opposition to motion for judgment on the pleadingscjaavc.org/images/15_10_01_opp_to_mjop.pdf · a...

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OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

A former law professor for Plaintiffs attorney once said, "If you have to use the word

'clearly' when arguing a legal position, that usually means that the issue is not clear at all."

Defendants use the word "clearly" no less than nine times in their 15-page motion for

judgment on the pleadings, to try and convince the Court that the Ordinance and the PRRs

"clearly" authorize this thing that Defendants refer to as a "lateral transfer." They direct the

Court to several hundred pages of legislative history and other documents and assert that from

these documents, the answer is "clear." If only.

II. ARGUMENT

A. "Lateral transfer."

A critical issue in this case is whether the term "transfer" within the Ordinance includes

a so-called "lateral transfer." But more fundamentally, what exactly is a lateral transfer? That

term appears nowhere in any version of the Ordinance or the PRRs that has ever existed.

(Vanarelli Decl., ][ 2.) There is nothing of which Defendants have requested the Court take

judicial notice that defines a "lateral transfer." And Defendants have submitted no evidence to

the Court defining a "lateral transfer."

However, the County does have a document that sets forth what the County says is a

"lateral transfer." Plaintiff is providing that document as Exhibit A to the request for Judicial

Notice, filed and served concurrently herewith. The reason that Defendants did not provide that

to the Court is that the appointment of Kelly Keenan, which is the subject of this action, did not

qualify as a "lateral transfer" under the County's own definition as set forth in this policy. So

even under the County's own definition, assuming for the sake of argument that "lateral

transfers" (without competitive examinations) do not violate the Ordinance, the County still has

a problem because Mr. Keenan did not qualify as a "lateral transfer" under the County's own

definition. The evidence at trial will show that Mr. Keenan was appointed to his position not

having met any of the County's conditions required for appointment as a "lateral transfer" in

Ventura County.


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1. The class to which the individual requests to transfer performs the

same, or substantially the same duties, has the same or substantially

the same responsibilities and requires the same or lesser minimum

qualifications as the class in which the individual is currently

employed. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Mr. Keenan met this

requirement, and the evidence at trial will show that he did not.

2. The individual has satisfactorily completed a probationary period in

the class from which he/she is transferring prior to the effective date

of the lateral transfer. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Mr.

Keenan met this requirement, and the evidence at trial will show that he

did not.

3. The individual achieved employment in the qualifying class as a

result of a qualifying or competitive personnel merit system (civil

service) examination. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Mr.

Keenan met this requirement, and the evidence at trial will show that he

did not.

4. The individual has performed satisfactorily in his/her employment

with the other public entity and is not being considered for

separation due to misconduct or poor performance. Plaintiff has

submitted no evidence that Mr. Keenan met this requirement, and the

evidence at trial will show that he did not.

B. Any Personnel Rule that conflicts with the Civil Service Ordinance is void.

While the Ordinance authorizes the Board of Supervisors to promulgate rules and

regulations governing the civil service system, such rules and regulations may not abridge,

enlarge, extend or modify the Civil Service Ordinance. (See, e.g. Ass 'n for Retarded Citizens v.

Dep't of Developmental Servs. (1985) 38 Cal.Sd 384, 39l;Aguirre v. Lee (1993) 20

Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652.) "Thus, when administrative rules or regulations alter or amend the3


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11"Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a

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statute or enlarge or impair its scope, they are void and courts not only may, but it is their

obligation to strike down such regulations." (J. R. Norton Co. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd.

(1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 29. Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

C. The Personnel Rules and Regulations must be interpreted so as to

harmonize their provisions with the Civil Service Ordinance.

As Defendants point out, the PRRs have been formally adopted by the Board of

Supervisors pursuant to authority conferred by the Ordinance. Therefore, the PRRs have the

force of law. (See, e.g., Posey v. State of California (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 836, 849.)

