operational telecoms and security systems report

Exported from DOORS module ‘WI3000 - Operational Telecommunications’ Baseline 1.0

Railway Systems Contract Works

Information

Operational

Telecommunications and

Security Systems

WI3000 – Technical Specification

Security Classification: Official

Handling instructions: This document contains proprietary information. No part of

this document may be reproduced without prior written consent from the Chief

Executive Officer, HS2 Ltd.

WI 3000 Technical Specification HRS20 – Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

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Contents 1 Introduction 1

1.1 Purpose 1

1.1.1 General 1

1.1.2 Application 1

1.1.3 Requirements management process 1

1.1.4 Compliance 1

1.1.5 Terminology 2

1.1.6 Standards 2

1.2 Scope 2

1.3 Works Information (WI) 3000 Structure 3

1.4 Geographical Description 5

1.4.1 HS2 Phase 1 and Phase 2a Route 5

1.4.2 Washwood Heath 7

1.4.3 Line of Route 9

1.4.4 Compounds 11

1.4.5 Use of Relocatable Equipment Buildings and Cabinets 14

1.4.6 Tunnels 14

1.4.7 Other Structures 16

1.4.8 Viaducts and Bridges 16

1.4.9 Stations 16

1.4.10 Infrastructure Maintenance Facilities 18

1.5 Principles 18

1.5.1 General Principles 18

1.5.2 System and Enterprise IT Principles 19

2 Operational Context 20

2.1 Operational Concepts 20

2.2 Operational Principles 20

2.3 Maintenance Principles 21

2.4 Users/Usability 21

2.4.1 Network Integrated Control Centre (NICC) Users 21

2.4.2 Depot Users 26

2.4.3 Station Users 26

2.4.4 Trackside Users 27

2.4.5 Train/Engineering Vehicle Users 27

2.4.6 Other Users 28

2.5 Route Capability 28

3 System Requirements 28

3.1 General Requirements 28


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3.1.1 Cable Management 29

3.2 Data Transmission Network (DTN) 30

3.2.1 DTN Safety, Integrity and Availability 35

3.2.2 DTN Connectivity 36

3.2.3 DTN Core Network Capacity 37

3.2.4 DTN Point of Presence (PoP) Locations 37

3.2.5 DTN for the HS2 CCS Lab 38

3.2.6 DTN in the System Integration Facility 39

3.2.7 DTN Reference Network 39

3.2.8 DTN Redundancy & Resilience 39

3.2.9 DTN Tertiary Route 40

3.2.10 DTN in Degraded Mode 41

3.2.11 DTN Scalability 41

3.2.12 DTN Performance 41

3.2.13 DTN Maintenance 42

3.2.14 DTN Obsolescence Management 42

3.2.15 DTN Clock Synchronisation 42

3.2.16 DTN Network Services 43

3.2.17 DTN Network and Cyber Security 44

3.2.18 DTN IP/Ethernet PoP Equipment 46

3.2.19 DTN Gateways and Firewalls 46

3.2.20 DTN Fibre Optic Network 48

3.2.21 DTN Supporting Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS) Devices 51

3.3 Operational Telecommunications Management Platforms 51

3.3.1 DTN Network Management 53

3.3.2 Operational Telephone Management System 55

3.3.3 Fireground Remote Management System 56

3.3.4 Voice Recording Management System 56

3.3.5 Operational Telecommunications Integrated Management Terminals 57

3.4 Operational Telephone System 58

3.4.1 Operational Telephone System Safety, Integrity and Availability 59

3.4.2 Operational Telephone System Equipment 59

3.4.3 Operational Telephone System Hardware and Software Requirements 61

3.4.4 Operational Telephone System Expandability & Scalability 61

3.4.5 Operational Telephone System Degraded Modes 62

3.4.6 Operational Telephone System Functional Requirements 62

3.4.7 Operational Telephone System Additional Interface Requirements 66

3.4.8 Operational Telephone System Communications Protocols 67

3.4.9 Operational Telephone Voice Recording System 67

3.5 GSM-R 71

3.5.1 GSM-R - Background 71


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3.5.2 GSM-R - System Overview 71

3.5.3 GSM-R - General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 72

3.5.4 GSM-R - GSM-R Reference Network 72

3.5.5 GSM-R - HS2 CCS laboratory 72

3.5.6 GSM-R - System Description 73

3.5.7 GSM-R - Functional Requirements 79

3.5.8 GSM-R - Non-Functional Requirements 86

3.5.9 GSM-R - Elements Provided by Others 91

3.5.10 GSM-R - Stations Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS) for GSM-R 91

3.6 Fireground radio system 94

3.6.1 Fireground Radio Safety, Integrity and Availability 100

3.7 Tunnel Distributed Antenna System (DAS) 100

3.7.1 Tunnel DAS - Safety, Integrity and Availability 102

3.7.2 Tunnel DAS - Interfaces & Requirements 103

3.7.3 Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cables 103

3.7.4 Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cable Mounting 104

3.7.5 Tunnel DAS - Other Antennas 106

3.7.6 Tunnel DAS - Physical Design considerations/factors 106

3.7.7 Tunnel DAS - Maintenance 106

3.7.8 Tunnel DAS - Environment and Conditions 107

3.8 Telecommunication Towers 107

3.9 Security Systems 111

3.9.1 PSIM 111

3.9.2 Video Surveillance System (VSS) 116

3.9.3 Intruder Detection System (IDS) 122

3.9.4 Perimeter Intruder Detection System (PIDS) 125

3.9.5 Electronic Access Control System (EACS) 128

3.9.6 All ESS Systems 131

3.10 Equipment Rooms and Racking 138

3.11 Radio Mast Compounds 139

3.11.1 Radio Mast Compound ESS 139

3.11.2 Radio Mast Compound Fencing 139

3.12 Rapid Deployment Sites (RDS) 140

3.13 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Power & UPS 141

3.13.1 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Power 141

3.13.2 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems UPS 141

3.14 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Environmental Conditions 142

3.15 Operational Telecommunication and Security System - Spares 143

4 Interface Requirements 144

5 Quality 144


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6 RAM 144

6.1 Materials and Durability 144

6.2 Performance, Reliability and Availability 144

6.2.1 Performance 144

6.2.2 Availability 144

6.3 Maintenance and asset management 145

6.3.1 Asset Condition Monitoring 145

6.3.2 Maintenance 146

6.3.3 Obsolescence 148

6.3.4 Whole lifecycle cost 148

7 Safety 148

8 Fire Safety 151

9 Security 154

9.1 Physical Security 154

9.2 Cyber Security 155

10 Environment and Sustainability 156

11 Interoperability 158

12 Ergonomics 158

13 Sound, Noise and Vibration 165

14 Earthing and Bonding 169

14.1 Electrical Isolation 170

15 Electromagnetic Compatibility 170

16 System Integration 170

17 Assurance and Governance 170

18 Testing and Commissioning 170

19 Product Acceptance 170

20 Information management 170

21 Training 171


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1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose

1.1.1 General

This Works Information (WI) describes the Employer’s requirements in relation to the

Contractor’s design of the works.

This Works Information describes the technical requirements of the works and the

technical constraints on how the Contractor Provides the Works.

The Employer’s process requirements related to systems integration, Contractor’s

design, Digital Engineering and transverse processes are set out in WI 0300.

The Employer’s environmental and sustainability management requirements related to

design and construction of the works are set out in WI 0285, with further technical

details described in this Works Information.

1.1.2 Application

This Works Information is applicable to HRS20.

1.1.3 Requirements management process

The Employer operates a requirements management process which captures, allocates,

verifies and validates project requirements. The details of this process are set out in

section 3.3 of WI 0300.

The requirements described in this Works Information are captured in the Employer’s

requirements management system, which uses a requirements management database

(DOORS). This Works Information is managed in DOORS and changes to this Works

Information are made in DOORS.

Any differences between this Works Information and the requirements captured in

DOORS are notified to the Project Manager.

1.1.4 Compliance

The Contractor provides compliance evidence against the items contained within the

text boxes in this Works Information, using the unique identifier as a reference in

accordance with WI 0300.

To support the management of systems integration, design management and railway

authorisation, the Employer has specified, where specifically needed, compliance

criteria (the ‘Acceptance Criteria’) in this Works Information. Where specified the

Contractor may propose alternative Acceptance Criteria to the Project Manager for

acceptance.


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1.1.5 Terminology

This Works Information uses terms which are commonly understood in the field of

railway engineering. Further definitions are contained in WI 0020.

1.1.6 Standards

HS2 standards set out in this Works Information are listed in WI 2002.

1.2 Scope

This document forms part of the Works Information (WI) for Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems (HRS20).

The scope of the Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems contract

includes the design, procurement, manufacture, supply, installation, supervision,

inspection, safety authorisation, testing, commissioning, and maintenance until

handover to Trial Operations of the following systems:

- Data Transmission Network (DTN, and fibre cabling);

- Operational Telephony System (OTS);

- GSM-R radio access network (BTS, antenna, FTS terminals etc...);

- Tunnel Fireground radio system;

- Tunnel Distributed Antenna System (DAS);

- Electronic Security Systems (PSIM, VSS, IDS, PIDS and Electronic Access Control); and

- Telecommunications infrastructure (telecommunications towers, REBs, trackside

cabinets, local cable management and all cabling)

Sites where Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment and

services are required include the NICC, Depots, Stations, Tunnels, Viaducts, Railway

System Compounds, Radio Mast Compounds, and trackside along the HS2 route.

The Global System for Mobile Communications - Railway (GSM-R) system design, cell

planning, frequency planning and core network works required to support the

integration of the HS2 network into the national core GSM-R network will be delivered

by Network Rail. Locations for GSM-R base stations will be specified by Network Rail

and shall be supplied, installed and commissioned by the Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems contractor (this contract) on HS2.

Elements of the Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems are specified in

National Technical Specification Notices (NTSN) and include GSM-R and communications

in tunnels. These are:

- Control, Command and Signalling National Technical Specification Notice, and


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- Safety in Railway Tunnels National Technical Specification Notice.

A list of abbreviations relating to this WI 3000 are listed in HRS20 Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems WI 3000 Abbreviations List [HS2-HS2-EN-LST-

000-000005].

1.3 Works Information (WI) 3000 Structure

The WI 3000 provides the requirements for the Operational Telecommunications and

Security Systems in a document form. The requirements are extracted from the DOORS

database and includes additional supporting information, and where needed, specific

acceptance criteria.

The WI 3000 is organised in to 21 Chapters.

This is Chapter 1 and provides the Introduction to the WI 3000 including a high-level

overview of the HS2 Railway, the Geographic Limits, the infrastructure and an overview

of the scope of the Operational Telecommunication and Security System to be delivered

under this contract.

Chapter 2 provides the Operational Context that provides insight into the operational

framework that the Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems will need to

perform.

Chapter 3 is the system requirements for the Operational Telecommunication and

Security Systems and has been organised by sub-system. The structure of this chapter

does not constitute a design constraint, but a basis to produce the requirements and

interfaces that need to be met by the Operational Telecommunication and Security

System.

Chapter 4 contains the Interface Requirements. The requirements are contained in the

Interface Control Document that describes the physical interface requirements for the

Operational Telecommunications and Security System. This is an extract from the

Relatic's Online Interface Management tool.

Chapter 5 to 21 are called “transversal” requirements and are a set of common railway

system requirements that the Operational Telecommunication and Security System

needs to achieve.

Chapter 5 contains Quality transversal requirements that the Operational

Telecommunications and Security System needs to demonstrate.

Chapter 6 contains the Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Requirements that the

Operational Telecommunications and Security System needs to achieve to meet the

performance targets for the HS2 Railway.

Chapter 7 contains the safety requirements for the HS2 Railway. The system

requirements in Chapter 3 have been tagged as safety requirements where the HS2

Safety assurance work has identified them as such.


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Chapter 8 contains the fire safety requirements for the Operational

Telecommunications and Security System.

Chapter 9 contains the Security requirements. This Chapter will include both physical

and cyber security requirements.

Chapter 10 contains the Environmental and Sustainability requirements. Specific

environmental requirements for parts of the HS2 Railway will be set out in the relevant

standards.

Chapter 11 contains the Interoperability requirements for the Operational

Telecommunications and Security System.

Chapter 12 contains the Ergonomic requirements. This will need to be read in

conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management process.

Chapter 13 contains the Sound, Noise and Vibration (Acoustic) requirements. This will

need to be read in conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management

process.

Chapter 14 contains the Earthing and Bonding (E&B) requirements. This will need to be

read in conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management process.

Chapter 15 contains the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements. This will

need to be read in conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management

process.

Chapter 16 contains the System Integration requirements. This will need to be read in

conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management process

Chapter 17 contains the Assurance and Governance requirements. This will need to be


Chapter 18 contains the Testing & Commissioning requirements. This will need to be


Chapter 19 contains the Product Acceptance requirements. This will need to be read in

conjunction with the WI 0300 which sets out the management process.

Chapter 20 contains the Information Management requirements. This will need to be


Chapter 21 contains the Training requirements.


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1.4 Geographical Description

1.4.1 HS2 Phase 1 and Phase 2a Route

1.4.1.1 HS2 Phase 1 Route

The overall Phase 1 route length is 230km of which ~50km is in tunnels and a third of

the route is in cuttings. Total linear length of track equates to 486km including the twin

track railway, platforms (30 in total), 6 passing / maintenance loops/sidings and 4

complex track junctions. There are over 250 bridges, including 58 viaducts, 47

underbridges and 148 overbridges. In addition, there are 115 culverts. All numbers in

this clause are indicative only and subject to final design.

HS2 Phase 1 Route

There are seven Main Works Civils packages of work spread across three geographical

areas, comprising of North, Central and South delivery areas.

Four stations exist along the Phase 1 route at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham

Interchange and Birmingham Curzon Street.

The Phase 1 mainline route connects with Network Rail's Conventional Railway Network

(CRN) at Handsacre Junction. A connection with East West Rail (EWR) is provided at

Calvert Depot.

An Infrastructure Maintenance Depot (IMD) is located at Calvert.

The geographic scope of supply for HRS20 Operational Telecommunications and

Security Systems includes the whole Phase 1 line of route from Euston to Curzon Street

and connection to the West Coast Mainline at Handsacre Junction.


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The geographic scope of supply of the Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems includes the NICC, line of route and the railway technical interfaces with the

depots and stations. This is described in the Physical Infrastructure Diagram (see section

1.4.3) and other drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for this contract.


Systems includes the railway technical interfaces at the boundary with the CRN at

Handsacre Junction. This connection is described in the Physical Infrastructure Diagram

(see section 1.4.3) and other drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for this contract.


Systems includes the railway technical interfaces with the DTN external gateway at the

NICC and the external to HS2 Third Party service providers including Network Rail (and

Network Rail Telecom). This connection is described in the Physical Infrastructure

Diagram (see section 1.4.3) and other drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for this

contract.

1.4.1.2 HS2 Phase 2a Route

The HS2 Phase 2a route is approximate 60km in length and is made up of sections that

run at grade or in cuttings (~30km), in tunnels (~2km), upon embankments (~30km) or

on viaducts (~6km). This section also includes 22 underbridges and 39 overbridges. All

numbers in this clause are indicative only and subject to final design.

Phase 2a is generally split into two route areas which are defined as Fradley to Yarlett

(circa 28km) and Stone to Crewe (circa 32km).


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HS2 Phase 2a Route

The Phase 2a route connects with Network Rail's Conventional Railway Network (CRN) at

Crewe.

An Infrastructure Maintenance Depot (IMD) is located at Stone.

The geographic scope of supply for HRS20 Contract includes the whole Phase 2a line of

route from the boundary of Phase 1 to the NR connection at Crewe. This connection is

described in the Physical Infrastructure Diagram (see section 1.4.3) and other drawings

contained in the Site Plan Pack for this contract.


Systems includes the railway technical interfaces at the boundary with the CRN at

Crewe. This connection is described in the Physical Infrastructure Diagram (see section

1.4.3) and other drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for this contract.

1.4.2 Washwood Heath

The Washwood Heath site comprises the Network Integrated Control Centre (NICC) and

the Washwood Heath Rolling Stock Depot (WWHRSD).

The layout of the Washwood Heath site is shown in drawing [1D202-EDP-UT-DPL-

NS03_NL08-200100] with general arrangement drawings of the area shown on HRS08

Washwood Heath Depot Rail Systems General Arrangement and Spatial Provisioning

sheets 1 to 3 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS03_NL08-000015, HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-

NS03_NL08-000016 and HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS03_NL08-000017].

1.4.2.1 Network Integrated Control Centre (NICC)

The NICC for the whole of the HS2 operation is located at Washwood Heath within the

boundaries of the Washwood Heath Rolling Stock Depot (WWHRSD).

The NICC acts as the command centre for all incidents and emergency situations arising

or impacting on the HS2 network, co-ordinating resources to maintain the safe

operation of the railway.

The NICC liaises with and co-ordinates staff at remote locations including infrastructure

maintenance depots and bases, train maintenance depots, train crew depots, stations

and Network Rail ROCs.

The NICC is the focal point for monitoring and managing the effect of each of the

railway systems (on their own and in aggregate) on the people experience and will be

the centre for making service-affecting decisions in the customers’ interests.

The NICC building has space allocated for Equipment Room(s). Within this space

allocation provision has been made for Operational Telecommunications and Electronic

Security Systems.


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The NICC building contains the HS2 Operational Control Room (OCR) where all phases

of HS2's operational service will be controlled from.

The OCR follows a pod methodology, with pods covering the geographical areas of the

route and a central pod providing management oversight and the ability to take over

control of any geographical area. Additional pods are provided for Security

Management.

The current default base configuration of the geographical pods, subject to further

design and human factors work, is as follows:

- Pod 1: Phase 1: Euston – Curzon Street and Streethay / Phase 2a: Streethay Jn –

Handsacre and Crewe

- Pod 2: Phase 2b West: Streethay Jn – Manchester Piccadilly

- Pod 3: Phase 2b East: Streethay Jn – Leeds / Church Fenton

The area controlled by a pod is flexible and areas can be reallocated during incidents or

busy times.

A remote Tap-in facility is provided at Birmingham Curzon Street station to be used in

the event that the NICC OCR is not available and provides the same level of

functionality.

The Diagnostic and Technical (DAT) Room is where all maintenance workstations for all

Rail Systems will be centralised. The Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems Contractor will need to co-ordinate with others to provide a working

environment for maintenance staff responsible for supervising and rectifying the

various Rail Systems. The Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems are

split across two workstations one for Networks and Telephony Management Systems

and one for Electronic Security Systems.

The Data Review Room is a secure room that is used by authorised people for post

incident review of VSS, voice recordings and other Data Protection Act qualifying

material away from the operating floor. The Operational Telecommunications and

Security systems will be available in the room through dedicated terminals or web-

based application to provide access to voice recordings and VSS.

The Incident Control Room (ICR) provides a dedicated, bespoke environment for

managing major service-affecting failures or incidents on the HS2 network or co-

ordinating incidents affecting HS2 services on the conventional rail network. The

Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems contractor will provide GSM-R

and Operational Telephone devices in the room.

Training facilities are provided within the NICC building to provide both one to one and

group practical scenario and classroom based training for operations controllers. NICC

Operational Control Room (OCR) systems are replicated in the Training facility to enable

all operations controllers undertake initial and ongoing training in these facilities. The


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instructor facility enables up to four trainers to run training scenarios and role play the

external roles.

A CCS laboratory (or CCS Lab) is provided in the NICC and will be used during the design

and testing phase to demonstrate the CCS Systems are configured correctly and deliver

the required functionality.

The System Integration Facility (SIF), is a separate facility from the CCS laboratory, and is

provided in the NICC for use by all Railway Systems Contracts to demonstrate system

integration, validate interfaces and prove end to end system functionality. The

representative elements of the Operational Telecommunication Systems will be

demonstrated within the SIF to validate system design and services.

The SIF requirements for all Railway Systems Contractors, including HRS20, are captured

in a separate HS2 document (see WI 0100).

1.4.2.2 Washwood Heath Rolling Stock Depot (WWHRSD)

The WWHRSD will be the only rolling stock maintenance depot for the maintenance of

HS2's passenger trains for Phase One and 2A operations.

WWHRSD will enable the train service specification, which at its peak will see up to 18

trains per hour leaving or arriving in the depot, with a speed of 25 km/h inside the depot

and 80 km/h on the arrival and departure routes.

The WWHRSD will comprise of track and associated Overhead Catenary System (OCS),

signalling, power and telecoms. The depot will have combined stabling and servicing

sidings with associated platforms and walkways to enable cleaning and servicing of the

trains. The system architecture for the depot is shown on the Level 1 Washwood Heath

Depot system architecture diagram [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000060].

Within the depot boundaries there is space for a Radio Mast Compound with

Telecommunications Tower [see drawing HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS03_NL08-000016] to

provide radio coverage of the mainline and depot.

1.4.3 Line of Route

The line of the HS2 Phase 1 and Phase 2a route and positioning of its infrastructure

(including stations, tunnels, viaducts, bridges, track junctions and cross overs, sidings,

depots, compounds and access points) is shown on the Physical Infrastructure

Drawings.

- HS2 Phase 1 Physical Infrastructure Diagram Chainage 000+000m to Chainage

026+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920001]


048+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920002]


087+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920003]


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127+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920004]


167+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920005]


195+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920006]

- HS2 Phase 2a Physical Infrastructure Diagram Chainage 188+291m to Chainage

249+000m [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-920007]

A typical arrangement for a 5km Open Route Section is shown on the Level 3 5Km

Integrated Lineside Railway Systems Architecture [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000034].

Along the line of route, in the open track sections a primary Cable Management System

(CMS) is provided by others on both sides of the track with regular interconnecting

under track crossings. The CMS route is shared with cables for CCS, Operational

Telecommunications, Security Systems and LV power. A cross-section is shown in the

following drawings HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-300041 and HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-300042.

General Arrangement Drawings (GAs) have been developed to diagrammatically

represent complex areas along the HS2 Railway.

The GA drawings depict the relationship between the various Rail Systems and the Civil

Infrastructure. The intent of these drawings is to show the arrangement of equipment

for tendering purposes and the contractors are expected to develop them as part of

their Detailed Design and interface management works.

The list of GA drawings includes:

- Chiltern South Portal (West Hyde ATS) Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial

Provisioning [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-C001-000001];

- Maintenance Siding 1 - Stoke Mandeville Rail Systems General Arrangements and

Spatial Provisioning [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-C002-000001];

- Perturbation Crossover Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning

[HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-C002-000002];

- Calvert Rail Systems General Arrangement and Spatial Provisioning Sheet 1 to 6

[HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-CS06-000001 to 000006];

- Birmingham Interchange Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning

Sheet 1 to 3 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-N003-000001 to 000002 and 000004];

- Washwood Heath Depot / Mainline Connection - Rail Systems General Arrangement

and Spatial Provisioning Sheet 1 to 3 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS03_NL08-000001 and

000003];


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- Delta Junction Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning Sheet 1 to

6 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS04-000001 to 000006];

- Curzon Street Approach Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning

[HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS08-000001];

- Old Oak Common Station Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning

Sheet 1 to 2 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-S004-000001 to 0000002];

- Euston Approach Rail Systems General Arrangements and Spatial Provisioning Sheet 1

to 3 [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-SS01-000001 to 000003];

- Victoria Road Crossover Box and Access Shaft Rail Systems General Arrangement and

Spatial Provisioning [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-SS04-000001]; and

- West Ruislip Siding (Gatemead Embankment) Rail Systems General Arrangements and

Spatial Provisioning [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-SS05_SL07-000001].

1.4.4 Compounds

Compounds are to be used for the co-location of Railway Systems equipment along the

trackside.

The location of the compounds has been optimised to support their primary functions

whilst providing the Operational Telecommunication System space to locate trackside

equipment.

The Compounds are commonly known as Railway System Compounds and Radio Mast

Compounds (including Rapid Deployment Sites).

1.4.4.1 Railway System Compounds

Railway System Compounds (RSC) are located at strategic locations along the trace and

are there primary function is to provide intakes for the power systems both traction and

non-traction.

The typical arrangement for these sites is shown on the Level 3 Generic Railway System

Compound system architecture diagram [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000042].

Space allocation within the Railway System Compound is managed by the HV power

contractor and subject to further design development. The initial space allocation

within these compounds are shown in the following drawings:

- Burton Green [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000001];

- Ickenham [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000002];

- Quainton [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000003];

- Newlands [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000004];


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- Bromford Bridge [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000007];

- Lyntus [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000008];

- Interchange [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000009];

- South Crewe [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000010];

- Whitmore North [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000011];

- West Hyde, Greatworth, Chipping Warden & Madeley North [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-

000012];

- Gilson Road [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000013];

- Curzon Street [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000014];

- Stoney Thorpe [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000015];

- Whitfield, Drayton Lane & Mill Lane [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000017];

- Danes Moor [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000018];

- Cuttle Mill & Cappers Lane [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000019];

- Wendover [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000020];

- Leather Lane [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000022];

- Sedrup & Tibbets Farm [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000023];

- Bradnock [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000024];

- Radbourne [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000025];

- Yarnfield [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000026]; and

- Castle Bromwich [HS2-HS2-RE-DPL-000-000027].

The typical arrangement for these sites is shown on the Level 3 Generic Railway Systems


The general arrangements for Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems at

these locations are shown in the following drawings:

- Operational Telecommunications at Rail System Compound - Without a Mast [HRS08-

WSP-RC-DPL-000-000011]

- Operational Telecommunications at Rail System Compound - With a Mast [HRS08-WSP-

RC-DPL-000-000012]

For Phase 1 there are 28 RSC for Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

use in the open route sections, 11 of which are proposed to have Telecoms Towers. For


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Phase 2a there are 13 RSC for Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

use in the open route sections, 6 of which are proposed to have Telecoms Towers. It

should be noted that where these compounds are adjacent to Tunnel Portals these

locations have been counted with the Portals.

1.4.4.2 Radio Mast Compounds and Rapid Deployment Sites

Radio Mast Compounds are in addition to Railway System compounds, located at

strategic locations along the trace and sited to provide optimal GSM-R coverage to

enable both voice and data communications.

For Phase 1 there are:

- 40 Radio Mast Compounds in the open route sections, and

- 2 Radio Mast Compounds in the depots (one in Calvert and one in WWHRSD).

For Phase 2a there are:

- 22 Radio Mast Compounds in the open route sections.

The typical arrangement for these sites is shown on the Level 3 Generic Radio Mast


Space in this location is managed by the Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems contractor with allocations included for HV Power, M&E, CCS and Third Party

Telecommunications. The general arrangements are shown in the following drawings:

- Radio Mast Compound Including LV Distribution Cubicles - Option A [HRS08-WSP-RC-

DPL-000-000101]

- Radio Mast Compound Including LV Distribution Cubicles - Option B [HRS08-WSP-RC-

DPL-000-000102]

- Radio Mast Compound Including LV Distribution Cubicles - Option C [HRS08-WSP-RC-

DPL-000-000103]

- Radio Mast Compound Including LV Distribution Cubicles and HV/LV Substation -

Option A [HRS08-WSP-RC-DPL-000-000106]


Option B [HRS08-WSP-RC-DPL-000-000107]


Option C [HRS08-WSP-RC-DPL-000-000108]

Where it has been determined that Radio Mast Compound construction is not possible

at the optimal location, an alternative trackside deployment has been proposed known

as the Rapid Deployment Site (RDS) [as shown in HRS08-WSP-RC-REP-000-000005 -

HRS08 GSM-R Multi-User Rapid Deployment Solution Rationale Report].


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There are 14 Rapid Deployment Sites with Telecoms Towers in the open route section

for phase 1.

1.4.5 Use of Relocatable Equipment Buildings and Cabinets

For Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment located in the

Compounds or at a Rapid Deployment Site location then the preferred solution is for

the equipment to be located in a Relocatable Equipment Building (REB).

For Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment located trackside

including the open route and in running tunnels, then the preferred solution is for the

equipment to be located in an active cabinet.

For Operational Telecommunication System fibre optic network cable joints located in

the open route trackside or in compounds the preferred solution is for the joints to be

placed in a passive cabinet.

The requirements for REBs and cabinets can be found in CCS & Comms REBs and

Cabinets Guidance document [HS2-HS2-EN-SPE-000-000004].

1.4.6 Tunnels

Tunnels make up a significant element of the total Phase 1 and 2a HS2 route (see HS2-

HS2-CV-DSC-000-000005). They are:

Phase 1

- Euston Tunnel (triple/twin bored) - 7.967km

- Old Oak Tunnel into Northolt Tunnel (twin bored) - 14.241km (combined)

- Copthall Tunnel (single bore) - 0.8km

- Chiltern Tunnel (twin bored) - 16.242km

- Wendover Tunnel (cut and cover) - 1.42km

- Greatworth Tunnel (cut and cover) - 2.101km

- Chipping Warden Tunnel (cut and cover) - 2.521km

- Long Itchington Wood Tunnel (twin bored) - 2.032km

- Burton Green Tunnel (cut and cover) - 0.761km

- Bromford Tunnel (twin bored) - 5.83km

Phase 2a

- Whitmore Heath Tunnel (cut and cover) - 1.35km

- Madley Tunnel (twin bored) - 1.025km


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Tunnel lengths shown are provisional and subject to final design by the Main Works

Civils Contracts.

By their very nature, tunnels are space critical areas where many different systems need

to co-exist within a constrained area. Space has been provided for the Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems and is best shown in the Tunnel Cross

Section General Arrangement Drawings:

- 9.1m Internal Diameter Tunnel Cross Section [HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-200123]




- Cut and Cover Tunnel Cross Section [HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-200124]

- Precast Arch Cut and Cover Cross Section [HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-200115]

- HS2 Tunnel Spatial Arrangements Cross Sections General Notes Drawing [HS2-HS2-CV-

DSH-000-000002]

Tunnel Portal Buildings are typically located at either end of most tunnels along the

Phase 1 and 2a line of route for railway systems contractors to co-locate railway

systems equipment. The Portal Buildings contains an equipment room for Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems Equipment and space adjacent to the

building for a telecommunications tower. There are 22 of Portal Buildings (18 for phase

1 and 4 for phase 2a).

Tunnel Vent & Intervention Shafts are located in long bored tunnels for the Phase 1 line

of route. Each shaft contains an Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

Equipment room to hold comms equipment. There are 13 number of Tunnel Vent &

Intervention Shaft equipment rooms (including Park Village intervention and escape

shaft).

Tunnel Cross Passages are located at approximate intervals of 350m along the bored

tunnel length for the Phase 1 and 2a line of route by HS2 (this spacing dimension is

subject to the design for each specific tunnel) see Tunnel Cross Passage Door Schedule

[HS2-HS2-RV-SCH-000-000001].

Each cross passage contains space provision of 3.7m (width) x 2m (height) x 0.55m

(depth) adjacent to the wall on one side of the cross passage for Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment and on the opposite wall, a

smaller space for Third Party Telecommunications equipment (1.5m x 2.0m x 0.55m).

There are 106 number of cross passages with space provision for telecommunications

equipment and cabling. Cross passages are not air-conditioned, and equipment

installed must be appropriate for the environment (see D01-OPSCOM-3043) and fire

requirements (see D01-OPSCOM-112).


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In cut and cover tunnels there are no cross passages in which to install railway systems

equipment but there are 19 cross passageways between the running tunnels providing

the evacuation route see Tunnel Cross Passage Door Schedule [HS2-HS2-RV-SCH-000-

000001].

Limited space exists for a small equipment cabinet enclosure to be positioned adjacent

to Tunnel walls. In cut and cover tunnels the preference is to install equipment mainly

in the portal buildings due to lack of space and also the need to run LV power from the

portal buildings to any cabinets and equipment installed within the tunnels.

Throughout the tunnels the primary cable containment system is provided by others

excluding the arrangements required for the Operational Telecommunications systems

radiating cables where a space provision has been made. The Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems Contractor will be required to provide any

secondary cable containment to connect the primary cable containment to the

Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems equipment locations. The

Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Contractor will have to co-

ordinate the design, materials and installation of the secondary cable containment with

others to ensure that the system is complete.

1.4.7 Other Structures

A special structure is provided at Sheep House Wood, across the HS2 phase 1 and

Network Rail route, to provide protection to bats at this location from the operational

railway. This structure is known as Sheep House Wood Bat Mitigation Structure

(SHWBMS) which is 0.921km long.

SHWBMS has a portal building at the North Portal with an equipment room allocated for

Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment and space allocated

for Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems REB in a Compound at the

South Portal.

1.4.8 Viaducts and Bridges

There are many viaducts and bridges across the HS2 Phase 1 and 2a network including

the Colne Valley viaduct which is 3.4km long. The preference is to keep Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment off these structures as there is

limited space for anything except cables in the primary cable containment.

The general arrangement drawing for Curzon Street [HRS08-WSP-ZC-DGA-NS08-000001]

shows a special arrangement for providing Operational Telecommunications and

Security Systems equipment and services required to support HS2 operational systems

in that area.

1.4.9 Stations

Station activities are managed from the local Station Operations Room, with each HS2

station playing their part in the overall delivery of the train service.


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All station platforms can accommodate, as a minimum, two 200m trains which may be

coupled or uncoupled.

1.4.9.1 Euston Station

Euston station is the London terminal station for HS2.

The existing design for Euston HS2 station has 11 platforms built in two stages, however

this is subject to change. It is expected that Euston HS2 station will have 10 platforms

built in a single stage. The Station Operation Room (SOR) manages all aspects of the

operational station, its station systems, the safe boarding and dispatch of trains and the

management of HS2's visitors and passengers.

Euston station has cable termination rooms and Operational Telecommunications

equipment rooms located on the platform as shown in the drawings contained in the

Site Plan Pack for this contract.

1.4.9.2 Old Oak Common Station

Old Oak Common (OOC) station is the outer London station and provides

interconnection point with services on the Great Western Mainline.

Old Oak Common station has 12 platforms that provide interconnection between HS2

and the Great Western Mainline - 6 platforms for HS2 services and 6 platforms for

services running on the Great Western Mainline. The Station Operation Room (SOR)

manages all aspects of the operational station, its station systems, the safe boarding

and dispatch of trains and the management of HS2's visitors and passengers.

Old Oak Common station has four cable termination rooms two located at either end of

the HS2 platforms and Operational Telecommunications equipment rooms located on

the platform as shown in the drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for this contract.

1.4.9.3 Birmingham Interchange Station

Birmingham Interchange is an intermediate station which will have stopping services as

well as planned through services and provides a point of interconnection via an

Automated People Mover to Birmingham Airport, the National Exhibition Centre and

Birmingham International railway station.

