo To comblit those tuns inflntry hlid to lJore the r()l3d flnd ltdshy
V3nce llone tho ridtos Tflnks used selT6rJl rounds of smoke fi red in the ~
52
~ rsll direction of the mtit~nk gun to permit thl infpntry tn g0t by the
interdicted spot on the rOJld
Armored units in mount~inous t~rrpin f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of
Il one dlmned mountqin lImiddotfter I3nother 1I The bck of spectlllculqr pro~r()ss the
mud rlin ~1ow or wind tho perpetu~l slopes nd rocks tgtnd the lqck of ltny_J bull
lltr~e tovns for ~dOqUlt6 shelter ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo A
d ivis ion comm$ndor wrote
Too ~ny unit cOIDrnltnders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under idell conditi0ns When they find thltit conditions ~ro otherwise they tond to fDa jhl~ _thoir-Unit~LllrfiLJlelp1oss CnT1l7ll3nders of tS1n1lts 1-d othr~ c0Ilplllin thllt they liro unl1bleto employ thoir units qccordin~ to tho best tlcticpl principles This ~~y be truo but tho commndcrs should undorstnd thS1t ided t~cticpl cfnditjrns lro seld0m rOtJlfed in bttle They must leltlrn to rogfrd cortliin hllndicltips ts hqint entirely n0rtnl3l AgSlin most officers of ~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13 brel3kshythr0ugh This of cours t ) is tho idell hrwmror the GOrml3ns ~re
-clevf)r in mlintqinine 1) continuous front llnd tlke soocil preshyl3utions tf defend p1Elps suitble for tqnks Therefore the conshy
copti(ln thlt tlnks I3re tn bo used (Inly to breltlk thr0ueh does not fit in with th9 conditJ(ns 13 they exist ArmormiddotlTDlst w(lrk with inflntry ltis l telm whether or n(t ~ br31kthroueh is possible32
To bre~k tho etern~l monotony Fifth Army instructed II Corps to
bullbullbull Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s mltiny tr00ps ~s possible to reqr ~rcllS for rest reequipping I3bsorpti(ln of ropll3cements ~nd trlininebullbullbull Prmrido awry flcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re
of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fotqrd 1rels If pr~ctic1ble cless build ims lnd helv tent sloepine lccoIn(ldlti(lns will b9 utilizod 33
Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who
WIlS well W1re (If thE) full irJPl3ct of m(untmiddotdnollS tJrr~it1 upon morl3la lnd
cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units
The followine historiCll eXlmplo is pro sented with the objective of
furnishine ~ highly r~llistic SUMmlry (If the rollin points co~ered in this
c~el It is boliEnrcd thlt this ~ccount of cortlin lccomnlishments of Iln
Ih ad unit in comblt throueh mount~ inClus tlrrlin botter emphllsizes the
53
~Bo
rbOI
OV
Ie
-
~ t~
NO~hI
Q~Y I
rW-~
erv l
er 1
2S
J31
5 Il9
R (F
R)
B
rem
pnil
i
I~
V(FR
) bull
shy
-
--
~
-~
---
_~
tt
J 1
_-
-
---
---
--+
lo P
ef
e p
~e
FOR
CIN
G
TH
E
SAV
ERN
E GA
P 2
nd
F
RE
IC
H ~RMORED
Div
iS O
N
WIT
H X
v O
IiPS
LlG
EN
D
__
TO
I~ F
orc
e M
Oll
u a
sk F
orc
e M
njO
nn
el
_
_
To
lk gt
ore
e R
ouv
lio
_
__
_ T
alk
Fo
rce
QlJlhehl~
1
En
em
y I~
red
-
-
FIC
r II
Co~bat
Co
rrm
an
d
ILl
Co
mb
ot Comm
~nd
nO
4 -e -
~ -
J
bullbull bull
--- - - - -
bull
-----~---- J
i
Ho
~314
~Anl
ibull
- ~ ~ oi ~
~- -- -JL~~--_~t(-
$~ ~__shy lt-r---_
-I ~
bull
shyeo bull
FORCING THE SAVERNE GAP ~ d Fr PE t ~ q 5
t t F I Cr 1I~3 ~ ICgtI ~ bull~ 911( -shy
____ TC r ____ tro t1 o a mord r tn bull
shyti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro body
of the ch~pt6r
At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the
RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL At ~ point east of LUNEVILLE FrAnce to the foothills of
the Vosges Mount~ins Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hifh Voses in the s011th
from the Low Vosfes in the north The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the
e~stern exit of this pass The High Vosees re1C1 elev~tions of orer 4000
feet The Low Voslltes thrp)~h lower in elevlltion ~re mot13 he~vily forested
wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf6 difficult milit~rv obstrlcle tbm
t1e Hifh Vosges
The ~re~ between LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct
reidons Between LUNEVILLE and thl SAFRE RIVER in l redon of forest Ind
l~lt from SARREBOURG is tln open plate~u e~tendine to the western edee of
tL AVERNE PASS The Vostes iV(IuntJdns constitute the next redon The
western edee is shaped like tiers hi 16 thl eastern ldf-fl drops ()ff shArply
to the ALSATIAN PLAIN The GermlJns had constructed a defense Ijne done the
estern foothj lIs and tlnothAr in the Vosges themselves The line ~lont the
Wlstern footrills or the pre-Vosl1S ljne h~d been constructed by GermJln
troops ~nd conscripted hhor It ws coUpJete with bl3rb3d vdre lntpngleshy
menta antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches The m~in Vosges d3fense
line consisted of strone pojnts eyt3nrJinf 110m the miUt8ry crest Old
fortific~tions W8re lJtilhfld pntjtCln1r djtchAs were bllilt blocking the
princiPll jprenues of ~ppro~ch ltgtnr Dreplred mJ3chine eun positi(lns fire 3nd
communjcqtions trenches were ploJC3d At strqtelZical points This W3S the
eround throueh which the 2d Fr3nch ArUored Djrision of the United Stqtes XV -shy
AI )IPS W3S to tt~ck
55
The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of
the ore-Vosges line supported bT the 2d French Armored Division i~hen the
brolkthroueh hld been qccomplishHl the 2d French Armored Divjsion WIIS to
p~ss throueh the two infllntry divisions qnd secure the 611st9rn portion of
the SAVERNE GAP By the 19th of November the infllntry divisions hqd seshy
cured 3 brMkthrouh in the vicinit- of CIREY Though the wellther qt this
time WqS bqd with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded the Corps order now
regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroueh
The 79th Inf3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the Irmor ~nd mop up
M~ior G3nerlll Philippe Frlncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his
troops in the followi ne roonner
a) In generl3l the ldv3nce w(luld followtbe less frequented routes
t9-1J~h tho Vosees north Ilnd sOlth of the SAVERNE GAP I3void jne urblln censhy
t
b) Smflll Jlrmored tems WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsllkthroulh 13nd
probe for we3k points vVhen one WB-S found the m~ss of wnnor would be emshy
ploved
scribed
Durj ne th9 eqrly poundl ftern~on of the 19th of November CeL moved out to
UfJ northe3st froU the dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns By 1830
hours on tbe 20th ono t1sk force h3d reqched DlBO In th3 llte fternoon
CCV wlts committed to follow thE 811ments of ceL CCV rolled into thp VOS13S
in l downpour of rlin Ind with 15eht~ bhzinl CCR wtJs selected to protect
tho Corps rieht fhnk CCD mov3d jn the left portion of th3 ~on3 tJnd lldshy~
T north AgtJ in 63ch comblt cOU1Uqnd WJlS subdjrided into two tBS1r forces
56
~ 9re wete now eiltht amlll teqms morlntt north nd northellst otrer unimproted
nlrrow- windine- lnd slippery mounttlib t~ds~
Alone every roqd in I3ddition to their nflturll difficult trlVerse
~nd the poor we~ther mtln-mlde obstlcles were encountered time qnd time lelin~
Abltis old forts rOld blocks m13de of los Illld cement It irreeuhr intervl1s_
f) 11 covered by fire it were met ind reduced Althoue-h such obstlcles were
frequently bY-pIssed mtny could not be lroided 13nd eneineers qnd infl3ntry
troops di rectlv supported bv tlnk fire 1111ere used to red1lce them Adverse
welther conditions rllin lnd some snow imposed an I3dditionll hl3ndiclp is the
division frontll1y left the VosfCes lno dElbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN
Two tsk forces hld enreloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south while
the southern forces turned north circled lnd entered the pqSS from the eqst
Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north By the 23d of November -- 3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3d been reduced
Twenty-one miles strlight qcross hqd been tdvlnced This WlS some-
whlt less thln lrU10r WlS in the hlbit of ld~Tpncin[ durintr the summer rf 1944
throue-h trelcherous mountlins The lctull distlnce trlveled WlS much prelter
thln twenty-one miles Hld l unit other thln lrmor lttempted this lttlck withshy
out the speed qnd fire power of Ilrmor it is doubtful thqt the SAVERNE PASS
would hlve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divishy
sion On the other hlnd the 2d French A~ored Division would hlV6 been
dehved considorlhlv hqd they not been s)pported hy infl3ntry
The XV Corps hld been opposed hv units of the 21st Plnzer Lehr Divishy
~ 25th Pner Grenfldier Di7ision 130th pqnzer Lehr Division 245th Inflnshybull i (
~ - Divis ion 25~th Infl1ntrv D1 vIs ion 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion 553d InfintlllY
57
-shy
1 ion t3nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce IIOross the VOSlS9S
to the bltmks of the REnTE RIVER The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine
WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston Even the shfirp slopes forested
bills steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rpnge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsurshy
mountb 1 e obst)c le for armor in thJ exploitfition under the fIorst 11119pther con-
d t 34J lons ln mlOIny va rs
NOTES FOR CRAPIER 3
lilT he Gothio Line Fifth Army History Vol VII (Wllshington Governshyment Print in~ Office) p 7
2Field Service Refuhtions FM 100 5 (7ft3shinton GOV3rnment Printshying office 1949) PJir~gr~ph 836
3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh Mountl3inous Terrlin in Generfi1 The Militlry Review Vol 24 No6 (June 1944) p 72 lnd 73 (Origin~lly printed in Fr~tl7lr trllnshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)
411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campliien TM 2 Hq NATO P 22
5Ml M T Hunt USEI of Armor on Luzonll student monorlph 75 (Ft Knox
The Armored Sohool 1948) p 11 llnd 12
6The VYintor Line Historicll Divis ion U S Vl3r Depllrtl1lmt (14 June 1945) p 56
7After-Action Report 775th T~nk Bn Sept 1943 to July 1945 p 7
8Clipt Neil W Dennjs A Tlnk COlPPl3l1Y on Okinlwl student mono~rqph 103 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1948) p 9 and 10
9Klsi1owitch op cit p 4
10Bri~ Gen T J Clmp T~nkers in Tunisili (Ft Knox Hq The Armored Commlnd 1943) p 6
11 Interrogatlon Report 34 7707 Mis MIS CEITER (4 Mlrch 1947) p 20
12 After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn December 1944 p 14
~ 13After_~ction Report 757th Tl3nk Bn July 1944 p 1
14AfterAction Report 2nd ~rmored Group July 1944
58
15Milit llry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12 WilD Wllr DepArtment (1843) p 10
16 J J 1After-Action Report 1st Armored Division 21 une 1944 to 6 u Y 1944 Ellssim
17L0860ns froln the It3liSln C13mp13i~nn TAil 3 Rq NATO 12 lVpgtrch 1944 p 29
18After_Action Report 756th Tllnk Bn ~y 1944 P 5
19lnterview Cllpt H Simpson Armored Officers Advpnced Cl~ss 1949-50 The Armor~d School Ft Knox Ky
20Intervlew Lt Col W J Lind former Executive Officer llnd S-3 of 125th FA BN (L) 34th Infantry Divis ion
21775th Tlnk Bn oJ cit plJssim
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3tion Report 34 JS Center Mprch 1947 pl3ssim
23Interview Cllpt Rl31ph N~rdlow Instructor Automotive Dep~rtment The Armored School Ft Knox Kyrshy
24Interview Cllpt Kenneth L Thompson Communjcatjons D9pllrtment The AJored School Ft Knox Ky
25L d t1n 01 C1 bull
26Military Repoxts on th9 United NAt ions Vol 22 MID Wllr Depllrtment (1944 ) p 16
27After-Action Report 13th Armored Regiment ~~y 1943 pl3ssim
28Lt Col R K Gottschllll nlVlount~in GOl3t M4 The Cavalry Journi1 Vol LIV No1 (Jan-Feb 1945) p 29
29ClDt Robert F Ivioore The Employment of Tlln1rs in the Mountains student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox The Armored School 1944) p 2
30tlMud ~- t t C ( KII~~un lllnS llnd Armor rGpor of ommlttee 17 Ft nox The Armored School 1949) p 53 lind 54
31 After-Action Report 755th T~nk Bn Februllry 1944 p 9
32M~ G61n Fred L VfSllker The fhdling List Vol XXVIII The Infantry School (July 1944) p B
-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army Subiect Current Operltions To CG II IV XIII J 6th South African Armored DiviSion and 92nd Infl3ntry Division file
59
2-Y2 Norember 1944
340per~tions Report Seventh United St~tes Army Vol II 1944-1945 P 397 Imd 412
60
i
CHAPIER 4
DEFENSE
Speoiel Consider~tions
The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in PlSS tbe Bqttle of
lh3rmopyl~e conbdns severlll eleroonts which 3r0 still worthy of considerlition
in lny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re
