operation sunrise (the original documents)
DESCRIPTION
American OSS, SWISS intelligence and The German Surrender (1945)TRANSCRIPT
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I.
h.xl r epor t ed tllat an o f f i c i z i ul t he Gemen Emkassy i;i Hcrthern
I t a L y vius then i n Lwltzer,and for t he purpcs? of t ransfer r ing i n t o
Swiss f r ancs sone marks telonging t c ffiembers of Kesselri%--'s . sk i f f .
LCoUrce s t z t e a t h a t Lesselrix and kahn ' ( fomer German ambassador t o
Ttciy) were ready t o q&.t ana even to ' f i g h t zgainst Hitler if the
k - i i i e s could o f f e r them 8 quid pro B. The Gernan c f f i c i a l s t a t e d
t h t i t Kesselring was moved, by the feeling t h a t his ' u t i r n a t e dest iny,
a s th ings aere so ing , WLS (I) t o xind up i n t he Alpine "redui t"
subordinate t o SS c f f i c i i i l s , o r (2) t o dit: in h filial r e s i s t ence or
be k i l l e d f o r not resist?-%.
s t i l l h a i power 2nd was llviikx t o us6 it by surrenderi ,x i n r e tu rn
for' scffie concession. I t was n o t clezr 'whether. it was 8 question of
concessions t o Kesselriw- anci h i s s t a f f o r t rcops _oerscnalLy, o r
whether it was & y x s t i o n of concession t c Gcraany gegera i . k t any
r a t e , Kesselring anci his s t a f f appenrea to 'want usable pOst-vJEtr funds.
03 2: February OSS dckn s ignel; ed tn&t source "?ONT@R!W~ (836)
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As ioA= C I S he was i3 I t a l y , Kesselring
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S o k c e did not disclose IILILC c.f Gerinan Embassy tjfi'iciaL but
l:rould do SG had hinself s t e p <*ut of tile matter if ki.;.ies Rere in te res ted .
The o f f i c i a l ' w a s t o CGILE; t o s-curce ag&i,? seeking heip . t o sei1 t h e f r e e
marks h t , & gcod r a t e . Soilrce s t t i t ea t h a t he would s t r i e him along
i n order t o delay him for a f e w days.
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OSS representht ive i n S w i t z e r l a ~ d ccmmented t h a t he did g o t rate ' '
source very highly but d i d have indepenient reasons t o , b e l i e v e that'
it was not impossible that Kesseiring and Rahn might be preparing f o r . ,
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somethi-y: l i k e t h i s . He tiddcd that he vas
through more d i rec t and reiialcle channels.
inves t iga thg the rumor
TI. 24 Febr,ary. OSS Ctsertt: wirea OSS Bern t h a t AFHQ *as
def in i t e ly interested i n get t ing posit ive and authentic infmmation
t o support .the aiAeged disposit ion of Kesseiring.
cropped up repeatedly, but t h e r e had never been proof of its accuracy.
Ti' Kesselring had wanted t o d i s p u t b l i zln emissary with an offisial
The s tory b d
message i t was thought t h a t he could find whys of doing so.
AFHQ would certainly not recommend t o t h e Combined Chiefs of Staff
any modification of unconditional surrender such as would be involved
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i n prorriises, commitments or btrgainlng . Although Kesselring. as a
his rank, i t was
tionsl surrender
prisoner of ;var wouid undoubtedly be given the customary priviieges of
extremeiy dGubtfui th t any rndif icat ion of uncondi-
111. The London DLiiy Dt-s!>stch . .
Charles Clbrke, i t s correspondent
on 24 February carried t h e story from
i n Bcrn, t h a t Kesseiring had mde
sec re t ovcrtwes t o t h e Al i i e s , quotic-g a statement sal6 t c have been
made by a nember of Kesse l r ik ' s entourage reported a t t h e ' t i m e toehave
been i n Smitzcrland.
t o withdraw under Aided pressure leaving Northern I t a l i a n c i t i e s
intact and preventing t h e i r deztnucticn ly Nee-Fsscfste.
Kesseirfng was said to have askcd for H free re t r 'ent tcvord Ge- man
t e r r i t o r y v!here f ~ i s so ld ie rs ccculd be used t o maintain order. Hg'also
According t o Clarke's s t o r y , Kesselring offered
In return,
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i n Bern 7 5 February hw6.y: l e f t . Vieruw c.2 o r &cut ii Febrwtlry.
Source f o r se-feral years hkd keen acqusintea with one Hcttel, described
BP one of t h e SS c h i e f s i n Vierma x h c knew v.zguely t h a t sctirct; find
i n d i r e c t ccn t sc t s with kmcr icans Ln Switzeriand.
from Vienn; scurce hsd becn informed Lly Hot te i t h a t Kaltanbrunner,
Chief of tlie SD, m x t e c t o FEB him.
he m d Himmler were mcst anxious t o end t h e war and, e s ti f i r s t s tep ,
vere contemplht iw the l i q u i d a t i n n of llvmr-mngersft within t h e Nazi
PErty, e c p e c i i l l y Bormmn (Chiel" of S t a f f of the Chancery of the Party;
wmber cif Fa r Cabinet, SS Obergruppcnfuehrer; af ter 1941 Eess's
Eefcre h i s departure
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Kait,enbrunner infcrmcd source that __ -
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s.ucocEsor in of f i ce ) . Hlmmcr .and Kartcabrunner were mcst anxious tc
e s t a b l i s h ccntac t r ! i th t he B r L t i s h and Pmericcns and 6 s k d source
t o make En e f fo r t i n t h i s direct:on on h i s t r t p t o Switzerland. ThFy
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contemplhted senriirg t o SrvitLerland E\ high SS officioi .iiho wouid
Epenk cn t h e i r behalf prcviuea contact c c u d be established.
Solu*ce, on h i s c m f n i t i a t i v e , s q g e e t e d Alfred Potocki, brother
cf the forcler Pc i i sh minis te r t o RashLngton, should be permitted t'o
g o t o Switzerland with him &E he f e l t Pctccki had first class contacts , I
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mlth t h e Bri t ish. Ho t t e i imediti tely a r r u g e d an exit visa fcr
Potocki tnd h i o mother. Potocki expected t c proceed f irst t o ~ ~~
l e i c h t e n s t e i n where on L March he h&d n o t g e t a r r ived . , ~
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Amroved for Releass 2 . Date OCT 1992 . /
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QSS
u'ce t
representb t ive i n Bern sfuatea t k t
be " ra ther ijght-weight," he ccns
while he believed the
dered the above approach
i n t e r e s t i n g as ti s ign c?i' t h e Increrising d i s in tog ra t i cn n i t h i n the L
Nazi Party nxd ts on imiicatfcn of Himiicr'a yn t ics t o p rep i r e d i b i s .