Birmingham Interchange station has 4 platforms connected via a wide station

concourse which sits above the platforms and through lines. The Station Operation

Room (SOR) manages all aspects of the operational station, its station systems, the safe

boarding and dispatch of trains and the management of HS2's visitors and passengers.

Birmingham Interchange station has four cable termination rooms two located at either

end of the HS2 platforms and Operational Telecommunications equipment rooms

located on the platform as shown in the drawings contained in the Site Plan Pack for

this contract.


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1.4.9.4 Birmingham Curzon Street Station

Curzon Street Station is the terminal station in Birmingham.

Curzon Street station has 7 platforms connected with a wide station concourse which

sits above the platforms. The Station Operation Room (SOR) manages all aspects of the

operational station, its station systems, the safe boarding and dispatch of trains and the

management of HS2's visitors and passengers.

Curzon Street station includes the remote tap in facility which is to be equipped with the

same workstations and functionality as the NICC Operation Control Room. The remote

tap-in facility is a fall-back facility that is to be used if the NICC Operation Control Room

becomes unavailable.

1.4.10 Infrastructure Maintenance Facilities

HS2 Infrastructure Maintenance activities are managed and co-ordinated from

dedicated, strategically placed facilities with the provision for stabling maintenance

plant and On-track Machines (OTM), storing materials and spares, and for providing

welfare and IT facilities for maintenance staff.

The main HS2 depot for phase 1 is the Infrastructure Maintenance Depots (IMD) at

Calvert with phase 2a supported from the Infrastructure Maintenance Base - Rail

connected (IMB-R) at Stone.

Other smaller Infrastructure Maintenance Base (IMB) are provided in strategic locations

across HS2 so that rapid response teams can quickly respond to failures.

Both Calvert IMD and Stone IMB-R have a Depot Control Room for controlling the

movement of rail mounted engineering plant and vehicles.

1.5 Principles

1.5.1 General Principles

The following general principles shall be used by the Contractor in delivering the works

and developing the systems design:

a) HS2 is planned to be a 24/7 operational railway. All designs shall adhere to ‘always up’

principles with appropriate periodic maintenance and servicing concepts to support 24-

hour operations;

b) use the built environment, technology and systems to improve security and safety;

c) flexibility to support changing technology and processes which include elements such

as energy storage, autonomy, security, biometrics and advances in telecommunications

and technology generally;


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d) provides value for money by actively considering and monitoring of the project cost

targets in all design aspects to ensure the delivery of Security Design and Build is within

budget;

e) flexible, adaptable and scalable (without disruption to operations) for building

structure and systems as well as to support changing technology and processes;

f) ensure the design for all elements considers the testing and commissioning sequence

and strategy for future Works, to avoid any adverse impact on the commissioning

process;

1.5.2 System and Enterprise IT Principles

The following system and enterprise Information Technology Principles shall be used by

the Contractor in delivering the works and developing the design for each technology

system:

a) Innovate using proven N-1 solutions. Systems are to be based on commercially

available products (COT’s), proven technologies and ut ilising standard configurations.

Where bespoke systems or applications are the only method of servicing these

requirements, with approval from the WPO a bespoke solution may be offered in

concert with an Escrow agreement.;

b) Minimise harm to the environment and ensure sustainability outcomes are

addressed in the design;

c) Simplify the business and IT environments;

d) Ensure all solutions are secure by design;

e) Provide multi-purpose solutions where there are similar requirements for

different operational outcomes. (e.g. where VSS coverage of the same area is required

by different operational teams, duplicate streams from a single camera rather than

providing two cameras).

f) Manage information as a core corporate asset (trusted and protected).

g) Adopt a risk-based approach by designing highly available, secure, safe and

compliant solutions;

h) Adopt open standards with integration using services-based, modular solutions;

and

i) Design a systems environment that is agile, flexible, secure and open to change.

The end system incorporates flexibility, maintainability and constructability principles

that form a systematic means of ensuring a flexible, maintainable and constructible

design. These principles shall be applied throughout the project lifecycle and shall meet

the following criteria:


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a) Flexibility – The objectives of the flexibility principles are to enable the Railway to

accommodate future modification caused by a change of use, function, technology or

regulation with minimal impact to the building fabric, operations, governmental

functions or passenger experience. These principles shall include building structure,

building systems, materials, construction methodologies or overarching design concepts

and shall be applied throughout the design at locations most likely to be impacted by

change and/or growth;

b) Maintainability – The objectives of the maintainability principles are to define

design standards that allow for safe, efficient and easy maintenance of the systems with

minimal impact to operations, or passenger experience. The principles shall address

access to cyclical replacement or cleaning of typical system devices, plant, equipment

and components. The principles shall take into consideration building systems and

services, external systems and services, materials, access and design concepts and shall

be applied throughout HS2; and

c) Constructability – The objectives of the constructability principles are to define

design standards which govern the definition of materials, methodologies, concepts and

details that allow for an efficient and simple construction process. The principles shall

take into consideration standardisation, modularity, pre-fabrication opportunities,

ability to modify materials on-site to enable them to fit where applicable, manual

handling of material to avoid safety or access issues or any other characteristics that

impact on the ease and efficiency of the construction process and future operations.

2 Operational Context 2.1 Operational Concepts

The Operational Concept is the blueprint of how the railway is to be configured,

operated and maintained in its operational phases. It informs the requirements for the

capabilities (being the people, assets, processes and systems) of the future delivery

organisations for operations and maintenance.

HS2 conforms with current UK legislation including compliance with the National

Technical Specification Notices (NTSN) and National Technical Rules (NTR).

2.2 Operational Principles

HS2 operational service is typically from 0500 to 2359 Monday to Saturday and 0800 to

2359 on Sunday.

Trains operate in the highest level of supervision available at all times.

HS2 non-passenger rolling stock operates under ETCS Level 2 and does not use ATO

functionality.

In normal circumstances, rolling stock in passenger services and empty rolling stock

operate under ETCS Level 2 and uses ATO functionality.


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In degraded modes where ATO is unavailable, manual driving in ETCS is used.

Operational procedures for manual driving in degraded modes are based on Train

Captain competence profiles.

Lineside signage is provided in both directions to facilitate throughput of trains in

degraded modes.

ETCS national values are specifically configured for HS2, cognisant of lessons learned on

the conventional rail network.

Full bi-directional working capability is provided throughout the HS2 network and

includes all loops and platform lines.

Bi-directional movements are capable of the maximum speed profile permitted by the

infrastructure.

Bi-directional movements are subject to the same headway as those in the nominated

normal direction.

Permissive routes are available from all route setting points and are not restricted to

platform tracks.

Degraded routes are available from all route setting points.

Trains can perform Start of Mission at all locations throughout the HS2 network.

In normal circumstances, automatic driving is available from Start of Mission.

2.3 Maintenance Principles

Intrusive maintenance of systems and trackside infrastructure takes place within the

white period that is scheduled each day at the end of the HS2 operational service.

Routine maintenance of systems and trackside infrastructure takes place within the

white period or without impacting upon train running.

Rapid response teams are based at strategic and critical locations throughout the

network and hold a suite of operational and infrastructure competencies.

2.4 Users/Usability

All users of Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems will undertake

specific user and/or maintenance training and where necessary undertake competence

assessment, prior to undertaking the role. Individuals can hold multiple competencies

as necessary to undertake their duties.

2.4.1 Network Integrated Control Centre (NICC) Users

The following users in the NICC use the Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems to carry out their operational roles and communicate with trains, maintainers,

other railway infrastructure managers and operators and businesses outside HS2.


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2.4.1.1 Traffic Management (TM) Controller

The Traffic Management (TM) Controller is located within the geographic pods of the

NICC OCR.

The Traffic Management (TM) Controller is responsible for managing the safety and

performance of trains, including:

- Overseeing the movement of trains throughout the HS2 network to the handover point

with the Network Rail or depot signalling systems,

- Monitoring and responding to relevant train or infrastructure faults or alarms reported

to the NICC,

- Monitoring and deconflicting the plan to ensure the HS2 customer experience is

delivered,

- Monitoring the movement of trains on the conventional rail network and predicting

and planning for the impact of their arrival on the HS2 network,

- Managing the train service to comply with infrastructure restrictions,

- Managing the handover and hand back of portions of the infrastructure for

engineering works,

- Controlling train movements to and from possessions

- Manual route setting under degraded scenarios,

- Resolving train running conflicts which cannot be resolved automatically by the

system, and

- Developing and implementing contingency plans during service disruption.

The TM Controller uses GSM-R to communicate with trains and maintenance workers,

and the operational telephone system to make and receive other operational calls.

2.4.1.2 Infrastructure Management Controller (IMC)

The Infrastructure Management Controller (IMC) is located within the geographic pods

of the NICC OCR

The IMC is responsible for managing the performance, condition and control of HS2

infrastructure assets, including:

- Monitoring and responding to relevant condition monitoring data or infrastructure

faults or alarms reported to the NICC,

- Overseeing planned isolations,

- Taking emergency isolations,


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- Overseeing works progress within possessions / worksites, and

- Operating tunnel controls.

The IMC acts on critical alarms passed from the Operational Telecommunications

System management platform to the Engineering Management System (EMS) and uses

GSM-R and the operational telephone system to communicate with maintenance and

make and receive other operational calls.

2.4.1.3 Shift Manager

The Shift Manager is located within the central pod of the NICC OCR.

The Shift Manager is responsible for the overall running and management of the OCR,

including:

- Final operational decision making across the HS2 network,

- Setting up transfer of key resources to the Incident Control Room in the event of a

major incident or disruption,

- Invoking emergency procedures and contingency plans when appropriate, and

- Line and competence management of controllers.

The Shift Manager uses GSM-R to communicate with trains and maintenance workers,

and the operational telephone system to make and receive other operational calls. The

Shift Manager has access to voice recordings to carryout investigations and staff

competence assessments.

2.4.1.4 Rolling Stock Controller

The Rolling Stock Controller for the Train Manufacturer and Maintainer (TMM) is located

within the central pod of the NICC OCR.

The Rolling Stock Controller is responsible for:

- Providing assistance to train crew in the event of onboard defects,

- Answering queries regarding rolling stock on the help line,

- Monitoring and overseeing incoming data from the HS2 train fleet, and

- Collaborating with rolling stock depots where unplanned changes to the fleet plan are

required.

The Rolling Stock Controller uses GSM-R to communicate with trains, and the

operational telephone system to make and receive other operational calls.


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2.4.1.5 Resource Controller

The Resource Controller for the Train Operating Company (TOC) is located within the

central pod of the NICC OCR.

The Resource Controller is responsible for:

- Planning the balance of the fleet for the following days’ service,

- Collaborating with the Traffic Management Controller when units are required to be

swapped or taken out of service,

- Managing the availability status of train crew, and

- Amending rosters and allocating short term duty requirements to staff.

The Resource Controller uses the operational telephone system to make and receive

operational calls.

2.4.1.6 Security Controller

The Security Controller is located within the security pod of the NICC OCR.

The Security Controller is responsible for:

- Overseeing VSS and other security systems throughout the HS2 network. These can be

manually selected or automatically displayed upon receipt of designated trigger alarms,

- Responding to alarms and alerts which will be reported by exception with an

automated feed to the appropriate camera(s),

- Liaising with British Transport Police and other security stakeholders to co-ordinate the

response to potential and ongoing security threats,

- Central point of contact and advice for controllers in the local Station Operations

Rooms, and

- Managing staff and contractor access issues to lineside facilities and equipment

rooms.

The Security Controller uses the route wide Electronic Security Systems (VSS, Electronic

Access Control, Intruder Detection System and Perimeter Intruder Detection System) to

oversee the security of the HS2 line of route and uses the operational telephone system

to make and receive operational calls.

2.4.1.7 Customer Experience Controller

The Customer Experience Controller is located within the central pod of the NICC OCR.

The Customer Experience Controller is responsible for:


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- Delivering the overall customer experience beyond automated information, in terms of

customer assistance, customer information and social media feeds,

- Changing information system messages on HS2 stations and trains,

- Managing passenger reallocation issues in the event of cancellations and 200m v 400m

trains,

- Managing station information in the event of a local Station Operations Room being

unavailable, and

- Delivery of safety critical announcements directly from NICC to customers on board

trains in the event of an emergency.

The Customer Experience Controller uses the operational telephone system to make

and receive operational calls.

2.4.1.8 Diagnostics and Technical Support (DATS) Technician

The DATS technician is located within the central pod of the NICC OCR.

Note: It is envisaged that two DATS Technicians will be on duty at all times, collectively

covering the full suite of DATS core competencies to enable the railway system to

achieve its PRAMS target and remain operational.

The DATS technician is responsible for:

- Acting as the first line interface between the operations controllers in the NICC and the

Infrastructure Maintenance function at Calvert IMD,

- Network health monitoring and responding to alarms raised by monitoring systems,

- Monitoring the health of asset condition monitoring systems,

- Providing technical support to on site staff during rapid response or engineering

works,

- Providing technical support to NICC or stations staff

- Trend analysis, interrogation of the ORAC system for supporting Calvert based asset

engineers and reporting on performance of railway systems, and

- Prioritisation of defects in accordance with standards

Systems administration for NICC systems, including EMS and TMS.

The DATS technician uses the Operational Telecommunications and Electronic Security

Management Platforms to operate, manage, monitor system health and diagnose faults,

and uses the operational telephone system to make and receive operational calls.


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A DATS room in the NICC building is equipped with railway systems management

platform HMIs including those for Operational Telecommunications and Electronic

Security Systems.

2.4.2 Depot Users

2.4.2.1 Depot Controller

The Depot Controller is located in the depot control room and is responsible for

managing the safety of passenger trains/maintenance trains/On-Track Machines (OTM),

including:

- Authorising the movement of passenger trains/maintenance trains/OTMs in the depot

to the handover point with the HS2 mainline or Network Rail systems,

- Monitoring and responding to relevant train or infrastructure faults or alarms reported

in the depot, and

- Co-ordinating activities with the NICC or Network Rail control rooms.

The Depot Controller uses GSM-R to communicate with passenger trains/maintenance

trains/OTMs and the operational telephone system to make and receive other

operational calls.

2.4.3 Station Users

2.4.3.1 Station Controller

The Station Controller is located in the Station Operations Room (SOR) and is

responsible for:

- Overseeing all station issues,

- Overseeing station security systems,

- Liaison with controllers in the local SORs,

- Taking overall control of stations in the event of a local control room being unavailable,

- Managing the day to day customer experience at stations, and

- Liaison with the Network Integrated Control Centre (NICC), management of

emergencies.

The Station Controller uses the operational telephone system to make and receive

operational calls (including calls originating from station help points) and the electronic

security system to manage and monitor the station security.


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2.4.4 Trackside Users

2.4.4.1 Protected Area Manager (PAM)

The Protected Area Manager (PAM) is responsible for setting up a safe system of work to

ensure the safety of those working on the railway.

The PAM uses a handheld smart device connected over GSM-R GPRS/Edge to the

Possession Management System (PMS) to oversee safe systems of work including the

safe movement of maintenance trains, on-track machines and plant.

2.4.4.2 Worksite Manager (WSM)

The Worksite Manager (WSM) is responsible for maintaining the safety of all individuals

and equipment working in a worksite, which includes authorising non-passenger rolling

stock movements.

The WSM will have a handheld smart device, connected over GSM-R GPRS/EDGE, to the

Possession Management System (PMS) that will allow him to manage the staff safety

protection at a worksite and the workflow management associated with the PMS. The

WSM will also authorise the movement of non-passenger rolling stock movements,

which will be conducted under ETCS shunting arrangements.

2.4.4.3 Maintenance Teams

Maintenance teams are tasked from Calvert IMD to carryout planned and un-planned

maintenance tasks and respond to faults. The maintenance teams use a handheld

GSM-R mobile to communicate with the NICC and other maintenance teams.

In tunnels, GSM-R coverage is provided throughout the tunnel including vent shafts and

cross passages to aid maintenance communication particularly in the event of an

incident. Additionally, emergency Tunnel Telephones are provided at cross passage

doors for a direct link to the NICC.

2.4.5 Train/Engineering Vehicle Users

2.4.5.1 Train Captain

The Train Captain is in charge of the train and is competent as either or both; an

Operator and Driver.

The Train Captain uses GSM-R to communicate with the Traffic Management (TM)

Controller as the primary means of communication. Whilst in the area of control of the

depot, GSM-R is used to communicate with the Depot Controller.

2.4.5.2 Maintenance Trains/OTM Users

The Maintenance Train/OTM driver uses GSM-R to communicate with the Traffic

Management (TM) Controller or Depot Controller as the primary means of

communication. Whilst in a possession GSM-R is used to communicate with the

Worksite Manager for movement authority.


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2.4.6 Other Users

2.4.6.1 British Transport Police (BTP)

The British Transport Police (BTP) use the HS2 Video Surveillance System (VSS)

management terminals provided at the NICC and Calvert Depot as part of their day to

day operational policing and to manage the response to incidents across the HS2

network.

2.5 Route Capability

The HS2 railway supports trains passing through a given section at 360km/h where the

physical infrastructure permits.

The HS2 railway supports the 18tph required service frequency on the Phase 1 HS2

infrastructure, with the theoretical capability of facilitating 24tph in recovery mode.

The HS2 railway is based on the principle of offering the highest levels of automation

possible whilst giving consideration to Human Factors assessments and Task Analysis

identification.

3 System Requirements 3.1 General Requirements

[D01-OPSCOM-2894] - General Requirements

Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems shall use a hierarchy of systems,

using an open interface and open architecture principles, allowing multiple inputs and

outputs from different providers’ systems.


Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems shall be designed to permit future

changes in technology or capability to be implemented without impact to operations.

Supporting Information : This may include through the provision of additional space in equipment rooms for

expansion or renewal, upgrade paths for data transmission capability, and radio system or infrastructure

capabilities.


Lineside and tunnel mounted cables and equipment shall be installed outside the UIC GC

gauge (refer to Technical Standard - Track System Structure Gauges HS2-HS2-RT-STD-000-

000005).


Lineside and tunnel mounted equipment shall be installed so as not to affect any signal

sighting.


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All Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems and assets shall be identified

and named following the HS2 Asset Identification Standard [HS2-HS2-IM-STD-000-000010]

and HS2 Asset Labelling standard [HS2-HS2-IM-STD-000-000004].


Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems REBs and Cabinets shall comply

with HS2’s specification for the provision of REB’s and Cabinets [HS2-HS2-EN-SPE-000-

000004].

Supporting Information : REBs are used to house Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

equipment in Railway System Compounds, Radio Mast Compounds and Rapid Deployment Sites, whereas

cabinets house Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment at trackside locations and

cable joints/ terminations at trackside locations or in compounds.


All Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems using lasers shall comply with

BS EN 60825 Laser Safety.


All software for each Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems sub-systems,

which forms part of the HS2 Railway System, shall be subject to approved configuration

management and change control procedures that complies with ISO/IEC 15288.


All data stored for Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems shall be stored in

a secure form, commensurate with its safety and security classification and intended use.


Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems user interfaces shall use English as

the primary language.


All Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems devices shall have default

passwords changed in line with HS2 policies.

Supporting Information : HS2 password policies will be provided during the design stage to inform design and

commissioning documentation.

3.1.1 Cable Management

[D01-OPSCOM-3182] - Cable Management

The spatial arrangement of primary cable management systems and cable troughs shall be

in accordance with Technical Standard – Spatial arrangement [HS2-HS2-CV-STD-000-

000001].


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Cable management system in the open route shall comply with Technical Standard – Cable

Management [HS2-HS2-SY-STD-000-000002].


Cables and cable management systems in tunnels shall comply with Technical Standard –

Cable Management [HS2-HS2-SY-STD-000-000002].

Supporting Information : This standard also describes requirements for tunnel services supports. Further

information can be found in the document HRS08 Tunnel Services Fixing Report (HRS08-WSP-ME-REP-000-

000002). Cable management principles for cable routes between the tunnels and portal buildings for bored

tunnels are shown in drawing HRS08-WSP-ZC-DSC-000-000002 and for cut and cover tunnels in HRS08-

WSP-ZC-DSC-000-000003.

HS2 Technical Standard - Cable Management [HS2-HS2-SY-STD-000-000002] clauses 2.3.7, 2.3.8 and 2.3.9

provides requirements for the positioning of RF cabling within the tunnel. The contractor may propose

alternative values so long as both the functional demands of the system are met, and the spatial co-

ordination constraints are respected.


Cable management systems in stations, tunnel shafts and Portal buildings shall be in

accordance with Technical Standard – Shaft and Portal Building MWCC Interface [HS2-HS2-

CV-STD-000-000008].


Cable support systems in tunnels shall have a service life of not less than 40 years.


Cable brackets/support arms in tunnels shall have a service life of not less than 120 years.


Tunnel services shall not infringe upon the escape walkway.

3.2 Data Transmission Network (DTN)

The DTN is the comprehensive HS2 transmission system that has three main

components;

a) Fibre Optic Network (FON) which provides the physical transmission medium;

b) DTN equipment that utilises the FON to transport voice, data and video information

between locations along the HS2 alignment and also inter-site; and

c) network services offered by the DTN and other equipment connected to it.

The concept DTN system architecture is shown in the Data Transmission Network Level

2 Railway System Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000035] and Network

System Level 3 Railway System Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000036].


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The HS2 Data Transmission Network (DTN) consists of the following distinct and

separate networks:

a) DTN-Critical (DTN-C) - Security Zone 1;

b) DTN-Protected (DTN-P) - Security Zone 2; and

c) De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) - Security Zone 5.

The concept and security zoning is shown in the Network Security Zones Railway

Systems Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000039].

The DTN-C (Security Zone 1) is for the connection of operationally critical systems and

includes the following:

a) HV Power HV/LV SCADA;

b) EMS;

c) GSM-R;

d) CCS & TM (including Adhesion Management, Possession Management, RBC,

Interlocking, Trackside Objects,Object Controllers, Weather Monitoring and ATO);

e) M&E SCADA; and

f) Tunnel System SCADA.

The DTN-P (Security Zone 2) is for the connection of systems that are not considered

operationally critical for the safe operation and shutdown of the railway but are

considered vital for the day to day operation. The DTN-P systems include the following:

a) Physical Security Info Management (PSIM);

b) Video Surveillance System (VSS);

c) Intrusion Detection System (IDS);

d) Electronic Access Control System (EACS);

e) Infrastructure Monitoring;

f) Network Management System (NMS);

g) Security Information and Event Monitoring (SIEM);

h) Authentication Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) Services;

i) Dynamic Host Control (DHCP)/Domain Name System (DNS) Services;

j) Master Clock System;

k) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS); and


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l) Operational Telephone System.

The DMZ (Security Zone 5) is a physically and logically separate subnetwork containing

HS2's exposed, outward-facing services. It acts as the exposed point to any untrusted

networks such as cloud services or the internet.

At locations along the HS2 alignment the DTN interfaces to other sub-systems and

equipment provided as part of this contract, including but not limited to:

a) GSM-R Radio System;

b) HS2 Operational Telephone and Voice Recording System;

c) Electronic Security Systems (ESS);

d) Network Services;

e) Master Clock Systems;

f) Fireground Tunnel Radio System;

g) Cyber and Network Security Systems; and

h) Network Management Systems.

At locations along the HS2 alignment the DTN interfaces to other sub-systems and

equipment provided by others, including but not limited to:

a) Command Control and Signalling System (CCS);

b) Switches & Crossings (S&C) Control Units;

c) Engineering Management System (EMS);

d) HV Power SCADA System

e) M&E SCADA System

f) Tunnel control facilities (including tunnel ventilation) (Tunnel Systems SCADA);

g) Passenger Communications System (PCS);

h) Building Management System (BMS);

i) Customer Information System;

j) Public Address / Voice Alarm System (PA/PAVA);

k) Station Data Network (SDN); and

l) Station User Applications.


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[D01-OPSCOM-915] - Data Transmission Network (DTN)

The DTN shall support a minimum 12,500 end point devices which will be refined in line

with the DTN system design and traffic matrix.

Supporting Information : The Contractor is responsible for developing a detailed circuit matrix and network

traffic model during the design phase to model and evaluate network traffic for all connected systems and

applications. The Contractor shall liaise with other HS2 contractors and, where necessary, external

contractors to assess and collate the requirements of the individual interfaces and applications appropriate

to the DTN design.


DTN network services shall be sized to manage IP address allocations for a minimum of

28,500 devices which will be refined in line with the DTN system design.

Supporting Information : The Contractor is responsible for developing and managing an IP address schema

during the design phase to allocate and record all IP addresses for connected equipment and devices. The

Contractor shall liaise with other HS2 contractors and, where necessary, external contractors to assess and

collate the requirements of the individual interfaces and applications appropriate to the DTN design.


The DTN network shall as a minimum be based on four 10Gb core DTN rings.


The DTN shall be of a modular and non-blocking network architecture construction.


The DTN shall provide a transparent data bearer between Control Centres, passenger

stations, Railway Systems Compounds, Radio Mast Compounds, Depots, Tunnels, the

Systems Integration Facility (SIF) and lineside infrastructure.


The DTN shall ensure the integrity of safety critical communications is maintained for the

following systems as a minimum:

a) GSM-R for communication between trains and Network Rail / HS2 control centres;

b) Command, Control and Signalling (CCS);

c) Tunnel Telephones;

d) Tunnel Systems; and

e) HV Power SCADA.


The DTN shall provide high-availability and high-performance services required for safety

critical systems.


The DTN shall support point-to-point, point-to-multipoint and multipoint-to-multipoint

connectivity.

Supporting Information : Multi point to multi point i.e. campus wide distribution principle


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The DTN shall not store and/or modify data in any way.


The DTN shall provide a topology that ensures that the 'hop' count from end point to

service point is the lowest possible number.


The DTN shall take into account the distinct Configuration States, Test Areas and

subsequent HS2 phases.

Supporting Information : HS2 will be implemented with distinct configuration states and test areas which

will impact the design, installation and commissioning of the DTN in order to support project roll out and

provide access to a DTN service for other railway systems contracts. Further information on is captured in

the WI 0300 4.11 and WI 0700.


All hardware and software licences, equipment approvals and interconnection agreements

required for the DTN shall be provided.

Supporting Information : All licences, approvals and interconnection agreements are migrated to HS2

ownership upon system commissioning and formal handover.


The DTN shall provide secure redundant facilities for connection to Network Rail Telecoms

Fixed Transmission Network (NRT FTN/FTNx) for Global System for Mobile Communications

– Railway (GSM-R) and other shared services.

The connection to Network Rail Telecoms Fixed Transmission Network (NRT FTN/FTNx)

is proposed to be via duplicated fibre connections to the NR FTN/FTNx Point of Presence

(PoP) adjacent to the Washwood Heath Depot and Old Oak Common Station for Phase 1

and at Crewe Station for Phase 2A; suitably protected by appropriate cyber security

measures.

In order to comply with the HS2 network security zones architecture derived from the

HS2 Cyber security risk assessment it is envisaged that physically separate fibre

connections shall be required at each of these locations. The fibre connections shall be

for:

a) GSM-R to DTN-C;

b) Signalling and Telephony to DTN-P; and

c) LINX services to DMZ.


The DTN shall provide secure redundant facilities for connection to all external interfaces,

including but not limited to the following:

a) HS2 Business Systems;


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b) Train Operating Company (TOC) Systems;

c) Emergency Services Network (ESN);

d) Mobile Network Operators (MNO) for delivery of the HS2 Passenger Communication

System [PCS] and Wayside Data System (WDS);

e) Internet Service Providers (ISP) for external access;

f) British Transport Police (BTP);

g) Station Data Network(s) (SDN);

h) HS2 Federated Service Bus (FSB); and

i) any additional external interfaces identified.

3.2.1 DTN Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-932] - DTN Safety, Integrity and Availability

The DTN shall comply with the requirements of a BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 Category 2

network.

Supporting Information : BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020

Pr1 - The number of pieces of connectable equipment – either safety-related or not – to the transmission

system is known and fixed.

Pr2 - The characteristics of the transmission system are known and fixed.

Pr3 - The risk of unauthorised access to the transmission system shall be negligible


The DTN shall fully support any appropriate Safety Integrity Level (SIL) categorisation

requirements for connected systems.

Supporting Information : The DTN itself is not required to be SIL rated, but is required to support applications

and functions of connected systems up to SIL4 rated.


HS2 availability targets (see D01-OPSCOM-3101) shall be met by the DTN on-route network

without reliance on the tertiary route.


The functions of DTN responsible for routing Safety related data (including voice and SMS)

shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS

Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The DTN functions responsible for storing the IP addresses for Systems having DTN

Connectivity information shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN

50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-

088).


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The DTN functions responsible for allocating network access control for those systems

requiring safety critical data shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN


088).


The DTN functions responsible for applying network access security countermeasures for

those systems requiring safety critical data shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN


088).


The DTN functions responsible for providing a time reference for those systems requiring

safety critical data shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020

and UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The DTN functions responsible for determining the IP Address for those systems requiring

safety critical data shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020

and UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The DTN functions responsible for providing real-time DTN and ESS system status and fault

diagnostics shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and

UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The DTN functions responsible for performing the Authentication, Authorisation and

Accounting (AAA) shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and

UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


In the event of a failure of the DTN, the tertiary route shall be used for routing of priority

voice and data services.

Supporting Information : A list of priority voice and data services is to be proposed and agreed with HS2.

3.2.2 DTN Connectivity

[D01-OPSCOM-935] - DTN Connectivity

DTN devices shall be directly interconnected physically or logically by fibre or copper

connections.


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DTN devices shall be able to be configured for Layer 2 switching and Layer 3 routing

protocols.


The DTN shall have suitable optical and electrical patch panels at all HS2 DTN Point of

Presence (PoP) locations sized for the utilisation, connectivity requirements and 30%

contingency for scalability.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall undertake interface management with all other connected

subsystems in order to appropriately size all patch panels


The DTN for Phase 1 and 2a shall include provisions to accommodate connection of the

subsequent HS2 Phase 2b telecommunication networks.

Supporting Information : The HS2 Phase 1 DTN is expected to be scalable to become a fully integrated

system when further HS2 stages are commissioned. The connection allows data to be exchanged, across the

transmission networks between railway systems deployed for phase 1/2a and phase 2b.

3.2.3 DTN Core Network Capacity

[D01-OPSCOM-947] - DTN Core Network Capacity

The capacity of each DTN Point of Presence (PoP) shall be sufficient to carry the total traffic

generated by devices connected to that PoP.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall undertake interface management with all other connected

subsystems in order to establish the number of connected devices and their traffic requirements

3.2.4 DTN Point of Presence (PoP) Locations

[D01-OPSCOM-949] - DTN Point of Presence (PoP) Locations

The DTN shall provide a Point of Presence (PoP) at the following locations (as a minimum):

a) Stations;

b) NICC/Remote Tap-In Facility;

c) Washwood Heath Depot & ATO area;

d) IMD/IMB-R;

e) Railway System Compounds (containing ATS, ATFS, MPATS);

f) HV/LV Transformer sites (HV/LV);

g) Tunnel Portal buildings;

h) Tunnel Vent & Evacuation Shafts;

i) Tunnel Cross Passages;

j) Tunnel Cross Passageways;

k) Systems Integration Facility (SIF);

l) CCS Lab;

m) Lineside cabinets;

n) Switches & Crossings and complex lineside areas;

o) Pumping Stations

p) Radio Mast Compounds, and


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q) Rapid Deployment Sites (RDS).

Supporting Information : The number of sites and systems are listed below:

- Stations x 4;

- NICC/ Remote Tap-In Facility x 2;

- WWHRSD x 1

- IMD/IMB-R x 2;

- Railway Systems Compound (RSC) x 28;

- Auto Transformer Sites (ATS) x 49;

- Auto Transformer Feeder Site (ATFS) x 4;

- Mid-Point Auto Transformer Sites (MPATS) x 4;

- DNO/HS2 Interface x 10;

- HV/LV Sub-station (HV/LV) x 138;

- Tunnel Portal Sites x 48;

- Tunnel Portal Buildings x 22;

- Tunnel Vent & Evacuation Shaft Sites x 14;

- Tunnel Cross Passages in bored tunnels x 106;

- Tunnel Cross Passageways in cut and cover tunnels x 19;

- SIF x 1

- CCS Lab x 1

- Switches & Crossings (and complex lineside areas) x 28;

- Pumping Station (PSTN) x 5;

- Radio Mast Compounds x 40;

- Rapid Deployment Sites x 14;

The numbers are indicative and will be subject to change during the other contractors design phases.


At Washwood Heath Depot the DTN shall provide services to Washwood Heath Depot

Control Room, Equipment Room(s), HV Switching Station and the depot ATO area for

exchange of data and information between the depot and the mainline systems.


At Calvert IMD the DTN shall provide services in the Depot Equipment Room, the Depot

Control Room, the Incident Control Room and BTP office.


At Stone IMB-R the DTN shall provide services in the Depot Equipment Room and the

Depot Control Room.

3.2.5 DTN for the HS2 CCS Lab

[D01-OPSCOM-3297] - DTN for the HS2 CCS Lab

The DTN shall provide a Point of Presence (PoP) in the CCS Lab and provide services

between the CCS Lab, the NICC equipment room and the GSM-R network.

Supporting Information : See section 3.5.5 for further information.


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3.2.6 DTN in the System Integration Facility

[D01-OPSCOM-951] - DTN in the System Integration Facility

A representative copy DTN system for HS2, shall be provided within the HS2 System

Integration Facility.


The SIF DTN shall include representation of the connectivity including DTN-P, DTN-C, DTN-

DMZ.


The SIF DTN shall include representation of the network services including Master Clock,

AAA, DHCP and DNS.


The SIF DTN shall include Network Management System and Security Incident Event

Management monitoring systems.

3.2.7 DTN Reference Network

[D01-OPSCOM-955] - DTN Reference Network

A reference DTN test network for HS2, shall be provided and hosted by the DTN contractor

at their premises, for proving new services, configuration changes and software patches

prior to deployment in the operational network; this facility shall be transferred to HS2

post commissioning.

Supporting Information : This is anticipated to consist of a cross section of all DTN network element

equipment

3.2.8 DTN Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-957] - DTN Redundancy & Resilience

The DTN shall be fault-tolerant, load balanced and have a resilient topology that meets HS2

availability requirements (see D01-OPSCOM-3101).


The DTN shall employ software mechanisms to eliminate loops in a redundant-link network

by selectively disabling links (i.e. a self-healing network).

Supporting Information : Network loops shall be eliminated in order prohibit the possibility of broadcast

storms


The DTN design shall employ automatic software mechanisms to monitor failure of active

links.