The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple The p~ss
WBS loclted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA in Greece It held ~ pllrttoull3lr
str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile
Rrmy might penetrpte from northern into southern Greece
In Aueustl 480 BC bullbull Xerxes rul3r of the Persi3n Empire inv~d6d
Greece witb I3n I3rmy drllwn from l11 the peoples of his r3Rlm The Greeks
~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes lt)nd bis lTmy ~rrived therel ~nd S3t up 13
c131 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the PISS the lpDrotlch to which
WltlS only some 50 feet vfide l To ridioule them he sent the Medes 1nd Cissilms
1lith instructions to tpke them prisonors lnd bring them before him 1Nben they
were unsuccessful aftlr Il d~ys fiehtine the kine sent fOIllTlrd his 10000
immortBls an elite unit But they too were unsuccessful Few Greeks
werEl killod but the Porsilm losses wero excessively S61TElre The stqlemSlte
WIlS broken when l ntltire fltlmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY
which led lcross the mountltlin the llse of Nhich w(uld enltgtble his troops to
outfhnk the Greek position The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong this trllil Ilrriving
in the re~r of the Greek position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy Tidin~s
of the qpprollchin1 Persllns qlrpldy hrd heen brought to the Greeks by scouts
pl3rmittire q withdrlw1ll of the mlin body but thEl 1100 Greeks who remlined
61
were ~lmost ~ll killed2 ~
In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel
de~~olonAd Howovsr the chpr~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin ~nd itshIS be en r-v
effect on def~nsivo oper~tions rerr~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of
1odern ~rtillery~ ptmor nd Iircrlft In mountlins the defender clln stop
m~nv I1tt~bks with few troops The Gertlllln dehying ctions in Sicily Ind
It~ly during World Wflr II gll713 ~mple proof thlt this still holds true todliY
When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd he wqs forced to outflqnk
tho position by Il second~ry ropd To judge from its description this rOlid
would se8m to riQq I those seC(lndtlr routes which United Stqtes units were
forced to use in Itlily to by-pSss Germlin defmsjve positions This plth
lscended the jtoree of the River ASOPUS qnd the Hill ANOPAE then pqssed over
tho crest of (MOUNT) OETAbullbullbull3
~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS1 Ilvenues of pprollch
HO~Jver he cpnnot n~glect secondqry routes Those which he cllnnot block by
troops or we pons must bo COlrGroo by obs)rvtltion Leonjdlls the Greek
commqndor ~s lbla to oxtriCllt8 th~ mlljor portion of his force due to the
f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persillns wqs covered by
his scouts who w~rned him of Xarxos outflqnki~ mqneuver
The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone points
FurthGrmore th8 morllo of th0 defonse pound~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to withshy
stlnd isollCltion ~nd rcpeptltld ~ttcks The imPort~nco of individulCIl brqlTJry in
this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo gjned fr(l11i history When tho Grook
forces were undo~ qttlC~ frorr both diractions Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -shy
~ very effectbro we~pon IpoundIinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents Wben
one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t Th Persilln Ilrrows Ire dlirkening ~
62
~ ky tho Sptlrtqn Dieneces is s~id to h~ve IJnswerod Good then wo sh~ll
fi~ht in the shde4
The lessons of 480 BC still hold true Consider these excerpts
from In lrticle in Red stlr givlll Russiln experience in defensive oper~
tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II
In the foothills which ropresent l series of low p~r~llel
crosts dissected by vlllleys tho defense often hllS ll disshycontinuous cbllrllctor bec~uS8 of the isolPtion of tho soprpte h3ights nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3pprMchos from the r8llr qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on bull brolld front These peculi13riti0s I3r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13ins proper Hero it is gonGrGlly impossible to creto bull continuous front line Units Ilnd somotim0s even smn eroups occupy only the individulll promontories mountl3in pI3SS3s roqds qnd trqils forming points qnd centers of resist13nco They llre isolpted from one Ilnotb3 r cud lequire l cJrtltgt in independence of lction These condjti(lDS Cr0lte ~ flClrtbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd fl1nldng the dmiddotfensive units Turning Ind flpnldng lre fUrther helped bytht poor field of vision I1nd th9 delld spqces
~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3nulll front131 IJttpck is by 1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in poshyltion Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the
height ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3rrow section of the front
Dospite those vul~0rble flSP)Cts of mountpin defense it Cll be m~de thoroughly impregnble Comblt exporience shows thflt if the cororrnd3r orgllnizes the def3nS0 wisely rnd tltkes effoctbre ID3~surGs qginst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move lLltnts lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk Ind ro~r end in fl3ilur9 Moro01rar tho flqnking units thlmshySfJ Ivos often fSet into I3n unfA~rorpble s itwltion ~nd t1lke the ir W1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty
Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti(n ~gqinst turnjne Ilnd fhnking movements is 13 development of defense in depth ~nd strong security on the fl~nks Org~nized defense in the mounshytpins must first of 1311 tlrtJ C1ro to secure the junctions jmd 6specict11y the opon fhmkbullbullbullbull This cOlrering force is disposshyed in echo Ion 0n th1 flltmlrs fl1d is in 1riSUltl1 C011lTUnjcltltion with the unit sending it outbullbullbullbull For qdequ$Jte security of iunctions qnd flnlls it is llso necessllrv to hltve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce rnlinble outposts obstltlcles on tho open flltlnks ltlnd to thFJ reqr corroct dj spos itions of re Srv3 s Ilnd constnt comrruniclJtions with Ildjllcont units
But thjs still is pot 1311 No explldients will SIWe the deshy~nse if it ltlcts ir rl solute lYe PSS irity 13nd rpcillqtion inshy
itbly led t loss of thJ initiptiv6 to thl movement of the
63
ens-r on th$ flanks and rear to the disinte~ratjon of the combat 1
fonnation and finally to the encirclement of individulJI units by the Ilnemy Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished by an actilTity which includes bullbullbull the forcine of our will on tbe enemy Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for this In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under ord ina ry cond it ions
Techniques
Althoulh the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre comblJt in mountll ins
are timeless the development of techniques for the defender has been inshy
fluenced 1v the r3finement of modern welJpons The firepower mobility and
shock action of armor tH~S hltd a profound effect upon the techniques of the
defense Even wtgtere the defender is WEllJk in armor he is influenced by the
presence ltnd problble emnloyment of enemy armored forces This will effect
his organization of the terrlJin engineer works defense of mountain Plsses
-- ld observ~tion posts It influences his melJsures to limit routes of
approach IJS well IJS his employment of IJrtillery lnd self-propelled Iuns In
further pJimnine the defense considerlJtion must be ei en to sl)pportinl air
lnd camouflare or concealment from both eround and air obser7ltion
Orgllnizltion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendinr a mounshy
tlin position The defendin~ forces must correctly IJnalyze the routes of
enemy approach lnd or~lnize the key terrlin features the control of which
will block the qdvan~e These criticql terrlin features are manned by strone
balanced selfsustaining units orelnized for ltll~around defense ~trols conshy
stlntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI points of enmll
gtltroups of enemy lttemnt in to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone points by
-Jlnits are often critical points thllt require constlnt patrollinl or
64
I
o~v1tion to dotoct anomy units rttotptinl to pJli0tr1te th def3ns)ve
p don
COYlsidlt1rint tho probhw frClT the poil1t of (iow ltf the ltlttlcker rgtry
help renuc3 it to tre rniniT11J ess01tj~ls 1Vl-tln llttncldnr stronlv held doshy
slilltul ~ppliclti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w-r Frontl11 Attllclrs 9ro by no
()~nS the only Tothoa of sehil1r Il r1ount1jn position The onetly will unshy
doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~ppr(ch The Gorl1Qns oftrin llttomptcd to
fhnk 1nd isobt) tho mountltin psitlrls PTd th~n would lltt3lipt ~ brsqr shy
tl1rough on nltJrrow front
This is prociso ly how thrJ Gorrrms Ilctulllly did operqte in tho foothills of tho Northern C1UClsus They tried to utilize overy br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr I)vr)ry conrenient hidden IlpprOl1ch nd difficult pflthWllY lOl3dine to the fhmlr or rOlr of th9 dfonso in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts Sometiros tho Gorm~ns
~tried to wedo t1letsolvos iYtn Ilur dofense on 1 YlJJrrOl( sector enshyIvoring to 6U1orge on tho lil1GS of c01Trunicltions 1nd il1to the A1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the
fll3nks llnd rellr gf tho units CiofJnding thn flllin positi(ns Cn the nountqin slopes
Tho defendire force whjc0 relies on lIiTplss~hlo terrlin for fl8111shy
security inITjtes disPtster ElOl unit rrust pro~ride 1311010 fIqnk security str ~
tho Approllch of onOtl1y form~tions since he trust h~~ro tirre to shift his ro-
SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~ttltgtck For this r8pson it hecorGS extromeshy
ly importqnt to th0 comrrAnder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system Security
elements should be sent out fr0r tlJ outposts with th1) --rission of gqinjng con-
t~ct with the enemy llt the groqtJst possible distqnce It is jrlJort11t to ~
65
- the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd
to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time
strong points form the blckbonl3 of ~ defensilTe system in mount~inous
t8rr~in These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~
plfltoon in strrmgth ~nd Olrf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the
bnttlrgt position T~nks my be effecttv31y enployed witl the strong points
with tho mission of ~ntitlnk ~nd lone rltlnge fires pgqjnst the tlttJ)ckers Beshy
C8USO of its mobility 11nd DOW3rful rrntlment the hellry ttlnllt will problbly be
used to protTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone point In
mount8inous terr~in wher) enemy flttlcks cSJn be c8n~lized well trqined tflnk
try from th3ir tJrmor find destroy thr) qrIior in detlil while enfil~de fire
~hin the defonsive position tlk8S CJro of the l3ttltcking infltmtry Armor
Iso very 3ffectbre Qg1inst infqntry ~ttSJcking without lTr1orod support
~ccompl)nying his inff1ntry to tbl fil1l obiectivG
TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inflntry ~nd ~n
~doqu1tG WA rning or s~curity systnr sholl Id bl El st~blished An lttlcllt by T~sk
Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrmln stroDe point shows
th3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P tqnk qS q strong point without the
protoction of inf~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning system T~s~ Force Howze WqS
opltJrlt in in the center of tb9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit
north of RonE in the SUJll1OOr of 1944
The column 17O1ed saverill rilos over mountltdnous terrlin whon suddenly
the Armored I73hiclr3s found trrlsc~bres hllted in q r8ry dnp r~rine (See IDJlp)
---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n
66
~ -i~~~on~~~~~- 0 ~ft-~~Ci~i~ Jt - - l ~ __ trJ ~ Dl ~
o
-----u -- shyfaCe __ n ow _
Ca~ middot st1-~_
a bullbullbull
~tv~laquo I[f VWt ~ - I~ I f
the vicinity of C From there hewas
bull f
I~
-curve The pl3rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3nks cov3ring the rOllo from
positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva
The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3ns to knock out tho Ti~er
Tl3nk stron~ point An inf~ntry pl~toon WlS disposed on Point A extendircg