County ordinances, as well as rules having the force of law, are interpreted by the same rules

applicable to statutes. (People v. BeaumontInv., Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 113.)

statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as toeffectuate the purpose of the law. In determining legislative intent,we first look to the statutory language itself. The words of thestatute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutorypurpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the samesubject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to15the extent possible." (Ibid.}

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PRR 714, entitled "Transfer" does say, "As an alternative to appointment from an

eligible list, a position may be filled by transfer." So the question is, are so-called "lateral

transfers" included within this provision? The County argues that they are. But to interpret

PRR 714 in this manner effectively does away with the mandate under the Civil Service

Ordinance that all appointments to the classified service, except for provisional appointments,

be based solely on the basis of merit and fitness ascertained through practical and competitive

examinations. In other words, to interpret PRR 714 in this manner would cause it to conflict

with the Ordinance and therefore, such an interpretation would necessitate a finding that PRR

714 is void, at least to the extent that it purports to include so-called "lateral transfers" within

its authority.

It is not necessary to look behind the language of the PRRs in following the established

principles for interpreting them, because the PRRs, as written, can (and must) be interpreted in

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a manner that is consistent with the Ordinance. As noted above, the words in the PRRs and in

the Ordinance "must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and

statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally

and with each other, to the extent possible." Applying these principles, the only practicable

interpretation of Section 714 is that it refers only to traditional transfers (transfers to and from

positions within the Ventura County service). This interpretation the only one that makes sense

in light of PRR 714's requirements that (1) all appointing authorities concerned must approve

of the transfer; and (2) the releasing appointing authority shall release the transferee within

thirty days after being accepted by the accepting authority. This is also the only interpretation

that can be harmonized with the Ordinance, which requires all appointments to the classified

service, except for provisional appointments, to be made based "solely" on the basis of merit

and fitness ascertained through practical and competitive examinations. Applicants already

employed in the County service have previously undergone a competitive hiring process in our

County; they are already in. Applicants from agencies outside the County service have not, and

there is no basis to conclude that such applicants are equally qualified as people who have gone

through Ventura County's competitive process.

But is the issue "clear"? Not at all. To illustrate the nuances of the issue presented in

this case, consider the comments made at the Civil Service Commission investigative hearing

conducted on November 17, 2014, of which the Court has been requested to take judicial

notice. (C. Vanarelli Decl., ]f 4; Exhs. C, D.) The Court is specifically directed to that portion

of the hearing from timestamp 44:23 to 53:51. A transcript of this part of the hearing is

provided as Exhibit D.

23 D. The "Lateral Transfer Process"

This dispute formally began on October 7, 2014, with Plaintiffs request to the Ventura

County Civil Service Commission to open an investigation into the process that was used to

appoint Mr. Keenan to the Attorney III position, which is in the classified service and therefore

subject to civil service requirements. (C. Vanarelli Decl., ]HJ 3, 4. See Exh. B.) In opposition

to Plaintiffs request for the Civil Service Commission investigation, Defendants, on October5


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20, 2014, submitted to the Civil Service Commission a letter, in which Defendants explain that

the Keenan appointment was made pursuant to that County administrative policy entitled

"Lateral Transfer from Outside the County Service." (Chapter VIII(A), Policy No. 12.1) (C.

Vanarelli Decl., ][ 6. See Exh. E.) Defendants contended at that time, "This procedure, which

has been in effect since 1988, establishes that lateral transfers from public agencies may be

appointed without going through the competitive examination process." (Exh. C, p. 3.) The

evidence at trial, which include an illustration of the legislative history of the County's Civil

Service Ordinance, will prove that to dispense with the competitive examination process for

applicants on the basis that they held a similar position in another county (or city, etc.), is

contrary to the law in Ventura County.

E. Defendants want the Court to find that an illegal hiring process, if in place

for a long period of time, will ripen into a legal hiring process. When we distill Defendants'

moving papers down to what they are really saying, it is this: "We have done this for so long

and we like it because it is easier than doing it the right way." And in fact, at trial, the evidence

will show that in recent history, the PRRs were sometimes amended as a reaction, "to bring the

rules into compliance with current practice," without a thorough analysis of whether the

"current practice" complied with the Ordinance. (C. Vanarelli Decl., ]f 2.)