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The software mechanisms shall reactivate any redundant links in order to restore the DTN

to full connectivity whilst also preserving a loop-free topology.


The DTN shall have no single points of failure (above the access layer) that can impact the

delivery of services across the network.

Supporting Information : The DTN is designed and configured so that there is no credible single point of

failure that can cause a system wide loss of DTN services. DTN failures at the access layer only impact of

services at within a single DTN PoP area.


The DTN shall be able to withstand multiple connectivity failures by routing traffic through

redundant physical/logical connections.


The DTN shall utilise a loop free logical topology using industry standard protocols or

acceptable proprietary derivations (where agreed by HS2), when using physical looped

connections.


The DTN equipment shall remain in operation, and the network shall automatically

reconverge, without the need for control by the NMS under fault conditions.

3.2.9 DTN Tertiary Route

[D01-OPSCOM-966] - DTN Tertiary Route

The DTN design shall allow for an off-route path to provide resilience for railway critical

operational data, referred to as the ‘Tertiary route’.

Supporting Information : This is to be provided under a separate agreement between HS2 and Network Rail

Telecom. The contractor is expected to liaise with this provider in order to agree physical interfaces and

services


The DTN design for the Tertiary route shall utilise a 10Gb single ‘Wavelength’ service

provided by NRT from its DWDM Network using PoPs adjacent to Washwood Heath Depot

and Old Oak Common Station for Phase 1 and Crewe Station for Phase2A .

Supporting Information : HS2 will contract directly with Network Rail Telecom to provide this connectivity

for use in the overall HRS20 DTN system.


The DTN Tertiary route shall include network security protection.

Supporting Information : The Tertiary route network security protection shall follow cyber security policies

and frameworks in section 3.2.17 DTN Network and Cyber Security requirements.


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3.2.10 DTN in Degraded Mode

[D01-OPSCOM-972] - DTN in Degraded Mode

Failures within DTN PoP shall not affect the overall service for systems that are connected

to them to such an extent that they cannot operate effectively.


Time synchronisation service from the HS2 Master Clock System shall continue to be made

available to the DTN equipment and all connected systems when DTN is operating in

degraded mode.


Traffic intended for a failed DTN PoP shall be routed onto an existing operational PoP, or

load balanced across the remaining operational PoPs.

3.2.11 DTN Scalability

[D01-OPSCOM-976] - DTN Scalability

DTN network equipment shall be sized with 30% contingency over the modelled network

demand for the first 5 years of operation.

Supporting Information : This anticipated connected headroom is not to be constrained by integration of

successive stages of HS2

[D01-OPSCOM-977] - DTN Scalability

The DTN shall have the capability to enable capacity to be increased on a temporary or a

permanent basis without affecting network or system performance.

3.2.12 DTN Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-979] - DTN Performance

DTN traffic prioritisation and Quality of Service (QoS) shall be able to be assigned for all

types of data irrespective of network demand.


The DTN shall guarantee the specific GSM-R QoS performance requirements to ensure that

it meets all appropriate NR and GSM-R supplier demands for the interface between the

Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) and the Base Station Controller (BSC). This shall include the

requirement for Abis over IP to transport the packetised equivalent of up to two E1 per

BTS.


GSM-R IPv4 traffic shall be 'tunnelled' through the DTN in order to ensure that there is no

impact on availability of GSM-R network IPv4 addresses.

Supporting Information : GSM-R uses IPv4 and therefore has a specific IP range. It is important to maintain

the integrity of the GSM-R / NR IP address scheme allocations and therefore a DTN tunnel is required.


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The DTN shall meet the following ‘end to end’ circuit performance requirements:

a) restoration times on failure of links or equipment shall be less than 20ms;

b) one-way packet delay shall be less than 1ms; and

c) Packet Loss (over a sampling period of 1 month) shall be less than 0.01%.


The DTN shall restore in a predetermined sequence when recovering from power failure,

such as:

a) restoration of the PoP communications;

b) restoration of network redundancy;

c) restoration of traffic connections; and

d) transmission of traffic as per configuration.

Supporting Information : The sequencing proposal to be agreed with HS2


Potential data storms shall be prevented upon initialisation of the DTN and following

restoration of service.


The DTN shall detect intermittent equipment failures in the system and, if necessary, shall

provide facilities to automatically disable network equipment or elements that cause this

condition to arise, on a permanent or temporary basis.


In order to guarantee the specific performance requirements for the Video Surveillance

System (VSS) the DTN shall ensure that the service requirements comply with British

Standard BS EN 62676-1-2 CLASS 4.

3.2.13 DTN Maintenance

[D01-OPSCOM-987] - DTN Maintenance

Hardware and software upgrades to DTN equipment shall be able to be made without

interrupting end system service.

3.2.14 DTN Obsolescence Management

[D01-OPSCOM-990] - DTN Obsolescence Management

DTN equipment shall be provided with industry standard interfaces in order to facilitate

compatible substitution at end of life.

3.2.15 DTN Clock Synchronisation

[D01-OPSCOM-992] - DTN Clock Synchronisation

An HS2 Master Clock System (HS2MCS) shall be provided to allow all DTN network attached

equipment to synchronise to the network time service synchronised to UTC.


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The HS2MCS shall provide network-wide clock synchronisation of systems and devices

using Precision Time Protocol (PTP) and Network Time Protocol (NTP).


The HS2MCS shall be PTP-compliant to IEEE1588 for the HS2 GSM-R sub system and any

other sub systems that require PTP.


All DTN equipment shall refer to the HS2 Master Clock System for time reference.


The HS2MCS shall provide a distributed time service on the DTN synchronised to Global

Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) as the reference clock source.


The HS2MCS shall be scalable and support the total number of requests from end point

devices and system services.


The HS2MCS equipment shall be capable of being distributed anywhere along the HS2

alignment.

Supporting Information : The Grandmaster clocks provided as part of the Master Clock System for PTP are

preferred to be located at manned HS2 locations


The HS2MCS shall provide clock synchronisation for normal, abnormal, degraded,

emergency and maintenance modes.

3.2.16 DTN Network Services

[D01-OPSCOM-1001] - DTN Network Services

The DTN shall employ both fixed and dynamic IP address allocation.


The DTN shall have Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) servers in order to provide IP

address allocation, and related network configuration, to all DHCP enabled network hosts.


The DTN shall have Domain Name Servers (DNS) in order to resolve domain names into IP

addresses.


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The DTN shall have an Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) System for user

authentication, host authentication and security policy enforcement on behalf of all HS2

contractors.


The Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) System shall be utilised for all HS2

operational systems and coordinated with other HS2 railway systems packages so that

designated role profiles and permissions are configured by this contract.


It shall be possible to create DTN access rights and privileges on a per-user/device basis.


Duplicated DTN Network Services equipment shall be provided at the NICC and at Old Oak

Common in order to provide continued network services in case of loss of equipment

functionality, or communications failure, with the equipment at the NICC.

3.2.17 DTN Network and Cyber Security

[D01-OPSCOM-1008] - DTN Network and Cyber Security

The DTN shall be compliant with the following Cyber Security policies, frameworks:

a) Network and Information Security (NIS) Regs 2018;

b) ISA IEC 62443 Industrial communication networks - IT security for networks and systems;

c) NIST Special Publication 800-82 – Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security; and

d) ISO/IEC 27000 Information security suite of standards.

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall liaise with HS2 Cyber Security team to confirm the

requirements applicable to the HS2 DTN.


The DTN shall comply with the requirements mandated in the Telecommunications

Security Bill 2020: Telecoms Security Requirements and any guidance issued by the UK

Government Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport.

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall liaise with DfT, DfDCMS to confirm the requirements

applicable to the HS2 DTN.


The DTN shall resist network attacks and be equipped with appropriate facilities for the

security of data, and protection from external and internal network threats.


A Security Information and Engineering Management (SIEM) system shall be provided for

threat intrusion/detection and to support security incident response through the real-time

collection and historical analysis of network security events.


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Duplicated DTN network security equipment shall be provided at the NICC and at Old Oak

Common for continued network security services in case of loss of equipment functionality,

or communications failure, with the NICC equipment.

Supporting Information : The NICC and OOC are expected to be the two locations on HS2 stage 1 where

duplicated equipment is accommodated

Data stream compatibility, encryption, and any other appropriate protection measures

will be applied by the end user of the DTN service, if required by their application safety

case, and is not the responsibility of the HRS20 Contractor.

A De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) sub-network exists to protect the DTN and DTN-connected

sub-systems that might be vulnerable to attack. These may also involve services that

extend to users outside of the DTN network, the most common examples being email

servers, web servers, proxy servers and DNS servers. Due to the increased potential for

attack, these servers are placed into the DMZ sub-network to help protect the rest of the

DTN and other DTN- connected networks and sub-systems from becoming

compromised.

The ultimate goal of the DMZ is to allow access to resources from untrusted networks

while keeping the DTN network secure.


A Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) network shall be provided as part of the DTN to function as a

sub-network containing HS2's exposed, outward-facing services and act as the exposed

point to external, 3rd party and any untrusted networks.

Supporting Information : The NICC and OOC are expected to be the two locations on HS2 Stage 1 where

duplicated DMZ equipment is to be accommodated.


The DMZ shall provide an additional layer of security to HS2's DTN and shall be structured

to protect any DTN-connected sub-system equipment or services that have connections

that face externally, while the rest of HS2's DTN resides behind firewalls.




The DMZ shall be sized and designed to accommodate any equipment or services that are

required by DTN-connected networks or sub-systems.




The DMZ shall manage duplex and/or unidirectional data flows to external or third party

systems without adversely affecting the continued safe and effective operation of those

DTN-connected networks and sub-systems.


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The DMZ sub-network shall accommodate equipment that provides services extending to

users outside of the DTN and connected networks.

Supporting Information : The DMZ sub-network shall accommodate equipment that provides services that

extend to users outside of the DTN and connected networks, the most common examples being email and

web servers. Because of the increased potential for attack any of these services that are deemed to be

required are to be placed in the DMZ sub-network in order to help protect the rest of the DTN and other DTN-

connected networks and sub-systems from potentially being compromised.

3.2.18 DTN IP/Ethernet PoP Equipment

[D01-OPSCOM-1015] - DTN IP/Ethernet PoP Equipment

The DTN equipment provided shall be Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), and suitable for

the application.


The DTN design shall ensure that appropriate physical interfaces are provided as part of

the DTN in order to allow all end point devices to be connected to it using either electrical

or optical Ethernet interfaces.


The DTN shall support operation with a wide range of end user interfaces for data

applications including all of the sub-system interfaces. The DTN shall support as a

minimum the following:

a) VLANs;

b) IP routing between subnets;

c) both IPv4 and IPv6;

d) multicast;

e) QoS;

f) provision of Power Over Ethernet (POE) to IEEE 802.3af and IEEE 802.3at, where required;

g) compatibility with NTP / PTP Timing Protocols;

h) compatibility with industry standard protocols required by supported sub-systems;

i) equipped with management facilities, accessible via the NMS; and

j) facilities for software updates.

3.2.19 DTN Gateways and Firewalls

[D01-OPSCOM-1019] - DTN Gateways and Firewalls

Secure network gateways shall be provided as part of the DTN.

Supporting Information : The network security zone concept shown in the Network Security Zones Railway

Systems Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000039].


DTN Gateways shall include 30% spare capacity for future provision.

Supporting Information : Gateways should be scalable to provide flexibility for future growth.


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DTN Gateways shall be monitored by the NMS/SIEM system for intrusion detection,

protection, configuration and reporting.


DTN Gateways shall provide segmentation of traffic routes.


The DTN shall have duplicated external Gateway equipment at the NICC and at Old Oak

Common in order to provide continued connectivity to external services in case of loss of

equipment functionality, or communications failure, with the equipment at the NICC.


The DTN De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) shall be protected by firewalls where appropriate.


The DTN shall be provided with firewalls that can separate subsystem data within the DTN.

All data shall be passed through them for packet inspection with minimal latency so that

the performance of connected systems is not adversely affected.


DTN Firewalls shall be provided at network edge locations in order to protect the DTN from

attack. All data shall be passed through them for packet inspection with minimal latency so

that the performance of connected systems is not adversely affected.


The DTN Firewalls shall be capable of being updated with the latest threat profiles provided

by the firewall provider.


The DTN Firewalls shall be capable of implementing updatable user-configurable rules

based upon the network requirements.


The DTN firewall architecture shall include 30% spare capacity for future provision.

Supporting Information : Firewall architecture should be scalable to provide flexibility for future growth.


DTN Firewalls shall block all unused software ports / unsecured traffic.


DTN hardware equipment shall utilise any additional firewall protection contained within it

and this firewall protection shall be compatible with other firewalls provided.


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Supporting Information : Some Edge device DTN equipment may have integrated firewall facilities that

should be enabled and utilised wherever possible to enhance protection


DTN Firewalls shall detect emerging threats through learning algorithms and provide an

alert to connected network management systems.

3.2.20 DTN Fibre Optic Network

[D01-OPSCOM-1038] - DTN Fibre Optic Network

The DTN Fibre Optic Network (FON) shall, as a minimum, provide connectivity between the

the following HS2 operational sites:

a) Stations;

b) NICC/Remote Tap-In Facility;

c) Washwood Heath Depot & ATO area;

d) IMD/IMB-R;

e) Railway System Compounds (containing ATS, ATFS, MPATS);

f) HV/LV Transformer sites (HV/LV);

g) Tunnel Portal buildings;

h) Tunnel Vent & Evacuation Shafts;

i) Tunnel Cross Passages;

j) Tunnel Cross Passageways;

k) Systems Integration Facility (SIF);

l) CCS Lab;

m) Lineside cabinets;

n) Switches & Crossings;

o) Pumping Stations;

p) Radio Mast Compounds;

q) Rapid Deployment Sites (RDS);

r) Infrastructure Monitoring devices; and

s) Inter-connection points with Network Rail


The Fibre Optic Network (FON) topology shall support the requirements and capacity needs

of the DTN.


Diversely routed cable paths shall be included in the FON design in order to mitigate the

effects of any potential cable failures.


The FON shall initially be based on 12 off, 96 core fibre optic cables (split 6 on each side of

the route) throughout the HS2 alignment including open sections, cuttings, embankments,

viaducts and tunnels and will be optimised through the design to meet HS2's overall

requirement.

Supporting Information : On each side of the route:


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- 4 of the 6 cables are for HS2 operational use (this contract Operational Communications Systems (HRS20)

and other HS2/railway systems applications described in D01-OPSCOM-1042), and

- 2 of the 6 cables for Third Party Telecommunications use (HRS21).

Space for additional fibre optic cables has been included in the CMS to accommodate DTN access network

and local fibre services as needed based on the design.


Dark fibres shall be provided within the FON to support applications requiring dark fibre

connections to the following as a minimum:

a) Operational Systems;

b) Auto Transformer Stations (ATS) and Low Voltage Distribution Points (LVDP);

c) Rail Acoustic Emissions Sensors;

d) GSM-R (in tunnels);

e) Emergency Service Network (ESN);

f) Fireground (in tunnels);

g) Network Rail;

h) Tunnel Vent SCADA (in tunnel cross passages);

i) Station Connectivity;

j) Inter-Station Data Network;

k) HS2 Business systems;

l) IT Services Network for Train Operating Company (TOC);

m) Other HS2 Maintenance Services or organisations;

n) Passenger Communications System (PCS);

o) Emergency Service Network (ESN);

p) Airwave (TETRA) Radio;

q) Non-Rail Communications (e.g. backhaul for rural broadband); and

r) Future HS2 phases (from the NICC to Phase 2b interface).


The FON shall be dimensioned to include 30% spare capacity for future provision.


The FON shall be optimised to allow for a logical and standardised fibre configuration

minimising where practicable the number fibre cables required to support the system.


The fibre cables for HRS21 Third Party Telecommunications contract are to be made

accessible for external connection at Rail Systems Compounds (RSCs), Radio Mast

Compounds, tunnel portal buildings, tunnel vent shafts and stations.

Supporting Information : Two x 96 Fibre cables are provided by HRS20 for HRS21 use. The design,

configuration and implementation of these cables needs to reflect HRS21's requirements. Connections at

Rapid Deployment Sites is for HRS21 C-RAN connectivity only.


The fibre cables for HRS21 Third Party Telecommunications contract shall be terminated in

separate cabinets containing optical termination enclosures.


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The fibre cables for HRS21 Third Party Telecommunications contract shall reflect HRS21's

Centralised Radio Access Network (C-RAN) design providing connectivity between

centralised Digital Modules (DM) and Remote Radio Heads (RRH) in open route and tunnel

sections.

Supporting Information : The HRS20 contractor will co-ordinate the FON design and configuration with the

HRS21 contractor's C-RAN design as it is developed during their design phase.


All fibre cables supplied for the FON shall comply with the mechanical and environmental

characteristics requirements below:

a) Tensile Strength: IEC 60794-1-2 Method E1;

b) Crush Resistance: IEC 60794-1-2 Method E3;

c) Impact Resistance: IEC 60794-1-2 Method E4;

d) Torsion: IEC 60794-1-2 Method E7;

e) Cable Bend: IEC 60794-1-2 Method E11A;

f) Water Penetration: IEC 60794-1-2 Method F5B; and

g) Temperature Cycling: IEC 60794-1-2 Method F1.


All fibre cables supplied for the FON shall be Low Smoke Zero Halogen (LSZH) for sub-

surface use including through and in stations and tunnel sections.


Where FON fibre cables are metal armoured, the cables shall be sheath gapped at required

intervals and single bonded to the earthing pillar as specified in the Earthing & Bonding

Specification Module 6 – Train Control and Detection Systems and Lineside

Telecommunications Systems [HS2-HS2-SY-SPE-000-000008].


Where FON cables are metal armoured, the armouring shall be bonded to the earthing bar

at the point of entering a building.

Supporting Information : Also refer to Earthing and Bonding requirements (see D01-OPSCOM-120).


All FON cables supplied shall be labelled in accordance with HS2 Asset Labelling standard

[HS2-HS2-IM-STD-000-000004] including at the end of each cable and on either side of an

undertrack crossing or where it passes through a structure such as a wall.


The FON Optical Link Performance shall comply with ISO/IEC 11801.


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The Optical budget of the longest end-to-end connections shall take account of potential

maintenance activities such as jointing and repair of damaged cables throughout the

lifetime of HS2.

3.2.21 DTN Supporting Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS) Devices

HS2 has a requirement to remotely monitor a significant number of their civils assets,

which includes overbridges, underbridge and viaducts. To deliver this functionality the

Main Works Civils Contractors (MWCC) will deploy sensors at approximately 405

locations along the HS2 Phase 1 line of route.

The DTN provides LV power and fibre optic cabling from the nearest DTN PoP (located in

compounds or trackside cabinets, approximately 136 PoPs) to the 405 structure sensor

locations. This is estimated to require:

- 1655Km of armoured LV power cabling, and

- 1092Km of armoured fibre optic cabling.

The sensor distribution is such that between 1 to a maximum of 13 sensors may require

connection to a single DTN PoP. At the 405 sensor locations the MWCC will supply a

small equipment cabinet and base (assumed to be 600mm x 600mm x 300mm deep),

the sensor and local cabling between the sensor and small equipment cabinet.

[D01-OPSCOM-1583] - DTN Supporting Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS)

Devices

The DTN shall provide connectivity to HS2 Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS)

devices at trackside locations through the provision of fibre and LV power cabling from the

DTN PoP to the civils structures.

Supporting Information : The civils Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS) is being developed by HS2's

Main Works Civils Contractors (MWCC) to the requirements in Technical Standard – Civil Engineering

Instrumentation and Monitoring’ [HS2-HS2-CV-STD-000-000004].

3.3 Operational Telecommunications Management Platforms

The Integrated Management Platform is a collective name for a management systems

that includes the individual management systems for the DTN (the Network

Management System), the Operation Telephone System (the Operational Telephone

System Management System), the Voice Recording System (the Voice Recording

Management System) and the Fireground Radio System (Fireground Radio Management

System).

Separate applications for the monitoring, provisioning and management of each

individual subsystem are expected to be an acceptable solution.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1057] - Operational Telecommunications Management Platforms

An Integrated Management Platform (IMP) shall be provided for the management,

operation and health monitoring of DTN, Operational Telephone (including SIP servers) and

Fireground Radio Systems.

Supporting Information : Separate applications for the monitoring and management of each individual

subsystem are expected to be an acceptable solution.


Configuration and layout of IMP GUI screens shall be formally agreed with HS2

Maintenance during detailed design.


The IMP through the timely prioritisation and presentation of system alarms to the system

user shall enable HS2 to achieve and report on availability targets (see chapter 6).


The IMP equipment shall be provided at the Washwood Heath NICC and Old Oak Common

Station.

Supporting Information : IMP to be provided on managed physical or virtualised equipment within HS2.


The IMP shall comply with the HS2 Alarm Management Philosophy [HS2-HS2-HF-STR-000-

000003].


The IMP shall monitor and log all alarms from operational telecommunication systems and

their management applications.


All alarms are to be timestamped with reference to the HS2 master clock.


All IMP terminals shall be provided at Washwood Heath NICC, Calvert Depot and Stone

Depot with user access secured by the AAA System.


All IMP terminals shall be resistant to liquid spills, cleaning chemicals and solvents which

could be reasonably be expected to be present in the locations in which they are to be

installed.


The IMP and Operational Telecommunications Management Systems shall ensure it is not

possible for users to amend, edit or delete stored data retained for evidentiary and record

management purposes.


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Supporting Information : The ability to delete marked data is restricted to the highest user access permissions

levels only such as system administrator.


The IMP shall support multiple user profiles with profile-specific security permissions for

facilities within it.


The IMP shall provide web browser functionality in order to allow authorised and secure

remote read only web page access and remote status interrogation from the Engineering

Management System (EMS) provided by others.


A means of playback of captured data and alarms shall be provided by the Operational

Telecommunications Systems and their associated management applications.


All systems management platform software and hardware licences for the Operational

Telecommunications and Security Systems shall be provided.

Supporting Information : Where ongoing licensing arrangements need to be included within OEM/Support

agreements the contractor will advise HS2 at the earliest opportunity so that necessary arrangements can be

made.

3.3.1 DTN Network Management

[D01-OPSCOM-1065] - DTN Network Management

The status of the DTN shall be monitored and logged by a Network Management System

(NMS).


The NMS shall provide alarms for all network elements of the DTN.


The NMS shall provide network-wide management facilities, fault management,

configuration management, performance management and security management of the

entire DTN System including IP compatible HRS20 devices attached to it.


The NMS shall provide for inclusion, removal and configuration of network PoPs.


The NMS shall provide for the configuration of traffic parameters, including allocation of

QoS for data streams.


The NMS shall be capable of remotely re-initialising or resetting network elements.


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Supporting Information : On the proviso that processes are in place that ensures that the HS2 system is in a

known “safe state” before the DTN is remotely re-initialising.


The NMS shall automatically discover and provide alerts for all new DTN PoPs and HRS20

end point devices but shall not be responsible for any non-HRS20 end point devices.


The NMS shall support web-browser functionality.


Facilities for manually and automatically archiving NMS records over a rolling 12-month

period shall be provided.


The NMS shall allow the status of DTN equipment and connected systems to be

interrogated using appropriate industry standard network management protocols.


The NMS shall allow DTN equipment to be reset to an initial start-up configuration agreed

with HS2.


The NMS shall be capable of producing reports on network performance, availability and

health, both at individual service level and at network service level, using both 'live' and

historical data.


The NMS shall allow DTN equipment self-test functions to be initiated and subsequently

reported on.


An alarm shall be generated on the EMS if the NMS loses communication with the DTN.


The NMS shall provide alerts to the EMS in the event of performance degradation to

thresholds agreed with HS2 during detailed design.


An interface from the HS2 NMS to the EMS shall present:

a) Servicing Affecting faults (major);

b) Critical Faults; and

c) Network Security alerts.

Supporting Information : The NMS interface with the EMS provides information to support the HS2 fault

management process, workflows and service ticketing for maintenance operations.


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Alarm reporting from the NMS to the EMS shall be configurable by the NMS.


The NMS shall support the export of DTN events and alarms to the HS2 Federated Data

Bus for use by the HS2 Asset Information Management System (AIMS).


The NMS shall interface with the HS2 Federated Data Bus for the exchange of information

regarding serial numbers of equipment and historical performance data held by AIMS.

3.3.1.1 DTN Configuration Management

[D01-OPSCOM-1087] - DTN Configuration Management

DTN equipment configuration shall be stored in a centralised Configuration Management

Database (CMDB) within IMP.


The IMP shall provide network configuration information and facilities for backup and

restoration of remote equipment configurations.


It shall be possible to export and regularly backup these CMDB configurations to an

external storage system.


All equipment configurations shall be able to be restored based upon the configurations

stored in the CMDB.

3.3.2 Operational Telephone Management System

[D01-OPSCOM-1092] - Operational Telephone Management System

An Operational Telephone Management System shall be provided, and integrated with the

IMP, to manage the HS2 Operational Telephone System (including SIP servers).


The Operational Telephone Management System shall support web-browser functionality.


The HS2 Operational Telephone Management System shall have an interface to the EMS

for critical alarms


The HS2 Operational Telephone Management System shall have an interface to the

Federated Data Bus for maintenance reporting in AIMS.


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3.3.3 Fireground Remote Management System

[D01-OPSCOM-1097] - Fireground Remote Management System

A Fireground Monitoring System shall be provided and integrated with the IMP in order to

monitor the operational health and status of the Fireground System installed in tunnels.


An interface shall be provided between the HS2 Fireground Monitoring System and the

EMS in order to present any critical Fireground System alarms.


The Fireground Monitoring System shall also be able to select each tunnel individually and

remotely switch the system between analogue and digital modes of operation with an

indication on the GUI confirming the mode of operation.

3.3.4 Voice Recording Management System

[D01-OPSCOM-1101] - Voice Recording Management System

A Voice Recording Management System (VRMS) shall be provided, integrated with the IMP,

to manage the HS2 Voice Recording System.


The VRMS shall provide remote interrogation of all individual voice recorders, via the DTN.


The VRMS functions shall be available to individual users by logon authorisations and

permissions.


The VRMS shall record logon access and this is time/date stamped by the system.


The VRMS shall support web-browser functionality in addition to any applications specific

to the operation of the HS2 Voice Recording System.


The VRMS shall store alarms in the database for future analysis for a minimum period of 24

months.


All HS2 Voice Recording System equipment alarms and status shall be shown on the VRMS

terminal(s).


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An interface from the HS2 Voice Recording Management System to the EMS shall be

provided for critical alarms


An interface from the HS2 Voice Recording Management System to the Federated Data Bus

shall be provided for maintenance reporting in AIMS.

3.3.5 Operational Telecommunications Integrated Management Terminals

[D01-OPSCOM-1112] - Operational Telecommunications Integrated Management

Terminals

Terminals shall be provided in the Diagnostics and Technical Support (DATS) room to

access the Integrated Management Platform (IMP).


Terminals

The IMP terminals in the DATS room shall be configured and equipment/end user devices

laid out to comply with the HS2's Ergonomic requirements (see D01-OPSCOM-118).

For the purposes of the contract the Contractor should assume that two positions have

been space provisioned in the DATS room each with desks measuring approximately

152cm by 76cm to host all Operational Communications Systems management

terminals, screens, devices and operational telephone handset. For space allocation

purposes it has been assumed that one desk is for operational telecommunications

systems (including an NRT GSM-R terminal) and the second desk is for the electronic

security systems. Furniture in the room including desks and chairs are provided by

others.


Terminals

The configuration and layout of the IMP terminals in the DATS room shall incorporate the

GSM-R Monitoring terminal to be provided by Network Rail.


Terminals

The IMP terminals shall integrate with the HS2 AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and

Accounting) system to enable each operator’s details to be fully synchronised.


Terminals

User access to the IMP shall be restricted using a unique username and password.


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Terminals

The IMP shall allow configuration of password requirements in line with HS2 policies.

3.4 Operational Telephone System

The HS2 Operational Telephone System provides an integrated, route wide, telephone

communications system at key infrastructure locations to support the operation and

maintenance requirements of HS2.

Telephone devices will be suitable for the environment that is likely to be encountered

at the locations they are provided and shall allow HS2 operations and maintenance staff

to communicate with each other, the NICC and externally, subject to any call-barring or

restrictions.

Designated calls made on the Operational Telephone System will be recorded on a

dedicated Voice Recording System and the system itself will be managed from an

Operational Telephone Management System application run on the Integrated

Management Platform located in the DATS Room at the NICC.

The concept Operational Telephone System is shown in the Operational Telephone

System Level 2 Railway System Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000032].

[D01-OPSCOM-1117] - Operational Telephone System

A fully integrated HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be supplied in order to provide

secure operational voice communications between HS2 locations and to locations external

to the railway.


The HS2 Operational Telephone system shall be based on Voice-Over-IP (VOIP) technology.


The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be connected to the Public Switched

Telephone Network (PSTN).


The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be able to extend calls to and receive calls

from locations external to HS2.


The OTS shall deliver the fixed line communication requirement specified in the Safety in

Railway Tunnels NTSN.


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3.4.1 Operational Telephone System Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3216] - Operational Telephone System Safety, Integrity and Availability

The fallback phones located in the NICC and the RTIF shall be available to be used in the

event of a failure of the Operational telephone System.

Supporting Information : The contractor for HRS20 provides fallback phones (see D01-OPSCOM-1190).


In the event of a failure of the Operational Telephone System (OTS) alternative methods of

communictaion shall be available.

Supporting Information : This may include use of fallback phones and/or mobile phones.


In the event of loss of the Operational Telephone System (OTS), GSM-R voice or the Public

Mobile Network shall be used.


The OTS functions responsible for initiating and routing voice calls shall have a minimum of

"Basic Integrity" in accordance with BS EN 50128.


The OTS functions responsible for providing OTS real-time system status and fault

diagnostics shall have a minimum of "Basic Integrity" in accordance with BS EN 50128.

3.4.2 Operational Telephone System Equipment

[D01-OPSCOM-1122] - Operational Telephone System Equipment

Telephone instruments shall be supplied and installed within each site and physically

connected, directly or indirectly, to the local DTN PoP using the appropriate site network

infrastructure.


The Operational Telephone system shall be sized for the following equipment and end

devices:

a) 1600 end devices across the Line-of-Route (Inc NICC, Depots, Railways Systems

Compounds, Tunnel Telephones, Radio Mast Compounds etc)

b) 430 end devices at Euston Station;

c) 605 end devices at Old Oak Common Station;

d) 185 end devices at Birmingham Interchange;

e) 400 end devices at Curzon Street Station; and

f) SIP Servers at the NICC and the four Phase 1 Stations.


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A quantification exercise shall be performed to estimate the number of telephone

instruments required as part of the detailed design.

Supporting Information : This will require the contractor to liaise with other contractors for areas including

depots, stations, tunnels and railway systems compounds to establish the quantity of telephone instruments

required at all HS2 locations.


All hardware and software licenses, approvals and interconnection agreements required

for the installation and operation of the HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be

provided.


All telephone instruments for use within tunnel areas shall be suitable for the aerodynamic

effects for line speed of 360kph and the tunnel environment (see D01-OPSCOM-3043).


Telephone instruments for use within tunnel areas shall be provided with labelling and

signage to GI/RT7033 - Lineside Operational Safety Signs.


Handsets shall be provided within all operational areas at the NICC that require operational

telephones including in the operator training suite. This is for communication or simulation

of the Operational Railway.


Specific types of telephone instrument necessary for every location shall be identified,

these will include:

a) full feature units;

b) keypad only (office environment);

c) keypad (tunnel environment);

d) single button or lift to auto-dial (tunnel and Fire Fighters mimic panel);

e) Intercom;

f) HMI;

g) Any additional types identified.


Telephone instruments shall be provided in tunnels at locations including:

a) At cross passage doors within the running tunnel;

b) Muster points in evacuation shafts (at tunnel and ground level);

c) Tunnel portals;

d) Incident control points;

e) Vent System Status Panel; and

e) Fire Fighters Mimic panels.


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Supporting Information : The Contractor shall liaise with the tunnel contractor and Fire services during the

detailed design stage to agree telephone instrument locations.

The telephones in running tunnels at cross passage doors provide fixed line voice communications capability

aligned with the requirements stated in the NTSN for Safety in Railway Tunnels.


Configurable HMI operator terminals shall be provided in the NICC, Stations, WWH Depot

and the Remote Tap-In Facility to facilitate call management and call handling.


The HMI operator terminal screens shall be configurable so that the design layout, icons

and colours meet the ergonomics and user requirements (see D01-OPSCOM-2495).


The capacity assessment shall detail the normal, abnormal, degraded, emergency and

maintenance mode requirements for the HS2 Operational Telephone System.


Telephones located adjacent to the fire fighters mimic panels in the tunnel evacuation

shafts shall have a probability of failure of demand not lower than that of the tunnel

ventilation system (A PFD of 0.01 for a low demand system).

3.4.3 Operational Telephone System Hardware and Software Requirements

[D01-OPSCOM-1138] - Operational Telephone System Hardware and Software

Requirements

The HS2 Operational Telephone System (including Voice Recording) software and firmware

shall be capable of being upgraded without causing a loss of service, or interrupting system

functionality/performance.

[D01-OPSCOM-1139] - Operational Telephone System Hardware and Software

Requirements

The HS2 Operational Telephone System (including Voice Recording) shall be designed so

that, upon power failure, all programming data will be retained in non-volatile memory.

3.4.4 Operational Telephone System Expandability & Scalability

[D01-OPSCOM-1141] - Operational Telephone System Expandability & Scalability

The HS2 Operational Telephone System (including Voice Recording) shall provide 30%

spare capacity provision for future requirements.

Supporting Information : The assessment of system spare capacity should consider bandwidth, traffic type,

number of users, sessions, ports and VLANs, etc, whilst maintaining throughput, Quality of Service and

security.


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The design, site installation and commissioning of the HS2 Operational Telephone System

(including Voice Recording) shall consider the requirements for additional phases of HS2

and include as a passive provision.


The distinct commissioning stages of bringing HS2 into operation shall be considered

within the design of the HS2 Operational Telephone System (including Voice Recording);

including the operation and integration of this within the HMI facilities, for system

operation, monitoring and playback.

3.4.5 Operational Telephone System Degraded Modes

[D01-OPSCOM-1146] - Operational Telephone System Degraded Modes

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall demonstrate that communication between

telephone instruments at HS2 sites shall be possible even in the event of DTN

communications failure between sites.

[D01-OPSCOM-1147] - Operational Telephone System Degraded Modes

Enhanced-feature telephone instruments for operators in Control Rooms shall be provided

for fallback operation in the event of any Voice Communications and Information

Workstation failure.