311nl1 the hillside to Point B s shown on sketch On ~fgivan sign1ll 1ln M-10
Tl3nk DAstroyer Wl3S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk
The 1e3ding t1lnk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3S instructed to send ~ tl3nk 1lround
the bond following the M-10 como up 131oneside it 1lnd ong~~o wh~tevor t1lrshy
gl3t CO) 1d bo found
A single bl3zook~ gunnpr fired the II st-=lrtine sigIllll Tho shot WlS
rDID1lrkqb1e in thl3t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13 direct hit from 200 Yl3rds
Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick
~ of thl) tSlnk The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn3d up with every
Vv_ Jon nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll cllibor bullets richlted off the two
Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C nd w~s closely folloWOd by the tl3nk
p11ltoon which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3nk repel3ted1y
But e~ch round bouncoG off tho tlnk ~nd into the woods The tl3nk destroyer
IvI~lO Will) 111s(l firin In tho midst of this bldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to
I3b~ndon the first Tieor TInk The crPwVlls insttmt1y cut dClWn by nur infqntry
The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t towltlrds the 1qrge stnne bridgo
An M-4 rOlched Point E IInd fired down the r01ld in ~n ltt0mpt to preshy
vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osclping over th~ stone bridge
In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down Both Tiger Tl3nks h~d been ~
k d out lnd the rOltld WIlS c 1elr for T1lsk Force Howz3 to C(lrrt inue on its
tilSS ion
cortrrnC0r rd nn infpntrv prnt8ctjnn ltnc in q(liti0n ho f11Jd t plfce ~n
nbs-Tvor rn th blind S-CUTW t wPtn of ~pprolchirl~ Amoticln fTtilrs 7
The loss nf strone point by th defendmiddot)r Ctn38 n0t rJlce SSlri 1y do-
fiTJ In- by loc~l cIIlmterttqck-s whrmevflr the situltin perwits Ml1ra(Irer
On the Est eeB hld l3ft Rute 1 poundlnG tlJrnA(l 1rrth into the mountqins nn th~ rOld tn MASSA chnsen qS q mqin lxis TW0 thnUSlnd ylrds north f tb1 hj hwq~ th fCrce hac t(l pqSS thrnugh
r- nrTOW sqddle On tht fr side of sldfle distributed qcross sW3ll plqin nine Tig3r T~nks ~ited As tho column nf eeB
l~nks crossed the rise th3 TLf3rs struck AlthnUlh s)ITf)rql of the T123rS were d3strfyec the Germlns ret iTled crntrnl of tho position A forco WlS S-l1t t(und th3 riebt to fhnk to turn the position Shortly lft)r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their qttlt1Ck six Tircers qnd fll11r qrk IV tpnks qtt1cte ri from fnur directi(lns 3nd knocked OlIt fur M-10s nd tW=l1ve light bmks 8
q ritq1 role in m011nblins OrpltInizltinn of Ilny positi(ln must include c~H9fu1
ewer the r3 stricte~ nlture nf T7luntlt j nons tArrlin prevlnts -nv lltlrfl sole
ft3nElrll counterltttpoundlcks FUrthr th3 1 imitid IVIOI ihlJle rutes mliy ho 9X
pacted tn impede ltlny pttempt to k0~1G the reserves rppid1y 1)17I3r lt vide fr(nt
This is espechlly true where he8Vlr tlnks lttl imTo1red For thlt rerson
rlSElrves mqV he heJd It lowr 161131s qnc cltrrtritted in snlOIll units which Cln -
69
exploit thp limit terrlin lv3Hble Since the pttqcker will 1jCl lt018 to --
onlv q limited mount (If his pTIlor in lny (lnEi lrell he ml~ be s1CP6cted
t(l lttlck on numer(lus r0utes sinllllttneously The sever1 SITlll reser(l9S of
te defender qre tr1 ic1831 force to (opel multiple lttlclrs in restricted
terrlin
The tqsk nf snoineer llrdts i n tbe defense in mountl ins is to pro~Tide
fOt de fense bull
In locqtjng ltlnc constructitw l syst3rr (If field fortificSltions lnd lpprF3ci8tion of th) tArrltdT is prerequisite since field f0rshytificltj(lns cnnsist primlrilv of strengthening its dClfensive vgt11ue Obstltlcles hinder n(llT3ment (If tb0 enemy lnd hold rim uncer the deshyfonders fire
The positi(lns selecte~ hy th0 defender lre strlnethened by fteld f(lrtificltio1s Orinldly the occupying troops Cnlt)nize the ground Ind construct thp fortificgt1tjons Duties (If engineers Ire to provide tools lnd mlteri~ls lnd to execute w0rks of genshy6rql use bullbullbullbull All wrks of l technicll nlture tht l31e beyond
--- the clpllbilities of occupyincc troops lre preplred bv the ~mgine8rs9
Obstlcles ml3Y be nltur~l (Ir lrtificill Nlturll obsbwles include
such terrJjn f3ltur9S lS wQter cnurses p(lnds SWllmps gtlll1ies steep slopes
crelting 3 b~rrier Thev Jlre Sl1pole11lented when neceSSltlrv hy irtifjcj~l
obstcles These F3Y be wClrks If dlstr1)ct i nTI such qs destroyed brid-res or
blJi Idins rOid crqt1rs inundt i MS lnd fe lIed trees or telephone poles
fjelds of steel rlil lnoden posts heJlTY fences (dbs clbles wire r(llls
ind birriclc1es Works (If consttlctjon must be designld to deBl effectively
with the clplbiUties no limitlttioDs of 3nemv vehjcles which they lt3 inshy
tended to stoplO
Works of dl3struction provi1e the 111301 plrt [If th3 Ihstl3cles tl the
70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use
~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters l~ndslides blowing
btidlies or culverts diverting the course of mount~in strelms ~nd other
forms of demolitions Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the deshy
struction of 1 structure roqd or trq i~ so th~t the ~ttlcker will be forced
to repllce or rebuild rlther thln rep~ir Ro~ds mly be extensively d~ma~ed
by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~reps lre very limited
the effoct will be to forco the tt cker ~ seek new ~venues into the mounshy
tqin position
An observer in ItJlly roported
As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es deshymolished ro~ds it critic~l points fell~d l~r~e trees lcross rOlds mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in critic~l villqges by dernolishing middot buildin~s All obsticles were protected by AT guns rnd Jlutom1tlc WElPpC1tlS on slopes of connect_ ing rid~es These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other
~ ridges bullbullbullJlnd by relistered I1rtillery SP 88 1uns were clenr ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fllts ~nd slopes ~ffording
commrnding observ~tjon Tqnks were kept in plqtoon lnd comp~ny
groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJlystncks to oppose infqntry qdshyvllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd lrtplery were held up by obstllcles l
Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged olt)ulltry I1re extreme ly criticlil
fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(molitions tJlnk trqps
felled troes lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oftectively stop tho enemy in
his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing
Eneineor erected obstl3cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily
the enomy whoro he Cln be hold under fire or fO~~J him to seek new routes
into the position Obst1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3 becuse left unpro
tected they 1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci l equipment qnd troops of the
qttllcker They re 1 nrust fClr effective de fAns ) in mount inous terril in
71
~ ~
~
(I
t
l
~
-
-
-
~
ft~
r
rUT
13
lAST CE~TRFL 1
TO~(SIA I SeA I~ I 000000
(( - 11 M~rs
I
sd- 1bbullbull 2 t I
II
r
bull bullbullbull t
bullbull shy I~
FUr 13
when used wisely I3dd grelt strength to the defensire position The
extent to which these obstl3cles will be successful in dellying in ittlcking
enemy is pn excellent molsure of the effectiveness of the defenders engishy
neers
Frequently in rouelgt terr3in the comblt will be reduced to I3n engishy
neers Wlr n in which engineers of the 1ttl3cldng force must le1d the dr~nce
constlntly strbrinrr to neutrl3lize th9 obstJicles phced in the pl3th by the
dofenders engl_neers An eXl3mple of 1tengineers wqr mly be found in the
comblt experiences of the 56th 2npineer Blttllion (11th United Stqtes Armored
Division) in the vicinity of PRUM Ge rmqny The terrt=Jin round PRUM is
chArl3cterized by steep slo-pEls numerous wqter ccmrses heivy wooded 3re8s
3nd qbruptly qrisine h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight
On the ~orning of 3 Mlrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8ny B 56th Armored Dj1rision Blttllion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e towns of SCEiifARZHEIM ltnd BUDESCHEIM At first the engineers repSl ired rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsAr lt pth throueh i mine fie Id
On the marnine of the 5th of MOIrch the whole compmy IlSshy
sistec by q phtoon from Compqny C SOlssembled it 008 to repll3ce two blown bridges On 6 M1rch CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed
ittlck to seize I crossinI site on KYLL RIVER B Compllny with 3d plqtoon of Compflny C lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL Due to the extreme ly limited roqd net the rugged ch~rpcter of the tBrrlin qnd the rq in snow mud l1nd sleet the Bqiley f iled to 8rrive so wl)rk Nltl sst rte d on l1 trlt38dJIIllY ford AC ros s the 1 1r9 112
An officer with the 56th Bqttplion pdds thjs eyewitness 8ccount of
the 8ction
bullbullbull Garmlm troops well dug in held the high ground on the fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8d boon complotely blown qnd tho sito cO~Jered with qrtilleryt I3ntit8nk morttlr qnd sm1311 8rms fire On the fltJr shore the rOgt1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge to the high ground WlS criss-crossed by hrge fllen trees to
~ form offective Ib8tis At tho pointwhere the r08d stqrted up into the hills hold by the Germfns WfSmiddot11 hrge pntitpnk ditch
73
which cut thl) rOlld Ilnd prevmted Ilny by-plssing The ditch vms Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd pppa~red to be ~bout two mile long
B Compllny with lll of C Comp~ny ltt~ched stllrted to work on q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of 6 M1rch At Ilbout 2300 h(l1Jrs the ford WIlS rflf completed when the Ger1Mns cOllnter~ttlcked In the ensuing fight e~ineeB of B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~
BOWQ~r lrtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued unshytjl tho morning hours 1nd provented completion of tho ford
About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with ilpmored cltlbs wore out flcross tho river to remove the lbltis from the rOl)d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river)
By d~ylieht ~bout hltlf of the rOlild hld been cle~red when tho Gormlns st3rted thro~ring AP shells 1t the dozers The dozers then withdrtJw to covElred positions llone tho blink of the river
B 3nd C Compllnios continued to work on the ford durine the morning of 7 MfJrch however the Gorm1ns still held the high ground on tho fl-lr shore flrd the srmll ~nns ltnd 1rtillory fire on tho crossinjl sito ~de work oxtremely hllzlrdous
At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned CCA h~d broken out of their bridgeho1d It GERALSTEIN lndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA
El1borgtto engineer IssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue however unshy
d control of plsses throupoundh thtJ mountlins is held by the defender These
plsses represent k0Y terrpin fo~turos on tho nptur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which
tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his tltlnks pounduns ~nd he~vy equipment Control
hingos upon possossion of the critic~l heipoundhts domin~tinpound p~sses
An lotion ~t KASSERINE PliSS illustrlites tho importlnce of hold ini
tho so he ights
After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy two comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer bltt~lion were givon the mission of holdin~ KASSE~RINE FlSS I3gPinst enomy tl3nks qnd to est~blish
OPts for indirect lrtillery fire At this time there W7Jr8 but soven 75mm SPs in om oomplny ltmd ten 75mm SPs remlinjnpound in tho othar Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther side of the pASS The TD guns wore cttreful1y dUj in c~mouflllpound od Ind sl~htod nlollpound the ro~d For three d~ys tha TDs with- stood tho ontire pressuro of tho GermlTI Armored force consist shyinl1 of bmks ~rtillery inf1l1try sir I3tbwks pnd mortlr fire Evory tlnk lttlok into tho prtss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY
~ 10ss08 Only whon tho enemy infflntry c~ptured the high eround )n both sides of tho ~ss l~d wore mlchine-eunnfng the TOts did they withdrlw 14
74
Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp been the subiect of
0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience WltlS ~~ined ellrly in