The evidence at trial will show that early on in our County's history of civil service,

when changes were made to the Ordinance or to any other ordinance or regulation having an

impact on civil service, the District Attorney (who at one time performed the role of today's

County Counsel) meticulously evaluated each change or proposed change to ensure that it

would not conflict with any other law.2 For whatever reason - budgetary or otherwise, the

evidence at trial will show that we don't do that anymore, and as a result, rule changes seem

rushed and rubber-stamped, without due consideration of their effect. This has resulted in

1 This is the policy provided by Plaintiff as Exhibit A, which Defendants now do not want to rely onbecause evidence obtained in discovery in this case proves that Mr. Keenan was not qualified as a so-called "lateral transfer" under this policy.

2 These historical documents are fascinating. Defendants intend to present the most relevant of these2 Q

documents at trial.


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ambiguities and problems, in the PRRs in particular, which, as in this case, might not surface

until years or decades later.

Now, in this action, more than sixty years after the Ordinance was adopted and

approved by the voters of Ventura County, the Court has the responsibility to take a

comprehensive look at the evidence presented from both sides, in order to make a

determination as to what the Ordinance allows. Then, the Court must decide if the Keenan

appointment complied with the Ordinance. Finally, should the Court determine that the Keenan

appointment did not comply with the Ordinance, the Court must then determine whether

voiding that appointment, as Plaintiffs have requested, is the appropriate remedy. This will not

be an easy undertaking, but to reach the answers, a thorough examination of the evidence is

essential.

F. Defendants Have Misapplied Local Agency Personnel Standards.

Defendants claim that Title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 17498

"specifically authorizefs] transfers between public agencies without examination." Moving

Papers, p. 13, lines 14-19.) This is true. But what Defendants leave out is that this regulation,

which is contained in Chapter 2 of Division 5, is applicable only to local agencies that are part

of the Interagency Merit System ("IMS"). (See 2 CCR 17400.) The IMS is a network of

counties that are overseen by Merit Systems Services ("MSS"), the entity charged with

ensuring that counties adhere to federal merit principles (which is a requirement to obtain

certain kinds of federal funding). Ventura County has its own civil service system; it is not a

member of the Interagency Merit System, and thus Section 17498 has no application to Ventura

County. (C. Vanarelli Decl., If 7. See Exh. F.)

Counties in the IMS are small counties, presumably without the resources to administer

their own civil service or merit systems. MSS works with the IMS counties on a daily basis on

issues such as recruiting, discipline, layoffs, transfers, appeals, etc. such that there is a common


1 set of standards for all IMS counties.3 So it makes sense that a person working in one IMS

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county can transfer, without examination, to a like position in another IMS county. But that

logic has no application to the situation here where we have Kelly Keenan, a former employee

of Fresno County (a non-IMS county) resigning his position in Fresno County and being hired

in Ventura County (another non-IMS county). What assurances do the taxpayers of Ventura

County have, that Kelly Keenan would have scored higher than all of the people on the existing

eligible list, or that he would have even passed Ventura County's civil service examination at

all? None. That is why this thing that Defendants call the "lateral transfer process" is an illegal

end-run around the competitive examination process mandated by the Ordinance.

G. Other Counties' Rules and Practices

Defendants also assert, without substantial evidence, that Santa Barbara County and

Placer County both allow employees from other public agencies that operate under merit

systems to be appointed to positions without examination. Even if this is true, so what?

Ventura County is not Santa Barbara County. Ventura County is not Placer County. Whatever

the laws and rules are in other counties, in Ventura County, we have a law that tells us, once

again:

"The purpose of this article is to establish and maintain anemployment relationship between the County and its employeeswhich will promote and increase economy and efficiency intheCounty service. In order to achieve and foster this end eachposition must be filled with the best qualified person available.

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21Emphasis added.)

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Except as otherwise provided herein appointments shall be madesolely on the basis of merit and fitness ascertained throughpractical and competitive examinations." (Ordinance, § 1341.

H. An evidentiary showing is necessary for the Court to determine the

appropriate remedy in the event the Court finds that the Keenan Appointment violated

the Ordinance.

3 MSS also conducts periodic audits of non-IMS counties, such as the 2012 audit of Ventura Countyreflected in Defendants' Exhibit 14 to their moving papers. For more information, see Defendants'Exhibit 14 and also refer to the MSS Web site at http://www.mss.ca.gov/.