3.4.6 Operational Telephone System Functional Requirements

3.4.6.1 Operation

[D01-OPSCOM-1150] - Operation

All equipment provided as part of the HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be type-

approved for all mandatory regulatory requirements and for connection to UK PSTN.

[D01-OPSCOM-1151] - Operation

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall support the capability of Direct/Hot lines to:

a) National Grid;

b) Direct Network Operators (DNO);

c) NR neighbouring Rail Operating Centres (ROC) and Electrical Control Rooms (ECR);

d) Emergency Response Organisations; and

e) Priority voice communications from the NICC to:-

- Station Operations Rooms (SOR),

- Infrastructure Maintenance Depots (IMD), and

- Rolling Stock Maintenance Depots.

3.4.6.2 Quality & Level of Service

[D01-OPSCOM-1153] - Quality & Level of Service

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be able to assign levels of service to users


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The Operational Telephone system shall provide facilities to implement call-type

restrictions for designated telephone instruments


Call-barring shall be possible for individual users, class of users and locations including

incoming and outgoing calls, for national and international call and premium rate numbers.

3.4.6.3 Call Handling

[D01-OPSCOM-1157] - Call Handling

Automatic dialling facilities shall be provided for certain specific communication paths, to

be agreed with HS2 at the detailed design stage.


Call handling facilities shall be provided that shall include, as a minimum, the following

features where required:

a) Call queuing in order of call arrival;

b) Incoming call answering;

c) Call Hold and Call Park;

d) Call Termination;

e) Call Transfer to the recipient via the external systems accessible to the HS2 Operational

Telephone System;

f) Display of Call Line Identity;

g) Call conferencing;

h) Display and scrolling through the telephone directory.


The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall provide facilities to:

a) Make and receive incoming and outgoing calls;

b) Route calls based on the selection of a destination by entering an extension number;

and

c) Handle various forms of number dialling including short-code and preconfigured single

button dialling.


The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall provide facilities to ensure that the routing of

calls to the HS2 TMS Controllers is configurable based on agreed fixed zones associated

with the Area of Control (AoC) allocated to each Controllers workstation.

Supporting Information : The functionality delivered to achieve correct call routing to the TMS Controller

based on AoC allocations, must be able to accommodate adding additional AoCs needed for later stages of

HS2.

The indicative areas of control for Phase 1 and 2a are as follows:

1. Euston Station area,

2. Euston Tunnel area,

3. Old Oak Common Station area,


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4. Northholt Tunnel to Stoke Mandeville

5. Stoke Mandeville to Balsall Common Viaduct

6. Birmingham Interchange Station area,

7. Delta Junction area,

8. Birmingham Spur Line,

9. Washwood Heath Depot,

10. Curzon Street Station area,

11. Delta Junction to Handsacre Junction,

12. Streethay Junction to Stone IMB-R, and

13. Stone IMB-R to South Crewe Junction.


Full duplex communications shall be provided by the HS2 Operational Telephone System.


DDI facilities shall be provided between the HS2 Operational Telephone System and the

PSTN.


Emergency calls shall have the following features:

a) No busy tone;

b) Priority override;

c) Auto conferencing;

d) Priority queuing where multiple emergency calls received.


All keypad dial phones shall be able to dial emergency numbers directly.


Emergency calls shall be allocated the highest priority and routed immediately to their

intended destination irrespective of the network load conditions.


A HS2-wide incident number shall be implemented to route calls to a designated controller

(or Shift Manager), in the NICC/Remote Tap-In Facility, in the event of an incident on HS2.

The incoming calls shall be announced, queued and handled on the Voice Comms and

Information Workstations in accordance with HS2 requirements.


Time out for calls receiving ring tone and no reply on internal and DDI calls shall be

configurable up to 20 minutes.


It shall be possible to prioritise all types of call depending upon user-defined requirements

to be developed at the detailed design stage.


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3.4.6.4 Operational Telephone System Supplementary Services and Facilities

[D01-OPSCOM-1174] - Operational Telephone System Supplementary Services and

Facilities

A full back-up of all Operational Telephone System voice data shall be provided for a

minimum of 31 days.


Facilities

A Phonebook Management facility shall be provided in order to manage HS2 Operational

Telephone System contacts.


Facilities

The Unified Messaging Facility shall be provided for the integration of different forms of

communication media.

Supporting Information : Different communication media to be integrated may include SMS, messaging and

voicemail.


Facilities

A Computer Telephone Integration (CTI) shall be provided as part of the Operational

Telephone System including Interactive Voice Response and Unified Messaging facilities.

The extent of CTI is to be agreed with HS2 at the detailed design stage.


Facilities

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall provide for a softphone CTI for integration

with HS2 systems delivered by other contracts to facilitate softphone functions on the HMI.


Facilities

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall ensure that the HMI softphone subscriptions

are configured and programmed to deliver the required functionality.

Supporting Information : HMI softphone functionality is to be developed in the design phase with HS2

Operations.


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3.4.7 Operational Telephone System Additional Interface Requirements

3.4.7.1 Operational Telephone System Interface to Master Clock

[D01-OPSCOM-1178] - Operational Telephone System Interface to Master Clock

An interface shall be provided with the Master Clock System which shall enable date and

time stamping of events, faults and calls; and the display of date and time on any

telephone instruments screen.

3.4.7.2 Operational Telephone System Interface to Voice Recording System

[D01-OPSCOM-1180] - Operational Telephone System Interface to Voice Recording

System

An interface with the Voice Recording System shall be provided to enable the recording and

logging of all incoming and outgoing calls.

Supporting Information : See Voice Recording System requirements for additional information (section 3.4.9).

3.4.7.3 Operational Telephone System Interface to DTN

[D01-OPSCOM-1183] - Operational Telephone System Interface to DTN

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be compatible with the services provided by

the DTN, these shall include at a minimum:

a) DNS;

b) DHCP;

c) NTP;

d) VLAN;

e) POE; and

f) IPv4 / IPv6 numbering (in accordance with HS2 IP Schema).

3.4.7.4 Operational Telephone System Interfaces with Other Networks

[D01-OPSCOM-1190] - Operational Telephone System Interfaces with Other Networks

The NICC/Remote Tap-In facility Control Rooms shall be equipped with a connection from

dedicated telephone instruments to the PSTN for fallback in case of equipment failure.

3.4.7.5 Operational Telephone System Interface to Tunnel Public Address Voice Alarm

[D01-OPSCOM-1193] - Operational Telephone System Interface to Tunnel Public

Address Voice Alarm

The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall have an interface to the Tunnel PAVA paging

systems to facilitate remote live and recorded broadcasts to specific tunnel areas.

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall liaise with the tunnel contractor in order to define the interface

requirement of the Tunnel PAVA system.


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3.4.8 Operational Telephone System Communications Protocols

[D01-OPSCOM-1195] - Operational Telephone System Communications Protocols

The Operational Telephone System shall support open protocols.


Any software associated with the operation and control of HS2 Operational Telephone

System equipment shall have been implemented and verified in similar project

environments.


All voice codecs and PSTN connections utilised shall be of a standard design and compliant

with ITU-T Recommendations.


The HS2 Operational Telephone System shall be upgradable to the latest version of ITU-T

protocols by updating the software.


The core software application shall not require any development to meet the

requirements.


Software maintenance and software upgrades/updates/configuration shall be able to be

carried out over the DTN and shall not require the Operational Telephone System to be

taken out of operation.

3.4.9 Operational Telephone Voice Recording System

3.4.9.1 Voice Recording System General Requirements

[D01-OPSCOM-1204] - Voice Recording System General Requirements

An HS2 Voice Recording System shall be provided in order to record designated

operational and training simulation voice communications for post-event analysis.

[D01-OPSCOM-1214] - Voice Recording System General Requirements

The Voice Recording System's time shall be synchronised to the time source from the HS2

Master Clock System.

3.4.9.2 Voice Recording System Sub-System Architecture

[D01-OPSCOM-1206] - Voice Recording System Sub-System Architecture

The HS2 Voice Recording System equipment shall be capable of operating in Load-sharing

or Standby-mode.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1207] - Voice Recording System Sub-System Architecture

The HS2 Voice Recording System architecture shall provide resilience in case of DTN

communications failure and shall maintain recording of designated voice conversations

within all zones.

3.4.9.3 Voice Recording System Performance Requirements

3.4.9.3.1 Voice Recording System Capacity

[D01-OPSCOM-1210] - Voice Recording System Capacity

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall provide call logging, audio recording and archiving

facilities for the storage of voice recordings from control room operators and other

designated telephone instruments covering the previous 31 days.

[D01-OPSCOM-1211] - Voice Recording System Capacity

The Voice Recording System shall provide 30% spare capacity provision for future

requirements.

3.4.9.3.2 Voice Recording System Response Times

[D01-OPSCOM-1213] - Voice Recording System Response Times

The recording of all selected voice calls shall be initiated by the HS2 Voice Recording

System immediately upon detection of successful call set-up and answer.

[D01-OPSCOM-3324] - Voice Recording System Response Times

All recorded voice calls shall be of UK evidential quality, time and date stamped.

3.4.9.3.3 Voice Recording System Hardware Requirement

[D01-OPSCOM-1217] - Voice Recording System Hardware Requirement

All designated voice calls shall be recorded for the full duration of the call.


The HS2 Voice Recording System media shall be on hot-swappable removable drives

suitable for continual read/write operation.


The HS2 Voice Recording System shall be designed to allow future advances in compatible

archiving technology to be readily incorporated.

3.4.9.3.4 Voice Recording System Security & Confidentiality

[D01-OPSCOM-1221] - Voice Recording System Security & Confidentiality

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall ensure the security of data and protection from

external network sources.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1222] - Voice Recording System Security & Confidentiality

Locking facilities shall be provided for the HS2 Voice Recording System to prevent

unauthorised physical access to the recorders.

3.4.9.4 Voice Recording System Functional Requirements

3.4.9.4.1 Voice Recording System Operation

[D01-OPSCOM-1226] - Voice Recording System Operation

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall record and log the following as a minimum:

a) All Operator Control Room calls;

b) All Fire Fighters Mimic Panel Telephones;

c) All tunnel PAVA announcements;

d) All Incident Control Room Telephones; and

e) All Training Suite calls.

3.4.9.4.2 Voice Recording System Search, Playback and Analysis

[D01-OPSCOM-1228] - Voice Recording System Search, Playback and Analysis

A dedicated Voice Recording System HMI shall be provided within the NICC (location to be

agreed with HS2) to access all voice recorders networked via the DTN for monitoring,

search, playback and analysis of all conversations recorded by the system.


The HS2 Voice Recording System shall provide a playback application on the HS2

Operational Shift Manager's workstation in the NICC Control Room and Remote Tap-In

Facility for monitoring, search, playback and analysis of selected calls.


The HS2 Voice Recording System HMI shall be equipped with a volume control and privacy

headset for the monitoring and playback of recordings.


The HS2 Voice Recording System HMI operator shall be able to copy and archive all, or

selected, voice recordings to a removable high capacity media device, subject to

operational procedures.


Off-loaded recordings for archiving or use by HS2 shall be physically stored in a tamper-

proof arrangement, and that a digital certificate is provided for the time stamp to meet all

requirements for post-incident investigation.


The HS2 Voice Recording System application shall have Operator selectable functions that

provide the facility to:

a) View the call log;

b) Listen to recorded calls;


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c) Play, pause, stop, fast forward, rewind, skip forward, skip reverse;

d) Playback single or multiple calls simultaneously;

e) Fast search based on items including, but not limited to, channel number, incoming

number, outgoing number, call type, source, date and time;

f) Replay the same recorded file on a continuous basis until stopped by the Operator;

g) Playback stored and archived recordings without affecting the normal recording process;

h) Enable playback to be listened to simultaneously by up to four additional local or remote

operators;

i) Live monitor a channel on a selective basis;

j) ’Bookmark’ a call for later searches; and

k) Select the recording mode.

3.4.9.4.3 Voice Recording System Call Logging

[D01-OPSCOM-1235] - Voice Recording System Call Logging

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall be equipped with a call logging facility with details of

the following as a minimum:

a) Call initiator (number and location);

b) Call recipient (number and location);

c) Call type;

d) Time, date and duration of the call; and

e) Field for operator insertion of notes in real-time.

[D01-OPSCOM-1236] - Voice Recording System Call Logging

A call logging system shall be provided that can provide the following at a minimum:

a) Call log reports;

b) Dynamic statistics;

c) Directory Synchronisation;

d) Web browser customisable interface;

e) Data export to industry standard formats (e.g. XML/CSV etc);

f) Archiving capability;

g) Open standard database; and

h) Redundant operation functionality.

3.4.9.5 Voice Recording System Interface to Master Clock System

[D01-OPSCOM-1242] - Voice Recording System Interface to Master Clock System

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall interface with the Master Clock system for the time

and date stamping of voice recordings, call logs and alarm logs.

3.4.9.6 Voice Recording System Interface to DTN

[D01-OPSCOM-1244] - Voice Recording System Interface to DTN

Suitable interfaces shall be provided from the HS2 Voice Recording System to the local

network equipment (where appropriate) to enable communications within sites and to the

DTN for inter-site transmission.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1245] - Voice Recording System Interface to DTN

The HS2 Voice Recording System shall be compatible with the services provided by the

DTN, these shall include at a minimum;

a) DNS;

b) DHCP;

c) NTP;

d) VLAN; and

e) IPv4 / IPv6 numbering (in accordance with HS2 IP Schema).

3.5 GSM-R

3.5.1 GSM-R - Background

GSM-R is an international standard radio system for train-trackside operational voice

and signalling communication. It will be implemented on HS2 infrastructure as

mandated by the UK Command Control and Signalling (CCS) NTSN.

GSM-R on HS2 will support:

- Voice calls and text messaging using train cab radios and portable handsets;

- ETCS Level 2 (and above);

- ATO;

- Online Key Management;

- Possession Management System Hand Held Terminals (HHT); and

- Fixed dispatcher terminals (including Traffic Management click-to-call support, area of

control and berth triggered messaging).

Within Great Britain, a GSM-R network is already deployed across the existing mainline

railway by Network Rail. Rather than HS2 deploying its own network and in conjunction

with Network Rail, HS2 will expand the existing GB GSM-R networks to provide the

coverage, capacity and functionality needed for HS2 services and testing. This is in-line

with EU laws that mandate a single GSM-R Infrastructure Manager (IM) per member

state.

3.5.2 GSM-R - System Overview

The key GSM-R network components and interfaces are shown in the GSM-R Systems

Architecture drawing [HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000022].

The GSM-R system comprises of the following:

1) The Network Switching Subsystem (NSS) performs the main call control functions and

contains subscriber’s databases. HS2 will use Network Rail's NSS rather than

implementing its own.


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2) The Base Station Subsystem (BSS) provides the radio interface to the mobile stations.

It comprises the Base Station Controller (BSC) and the Base Transceiver Stations (BTS).

Dedicated HS2 BTS will be deployed connected back to the Network Rail BSC(s).

3) The Fixed Terminal Subsystem (FTS) supports fixed voice “GSM-R Dispatcher

Terminals” for operational control personnel. Dedicated HS2 GSM-R Dispatcher

Terminals will be deployed, connected to Network Rail's Fixed Terminal Subsystems.

4) The mobile stations provides the user or system interface and includes the GSM-R

Subscriber identity module (SIM), the Rolling Stock provided voice and data radios, the

Maintenance On-Track Machines voice and data radios, Maintenance Hand Held

mobiles and Possession Management Hand Held Terminals.

3.5.3 GSM-R - General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)

To meet the throughput requirements of CCS services such as ETCS, HS2 requires the

GSM-R network to provide a packet switched bearer using General Packet Radio System

(GPRS) with Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE).

Network Rail will provide BSC capacity and resilience which is sufficient to meet the

requirements for HS2's GSM-R system.

The GPRS subsystem comprises of:

- The Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN)

providing core functions such as call control and a gateway to the Data Networks;

- The Packet Control Unit (PCU) providing the radio related functions;

- The Domain Name System (DNS) providing the resolution of Domain Names into IP

addresses.

- The GPRS core network subsystem will be provided by Network Rail.

Network Rail's Live GSM-R network does not yet support GPRS/EDGE, but Network Rail

is upgrading the network to support it in line with a separate agreement with HS2.

3.5.4 GSM-R - GSM-R Reference Network

Network Rail has a second GSM-R “Reference Network” used for integration testing and

training work which is entirely isolated from the live railway. The Reference Network

supports GPRS/EDGE.

3.5.5 GSM-R - HS2 CCS laboratory

A CCS laboratory will be setup at the NICC to perform integration testing and for the

testing of configuration changes before deployment on the operational railway. The CCS

laboratory will have GSM-R capability and will be connected to both Network Rail

Reference and Live GSM-R Networks. The CCS laboratory is separate from the SIF, but

maybe co-located in the NICC building.


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Network Rail has produced a high level design document, HS2 Tranche 2 - System

Integration Facility (SIF) [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000002], to describe how they have

proposed that the GSM-R be integrated into the HS2 CCS Laboratory.

3.5.6 GSM-R - System Description

3.5.6.1 GSM-R - BTS and Radio subsystem

[D01-OPSCOM-1261] - GSM-R - BTS and Radio subsystem

HS2 BTSs shall provide GSM-R coverage across HS2’s entire Phase 1 and Phase 2a route

with locations based on the Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001].

Supporting Information : The BTS and radio parameters for HS2 radio sites shall be defined by the contractor

including:

BTS configuration;

Antenna configuration;

Radio optimisation parameters; and

GPRS/EDGE features parameters.

The Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001] is based on tower

mounted GSM-R antennas providing coverage along the HS2 open route, with

distributed antenna systems being used in sub-surface areas (including tunnels) and

certain stations.


GSM-R Coverage shall include:

- HS2 open route including trackside areas within the boundary fence;

- Station platforms;

- Network Rail’s track interfaces to HS2;

- Tunnel bores;

- Tunnel cross passages and equipment rooms;

- Tunnel intervention shafts (all rooms, staircases, lifts and corridors);

- Tunnel portal buildings (all rooms, staircases, lifts and corridors);

- Tunnel access and muster points; and

- Depots.

At the boundaries between HS2 and Network Rail infrastructures, and where both lines

run in parallel, GSM-R coverage may be provided by existing Network Rail BTSs to

minimise the risk of interference and to optimise the allocation of GSM-R frequencies,

hence coverage must be shared in those cases.

Network Rail BSCs hosting HS2 BTSs may be dedicated to HS2 BTSs only or shared

between Network Rail and HS2. The exact structure of the BSC deployment will be

defined by Network Rail as part of their wider network integration works.

As HS2 utilises Network Rail GSM-R equipment and radio spectrum, Network Rail is

contracted by HS2 to provide the Cell and Frequency plans.


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HS2 GSM-R BTSs, radiating equipment and associated RF components shall be installed at

the locations specified in the Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001].


The GSM-R BTS equipment shall deliver the performance required to meet the Network

Rail in the Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001].

Supporting Information : The Network Rail Cell Plan is based on using the Network Rail preferred product the

Kontron BTS-R.


The GSM-R BTS equipment shall be approved for use by Network Rail and HS2.

Supporting Information : The contractor will gain necessary approvals for use of the selected BTS equipment.


The GSM-R system shall be based on the validated Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-

RC-DES-000-000001].

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall validate Network Rail’s cell plan to ensure the coverage,

capacity, interference and QoS requirements are met. Any changes to the assumption is documented and fed

back to Network Rail to enable them to update the plan.

Note that the cell plan will continue to be refined and updated based on the latest additional information

from the Main Works Civils Contractor(s) about Radio Mast Compound constructability prior to HRS20

contract award.


The GSM-R system shall be configured based on the Network Rail frequency plan.

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall validate Network Rail’s frequency plan to ensure the coverage,

capacity, interference and QoS requirements are met. The frequency plan is to be provided by Network Rail

in a later stage of their design work working with the HRS20 contractor.

The detailed design should include the dimensioning of the GSM-R cells based on the traffic model. It

includes the verification of whether the assumptions used for the frequency plan were correct. Any changes

to the assumption is documented and fed back to Network Rail to enable them to update the frequency plan.


The GSM-R system documentation shall include a report provided to HS2 documenting the

validation of the Network Rail cell and frequency plans and equipment specifications.


HS2 GSMR BTS to Network Rail GSMR BSC connections shall use the HS2 DTN up to an

agreed demarcation point with Network Rail transmission as defined in the interface

control document [HS2-HS2-IN-ICD-000-000027].


The GSM-R BTS equipment quantities shall be based on the estimates in the Network Rail

GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001].


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Supporting Information : These estimates should be confirmed as part of the Detailed Design.

3.5.6.2 GSM-R - Dispatcher Terminals

[D01-OPSCOM-1274] - GSM-R - Dispatcher Terminals

HS2 GSM-R Dispatcher Terminals shall be deployed on the Operations Control Room in the

NICC at the Washwood Heath Depot site.

Supporting Information : The quantities of GSM-R Dispatcher terminals for the Operations Control Room at

the NICC will be refined during the development of the design working with HRS23 and HS2. The initial

position is that 18 (eighteen total)GSM-R Dispatcher terminals are required split:

- Four terminals in each of the geographical pods (four pods); and

- Two terminals in the central pod.


HS2 GSM-R Dispatcher Terminals shall be deployed at the Remote Tap-in facility at

Birmingham Curzon Street.

Supporting Information : The quantities of GSM-R Dispatcher terminals for the Remote Tap-in facility at the

Birmingham Curzon Street will be refined during the development of the design working with HRS23 and

HS2. The initial position is that 14 (fourteen total) GSM-R Dispatcher terminals are required split:

- Four terminals in each of the geographical pods (three pods); and

- Two terminals in the central pod.


HS2 GSM-R Dispatcher Terminals shall be provided at the phase 1 and phase 2a depots.

Supporting Information : The quantities of GSM-R Dispatcher terminals for the Washwood Heath depot,

Calvert depot and Stone depot will be refined during the development of the design working with the depot

contractor and HS2. The initial position is that 6 (six total) GSM-R Dispatcher terminals are required split:

- Two terminals in Washwood Heath Train Maintenance Depot (TMD);

- Two terminals in Calvert Infrastructure Maintenance Depot (IMD); and

- Two terminals in Stone Infrastructure Maintenance Depot (IMD).


Desk mounted GSM-R radio terminals shall be provided including a local, directly cabled,

passive antenna if necessary, for the Incident Control rooms located at the NICC and at the

Remote Tap-in facility.

Supporting Information : There will be a dedicated incident control room at the NICC, at the Remote Tap-in

facility there will be a meeting room which can be used as an Incident Control room in the event it is required.

The terminals in this room must be able to be secured against unauthorised use when the room is not being

used for incident control. Radio terminals are used as the full functionality of a fixed dispatcher terminal is

not required and the available role profiles do not match the intended use. The exact configuration of the

terminals will need to be agreed with operations.

The quantities of GSM-R radio terminals for the NICC and Remote Tap-in facility will be refined during the

development of the design working with HRS23 and HS2. The initial position is that 4 (four total) GSM-R

radio terminals are required split:

- Two terminals in the dedicated Incident Control Room at the NICC; and

- Two terminals in the shared use room at the Remote Tap-in facility at Birmingham Curzon Street.


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Desk mounted GSM-R radio terminals shall be provided including a local, directly cabled,

passive antenna if necessary, for the DATS technicians and Security Controllers at the

Operations Control Room in the NICC and at the Remote Tap-in facility at Birmingham

Curzon Street.

Supporting Information : The GSM-R radio terminals are provided to provide voice communications between

the DATS technician/Security Controller and on-site maintenance teams without the use of full fixed

terminal.

The quantities of GSM-R radio terminals for the NICC and Remote Tap-in facility will be refined during the

development of the design working with HRS23 and HS2. The initial position is that 4 (four total) GSM-R

radio terminals are required split:

- One terminal for DATS technician at the NICC;

- One terminal for the Security Controller at the NICC;

- One terminal for the DATs technician at the remote tap in facility; and

- One terminal for the Security Controller at the remote tap in facility.

The HS2 GSM-R Dispatcher Terminals are to be connected to Network Rail FTS.


The connections between HS2 Dispatcher Terminals and Network Rail GSM-R network shall

use the DTN up to an agreed demarcation point with Network Rail transmission as defined

in the interface control document [HS2-HS2-IN-ICD-000-000027].

3.5.6.3 GSM-R - Subscriber profiles and SIM cards

SIM cards will be specified, supplied and owned by Network Rail.

[D01-OPSCOM-1280] - GSM-R - Subscriber profiles and SIM cards

The HS2 GSM-R Mobile equipment listed below which will have access to the GSM-R/GPRS

network shall be fitted with GB GSM-R SIM cards from Network Rail:

- GSM-R Cab Radio;

- ETCS EDOR;

- ATO EDOR;

- Possession Management System handhelds;

- Maintenance workers handhelds; and

- On-board handhelds.

Supporting Information : The HRS20 contractor shall manage the supply and issue of GB GSM-R SIM cards

from Network Rail for the HS2 mobile equipment.

[D01-OPSCOM-1281] - GSM-R - Subscriber profiles and SIM cards

The SIM cards used by the GSM-R system shall use the validated SIM card specifications

produced by Network Rail Telecoms.

Supporting Information : The HRS20 contractor shall validate the SIM cards specifications produced by

Network Rail Telecoms.


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3.5.6.4 GSM-R - Handhelds

[D01-OPSCOM-1283] - GSM-R - Handhelds

280 GSM-R handhelds shall be provided.

Supporting Information : This excludes data terminals such as PMS.

The capabilities, operating approach and requirements for the GSM-R handsets (portable radios rather than

cab radios) shall be assessed and defined based on the technical solutions available from the suppliers.

[D01-OPSCOM-3173] - GSM-R - Handhelds

1041 GSM-R SIM cards shall be provided.

Supporting Information : The breakdown of SIM card is as follows:

- 60 passenger trains, each with 10 SIM cards: (600)

- 6 pairs of On-Track Machine (OTM) traction trains, each pair with 6 SIM cards: (36)

- up to 92 Possession Management Handhelds (HHT): (92)

- 280 voice-only handhelds: (280)

- 25 security handhelds: (25)

- 8 for desk mounted GSM-R radio terminals: (8)

3.5.6.5 GSM-R - GPRS/EDGE

GPRS/EDGE shall provide a data transfer bearer for the following HS2 CCS systems:

- ETCS Level 2;

- ATO;

- PMS;

- KMS; and

- TMS (as part of Possession Management).

[D01-OPSCOM-3313] - GSM-R - GPRS/EDGE

GPRS/EDGE shall be configured to meet the traffic and performance requirements of HS2

at Stations, Depots, Tunnels and on the open line of route, including consideration of

coding schemes and error correction algorithms.

Supporting Information : The contractor will derive traffic, bandwidth and other performance requirements

for stations, depots, tunnels and the open route and develop a capacity model(s) of the HS2 route. Based on

the output of the model(s), and the equipment capabilities, the contractor will work with NRT to propose and

agree the configuration of the air interface on HS2 including link adaptation algorithms and coding scheme

parameters.


All HS2 BTS and radiating equipment shall support GPRS and EDGE.

Network Rail BTSs providing coverage on HS2 route will also support GPRS and EDGE

provided under a separate contract between Network Rail and HS2.


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The GSM-R network shall be configured such that GPRS/EDGE data connections are

maintained when roaming between Network Rail base stations and HS2 base stations.

3.5.6.6 GSM-R - CCS laboratory

[D01-OPSCOM-1290] - GSM-R - CCS laboratory

Two GSM-R BTSs shall be included in the CCS laboratory, with appropriate equipment (such

as fading simulators, combiners, splitters, attenuators, and cabling) to connect the BTSs

directly to the radios.

Supporting Information : The contractor is responsible for the RF solution for providing/simulating GSM-R in

the CCS Laboratory.


The CCS Laboratory GSM-R BTSs shall be capable of being configured to connect to either

the Network Rail GSM-R Reference Network or the Network Rail Live GSM-R Network over

the DTN up to an agreed demarcation point with Network Rail transmission as defined in

the interface control document [HS2-HS2-IN-ICD-000-000027].

Supporting Information : The contractor's design for the CCS Lab shall be aligned with the high level

Network Rail design document, HS2 Tranche 2 - System Integration Facility (SIF) [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-

000002].


Dummy loads shall be available for GSM-R BTS and radios that are not connected but

powered on and could transmit.


The GSM-R fading simulators shall be controlled by simulation control equipment in the

CCS laboratory for the automation of test scenarios.


The GSM-R BTSs installed in CCS Laboratory shall be the of the same type as that deployed

along the route.

Supporting Information : The RF equipment, including the fading simulators and controlling equipment shall

be specified, supplied and installed by the HRS20 contractor.


The CCS Laboratory GSM-R Dispatcher Terminal shall be capable of being configured to

connect to either the Network Rail GSM-R Reference Network or the Network Rail Live

GSM-R Network over the DTN up to an agreed demarcation point with Network Rail

transmission as defined in the interface control document [HS2-HS2-IN-ICD-000-000027].

The following CCS test systems will be integrated with Network Rail Telecoms Reference

and Live Networks by the CCS contractor:


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- ETCS Level 2;

- ATO;

- Traffic Management;

- Possession Management; and

- Key Management.

3.5.7 GSM-R - Functional Requirements


The GSMR system supply shall be provided with all relevant licenses.

3.5.7.1 GSM-R - Generic requirements

[D01-OPSCOM-1301] - GSM-R - Generic requirements

The HS2 GSM-R equipment deployed shall fully support existing Network Rail GSM-R

functionality.

[D01-OPSCOM-1303] - GSM-R - Generic requirements

The GSM-R system shall consist of equipment, which is fully compatible with, utilises, and

interfaces to the NSS, BSC and FTS of Network Rail’s GSM-R network.

3.5.7.2 GSM-R - Dispatcher Terminals


The GSM-R System shall provide the following HS2 functions with a GSM-R Dispatcher

Terminal:-

In the geographical pods:

- Traffic Management Controller (TMC);

- Infrastructure Management Controller (IMC);

In the central pods:

- Shift Manager;

- Rolling Stock Controller;

In the depots:

- Depot Controller.


HS2 functions used on the HS2 GSM-R system shall be mapped to Network Rail FTS roles

where possible.


Default areas of control shall be aligned with the geographical pods in the NICC Operation

Control Room (OCR).


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The geographical Pod 1 in the NICC Operation Control Room (OCR) is planned for the

control of Phases 1 and 2A areas.

An Area of Control (AoC) is the collection of zones assigned to a Traffic Management

Controller or Infrastructure Management Controller. Only one TMC or IMC can control

any zone of control at any time.

The TMS Areas of control (AoC) will be reconfigurable to optimise workload distribution

during possessions, incidents and service recovery which will also configure the GSM-R

dispatcher terminals.


The GSM-R system shall route incoming calls from trains to the correct Traffic Management

Controller based on their assigned Area of Control (AoC).


The GSM-R Dispatcher System shall be integrated with the HS2 TMS system to notify and

dynamically update Areas of Control (AoC) for the Dispatcher Terminal users over the

Computer Telephony Interface (CTI) link.

Supporting Information : The functionality delivered to achieve correct call routing to the TMS Controller

based on AoC allocations, must be able to accommodate adding additional AoCs needed for later stages of

HS2.

The indicative areas of control for Phase 1 and 2a are as follows:

1. Euston Station area,

2. Euston Tunnel area,

3. Old Oak Common Station area,

4. Northholt Tunnel to Stoke Mandeville

5. Stoke Mandeville to Balsall Common Viaduct

6. Birmingham Interchange Station area,

7. Delta Junction area,

8. Birmingham Spur Line,

9. Washwood Heath Depot,

10. Curzon Street Station area,

11. Delta Junction to Handsacre Junction,

12. Streethay Junction to Stone IMB-R, and

13. Stone IMB-R to South Crewe Junction.


The GSM-R system shall make it possible for the TMC to contact a train driver from the TMS

HMI using the “click-to-call” feature.


The GSM-R to TMS integration features shall only be available to dispatchers with Traffic

Management capable workstations.


The GSM-R system shall allow control to be transferred to the Remote Tap-in NICC in the

event of planned or unplanned shutdown of the NICC.


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The GSM-R dispatcher systems at the Remote Tap-in NICC shall have the same functionality

as those at the NICC.

3.5.7.2.1 GSM-R - Dispatcher Terminals for Operator Training Simulator

[D01-OPSCOM-3054] - GSM-R - Dispatcher Terminals for Operator Training Simulator

Simulated GSM-R dispatcher terminals shall be provided and integrated into the CCS

Operator’s Training simulator (provided by HRS23) for training purposes.

Supporting Information : The overall development of the HS2 training simulators is within the scope of

others to deliver (including HRS23). The HRS20 contractor co-ordinates with HS2 and the other contractors

to ensure the successful delivery and integration of the simulated GSM-R dispatcher terminals.


The look and feel of the simulated GSM-R dispatcher terminals provided for operator

training should be identical to those of the operational system.

Supporting Information : The intention is for the training simulator to match the live operating environment

as closely as possible to facilitate effective training.


Instructor terminals shall be provided that allow the simulated GSM-R dispatcher terminals

to be controlled and configured to simulate dispatcher terminal functionality and the

instructors to play roles within the simulation.

Supporting Information : The instructor should be able to configure the system (using one of the two

instructors' terminals) to match operating scenarios, such as simulating train registrations and

making/receiving calls of various priorities (including REC calls)

3.5.7.3 GSM-R - GSM-R Configuration

[D01-OPSCOM-1321] - GSM-R - GSM-R Configuration

Operational data on the GSM-R system shall enable appropriate call routing on the HS2

infrastructure and depots, and on the neighbouring Network Rail infrastructure including:

- Group Call, including Railway Emergency Calls (REC) configuration;

- (enhanced) Location Dependant Addressing (eLDA); and

- Signalling data configuration (berth data).


The GSM-R Operational data shall include default recipients of unrouted calls.


The GSM-R Operational data shall include the use of 12XX Short Codes in specific locations.

EIRENE and E.164 number ranges will be allocated to HS2 subscribers within the overall

GB GSM-R Numbering Plan managed by Network Rail.


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The GSM-R EIRENE and E.164 numbers shall be allocated to HS2 Subscribers from the

ranges assigned by Network Rail Telecoms.

Supporting Information : The HRS20 contractor should work with Network Rail Telecoms to allocate the HS2

numbers.

The IP V4 addresses allocated dynamically to HS2 on-board units during GPRS session

establishments will be managed by Network Rail.