HIlring se ized ~ p~ss the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver ~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd relr of whole units enelGd in defl3nse For this rellson the units engllged in defense ltf pllsses detnllnd speci131 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd officers
After clpturine the hej~hts ov~rlookine the p~ss the units must hold them rt 111 costs Even if the enemy brc~ks through the PIlSS lnd its defenders Ille enCircled they Ylust stllY nn Bnd drlw up 1l11-qround security on the heirhts Holdine these heights mly be of decisive importlnce in the bqttle with the second echeshylons of the lttlckin~ enemy Besides th~t the elrrisons of the heights will pin down Ipr~e forces of the enemy which will help in tho hunching of tho counterlttpck Upon withdrllwll of the foe thll encircled gllrrisons clln C8use considerlOlble dllmqge sinc~ they will keep under inccssrnt fire the entire course of the hostile retrelt through the mountlin p~sses15
The Russillns noted thlt the Gerrnlns frequently lttempted 13 thrust in
~8rrOW sector endellvorine to brFiltJk throu~h into 11 v811ey lnd corne out on
fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights Such ~n enemy mllneuver
wqs ~ll the morc dmiddotID~erous lS it NilS often clrried out with 113rge numbers of
infqntry nd tllnks If successful it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole
divisions of the defenders Consequently Russi8n doctrine stressed thqt deshy
fense of mountlin vllleys Ilnd passes into them deml3nded pllrticulllr Clre from
officers of ~ll rllnks Th3ir experience of fi~htjne in the C8UC8SUS proved
thlt for d j rect control of thl rltl lleys the enemy must secure the commlnd ing
heiphts llol1P- which th3 vltllIey uSlllllly extended Therefore cross fire from
the ldipcent mountrins Ilnd slopes WlS the best w~y to defend the ~lley It
wqs expedient to lellre only smltlll forces reinforced with I3ntitllnk fire units
on tho floor of the rlllley Tpnks llso proved invllu8ble to the defender 16
In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes of 11 crest extending from lest to elst Three regiments of hosshytile inflntry supported by trmks broke throueh on the iunction
75
between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it ~nd moved out into the vllley between tbe mountJins Two d3ys
~ter more thln 100 t3nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts undertook ~n lttpck llon~ 3 ~lley to the 63st in order to comshypleto q deep fllnking of tbe ridgo from the south lnd to emerge in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount3ins At this time our comtn3nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl3cO of th3 prospective bre3ktbrou~h this shut off the v~lley completely Rjfle lrtil shylery lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the mounshytllins bullbullbullbull In the center of thQ Vltllley whoso width WlS sevan to nino kilometers q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d Thus the entrqnce to thJ vllley reprosented f pocket of riM subiected to lrtillery lnd mortqr lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns The hostile bmks moved tOWlrd tho centCfr of the Vltllley in three echelons When they reqched thg zone of cross fire the lrtilllry he3vy mlchine guns ~nd tlnks disposed inlmbush opened up on them with q c0ncentrltion of fire Pqrt of the lrtillAry unjts fired on tbe inflntry cutting it off from the tqnks The GarmlnA took cover wh Ue the ir t~nks hl1T ing suffered ~reqt d3mlge were unshy3ble to withstnd the pcwerfulb3rrqfe fire lnd retrelted
After 3 whj le th8 enemy ren311ed the littlck Now his tltmks lnd inflntry seplrlited nto throe groups Two of them mov-d ~long the slopos hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open the entr~nce to the v~ley The third group ~tt~cked in the censhyter Thus the enemy h~e SClttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~ in~ ~dv~nttJle of th~t crush3d ~ll his groups in detltl il At the
~homent when the enemy 3tt~ck hlld relched its m3ximum intensity Ind its tempo ~s stlrtiru to slow down und3r the effect of deshystructive fire from thrs directions our tlnks rushed out of lmshybush lnd counter11ttpcked on th0 right fhmk rolJp of G3rmln tqnks Immedi1ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire nd tho reshym~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe pressure of our tqnks 17
RussiIn success in this eng3goment demonstr3ted tlle ilrportqnce of conshy
trol of thf1 heiehts oVlrlookinl vllleys ~nd plisses Such control WliS obtlined
by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin of units in the
vqlley Tlnks phced in lmbush were V3rv effective in dostroyinl the enemy
~rmor thus prolTing their ero3t VIllue to 3 dt1fender in mountqinous terrlin
I)
A t3chnique re llted to thBt of controlling the pltlsses is one of reshy
bdnjng observItion posts of 10 suit3ble chtlr$icter The defending force in
m0untinous terr3in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consbmt surveilhmce
~report the locltion 8nd lictivity of the pttlcker FUrther such
76
Vflt ion posts mllY bring down highly lccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces
in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in Such OPs m~y
hItrG excellent rfldio cNJnnunicption even with smflll FM sets becluse of their
locfltion on high ground Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion
m~y be found in 1rmorod unjts In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfln be
spotted by the It-b3ckor he mlY be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength
to destroy it Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisil soon lO3rned the Villus of
tItnks wit~ obs)rvlltion posts for communicllt ions is we 11 lS protection
In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornplny Cs plqshytoons (Slst Reconnqissmce B~tt3lion) h~d 1n OP within 400 y~rds of t3n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR The enemy know th1lt the OP WlS there ~nd finilly sent 3 plqtoon out to get it The C Com p~ny lielltemmt in the OP SlW them coming omd fJlerted his two itticbed t3nks which were in fJ fo~rered posttj(ln lbtlllt 200 Y3rds in the rOltr The t3nks CQ1ne out Iuided b r~dio swunoc llrouncentl the little knoll where the OF WqS lnd opened fire with cinistor bull
lS-The t3nks killed or wounded 111 but seven men
The number of observltion posts necesspry for ltJdegulte wltrnircg m~y be
decrellsed if tho defender C8 limit the routes of 3)gtroqch tn his position
Rcutes thrCllgh m(lunt in ~reps Ilre limited to some degree by the nqturo of the
terrnin An r)dded ldv~ntr)ge ml be derived by the defender if he or(lnizes
the gr0und wisely The enemy should bE f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of
~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use If th defense is to be sucshy
cossful the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his
will on the enemy If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he
desires to flgbt th8 defender immediqtely loses whltlterer sm~ll initilltbre he
terrgtin is lost to the defender
In Sicily the Arnericpn troops frequently turned the mount~inous
in intn food ldvlntl3[e for offensiT(l 1ction bv proiectini2 iccelerltted
77
)itpckS qlong the limited routes f Slpprolloh
The mountqinous terrJlin in Sicily tended to clnqlize the moveshyment of tqnks in most qre~s There were certqin ~re~s however where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in tJlinin~ ground by rookiIle lightnin~ thrusts closely follollred by the inf~ntry ~sSJlult In such cJlses Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok ~s made the objective ~s tqken The conditions fJlvoring attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck19
A bJlttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks
to prevent attficks over most Iilrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlrker to
move over routes pnd into IlrellS previously selected by th9 defender The
enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defenders position by advancing on
th9 lelist likely tvenues of Ilpprol3ch into Il dofender1s qrell Therefore
the dofendjng forces must block even the l1il1possible Jlvenues of approllch
and force the enemy to fight over the terrain selected by the defense comshy
mander Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets the defender will hJlTe-
iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c(lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy
thrust unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3s
The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which
the lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiCn in mountJlincus terrl3in
would Slppelr to be
1 Deny secondJlry routes nf lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces preshyventing the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked
2 Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to clnJlliz8 the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense
3 Have reservos helVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3ble as a counterJlttJlck force to destroy enemy penetrltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes
The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach
Ilnd inadequltlte vis ibility should lssist the defel1der in the successful execushy
~n of ambushes The defender has e ~re~t advlnta~o his screening forces
78
~ g iva him Ilmple time to preplre the lmbush he need only sit lnd Wl it
while the lttlcker limit8d in his routes of I3pprol3oh W13lks into his trl3p
The followinr I3ccount of 13 Russil3n I3ttl3ck on i Germl3n unit illustratos
the dec is iveness I3nd de structiveness of suoh I3n I3mbush discussed in the fore-
In one of the mountlin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3n front Germl3n tl3nks hid forced thGir w~ into l VJllley There were ibout 40 t~nks moving in column llon~ the only rOl3d A cowpl3ny of tlnks with l3utoml3tic riflemen under the cotnml3nd of Senior Lieutenl3nt EROFEYEV wltlts givon the tpsk of stopping the enemy it the villJ~e of MALKINO
Ihe tf1nk unit rel3ched tho vilhg6 lfter twenty kilometer Tilrch I3nd deployed in line on the western side of the villlee from which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come Trymmy gunners 1nd inf3ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions Cn the flank of the tmk compPny protect in it from sudden I3tbck by GerIllrln tommy gurmers Such distribution of f(1rces hlls freshyquently justified itself In wooded hill country the GerllJlns ofton send inf~ntry I3heltld of the ir tlnks fhey comb the undershygrowth striving to extermin1to the crews of Soriet lntitmk guns ~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their tlnks be inl I3t the Slme time 13 fighting pltrol qud the fi rst I3ttacki~ Wlve For this r8lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes ippe~r suddenly on the fllnks or in the re3r of the Soviet troops Infntry obshyservers postGd on the fllnks of the inhlh ~ted point protected tho tltmks from such surprises
In the ~ftornoon Germl3n t13nks IlpP9llred out of l stl1Sl11 pltch of woods SNleuro two kilometers west of MALKINO ViithCut stoppiI1 they rcoed towlrds the villlP-8 It full speed Senior Lieutenlnt EROFEYEVS tl3nks decidod to permit th3 Germlns to get ~s close lS possibb lnd then shell thorn witz controlled volleys This WlS l correct decision for thry GermlIlS were qdlTlncing without reconnBisslnce lnd did not expect to meet with resistpnco of 3rnorod vl)hicles jn IvIALKINO
1J1lhen the 0nemy tlnks were within 1000 to 2000 l1eters our tnks opened fire witr their c~mnon After the first few volleys two Gerl1ln tlnks burst inti flJl1OOs The r3trI31Pder beeln to d8shyploy hAstily on both side s of the rOlld Deployment find the ldoption of blttle order occupied ~bout five minutes lnd thmiddot) Gershymlns ld1rlnced 3 f3rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting unlined fire Firo from our stl1tionlry tlnks WlS so Slccurqte thrt during this time lnother six enemy tf3nks were knocked out bull Hll f of thom were burnt The Germln tt3nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire IDd rotreqted This WlS thEl TI1CTIlcnt when re inforcemmts qrrived lt
~MbLKINO 90ns iatinpound of fln ~ntitlnk bottormiddot lUG s8v8rl1 lorry lOlds of soldiers twongst them sOlter31 tqnk d8strCvers with Itnti shytlnk rifles
79
Fi s
(to
SpoundCcw-o ENEM Y TTi C
I
IJ
(NOTE Before the second Germ$Jn qtt~ck the Russi~n tflnk force WlS split I1nd phced in Ilmbush on both fllnks of the position The Mllin drive WlS ~glinst the Germ~n infqntry pnd qfter disshypersine tho inflntrthc Russiqns concentrlted on the German t8nks)