Accorfiirg t o EOUTCC, Hialn-er -,"as then o r g m i z i r g the defcnse cn the
Elastern Frcnt and w i h ~ ibrgeiy i n coomnd cf t h t thea t r e af war. -
V. 3 Piarch. OES represcnta t i -e 1-1 Btrn repcr tea t h a t f u r t h e r
cGnuercation with sc~urce aentioned i n P a r h g r q h . I V above, indicated I
t i i tkt h i s 'FD contec ts End iaforin:ltfcn hsd mcre impcrtsnce than vies
c r i g i n e l l y b e i i e v d . Information frcrrr. o ther good S O L L T C ~ S tended t o
bear out t h e ind ica t ions given by s ~ i r c e t h a t Hirrnler, Kaltenbrunner
and c e r t a i n c the r h igh SP officials n igh t no t gc &long ydth t h e die-
hard fanatics and might t r y t o g a i n some irf iunity by cerv i rg i n ti
t r c u s i t i o n d regime betPveen tf i t iar and the occupational fc rces .
They might possibly p r e f e r this t o the n l t e r n c t i s e of ; o b i % Hi t l e r ,
Mrmtinn, e t a1 i n the Gerinhn "reduit .I1 OSS representative again
pcinted cut t h e s t a t e a e n t earlier contribut.ea t c Kalte3brunner t h h t
Himier wes m x i o u s t o l iqu iGate war-rncngers such &S Bormmn.
OSS representh t ive f u r t h e r s t a t e d that , a l t h a g h perscns cf 'the
Himrmer, Knltenbrunnsr type c o u d naturally gain no immunity fro? us,
E @ long as they believed t h i s xere poss ib le , it nright g i v e us an
opportuni ty t o drive a wedge in the SD and thus t o reduce t h e effecti te-
I ness of enemy plans f o r t h e Geriuin " r e d a t . " Stat i ry t h a t he had no
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coriscience ihou t douhle-crossi.lg types like Himiier and Kaitenhrizqnor,
he s&id t h a t tbxGu&h i n d i r e c t channels he has Lrranging tc. have Hottel
come t o the SKiss Fi-ontiur where a t r u s t e d interEediary w d d meet
him. I
V I . 5 Marcn. OSS representb t ive i n Bern s ignuLed t k i t through
tno Close f r i e n d s i n t h e Swiss s e c r e t i n t e i i i gence he w ~ s advised
t h a t an important I t n i i n n i n d u s t r i t i i s t named Baron P o r e l l i ( the
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Fpeliing of h i s name WQS uncert2i.n) n-ished t o f a c i l i t h t e ccntac t I
b e t w e n importerrt Germm s f f i c i a l s in Northern I t a ly m d the All ies
with t h e generh i viev: of t e m i n a t i n g Germen re s i s t ance i n Ncrthern
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I ta ly . One of hbove-mentioned sources vms a person well-kncwn t o
the-m'ar Department"under ( ? ) nmber 6028." Baron P a r e h i h&d been f o r
amy years I t a i i a n r ep re ren tc t ive of I k z h Kelvintitcr and clbimea t o
be v d l - k n c w n i n Lctrciit.
After a m e t i n g between Earori PLrclii and an intermcdibry, it
seemed des i r ab le t o follow up t h e matter and r a t h e r unexpec td ly 02s
rop resen t t t l ve had been advieea i e te on t h e day of 2 NItrrch by h i s
Z w i s s s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e f r i e n d t h h t Standsr teafuehrer Do i lnwm and
,
.- Zimer, who W E ~ reputedly Doilmanq's aide, had a r r ived a t t h e S ~ i s s
Fron t i e r . Reports 1x.d i t t h s t DOAUI~LXI R(LS e--:ceed ingLy iirf,uential
i n Rome p r i o r t o i t s l i b e r a t i o n and t h a t hc bpgzrentiy cAiLiuea c r e d i t
for hming saved Rome from des t ruc t i an .
a cons idera t ie fo r tune in ccjnnecticn mith the rhnsoming of i n p c r t u t
nepatediy he h td b u i l t ug
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i n d i v i d m l s and I enerLLy, though 5:
some sympzithy f o r Itz3.ians9
metinmi f o r a price, ,.ad shown
OFP internediery, whcj viiis proceeding t o L u p n c on other
businesst met Dolinlmn, ZimTer and P b r e d i &nd a Swiss i n t d i i g e n c e
o f f i c e r et Lxano on 3 March. To t h e Saiss intermedkry, Dolincnn
had apparently claimed thHt he represented Kesseuing , Rahn (Nazi
d i2 lona t i c repreeenta t ive i n I t a l y ) , Wuif'f ( sen ior SS and pol ice
l e a a e r , Itbly) , and Cerrt,t>r el' Hhre te r ( idenf , i ty uikncrin) :. but t o
OES intermediary he never spec i f i ch l ly so s t a t e d . T o t he l a t t e r
he indictited only t h a t a f t e r c c n s u t a t i o n s a t Fuseuc (Fasanu '2
Venice a re& o r Istria :), and subjeqt t o c c n f i r m t i o n on b Mzrch,
t
he w o u d r e tu rn t o Switzer,snd on Thursday, E! Mach, Kith c redent ia l s
and d e f i n i t e propcshls.
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The nature cf t he prcposnls viere not indicated
9 but from other trslks which in te rmtdihr i ss nnd, OSS re ixesenta t ive
assumed that they r o u l d bear upon t h e future d i spos i t i on of German
forces i n Ncrthern I t a l y .
' A s Q r e a l tes t of Doilmenn's s i n c e r i t y a& a b i l i t y t o a c t , it
was suggested t h a t t h e release of c e r t a i n I t a l i a n p a t r i o t s be '
promptly e f fec ted . (One of these being P a x r i , otherwise kncwn as *
Pdeurizio, a CLN representa t ive who had been a r r e s t ed by the Germans
i n Turin. On 8 March OSS representh t ive s ignal led t h a t he had been
t o l d P a r r i was being released. See paragrhph VI1 helow.) OSS
intermediary gsve Dollmann no name; Dollmonn probably believed t h a t
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he was asscjciating wi th a representa t ive of t h e S u i t e Department.