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As has been discussed in the moving papers and this opposition, the Ordinance sets

forth certain mandates, and authorizes the County to adopt rules and regulations to carry out

those mandates. (Ordinance, § 1345-1.) But neither the Civil Service Ordinance nor the PRRs

give any instruction on what to do when an appointment to a civil service position is later

determined to be unauthorized by law. In this case, Plaintiff intends to establish that the

Keenan appointment was unlawful. But then, what is the Court to do with that finding?

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Keenan appointment is void. Is this the appropriate

remedy? To answer that question, the Court must determine whether the Keenan appointment,

though unlawful, was nonetheless made and accepted in good faith.

The Ordinance contains all the same principles, and much of the same language, as is

found in the State Service Act (Gov. Code, §§ 18500 et seq.), which governs California state

civil service. This includes, for example, a requirement in state civil service, identical to the

requirement under the Ventura County Civil Service Ordinance, that "Appointments are based

upon merit and fitness ascertained through practical and competitive examination."4 (Gov.

Code, § 18500(c)(2).) At least one published case has held that when the language of a local

civil service ordinance is comparable to the language in the State Civil Service Act, a showing

of sufficient similarity will make the principles laid down under the California State Civil

Service Act applicable to the local civil service system. (Reed v. City Council ofRoseville

(1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 628, 636.) Thus, because the Ventura County Civil Service Ordinance

mirrors the State Civil Service Act, we can look to State Civil Service Act, and its

implementing regulations, for guidance when our own ordinance and rules are silent as to a

particular issue, as is the case with the issue of how to correct an unlawful appointment.

Title 2, California Code of Regulations section 266 provides:

4 Notably, the State of California, on its employment Web site, expressly explains, that employees of thefederal government, employees of counties, employees of the legislature, and employees of the CSUsystem, among other, are not eligible to "transfer" into state civil service because those people "are notpart of the State of California Civil Service System." (See Exh. G, p. 2, #s 3-6 under "OtherQuestions".)

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"When the Department determines that an appointment isunlawful, the Department shall determine the good faith of the

- appointing power and the employee under section 249 and shalltake corrective action up to and including voiding the appointment,

3 provided that:

4 (a) No corrective action shall be taken on any appointment whichhas been in effect for one year or longer if both the appointingpower and the employee acted in good faith; and

6(b) No corrective action shall be taken on any appointment which

7 has been in effect for five years or longer unless:

(1) the employee acted in other than good faith; or

9 (2) the Department determines that the rights of another10 employee are significantly endangered by the retention of

the appointment in question.11

When an unlawful appointment is terminated or corrected, theemployee who acted in good faith shall retain only thecompensation as defined in section 9. In all cases, compensationshall be corrected on a prospective basis.

14The employee who acted in other than good faith shall reimburse

15 all compensation resulting from the appointment. The Board inreviewing cases on appeal may, based upon the evidence, providefor less than full reimbursement of compensation."

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Title 2, California Code of Regulations section 249 provides:

19"To be valid, a civil service appointment must be made and

2 0 accepted in 'good faith' under the civil service statutes and Boardregulations.

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(a) In order to make an appointment in 'good faith,' an appointingpower and all officers or employees to whom an appointing power

2 3 delegates appointment authority must:

2 4 (1) Intend to observe the spirit and intent of the law; and

i~\~

(2) Make a reasonable and serious attempt to determine~ f- how the law should be applied; and

2 7 (3) Assure that positions are properly classified; and

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(4) Assure that appointees have appropriate civil serviceappointment eligibility; and

2(5) Intend to employ the appointee in the class, tenure and

3 location to which appointed under the conditions reflectedby the appointment document; and

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(6) Make a reasonable and serious attempt to provide therelevant reference materials, training, and supervision

g necessary to avoid any mistakes of law or fact to thepersons responsible for the pertinent personnel transactions;

7 and

(7) Act in a manner that does not improperly diminish therights and privileges of other persons affected by theappointment, including other eligibles.