Two hours llter the Germ~ns ~epin ldvlnced ~eqjnst the vil~
If-lg-8 of 11IALKINO in the SIImo formnticlIJ qS before one compllny on either side of th8 ro~d The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wps reinforced with q bottqlion of Ilutomqtic riflomonqdnmcine 100 meters behind j
the t~nks Suspectin~ Il thropt from the flpnk the Germqns IdshyIrqncod It full speed As soon qS the tnks ppproqched within rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners IInd qntitlnk (TDts) got into lction Ilnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks The inshyfpntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tpnks seplrqted from the ir inflntry continult)c t( qdvl1nce Six GerT11n tqnks W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes Their formltion wps disrupted On q ~i-Iret1 s ignll our tqnks opened rrJJchi~O ~un fire on the infqntry lnd cnnnon firs on the tllnks bullbull bullbull
If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing IIc(0unt hqd had IIrtillery
in support of their positi0n they might hqrG pccomplished eTen Toore For in
~ use of qrtillery th3 def3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p(Issesses eertqin
inite ~dvJ)nt3res A few of these IIdvqntqges qre his guns CqIl be dug inshy
to lClclaquotions whicb offer consjd9r~(lle protecticn Ig3inst enemy ctunterbpttery
tho presenoe of deep Cpr6S I1V offer dd4ticIll1 protectiltn to fire direction
centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews 1nd tho prElpprlltion of blrrpges rtnd concentrqtions
opn bl oompleto qS8umjrw complete initipl pccurpcv of Ipr~E1 c(Ilcentrqtions
The prtillery G lements of the de fense gprris(m cpn plso become
thoroughly fqmililr with meteorologicAl conditions of the ~req Ancl on set up
resultpnt increqs() in qccurpoy (If unobserTed fire justifies the time qnd
High pniSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA]n defense F0r this purshy
p0se the 42 mortlr would seem e~en m(lre useful thlln the l05mm howitzer21 ~
s physicplly sT)1119r nd lighter permittin1 it to be mqnhqndled into the
81
un i1 lon on the crest
fiDht nD bv
o
o
o
possible position continue to be fired to hst possible moment and
then be quickly disphced to the next position Artillery should be of the
self-propelled type for gre8test effective use 8ud should preferably be
mounte-l on a full tracked chassis In Ittlly the ~rlTl8n use of such ~uns
W1S of ero1tflst vlIlue to the defonso Germ1n SP euns W(luld fire on IOl3d
elements cnusing thclTl to deploy nd Ildvllnce slowly Ilnd cltUti(111Sly By the
time our troops reached its suspected locltltion the SP gun 1flS behind the
next bend in thQ r n8d re$Jdy to r 9 peat the same performance In th is w~y
the defense VlllS ltlble tC klt3Gp the lttcker cCnst8ntlv off b8hnce ne~rer k-nowshy
ing when he was gojng tn hit thl l1ltlin battle position
This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored
Eeeiment defend5nz 8 mountqin PIlSS in Tunisil3
Durirw the first week we were near SID BOU ZID we 1ere u-rding the Plss We W(Jr0 eqiDped f(1r indirect firine
11 of our tanks lIere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8SS bull bullbull set bltck 8b(llt fiyo or six mil0s jIe Cltlme within 2000 yrds of tho PllSS Cl~middotpoundJry rrornine firoc int(l thJ pss nd pulled bck No were iust b ck of LpoundSSOUj (lrrTl INS 22
Mountninous terr~in genortllly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8
for cITrouflqgo in the br(lken I1r(lund IInd wooded ~reqs Concellment of the
tho dcfondor This is espociplly truE) of forilflrd (Ibserl1)ti0n posts which IICt
IIS tho eyes ltmd elrs 0f the defense comnmder Their concolllment is their
chief fnrm of lofense
The enemy r3~~rdl(Jse nf lis strnneth clnnot hit whlt he cmnot see In mountll in0us tJrr tl in thlt do fender mlV leqve s111811 d9t8chmonts on isolltltcd PElllks lithin sivht of the prinshyciplll 8lnUG8 (If pprolch If thGs dJtllchrrents ltire well cllrrouflq~Gd the mly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the locltion lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy long lfter the originl31
-4efensive positifln hlts been penetr1ted Such forces pre tllso oful in bringing d0JVtl ltlccurllto nrtillJrv fire upon fln ldshy
middotmcing ClDOmy whJ h1s rEJlchEld prclrrltJllfod loc1tlons such J)S
83
~ criticql defiles 23
Within the strong points qnd the m~dn I)ltttle position 811 possible rre3suros should bo t3ken to clmouflllge men wepons supplies ~nd t3nks This will effecti1rely concell the mlin defensive position from the enemy 3nd keep him constlntly conshyfused 3S to its eX3ct loc3tion The occ3sionql p3tches of snow ltmd blro rock mqy cl)mpliCltl3 the clmoufl3ge of t3nks during light snowflll the ch3n~ing l3ndscqpe m~y require the frequent chqnidng of the color of individu31 t3nks Germpn units in Russi3 frequentlycqrriod 13 buckot of ch31k or lime in e3ch tlnk to permit the crews tCl blend with the lq~2SClPO by lpplying the whitening 3gent or removin~ it quickly
During the summer months the Gormqns mlde effective use of brpnches
to pre~rent 8 ir observ3tion of the ir tlnks
In wooded qnd hilly prelS cover Ind cqmoufl3ge W1S bottor Summer foli3ge trees offer better clmoufl3ge There were fewer losses frm qir 8ttlck bec3USo of bettor c8moufl1ge discipline (everv rmored vehicle WqS c01rered dth tree brpnches 3nd m3de to hug the edges of hedges or woods so PS to lPpeqr from the 3 ir to be 3 me re proiection of the pound0 li3 ge )
In expect3tion of enemy 3ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt3ck the defender
in mountqinous terr3in must tlre 1311 clmouflqge meqsures necessqry in 1ny
type of terrlin The len~ths to which q militlry unit is forc)d by hck of
qir protection m3Y be shown by these ststeroonts of 3 Gormln qrrrored division
comm3nder
bullbullbull No vehicle WlS permitted to mOlre on the roqds during the d3y unloss $bsolutely nocesspry 8nd the bulk s conce31ed deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det3chments in vill1ges 25
The Division Comm3nder h3d seen personqlly to the clmoufl3ge discipHne in tho noi~hborhood wen h3Irjne det3chments witr brooms to sweep 3W3y tr1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO3ds He cqlled these men IIbroomstick commltlndersl~26
Prob lems
Coordinqtion Ind control of tbo c1efendintr g3rrison presents serer31
problems FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to prolTide telephone communishy
~ )n throughout his position since qmple time prob3bly 1s 3vlilqble for
84
~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck As ~ result the defender m~y be exshy
d to h8ve ~t his dispoSJll excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities rel~tively
immune to the effects of the tertJl in In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8ve
time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl~8inst enemy ~ir or 8rtillery
In wooded hilly country t8nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il
from eVFJry viewpoint Engineer prGP8r~tion for toutes of t~nk count3rltt~ck
must be thorough 8nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l
of de l~ying forces In plrtic1l1~r e8ch blnk must be lble to ident ify its
own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks In close wooded terr~in this h~s
proved very difficult One Russi13n officer suggested th~t 8 thorough reshy
he~rs~l bo given -nd th~t th8 b8rk of trees be cut ~t drivers eye le~rel or
Plinted with q dlb of lime 27
In wooded hill countrT in ~ble cClnmnder llsing movement ~nd
controlled fire 1fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS m~y m~ke
~ oss ible succes sful ~cti nn lt111lt i nst hrge enemy forces Experience n defend ini monnt~ in v~ lleys hJls shown thltlt t~nks rendered ir shy
replice~ble ~ssistltlnce to infltJntry when coopor~tion h~s been corshyrectly org~nized28
Grol3t coordin~tion is dOr1l3nded in phmninl1 ~rtillery support for the
defense since it is 10gic81 to expect thlt the ltt~cker will use Ill l3r~il-
1ble we~pons for counterblttery fire If the defl3nder is lble to c00rdin~te
the ~ctivity of his obserTlltion posts ~nd m~intl1 in cO1municltltion with them
he Cln permit gun crews to r3m3in in protected loc~lities until the llst
possible moment The effect of this coordinltion is l rrre~t impro3mont in
mor~le lnd ~ lower c3su~lty r~to 8mong gun crews This type of coordjn8tion
W3S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsiln hills
Tho enemy h8d spent months prep8ring those positions 8nd when ~ttillery or 8ir pounded 13 positi 0 n in preplr~tion for ~n att~ck Jerry stlyed in his dugout until the lrtillery fire W8S
~riised Then he rem~nned his fUns ltlnd c~ueht our inf~ntry with ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8rds 29
85
Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point Although
S 1lt38s frequently Ji-Tlillble thln Jirtillery support the defendermust
clrefully cootdin~te its use when it is llmillble The need fCr lir support
in ID0untll1nous terr3in is rellly no different for the Ilttl3ck or tho defanse
The technique of its use is the s~me ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll~e of
qrtillery
From the ~ir q pilot unf~mililr with th0 lJindsclpe below will exshy
parience grcllt difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~
friend froIT foe withollt ldditionlll identifyint c3vices However the de-
f3nder should be in I position to fqmililrize his supporting lt1ir with the
terrlin by previous detlilec reconnlissInce Ind rehollrslJl
On the other hJ3nc if we lssume thlt llny Ilttlcker possesses l locll
superiority over the defense we mllY qssume Ilso thqt the defendor will
~om be llble to c0ntr01 the lir over his position For thlt rellson the
Ind concellment for his own protection
the Buhe- where the Am3ricln defenders 3ctuJilly possessed pir superiority
When the weqther cl31red however there WIlS presented the unusulll circumshy
stlnces of Il defend-3r in rough terrlin who enjoyed q ir sUp-3riority OlTOr tho
The following lccount furnishes q detliled Inn striking eXlmple of
the use of qir by 1 defender
At 1000 hours on December 23 1944 Clpt~in P~rker lt his r~dio heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y Within ~ few minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike The stron~6st enemy
f-- uildtipa at this time were west ltmd northwest of th3 town(BASTOGNE)
86
thre~tening the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry lnd 527th Glider Infqntry Rejiments (lOlst Airborne Division) The infllntry front lines bld been helring lnd seeine the rrivSll of those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two dlYs But beCluse of the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition there hqd been no re~l chock 8gq i1~st them The plllnes dropped low ltmd Cltltne in fllst IgP inst the anomy columns gl ining complete surprise The Gorshym~n vehicles Wlre on the rord fqcinl towlrd BASTOGNE when the first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them On thllt first dllY the Gershym8ns did not use tleir Ilntillircrqft gnns lgBinst iny of the di1Te bombers
If this reticonce wls due t 1 desire to cover up the poshysitions of the ~uns it IfflS Il 1riew qllickly chpnged beo~use of th3 dllUlIlge the Ninth Air Force plAnes hld done durin the dllY For there8fter the Germln fl~k WlS intense over the front Ilt 111 times 1nd the lir units hld Wgt furthGr hnurs of unopposed operllshytion
They tnlldo the most of their opportunity The snow ~s ~re~t qid Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which were prompt ly bombed The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy WlS out th9 smoke from those blqz jng phntltions lnd from brewedup enemy columns Ulflde a complete circle Slround the besiel1ed forces untn it hit every Doqrby to11 pt le~st once -lith oxplosive 1nd fire bombs