*Eugen Doi lmn has been described t ts Himrmerts perscnal envoy i n Italy,
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where he has l i ved f o r years. He spetiks f l u e n t I t a i i a n , and resided i n ' Rome before liberation. 1 $
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On 5 &rch OSS representa t ive s t a t e d i t was n o t y e t c l ea r
' whether t h i s move of Colimannts wae separate from o r p a r a l l e l t o
t h e e a r i i e r negot ia t ions mentioned i n paragraphs I V and V, bu t he
w a s inc l ined t o be l ieve that &s f a r &s t h e North I t a i i a n s i t u a t i o n
was concerned, they Pr.uuld merge if, i n f a c t , Doiirrann was. ac t ing
f o r Kesseiring, Rahn, e t a l . Ti thout c i t i r i f i ca t ion of Doilmannfs
roLe, t he re was naturn1,y n G niention m d e of t he Himruler, Khltenbrunner
i i n e ., OES representa t ive s t a t ed t h a t i f Dolirann returned he woud
arrange t o find out what he hLd t o say. a
nature t o f a c i l i t s t e uncondi t iond surrender of t h e German forces
i n Northern I t a l y , he ~~ suggested t h a t it might be des i rab le t o arrange
a m i l i t a r y contact t o t ake place on the Swiss side of the Front ie r .
If t h i s shouid be of
H e remarked that i n s p i t e cf AFI-Qts cbservEtions t h a t if
Kescelring wished t o dispbtch an emisssry with an o f f i c i a l message
he cculd ~ l v ; ~ y s f i n d ways of doing it, it should be remmbered
t h a t those around Kesaelring wno might wish t o f a c i i i t a t e a surrender
could act only with t h e g r e a t e s t secrecy i e s t t h e i r movements be
betrayed by f a n a t i c Nnzis i n Kesselringts entourage. Thus, he pointed h
out , t h e normal procedure of sending an a f rp l sne o r messenger t o our
l i n e s might prove d i f f i c u l t , t h c x h it was r e l a t i v e l y easy f o r high
o f f i c i a l s t o come t o Switzeriand, as they h&d been d o i w continuously
over a lung period, without arcusing suspicion.
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OS8 representa t ive i n Bern s t a t ed that he had csilficknce i n
the Swiss through whom he was deGLiq and f u r t h e r pointed out t h a t
all Swiss interests lay i n t h e f a c i l i t a t i o n of a peaceful eurrender
of Germans i n North I t a l y .
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'VII.
Gaffen SS Cenerai Karl Wolff, t cge ther w i t h an OKm representa t ive
presumably from Kesselr ingts staff, p lus Doiimanri and Zim'er err ived
i n Lugano t h a t morning d l e g e d l y prepared t o t d k d e f i n i t e l y .
On 8 March, OSS repre&ents t ive in Switzerland s igna l led that -. ~ -
If
t h i s were ccnfirned, he w ~ u i d see K h a t they had t o sty. He hed been
t c i d a l s o thn$ i n answer t o his request P a r r i was about t o he l ibera ted .
If both these r epor t s were true, OSS representa t ive suggested that a
high SACMEU author i ty be prepared t o g o t o Bern.
ccuLd, 791th absolute secrecy, arraage en t ry i n t o S a i t a e r i m d i n
c i v i l i a n crothes , and s e c r e t cooperation of locai autho ' r i t ies C G U ~ ~
be assured.
d u t h o r i t i e s from SHAE.F constant iy came t o Bern.
4 .
Said representa t ive ~
There W N ~ S nothing unusuai i n this 8s high military , 1
OSS representa t ive t h o y h t that the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s
developments were so far-reachirg t h a t they j u s t i f i e d immediate
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, c o n a d e r a t i o n in t he h ighes t quar te rs . If Wolff were r e a i l y working ~~
with Kesselring, these two might effect an unconditional surrender
provided absolute secrecy could .be preserved.
The quest ion remined, how much d id Himmler know about t h i s ? F
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VIIT.
t h e t an o f f i c e r named Adriano of CLN, Venice, wouid s h c r t i y
a r r i v e i n SwitzerJ-md and seek t o contiict OSS.
he would b r i r g informat'ion about severaA nigh German o f f i c e r s i n the
Venice area who were sa id to'be part of o German insurrect ionary
movement End disposed t o co l labora te with Allied forces i n t h a t
Meanwhile, on 12 February, OSS Caserta had s i g n a d e d Bern
According t o repor t s ,
area. It was stated t h a t our prirctuy in te res t would be t o a sce r t a in
everything possible about said German of f icers : t h e i r simE and
acti;ntions, a d t h e s t rength , composition, l eaders and d i spos i t i on
of t h e a l l eged ins&rectiomry movement.
f a c i l i t a t e contact and advise i f contact were mede.
t h a t an a t t e n p t might be mcie t o sell an elaborate military plan
- OSS Bern was t c l d t o '
Warning was given
which should be t r ea t ed v:ith g r e a t caution.
Connection between t h e reported Adriano deal end the al leged
has a r r i v a l of Wolff, Doiimann, Zimmer e t a i is m t npphrent, nor
there y e t been reported t h e a r r i v a i of kdrihno i n Switzeriand.
IX. heference the Adriano s tory, t h e following was r e p r t e d from
' 08s Florence:
1. Sta r t ing 19 February, m i l i t a r y command of Venice w a s ,in
contact with Venice Pla.tzkommandantur, who, i n turn, s t a t e d he
represented German insu r rec t ion movement and was i n touch.with Kesselring.
Desired t o meet All ied o f f i c e r t o present proposals and rece ive a rep ly
f o r s surrender of t roops operating i n Italy.
I
On 10 February, Liberat ion
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Headquarters haa sen t Adriano t o Switzerland t o contact OSS and
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make t h e proposals.
t h e f oilowing 2
It was said he could approach Kesselring with
Throtgh Paulus t o persuade Von krnim to j c i n Anti-Nazis.
The three Generals t o br ing cibGut col lapse of the Front.
Al l ies t o land a t severa l po in ts on the Adriat ic .
Parbchut i s t s t o rand i n Upper Erenta VaiLey t o i s o l a t e
Kesse l r ingfs HQ from Gemany.
Guarantee Kessehing and a few others not t o be considered
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var criminals.
Guarantee German people not t o be exterminated nor s t e r i l i z e d .
Leave t h e three G e n e r d s with an appearance of au thor i ty ,
presumably a s pol ice serv ice .
R e l i a b i l i t y of above r epor t is questioned.
2. A second North Itaiian Source reported io February t h a t from varieus
Sub-sources, ch ie f ly German Consul i n Turin, t he Germans had declared that
they acuLd l i k e t o make a separa te peace i n I t a l y and t o meet an American
Off icer t o present t h e i r proposals.