10Any officer or employee who violates any of the foregoing

11 provisions of this regulation, or any other officer or employee in aposition of authority who directs any officer or employee to violateany of these provisions, shall be subject to civil or criminalsanctions as provided in Government Code sections 19680, 19681,19682, 19683, 19764, as well as adverse action as provided in

14 Government Code sections 19572, 19583.5, or 19682.

15 (b) In order to accept an appointment in 'good faith,' an employeemust:

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, 7 (1) Intend to serve in the class to which the employee isbeing appointed under the tenure, location and other

1 s elements of the appointment as reflected by theappointment document; and

19(2) Provide the appointing power with complete, factual,and truthful information necessary for a proper

2 ]_ appointment; and

22 (3) Make a reasonable attempt to seek correction of anyaspects of the appointment that the employee knows areillegal.

24Violation of any of the foregoing provisions of this section by an

2 5 employee shall be cause for adverse action.

26 If a lack of good faith exists on the part of either the appointingpower or the employee, the Executive Officer may cancel theimproper appointment without regard to the one-year limitation set

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Thus, under established civil service principles, the issue of good faith must be

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forth in Government Code section 19257.5 subject to theprovisions of section 266." (2 CCR § 249.)

determined in order for the Court to make a determination as to whether, should the appointment

of Mr. Keenan be deemed unlawful, declaring the appointment void is the appropriate correction.

The evidence at trial will show that the Keenan appointment was not made in good faith on the

part of the Defendants or Mr. Keenan.

III. CONCLUSION9

As the record in this case reveals, Defendants have done everything in their power to

prevent the facts giving rise to Plaintiffs complaint from coming to light. This is because the

evidence is not favorable to Defendants. Discovery has been a constant battle. Notably,

12Defendants did not file a motion for summary judgment in this case but instead want the Court to

grant judgment on the pleadings. And why? Because if Defendants requested summary

14judgment, Plaintiff would be able respond by putting some real evidence before the Court. And

15that is the last thing Defendants want to have happen, because they know exactly what they did;

they know it was wrong; they know that the evidence will show that some of the players in this

story were merely negligent in failing to comply with the law, but that others knowingly made-1 o

absolutely no attempt to comply with the letter or the spirit of the law, even once Plaintiff raised

the issue (which was well before Mr. Keenan began work and plenty of time to cure the

problem).

Now, Defendants take one more shot at avoiding trial, with this motion for judgment on

the pleadings in which Defendants seek to deprive Plaintiff of its day in court. Plaintiff, and the

citizens of Ventura County, are entitled to have the Court see what happened here and to have

the Court determine whether Defendants have violated the law.

The Court cannot make a determination of the propriety of the Keenan appointment

without a full presentation of the evidence, which will include a showing of: (1) history and

objectives of civil service systems; (2) legislative history of relevant parts of the Ordinance; (3)

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Respectfully submitted,/

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By:

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meaning of the term "transfer" as used in the Ordinance; (4) common features of civil service

systems; (4) public policy in California relative to public employment and civil service systems;

and finally (5) the facts giving rise to Plaintiffs complaint here (the process of appointing Mr.

Keenan).

Based on all of the foregoing, Plaintiff requests the Court deny Defendants' motion for

judgment on the pleadings. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests leave to amend the Complaint.

Dated: \.\<J^\-^^\. ' CHRISTINAVANARELLI,INC.A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION

Christina Vanarelli, Attorney forCRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS'ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA COUNTY

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DECLARATION OF CHRISTINA VANARELLI

I, Christina Vanarelli, declare:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in California and representing plaintiff,

Criminal Justice Attorneys' Association of Ventura County, in the above-captioned matter. The

following facts are true of my own personal knowledge and if called as a witness, I could and

would testify competently to those facts.

2. As part of my investigation into the facts of this case, I served a subpoena on the

Clerk of the Board of Supervisors for all of the legislative history of the Ordinance and the

PRRs. My review of those documents reveals that the term "lateral transfer" has never appeared

in any version of the Ordinance or PRRs that has ever existed. Further, my review revealed that

beginning in the 1990s, amendments to the PRRs appear to have been made "to bring the rules

into compliance with current practice," without a thorough analysis of whether the "current

practice" complied with the Ordinance.

3. In addition to representing Plaintiff in this action, I am also representing Plaintiff

in proceedings before the Ventura County Civil Service Commission, which I commenced on

Plaintiffs behalf in late 2014. Attached as Exhibit B to the Request for Judicial Notice filed

concurrently herewith is a true and complete copy of the Request for Investigation that I

submitted to the Civil Service Commission, commencing those proceedings. The original of this

document is maintained by the Civil Service Commission as part of its official records.