- The entire iir oper~tion Wl1S crefully sYsteml1titod ~nd then supervised in det~il As phnes VV3re I7ssigned to the 101st Di1rision by VIII Corps they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by rqdio He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or highWBY PS they ClXOe in tOVlIrd BASTOGNE Sevorl check points wore then gi1Ten them fr()m tl1e map When the Pppropoundlching phnes were definitely loclted nn approtch cirecti()n w~s given thqt wOl11d bring th3m strllght in ovor the tqrglt This procedure eliminqted pll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them surprise the enBmy Vfuen tho bombs pnd gun qmmunition were expended the phm) s were (lrdeted up to t SP fe ~ ltitude ta pa tr()l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wete ei~en specific reshyconnqisslnce rrissjons The3r reconnlisslgtnce rerorts were used ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for gi~Ting the gr()und forces pd~rltnce informl1ti(ln on the build up of enemy strength After the first f] ight thrlre were rlwi1Vs tqrgets listed ~he~d Cqptnin fprker cqre~~lly monitorin~ the ~ir 111so clms lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces b~tt ling in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f(lr the ir bombs tIe would then cqll to them rJd h3 often succeeded in persu~ding them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE llrefl In l few minutes these pl~nes would brJ bpck on their ~ssjlne(l missions bull
bull bull bull (it WIlS Sq id with enthus ilsm) tlle effect WS w0rth two or three inflntry divisions
It WfS not unusull during the siege to hltVEi 8n infmtr~n ~ cpll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P4s diving It the tltnks within 20 minutes30
87
The defender in mountpinous terr~in h~s the ~dvpnt~g~ of choosing
811y spel3kine where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe ltmd of being ~blc to
IlI8ke ltildlTl3nCe logistic~l prep8r~tions His plltmnintr cJin include prior proshy
vision of Idequlte supplie a eXlctly where they will be needed This frequentshy
ly Cln be done lo~ in ~dv8nce so thJlt th8 minimum mOlHffint (If supplies will
bp rQquired I1fter the bltlttle hls bean joined Thus the defender enjoys III
relptivo ~dv8ntpge in tho logisticll support of his units ltilt the blttle poshy
s ition He Cln mOlre his supplie s fOIWlrd without the hltmd ictps presented by
o0molitions or terr~in bottlenecks His routes ire open rtnd his rOlJd moveshy
mont relltbrely protocted except for the ltlir 13ctirity of th9 ltIttltlcker Thus
qdeqlJIOte t0nnll1e IDly be provided flt successi) defensbr6 positions
Germ13n technique in Ittllr fe-llowed these linea Their tl1nks or iuns
8mply prorided with 8t1munition lliid down no I rby would requcntly fire Ill
po-- Ilmmuniti0n llV1lihble it the positifn bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-
In contr~st the ntt8cker is frequently frced to leqrn th8 hltlrd f13cts
of mount8in lo~istics through bitter experience IS AForicln ~rmor~d units did
in Tunisi13 ltInd Itllly
Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t191ns of tr$nsport~tion limited r~ute s unsettled W813ther obs) rved Ilrtil1ery fire lnd minas ~long trlils tlnd mllunt in routes logistics in mount~in operlshytions 13re much more compliclted th~n g()ner~lJy te~lite0 The use of map dist13nces bull bull bull in time ln~ sp~ce fqctors in mounshytdn operJltlon bullbullbull is of no vltgt1la 3
Little cnn be ldded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr thlt h13s
not q)roAdy been mentjnned in thjs report The oeculhr looustics nf mounshy
tlins with the reverberlttion usuI=Il in tltoky slooes mliy seri(llsly or-nruso the
listeninR nnsts (f t~e defense In ltddttiln th3 frequent thick fCgs prevli shy
~ in the ltlleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC the point where enemy t~nks
-- y penotrqte undetected to ortthin f fov YItds of thr defensive positions
In the Ardennos for oX8mple enomy ttlnks wore lble to ponetrlto fqr into
At 0830 on the 19th of December two Ti~er T~nks nosed out of the fog ~nd stopped within 20 Ylrds of the rolch ine gun poshysitions cO(713ring the northern sector The 57mm gun to the right of tho rOld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~lnks A medium tlnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ strlight It thoro Tho mlshychino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs All fired lot the Slme time Ind in I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks hld bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1 Lqter flll hllnds c11 imed credit for tho kill
Fog lt night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders beshy
clluse the difficulties ~re multiplied For the men of CeE who ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)ht 1IIIqS comp~rqtitTely
quiet Their pe~ce WIS punctured ~t times by the dropping of q fe Irtillery shells rnd out beyond the Wall of fo~ they could helr the nrgtise of n) 6ne1J1y buildup There WIlS littlo quiet hOiVJ-rer 11 long trJ inf~try perimeter Enemy tqnks in twos Ilnd threes suported by jnfl311trY probed towlrds them yenfilen lrnod by smqll qrms or blzookq fire they checked qnd bllued lMtJy qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes Tho lccomp~nying Germln infqntry tried to infiltrqte through the lims Theso sm$)ll penetrltions 1nd the resulting fire woro such thlt it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to mlintltin wire comshymunicqtions with the outnost For tb(t p$)rltroopers these hours vre-ro lt nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0nd confusion But when morning CBme the light reveqled thlt two of thJ enemy tlnks hld beon kn0cked (Ut bv blookq fi-re 32
The defonder in mountqins will frequently seek to delqy the IJttlclrer
until tho bJid wOllthor of lltte fqll ltInd winter tips the strqtelic bqlltgtnce still
further in fYor of the defonse Their corttrol of the heights their prior
prep1rqtion I3nd their defensirG role Ill Clperlted in fltror of the Germqns
throurhout mQuntgt3inous opetltltions qglinst lJinited stltes forces in World ilqr
II As El$)rly ~ s Februqry of 1943 Time Mlgl z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the
Arnericlln people concerning the Germ$)n position in Tunisi$)
bullbullbull ROITroel WqS jmproin 8 position in which he ql-reqdy held the Ila-rqntl1ge He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurgin Von A-rmin
89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North occupied q rim of comm~ndinpound heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line Behind tb3TIl WlS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpidshyly qq inst qny vulnerlble Sll1ied point Generl Dwight Eisenhover WlS f(lrced to operlte qcross Il mndo~ terrq in Ilt the t0ugh end of q supolv line some 400 miles long 3
In llte 1944 Fifth Army operqtin~ in Itlly still found out tbltlt even
the w0ther seemed to work in fpvor of the defenders bull
bull bull bull With the be~inning of the flll r~ins trqils ~nd socond~rY rOlds turned into muddy quqgmires complic~ting supply Ind service functions nlre~dy m1oe difficult by the distqnce the Army h~d mcyved from blse instllhtilns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE ~req Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop m0vements qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir power gtnd lrtillery Even grCund observers were frequently unshyble to direct the fire Wellther conditinns promised to deteri or~te further lS winter Qpprolcbed 34
An Ilppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing prmored units in the
defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn1Y be fmJnd in l report of 1 Germqn Mlor
The Germl3n P1nzer units in reg~rd to organizqticU equipshyment qnd trqinine were intonded primlrily frr lction on tershyrqin like thlt of Western Centrql flnd Eqstern Europe Here tbey were lble t( mJlke tho bst llse of their strength which lies in their firepower speed Ilnd mflbility On the other bgtnd Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment of these chqrqcteristics except perh~ps in the regions 1shy
r0und ROlE lnd SALERNO and s66r-l1 other c(~stql qre1s T be sure the Pqnzer org1nizlti(ns of the enemy Ire subect to the s~m0 c0nditions but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the opporshytunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful rElcnnisslDce Can preplre in dvlnce the c(lmroitment of bis frc6s
An import9 nt cnsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcushyl1tion of time needed for 11 T(I1rements Especillly in mounshyt) ins Il greqt diJq 1 more th1n the tim usull11y required in othor theqters of Wlr hpd t( he ~ll~Nedbullbullbullbull
The trlnsfer of one Pnzer division in the be~inning of 1944 (through snow cnverea m0untpins) from the re~ion south of ROME to the Adritic noll I-ESCAEA required severltJl weeks time Therofcre tho l1st units hld n0t Arrived when the dishyvision WltJS pulled b1ck tr tro ANZIO~~TTUNO bo~chheqd
It was of decisive significltlDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3shy--ions wro fighting on th~ defenshe durinpound the whole cf3mpllign
here1s they were intended for ffensil-e lction Almost lt11
90
the P~nzers 3nd P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in 194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbpt oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in Frpnce ~nd RU8Si~ There where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grst strqtegic signifjc~nco their tr~dnine tTIG prepqr~ti(ln hlaquod stCod the test In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly ~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons Tbe pcticn here eenerl111y took plctce in the IDfluntl ins or f0othills ~nd the opporshytunity for mobile w3rftre wps s6rorely limited The Cflses wero few in whicr counterqttllcks wit1 limited obiectbres were mounted lud in which tlnks hltld the t1sls (If Icc0llpQnyjng lUd supporting the infmtry directly Frequently tbese tllnks hld tn be employed in rnlll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time beclluse the tershyrqin did nt permit them tC lelT6 the rOflds Ilnd highwqys Genshyerq lly they weref0rced tn per~te in direct cooperptiCn with the jrfAntrv units thqt is tr sfly they were hold in rO1diness in tte depth (If tbe b8ttle pos itinn fr1T where thoy cCuld drbre to preTinusly race-nnoitered positions nd engl1ge the enemy qrnr whenev-lr the enemy pttqcked or effected q penetrltinn The choice of ~n Issembly qro~ in the brttle positin wps usu~lly very difshyficult bectluse cf the l~ck of the necesslty cnV3r fnr thqt type 0f lne whicle There WJJS rllrely suit~ble 1Tegetltjnn buildines WfJro sCIon dostrCyed by rtillery fire (Ir bCmbing qnd it WlS difshyficult to cllmoufhge hles in the grrund pnc the ir axits
Tomove into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b1ttle position provshyed inexpedient becJJuse lt t1) hegirming of pn 1ttlck the fire (If the enemy nrtillery JJnd flir frrce WltIS generlilly directed in such strengtb on the re~r reltts thft eiTen rmored vehicles cfluld n(lt got int(l lctin It the proper time becluse nf the destlllction they sl)ffered 35
NOTES FOR CHAPlER 4
lEncyclopedilt3 Brittllnicl3 Vol 13 (Chicq1rgt UnbTorsity 1948) p 941
2Encycloped b Americqnl _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-I) Am(lriJJn~ Cor p0rQtjnn 194sect)~ p 546
3 Ib id P 546
4 Ibid P 546
5Mltlj R Milovqnov Counter1cti(TI AFl inst Turning nd Fhnktng M01reshyin tho Mount11ins The l~d litrIil Review Vol XXII No3 (June 1943) (Origirmlly published in Red stltlr 9 Docomb0r 1942)
6 Ibid P 70
7Ccl ~milton H Howze IlTiger Tiger The Inflntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI No2 (Februqry 1950) p 19 pnd 21
91
8Lt Col It K Gottschl311 I1L0unt1in Go~t M4 ~ Tro CfvltJlry Journl~ LTV No 1 (Jqn-Feb 1945) ~ P 29
9Encyclopedip Americpnp~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicflgo AOoric8llIl Corporashytion~ 1949)~ p 76
10Ibid~ P 76
llit Col Joe C Llmbrrt 0bsrvcrs NCtes Itlly 4 October 1943 to 29 Decembor 1943 ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 3191103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30
12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec Enjineer Bflttalion 11th Arm(lred Divis ion July 1945 P 15
13 InterV1Jw Cqpt M L YlIune Jrm(lred Officers AdITlnce C1ass~ 1949-50
Tho i rm(re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-x Ky
14C(lmblt Reports fr-m Thopters of Operations G-2 Tlnk Destroyer Scbfol FfJbrullry 1944 P 2
15 1 t 70Ml ovqnov~ op C1 p bull
7016 Ibid- P bull
17Ib~d 70 d 71~ p ~n bull
18Lt Col C J Hoy Mech3nics (If BIttlefleld Reconn3isslnce l1 Tho
Cllralry J0urn~1 Vol LIII No3 (jAy-June 1944)~ p 24
19Lt Col P L Godd1rd IlTltJnks in Sicily ~ Tho C~T11rv JourWll Vol LII No3 (Nltgty-Juno 1944) p 6 me 7 -
20iVli P SleSlrev tUse of T-nk F(lrmlltions in W((lded Hilly Crluntry The Militotry ReTiew Vol LXIII 10 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 Ind 68 (Reprinted from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd))
21Lt Col T c Bibbo~ Jr lIsc0nomy in Killinel The Field Artillery Journql Vol 39 bull 5 (SeptenlbJr-Octnber 1949) p 210 Ind 213