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x. On 8 Marcsh, 0 5 s Caserta not i f iedUS6 reprassnt&ive that WQ
vas aonaiderlng tho question of whether or not n representative
ehoul& be sent t o Switserlend for a possible lceeting vith (tersres .
authori t i e r .
nothine; but rhould ueoure whatever information ha could, sspediallr
on the reliability of the parties involved and dstai lr of the
In the neanvhile, 05s representative ~bctuld proare
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Xeaselring - RflPrJler relationship.,
u. 9 Marah. OSS rapreeeatatlve in Switserltlnd signalled that Wolff
hdtd inafcetea i w i ~ ~ r q p e s s t o attempt dstrs10ping 8 progrim t o trifre
Northern It& out of the confl ict . Walff eonridered that a m ~ r o
Ecf'litary surreudo~ would be df f f iau l t t o sffeat.
capitulation be preorded by LI statement t o the Qannan people from German.
l d e r o in Porth I ta ly , t h t any further struggle w a a hopeless and would
He preferred that
aerely cauee nesdlws Qeman bloods'ntlb end daetruct:on. golf f otrcted
that Bahn was in accord with him but that Xesselrfag vboaa adherenae
waft essential had not bern won over.
Uclff w(h8 proaeeding iaunsdfataly t o Jofn xeos%lring a d endeavor
t o re11 hir progru t o h i m . Yofff vould h.3 in touch -with us.
- Volff hsd enquired a b u t BIL alleged P r l t i c h agent, one Captan
heker, who bpd raoentlf beun turned over t o htm b~ Qrlrlrladi urd
releaarb t o return t o SAWGD via Switxerlurd (apparently vfth the Idea
of belptng t o n q o t i a t e a aurreader).
rola C q t a i a Duckas w a s really p1a;ying.
Wo&ff ua8 pussled a8 t o V h r O -.
e
(On 13 %8rchr OSS Bars riQJ4fhl that k c b r hqd turned out t o
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in order t o get aut of I t d y anit rgport t o SOB. Being out on parole,
ha proposed t o reburn ta %Iff's HQ xhers tvo other 18ritiah offiaorrr
had been left e15 hostages.
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3uok.r had already rpmt a WI& in (5
Swirr internment amp, a d OSS representetiva, vithouf dircloring the
baa@round, hcrd axranged that Mallaby wait In Switzorhnd 81 they0
wat no tima l i m i t on hia parole.
with i f o l f f , the oatter aottld easily be clanred inaamuch an Hallaby's
ertory checked with Volff's)
ff there were a further sieeting
, . Parr% ( nMauriiion e CLI agent meutioned in paragraph VI above)
had been delivered in Zurich unconditionally and B T ~ A prior t o a n ~ r
lndicstion that 08s representative would *@e Yolff.
hsb teen him in good health the night of 8 March.
did not knov hov he bad been released.
that tbe c l r c u t ~ r t ~ c e m o f N s release be kept secret, OSS rapreosatotiva
prugoeed that when Parries prerrence in Switxerlsnd becane knowns i t bo
hinted that be w88 freed in exchanga f o r a Ger- ?/d.
098 repreeentativu
P u r l , at that tima,
Stating that i t warn importors$
Truthfully or not, W'olff claflced that Eiaanler wau uawre o f his
activitier.
Sinca Xolff apparently coptrolled a11 police on entire Swlsr - I ta l ian frontier, it mi thought that we now ha& EL m 1 ~ a n 1 of q-aiak
uontadt ulth top @enaazr parronalifisr fa Sorthero. Italy. An 3ntcrrmrdiary
(I) wa@ t o hrwa further meeting with t'folff oa 9 Maroh and a full report
voald follow by rcplftr chmnslr.
On 9,)ltsrchs OSS Carmto inforeed OSS reprerentstir* (who shall
henceforth be a d l e d X) that Bia ld MarrhQl Alexandar had outlined
t o Marshal Brook a progored plm involving the di<patoh t o Svftzarland
of two senior rttaff O f f i U a r t ! who si& mot with 8.lqum reprermtrtiveo.
OS8 hrtd been dtrecrtsd t o mbmit LL plan for all necessary stepr, inuluding
trrrPngemantr for s meettag glace in Switrerland and Crampartation t o
and from that placse t o Amsmro o r vicinity.
. .
f a aaditionQS8 would
bs c d l a d upon t o provido c o m e a t i o n e , olerical autistmoe,
intrrpreterr &d d l neceusary Pdegusrde for bhe eeaurfty of tho
operation which, within OSS, vas t o be known by the code nam SULIBISO,
S b + V +
a
undartake.
abmlute secrecy)
He cmtiodod th0t the success of the projaat depended upon
,
,
. .. _. . . . . . . ._ L . . ,
. _ . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , . : _: , . . . , . .
' . .
U f f .
had been acooPepanied t o Zurich by Rollmann; Lt. COT. Werner, h i 8
military oxpert; %imrrsr an8 Yarelli. X had coneented t o see only
Voiff who, acconpmisd by a Sulsfi fntarsediarg, came t o his &part?:
10 Warch. A stap.l;laolentary re2,ort from X stated. that Holff
on the evoning of 8 karch.
parsiyra_uh XT above) then talked t o 'dolff alone, an& Y later intexoieue8
$'oLfi ead Dollmann.
X a d Y ( t h e intermediary mentioned In
It VRS ap-garsnt t b t blolff uaz~ a dietinctiwo geriiond.ftg.
Eqerytking indicated that he represented the more moderate olemaat
in the iiraifen SS with a certain raixture of romaatiafsm. Re yest th.
mctrat dynaaic parsanalltg in Northern Italy ma - after Kraarlring - k.
the most ?aawetful.
jcolff stated that the time ha8 eame &en some Q e r w vitb the
To a d u e e l e s r a.nd powar t o act rhouldlssd Germany out of the war.
naterial deitructtoa he was willing t o act and fe l t that he could
Vorarlberg, rEyrcl and the Bremer Pam with both Horthofn m6 Southern
approBohe8.
una Hinnaler wuld be~pouer1e.r~ t o taka sffocticre oountsrmea6arrf uore
In cbntrart with tha sltnation of 20 July 1944, Rftirr
laad, their joint action would Liave vital re~srau~rion~. A r far P I
I .
, , , . . . - - , , , .:I,
, ..... ' . . , ' . . , . , . ' ., . . . .. . , , ,.. . . ,
I ., .
Ma own remandl safety was aoncernea, k'olff made no requeett.
To bring about action Wolff c m v i w s d the follouing proceaurer 1) EIe wuld amat Xearoelring, with whom for s~vorctl .
' years ha clniaed tha C l O t t t S t personal ,relatione,. over tho
weekend of 10 - 31 Mmch with the puqore o? obtsining a
definite commitmen9. Xesselring, who ha& instoted tha%
throughout hi8 long military carerr be had a lwiy t kept'hir
oath of e13egienos a d was now to@ old t o change h i t Ideas,
would have the problem of reaoaailing any D U C ~ proposals
with bio oath: but Volff bellavkd that Lesselring could be
won over t o the futility of the struggle iurd t b t , above
hia duty t o the hehrer, war his duty t o the Oarmsrn people.