4. In response to Plaintiffs request for investigation, and over the objection of

Defendants herein, the Civil Service Commission commenced an investigation into the propriety

of appointing people to the classified service by the so-called "lateral transfer process," without

them having undergone a competitive examination. I was present representing Plaintiff at all of

the Civil Service Commission Hearings that have been conducted to date in furtherance of this

investigation. Exhibit C, attached to Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice, filed and served

concurrently herewith, is a true and accurate recording of the Civil Service Commission

investigation hearing conducted on November 17, 2014, which I obtained from the Civil Service

Commission. Exhibit D to the Request for Judicial Notice filed and served concurrently

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herewith is a transcript of part of that recording, covering the timeframe from 44:23 to 53:51 on

the recording. I prepared the transcript myself and double-checked it to be sure it is accurate.

5. Discovery in this case has revealed that at least one individual appointed as a

"lateral transfer" within the District Attorney's Office did participate in a competitive

examination process, and became eligible for hire based on his score. Plaintiff has no issue with

this appointment, or any other so-called "lateral transfer" who becomes eligible for appointment

on the basis of a competitive examination.

6. In opposition to Plaintiffs request for the Civil Service Commission

investigation, Defendants, on October 20, 2014, submitted to the Civil Service Commission a

letter, in which Defendants explain that the Keenan appointment was made pursuant to a certain

County administrative policy entitled "Lateral Transfer from Outside the County Service."

(Chapter VIII(A), Policy No. 12, the "Administrative Policy." A true and complete copy of that

letter, the original of which is maintained in the records of the Civil Service Commission, is

attached as Exhibit E to the Request for Judicial Notice filed and served concurrently herewith.

7. Attached as Exhibit F to the Request for Judicial Notice, filed and served

concurrently herewith is a printout of the "Counties" page of the official Web site of Merit

System Services ("MSS") (www.mss.ca.gov), listing all of the Interagency Merit System

("IMS") counties.

8. Attached as Exhibit G to the Request for Judicial Notice filed and served

concurrently herewith is a printout from the State of California's official Web site, covering

frequently asked questions for people seeking to work for the State of California.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Christina Vanarelli

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POS-030ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address)

Christina Vanarelli (242288)CHRISTINA VANARELLI, INC.A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION674 County Square Drive, Suite 209CVentura, CA 93003-0449

TELEPHONE NO.: 805-233-7848 FAX NO. (Optional). 805-456-0885

E-MAIL ADDRESS fOp(/ona/;[email protected] FOR f^mei Plaintiff, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS' ASSOC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURASTREET ADDRESS 800 S. VictOHa AV6.

MAILING ADDRESS 800 S. Victoria Ave.CITY AND ZIP CODE Ventura, CA 93009

BRANCH NAME Hall of Justice - Civil DivisionPETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS'

ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA COUNTYRESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:COUNTY OF VENTURA et al.

FOR COURT USE ONLY

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVILCASE NUMBER:

56-2014-00461377-CU-OE-VTA

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)1. I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing

took place.

2. My residence or business address is:

674 County Square Drive, Suite 209C, Ventura, CA 93003

3. On (date): 10/01/2015 I mailed from (city and state): Ventura, CAthe following documents (specify):PLAINTIFF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ATTORNEYS' ASSOCIATION OF VENTURA COUNTY'SOPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF VENTURA AND GREGORY D. TOTTEN'S MOTIONFOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; DECLARATION OF CHRISTINA VANARELLII I The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail—Civil (Documents Served)

(form POS-030(D)).

4. I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):a. I / I depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.b. I I placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this

business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence isplaced for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service ina sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

5. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:a. Name of person served: Matthew A. Smith, Attorney for County of Ventura and Gregory D. Tottenb. Address of person served:

Ventura County Counsel's OfficeCounty Government Center800 South Victoria Avenue, L/C #1830Ventura, CA 93009

I I The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Serviceby First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: October 1,2015

Christina Vanarelli(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

Form Approved for Optional UseJudicial Council of CaliforniaPOS-030 [New January 1, 2005]

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL(Proof of Service)

Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1013, 1013awww.courtinfoca.gov