The GSM-R system configuration shall take account of operational requirements defined by

HS2 and Network Rail Telecoms.

Supporting Information : The configuration is likely to include:

- Access/Connectivity Matrix; and

- GSM-R registration procedure.


GSM-R parameters/configuration to support the HS2 GSM-R systems shall be implemented

on the core Network Rail GSM-R systems (FTS, OMC-R, NSS).

Supporting Information : Network Rail Telecoms will be responsible for the implementation of the

configuration of HS2 parameters on the GSM-R central systems. The Contractor shall lead, coordinate and

document the work, including the preparation, on behalf of HS2.

Provision of configuration, data preparation, and commissioning not normally done by

Network Rail Telecoms (normally done by manufacturer or installer) will be done by the

contractor.

3.5.7.4 GSM-R - GSM-R Phonebook

[D01-OPSCOM-1330] - GSM-R - GSM-R Phonebook

Existing GSM-R phonebooks shall be updated in conjunction, and agreed with, Network Rail

and HS2, not including the update of individual cab radio phonebooks on non-HS2 trains.

Supporting Information : The existing GSM-R phonebook requires update as part of the commissioning of

equipment specified in this package. The Contractor should ensure Network Rail completes this work and the

phonebook is integrated into all equipment provided and given to other railway stakeholders (including

TOCs) in order to upgrade their equipment.

3.5.7.5 GSM-R - Signage

[D01-OPSCOM-1332] - GSM-R - Signage

GSM-R related trackside signage shall be implemented according to RSSB GI/GN7634 or

successor standards in force at commissioning.

The need for and location of the GSM-R signage on the mainline and depots shall be based

on input from the HS2 Operations team.


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GSM-R signage shall be mounted on existing structures wherever possible avoiding the

need for additional posts.

Supporting Information : Any unavoidable civil works required are the responsibility of the HRS20

Contractor.


The placement of all GSM-R signs and any necessary supporting structures shall be as

agreed with Network Rail and HS2, subject to appropriate signal sighting.

3.5.7.6 GSM-R - ETCS

In normal operation, all trains will operate on the HS2 infrastructure in ETCS Level 2.

[D01-OPSCOM-1337] - GSM-R - ETCS

The GSM-R bearer for the data transfer between the ETCS onboard and the RBC shall be

Packet Switched Data (GPRS/EDGE), with a Circuit Switched Data bearer as fallback when

GPRS/EDGE is not available.

Supporting Information : The GSM-R frequency spectrum is limited and does not provide sufficient capacity

to operate ETCS and the other CCS services in Circuit Switched mode. The multiplexing gain of GPRS and

EDGE offers additional capacity.

In degraded mode when Packet Switching is not available, Circuit Switched operation enables some ETCS

operation to take place, but at reduced capacity.

In order of priority, EDGE is the preferred bearer, followed by GPRS. If neither is

available, Circuit Switched Data shall be used.

Trains operating in ETCS will be fitted with two ETCS EDORs.


The interface between the GSM-R/GPRS system and the ETCS EuroRadio module shall

comply with the Radio Transmission FFFIS for EuroRadio [A11T6001]


The interface between the GSM-R/GPRS system and the ETCS EuroRadio module shall

comply with the European Integrated Railway Radio Enhanced Network (EIRENE) System

Requirements Specification (SRS) [EIRENE SRS].


The GSM-R/GPRS system shall support the ETCS features specified in the ETSI Technical

Specification (TS) 103 328 - GPRS/EGPRS requirements for ETCS.


Network Rail GSM-R BTSs near or on HS2 infrastructure shall have GPRS and EDGE enabled

to prevent established ETCS Packet Switched sessions dropping to Circuit Switched mode.


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3.5.7.7 GSM-R - ATO

Automatic Train Operation (ATO) with Grade of Automation 2 (GoA2) will be in use on

the mainline HS2 infrastructure. The bearer for the data transfer between the ATO

onboard and the ATO trackside shall be either ATO over GPRS/EDGE or ATO over ETCS.

Trains operating in ATO will be fitted with one ATO EDOR.

[D01-OPSCOM-1345] - GSM-R - ATO

The GSM-R ATO-OB to ATO-TS interface shall comply with the requirements of Subset-125

ATO over ETCS SRS and Subset-126 ATO-OB / ATO-TS FFFIS.

3.5.7.8 GSM-R - Online Key Management

Online Key Management will be used for the remote management of the ETCS and ATO

authentication keys, as specified in the Online Key Management FFFIS [Ref Subset-137]

[D01-OPSCOM-1348] - GSM-R - Online Key Management

GPRS shall be used as the bearer for the transfer of the authentication keys to the on-

board equipment.

Supporting Information : The GSM-R frequency spectrum is limited and does not provide sufficient capacity

to operate Online Key Management and the other CCS services in Circuit Switched mode. The multiplexing

gain of GPRS and EDGE offers additional capacity.

In degraded mode where Packet Switching is not available, limited Circuit Switching capacity is reserved for

ETCS.

As specified in RIS-0743-CCS ERTMS Key Management [RIS-0743-CCS], the national GB

ERTMS KMC will issue the keys to HS2 KMAC entities.

3.5.7.9 GSM-R - Possession Management

The Possession Management System (PMS) will be used to manage possessions during

non-traffic hours and in emergency or degraded working scenarios.

The Possession Area Manager (PAM) and the Work Site Manager (WSM) will be issued

with Hand Held Terminals (HHT) which will be used as an extension to the TMS during

possessions.

The PMS HHT will be GSM-R and GPRS/EDGE enabled for voice and data

communications.

Before the start of the possession, Possession Plan data will be transferred to the PSM

HHT via a docking station connected to the LAN to avoid large data transfer over GSM-

R/GPRS.

During possessions, the TMS delegates an AoC to the PMS and the PMS HHT becomes

the front end of the control system.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1352] - GSM-R - Possession Management

GSM-R shall be used as the bearer for the transfer of real-time possession data between

the PMS/TMS and the PMS HHT including:

- Transfer of control of protected area from NICC to trackside;

- Train position updates;

- Points movements; and

- Work Flow Management updates.

[D01-OPSCOM-1353] - GSM-R - Possession Management

GSM-R shall be used as the bearer for voice communications:

- Between the PMS HHT and the NICC;

- Between the PMS HHT and the engineering train Cab Radio to take the trains into or out

of the possession area; and

- Between the PMS HHT and the engineering train maintenance handheld inside the

possession area.

3.5.7.10 GSM-R - Call Recordings

[D01-OPSCOM-1355] - GSM-R - Call Recordings

All GSM-R calls originating from HS2 BTS shall be recorded on the Network Rail GSM-R

voice recording system.

Network Rail will be responsible for configuring the voice recording functionality on the

Network Rail GSM-R system in order to record the HS2 calls, with the HS2 contractor

ensuring that the HS2 requirements for the system are defined and validated.


The GSM-R system shall provide HS2 authorised personnel located in the NICC Incident

Control Room (ICR) with direct access to HS2-related call records and recordings from

Service Monitoring terminals supplied by Network Rail, whilst respecting confidentiality and

data protection laws.


GSM-R call recording data shall be configured to be available electronically to specified

authorised stakeholders.

Supporting Information : External stakeholders may include parties such as the British Transport Police or

external security services contracted by HS2.


The GSM-R system shall not permit end users to amend, edit or delete stored call recording

data.

HS2 call records and recordings retention period will be aligned with Network Rail

Telecom’s current practice for the purpose of training, competency and in case of

retrospective investigation.


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The Network Rail delivered GSM-R Call Recording System shall be fully validated against

HS2 requirements.

3.5.7.11 GSM-R - QATS Service Monitoring

[D01-OPSCOM-1362] - GSM-R - QATS Service Monitoring

Network Rail QATS Railway and QATS Signalling systems shall be used to monitor HS2 Voice

and Data traffic.

Network Rail QATS Railway and QATS Signalling systems will be upgraded by Network

Rail with additional monitoring interfaces where required and Network Rail will provide

the QATs terminals to provide the real-time access to system performance data.


The GSM-R system shall provide real-time access to the system performance data for HS2

personnel at the NICC and Calvert IMD.

Supporting Information : Access to the data will allow HS2 staff to analyse the GSM-R network performance

and automatically identify and predict service affecting degradation or failures affecting HS2's

infrastructure.

HS2's data retention period for the GSM-R performance data will be aligned with

Network Rail Telecom’s current practice for the purpose of training, competency and in

case of retrospective investigation.

The Service Monitoring terminals used to access the QATS records will be supplied by

Network Rail.


The GSM-R QATS system provided by Network Rail shall comply with the HS2 requirements

for monitoring of the system.

Supporting Information : Although the QATS system will be provided by Network Rail, the contractor shall

define the HS2 requirements for monitoring of the system and validate that these are met by the system.

3.5.8 GSM-R - Non-Functional Requirements

3.5.8.1 GSM-R - Standards compliance

[D01-OPSCOM-1371] - GSM-R - Standards compliance

The GSM-R system shall be compliant with the CCS NTSN - Set of Specifications #3 (ETCS

Baseline 3 Release 2 and GSM-R Baseline 1) defined in the Annex A of the CCS NTSN.

Supporting Information : If the NTSN is revised prior to authorisation the system may need to comply with

the revised specifications.


The GSM-R system shall be authorised to be placed into service in accordance with Article

18 of Directive (EU) 2016/797 on the interoperability of the rail system within the European

Union (the Fourth Railway Package).


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Supporting Information : Directive (EU) 2016/797 on the interoperability of the rail system within the

European Union


The GSM-R system shall comply with Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) standard for

GSM-R in GB [RIS-0794-CCS].


The GSM-R system shall be tested using engineering rules and operational test scenarios

for the trackside parts of GSM-R in accordance with the CCS NTSN clause 6.1.2.3.


The trackside parts of the GSM-R system shall be assessed in accordance with Table 6.3 of

the CCS NTSN following module SG.


The GSM-R/GPRS system shall be dimensioned to support the capacity requirements of

HS2 voice and data applications in normal and degraded operations:

- GSM-R Voice between the NICC operational staff, train drivers, and trackside workers;

- ETCS;

- ATO;

- Traffic Management (as part of Possession Management);

- Possession Management; and

- Key Management.


The GSM-R system shall be dimensioned based on an overall GSM-R and GPRS/EDGE traffic

model developed to include GSM-R voice and CCS data requirements.

Supporting Information : The Contractor is responsible for developing a GSM-R and GPRS/EDGE network

traffic model during the design phase to model and evaluate network traffic. The Contractor shall liaise with

other HS2 contractors and Network Rail to assess and collate the requirements of the individual interfaces

and applications appropriate to the GSM-R and GPRS/EDGE design.

The Network Rail frequency plan is based on the assumption that two frequency

channels are allocated to GSM-R cells covering stations, depots and tunnels longer than

3km and one frequency channel per cell in all other locations. The contractor shall

validate this assumption against the traffic model.


The GSM-R system and supporting infrastructure shall have sufficient capacity to meet the

predicted HS2 traffic model based on the Phase 2b recovery mode target of 24 trains per

hour

Supporting Information : The Contractors GSM-R and GPRS/EDGE network traffic model includes capacity

for phase 2b recovery mode.


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3.5.8.2 GSM-R - Coverage and performance

[D01-OPSCOM-1386] - GSM-R - Coverage and performance

The GSM-R system shall meet the target coverage and performance requirements defined

in the Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001].


The GSM-R/GPRS system shall meet the QoS requirements defined in Subset-093 GSM-R

Interfaces Bearer Service Requirements.


The HS2 GSM-R system shall coexist with all other HS2 equipment and systems without

causing service affecting interference to any other radio network, HS2 equipment or rolling

stock.


The HS2 GSM-R system shall coexist with all other HS2 equipment and systems without

being adversely affected by interference from other equipment outside of the GSM-R radio

bands.


The GSM-R cell handover and relocation locations shall not coincide with key ETCS

locations such as RBC handovers and ETCS entry points.

3.5.8.3 GSM-R - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)

[D01-OPSCOM-1392] - GSM-R - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)

The GSM-R network shall meet the HS2 availability targets specified in D01-OPSCOM-3097,

D01-OPSCOM-3098 and D01-OPSCOM-3099.

3.5.8.4 GSM-R - Installation requirements for the Open Route and Tunnels

[D01-OPSCOM-1394] - GSM-R - Installation requirements for the Open Route and

Tunnels

The CPRI link between the GSM-R BTS Digital Module (DM) and the Remote Radio Head

(RRH) shall use dedicated dark fibre provided by the DTN.


Tunnels

GSM-R antennas shall be installed on telecoms towers, tunnel portal walls and in-tunnel

mounting bracketry.

Supporting Information : For station installation see section 3.5.10.


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Tunnels

The GSM-R system shall include all adapters, additional LAN components, cabling (in

appropriate ducting) or converters to connect the GSM-R equipment to the DTN PoPs.


Tunnels

The GSM-R system shall include all necessary local installation fixings, power

conversion/conditioning/protection and cabinet environmental conditioning required for

the system installation and operation.


Tunnels

All GSM-R equipment other than the cell radiating equipment (which has its locations

defined by Network Rail in Network Rail Telecoms design document HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-

000001) shall use only designated equipment locations and buildings prepared for Comms

and CCS equipment.

Supporting Information : Whilst the cell radiating equipment locations are defined by Network Rail in

Network Rail Telecoms design document HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001, for all other GSM-R equipment,

the Contractor shall liaise with HS2, other Railway Systems Contractors and MWCC in order to use only

designated equipment locations and buildings prepared for Comms and CCS equipment:

- Railway Systems Compounds;

- Radio Mast Compounds;

- Telecommunications rooms;

- Tunnel walls;

- Tunnel cross-passage equipment rooms;

- NICC;

- Depots;

- Cable ducts (for cables only); and

- Any construction/civil works for the placement of GSM-R related signage.

3.5.8.5 GSM-R - Obsolescence Management

[D01-OPSCOM-1402] - GSM-R - Obsolescence Management

GSM-R Spares, system roadmaps, patches and upgrades shall be available to HS2 for as

long as it continues to use GSM-R and as long as Network Rail GSM-R is provided to

another non-HS2 railway entity for BSS and FTS equipment.

[D01-OPSCOM-1403] - GSM-R - Obsolescence Management

The GSM-R system shall include passive provision for its upgrade to support FRMCS at a

later date.

Supporting Information : HS2 wishes to simplify the upgrade of the operational telecoms system to FRMCS

wherever possible. Consulting with a wide range of suppliers will provide information on possible upgrade

paths, which can be used to determine and agree with HS2 the passive provisions for inclusion in the design.


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3.5.8.6 GSM-R - Product Approval

[D01-OPSCOM-1406] - GSM-R - Product Approval

The GSM-R System shall only use equipment, mobiles, fixings, designs and documentation

approved by Network Rail for use on the mainline railway and by HS2 unless HS2 has

waived the requirement for Network Rail approval.

3.5.8.7 GSM-R - Test and commissioning

[D01-OPSCOM-1410] - GSM-R - Test and commissioning

All GSM-R related equipment (including BTS, dispatcher terminals and handheld devices)

shall be fully integrated, commissioned and tested with Network Rail’s network (with

support from Network Rail).

Supporting Information : HRS23 are responsible for PMS handheld terminals and Rolling Stock Contractor

for the on-board radios.

As Network Rail has to integrate the new BTS into their GSM-R network the electronic/configuration

elements of this work will be completed by Network Rail under contract to HS2. Contractor will nevertheless

lead this work on behalf of HS2 and as part of the complete delivery.

[D01-OPSCOM-1411] - GSM-R - Test and commissioning

The GSM-R System testing shall be developed in line with ERTMS/GSM-R Quality of Service

Test Specification (O-2475) and GSM-R Interfaces Class 1 Requirements (SUBSET-93) to

include functionality, RF propagation and coverage, capacity checking, optimisation and live

train testing at full line speed.

Supporting Information : A train and driver will be provided by HS2 for up to two test runs in each direction.

Responder units connected to the GSM-R and GPRS Core networks will be provided by

Network Rail for the termination of the voice and data (CSD and PSD) test calls during

Radio Network testing.

3.5.8.8 GSM-R Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3219] - GSM-R Safety, Integrity and Availability

The functions of GSMR responsible for transmitting Safety critical data (including voice and

SMS) shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG

ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


In the event of an emergency, GSM-R voice / data shall be able to be used by the Traffic

Management Controller to send command(s) to stop the train.


The GSM-R Onboard Handheld shall be able to be used by the Driver / Shunter upon the

failure of the In-Cab radio.


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The GSM-R functions responsible for providing the health status of the GSM-R Systems

shall be implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS

Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The GSM-R functions responsible for performing in-cab de-registration shall be

implemented in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS Application

Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The GSM-R functions responsible for performing in-cab registration shall be implemented

in accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 -

Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


The GSM-R functions responsible for recording voice calls shall be implemented in

accordance with BS EN 50159:2010+A1:2020 and UNISIG ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 -

Safety Analysis (SUBSET-088).


In the event of a failure of the GSM-R Voice System, the Operational Telephone System

shall be used where available.

3.5.9 GSM-R - Elements Provided by Others

The following is outside the scope the Contractor’s delivery of this package and will be

procured separately:

- Deployment and upgrade of NSS, BSC and GPRS core-network equipment (to be

procured and installed by Network Rail but coordinated with this package by the

Contractor);

- All onboard equipment including cab mobiles and EDORs which will be procured as

part of the Rolling Stock package; and

- Any GSM-R handsets (procured by the West Coast Partnership Train Operating

Company (TOC) and/or HS2 operations) except those specified in this document.

3.5.10 GSM-R - Stations Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS) for GSM-R

The Birmingham Interchange Station is not deemed suitable for an indoor DAS solution

for GSM-R due to its open ceiling structure above the platforms which makes the GSM-R

coverage from the nearby macro cell site remain dominant. A DAS solution would not

be capable of achieving dominance over the macro layer.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1418] - GSM-R - Stations Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS) for GSM-R

The GSM-R system shall provide coverage for Birmingham Interchange Station as per the

open route GSM-R cell plan defined by Network Rail in HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001.

London Euston, Old Oak Common, and Birmingham Curzon Street Stations are being

provided with a DAS by the station communications contractor which will provide

coverage for station WiFi and Mobile Network Operator (MNO) networks.


A dedicated GSM-R Distributed Antenna System (DAS) solution shall be provided at London

Euston, Old Oak Common, and Birmingham Curzon Street Stations to provide coverage on

all platform areas.


The GSM-R station antennas shall be fed from Remote Radio Units (RRUs) controlled by

GSM-R Digital Modules (DM).


The stations GSM-R DAS implementation shall be based on the high-level design proposal

provided in HRS08-WSP-RC-NOT-000-000001.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall provide the detailed design for the stations GSM-R DAS based

on the high-level design proposal provided in HRS08-WSP-RC-NOT-000-000001.


Where required, at the stations, the GSM-R BTS equipment shall be housed in the Rail

System equipment rooms located on the platforms.


The GSM-R stations DAS implementation shall consist of passive components with no

power amplification.

Supporting Information : This will be fed from the BTS equipment detailed in D01-OPSCOM-1424. The DAS

system will consist of passive elements (couplers, splitters etc) without any active components to reduce

power and maintenance requirements.


The GSM-R Station DAS antennas shall be connected to the Radio Remote Unit (RRU)

through Low-Smoke Zero Halogen (LSZH) co-axial cable and associated passive

components.


The GSM-R system cabling in the Stations shall utilise the most suitable routes as identified

by the Station Comms contractor, using the existing station cable containment where

possible.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall interface with the Station Comms contractor in order to

identify the most suitable routes and locations for cable, and component installations. The cable


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containment (also known as the ‘boom’) located above the platforms should be used to run cables and to

install passive components where possible.


GSM-R station antennas shall be securely mounted to provide directional coverage to the

tracks at the platforms.


The GSM-R system component locations shall be selected to facilitate future maintenance.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall assess all antenna locations, heights, cable routes, cable

containments and radio equipment locations by a Multi-Skilled Visit and consult with the station’s contractor

and HS2 to ensure they are feasible for installation and maintenance and the risk of interference between

systems is minimised.


GSM-R coverage on all HS2 rail tracks at platform level shall achieve a target coverage level

of -60dBm with a minimum of -75dBm as specified in the Network Rail GSM-R Cell Plan

[HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-000001] for significant stations.

The High-Level Design proposal provides provisional quantities of antennas to be

procured by the contractor for Old Oak Common (24 off), London Euston (20 off) and

Birmingham Curzon Street Station (18 off). These antenna quantities are based on a

calculated approach to achieve required target levels supported by coverage

predictions. They shall be confirmed by the contractor during the detailed design.

The coverage predictions for the stations GSM-R DAS have been generated based on the

GA drawings available at the time of writing and shall be re-validated by the contractor

as part of the detailed design using the latest versions of the stations’ drawings, and

confirmed equipment locations and quantities.


The GSM-R System coverage levels from the Stations DAS shall be validated if possible,

through Continuous Wave (CW) testing.

Supporting Information : The GSM-R System coverage levels from the Stations DAS shall be validated if

possible through CW (Continuous Wave) testing during the commissioning stage. The approach and

feasibility for that testing shall be agreed with the station’s contractor and HS2 and must be in-line with

industry practices for such testing to ensure the coverage levels captured through testing represent the levels

received at the train antenna above the carriage.


The GSM-R system shall not exceed the International Commission on Non-Ionizing

Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) ‘General Public’ and ‘Occupational’ exposure levels.

Supporting Information : As part of the detailed design, the contractor shall carry out International

Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) calculations for both ‘General Public’ and

‘Occupational’ levels to ensure the safety levels are achieved as per the industry standards.


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3.6 Fireground radio system

Fireground is a nationally used radio system for local fire service communication at

incident locations. On HS2, Fireground service will be provided for fire service

communications and personnel using breathing apparatus within tunnels, subsurface

areas and at sub-surface stations. This section lists the requirements for the system to

be provided in tunnels and associated subsurface areas only.

Fireground coverage is required in all HS2 tunnels longer than 1km, across both Phases

1 and 2a.

[D01-OPSCOM-1437] - Fireground radio system

Independent Fireground radio systems shall be provided in each tunnel longer than 1km.


Each Fireground radio system shall be distinct from adjacent tunnel and/or sub-surface

station Fireground systems with the exception of Old Oak Common (OOC) and adjacent

tunnels.


At OOC, the Fireground radio system shall perform as one seamless system covering:

- Euston Tunnel,

- OOC Station,

- OOC Tunnel,

- Victoria Road Cross Over Box, and

- Northolt Tunnel.

Supporting Information : The Fire service requires the OOC area to be managed as a single system in line with

BS9992 such that fire fighters are able to communicate with each other regardless of point of entry when

responding to an incident.


Each Fireground radio system shall be non-interfering with adjacent tunnel and/or sub-

surface station Fireground systems.


The Fireground radio systems shall support Analogue (PMR) and Digital (DMR Tier 2) modes

of operation.


The mode of operation of the Fireground radio systems (Analogue or Digital) shall be

individually configurable from the NICC via the Fireground Monitoring System for each

tunnel.


The Fireground radio systems shall meet the radio communications requirements of all

brigades covering the line of route.


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The Fireground radio systems shall meet the requirements of MPT1327 and ETSI DMR Tier

2 standards:

- ETSI TR 102 398

- ETSI TS 102 361-1

- ETSI TS 102 361-2

- ETSI TS 102 361-3

- ETSI TS 102 361-4

Individual user radios are provided by the fire service for command and control at

incidents and also as an integral part of their breathing apparatus. The mode of use for

the radios is determined by the fire authority that would normally attend the incident:

fire personnel set the appropriate mode in their breathing apparatus or have

equipment with a single mode.


Coverage from the Fireground radio systems provided in equipped tunnels shall extend to

cross passages, equipment and other subterranean rooms, tunnel escape shafts, stairways

and intervention shafts linked to the tunnels.


External Fireground radio system coverage (outside the tunnels and buildings) shall be

provided to 30m from access shaft head houses and tunnel portals, plus parking areas

where attendant fire service vehicles may be parked and designated fire rendezvous

points, with the exception of tunnels that end directly adjacent to a station (e.g. Old Oak

Common)


The Fireground radio system shall provide a means of voice communications of sufficient

speech quality to minimise the potential for miscommunication.


External Fireground radio system coverage shall not extend beyond 30m from access shaft

head houses and tunnel portals, parking areas where attendant fire service vehicles may

be parked and designated fire rendezvous points.


Fireground radio system communications shall not be linked between adjacent tunnels on

the line with exception of the Old Oak Common Area.

Supporting Information : The Old Oak Common Area requirement is detailed in D01-OPSCOM-3178.


The Fireground radio system shall utilise the Distributed Antenna System (DAS).

Supporting Information : Additional radiating equipment for the Fireground radio system may be suggested

where use of the DAS is unsuitable, subject to approval by HS2.


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The Distributed Antenna System (DAS) is passive only. Any active equipment (repeaters

etc) required to provide or amplify Fireground radio signals transmitted to/from the DAS

must be provided by the fireground radio system.


The Fireground radio system base station equipment shall be installed in the Tunnel Portal

buildings wherever possible.


The Fireground radio system repeaters and combiner equipment shall be mounted in

housings in pre-defined tunnel cross passage equipment areas.


The Fireground radio system repeaters and combiner equipment shall be protected from

potential fire or impact in the main tunnel bores.


The Fireground radio system shall utilise the 220VAC supply provided at the equipment

rooms and tunnel cross passages for power.


The Fireground radio system shall include all required interfacing and power connection

equipment, including connection to HS2’s DTN PoPs.


The Fireground radio system shall be suitable for the installation environment (see D01-

OPSCOM-3043).


The Fireground radio system shall undergo operational tests with the relevant fire

brigade(s) covering each tunnel.


The Fireground radio systems shall include sufficient redundancy such that in the event

that one set of equipment is damaged by fire or other incident, another set will continue to

provide coverage along the entire length of the tunnel and other subterranean areas,

including when an incident partially or totally blocks a tunnel.


The distance between redundant equipment in the tunnel bores shall be such that

Fireground radio system equipment in any 400m stretch can be destroyed without the loss

of Fireground radio coverage in that area or other areas beyond it.

Supporting Information : If fireground base stations/repeaters in a 400m stretch of tunnel are destroyed,

coverage should continue to be provided by adjacent equipment.


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In the event of a section of DAS or radiating cable being damaged or destroyed, the

Fireground radio system shall continue to provide coverage up to the last undamaged

point of the radiating elements from either side of the damaged section.

Supporting Information : If a section of the radiating cables are destroyed for any reason, the fireground

system should continue to provide coverage in cross passages, either side of the damaged section and the

other running bore for twin bore tunnels.


The Fireground radio system signal coverage shall offer at least 90% probability of better

than -95dBm signal levels throughout the open tunnel, or better where mandated by any

of the fire brigades covering that tunnel.

Supporting Information : This coverage level does not have to extend inside trains within the tunnel.


The Fireground radio system shall operate on Fireground Channel 5 in half-duplex mode.


The Fireground radio system equipment shall be capable of transmitting and receiving on

any frequency in the 450-470MHz band with either 12.5 or 25kHz channels in order to

support any future spectrum reallocations.


The frequency and channel configuration of the Fireground radio system equipment shall

be able to be remotely configured by HS2 personnel from the NICC for each individual

tunnel and all tunnels together.


The Fireground radio system shall support the transparent use of CTCSS using tones listed

in MPT 1306.


The Fireground radio system shall include full self-test functionality to detect any faults

down to Field Replaceable Unit level in all equipment installed, in both analogue and digital

modes regardless of the mode in use, including the radiating and connection equipment.


The Fireground radio system shall conduct automatic tests at least once per hour with the

health status being automatically reported to the NICC via the Fireground Monitoring

System.


The automatic testing of the Fireground radio system shall not incur a loss of service

exceeding thirty seconds maximum in each hour.


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The Fireground radio system testing and test reports shall include:

- Overall health of the system, including if service is available through one or both

(redundant) systems:

- Mains power failure (power supply),

- Power conversion and conditioning equipment failure,

- Redundant system communication link failure,

- Base station and repeater equipment,

- Connections and communication with the DAS,

- Any dedicated radiating equipment,

- Transmitter low power output,

- Radio receiver failure, and

- Permanent receive carrier/noise detected.


When a transmission is made by fire or maintenance personnel the Fireground radio

system automatic self-testing shall be immediately postponed until at least fifteen minutes

after the last transmission is made.


When a transmission by fire or maintenance personnel is detected, the Fireground radio

system shall stop any self-testing already in-progress.


Fireground radio system self-tests interrupted by user transmission shall not result in fault

reports being generated.


Fireground radio system self-testing shall also be able to be triggered manually from the

NICC.


Fireground radio system self-testing shall not affect other systems using the DAS.


The Fireground radio system shall use the DTN for connections from the base station

equipment to the repeater equipment wherever possible (be that dark fibre or via the

managed IP service).


All Fireground radio system links or power cabling that don't use the DTN shall be routed

through cable ducting/troughs provided by HS2 wherever possible.

Supporting Information : All other links or power cabling shall be provided by the Contractor but routed

through cable ducting/troughs provided by HS2 wherever possible, in conjunction with other work package


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suppliers also using those routes. Any additional cabling, cable routes, ducting and troughs required are the

responsibility of the Contractor but must be agreed with HS2.


Six sets of handheld test radios for the Fireground radio system shall be provided for use

by HS2.


The Fireground radio system handheld test radios shall be able to operate in both

analogue and digital modes configurable directly on the radios.


The Fireground radio system handheld test radios shall include all cables and software

required to configure and update the radios to allow HS2 personnel to perform these tasks

without supplier support.


The HS2 Fireground radio system shall coexist with all other HS2 equipment and systems

without causing service affecting interference to any other radio network, HS2 equipment

or rolling stock.


The HS2 Fireground radio system shall coexist with all other HS2 equipment and systems

without being adversely affected by interference from other equipment outside of the

Fireground radio bands.


The Fireground radio system shall include any necessary trackside signage.

Supporting Information : The Contractor shall work with other package contractors to install any necessary

trackside signage in line with relevant standards in force at commissioning, including those from the relevant

fire brigades.


The Fireground radio system shall include any signage specified by the relevant fire

brigades.


The placement of all Fireground radio system signs (and any necessary supporting

structures) shall be as agreed with HS2 and the relevant fire brigades.


Construction and commissioning of the permanent Fireground radio system shall not

interfere with the operation of the temporary Fireground system which will be provided

during HS2’s construction works.


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Supporting Information : Any testing, switch-on and switch-off required must therefore be coordinated with

the construction contractors and local fire brigades.


Radiation from the Tunnel DAS system shall not exceed the International Commission on

Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) ‘General Public’ and ‘Occupational’ exposure

levels.




3.6.1 Fireground Radio Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3217] - Fireground Radio Safety, Integrity and Availability

The FGR functions responsible for initiating and transmitting Safety critical voice calls shall

have minimum of "Basic Integrity" in accordance with BS EN 50128.


The FGR functions responsible for providing FGR real-time system status and fault

diagnostics shall have minimum of "Basic Integrity" in accordance with BS EN 50128.


Following a failure of the FGR System, operational firefighters shall be able to communicate

emergency messages in the cross passage tunnels using the IP handset (Bi-directional) and

the PAVA system (unidirectional from the NICC only).

3.7 Tunnel Distributed Antenna System (DAS)

The HS2 route includes a number of tunnels which will require coverage from various

radio systems. The tunnels are a mixture of bored and cut and cover tunnels.

[D01-OPSCOM-1465] - Tunnel Distributed Antenna System (DAS)

The distributed antenna system (tunnel DAS) shall provide radio coverage in tunnels longer

than 700m, radiating the signals from the various radio systems via radiating cables located

in the tunnels and radiating cables and/or antennas located in cross passages, ventilation

shafts and at tunnel portals.


A distributed antenna system (tunnel DAS) shall be used to provide radio coverage for any

tunnels shorter than 700m if external sites or portal mounted antenna options are

insufficient to meet the coverage requirements of the supported radio systems.

The tunnel DAS will be used to provide coverage to train mounted antennas (for

onboard radios & repeaters) and handheld devices used by personnel on track. It is not

intended to provide direct coverage to handheld devices on the trains.


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Above ground coverage along the route will be provided via tower mounted antennas.

This section specifically relates to the tunnel DAS system.

This section covers the passive components only. The active components are part of the

relevant system design.

The HS2 requirement to provide Airwave is limited at this stage to passive provision only

in the tunnel DAS (see D01-OPSCOM-2764).


The tunnel DAS for Euston Tunnel, Old Oak Common (OOC) Tunnel and Northolt Tunnel

shall by integrated with the station DAS at OOC station providing seamless Fireground

coverage in the OOC area.

Supporting Information : The design of the proposed radio coverage at the tunnel and station interface of

Old Oak Common (OOC) requires special attention and agreement with HS2 and the emergency services to

provide seamless coverage between the tunnel and station radio systems for effective incident management

and operational resilience. The station DAS is designed and configured by the Third Party

Telecommunications Contractor (HRS21).


The tunnel DAS shall be provided, covering the HS2 and NR tracks, at an additional above

ground bat mitigation structure at:

- Sheep House Wood - Structure over twin tracks (including Network Rail tracks) - 0.921Km

Supporting Information : The radio attenuation and propagation characteristics of the structure are not yet

known. These will affect the requirements for the final DAS design for this area as there may be coverage

from the external sites. This requirement covers the worst-case scenario and may be removed if a DAS is not

required.


The tunnel DAS shall support GSM-R for Train & lineside operational communications - E-

GSM band, 880MHz to 921MHz.


The tunnel DAS shall support Fireground - Fire service incident radio system - 450MHz to

470MHz.


The tunnel DAS shall include passive provision for the Airwave - Emergency services legacy

radio system - 400MHz.

Supporting Information : Airwave is passive provision only at this stage.


The tunnel DAS shall support Emergency Services Network (ESN) - Emergency Services

communications at 800MHz and 1800MHz.


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The tunnel DAS shall support the Passenger Communications System (PCS) - provision of

high speed voice and data based on MNO technologies - 700MHz, 800MHz, 900MHz,

1800MHz, 2100MHz, 2600MHz and 3600MHz.


The tunnel DAS shall enable the GSM-R, ESN, Fireground and Airwave systems to provide

coverage in the running tunnels, the cross passages, the tunnel evacuation routes, the

portal building/equipment rooms and the muster points for firefighting locations.

Supporting Information : "Coverage" - the area within which the supported systems meet their defined

requirements for signal strength, quality, interference and functionality.

Airwave is passive only at this stage.

The Main Works Civils Contract (MWCC) may install certain elements of the radiating

infrastructure in the intervention shafts (in accordance with the HRS20 design) in order

to meet programme requirements and allow dependent tasks (such as fire-stopping) to

be completed.