'
2) Vith ploo~elring he would drdt aa appeal t o b@ oi$aed
by Kerrslrina;, asSn, hixmalf and other*, retting forth the
uaelse6nerr of She struggle, their reoponribility Ooward the
Qer- peopla t o terminate it, and an m e a l t o military
cammn%err and .11 concerned t o dirarsocierts thmselrsr froa
the Hiantler - ITitlEsr caotrolr
haet i l i t iea in Worthern X t a l j . .
The Germans would end a l l
3) fn order t o reach tho hrmarr laadera and the Qormmn
propla, a radio Lusd leaflet uampalgn voula ba prepared. ~
I
I
Wolf1 believed that wepe ~easslrin& uon over, he would o o u '
rs6rotly t o 8witrr*rlmB t o mest Allied military repreaeatativer urd t o
i I
-16-
coordinate purely military Pieftawes of ourrender baaed on the above
appr8l.
t o do thir for him; &sttiger, hlr Chief o f Staff, vas not yet
ApparontXy no one in K s r s d r i n g ' r imedirzts e t d f was suits.'
acquaintad vith tho proJect.
Sn W t i o n t o the relea.. 02 Parri (already blaZfP,
au ettidenae of hir ability t o act , pre>are&$
1) 20 diecontime active wrfcIre against the P a r t i e a s ,
keeping u p only the neasosnry preteaos pending exeoution of
4 the plan;
2) 210 releaao .into Switsaerlanb several hundred JEDS
(Jews or Jedburgho 7 ) Interned at B o z ~ ~ .
he had refused what6vtar raneon money hab been offered for them,
Volf elaimed tha%
m d if i t had disappmred, it had been ewdlowed up bg inter- .
aectiarier ;
3) To tmsuae f u l l r sqons ib i l l t f f o r the safety and
treatncnt of 3130 Brit i sh rrnd American prisoners, o f whom 160
wre i n the hospital at Htmtue. and 200 on the southern
outskirts of that city. ?his, he claimed, accounted for $&1
the British and American prisonere held in Harthera I t a l y AB
the r e r t had reoently been transferred t o Germany; ,
4) To release into So.itzsrland Sogno Pranai if raid
individnal, who watt 8 well-know0 patriot mrkin(5 with GLEU
and the Brltish whose release Parri particularly desire&,
could be found:
5 ) 40 faoiiftats, insofar as he .aould, the return t o
. . . . . . .
. . .
. .
. .
, . .
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Borth-fwlp a i s31 ftellan officaro then held in Oennany
who might, in the po$t-hootil€tSee period, prove u0efU .
6) V o X f would walooma the help of 8aurath vbra he
f e l t had aanoidorabla influence on Keaoelrlng.
invi te Hwrath t o Join M a In ftalr.
8s would
. Early in February VoUf had $ e m Kitlsr and ViMslsr mci
k d r i s d thm of the general hopeleoenaso of the Rmth ftalian
r i t n i o n but had reoeivrd f r o m then no definita instruetione.
31 commented that, while i t waa neoeora~y t a withhold final
judgment until
were Isnow, he
opportunity to.
the rewlta of the 330121 - Xorrrelringg: conrarscbtions
believed that t h i m might prorent a very a i m s ahorten the w a r and t o perrait tha aaaupatfoa of Northern
Xtdy and pasriblfr, even, the geaetration o f Austria unbr thtm moat
favorable conUt1ons.
ertablishmdat of IL Haqaim.
Heuclelring or mothsr .high military authority vera comiw t o Suitzerlruid,
f t m i # t , s lso , tdraak Qerm&rr plana far the \
trusted that if hs got word tbrat
with tho power to alter the uaurs~ o f military affairs, SAW@ would
bo prs;>a;red t o oand t o Svitaerland an appropriah nllitarp paprerent&-
tiyo. X wiehsd it oleslsly understood k h a t he had e a e d in no
*
negotiation*; he had msrely listened t o Molff+m graesntation arnd had '
stated, with no rofo.tation0 oa-~olfi's part , that uaaondltioaail
surrender uas the only poarrible course.
X kaov of no pmtiaularlfr uloso relations between SSannolring
F 'a \
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* '. . . , .
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3uY.
MCIQ were wirad t o Barn (and Vauhiqgton).
On 10 March, full detai lr of tha S~.%JfEU% plan as approved by
h1. Yuil with fourteen
personnel would proceed t o Aansmsrrre 11 March t o Join Crockett who
tlrrivad th&e 10 M.arch t o confer with X. 7'Qs pperaomel mnld be
kast in *"rams as a pa01 t o au~ylament whatever f t could provide.
They would be introduced into 8 w i t e e r l ~ d only as they verb needeb
X vas t o 5ecure fmra Wolff a atntsment that he, Wolff, end hl6
X!l.
upon complete sscreay,'pointing Go the fact that La hail n o t yet hrd
ftnal word f r o m Molff and that the cooperttion of X e s s e l r h g wall
eraontlal, ke neverthelera implied that if this vtwe Pcrceptablo t o
MW, the two ~ s n i o r stuff offiaerrr nri&ht well u6ue t o 1Lnnemaso6'in
r&adilzc)68 f o r proparad seetin&.
init ial psrroaael roquiremoata provided OSY CPeerta roppllrd tho
Qn 31 Harch, X signalled that uuccem of tba operation depended /
,
I# &l eventtt, ho could meet w;th
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. .
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i€ 1% wore .ao cfeslrsd.
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-1 9-
a * * * *
given bin clearance. In m y event, he dlA not expect t o hear f r o &
' . . tho Gnrtwlaa uti1 12 Wirch at the earliest. .
that mrning before, tihe arrival of X's afgnul daBCrfbed in paragraph
above.
hajndls all arr(Bn&;rSments, he did not deem i i y neaessary or desirable to'
consult British c o l l e ~ a m .
Since ApHtz had plaoed full r e n p n s i b i l i t ~ r on OsS $one t o -
XVSX. O n 32 March, X oigndled t b t Parellf hati Juet returned f r o m
aesing Vol i f .
he had tele2honed Xerselrlng's KQ only t o f fnd that hsselring had Juot
been stusmono& t o Hltlsr'* UQ.
but thare was a chanue that he might never roturn. The meeting vas,
therefor*, portponad pending word from Keareh-b.g. X ruggestad that
AFffQ coneidrr vhether they would Ire lntereotad in canbatsting Wolff,
1
2s.rulli stated that when i iolff bad ronqhed Yesuno (BQ South),
' Uol f i expected h i m back within three days,
aem.m5ng, o f course, thttt ka had a plan of aaticlin. Wolff ha& said that
he wuld aaag t o Svlteerlrurd at any time,
X hrb -robed t o Parslli that Volff indleate (a) What he
pr~@08ed t o do if Iterrelring did not rotura~ (b) What hr, mulb do
if he l I k ~ d 8 a wore orderad t o report t o the fiehrer: ( c ) ' 39 be
-20-
did aot cooperate.