22Brig Gen T J CI11P Tpnkers in Tunish (Ft KnCx Hq Tho Armored CoroshyMl nO 1943)p 42
23Intervitlw Mf-li Frqnk B CllY Arrn0red Officers AdT~nce Chss 1949-50 T~ Arrr(r0G School Ft Kn0x Ky
24 Interr0f1tion Report 34 7707 Mis MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947) p 20
25 p f T t tmiddot (11 rlsoner 0 ~r Lnerrng8 1en Rop(lrt Lt GanT Fritz B1ye r1a in) (Ninth AF Adr) 631945-3 732 (29 rv~y 1945) p 6
26 Ibid Appendix I p 1 p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4)
92
27Sles~rev~ op cit p 67
28 ~~ p 68
29Lt Col C J Hegty liThe Lllst DIYs in TunisilllI ~ The Cqvlllry Journ131 Vol LII No 1 (Jlnu~ry-Februllry 1944) p 10 shy
30 (Col S L A JIj1rshlll B1stogne The First Eight DlYs Wqshington The Inf~ntry Pross 1946) p 144 ~nd 146
31 S lin IlLLt C(ll G W chrraIzer itopnrt of Mount in Nlrfltgtre vuserlTOrs pCrt Hq AGF (iqr 1945) Jt p 16
32 Mltgtrshl1l op cit p 56
3311The Rim Tirrr3 1npoundIlZ jne (22 Febru13ry 1943) P 5
34Fifth Army Histtlry Vol VII (Wlsh ington Go~rernment Print ing Office) p 109 nd 131
35Mp4 Gen M~rtin Schmidt HEmployment f Pltlnzor Units in CentrBl Itl1y [I r De pA rtmnt Inte rr nglt i n Re pltrt (July 1947)
93
CRAPlER 5
cmctusIoN
This portion of the repnrt on Armor in Mountinous Wqrf3re in ilorld
WIJ1 II is d8votod to l summlrv of the conc Ius ions relched by the Committee
qnd 1 short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics or~lniz~-
tion lnc T1ltoriel which S80m desir~ble It must be emph3sized th~t these
sU~~0stinns pre editorill in ch~rlcter representing the considered opinion
tqtion is provided the intent inn h3s been meroly t~ shed 3dditi(n~l light
or tr- pro1T ide In unusull vievrpoint Tbe Committee fl3els thlt Imple iustifishy
C$ltjon for its conclusions llr33dy h3s been presented in tbe body of this
report Thl presently orgqnized lnd equipped ArIPored Djtrision is the unit
tOWJlrds which the Sugg0stions fmiddotr chlnPG d~Tpnced in th 1S study Jre 3 iT16d
s~fiC8l1y 1S the Armored Divisi(ln is Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr
t~ Ilount tl i n opo rt j ons
At first glJnce it might 3ppepr tbpt the employment of 3rmored units
in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for 3chievement or success The
Corrmittec feels th8t the discussion to this point bltls proved th3t this is
not entirely true Time qiter time in Worle Wpr II tmks were used in in_
lccossible pllJces t() the cb3erin of tbe vrelk-heqrted or less ingenious
com~nd9r
Certtin c0nsidcr~ti()ns Ilt Tlrhmce with open firhting do ltlrise Our
b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required
by the unusultllly rugced terr~in Orgltlnizltion for combqt c~lls for 3 keen
~ppreci~tion of t8rrltlin fltlctors Lo~istic~l support of 3rmored units in the
mountlins presents ~n increlse~ w(lrk loqd flnd demltlnds ingenuity on the Ptrt ~
94
of 111 concerned An undorst8nding of the nhysiCllodc81 Iud risvcholoelc~l -shy
foct of mount8inous torrllin on personnel is tGquired Some modificl3tion
of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will improre its trJ3ffiOllbilit~t
mobility 8nd firepOller Adequlte equipment tind 11 80urtd Ptocombtit trtlining
~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins
Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot Ipplic~tion
in TPrvine situ8tions The key to its 8pplictltion in mountl1ins lios in the
chl1rtictoristics of tho mount1ins thomselres In gen0rJ31 tho rugpod I1nd
close mount inous terrJ3in requires the employment of sorerl1l columns sprotid
out like the fi~ers of 8 hl1nd ~ll middotcolumns movin~ in one direction on J3
brold front El1ch column probes for 8 W8l1k point Etich column is weighted
then pourine throuJh the hole to converge upon decisive points This tllkes
--1st tidTtint8lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of lrmor The ntiturshy
1 COlror nd security proridod by mountti inous tertti in m~y reduce the number
of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction But it must nClt be tfK-on for
side
Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt3cK-or must h3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending
his forces The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc
with supportine troops Tho comITI8ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth
to his position thus ~dding to fl~nk protection tho more troops 8v~il1-1ble
for reserTG s the widor his front Cln be LllCk of 1l1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit
mutu8l support by the ~tt~cker forces nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordishy
l1ltion Limited obioctjmiddotos pre Ildhored to The loejsticlll sunport is kept tiS
flr for~fflrd ~s possible gtnd protected from tlliding pllrties morine on foot --
95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt Iround wh ich 1 ffords good observ8tion
Ilnd fields of fire This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~
in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture
simply bocquse it is held by the enemybull True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold
tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 811 Thus the enemy
c8n be encirclod qnd isol8tod by 8n qttllckine force operqtinl on 8 bro8d
front The m8ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought
fotW8rd qnd committed in ltl decisb euro3 qss8ult qg8inst his defense
In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c81 reserves 8t
oqch strong point The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control
Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense It is emph8sizod thqt in
qll mountllinous oper8tions s~ll tqsk forces 8re formed eqch force self
supporting This is neceSS8ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move ~ ~
ch f8cility in the mount8ins During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion
ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult This me~ns thqt detqiled prior
plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocessltlry Eqch smqll force
oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn unshy
usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction
The present org8nizqtton of the 8rmored division should permit it to
operqte over mountqinous terrqin without mltlior chqnges It f~cilitlltos rqpid
orgqniqtion of the smllll bqVmcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8nd its
offjcers qre experienced in the control of th3se forces However the qrshy
tillery now 8V8ihble in the llrmored di~Tision does not qpoetlr I3doqullto for
oper~ting in the mountqine Tho or~l3nic qrtillerv of the present I3rmorod
division is designed to Give the comml3nder minimum support fire durine comshy
~ t oporll lons on qverl3ge terrqmiddotin ~Tho compl3rl3tively long rl3neos of the
96
r- mtil lnd 155rnm howitters will provide ltldequlte fire support on leve 1 terrlin
HOllrever fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of
close hih ltlnl1le fire The 42 inch mortqr is well suitld to pro1ride this
type of fire so it is belioved thlt one or more blttlllions should be qttqch~
od to tho division A comp~ny of 12 mortlrs would provide tbe Slme supnort
PS ~ l05mm howitzer bltt~lion when massed fires qre employed lnd hqs the qdshy
vtntleo of clefJrine bieh rnlsks Ilt short rqnees The compllnys three pllltoon
orllnizltion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1lll telms Tbo morshy
tlr should be se If-prope lled The 1N9ltlse I-type vehicle (M29 Clro Cqrrier) l
personnel clrrier or the hqlf-trlck Cln be modified to Clrry this welpon
Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for
be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present capt shyrshylities The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii relashy
tively lare areli elich must hlve AAAW protection If the committee recom
mendation is favorably considered the division will acquire more mortlrs
Each mortlr increlses tbe need for tnt 18 ircrlft protecti on Supplies will
move over ml2ny roads throulh numerous defiles and into widely scattered inshy
stallations It seems obvious that qn increasine amount of antiaircraft proshy
tection is required and thtt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently
a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation
The ratio of inflintry in the trrnored division is ldequlite for mounshy
tain operations Inflntry provides close~in support to tlnks points out
suitable tareets lnd rnly even lead the tanks through difficult terrain
Tanks in turn give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection
r- shy
97
Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep
slopes stream and enemr mines ot deblolitiohs The demllnd for their serrices
increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Sershy
viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir lnd ~inten~nce headshy
quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil and artillery emplacements must be
constructed The front line units too will swell the demand for eneineer
services Above all enZinsers are essential for brineine tanks to im_
possible loclltions to astound the enemy ind assure success The solution
would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops preferably with he~vy equipshy
mente
Adverse weather sClrcity of roads jO mine fie Ids and transportation
difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious probshy
lem The tlctical employment of smlll task forces in mount~in ~~Zr~vates tho--shyoblem of control Weather IInd blld roads tllX the endurance of supply veshy
hicles The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route
Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic Two rOlds
should be selected when possiblo one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for
return traffic In mountains tho time-distance factor is greltor thqn jn warshy
fare over open terr~in
Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with
Il minimum loss of overall control Each task force employs combat trains
cqrryine broken loads This provents nUIDOrous round trips durinZ resupply
procedures An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1111 vehicles especially
Class III and V supplies
Durin~ defensire operations supplies can be btought fotllard and dumped
r- side the battle position The supply vehicles then can be placed nGtIr the
98
middot of the position or used for other purposes If successive positions
are to be defended thesllvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the
new arel~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forWird units will exhiust
tbe prelTious ly dumped suppliss before Vlc~tinll the 11 reli
All mount1 in operlltions req1Jire phnnine to the most minute data 11
Coordinltion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce More
dependence is pllce upon individuflls than under normfll combllt conditions
Moremem of supplies fotWllrd is normally slower therefore l grellter per
centqge of flll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety fflcshy
tor
tvlrdntennnce support must le closely tier in with supply Like supply
flctivities the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is
-1bJined Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt Ind prflctice of
dId expedients is l must poundfecJqniC6 ShOllld be clttplhIe of rBpairine iny
type of vehicle Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e~~culltion of va
hicles to tbe relr On m1ny occlsions prompt recovery ltInd repltdr of veshy
hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to ldv1nce the unit
The spltgtco flctor ia of conC3rn to tbe commflnder He must see thtt best poashy
slhle $=JrelS pre I11oc~ted for 111lintAnnce lctiITities
The desiln of vehicles is iffected by the terrqin A btnk c~~ble of
climbing er1dients lS steep qs 45 d3greos trllrersing nlrrow mount1in trl3ils
qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shprp turns is necess~ry The
present tnk requ ires more horse powmiddot)r per ton Engines ShOl11d be cllpqble
of functioning qt 12000 feet ~ltjtude The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such
as tho tl3nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models-shyty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be
99
j1)lte The ~ ir cooled engine ltmo short r~dius turning ~bj 1itv of the M46
t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction but this t~nk is too wide for mounshy
tllin operltion Its ~n will not elevlte or depress sufficiently to meet the
extle~e r euroquirements in mount8in fighting The ground cle~r~nce of our qrshy
mored vehicles in genell is too low for use in mount~ins A hi~h ground