The tunnel DAS shall enable the PCS to provide coverage in the running tunnels, the cross

passages and intervention shafts.

Supporting Information : Incidental coverage of other areas may also be provided, but any above-ground

coverage must be agreed/co-ordinated with the MNOs (Licence holders)

"Coverage" - the area within which the supported systems meet their defined requirements for signal

strength, quality, interference and functionality.

The PCS is not required to provide sub-surface coverage outside the running tunnels,

but there is no requirement to exclude it from these areas. Incidental coverage from the

PCS via the tunnel DAS may be provided in the cross passages, the tunnel evacuation

routes and portal building/equipment rooms, but any above-ground coverage shall be

agreed with HRS21.


The Tunnel DAS shall only provide above-ground coverage for the PCS if agreed by HRS21

Supporting Information : The PCS is not required to provide coverage outside the running tunnels, but there is

no requirement to exclude it from these areas. If there is a chance it could propagate above-ground (for

example from a headhouse) this must be co-ordinated with the public operators in order to avoid unwanted

interference to their networks.

3.7.1 Tunnel DAS - Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3204] - Tunnel DAS - Safety, Integrity and Availability

The functions of DAS responsible for transmitting Safety related data (including voice and

SMS) shall have minimum of "Basic Integrity".


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3.7.2 Tunnel DAS - Interfaces & Requirements

[D01-OPSCOM-1482] - Tunnel DAS - Interfaces & Requirements

The tunnel DAS shall meet the detailed technical requirements of the supported systems as

defined by the relevant suppliers.

Supporting Information : The technical requirements are expected to include areas such as continuity of

coverage, redundancy/resilience, availability, handover regions, separation regions, maximum

losses/minimum signal levels, SISO/MIMO support, combining/splitting of radio signals onto the radiating

cables, radio isolation between systems, noise figures for components, interface with the above-ground

coverage, equipment vendor’s specifications, relevant national standards etc.

[D01-OPSCOM-1485] - Tunnel DAS - Interfaces & Requirements

The tunnel DAS shall support any SIL categorisation of the supported systems/services.

Supporting Information : This may also be captured through the interface management process.

3.7.3 Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cables

Radiating cables are currently seen as the optimal solution (antenna type) for tunnel

coverage.

HS2 have nominally provisioned space/mounting points for radiating cables using a

messenger wire system in each running tunnel.

[D01-OPSCOM-1491] - Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cables

The tunnel DAS shall make use of the optimal cable type for each application, making use

of smaller cables wherever possible whilst meeting the identified requirements and

considering likely future technologies.

Supporting Information : Smaller cables will offer lower cost, easier installation and management vs.

reduced radio performance. Future proofing for technologies such as 5G should also be considered.


The tunnel DAS components shall meet the fire safety, radio performance and spatial

requirements identified in the relevant HS2 specifications and specified by the supported

radio systems.

Supporting Information : Product acceptance is likely to form a large part of the acceptance evidence.


The tunnel DAS shall utilise the optimal number of radiating cables required to support the

identified radio systems and services in the allocated frequency bands as determined using

value engineering practices.

Supporting Information : Hybrid options may also be considered, for example reducing the number of cables

at pinch-points, subject to suitable analysis demonstrating that the required performance is still achieved.


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3.7.4 Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cable Mounting

[D01-OPSCOM-1496] - Tunnel DAS - Radiating Cable Mounting

The tunnel DAS shall include the radiating cable messenger wire system (including

mountings and tension fixings).

Supporting Information : The contractor is responsible for installing the DAS (including all radiating cables,

antennas and supporting mountings and tail cables etc).


The loads for which the supports within tunnels and cable management are designed shall

include (1) the expected cyclic loads due to the pressures and airflow generated by moving

trains; (2) the static loads due to all components supported by the brackets, including the

weight of cables and water in the fire mains. The pressures and airflows shall be taken as

those provided in Technical Standard – Shaft and Portal Buildings MWCC and Rail Systems

Interfaces (HS2-HS2-CV-STD-000-000008).


Supports within the pre-cast elements of bored and cut and cover tunnels shall adopt the

cast-in sockets in the as per HS2-HS2-CV-SPE-000-014600_P02 SCEW Series 4600 Tunnel

Cast-In Sockets for Permanent Use by Railway Systems.

Supporting Information : Bored tunnels include the main lengths of Euston tunnel (North of the cavern),

Northolt tunnel, Chiltern tunnel, the longer portion of Long Itchington Wood tunnel, Bromford tunnel,

Whitmore tunnel and Madeley tunnel. Pre-cast cut and cover tunnels include Chipping Warden, Wendover

and Greatworth.


Supports within pre-cast elements of tunnels shall account for 18 sockets every 1.8m of

tunnel length for the S1/S2 the S1/S2 Tunnels; 21 sockets every 2.0m of pre-cast element

tunnel length for C1 and 19 sockets every 1.8m of tunnel pre-cast length for the N1/N2

tunnels.


Messenger wire system supports within tunnels shall be arranged to accommodate the

varying in location of the cast-in sockets.

Supporting Information : The Chiltern tunnel rings have an overlapping ring arrangement means that the

cast in sockets in alternate rings should be used.


On the escape walkway side of all tunnels the radiating cable messenger wire system shall

be connected to a primary support steel provided on the wall by the HRS02 Contractor as

an extension to their tunnel lighting support bracket.

Supporting Information : The HRS02 Contractor is expected to leave bolt holts in the web of their support

flange. General information regarding the potential nature of the tunnel supports can be found in the

document HRS08 Tunnel Services Fixing Report (HRS08-WSP-ME-REP-000-000002).


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The radiating cables, mounting brackets and ancillary items such as connectors shall fit

within the spatial allocation as shown in:-

- 9.1m Diameter Tunnel Cross Section with and without Cant (HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-200123)



- 7.55m Diameter Tunnel Cross Section with and without Cant (HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-

200121)

- Cut & Cover Tunnel Generic Cross Section Slab Track with and without Cant (HS2-HS2-CV-

DSE-000-200124)

- Precast Arch Cut and Cover Tunnel Generic Cross Section Slab Track with and without

Cant (HS2-HS2-CV-DSE-000-200115)

Supporting Information : Cable spacing for MIMO configurations and prevention of interference between

cables must also be considered.

See also the requirements for cables to fit within space constricted areas (such as around cross passages).


The cable containment within the tunnel shall be constrained to the maximum widths

shown on the tunnel typical cross section drawing.

Supporting Information : The drawings are listed in D01-OPSCOM-1497.


The tunnel DAS radiating cables shall be fitted within any spatial restrictions around certain

locations (such as cross passage doors) in addition to those identified in D01-OPSCOM-

1497.

The spatial allocation for the radiating cables is based on a separation of 200mm for

radiating cables supporting MIMO systems, a separation of 300mm between radiating

cables serving different radio systems and 300mm clearance from the tunnel wall to

include brackets etc.


The tunnel DAS shall include all fixings, mountings and cable/component supports

required for the system.

Supporting Information : The contractor shall design and install all fixings, mountings and cable/component

supports required for the tunnel DAS outside of those provided by the main works civils contract in the main

tunnel bores.

(for example, in tunnel cross passages).


The tunnel DAS cable layout shall be optimised to minimise the number of under-track-

crossings.

Supporting Information : The use of under-track crossings should be minimised so far as possible whilst still

meeting the radio performance requirements.


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3.7.5 Tunnel DAS - Other Antennas

[D01-OPSCOM-1504] - Tunnel DAS - Other Antennas

The tunnel DAS shall utilise antennas in order to provide coverage at specific locations

where they provide a more suitable solution than radiating cable.

Supporting Information : This may include larger tunnels where radiating cables may not provide adequate

coverage and tunnel equipment rooms, cross passages, evacuation routes or tunnel portals.

It should be noted that antennas used at portals will support the handover between open site macro

coverage and tunnel coverage.

[D01-OPSCOM-1506] - Tunnel DAS - Other Antennas

Antennas installed as part of the Tunnel DAS shall be securely mounted.

3.7.6 Tunnel DAS - Physical Design considerations/factors

[D01-OPSCOM-1508] - Tunnel DAS - Physical Design considerations/factors

The tunnel DAS equipment such as the RF combiners/couplers and supporting

components shall be installed in cross passages, equipment rooms or intervention shafts

where available.

Supporting Information : The intention is to try and locate equipment in accessible locations outside of the

running tunnels where possible without affecting the system performance.

The tunnel DAS cable routes and equipment will be spatially co-ordinated with the surrounding

infrastructure to avoid clashes.

[D01-OPSCOM-1509] - Tunnel DAS - Physical Design considerations/factors

In tunnels which do not have cross passages (such as cut and cover tunnels) any tunnel

DAS equipment which must be located in the tunnels shall be located on the outer side

walls.

Supporting Information : The justification for any equipment located in other locations shall include

consideration for aspects such as access and maintenance.

A typical cross passage layout is shown in HS2-HS2-IN-SAD-000-000031 where green

represents the space provision for this contract (Operational Telecommunications) and

yellow is the space provision for the Third Party Telecommunications Contract.

3.7.7 Tunnel DAS - Maintenance

[D01-OPSCOM-1513] - Tunnel DAS - Maintenance

The Tunnel DAS and its equipment shall be designed to enable maintenance and testing to

be undertaken with no or minimal disruption to railway operations.

Supporting Information : Requirements for generic RAMS analysis, spares and asset management

information are contained in other sections of this document.


The tunnel DAS shall enable the replacement of individual cables or components without

disconnection or disruption to other cables/components/services wherever possible.


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The tunnel DAS components shall follow metric dimensions and standards except where

industry standards commonly used in Europe dictate otherwise


The tunnel DAS shall include signage and warnings on/around the tunnel DAS to comply

with all applicable standards, legislation and industry best practice.

Supporting Information : Caution warning signs for the presence of radio transmitters provided with

additional signage at the boundary points where RF levels exceed public exposure limits limiting access to

authorised persons only (where this is not in free space).


The tunnel DAS shall allow for simple deconstruction and removal of the component parts

at the end of its life.

Supporting Information : Details of design decisions made to facilitate removal should be included in order to

demonstrate that this has been properly considered.

3.7.8 Tunnel DAS - Environment and Conditions

[D01-OPSCOM-1519] - Tunnel DAS - Environment and Conditions

The tunnel DAS shall be suitable for the installation environment (see D01-OPSCOM-3043).

Supporting Information : Including consideration of all environmental factors such as vibration and air

pressure/wind loadings from trains, water ingress, humidity, temperature etc.

Some of the environmental aspects will be defined via interfaces with other packages (e.g. probability of

flooding).

This may be evidenced through suitable product acceptance procedures (if available).


Radiation from the Tunnel DAS system shall not exceed the International Commission on

Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) ‘General Public’ and ‘Occupational’ exposure

levels.





The tunnel DAS shall minimise the risks associated with maintenance.

Supporting Information : The design shall consider factors such as safe access (e.g. minimising need for

working at height and locating components outside the OHLE zone of influence where possible), manual

handling of components and provision of space around working areas.

3.8 Telecommunication Towers

Telecommunication towers are required throughout the open sections of HS2’s route

and at depots for at-height installation of operational, emergency services and

passenger radio system antennas.


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[D01-OPSCOM-1523] - Telecommunication Towers

A telecommunications tower (including foundations) shall be constructed at each Railway

System Compound (RSC), Radio Mast Compound, Rapid Deployment Site (RDS) and Portal

Building where a GSM-R antenna is specified in NRT’s cell plan [HS2-NRL-RC-DES-000-

000001]

For the purposes of the contract the contractor shall provide 82 Telecommunication

Towers for phase 1 (11 at Rail Systems Compounds, 2 at Depots, 40 at Radio Mast

Compounds, 14 at Rapid Deployment Sites and 15 at Portal Buildings) and 32 for Phase

2a (6 at Railway Systems Compounds/ATS Sites, 22 at Radio Mast Compounds, 4 at

Tunnel Portals).


The telecommunications towers shall be of appropriate size to be able to mount a GSM-R

antenna as detailed in the HRS08 GSM-R Location Schedule [HRS08-WSP-RC-SCH-000-

000001]

Supporting Information : The ground level of sites requiring Telecommunication Towers may be above or

below rail height, so the actual tower height will vary by location


The telecommunications towers including supported equipment such as antennas shall

comply with the HS2 Act including the Environmental Minimum Requirements and

Environmental Statement.

Supporting Information : It is a legal requirement that towers comply with the HS2 act and related planning

permissions.

As summarised in WI890 Appendix C – Summary of the HS2 Act Planning Regime [HRS01-HS2-PR-ITT-000-

000042].

For illustration proposes a series of telecommunications towers drawings have been

included:-

- Lattice Tower (20m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000001);

- Monopole Tower Multi-user (20m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000002);

- Monopole Tower Single User (20m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000003);

- Lattice Tower (20m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000011);

- Monopole Tower Multi-user (20m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000012);

- Monopole Tower Single User (20m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000013);

- Lattice Tower (15m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000021);

- Monopole Tower Multi-user (15m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000022);

- Monopole Tower Single User (15m) in Cutting (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000023);


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- Lattice Tower (15m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000031);

- Monopole Tower Multi-user (15m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000032);

- Monopole Tower Single User (15m) in Embankment (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000033);

- Lattice Tower (20m) at Tunnel Portal (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000101); and

- Monopole Tower Multi-user (15m) at Tunnel Portal (HRS08-WSP-RC-DGA-000-000106).

Subject to the contractor’s design, it is estimated that 85% of the towers will be of lattice

construction and 15% will be of monopole construction. The HRS08 GSM-R Location

Schedule [HRS08-WSP-RC-SCH-000-000001] is to be used to provide an indication of

required tower height based on antenna heights.


Telecommunications Towers shall be designed to support up to three tiers of antenna and

ancillary equipment to provide the services listed below:

- GSM-R,

- Emergency Services Network,

- TETRA Airwave,

- Neutral host and/or each Mobile Network Operator to support passenger mobile

telephony/data,

- Space for other 3rd party antenna and transceiver equipment for public

telecommunications services used in the surrounding area, and

- Back-haul microwave links.

Supporting Information : Provided by Contract HRS20

- GSM-R, and

- TETRA Airwave (passive provision only).

Provided by Contract HRS21

- Emergency Services Network

- Neutral host and/or each Mobile Network Operator to support passenger mobile telephony/data,

- Space for other 3rd party antenna and transceiver equipment for public telecommunications services used

in the surrounding area, and

- Back-haul microwave links.

Note that Remote Radio Head (RRH) equipment is to be installed in adjacent REB and not on the tower itself.


Telecommunication Towers shall include Earthing and bonding in accordance with HS2's

earthing & bonding requirements.


Telecommunication Towers shall include access provision which does not require

equipment other than PPE to access the tower, antennas and associated equipment for

maintenance purposes.

Supporting Information : Access provision such as a tower ladder and fall arrest system.


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Telecommunication Towers shall include protection from falling from height in accordance

with the working at height regulations.

Supporting Information : Protection such as a fall arrest system, handrails on platforms etc.


Telecommunication Towers shall include Anti-Climbing Devices (ACD) to prevent

unauthorised climbing, together with removable vandal protection provisions.


Telecommunication Towers shall include lightning protection.


Telecommunication Towers shall include an aircraft warning light system where necessary

according to local regulations.


Telecommunication Towers shall include signage and warnings on the tower and at the site

to comply with all applicable standards, legislation and industry best practice.

Supporting Information : Signage to include caution warning signs for the presence of radio transmitters with

additional signage at the boundary points of where RF levels exceed safe exposure limits limiting access to

authorised persons only (where this is not in free space, such as on building roof top areas).


Telecommunications Towers shall include ducting and cable routes for RF and power

cabling from the equipment cabinets to the tower which will continue to each of the

antenna mounting positions within the tower structure.

Supporting Information : Overhead cable routes from the top of the equipment cabinets are acceptable and

likely to be the best solution in terms of ease of installation & maintenance.


The telecommunications tower and foundations shall be designed and constructed to

achieve at least a 30 year life span without the need for scheduled replacement of tower

parts.

Supporting Information : Towers should include measures such as corrosion protection to ensure they achieve

the required lifespan. Where the life of a component is unavoidably less than this, its periodic replacement

should be agreed by HS2 before fabrication or construction begins.


The telecommunications towers and foundations shall comply with all applicable

standards, legislation and approvals.


The telecommunication towers and foundations shall be suitable for the installation

environment.


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Supporting Information : The towers should be able to tolerate environmental factors such as wind loadings,

snow loadings, solar radiation etc.


All designs, fasteners, fixings and components for the telecommunication towers shall

follow metric dimensions and standards except where industry standards commonly used

in Europe dictate otherwise


The telecommunications towers shall accommodate the antenna and cabling loads

detailed by the radio system designers with an additional 33% load capacity for future

antenna systems.

Supporting Information : The tower contractor must coordinate with the other HS2 contractors to ensure

they have all relevant antenna and cabling specifications so that the required antennas and loads can be

accommodated. Additional load capacity of at least 33% should be included in the design for future antenna

systems.


The telecommunications towers shall permit antennas to be mounted in a manner which

does not impair performance.

Supporting Information : The design should ensure that the electrical, electromagnetic or mechanical

performance of the radio equipment or tower itself is not adversely affected by the design of the tower.


The telecommunications towers shall allow for simple deconstruction and removal of the

tower at the end of its life without requiring the removal of surrounding structures or

cabinets, or hazardous material handling and disposal.


Any cranes and other vehicle-borne equipment required for construction or removal of the

Telecommunications Towers shall not require access beyond the normal access routes,

parking and turning circle spaces of the RSC, radio mast compounds and tunnel portals.

Supporting Information : Fencing, adjacent only to the parking area, may be exceptionally and temporarily

removed for deconstruction but the requirement for this must be approved by HS2.

Construction method used at RDS sites will require a separate methodology taking into account access

constraints and location of other railway systems assets.

3.9 Security Systems

3.9.1 PSIM

3.9.1.1 PSIM - General Requirements

The PSIM is the comprehensive HS2 system for integrating and managing the

information from the separate electronic security applications:

a) Video Surveillance System (VSS);


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b) Electronic Access Control System (EACS);

c) Intruder Detection System (IDS); and

d) Perimeter Intruder Detection System (PIDS);

[D01-OPSCOM-1747] - PSIM - General Requirements

The PSIM shall include all equipment, hardware, software, cabling, and ancillary services as

required to provide a complete and fully functional PSIM in all respects.

3.9.1.2 PSIM - Functionality & Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-1749] - PSIM - Functionality & Performance

The PSIM shall provide real-time (within 500 milli seconds) situational awareness of the

security status of all monitored HS2 assets and sites.


The PSIM shall integrate the VSS systems to provide all operator functionality of the VSS

systems through its GUI. Only Engineering or Configuration activities should require direct

access through the individual systems.


The PSIM shall integrate the EACS systems to provide all operator functionality of the EACS




The PSIM shall integrate the IDS systems to provide all operator functionality of the IDS




The PSIM shall integrate the PIDS systems to provide all operator functionality of the PIDS




The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake Alarm / event management roles.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake Cardholder management roles.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake Access management roles.


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The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake VSS Monitoring roles.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake Site Monitoring roles.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to undertake System diagnosis roles.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to view the status of Security System devices.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to change / override Security System device

status (e.g. set / unset IDS device or open an access-controlled door).


The System shall allow Security Controllers to acknowledge an alert associated with the

device.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to view live or recorded video from a VSS

camera.


The System shall allow Security Controllers to generate a report on the device or associated

alert activity.

3.9.1.3 PSIM - Alarm / Event Handling

[D01-OPSCOM-1808] - PSIM - Alarm / Event Handling

By default, management of alerts by Security Controllers shall be a two-stage process;

requiring acknowledgement and subsequently processing.


The PSIM shall provide alarm / event handling (known as ‘cause and effect’) functionality so

that Security Controllers can effectively and efficiently assess and respond to alert

information.


All alerts, Security Controller actions and changes in system status shall be reflected

immediately (within 500ms) across the whole system.


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The PSIM shall be capable of tracking the logical activation of sequential alerts to track the

path of an event.


The PSIM shall support configuration so that 'tracked events' result in the system

automatically adjusting alert priorities as appropriate.


The standard process for operator acknowledgement of alerts shall require no more than

two Security Controller inputs (i.e. clicks / button presses), allowing management of

information with minimal and uncomplicated input.

3.9.1.4 PSIM - Alarm Prioritisation

[D01-OPSCOM-1846] - PSIM - Alarm Prioritisation

The PSIM shall support the required number of alarm levels to accommodate all possible

combinations of site / asset criticality (based on the TVRA) and event criticality (based on

the HS2 Alarm Management Plan).


The PSIM shall complete (including provision of visual confirmation through the PSIM GUI)

all basic user functionality requests within a maximum period of 500ms.


The PSIM shall allow full utilisation of all system functions by all PSIM terminals [on the

route-wide ESS] concurrently with no degradation in performance.


The PSIM shall be capable of receiving simultaneous alarm / event signals from remote

locations without loss or delay (of more than 1 second or that required by the relevant

standard, whichever is less) in their presentation to the operator.


The PSIM shall be CPNI CAPSS approved.

3.9.1.5 PSIM - System Hardware - Workstations

[D01-OPSCOM-1859] - PSIM - System Hardware - Workstations

Workstation terminals shall be provided with the ancillaries (e.g. viewing monitors,

keyboard, joystick, mouse, speakers) recommended by the PSIM manufacturer / developer.

For the purpose of this Contract, the Contractor shall assume that each workstation

shall have 3 monitors.


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3.9.1.6 PSIM - Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-1873] - PSIM - Redundancy & Resilience

The PSIM system shall have a fault-tolerant and resilient topology to provide back-up

control with full PSIM functionality for Euston Station and Old Oak Common available at

either site.



control with full PSIM functionality for Birmingham Interchange and Curzon Street available

at either site.



control with full PSIM functionality for all connected sites available at the NICC and tap-in

facility Curzon Street.


Upon failure of any one of the integrated ESS's, the PSIM shall continue to provide all

functionality associated with the other ESS's. (e.g. should the EACS fail, the PSIM will

continue to provide all functionality associated with the VSS, IDS and PIDS)

3.9.1.7 PSIM - Locations

[D01-OPSCOM-1889] - PSIM - Locations

The PSIM functionality shall be provided at the NICC.


The PSIM functionality shall be provided at Curzon Street.


The PSIM functionality shall be provided at the NICC Tap-In Facility at Curzon Street;


The PSIM functionality shall be provided at each Station.


The PSIM functionality shall be provided at each Depot.


The physical location of the PSIM application servers and workstations shall impose no

restriction on its capability to provide data from remote sites.


Restriction of PSIM access shall be achieved through configuration of user access rights.


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3.9.2 Video Surveillance System (VSS)

3.9.2.1 VSS General

The VSS is the comprehensive HS2 system for visually monitoring systems, persons and

/ or events across the HS2 network. It shall support the physical security measures

including:

- Video surveillance;

- Perimeter protection; and

- Access control points.

[D01-OPSCOM-1913] - VSS General

The VSS shall include all equipment, hardware, software, cabling, and ancillary services as

required to provide a complete and fully functional VSS in all respects.

The operational requirement for each VSS camera will be defined within the asset

specific SORs.

3.9.2.2 VSS Functionality and Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-2965] - VSS Functionality and Performance

The VSS shall provide the ability to view live footage from one or multiple cameras / camera

groups to Security Controllers.


The VSS shall provide all VSS camera controls for the selected camera (including Pan, Tilt,

Zoom and focus adjustment to Security Controllers.


The VSS shall provide playback of recorded video from one or multiple cameras / camera

groups to Security Controllers.


The VSS shall allow the export of selected footage to external media by the Security

Controllers.


The VSS shall allow real time video from any VSS camera to be accessed for viewing on

demand.


The VSS shall be capable of operating at the maximum required capacity (as specified in

these requirements) without degradation of performance. That shall include:

a) Recording of all video streams;

b) Live viewing of video streams;


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c) Playback of recorded video;

d) Rules based image analysis and

e) Export of recorded video.


Video streaming parameters for all VSS cameras shall be as described within HS2 Technical

Standard - Security Systems (ref: HS2-HS2-SC-STD-000-000004).


The VSS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile G.


The VSS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile Q.


The VSS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile S.


The VSS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile T.


The VSS shall be compliant with the requirements set out in BS EN 62676-1-1:2014 – Video

Surveillance Systems for use in Security Applications – System Requirements – General.

[D01-OPSCOM-1919] - Functionality and Performance

The [BS EN 62676] Security Grade of the system shall be as defined by the relevant TVRA,

SOR and Technical Standard - Security Systems (ref: HS2-HS2-SC-STD-000-000004)

(whichever defines the highest requirement).

For the purposes of this Contract, the Contractor shall assume that the entire VSS shall

be BS EN 62676 Security Grade 4.


The VSS shall perform as required to meet their operational requirements.


All VSS system components shall be compliant with the BS EN 62676 Environmental

Classification relevant to the installation environment.


The VSS as a whole, and specifically the VSS export process and exported footage shall

conform to the requirements of the HOSDB document “Digital Imaging Procedure”.


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The VSS as a whole, and specifically the VSS export process and exported footage shall

conform to the requirements of the “Home Office Retrieval of Video Evidence and

Production of Working Copies from Digital CCTV Systems”.

3.9.2.3 Video Storage

[D01-OPSCOM-1926] - Video Storage

The VSS shall record all live video streams from cameras.


The VSS shall record all video streams including PSIM and VSS workstation spot monitor

streams.


It shall be possible to configure recording parameters for individual or groups of video

streams.


The VSS shall include a rule-based Video of Interest (VoI) schema, as described in HS2

Technical Standard - Security Systems (ref: HS2-HS2-SC-STD-000-000004) to allow the

system to dynamically manage video distribution and storage.


All video storage shall be configured to provide redundancy in the event of multiple disk

failures (minimum of RAID 6 or contemporary and approved equivalent).


The resolution of all recorded video streams shall be suitable to meet the operational

requirement as defined within the site SOR.


All video streams shall be recorded as described in document HS2 Technical Standard -

Security Systems (ref: HS2-HS2-SC-STD-000-000004).


All recorded video shall be time and date stamped from the VSS system clock.

3.9.2.4 VSS Workstations

[D01-OPSCOM-2004] - VSS Workstations

Workstations shall be provided with the ancillaries (e.g. viewing monitors, keyboard,

joystick, mouse, speakers) recommended by the VSS manufacturer / developer.


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3.9.2.5 VSS Cameras

[D01-OPSCOM-2014] - VSS Cameras

VSS cameras and their associated components (lens, housing etc.) shall be designed and

selected to meet the operational requirement.


VSS cameras shall be of static or PTZ nature as defined by the operational requirement.

The use of multi-megapixel / 360-degree cameras instead of standard static or PTZ

cameras is acceptable where all operational requirements can be met.


Illuminators (which activate automatically based on ambient light levels) shall be provided

as required and as appropriate to the location to ensure lighting levels within camera Field

of View's are above the minimum requirements for the camera.


Camera housings shall be designed and selected to meet the operational requirement

considering the installation location and environment. Consideration should be given to

the requirements for:

a) IP rating;

b) IK rating (for vandal resistance);

c) Operating temperature range;

d) Sun / Rain / Snow shield;

e) Vibration testing, and

f ) Hydrophobic coating.

Thermal cameras may be used in support of Perimeter Protection functionality where

the operational requirement is only for the detection of the presence of an

unauthorised person in the field of view.

3.9.2.6 VSS Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-2030] - Redundancy & Resilience

The VSS system shall have a fault-tolerant and resilient topology in order to provide full VSS

functionality for Euston Station and Old Oak Common, available at either site for back-up

control.



functionality for Birmingham Interchange and Curzon Street, available at either site for

back-up control.


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functionality for the NICC and Curzon Street, available at either site for back-up control.


The VSS shall function autonomously in the event of failure of the PSIM; allowing the

Security Controller to access the VSS application directly, bypassing the PSIM.

3.9.2.7 VSS System Management

[D01-OPSCOM-3201] - VSS System Management

The VSS shall monitor its own operation and provide notification of any issues that

significantly impact its operation.


The VSS shall provide alerts for camera masking.

Supporting Information : To include attempts to ‘cover up’ the camera view either by painting the lens,

covering the camera fixture with a bag, blanket or similar or the effects of inclement weather such as snow,

mist or fog.


The VSS shall provide alerts for blinding.

Supporting Information : To include use of a bright light source or laser aimed directly into the camera lens.


The VSS shall provide alerts for signal cut.

Supporting Information : To include interruption of the camera power or signal cable.


The VSS shall provide alerts for camera jolt.

Supporting Information : To include physically knocking the camera off axis.


The VSS shall provide extensive reporting functionality.

3.9.2.8 Installation of VSS Cameras

[D01-OPSCOM-2048] - Installation of VSS Cameras

VSS cameras shall be provided in locations and at the required height to meet the

operational requirement defined in the site specific SOR.


VSS cameras shall be installed in positions to enable ease of maintenance without the need

to stop train movements or isolate Overhead Catenary System (OCS).


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VSS camera mounting poles and associated brackets shall provide winch-down operation

unless spacing constraints dictate this is not possible.


Mounting structures shall include integrated cable containment, ensuring cabling is

mechanically protected and is not damaged through repeated use of the winch-down

function.


All mounting structures shall be fitted with anti-climb measures to deter unauthorised

access to the mast, tower, bracket or pole.

3.9.2.9 VSS Testing

[D01-OPSCOM-2058] - VSS Testing

The VSS shall be tested against the operational requirement for each camera as defined by

the testing procedures in BS EN 62676-4:2015 (Video Surveillance Systems for use in

Security Applications – Part 4: Application Guidelines)

[D01-OPSCOM-2059] - VSS Testing

Testing shall be undertaken with the use of an Assured View (developed at design stage)

for each VSS camera.

3.9.2.10 VSS Locations

[D01-OPSCOM-2061] - VSS Locations

The VSS application shall be available at the NICC to provide route wide VSS monitoring.


All live and recorded video streams shall be available at the NICC.


Video management of Minor Sites shall be performed at the NICC.

3.9.2.11 VSS Interface

[D01-OPSCOM-2067] - VSS Interface

A secure gateway shall allow for sharing of video with authorised external stakeholders

including BTP, DfT, ES, LU & NR.


BTP shall be provided with access to the VSS through VSS terminals provided within the

dedicated BTP room at the NICC.


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BTP shall be provided with access to the VSS through VSS terminals provided within the

BTP room at Calvert Depot.


All requests by external stakeholders to export VSS footage shall be subject to a data

subject access request.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams form NR VSS system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from LU VSS system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from BTP VSS system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from TOC VSS system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from Automatic People Mover

VSS system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from HS2 station tenants VSS

system.


The VSS shall be capable of receiving external video streams from WDS.


All VSS functionality shall be available to video streams from the external sources.

3.9.3 Intruder Detection System (IDS)

3.9.3.1 IDS General

The IDS is the comprehensive HS2 system for detecting unauthorised intrusions into an

area, building or room and notifying the Security Operations Team. It shall support the

physical security including access control points.

[D01-OPSCOM-2120] - IDS General

The IDS shall include all equipment, hardware, software, cabling, and ancillary services as

required to provide a complete and fully functional IDS in all respects.


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The operational requirement for the IDS will be defined in the site specific TVRA and

asset specific SOR.

[D01-OPSCOM-2124] - IDS General

The IDS shall provide Basic, Early or Verified protection to assets as described within the

relevant SOR / TVRA.

Basic, Early and Verified IDS requirements are described below.

Basic: A single layer of IDS sensor capability is required in order that the system

generates an alert upon breach of the final barrier to intrusion (fence or enclosure) to

an asset. No technical verification is required of the alert. Verification is undertaken by

operational staff.

Early: As Basic but with an additional layer of IDS to provide early activation at the point

an attack is started. An attack must have to trigger 2 different layers of IDS sensor in

order to reach the protected asset. The activation of the second sensor validates the

first alert but full verification is still undertaken by operational staff.

Verified: As Early but with technical verification capability meeting the ACPO

requirements for immediate response.

3.9.3.2 IDS Functionality & Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-2123] - IDS Functionality & Performance

The system shall detect an attempted or actual breach of any physical security barrier

being monitored by the IDS.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to view device and zone locations and its current

status.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to select one or multiple devices or zones.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to add new IDS devices to the System.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to set / un-set one or multiple devices or zones.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to remove existing IDS devices from the System.


The IDS shall allow Security Controllers to configure existing devices on the system.


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The IDS shall be configurable to ensure nuisance alarms can be filtered out, taking into

account the effects of:

a) Wildlife (movement of animals or plant);

b) Environmental / weather effects;

c) Passing trains;

d) Road traffic or nearby machinery;

e) Rivers and streams; and

f) Overhead or underground power cables.


The IDS shall not have ‘dead-zones’ (areas where detection cannot be achieved) in any area

that is defined as requiring IDS.


The IDS shall have a Pd (Probability of Detection) rate high enough to meet or exceed the

operational requirement.


The IDS shall have a FAR (False Alarm Rate) low enough to meet or exceed the operational

requirement. A false alarm is any alarm generated due to a fault with the IDS.


The IDS shall have a NAR (Nuisance Alarm Rate) low enough to meet or exceed the

operational requirement. A nuisance alarm is any alarm generated by a positive detection

of an event that is not of interest (e.g. weather conditions causing the fence to vibrate

leading to an alert).


The system shall be compliant with the requirements set out in BS EN 50131 – Alarm

Systems – Intrusion and hold up systems.


The required [BS EN 50131] Security Grade of the system will be defined by the site specific

TVRA and asset specific SOR.


The IDS shall conform to BS EN 50131 Security Grade 3 for the purpose of pricing.


All IDS components shall be compliant with the [BS EN 50131] Environmental Classification

relevant to the installation environment.


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3.9.3.3 IDS Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-2160] - IDS Redundancy & Resilience

The IDS shall function autonomously in the event of failure of the PSIM.

3.9.3.4 IDS Interface

[D01-OPSCOM-2163] - IDS Interface

All Operator functionality of the IDS shall be available through the PSIM GUI. Only

Engineering / Configuration activities should require direct access through the IDS.

3.9.3.5 IDS Locations

[D01-OPSCOM-2174] - IDS Locations

All IDS information shall be available at the NICC.


The IDS application shall ensure IDS information associated with Major Sites is available at

those sites.


IDS management of Minor Sites shall be performed at the NICC.

3.9.3.6 IDS Installation

[D01-OPSCOM-2178] - IDS Installation

All cabling and field equipment shall be installed within the supervised premises / area, at

the maximum practical distance from the perimeter and shall be mechanically protected.