X suraiasd tkat X s i w l ? b & ' a e a 1 t o tha P\r&hrsr'r HQ af&+
forsahadaw an attonpted evacuation of Horthena I ta l7 arrd that if
Kessdring did not convince Hltler and. E i d e r that ho wul8 coopera:
he might ba $iton either a now comxzad or priroa. '
X Y I f I . %pplementLng thla metloage (Sea pbrqraph X V I I libova) completing
Parslltte report, X mbxiittod, tho follovlngr
I) Upon h i s return t o Xtaly, Volff had received a te1egre.a 8
from Xaltenbrunner advising him t o t w o i d srstablfmhlng oontaot
in Svitterlrrnd ss f t might mean catastrupba for €Mtenbrunnar'c
o m planm.
Eierster, at, the time of Dol1a;ann'a first t r i p t o Bwitaerl~rrriS,hah
Upon inveatisation, wolff had ascovered that '
wlred lkdt+mbmnner advising him that an at tempt night be mado
t o effect contacts in Swltzarlmd.
f e l t that t h l a wirer **as sen$ t o cover Dollmtina's trauk. and
bcuoraing t o Pare l l i , V o l f f *
that Barster vat dependable. (X considered th18 explanation
possible but diff icult t o verify).
2) &wmt on information that MuaSoliai had, obt&.lned Spanish
canrant for entry and wa8 preparing t o f l e a t o Spain, he &uld
be &~ced under amad guard.
3) Y o l f f considered that Oberstumbbnnfuehrsr '&exache,
now believed t o be hospitalized in Fr'moe, might. be useful 30
' farther h i a glanob (X nskad 2arirl t o give Bern fill information
. i
! . r . . I I . 7
-23-
s .. . . ... _;
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used 8s tur axcbzme;e t o cover the disappearance of Farri which
Wolff, raputsdl3r. WAC haPing difficulty explaining.
8 ) klff had clahed t o h ~ v e three milliard n o l b i u
r d n e shisros in Xtrllan companies on the Uspornition of which
he zslwd RdViue. - 6 ) He hwd. Hgaln enquired a@ t o whether we had any requeotr
for the fscil ite.t%on of a return f r o m Gsrrnraoy t o Northern Ztaly
of' X t a l i r r J I offlcero who might be uodul ;In the post-war pmiod.
night oog~romior an dreadf highly Involved taltuation.
Z X . On 13 Mrrch, X nfgnslled that ?or reason^ of ascurity Qlavin
Ar neithar Yolff qor eventually gersslrlng could be absent for any
'length of time at th le orinis witbout awekening serious suepicion, the
' .,
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1 .‘I ~ ..
-22-
Party arrived in Lpan 3630 burs. They wore t o proceed t o
dnnsmcrer 14 Msrah t o xeet with %.
XXSf. .At 0114 ibburrr 14 March.
at iinneimseo rtatfng that CIW had enquired .I t o w b t crraagemrats
had been nude f o r the entry of U X Q raprerentativer into Swltrerlmt!
A w i d wai sent t o Ba13tzX8S Party
: $$23s’ \N ‘FbKb
generals. Bad any further aontaot bean rantam with Wolfff
.
\
aonfarsntae vas migmlled.
X, i t was r a d , fadicated thkt about three veeks ago, Ik~selring
b d asked hurath t o Paset Wectzhal, Ilia Chief of Staff, and Blaakowitr,
Camanding &my (lrotq 8.
t o deternine bheir ~ f e w s in respect t o the need for negotiation d t h
tho Al l ioe .
!?!key war0 qnerisd by Xfmrath for Reorelring
(Thia infarPlPrtion bad, been furnisheU t o Y W tho-
ass).
not return bat had gointed aut that he would d e h y hio action
in m atternpt t o win r3vec Bessalringts B U O C ~ S B O F , if there
were on.; i f k9 failed, he would, then act alonei
w5th lailZtarr adviboro who muld bring with then the answer
a i t o vha% area8 they could. uontrol.
Y s l f i farther crtatad that he would be grad t o tnfrs a0 OSS radio ,
operator t o his €IC& who could kegp him in touah with the 3UYifiISE ?arty.
LIccordtng t o X, Wolff had tnkm a poaftfon deacribed a’s an haorable
one; he was aooMftted t o gs t h m * . h wlth hfr plsar and decisions).
-t*
-24-,
hatr infornaliioa receivsd through 05s contaat wlth*’dolff
lndicntod that 19olff had nrtrr0Wlp mlsaad doath by Allied bombing ar
V o l f f bad rtated that Kslteabmnner uaa then nt Peldkirch;
offenriver on Euat slr& ‘deut Bmats.
dlswnal o f Yoehlor .ad Rorghsao foreei. Yolff pointed aut that
if Gdtenbrnnner Vera t o arrive at hirr EQ, ho muld bet uLz&bke t o
Z y v a without eubatrnrsasnt or riak.
13 &kr& ‘violff bid m t h o w that there ws8 o auccessot being agrpointsd
fer Xoeselring).
Wolff tomt abrlao on the
( I t vas avidant that OD
Signal further stated that, judging f r o m dl rrrallcrble informe
tioa, X had the feeling t b t E i d e r sought pew&; X considered that
the potential r-aoultr of an early anefftirqg between Ab’IQ a d qualilikd
German ronrooentrtivar would (1) 8ecurg a full surreader, or (2) effect
confaoion bshind tho Lfem8n I h ~ e o , o r (3) obrtruat the development of
a Qennan Maquts, or (4) e f f e c t P ooPlbinertion.of ( 2 ) and (3) in tho
event thab (1)
Requoat
xltF13z. At 1220
aould not be realized.
wara made for a, dallr military intelligeaas mmmarp,
hours Lf3 M e , word srrired that Qlavio, Wail,
I . . .. , . . . .
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*.;. . ':e 111 -25-
XXVIII. 15 March. 11332 hours. 50s wired S t W S Z Party that
Conbined Chiefs of Staff had been notified of pertinent pofnto
i n t h d r msseage described i n Paragraph =SI1 above.
\*m,&Q
(\-I f- %L
out orders as ciroumrtonces permitted. &trfans would take part i n 4 - b
% u - r ~ dimcuseionr st ASHQ on arrival of Germ delegation.