cleQr1nce without Sl1crific in low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8rllcterisshy
tic
Sn811 full-trtck- vehicles lpproximltely 60 inches wide C8p8ble of
turnin~ cOIPulete ly Iround on 40 d3llee slopes JJnd hl-ul in~ he8VY pqyloOlds beshy
come neceSSlry for personnel e~middotrpCl)ltion Such vehicles would be excellent
for tho tllnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for
reconnpissqnce pnd p8trol 8ctivitv FUll-trpcked vehicles simillr to the
~red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y hve to replllce wh3el vehicles for trlmsporting
tgt_tlplifls from r(l~r l1res to fr(lnt line units They wCluld require modificl shy
tion in the Wfly of wider trllcks md thG clt1pllbilHy of negootilting lro de~ree
turns in one motion
No r-ttmored unit should operlte in mount inous country without prior
trllining which would condition the troops to mountqin comblt An Army Ground
Force report lttributed Germqn successes in the Bllk~ns to the presence of
lrmored units specific8lly trlined for mount 1 in oper~tions Likewise the
British f=ilure in Norwpy WlS c~lsed by httvine no troops tr3ined to operlte
in mountlinous terrltlin A progr-m of tllining is neceSS1ry for physiclll
conditjoning ~nd the deelopment r inithtjve for self-cgra on the prt of
the tr00Ps The extr) work IOf1d hllher Il1titude 8nd usullly severe
w8ltlther conditi0ns phce I pr0mium on (tood hGllth The sense of isohtion ~
of securit~T prolrided br proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es ~s found in
100
ffill operAtion incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq
Etleh soldier nrust recoive triningo in self-ltIdministrqtion of first qid He
shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos nd nrpctice of tnilitlrv s~nitltion Dilishy
qence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 tllertness to dlnrer ire importlnt in
mount~in comh~t
Trining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d TechnicAl trqinshy
in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce sefvicin~ of weApons pnd Clre of individuql
equipment should bG stressed All commqnders must be ltlert ltmo experienced
1n the employment of qttqched units They must undorstlnd the qpplicction
of tctics peculillr to mounbdn fightine Et)ch individujgtl Sht)111d k-now how
to obtltdn thr mlximum officiencv froIP hjs weoon Splvlge tlnd replir sershy
vice will not b~ reldily t 1Ino This pplies equllly to yehicles nd
~or equ ipment Tlnk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight s irlflntrymen
dn Ue need rises e spec iJgtlly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQllllc or wren
the ir tnlrs lre immobi1 ized Cooper8ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier md the
mounted soldier is pqrlmnunt
Troops should pr1ctice plpcinz vehicles in the Trost difficult firing
n)sj-t~ nns jn selected rUlPGd ter-tnin ld units should be reqllired tegt fire
from t~ese p0sitjons Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6Vlcuqting
helITilv Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpflsslblel1 torrin All cmnrrlnders should
be trlined to find their l~y throu9h the roughest terrllin Constlnt prllctice
in tr il find in~ will PW off imiddotmensllrtlbly in comblt
Modern rllored tl1ctics r3 mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in
mountlinous terrtin Succoss in ths l1se of qrmor under ldrerse conditinns
will Ulpke grent demlnds upon tho skill equipment time lnd Gner~y of the ~
llnd The use (If crmor in unexpected phcGS mpy melt1n tho difference be
101
n victory ~nd defeat It is certain th~t the emplo~nt of armor justi shy
fie s the effort invobrld This study le~ds to but one conclusion IT CAN
BE DONE
102
middotr-- APPENDIX I
Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~
sur~rey of the lrmored units thlOlt foueht in mountl1inous terrltlin This ~ppen-
dix shows the list of units ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte tlnk blttplions
qnd the cltlmp1liJns foueht wh3re mountp inous terrlin WIS encountered
Prt two of this lpnendix shows q further brelkdown dividin the
ltrmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepllrltltl9 tom1lt bqttllions by th3
PART I
Divisions Clmpq igns where Mount inous ~VJ)rfpre were conducted
1st Tunisil Nllplos-Foggiltl Rome-Armo N Apennines 2nd Ardennes 3rd Ardennes 4th Ard i3nnes
r- shy 5th Ardennes 6th Arde I1nf3S 7th Ardennes 8th Ardennes 9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes
44thmiddot Ieyte Luzon S1mr Ishmd 70th Tunisil Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1gil 701st Rhinehnd 702nd Ard f3nnes Rhinehnd 707th Ardennes Rhine lltlnd 709th Ardennes Rbjnohmd 711th Okirmwa 712th Ardennes Hhjnehnd 735th Ardennes 736th Ardermes Rhinehnd 737th Ardl) nne s 740th ArdJnnes 741st Ardennos Rhjnelrmd 743rd Ardennes Rhjne llnd
(44th Ardennes ----745th Ardennes Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd 48th Ardennes Rhjnehnd
103
rshy
--
750th 751st 752nd 7531lt1
754th 755th 756th 757th 759tb 760th 761st 763rd 77lst 772nd 774th 775th 777th 77Ptrl 78lst 784th 786th
1st British 6th British 7th British 5th C8nltldhn
A~dennes Rhinel8nd Tunisi8 North Apennines Tunisil3 N~ples Fog~iq Rome-Arno North Apennines Sicily N~ples Foggi8 Rome-Arno North Apennin~s Rhineshy
hnd North Luzon Nqp1es Foggiq No~th Apennines N3ples Fo~giq Rome-Arno Np13s Foggil3 Rome-Arno Rhin0hnd Nqplos FOI)il3 Rome-Arno Rhinehnd Ardennes Leyte Okinnwl Rhinell3nd Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinelqnd A~dennes North Luzon Rhinehnd Rhinehnd Rhinel3nd Rhinehnd Rhinehnd
Allied Divisions
Tunisil3 North Apennines
Rhine11nd North Apennines
North Apennines
Tunisi3 Rone-Arno North Apennines Tunis itgt t lT)pl9s FOIpil Rome-Arno North Apennines
6t-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno North Apennines 1st Franch Rh5nehno Centrlll Ell rope 2nd Fr3nch Rhj ne lnc1 Cent 11 1 Europe 5th Fr1nch Rhinehnd Centr11 Europe
104
Tank B3ttalions
44th 7l1th 754th 763rd
77th
Armored Divisions
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
11th
Tnk Blltt13 lion
70th 701st 702nd 707th 709th 7l2nd 735th 736th 737th 740th 741st 743rd 744th 745th 746th 748th 750th 753rd 756th 759th 761st 771st 772nd
APPENDIX I PART II
PAC IFIC THEATER
Camp~igns Particip~ted in
Leyte Luzon S~mpr Is llnd Okinl3wl3 North Luzon Le yte Ok i nl3wa North Luzon
EUROPEA THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS
Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes
lirdennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd Ardennes Rhinehnd trdennes Rh ine Illnd Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Ardennes Ardennes Rhine lnd Ardennes Rhino hnd Ardenne s Ardennes I Rhinehmd Ardennes RhinAhnd Ardennes Rhino It3nd Ardeymes Rhinclmiddotmd Rhino 1l1nd Rhinelllnd Rhjno 113nd Rhjnehnd Ardennes Rh ine hnd Ardenms Rb j ne llnd
105
774th 777th 778th 781st 784th 786th
[or d D5 vis ions
1st
70th 191st 751st 752nd
753rd
755th 756th 757th 760th
Rhinelind Ardennes Rhinehnd Rhinebnd Rhh16hnd Rhinel1md Rhinehnd
MEDITERPJNEAN TEE1TER OF OPERATIONS
Tunisill Nllples Foeei1l Rome-Arno North Apennines
Tunisi~ Npples Fogei1l TuniSlll Ncrth Apennines Tunisi~ Nqples Foggill R~me-Arno North
Ipennines Sicily Npples Fog~i~ Rome-Arno North
Apennines kples Foedn North Apennines NI3 ple s F(Iggi~ Rome -Arno J1lples Foelri~I Rome-Arno North Apennines N1lples FOEeill Rome-Arno North Apennines
100
APFENDIX II
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTbINOUS OPEPJTIOJ)TS
As In lid for future mOlmtdnous operlltions the committee hlls fund
cert~ in fqctors 110 icr phy ln importlnt plrt in mountl in oporltions Adequlte
CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help ilT0id llnnecessprily hiilh C(lst in lives
md oqlliprrent in futur) Qr11orod (lporJtions in lil(luntlins Listed for the
r8ltlder l s c(InsidorGtion (0 s31octd pertinent fllcts inC flctors in mountlinous
operrtions
1 Mount in wG1thlJr is chlrlcterized both in suUrrer ~nd winter by inshy
c lemenc~ or by llrge teITperlture differences hrlbyeneen night ~nd dltlY II 1tnd by
SlHaer nd 10cll17 lC ltmospheric d j stlrblnc8S such IlS violent snow storms
rl3 in lnd fo bull --
2 Smoke from firee in th- vltil1ev will often rise in l column tht
cl3n be seen fClr miles
3 Lihts It night C1n be GO3n from distpnt vsibltj p6lks
4 It is difficult to mlneU~Ter support qnd r3S8rve units to execute
counterpttck plfJns
5 Rtion needs of the troops Ilre jncrolsed bv the rigors of terrlin
6 Mountljn rOlds or trltdls usually 1r0 unimprorod but plissl3ble
7 EVfcullticn of wounded in m(luntltdn w1rfAre prQseuronts 11 difficult Drobshy
lem
efficioIcy
- 9 Low frequency Clmplitude modullted rodio sets Ilro better suited for
-l1tq in cotnmunj claquot j on thqn 1lt11
107
10 The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency
r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks
11 Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms
Ilnd lssume incrl~sed importmce in the mountl3jns
12 Decentrliz~tion of commllnd is chllrl3cteristic of mountl3in operltions bull
COmnJlnders of 8ubordin13t8 units must lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll
13 Combl3t in high mountllins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3nning lnd
proplrfCtion
14 Adillcent units frequentlv lre unl3ble to provide mutu131 support
15 Sm~11 forces of mountlin troops Cln prevent the movqment of mqin
forces by impeding qnd hlrlssing th~rn
16 The focal points of mountlj ns lrll he ights
17 Ad~nces Ire mlde 131ong ridges rlther thln through the naturlll Ilvenues
ipprolch
18 Djstl3nce is melsured in time rl3ther thln spllce
19 MountAin terriln lends itself plrticuhrly well to surprise bull
20 In climbing by foot the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be
lvoided
21 ClimMng tire s the helrt lnd lunes descendi~ Cluses r6lt muscuhr
fl3t il1u3
22 Reconnaisslnce of routos of mlrch should b1 m~d3 rmd r01ltes sllected
on the blsis of tactiCll security
23 Cilre must be tlksn to select an obiective which Cln be reached with
in time lvlillble
24 The de fender should ~u~rd lt1iS1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1lrmored a laments ~
ling of rOlld blocks mjnes ~nd AT guns
108
Thll clipture of vlntlo points for Ilrti 11ary obserVlltion must be
26 Once Ilined cont~ct should neVlr bo lost beCluse it t~kes time
to rloonnoit3r onemy positions ltand Ilvoid tIlmbush
27 Dominnnt terrllin provides the d~fender ~nd donies the ~tt~cker
obs~rVlltion ltand firin~ positions
28e It is oftJn impossib1 to turn whic1fls Ilround on mount~in roqds
29 Extensive engineer work is required for construction mlinten~nce
improvem~nt ltand rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion
30 Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges
31 Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb19 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe
32 Medicll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops
tltlins
34 Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0 3ithJr q dJingBrous obstc1e to opertltions
or Il vp1ul)b1e dd ~ccordine to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtlntfige
is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrSctri stics
tlnk oquipment
36 The doop$r th~ snow tho more it hm~)rs lnd clnq1i~Gs the movement
of columns
37 Mov~) Silmrnunition I)nd rltions lS fllr fOrwltlrd SlS possjble durine dqrkshy
ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce plcking nd hlnd cqrry
36 Trqffic control must bJ rigidly ml1intqined to prol9nt tr~ffic conshy
g0stion ~nd d~l~y
-
109
39 Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee
of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of
~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results
40 In cold iYOlthor lnd hi~b mountpins splt3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l
41 Litt3r hluls must be kept 18 sbort tlS tho t9ctic-=al situ-=ation will
prJrmit
42 Night eVIculti0n Olr1r rou~h tjrrlin is glnerltll1y iIl1prllcticlble Ind
tho rlsults qrlt rlrely corrmensurqte with the effort
43 During evqcultion OITor q cliff or down ~ very stpep slope the
cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter
44 Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient lnd ~lulble rneSS6npounders in tho moun
bdns 3 spociql1y for forw1rd dSlt3-chments
--- 45 N311 trlined moss(m~er dogs lrEl d0pmdqble qnd m9Y be useful in
bdn operltions
110
CO MR1NfD ARMS rlE SEi Ft CH lI8 RA ~
J~1 LiAVE~WO 1H KS
1 I III I II 11 1 1 I i I~ li1 11~ ~lrlil~ III II I ~ li11 ~ 3 1695 00324 2930