[D01-OPSCOM-2172] - IDS Installation

All Control and Indicating Equipment shall be installed within the Supervised Area /

Supervised Premises (as defined by BS EN 50131).

3.9.4 Perimeter Intruder Detection System (PIDS)

3.9.4.1 PIDS General

[D01-OPSCOM-2181] - PIDS General

The PIDS is the comprehensive HS2 system for detecting unauthorised intrusions across

the perimeter of a site. It shall support the physical security including perimeter protection.


The PIDS shall form an extension of the IDS, utilising the same management application as

the IDS.


The PIDS shall include all equipment, hardware, software, cabling, and ancillary services as

required to provide a complete and fully functional PIDS in all respects.


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The operational requirement for the PIDS will be defined in the site specific TVRA and

asset specific SOR.

The PIDS shall be applied to site perimeters as defined within the site specific TVRA and

asset specific SOR including on all access gates which may ‘break’ the perimeter fence

line.

3.9.4.2 PIDS Functionality & Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-2198] - PIDS Functionality & Performance

The PIDS shall be a system that is listed on the CPNI Catalogue of Security Equipment.


The PIDS shall be capable of monitoring different styles of fencing fabric including:

a) Chain link;

b) Expanded metal;

c) Welded mesh;

d) Palisade; and

e) Other fence fabric used within HS2.


The PIDS shall detect and locate attempts to breach the relevant site perimeter including

attempts to:

a) Scale / climb the perimeter fence;

b) Cut / damage the perimeter fence to gain access through it;

c) Raise / lift the fence fabric;

d) Burrow under the perimeter fence;

e) Disturb / shake the fence; and

f) Cut / damage any PIDS sensor or equipment.


The PIDS shall pinpoint attempted breaches of the perimeter with an accuracy of +/- 5m.


The PIDS shall be capable of detecting multiple simultaneous intrusions at distances of

50m or more based upon zone granularity.


The PIDS shall be configurable to ensure nuisance alarms can be filtered out, considering

the effects of:

a) Wildlife (movement of animals or vegetation);

b) Environmental / weather effects;

c) Passing trains;

d) Road traffic or nearby machinery;

e) Rivers and streams; and

f) Overhead or underground power cables.


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The PIDS shall not have ‘dead-zones’ (areas where detection cannot be achieved) in any

area that is defined as requiring PIDS.


The PIDS shall detect and report the location of any damage caused to the PIDS which

could result in degraded PIDS performance.


Where cable based PIDS technology is proposed, in the event of a cable cut the PIDS shall

maintain detection along the full perimeter.


The PIDS shall have a Pd (Probability of Detection) high enough to meet or exceed the

operational requirements.


The design basis threat for calculating the Pd and Cl shall be in accordance with the HS2

Design Base Threat document.


The PIDS shall have a FAR (False Alarm Rate) low enough to meet or exceed the

performance requirement.


The PIDS shall have a NAR (Nuisance Alarm Rate)low enough to meet or exceed the

performance requirement.

3.9.4.3 PIDS Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-2224] - PIDS Redundancy & Resilience

The PIDS shall function autonomously in the event of failure of the PSIM.

3.9.4.4 PIDS Installation

[D01-OPSCOM-2228] - PIDS Installation

Except for fence-mounted cables (if such a technology is selected by the Contractor), all

cabling and field equipment shall be installed within the supervised premises / area.

3.9.4.5 PIDS Location

[D01-OPSCOM-2232] - PIDS Location

All PIDS information shall be available at the NICC.


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The IDS application shall ensure PIDS information associated with Major Sites is available at

those sites.


PIDS management of Minor Sites shall be performed at the NICC.

3.9.4.6 PIDS Interfaces

[D01-OPSCOM-2245] - PIDS Interfaces

The VSS shall provide coverage of all PIDS detection zones to a minimum recognition level

of 10% Rotakin.

3.9.5 Electronic Access Control System (EACS)

3.9.5.1 EACS General

The EACS shall be the comprehensive HS2 system for managing the access control

needs of all HS2 sites. with each facility under the control of a single EACS for all areas

throughout HS2.

[D01-OPSCOM-3302] - EACS General

The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by permitting

access to authorised individuals to secured and any other area designated by HS2 and the

SOR and TVRA requirements.


The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by the prevention

of unauthorised access by inadvertent means or unauthorised individuals.


The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by the detection of

unauthorised access by inadvertent means or unauthorised individuals.


The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by assuring that an

individual is immediately denied entry to a specific area when that person’s access

authority to that area is withdrawn.


The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by archiving all

access and alert events, providing auditability of such events.


The EACS shall support the physical security and ensure Access Control by providing timely

notification to the Security Controller of all off-normal events and alert events.


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The EACS shall include all equipment, hardware, software, cabling, and ancillary services as

required to provide a complete and fully functional EACS in all respects including credential

capture and card production capability.

3.9.5.2 EACS Functionality & Performance

[D01-OPSCOM-2274] - EACS Functionality & Performance

The EACS shall allow operators to monitor and manage the status of all access-controlled

points across the HS2 Route. This shall include:


a) Identification of a device or Access Control Point; and


b) Set an Access Control Point to open / close.


The EACS shall enable management of personnel and vehicle access through secure

boundaries on HS2 sites.


The EACS shall enable monitoring of personnel and vehicle access through secure

boundaries on HS2 sites.

The operational requirement for the EACS will be defined in the asset specific SOR.


The EACS shall function autonomously in the event of failure of the PSIM, to the lowest

level of granularity (e.g. door or portal).


The EACS shall have an anti-passback function (i.e. to prevent a cardholder gaining access

and subsequently passing their card back to another user who may be unauthorised).


The EACS shall have the capability of enabling a two-person rule for certain safety and

security areas. This would always require at least two authorised persons to be in an area

when the area is occupied. Entry to such areas would require a valid entry request by two

cardholders before the portal would allow entry.


The EACS shall provide the capability to detect tailgating / piggybacking (where a second

person gains access through an access point by directly following an authorised user).


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There shall be a duress feature that when activated by staff, silently triggers an alert to

notify the NICC to a problem situation.


The EACS shall monitor all access requests, both authorised and unauthorised.


The acceptable false acceptance rate for biometric systems shall be low enough to meet or

exceed the operational requirement.


The acceptable false rejection rate for biometric systems shall be low enough to meet or

exceed the operational requirement.


The EACS shall meet the throughput requirements for each location without incurring

delays or waiting time.


The EACS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile A.


The EACS and all components (as relevant) shall be compliant with ONVIF Profile C.


The EACS shall be compliant with BS EN 60839-11-1 grade as defined within the site specific

TVRA or SOR


The EACS shall be compliant with BS EN 60839-11-2 grade as defined within the site specific

TVRA or SOR


Cards shall incorporate secure encryption technology to prevent fraudulent copying of

cards and compromise of the cryptographic protections.

3.9.5.3 EACS Redundancy & Resilience

[D01-OPSCOM-2326] - EACS Redundancy & Resilience

The EACS shall function autonomously in the event of failure of the PSIM.


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3.9.5.4 EACS Location

[D01-OPSCOM-2267] - EACS Location

All EACS information shall be available at the NICC.


EACS application shall ensure that information associated with Major Sites shall be

available at those sites.


EACS management of Minor Sites shall be performed at the NICC.

3.9.5.5 EACS System Management

[D01-OPSCOM-2328] - EACS System Management

The system shall be managed centrally at the NICC.

[D01-OPSCOM-2329] - EACS System Management

The system shall allow enrolment of persons onto the EACS on a permanent basis to be

undertaken at the NICC.

3.9.5.6 EACS Interfaces

[D01-OPSCOM-2343] - EACS Interfaces

The EACS shall be capable of receiving data from the Fire System to automatically update

dynamic data for system devices as required.

3.9.6 All ESS Systems

[D01-OPSCOM-3127] - All ESS Systems

Each ESS system shall comply with the requirements contained with HS2 Security Technical

Standard [HS2-HS2-SC-STD-000-000004].

3.9.6.1 ESS Safety, Integrity and Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3214] - ESS Safety, Integrity and Availability

The functions performed by the Electronic Security System to deter, detect, delay and deny

security related threats shall have minimum of "Basic Integrity".

[D01-OPSCOM-3215] - ESS Safety, Integrity and Availability

The ESS functions providing the Electronic Security System real-time system status and

fault diagnostics shall have minimum of "Basic Integrity".


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3.9.6.2 ESS Training System

[D01-OPSCOM-3160] - ESS Training System

The ESS Systems shall include Training equipment with functionality to simulate, record,

playback and demonstrate each operational feature of the ESS for operational training and

simulation events for full system functionality, operational training and post-event analysis.

[D01-OPSCOM-3165] - ESS Training System

The ESS Systems provided for training shall not connect to the operational live ESS

equipment.

3.9.6.3 ESS in the System Integration Facility (SIF)

[D01-OPSCOM-3336] - ESS in the System Integration Facility

The HS2 System Integration Facility shall include a representative Electronic Security

Systems to replicate the Railway electronic security system.


The SIF ESS shall include PSIM, VSS, EACS, IDS and PIDS systems.


The SIF ESS shall include representative PSIM workstations for the NICC and RITF.

3.9.6.4 ESS System Management

[D01-OPSCOM-2979] - ESS System Management

All instances of dynamic Security System data shall be updated within 1 second of the

relevant data value being changed by one of the systems.


The Security System shall maintain a log of all system, device and user events in a

database.


All system entities including devices and users shall be named in line with the HS2 Asset

Identification Standard [HS2-HS2-IM-STD-000-000010] and HS2 Asset Labelling standard

[HS2-HS2-IM-STD-000-000004].

3.9.6.5 ESS Resilience & Redundancy

[D01-OPSCOM-2355] - ESS Resilience & Redundancy

The Security System shall include automatic system monitoring and ‘heath check’ tools to

ensure that system faults are automatically identified and notification provided to

operators via the PSIM.


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The Security System interface with the IMP shall allow all Security System device data to be

shared between the two systems.


The Security System shall provide the facility to back-up the complete system configuration

and subsequently restore it in the event of a system failure.


The Security System at each major site shall function autonomously in the event it

becomes disconnected from the route-wide system.

3.9.6.6 ESS Users (Operators)

[D01-OPSCOM-2360] - ESS Users (Operators)

The Security System shall integrate with the HS2 AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and

Accounting) system to enable each operator’s details to be fully synchronised.


User access to the Security System shall be restricted using a unique username and

password.


The Security System shall allow configuration of password requirements in line with HS2

policies.


Changes in operator status (e.g. change to access rights) shall be reflected across the

entirety of the Security System within 1 second.

3.9.6.7 ESS System Hardware

3.9.6.7.1 ESS System Servers & Workstation Hardware

[D01-OPSCOM-2373] - ESS System Servers & Workstation Hardware

Workstation and Server hardware, operating systems and supporting software shall be of a

type / make / model compliant with manufacturers recommendations.


Workstation monitors shall be of a suitable size and technology type for their intended use

and environment. This shall include suitable:

a) Screen size;

b) Response time;

c) Brightness;

d) Contract ratio;

e) Resolution;

f) Viewing angles;


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g) Colour Filters;

h) Anti-glare surfaces; and

i) Features for reducing eye strain.


Monitors shall be designed for 24/7 operation.

3.9.6.7.2 ESS Connectivity

[D01-OPSCOM-2377] - ESS Connectivity

All hardware shall be interconnected physically.


All WAN connectivity shall be via the DTN.


The Security System shall utilise the DTN for all IP communications.


All structured cabling which supports field device connectivity shall be interconnected to

the DTN using colour coordinated patch leads.


All equipment shall be cabled in compliance with the manufacturer’s instructions using

manufacturer approved cable and terminations.


All cabling in external or unsecure areas shall be installed in ducting or mechanically

protected within steel cable containment.

3.9.6.8 ESS Installation

[D01-OPSCOM-2385] - ESS Installation

All Security System components shall operate (including meeting their operational

requirement) without fault due to their installation environment, allowing for 100-year

storm conditions.


All Security System components shall be compatible with the EMC environment at the LoR

location.


All Security System components and cabling shall be labelled in accordance with the HS2

labelling requirements.


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With the exception of cables supporting system components at the perimeter, all cables

shall not be installed within 3m of the perimeter fence.


With the exception of components specifically mounted at the perimeter to achieve their

operational requirement, components shall not be installed within 3m of the perimeter

fence.


All transmission, processing, analyser or electronic storage devices shall be installed in

protective enclosures.


Tamper protection shall be provided on all active equipment enclosure openings,

generating a tamper alert signal when activated.


All equipment shall be installed in line with the manufacturer's recommendations.


Workstations shall be installed within the relevant operational control room.


Mounts and locations for workstation monitors and input devices (mouse, keyboard and

joystick) shall be configurable to meet the ergonomic requirements of individual operators.


All field equipment cabling shall be mechanically protected up to the equipment housing.


Suitable cable entry glands shall be used to maintain the security and environmental

integrity of equipment housings.

3.9.6.9 ESS Power

[D01-OPSCOM-2399] - ESS Power

All Security System components shall be supported by a UPS for a period consistent with

the supporting infrastructure (specifically the DTN).


All systems shall be capable of initiating a controlled shutdown upon the receipt of a power

failure alert from the UPS.


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Loss of mains power shall not result in loss or corruption of any data.

3.9.6.10 ESS Scalability

[D01-OPSCOM-2403] - ESS Scalability

The Security System shall be an Enterprise level system, capable of multi-site

implementation with centralised monitoring and management capability.


The Security System shall be sized with 20% headroom over the initial required capacity.


The Security System shall enable capacity to be increased on a temporary or permanent

basis without degrading their performance.


The Security System shall have the capability to enable capacity to be increased on a

modular basis, and without requiring replacement of original system components.

Supporting Information : The system scalability is to include the hardware, software and licensing of

the ESS.

3.9.6.11 ESS Maintenance

[D01-OPSCOM-2408] - ESS Maintenance

The Security System shall allow for hardware and system upgrades to be undertaken

without degrading the system performance.

[D01-OPSCOM-2409] - ESS Maintenance

The Security System shall allow for standard regular maintenance and equipment

replacement without degrading system performance.

3.9.6.12 ESS Clock Synchronisation

[D01-OPSCOM-2411] - ESS Clock Synchronisation

All ESS’s shall interface with the HS2 master time source / master clock to maintain the

synchronised date and time from the HS2 master time source / master clock.

3.9.6.13 ESS IP Networks & Devices

[D01-OPSCOM-2415] - ESS IP Networks & Devices

All IP addressable devices shall support both IPv4 and IPv6 and shall utilise the DTN IP

Address Schema.


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3.9.6.14 ESS Network and Cyber Security

[D01-OPSCOM-2417] - ESS Network and Cyber Security

All ESS’s shall be compliant with all HS2 Cyber Security policies, frameworks and

requirements (See D01-OPSCOM-115).

3.9.6.15 ESS Testing

[D01-OPSCOM-2419] - ESS Testing

All ESS’s shall provide equipment self-test functionality.

3.9.6.16 ESS Interfaces

The following system interfaces apply to provide the functionality described by the

requirements in this document.

[D01-OPSCOM-2701] - ESS Interfaces

The PSIM shall interface with the VSS.


The PSIM shall interface with the IDS.


The PSIM shall interface with the EACS.


The VSS shall interface with the IDS if video analytics is proposed as a PIDS solution.


The VSS shall interface with the NR VSS.


The VSS shall interface with the LU VSS.


The VSS shall interface with the BTP VSS.


The VSS shall interface with the WDS.


The EACS shall interface with the IDS.


The EACS shall interface with the Fire System.


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The Security System shall interface with the IMP.


The Security System shall interface with the HS2 Master Clock System.


The Security System shall interface with the HS2 AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and

Accounting) system.

The requirements in this section apply to the Security System as a whole, specifically

including the PSIM, VSS, IDS, PIDS and EACS.

3.10 Equipment Rooms and Racking

Equipment rooms are provided for Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems use at the following buildings:

- Stations,

- Depots,

- Tunnel Portal Buildings,

- Tunnel Vent & Evacuation Shafts, and

- NICC.

[D01-OPSCOM-2991] - Equipment Rooms and Racking

Enclosures (e.g. kiosks / REB's) shall be provided as required by the site specific TVRA.


All enclosure access points (doors, windows and vents) shall be protected to the same level

as the enclosure itself.


All equipment rooms and REBs shall be a suitable environment as a place of work without

the need for ear protection and with suitable lighting levels and temperature control.


The equipment room layouts shall be designed such that two racks facing each other can

be maintained simultaneously.


Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems equipment in REBs and equipment

rooms (excluding tunnel cross passages) shall be populated in standard 800mm x 800mm x

42u rack types.


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All power switches in the racks, are to be located behind protective covers to prevent

accidental switching off of the power.

3.11 Radio Mast Compounds

[D01-OPSCOM-3105] - Radio Mast Compounds

Radio Mast Compounds shall be designed and constructed based on the outlined

principles captured in GSM-R Multi-User Compound Design Rationale Report [HRS08-WSP-

RC-REP-000-000003] and optimised during the design.


Radio mast compound REB alarms shall be connected to the M&E SCADA panel located

within the compound.

Supporting Information : Alarms to include as a minimum the status of the following systems fire, HVAC and

incoming power supply.


The primary Cable Management System (CMS) shall be provided in the Radio Mast

Compound including the connection to the trackside CMS for all contractors.

Supporting Information : The cable management system is to be designed for HV power cables, LV power

cables, earthing cables, signalling cables and telecoms cables. The design is to be developed in conjunction

with the other railway systems contractors so that the CMS has sufficient capacity for the amount of cabling

at these locations.


The Radio Mast Compounds shall have an earth mat, electrodes and suitable connection

points to the main site earth for the systems installed within the compound.

3.11.1 Radio Mast Compound ESS

[D01-OPSCOM-3108] - Radio Mast Compound ESS

The ESS located at Radio Mast Compounds shall comply with the requirements of the site

specific TVRA.

[D01-OPSCOM-3129] - Radio Mast Compound ESS

The ESS located at Radio Mast Compounds shall comply with the requirements of the

'Security Operational Requirements Radio Masts' [HS2-ARP-SC-SPE-000-000014].

3.11.2 Radio Mast Compound Fencing

[D01-OPSCOM-2983] - Radio Mast Compound Fencing

Fencing shall be provided as required by the site specific TVRA.


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Fencing shall be compliant with the requirements in document HS2 Technical Standard -

Fencing [HS2-HS2-CV-STD-000-000002].


Fencing shall be compliant with the requirements in BS EN 1722 Chain Link and Anti-

Intruder Fences for the relevant type of fencing (as described in HS2 Technical Standard -

Fencing [HS2-HS2-CV-STD-000-000002]).

Any change in fence line direction shall be 45 degrees or less from the projected fence

direction to minimise climb points. i.e. The internal angle (from 180 degrees) at the point

where the fence changes direction shall be a minimum of 135 degrees.


Fencing shall provide a continuous physical barrier around the perimeter of the asset.


The only breaks in the continuous fence line shall be access points.


Access points shall be protected with gates.

Supporting Information : For Electronic Access Control refer to section 3.9.5.


Access point gates shall be provided to the same specification as the adjacent fencing.

3.12 Rapid Deployment Sites (RDS)

[D01-OPSCOM-3307] - Rapid Deployment Sites

Rapid Deployment Sites (RDS) shall be designed and constructed based on the outlined

principles captured in GSM-R Multi-User Rapid Deployment Solution Rationale Report

[HRS08-WSP-RC-REP-000-000005] and optimised during the design.


RDS REB alarms shall be connected to the M&E SCADA panel located at the RDS.

Supporting Information : Alarms to include as a minimum the status of the following systems fire, HVAC and

incoming power supply.


The primary Cable Management System (CMS) shall be provided at the RDS including the

connection to the trackside CMS for all contractors.

Supporting Information : The cable management system is to be designed for HV power cables, LV power

cables, earthing cables and telecoms cables. The design is to be developed in conjunction with the other

railway systems contractors so that the CMS has sufficient capacity for the amount of cabling at these

locations.


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The RDS shall comply with the requirements of the site specific TVRA.


The RDS shall have an earth mat, electrodes and suitable connection points to the main

site earth for the systems installed within the structure.

3.13 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Power & UPS

3.13.1 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Power

[D01-OPSCOM-3086] - Operational Telecommunications and Security System Power

The design of the Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment shall

not exceed the following power loads without approval of HS2:

- NICC Main Comms Equipment Room (ground floor) - 98.6KWatts

- NICC Comms Equipment Room (first floor) - 5.5KWatts

- Washwood Heath Depot Control Equipment Room - 5.5KWatts

- Calvert Depot Control Equipment Room - 5.5KWatts

- Railway System Compounds (with a mast) - 29.95KWatts

- Railway System Compounds (without a mast) - 14.25KWatts

- Radio Mast Compounds - 14.25KWatts

- Trackside Active Cabinets - 1.5KWatts

- Tunnel Portal Buildings - 21.7KWatts

- Tunnel Vent Shaft Equipment Rooms - 6.5KWatts

- Tunnel Cross Passages - 1.75KWatts

- Station Operational Comms Equipment Room - 22.95KWatts

3.13.2 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems UPS

An Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system shall be connected between incoming

mains supply within the REB and the electrical load of the HS2 Operational

Telecommunication and Security Systems equipment to provide protection from

incoming mains supply failure.

In the event of a mains supply failure, the UPS batteries provide uninterrupted power to

the equipment. In normal circumstances mains failures are relatively short in duration

and thus the power supplied by the UPS needs to be adequate to support equipment

until mains has been restored.

[D01-OPSCOM-3088] - Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems UPS

Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment shall be connected to

an AC UPS backed supply.


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Supporting Information : At the following locations an AC protected supply (UPS backed) is provided for

HRS20 use by others:-

- NICC / WWH Depot,

- Calvert Depot,

- Stone Depot,

- HS2 Stations,

- Radio Mast Compounds,

- Rapid Deployment Sites,

- Trackside Active Cabinets,

- Tunnels (cross passages/portal buildings/shafts), and

- Pumping Stations

At some locations including at Railway Systems Compounds, only an AC supply is provided for HRS20 use.

Any AC to DC conversion required to power Operational Telecommunications Systems is to be provided by

HRS20.


A UPS shall initially be sized to support the Operational Telecommunications and Security

Systems equipment within the REB for 90 minutes and allow 20% spare capacity.


The UPS shall have the following features as a minimum;

- Rack mounted 19” format,

- Bypass switch allowing maintenance/replacement without loss of supply,

- Remote alarm monitoring of mains and UPS supplies and UPS faults, and

- Self test function.


The UPS shall be in accordance with BS EN 62040-1 Uninterruptible power systems (UPS) -

Safety requirements.


The UPS shall include lightning protection devices to prevent electrical surges damaging

the UPS and Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment.


All UPS batteries shall be sealed maintenance-free with leak proof electrolyte.

3.14 Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems Environmental Conditions

[D01-OPSCOM-907] - Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems

Environmental Conditions

All Operational Telecommunication and Security systems housings and equipment shall be

designed to withstand weather conditions to which it is predicted to be exposed.


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Supporting Information : The contractor's environmental modelling is to be used. See section 10 for more

information and HS2's Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Technical Standard [HS2-HS2-SU-STD-

000-000003].



The Operational Telecommunications and Security System deployed on the open line of

route shall be designed to operate in environmental condition category T1 as described in

BS EN 50125-3.



The Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment installed in tunnels

and cross passages shall operate within the ranges of the following operating conditions:

- Temperature range of -10oC to +50oC,

- Humidity range of between 35% and 65%,

- The railway environment subject to contamination from both metal dust and dust

particles,

- Pressure loading (pressure and suction) due to the passing of trains is 8 KPa +/-10% for

long tunnels and 12 KPa +/- 10% for short tunnels, and

- Withstand a minimum of 400,000 pressure cycles per year due to passing trains for the

duration of the equipment service life.



Any Operational Telecommunications and Security System trackside components shall

withstand vibrations due to the passage of trains, transmitted via the rail mountings or

otherwise, in accordance with the requirements in BS EN 50125-3.



Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems' equipment shall be fitted with anti-

vibration devices wherever practical to mitigate unwanted uncoupling or loosening.

3.15 Operational Telecommunication and Security System - Spares

[D01-OPSCOM-1400] - Operational Telecommunication and Security System - Spares

The Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems shall include a set of operational

spares in accordance with HS2 maintenance requirements.


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4 Interface Requirements The system interfaces for this contract are captured in the HS2 Interface Control

Document for HRS20 Operational Telecommunications [HS2-HS2-IN-ICD-000-000024].

5 Quality There are no additional requirements in this section.

6 RAM 6.1 Materials and Durability

There are no additional requirements in this section.

6.2 Performance, Reliability and Availability

6.2.1 Performance


6.2.2 Availability

6.2.2.1 GSM-R Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3097] - GSM-R Availability

The minimum steady-state availability for the Base Transceiver Station shall be 99.9811%.


The minimum steady-state availability for the Radiating Cables shall be 99.9811%.


The minimum steady-state availability for the Antennas shall be 99.9811%.

6.2.2.2 DTN Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3101] - DTN Availability

The minimum steady-state availability for the Data Transmission Network shall be

99.9985%.

6.2.2.3 Tunnel Radio Network Availability

[D01-OPSCOM-3103] - Tunnel Radio Network Availability

The Tunnel Radio system reliability and availability shall be commensurate with a

probability of failure on demand of 1 x 10-3.


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6.3 Maintenance and asset management

6.3.1 Asset Condition Monitoring

[D01-OPSCOM-2453] - Asset Condition Monitoring

The contractor shall configure Operational Telecoms and Security Management Platforms

to capture and provide HS2 with available telecommunication and security asset condition

and performance data.

Supporting Information : This is to achieve HS2 objectives of :

- Predict and Prevent approach.

- Minimise the extent of deploying people to site to physically monitor assets.

- Removing people from the railway environment by deployment of remote and autonomous systems.


Asset Management Plans provided by HRS20 contractor shall be written in alignment to the

ISO 55000 suite of documents.


The Operational Telecommunications and Security Management Platforms shall monitor

and diagnose asset information from a holistic / whole system perspective.


The Operational Telecommunications Integrated Management Platform (IMP) shall have an

interface with the Engineering Management System (EMS) to pass high level critical alarms

to inform HS2 operations and guide maintenance in the investigation and diagnostic of

telecoms failures.


The IMP shall aggregate data from all operational telecoms systems and store asset health

and trend data, where available, so that trend information and historic failure data can be

reviewed.


Audible and visual alarms shall be configured as agreed with HS2.


The Security systems alarms, status and data shall be managed and stored within the

security systems with alarm and health information being presented to the security

controller.


The contractor shall maximise the use of intrinsic* fault detection, Control and Indication

(C&I) and Built-In-Test (BIT) functions already monitored to develop new predictive

capabilities without the need for additional sensors or connectivity.


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* Intrinsic in this respect means within the ACM system itself rather than within the asset

that is being monitored.


The management platform shall store all asset condition and failure data for a period of 24

months or longer.

6.3.2 Maintenance

[D01-OPSCOM-2448] - Maintenance

The Operational Telecommunications and Security System shall be configured to maxmise

the amount of non-intrusive maintenance that can be undertaken on the system in

operational hours.


Assets shall be designed and constructed to enable safe and efficient maintenance within

the allocated white periods.


Other HS2 contractors will provide maintenance walkways either side of the track adjacent

to the primary cable management system. Where works is planned that affects the

walkway, the contractor shall ensure that any installed equipment, posts, signage or

cabinets does not impede the walkway and makes good any disturbance of the walkway

caused by the work.


Common Design Elements (CDE) shall be considered when designing Rail Systems, Stations

and Civil assets.


Systems and assets shall be designed to eliminate, where feasible, the need to work in

hazardous environments.


HS2 systems and assets shall be designed to incorporate redundancy and eliminate, where

appropriate, Single Points of Failure (SPoF).


System critical cabling with redundancy shall be separated to mitigate against single point

of failure scenarios.


Operational telecommunications and security assets and components shall be field

replaceable units wherever possible.


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Specialist equipment and diagnostic tools required to operate and maintain the

operational telecommunications and security systems shall be supplied. A list of

equipment and tools shall be of sufficient quantities to cover device and tool calibration

and failure/repair cycles.

Supporting Information : The list of specialist equipment and tools shall be agreed with HS2.


Any inspection and maintenance of assets prior to completion shall be in accordance with

the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) maintenance plans. Any works will be

recorded within the HS2 BIM or AIM system.

Supporting Information : Operational Telecommunications and Security System assets are required to have a

recommended planned maintenance activity scheduled that can be adopted by HS2 maintenance teams

following handover. For structures, such as telecoms towers and VSS posts this will include ground fixings

inspections.


Any equipment or system failures shall be captured in a DRACAS to identify any shortfalls

in the installation, operation and maintenance of the system, and ensure that any

deficiencies are identified and corrective actions captured.


Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems shall be designed and configured to

minimise the impact to customers and the customer experience during planned

maintenance activities.


Critical spares shall be provided to HS2 prior to commencement of trial operations


A Reliability Critical Item List (RCIL) shall be developed jointly by the OEM suppliers and the

HS2 Infrastructure Manager.


Rail systems shall be designed and constructed to be both interoperable and maintainable.


The Operational Telecommunications and Security Management Platforms shall manage

and reduce the impact of failure for at least 90% of the operational telecommunications

and security sub-system failure modes.


All Operational Telecommunication and Electronic Security Systems shall be provided with

a full set of O&M documents.


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Supporting Information : The O&M documentation is to include a list of safety hazards and safety

precautions that must be taken by users.


All Operational Telecommunication and Electronic Security Systems shall be provided with

a full set of maintenance specifications for HS2 acceptance.

6.3.3 Obsolescence

[D01-OPSCOM-2464] - Obsolescence

Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) suppliers shall provide upgrade paths for supplied

systems in order to mitigate obsolescence risk.

6.3.4 Whole lifecycle cost


7 Safety [D01-OPSCOM-3273] - Safety

The systems shall comply with the specified system safety targets.

[D01-OPSCOM-3274] - Safety

For all systems performing railway control and protection functions, the safety related

electronic systems for signalling principles contained within BS EN 50129 shall apply.


For all systems performing railway control and protection functions, the software for

railway control and protection systems principles contained within BS EN 50128 shall apply.


For all systems performing railway control and protection functions, the systems approach

to safety principles contained within BS EN 50126 Part 2 shall apply.


The software development tools and process shall be suitably accurate and robust to

reflect the SIL level of the functions being performed by the system.

Supporting Information : The assessed Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems functions at

this stage determined that they shall have a minimum of "Basic Integrity" (see sections 3.2.1, 3.4.1, 3.5.8.8.,

3.6.1, 3.7.1, & 3.9.6.1).


The Suppliers shall comply with CSM-RA.


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The Safety Cases / safety justifications for the Operational Telecommunication and Security

System shall detail how the the ‘safety’ and ‘non-safety’ parts of the system have been

segregated.



System shall detail how the design has minimised the ‘safety’ part of the system.



System shall detail how the design has avoided the need for safety-critical parts of the

system.



System shall detail how the design has minimised the required safety integrity of each

safety-related part of the system.



System shall detail how the design has separated the ‘control’ and ‘protection’ systems.



System shall detail how the design has avoided ‘provocation’ (i.e. leaning on the safety

protection).



System shall detail how the design has minimised interdependency between parts of the

system.



System shall detail how the design has partitioned the system to minimise the number of

interfaces.



System shall detail how the design has provided the simplest adequate solution.


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System shall detail how the design has used the simplest practicable technology.



System shall detail how the design has maximised visibility of the safety principles used in

the design and implementation.



System shall detail how the design has managed the complexity (e.g. hierarchical levels,

modularity, restricted options).



System shall detail how the design has minimised novelty: use existing proven techniques

as far as possible.



System shall detail how the design has provided correspondence between functional

entities and physical equipment.



System shall detail how the design has partitioned the system to create simple, testable

interfaces.



System shall detail how the design has adopted a defined ‘safe state’ under failure

conditions.


Where possible, the design shall avoid placing absolute reliance for safety on any single

entity, even if claimed to be ‘Fail-Safe’ or ‘Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 4’. (Defence against

systematic failure).


Diversity shall be applied at the highest practicable level in the system (e.g. separate

control and protection systems would be better than a combined system containing sub-

systems, each of which is individually protected).


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8 Fire Safety [D01-OPSCOM-3319] - Fire Safety

Travel distances within the buildings shall be limited to the limits given in BS 9999/BS 9992

for the given Risk Profile.

Exceptions are buildings accommodating rolling stock which will need to be separately

assessed and designed in accordance with BS 9999/BS 9992 and BS 7974.

Acceptance criterion: Fire strategies articulating what will be provided; self assured by Contractor's

competent fire engineer and accepted by HS2 and not objected to by the FRS.

Fire safety reports identifying how the requirement have been met and verification by the Contractor

that those measures have been delivered on site.

[D01-OPSCOM-2430] - Fire Safety

All Operational Telecoms and Security Systems REBs shall be provided with an analogue,

addressable fire detection and alarm system designed to the requirements of BS 5839-1

for a category P1/M system.

Acceptance criterion: Fire strategies articulating what will be provided; self-assured by Contractor's


Fire safety report identifying how the requirement has been met and verification by the Contractor that

those measures have been delivered on site including testing, commissioning and handover

documentations.

Regular site audits by Contractor's competent fire engineer and ad-hoc audits by HS2.

HS2 and FRS attendance at agreed witness testing.

Handover documentation submission to HS2 in accordance with BS 5839.


All Operational Telecoms and Security Systems REBs shall be provided with and automatic

fire detection system and with a manual fire alarm call point.



Fire safety reports identifying how the requirements have been met and verification by the Contractor




Manual fire alarm call points shall be located at every exit to fresh air in accordance with BS

5839 Part 1.



Fire safety report identifying how the requirements have been met and verification by the Contractor

that those measures have been delivered on site including testing, commissioning and handover

documentations.

Regular site audits by Contractor's competent fire engineer and ad-hoc audits by HS2. HS2 and FRS

attendance at agreed witness testing.

HS2 and FRS attendance at agreed witness testing.

Handover documentation submission to HS2 in accordance with BS 5839.


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All smoke detectors shall comply with BS EN 54 Part 7, while heat detectors shall comply

with BS EN 54 Part 5.







The REB fire alarm system shall monitor fire alarm status, incoming power supply status

and system health. These alarms presented to the HS2 Infrastructure Controller at the

NICC.