XXX.* 16 March. SLJTSRISE wired S0.S that intermediaries between
X and Crl t iu had le f t ]Bern early 15 March and were expected h a l t
f r o m Critio'r quarters on Saturday or Sunday. Hsaatirne, arrange-
ments were being mado 80 that Picholson and Mcl8sely might be near
at hand for next meeting i n th6 vicinity o f Locarno.
% G30
&L +-
X X Z . 17 Usrch. SUBRISE signalled SOS that intsnnsdisry had % 536 t3)d,-3/ Lk) returned and that p o s o i b i l i t f s s of conference b&Ueen X and Crith
5- looked favorable for Monday, 19 March. Gdn,
. XIPEII. 18 March. SU'NRISlb Ysrty wired from vicinity of 'Locarno
% 3 that Critic, vho would appear on Monday, had given intermediary n
following information: Enperor had been put in comaand of hotern YWL
..1 , ' L -.
. .
-26-
Yront and would be raplaced by (€lazier. While new fsppointrnent
woiild delay uny immediate move in lorthern Italy, it might open
up _nossibilities on the Wastern Pront.
XXXIff. 19 March. SUN8ISO Party acknowledged 3DS' authorizetit.
t o meet O r i t i u and h i s associates if situation devsloped t o make w\n& 61
3- 505\nrcci t h i s desirable.
. . 8 XZXIV. 20 March. m f S E signal sumnrarieed meeting with (lritio
. , t
1 . . .
held near Looarno 19 March.
X and Critfc, Richolson and MilcNeely had dadided t o meet with
Critia. Nicholson t o l d Critic that the problem resolved i t ee l f
into whether Critio should try hisi hand vi th Glazier, or should
proceed t o Empsror's HQ on the Western Pront before rreeing Glarier.
Oritic had decided to laave on 20 Marah f o r &peror's HQ for
puzpoes of obtaining 'ais support and return t o make definite
propreale t o Qlaoier.
than f ive d a y s ; it might tsrks as Bntch as aeven.
'phroughout the h o l e meeting, Crltie made no rsfermoe t o
3?'ollowiry D. long conference betvaen
H i s trip could not be accornpliahed in 3.e88
rrsy conditione of aurrender and did not attempt to bargain.
reemed possible, themfore, that Oritie had already gone further
with the ?4aps*t than he had preaowly admitted.
I t
XX%V. 21 March. SWXRfSR signalled So8 that arrangeareato were
-27-
succe~~sful . iliahalaon f e l t that Otitic would come to next meeting
either with definite plana aad propordo or admit his inability to
act.
vas requerted.
Approval of plan t o w a i t in Switzerland for ouch a meeting
x;Iu;vI. Oolonel Qlrnvfn and Veil signalled brief atatement for 24 s3q Q\.* relay t o 109.
,&LYh-
XKYplI . 21 14arch. McNeely forwrded summary of intelligence *
obtained at lceetlng of Oritio on 13 March, giving an estimate of
Critic himreli and a report as t o the forcer whom Critic claimed
t o control i n themar areas.
8
& h 8 %--- 3dL
XXX'tlXII. 21 March. SGS approved SUHBISE Partg'a remaining in l o $l$ S*%fL
- \
Cq,n,s15) Switzerland t o await next- contact vith Critic. s- C - f L
XXXIX. 22 k c h . Movenient report from Olavin add Well. & 539 Qm %fL
XL. 22 Mfiroh. Kire t o Glavin and V e i l iclssursd them that all OSS
plana had been nade f o r North Italian capitulation inaofar aa wao
XLf . 23 M a r c h . Becommendation f r o m Bicholson snd McNeely that
Parri a8 a security measure be removed from Switzerland a d taken to
Italy f o r confsrencdo.
% 5.17 s..c % Before he left Switzerland he would have
... . . . :
.. % . :
-28-
conferred with Oabrna and could bring 1ateat.appraisa.l of
aituatlon In North I ta ly to AZTQ.
XLIII. 24 March. SUXIUSE rfgnislled S W suggesting that CAdorna 22s 5& s- R C C O ~ ~ ~ M ~ Parri to Grrrerta. (Parri would travel under pseudonym
XLIV. 26 March. Colonel Olavin signelled order6 that OSS,
taking lnrtructionr from APHQ, chauld h d l a Parri and Oadorna
during their stay i n Southern Italy.
X 566 5- byc
k56Ci =v, 26 March. SQS signalled approval that C i o m a ticcompany
T O
%9-
XLVS . 26 Mar&.
had juot returned fran conferences with 476 and two Sviar inter-
mediaries, one of the l e t t e r t w o having been in contact w i t h
OriticIu aide, Graduate, who travelled between Milan and the
Xicholsoa signalled SOS that X and Ndeelp
% '7+ 4-
/ B e y v l ,
frontier, According to Qraduate, Critict@ HQ had had no word f r o m
him until l a t e 24 March, when I t was established that Critio could
not return before Wednesbay, 28 March.
S t l N l U ~ Party nuodd not g~ a w a y angrym.
Critia hoped that the
, ' .. .
-29-
XtVII;.
word from Critic the previour evening.
27 March. Nicholson vired SGS that there had been no
Although i t wao too early to coment on th8 oignificsnae
of the reprt with relation to SUTJRISE, lzahn and Hsreter had both
been returned t o hmany and, it was underotood, were participating
in a meeting at Hftler's HQ,
XLVIII. 27 XRrch. Bicholoon and t4cI?@ely rent SQS thsir
sppreciation of the aituationf (See 9 676 from Bern). Critic'o
free movements, his frequent abaences from his EQ, the relay of
telephona serrageo between fmperorla KQ and Milan, and the
con;lplicity of niercbere of his staff, all suggested a well-accepted
and sympathetic background for surrender, at least in BS circlsa.
In the event of Cr i t i c la f&ilurs t o returp, or further delay,
there was no alternative l e f t but for the SUNRISZD Party t o return
t o AlrrrQ, leaving the original OSS channels open for continued
contact.
S I X . 25 Maroh. Blchaloon and H&eely wired SOS 6 further
apgteciiztioa of events. A conrlderablo number of people were
aware of SUNEISB, these including not o n l y German authoritisr in
North Italy but oertaln elements of Swim SI a d (5 f w people in
North ftslian uonmrrcicel and Industrial circler. (Sed Q 688 from
Bern) .
P
-30-
Oritic was expected to return to hie EQ the evening of
28 Karch.
(During the night of 28 - 29 March, after s ~ 1 sxcb:~
o f telegram* betwaea Caserta and benuwse, a plane w a s eont t u
Lyon/Bron t o pick up Parri ma Cadorna)
L . 29 Haroh. Xicholson signalled sc)S that Parri and Cetdoma
' had l e f t for Caserts only with reluctance. They bad been assured
that every effort would bo made to return them t o Horth I ta ly when
conditions permitted.
them to aonfer with 0-3, C-5 and sther staff sections concerned with
ocouijntional problemo, and t o v i s i t E3 AC and 15 M;z
Be reconatended that arrangements be made for
LI. 3G March. Nicholson wired SOS that Critic was then
believed t c have returned t o his He, that the SWUSE Party y80
leaving f o r Locsrno to &e arrangements f o r the next meet iq
which might take place over the weekend of 1 Agril.
t i o n did not dsvelop favorably, ha reaommended that the Party bo
permitted t o return t o Caserta.