Supporting Information : The alarms are connected to the HS2 Engineering Management System (EMS) via:-

- HRS03 Power SCADA system in Railway System Compounds, and

- HRS02 M&E SCADA at Radio Mast Compounds/Rapid Deployment Sites




that those measures have been delivered on site including end to end integrated tests.



Fire rated cables shall comply with BS 8519, Selection and installation of fire-resistant

power and control cable systems for life safety and fire-fighting applications, Code of

practice and be rated in accordance with BS 8491, Method for assessment of fire integrity

of large diameter power cables for use as components for smoke and heat control systems

and certain other active fire safety systems or BS EN 50200, Method of test for resistance

to fire of unprotected small cables for use in emergency circuits, (depending on diameter)

categories C, W and category F2 for performance under fire conditions.

Acceptance criterion: Self certification demonstrating that the BSs have been complied with.

Regular site audits by Contractor's competent fire engineer and reviews and acceptance of designs and

ad-hoc site audits by HS2.


Cable fixings carrying fire rated cables shall provide adequate support in the presence of a

fire to not compromise the fire performance of any cable.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the materials meet this requirement including fire test reports and

fire test certificates.




Cable fixings and supports carrying fire rated cables shall be designed to cater for the

reduction in the tensile strength of steel when exposed to the effects of fire in accordance

with BS 8519.


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Acceptance criterion: Self certification demonstrating that the BS has been complied with.




Cables within tunnels shall satisfy the characteristics of low flammability, low fire spread,

low toxicity and low smoke density in accordance with NTSN for Safety in Rail Tunnels.

These requirements shall be fulfilled when cables as a minimum have:

- A classification of B2ca-S1a, d0, a1 as per BS EN 13501-6, Classification using data from

reaction to fire tests on electric cables.

- A toxicity index (ITC) less than 10, as for exterior cables in accordance with BS EN 45545-2

Railways applications – Fire protection on railway vehicles. Part 2: Requirements for fire

behaviour of materials and components.

Acceptance criterion: Self certification demonstrating that the requirement has been met.




Construction materials and installations within tunnels shall have low flammability and

fulfil the reaction requirements of NTSN for Safety in Rail Tunnels.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the materials meet this requirement including fire test reports and

fire test certificates of the materials and installation system provided.




For areas not covered under the NTSN for Safety in Rail Tunnels, materials shall be as

defined in BS 9999/BS 9992.


Evidence that the materials meet this requirement including fire test reports and fire test certificates of

the materials and installation system provided.




Operational Telecommunications and Security systems installed within tunnels (except

light diffusers and cables) shall comply with BS EN 45545-2 R23 classification with LOI >

28% (UL94 V0 will also be accepted for the relevant thickness of material), Ds(max) < 600

and CIT < 1.8.


Evidence that the materials meet this requirement including fire test reports and fire test certificates of

the materials and installation system provided.




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Fire stopping shall be provided for all services penetrations where required to maintain fire

compartmentation in accordance with BS 9999/BS 9992.

Acceptance criterion: Self certification demonstrating that the BS has been complied with including fire

test reports and fire test certificates of the materials and installation system used.




Emergency signage shall be provided in all buildings in accordance with BS 5499 Parts 4

and 10.


Electrically powered emergency signage to be tested, commissioned and handed over in line with the

requirements for emergency lighting. Regular site audits by Contractor's competent fire engineer and

ad-hoc audits by HS2.


In Tunnels a fixed emergency telephone shall be provided at each cross passage door

location to allow direct communications between the Emergency Services or user and

NICC.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that safe areas have been provided to meet this requirement. Self-

assured by Contractor's competent fire engineer and accepted by HS2.

9 Security 9.1 Physical Security

[D01-OPSCOM-2424] - Physical Security

The HS2 network shall be designed in accordance with Technical Standard - Station and

Network-Wide Security [HS2-HS2-AR-STD-000-000003].

Supporting Information : The HS2 network includes stations, rolling stock storage and maintenance areas,

Network Integrated Control Centre, the railway, trackside infrastructure and other fixed installations.

The HS2 network will be protected by perimeter fencing in accordance with HS2 Technical Standard –

Station and Network-Wide Security HS2-HS2-AR-STD-000-000003 and determined on a risk based

approach.

Acceptance criterion: Compliance successfully verified by witnessed demonstration of functioning

equipment on site accompanied with documented results.


REBs, equipment cabinets or cages located in a Low or Medium risk area shall comply with

LPS 1175 SECURITY RATINGS SR2




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REBs, equipment cabinets or cages located in a High risk area shall comply with LPS 1175

SECURITY RATINGS SR3.




All Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment shall be installed

within the secure perimeter of the line-side security fence or within a secure compound.

Acceptance criterion: Compliance successfully verified by witnessed inspection of capability

accompanied with documented results.


For Operational Telecommunications and Security Systems equipment to be installed

outside of a secure area, the Contractor shall undertake a Threat and Vulnerability Risk

Assessment (TVRA) as described in Technical Standard - Station and Network-Wide Security

[HS2-HS2-AR-STD-000-000003] to determine the security measures required at that

location.




Operational Telecommunications and Security System REBs and cabinets shall be designed

and constructed to prevent unauthorised access and theft and/or unlawful removal of

assets and equipment.

9.2 Cyber Security

[D01-OPSCOM-2835] - Cyber Security

The Operational Telephony, Electronic Security Systems, Fire Ground Radio and GSM-R sub-

systems of the Operational Telecommunications shall comply with IEC 62443 Part 3-3

Security Level 1 (SL1)

Supporting Information : The key drivers for Security Level 1 on the Operational Telecommunications sub-

systems (Operational Telephony, Electronic Security Systems, Fire Ground Radio and GSM-R) is the

protection provided by the DTN architecture, the threat actors being Insiders, no safety critical implication

and limited availability impact.

Acceptance criterion: Compliance statement from the Contractor that all the requirements within the

62443-3-3 Standard at Security Level 1 have been met. Also, evidence from the Contractor showing

how each requirement within the 62443-3-3 Standard at Security Level 1 has been achieved.

Identification and justification from the Contractor of any requirement that has not been met or only

partially met.


The Data Transmission Network sub-system of the Operational Telecommunications shall

comply with IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Security Level 2 (SL2)


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Supporting Information : The key drivers for Security Level 2 on following Operational Telecommunications

sub-system (Data Transmission Network) is the importance of the DTN to all HS2 operational systems (both

control systems and non-control systems), the DTN cyber security architecture (zoning), no safety critical

implication and the possible impact on availability.


62443-3-3 Standard at Security Level 2 have been met. Also, evidence from the Contractor showing

how each requirement within the 62443-3-3 Standard at Security Level 2 has been achieved.

Identification and justification from the Contractor of any requirement that has not been met or only

partially met.


The System shall comply with the Cyber Security Technical Standard [HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-

000011].

Supporting Information : The security requirements for the identified Security Level are listed within an

appendix of the Cyber Security Technical Standard (Ref : HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000011).


Cyber Security Technical Standard have been met. Also evidence from the Contractor showing how

each requirement within the Technical Standard has been achieved. Identification and justification

from the Contractor of any requirement that has not been met or only partially met.

10 Environment and Sustainability [D01-OPSCOM-2471] - Environment and Sustainability

Operational Telecommunication and Security Systems shall be designed, supplied and

installed to be resilient to the effects of climate change over the life of the asset.

Supporting Information : Where appropriate, climate change adaptation and resilience requirements are

embedded into relevant engineering and other Technical Standards and this Works Information. The HS2 Ltd

Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Technical Standard [HS2-HS2-SU-STD-000-000003], sets out a

process for managing climate change adaptation and resilience. The Climate Change Adaptation and

Resilience Technical Standard is underpinned by two key assessments:

. The Climate Change Design Impact Assessment (CCDIA) [HS2-HS2-EV-REP-000-000023], provides an

assessment of the resilience of HS2 to future climate change.

. The Climate Change Resilience and Interdependencies Assessment (CCRIA) [HS2‐ HS2‐EV‐REP‐000‐

000010] is an assessment of interdependencies of HS2 that may be affected by climate change.

Acceptance criterion: The CCDIA shall be reviewed at every Contract Stage (see WI300) by the

Contractor in order to consider the impacts of climate change related to their Works. The Contractor

shall also review the CCRIA at every Contract Stage (see WI300), in order to consider the impacts of

climate change on interdependencies related to the Works. The designer shall evidence each review of

the CCDIA and CCRIA through a Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Report (CCARR).

[D01-OPSCOM-2472] - Environment and Sustainability

Unless essential for safety purposes, there shall be no artificial lighting provision on the

green bridge, and also no artificial lighting provision where light could spill onto the flight

path of bats, either on the bridge or on the approaches to the bridge.


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Where a culvert is intended to maintain a bat commuting route and where there is a risk of

light spillage from the railway onto the culvert entrance of flight approaches, close boarded

fencing shall be used.

Supporting Information : Requirement applies to contracts having scope of work delivered in proximity of

wildlife culverts used as a suitable route for passage of target species such as bats. The location of such

culverts is determined in the design submitted by the Main Work Civils contractors.

This information on culverts location is to be provided by HS2 to the contractor through Building Information

Models when available.


Culverts shall be unlit and there shall be a designated dark area (maximum 0.5 lux) within

50 m of the entrance to the culverts.







Where artificial lighting is required within 50m of the entrance to the culverts for health

and safety reasons, it shall only operate on a motion triggered basis.







The motion triggers for artificial lighting within 50m of the entrance to the culverts shall be

designed to ensure they are not triggered by the species utilising the culvert.







Light levels in areas where close-boarded fencing has been used to provide mitigation for

bats, post construction shall not exceed 0.5 lux compared to pre-construction levels.







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11 Interoperability There are no additional requirements in this section.

12 Ergonomics [D01-OPSCOM-2480] - Ergonomics

The system shall be designed and constructed so that the users maintain situational

awareness of the status of the system during normal, abnormal, degraded and emergency

conditions.

Supporting Information : Scheme Design - Approved Design Documentation

Detailed Design - Approved Design Documentation / Testing (with representative Users) of the systems to

demonstrate that the design has been implemented as designed.

Construction & Handover - Testing (User)

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the system is has been developed to optimise the allocation of

functions between the users and the system in order to optimise user situational awareness and

reduce the opportunity for Human / Use Error to ALARP whilst maintaining the required level of

system performance.

To be submitted to and accepted by the HS2 EAM.

Submissions required at Scheme Design, Detailed Design, Construction & Handover.

[D01-OPSCOM-2481] - Ergonomics

The system shall be designed and constructed to remove or reduce to ALARP the risk of

Human / Use Error.

Supporting Information : The term 'Use Error' has been explicitly utilised as it infers that accidents / incident

should be attributed to the circumstances and the design of the system / equipment being utilised, rather

than apportioning blame to the human beings interacting with the system. As such the design of the system

is critical.

Scheme Design - Approved Design Documentation

Detailed Design - Approved Design Documentation / Testing (User)


Acceptance criterion: Ergonomics Plan (or separate referenced paper) defining the approach to be

applied to model and address Human / User Error and reduce identified issues to ALARP.

Evidence that the system is designed and built to eliminate or reduce to ALARP the risk of Human /

User Error during maintenance including mis-assembly / re-assembly tasks.




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The system shall be designed to be error tolerant

Supporting Information : Error tolerant systems are designed such a way that should the user commit an

error when using the system it will not lead to an unsafe event. Typically error tolerant systems remove

opportunities for error to occur. E.g. a system is designed so that it can only be assembled one way and items

cannot be installed back-to-front or upside down.

Acceptance criterion: Ergonomics Plan (or separate referenced paper) defining the approach to be

applied to model and address Human . User Error and reduce identified issues to ALARP.

Evidence of testing that the system is error tolerant eliminates or reduces to ALARP the risk of Human /

User Error during maintenance including mis-assembly / re-assembly task.




The system shall be designed and constructed so that the users cognitive and physical

workload is acceptable.

Supporting Information : Scheme Design - Approved Design Documentation

Detailed Design - Approved Design Documentation / Testing (with representative Users) of the systems to

demonstrate that the design has been implemented as designed.


Typically, this would be achieved through:

1. Physical Workload assessment of relevant tasks associated with system and identification of issues.

2. Cognitive Workload Assessment of system / subsystems and identification of issues.

Acceptance criterion: 1. The methodology to assess users cognitive / physical workload for the system

is defined by the contractor and approved by HS2.

2. The criteria for acceptable workload is defined by the contractor and agreed by HS2 (this will depend

on the model used by the contractor). Historically Task Occupancy has been used as a measure of

workload and typically levels below 60% are deemed acceptable with sufficient spare capability to deal

with and address abnormal, emergency and degraded events.

3. Workload Assessment of system / subsystems during normal modes of operation and identification

of issues.

4. Workload Assessment of typical (and agreed) abnormal, degraded and emergency conditions

events.

5. Evidence that output from workload assessment is embedded in design of system. 3. Evidence that

the system is has been developed to optimise the level of cognitive & physical workload. Initially

through design this will be through a predictive assessment that will feed into the design. This will then

be modelled and tested on a prototype before being tested and demonstrated on the installed system

prior to commissioning.


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The system shall be designed and constructed so that the user has sufficient cognitive

spare capacity during normal scenarios to safely manage and address unplanned events

(abnormal, degraded and emergency conditions).

Supporting Information : This requirement is based on ensuring that the system is designed for normal modes

of operations (and thus is cost effective) but takes into account that a user cannot operate at 100% workload

capacity. As such the system should be designed so that during normal modes of operation the user will

have adequate spare cognitive and physical workload capacity to address unplanned or abnormal events for

short periods of time.

Acceptance criterion: 1. Definition of acceptable workload spare capacity in line with railway good

practice (typically based on task occupancy - however contractor to define).

2. Workload Assessment of system / subsystems during normal modes of operation and identification

of issues.

3. Workload Assessment of typical (and agreed) abnormal, degraded and emergency conditions events.

4. Evidence that output from workload assessment is embedded in design of system.


The system shall be designed and constructed so that it can be maintained and operated

safely by a 5th percentile female to a 95th percentile male user.

Supporting Information : Contractors output should demonstrate progressively that the system can be

operated / maintained by all identified users as defined by contractor using the HS2 User Profile proformas.

<Peoplesize2008> is used as the baseline anthropometric dataset.

<Adultdata> is the baseline human strength dataset.

The requirement should take into account any special Personal Protective Equipment of clothing used by the

operator.



Construction & Handover - Testing (User).

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the system is designed and constructed to support 5th percentile

female through to 95th percentile male users for all relevant anthropometric and strength

characteristics including secular growth using:

<Peoplesize2008> for anthropometric dataset.

<Adultdata> for human strength dataset.

User Profiles - identification of the users

Key Anthropometric parameters and dimensions identified for each user.

Evidence that key anthropometric data has been embedded into the design or selection of the system

/ sub-system / equipment.


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Submission at Scheme Design, Detailed Design, Construction & Handover.


The system will be designed to take into account user secular growth of users throughout

its design life.

Supporting Information : <Peoplesize2008> is used as the baseline anthropometric dataset.

If secular growth is not taken into account the system design will become redundant throughout its life.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that anthropodermic data has been scaled appropriately to take into

account service life of the system / sub-systems / equipment.


The contractor will identify and document the critical anthropometric characteristics for

each user that they have identified for each system and associated sub-systems /

equipment.


The contractor will utilise <Peoplesize 2008> for all anthropometric data associated with

the maintenance and operation of the system.

Where <Peoplesize 2008> does not contain the relevant data the contractor shall propose

an alternative data source and present this for acceptance by the HS2 Ergonomic

Assurance Manager (EAM).


The system shall be designed and constructed to minimise the risk of musculoskeletal

disorders to ALARP for all users ranging from a 5th percentile female through to a 95th

percentile male user.

Supporting Information : Contractors output should demonstrate progressively that the system can be

operated / maintained by all identified users as defined by contractor using the HS2 User Profile proformas.

The requirement should take into account any special Personal Protective Equipment of clothing used by the

operator.



Construction & Handover - Testing (User).

Acceptance criterion:

Evidence that the system is designed and constructed to minimise the risk of muscular skeletal

disorders to ALARP for all users ranging from a 5th percentile female through to a 95th percentile

male user.


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Provide definition of assessment methodology to be applied to assess postures for all tasks and ensure

and evidence that the approach aligns with HSE recommended practices. E.g. Rapid Upper Limb

Assessment (RULA) Tool.




The contractor will identify and document the strength characteristics for each user and

the tasks that they perform for each system and associated sub-systems / equipment.


The contractor will utilise <AdultData> for all strength data associated with the tasks and

systems / equipment for the maintenance of the system.

Where <AdultData> does not contain the relevant strength data the contractor shall

propose a suitable data source for review and acceptance by the HS2 EAM.


The contractor will identify the viable environmental conditions in which the users will

operate / maintain the system and the associated constraints such as personal protective

equipment that will impact their ability to perform the various tasks.

This shall include but not be limited to the following environmental parameters.

illumination; climate; noise, and; motion.


On a progressive basis the contractor will identify all supporting equipment required to

maintain the system and ensure that the user can safely transport the equipment to the

maintenance location and that appropriate measures are in place to support transfer - for

example safe walking routes.

This shall include but not be limited to the following environmental parameters.

illumination; climate; noise, and; motion, limiting level changes and making the quickest

method the safest method


The system shall be developed and designed to remove or reduce to ALARP the need for

working at height.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the design has been developed and assessed to remove the need

to work at height for all required maintenance (and operational) tasks in accordance with the UK

Legislation: Working at Height Regulations (WAHR).

Where it is not possible to remove the need for working at height, evidence shall be provided that the

system has been designed with control measures that reduce the risk to the user to ALARP for working

at height activities.


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The contractor shall support the lead contractors in their Human Factors activities to

design and develop consistent and intuitive Human System Interfaces (HSI) at depots, NICC,

Remote Tap-In Facility and stations by providing design, configuration and documentation

for Operational Telecommunications system end devices.

Supporting Information : The Human System Interface (HSI) is any element of a system, equipment or

product that a user interacts with in order to operate or use the of a system, equipment or product.

The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be translated as signals for

machines that, in turn, provide the required result to the user.

Human System Interface are also known as Human Machine Interface (HMI) or Man-Machine interface

(MMI), or Human Computer Interface (HCI).

This requirement is applicable for all HSI's including fixed (for example TMS workstations) and portable

assets (mobile diagnostic device).

Acceptance criterion: 1. Evidence that:

- the HSI for each system has been identified.

- a methodology / approach for the design and development of consistent and intuitive HSI has been

developed

- the HSI for each system has been designed support the needs of the users using the defined

methodology.

- the systems HSIs have been developed in accordance with the <HS2 HSI Style Guide>.

- the design has been tested and evaluated using end user representatives.

- issues raised have been addressed and embedded in the design.




The contractor shall design and develop the Integrated Management Platform and Security

Management Systems to provide consistent and intuitive Human System Interfaces (HSI)

within the scope of commercially available systems telecoms and security systems.

Supporting Information : The Human System Interface (HSI) is any element of a system, equipment or

product that a user interacts with in order to operate or use the of a system, equipment or product.

The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be translated as signals for

machines that, in turn, provide the required result to the user.

Human System Interface are also known as Human Machine Interface (HMI) or Man-Machine interface

(MMI), or Human Computer Interface (HCI).


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This requirement is applicable for all HSI's including fixed (for example TMS workstations) and portable

assets (mobile diagnostic device).

Acceptance criterion: 1. Evidence that:

- the HSI for each system has been identified.

- a methodology / approach for the design and development of consistent and intuitive HSI has been

developed

- the HSI for each system has been designed support the needs of the users using the defined

methodology.

- the systems HSIs have been developed in accordance with the <HS2 HSI Style Guide>.

- the design has been tested and evaluated using end user representatives.

- issues raised have been addressed and embedded in the design.




The usability of the system shall be acceptable to the user(s) as represented by HS2.

Supporting Information : The usability of the system and devices used to support the operation /

maintenance of the system shall be acceptable for the users based on the user goals to be achieved and the

environment in which they are performed.

The HS2 Usability parameters are defined as:

- Effectiveness: The completeness and accuracy with which users achieve specified goals and objectives.

- Error tolerance: The system prevent errors caused by the user's interaction, and to help the user in

recovering from any errors that do occur

- Efficiency: The speed (with accuracy) with which users can complete the tasks

- Satisfaction: The Human System Interface is engaging, if it is pleasant and satisfying to use.

- Ease of Learning - A Human System Interface which is easy to learn allows users to build on their

knowledge without deliberate effort

Acceptance criterion: 1. Evidence of an agreed methodology for conducting usability assessment of the

system and that the usability of the system has been tested and demonstrated as acceptable for

representative users, using but not limited to the following parameters:

- Effectiveness

- Error tolerance

- Efficiency

- Satisfaction

- Ease of Learning




The system shall be designed and developed to provide consistent, applicable and non-

conflicting alarms and alerts.


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Supporting Information : The methodology / approach to address these requirements shall be defined within

the contractors Ergonomics Plan.

Contractors response should demonstrate progressively throughout the lifecycle that the alerts and alarm

presentation for system user interfaces are consistent, reduce Human / Use Error and align with the approach

defined within the <HS2 Alarms Philosophy> and the contractor developed Alarms Strategy to ensure

consistency of user interface and minimise the training impact.

Testing and evaluation will utilise end user representatives.

Where the system is a COTS or third part product the contractor will evaluate the third party products

against the <HS2 Alarm Management Philosophy> to identify and resolve shortfalls and any associated

issues and risks.

Acceptance criterion: 1. Evidence of a work package specific Alerts and Alarms Strategy.

2. Evidence that systems alarms and alerts have been developed in accordance with the <HS2 Alarm

Management Philosophy> and the work package specific Alarms Strategy including:

3. Rationalisation of alert / alarms based on users goals.

4. Consistent alert/alarm presentation across sub-systems / equipment to remove conflicting alerts /

alarms.



13 Sound, Noise and Vibration Early design assumptions concerning the operational sound generated by stationary

systems are provided in the Stationary Systems Sound and Noise Assessment

Assumptions Technical Note (HRS08-WSP-EV-NOT-000-000005). The responsibility for

the risk of any differences between these assumptions and the actual operational

sound generated by stationary systems is transferred to the Contractor.

[D01-OPSCOM-3073] - Sound, Noise and Vibration

The Operational Telecommunications and Security System emissions of airborne sound

shall comply with the stationary systems acoustic design objectives set out in HS2 Phase 1

Information Paper E22 Control of noise from the operation of stationary systems [LWM-

HS2-HY-PPR-000-000056] or HS2 Phase 2a Information Paper E11 Control of noise from the

operation of stationary systems [P2A-HS2-HY-PPR-000-000122] as applicable.

Supporting Information : Relevant HS2 guidance and standards include (but may not be limited to):

- HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000003 (design and specification of civil engineering mitigation for noise)

- HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 (baseline sound survey analysis, stationary systems airborne sound

prediction, assessment, mitigation design and demonstration that sound has been reduced AFARP)

- HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000006 (the approach to acoustic design of depots, as applicable)

- HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000009 (baseline sound survey monitoring equipment and techniques)

- Planning Forum Note 10 (indicative mitigation)

- Planning Forum Note 12 (engagement with statutory consultees)

- HRS08-WSP-EV-NOT-000-000005 (record of technical assumptions made during the design development)


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Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the stationary systems have been designed, built and tested in

compliance with the objectives of HS2 Ph1 IP E22 or Ph2a IP E11 (as applicable) in accordance with the

Environmental Minimum Requirements:

- Acoustic Design of Stationary Systems Reports demonstrating compliance of the design with the

EMRs to be submitted in accordance with the Contractor's accepted Design Management Plan

- Noise and Vibration Demonstration Reports demonstrating the design fulfils the relevant provisions

of Schedule 17 of the High Speed Rail (London - West Midlands) Act 2017 or Schedule TBC of the High

Speed Rail (West Midlands - Crewe) Act TBC (as applicable) to be submitted in conjunction with the

associated applications

- Acoustic Commissioning Testing Reports that demonstrate the compliance of the built systems with

the EMRs to be submitted in accordance with the Contractor’s accepted Commissioning Testing Plan


Depots and the Network Integrated Control Centre shall comply with HS2 Technical

Standard – Acoustic design of stations and depots [HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000006].

Acceptance criterion: Evidence within reporting that the Depots and Network Integrated Control Centre

have been designed, built and tested in accordance with all relevant aspects of HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-

000006.


Where the Operational Telecommunications and Security System includes noise mitigation

measures to which HS2 Technical Standard – Acoustic design of civil engineering assets

[HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000003] applies, these elements of the system shall be designed in

accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000003.

Supporting Information : Technical Standard HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 sets out the methodology

which is used for the design of stationary systems. HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 requires that certain types

of noise mitigation measures for stationary sources acting on the propagation path, e.g. noise barriers or

bunds, need to be specified and designed in accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000003.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence within the reporting that the design processes and specifications set out

in Technical Standard HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000003 for the noise mitigation associated with the works

have been applied for all system elements to which the standard is applicable.


Stationary systems sound, noise and vibration performance shall be designed, mitigated

and demonstrated in accordance with HS2 Technical Standard – Acoustic Design of

Stationary Systems [HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004].

Acceptance criterion: Evidence within reporting that sound-generating stationary systems plant has

been designed, built and tested in accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 and the Contractor's

accepted Acoustic Commissioning Test Plan.


The Operational Telecommunications and Security System shall meet applicable noise

limits derived using the baseline data in the following reports, unless otherwise agreed

with the Project Manager (e.g. if alternative data are required and available):

a. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Chiltern District Monitoring

Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-C001-000001];

b. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Cherwell District Monitoring

Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-C002-000001];


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c. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Aylesbury Vale District

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-C002-000002];

d. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Stratford on Avon District

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-C003-000001];

e. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – South Northamptonshire

District Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-CS07-000001];

f. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Warwick District Monitoring

Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-NS01-000001];

g. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Solihull Metropolitan

Borough Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-NS01-000002];

h. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Birmingham City Monitoring


i. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – North Warwickshire District

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-NS05-000001];

j. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – Lichfield District Monitoring


k. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – London Borough of

Hillingdon Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-S002-000001];

l. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – London Borough of Camden

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-S003-000001];

m. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – London Borough of Ealing

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-S004-000001];

n. 1D008 HS2 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems – London Borough of Brent

Monitoring Report [1D008-EDP-EV-REP-SS02_SL01-000001] and

o. HRS08 Baseline Sound Monitoring Stationary Systems Bromford Monitoring Report

[HRS08-WSP-EV-REP-NS02-000001]

Supporting Information : The noise limits applicable to sound-generating stationary systems plant and

activities are determined at the location of noise-sensitive receptors on the basis of the design objectives

defined in HS2 Ph1 Information Paper E22 and Ph2a Information Paper E11 using representative background

sound levels.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence within reporting that applicable noise limits have been derived using

representative background sound levels in accordance with HS2 Technical Standard Acoustics Design

of Stationary System (HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004) based on robust baseline data acquired in

accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 and HS2 Technical Standard Sound, Noise and Vibration

Instrumentation and Monitoring (HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000009).


The Operational Telecommunications and Security System shall meet the applicable

stationary systems noise limits derived from alternative or additional baseline sound

monitoring data, if acquired by the Contractor and accepted by the Project Manager.

Supporting Information : The noise limits applicable to sound-generating stationary systems plant and

activities are determined at the location of noise-sensitive receptors on the basis of the design objectives

defined in HS2 Ph1 Information Paper E22 and Ph2a Information Paper E11 using representative background

sound levels.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence within reporting that applicable noise limits have been derived using

representative background sound levels in accordance with HS2 Technical Standard Acoustics Design

of Stationary System (HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004) based on robust baseline data acquired in


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accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004 and HS2 Technical Standard Sound, Noise and Vibration

Instrumentation and Monitoring (HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000009).


All Operational Telecommunication and Security System sound-generating or sound-

attenuating system elements shall have acoustic performance demonstrated by certifiable

testing prior to incorporation into the design, with demonstrated performance to include

the applicable margin for test uncertainty (at 95% confidence), where the uncertainty

margin represents potential degradation of the actual performance compared with the

declared measurement value.

Supporting Information : Sound generating system elements includes elements that are likely to generate

noise passively due to airflow mechanisms. Examples of such elements include components that introduce

transitions, obstructions or constrictions into an airflow path, such as dampers, attenuators, diffusers and

grilles.

Relevant and appropriate acoustic testing standards include (but may not be limited to):

BS EN ISO 7235

BS EN ISO 3740

BS EN ISO 3744

BS EN ISO 3746

BS EN ISO 5136

BS EN ISO 13347

BS EN ISO 13350

Acceptance criterion: Evidence of test results from certified test facility and evidence according to the

appropriate test standard within reporting at all required stages of the Project lifecycle that certified

test data have been incorporated into relevant sound predictions and noise impact assessments in

accordance with HS2-HS2-EN-STD-000-000004.


The Relocatable Equipment Building (REB) and associated plant emissions of airborne

sound shall not exceed an A-weighted sound power level limit of 62 dB(A) re 1e-12 W.

Supporting Information : Relevant and appropriate sound testing standards that may be applicable include

(but may not be limited to):

BS EN ISO 3740

BS EN ISO 3744

BS EN ISO 3746

Note that in 4.1.146 of the REB and Cabinet [HS2-HS2-EN-SPE-000-000004] it currently states 64dB which

will be amended at next update to 62dB.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence of results from tests carried out in accordance with the applicable

sound testing standard by a certified testing facility to demonstrate compliance with the specified

performance requirements.


System sound characteristics shall be accounted for in assessments of noise impact at

sensitive receptors in accordance with BS 4142:2014+A1:2019 clauses 9.1, 9.2 , 9.3.2, Annex

D and Annex E, while not using the 'objective' method for determining tonality described in

clause 9.3.1 and Annex C, unless otherwise agreed with the Project Manager.


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Supporting Information : The third-octave band 'objective' method for determining tonality described in

clause 9.3.1 and Annex C of BS 4142:2014+A1:2019 has been shown to be technically unreliable (e.g. refer to

the Association of Noise Consultants Technical Note 'BS 4142:2014+A1:2019' dated March 2020 for more

information).

Acceptance criterion: Evidence that the stipulated methods have been adopted where applicable,

including justification for the accepted approaches.


The trackside cabinet emissions of airborne sound shall not exceed an A-weighted sound

power level limit of 62 dB(A) re 1e-12 W.

Supporting Information : Relevant and appropriate sound testing standards that may be applicable include

(but may not be limited to):

BS EN ISO 3740

BS EN ISO 3744

BS EN ISO 3746

Note that in 4.2.92 of the REB and Cabinet [HS2-HS2-EN-SPE-000-000004] it currently states 64dB which

will be amended at next update to 62dB.

Acceptance criterion: Evidence of results from tests carried out in accordance with the applicable

sound testing standard by a certified testing facility to demonstrate compliance with the specified

performance requirements.

14 Earthing and Bonding [D01-OPSCOM-2474] - Earthing and Bonding

The systems shall be connected to a common earth system as described in document

Earthing and Bonding Specification Module 1 Common Principles [HS2-HS2-SY-SPE-000-

000003].

Supporting Information : Assets and systems are bonded in a structured manner to a common earth to

reduce traction return touch voltages and control the flow of traction current within assets and systems that

do not form part of the traction return system.

[D01-OPSCOM-2475] - Earthing and Bonding

The systems shall be earthed and bonded in accordance with the Earthing and Bonding

Strategy document [HS2-HS2-SY-STR-000-000003].


The earthing and bonding system shall be provided in accordance with the Earthing and

Bonding Execution Plan [HS2-HS2-SY-PLN-000-000010].


The earthing and bonding system shall provide the following in accordance with Earthing

and Bonding Specification Module 2 Traction Return Current Bonding [HS2-HS2-SY-SPE-

000-000004]:

a. earthing and bonding connections of systems and assets in open routes and sub surface

routes;

b. cable identification for every bonding cable;


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c. bonding cable fixings and mechanical protection; and

d. the correct bonding cable types, cable terminations and cable attachments.

Supporting Information : The Traction Earth Conductor , Supplementary Earth Conductor, rail bond cable,

equipotential bonding cable and their terminations are described in document HS2-HS2-SY-SPE-000-

000004 (Earthing and Bonding Specification Module 2 Traction Return Current Bonding).


The system shall provide the earthing and bonding in accordance with the Earthing &

Bonding Specification Module 6 – Train Control and Detection Systems and Lineside

Telecommunications Systems [HS2-HS2-SY-SPE-000-000008].

14.1 Electrical Isolation


15 Electromagnetic Compatibility [D01-OPSCOM-2446] - Electromagnetic Compatibility

All equipment and systems shall be designed, manufactured and installed to be suitable for

operation in their intended electromagnetic environment to be determined in line with the

Employer’s EMC Strategy [HS2-HS2-SY-STR-000-000002].

Supporting Information : Characteristics of the intended electromagnetic environment will be identified as an

output of the Employer’s EMC process as per the Strategy document HS2-HS2-SY-STR-000-000002

16 System Integration There are no additional requirements in this section.

17 Assurance and Governance There are no additional requirements in this section.

18 Testing and Commissioning There are no additional requirements in this section.

19 Product Acceptance [D01-OPSCOM-3072] - Product Acceptance

Product acceptance shall be managed via the safety authorisation process and individual

system safety cases.

20 Information management There are no additional requirements in this section.


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21 Training [D01-OPSCOM-3069] - Training

User training shall be developed for HS2 all Operational Telecommunications and Security

systems.

Supporting Information : User training shall be developed and be appropriate to the range of users to be

trained. Training may take the form of briefing notes, online interactive modules or classroom delivered

training and should be agreed with HS2 for each type of system user.

Acceptance criterion: Availability of a range of user training covering all Operational

Telecommunications systems.

[D01-OPSCOM-3070] - Training

First and second line maintenance training shall be provided to HS2 for all Operational

Telecommunications and Security systems.

Supporting Information : Maintenance training shall be developed and be appropriate to the required

maintenance tasks. Training may take the form of briefing notes, online interactive modules or classroom

delivered training and should be agreed with HS2.

Acceptance criterion: Availability of first and second line maintenance training covering all Operational

Telecommunications systems.

[D01-OPSCOM-3071] - Training

Management platform training shall be provided to HS2 for all Operational

Telecommunications and Security systems.

Supporting Information : Maintenance and system operations training shall be developed and be appropriate

to the required maintenance and operations tasks (including server maintenance and admin). Training may

take the form of briefing notes, online interactive modules or classroom delivered training and should be

agreed with HS2.

Acceptance criterion: Availability of management platform and server maintenance training covering all

Operational Telecommunications systems.

operational telecoms and security systems report

Documents