If the Bitua-
LI a. 31 March. Sn # 593 from Bern, Mdeely requested
that 6-2 wire SUNRISE Party'e appreciation of 'the rltuation
(See Paragraphs %VI11 and XLIX] t o Q-2 Washington and fMf, London. $'
..
-31-
Lf b. 2 April . SO8 replied that Chief of S t a f f
S6G deemed i t unwire t0 repeat mere opinion8 to hlgher headquarters.
Reports t o 0-2 Usshington and would be taonflned to facts. \ - f -0
T a . , Y L
L I I .
much Parri snd Cadorna knew about SUERISBI-Ol?QSSWOB.
31 March. SGS queried the 9ulrTBfSB Party as t o how % 5 5 s
*e % r L < L -
LIIX. 1 April. Nicholson a,nd McNsely wired 809 that i t vaa
%S 6 \ G qyFh' confirmed that Critia ha& returned t o his EQ after having -LA%
received (L sympathetic hearing from the amperor who had
authorized him to epeak with Olasier i n hia behalf.
Oritic intended t o be i n Switzerland Monday or Tueiday, 2 or 3
Y 4 7- q-5k,
%o
Vhile
A&, Bicholson and t4cBeely did not pin much hope'on his
bringing Glazier 8 8 was intended. They thought, however, that
. in order t o reinsure himce&f personslly, Critic would come with
some offer, probably impraoticd., dealing vith the rear areas
=der hir oontrol.
LIT. 2 April. Xicholeon confirmed hi@ earlier meer~sge that
Parri and Cadorntc knew nothing about S ~ S ~ - o R D S S W O R D .
X 619- s.."- /9=.-yLc
%d'L \m
'?Ab 4!& '* L V I . * 3 April. 0345 "3" hours. Word vas sent t o Bern and
LV . t o Lyon 3 tpr i l t o p i a up WEiRxS party.
2 April. Paquest vas made thst a apeclal plane be rent
. l f 3 G J . t
-32-
Annsmasoo that a plane' wmld arrive at Lyon that afternoon.
LVII. 3 A p i l . 1515 hours. Word o m s from Nlcholron and
HcXeely (# 617 f r o m Bern) that Pari111 hdd crossed the bordn*.
the morning o f 2 April but had'nat h e n accomptded by Oritic
w h o had been warned by Himler that he way not to lsave Italy.
Critio had apparently conferred vith Glatier, according to
Parilli'e r a p r t , but, as Xicholson a d HcXeely noted, aaither
Critic nor Olarlsr had sent any suggestions vis Pari l l i au to
vhat altopld happen next. Nicholoon and RoEJeely had sent V W ~
back t o Critic that if he and Glazier vished t o surrender, they
could mend parlimentaires t o the Allierr directly through the
l ines .
Eitler's orders for the dertruction o f Rorthern It&?.
L
Oritic yiba reminded o f hie undertaking not to carry out
In view of developments, ljlicholson an& MoEiealy recommendad
they be sl10ved to return to Caserta.
LVIII.
return on 4 April.
3 April. SQS wired S W S B that D/SM had approve8 their
(Entire Sur(BIS3p P a r t y arrived at brchinero the afternoon
of 4 A p r i l ) *
LTX. 7 April. X signalled t h t the Sulrr preas had publiohed
. '. . .
-33-
the story that; two Eembers of the Ita3ia.n resistance had been
liberated by the Qernunr t o take part i n peace negotiation8 with
the Allies. Petmccio P a r r i had been one of them.
LX. 7 April. X rignalled that Graduate had arrived Friday
evening, 6 April, reprting thst Critic m a meeting with Glazier
and other8 Priday night and Satarw morning and that Parilli
wa8 b r i n g i s (L fu l l report.
8 ~
LXI.
to OCS, eummari zing the SUERISE-CEMSSWORD appreciation of dsvslop-
mento (See P 595 t o Bern) .
7 April . lllicholson wired to f a paraphrase of SA0 message
LXTI.
A full report would be forthcoxiing.
0 A p r i l . X wire6 that P a r i l l i ha8 arrived i n Switzerland.
~~
LXIIX.
report.
Critic had m e t with Glazier the night of the 6th and again. the
afternoon of the 7th.
9 April.
fie had delivered SUNUSE' me~aagea t o Critic on 3 April.
# 647 f r o m Bern gave a full account of Parilli's
O n 6 AFril Critict h&d met Vi th hi 0 comanders cmd cautioned
each t o prevunt deetruction within hi8 own area.
diatatctd. by Critie a8 rep=erenting Olazler's gosition had been
rubmitted t o X.
A rtatemurt
This, whiuh was forwarded in I t s original Omman
, :. ..:.
. . . .
-. -.. a , . .. .
-316-
,
i n 646 from Bern, set forth rtipulationr of a surrender
with military honora and the maintenance o f a substantial portiot?
of the Army Qroup &I) 8 future instrument of order inside ( i a m . ~ .
Pointing out that th6 matter ahould be oettled, if poeoibls, *
one trip, Glazier, Boettiger and Critic b b joined in aa urgent;
request that they be given a draft of the capitulation whioh they
were expected t o aign.
t o sign an unconditional surrender If i t could be put in a form
Oritic herd stated that Olaziar waa ready
which was consonant with h l a honor. Parilli and Graduate were
waiting in Switzerland in case SUNRXSE had any message to send to
Ofitia or wished to give X m y suggestions SUIRISE wished to convey
as coming from X.
LXIV. Bicholaontr reply to X suugiested a message which
waa to cone from X after consultation with "his military advisers":
It wa5 impossible to send 8 draft copy of any cspi tulkion, as,
in accordance v i th the usages o f war th i s vas only to be handed to
paslianentaiEee on their arrival at an appropriata He.
parliamentairee who came through the liner ehould include off icers
with abaoluts authority to act i n the name of the commander. *
9 April. A$
-4-0
%-fL
Any
Richoleon cautioned f against giving the Getmaas aap
excuse for clalmin& that the Allies were negotiating. The solo
obsect was t o mrmgo for paxliamentairau t o come to ASHQ 4 t h full
powbrs to arrange the detail8 of B military avrendgr.
further cautioned 8igalnot rrsndiw to the ~ermane, throua fnter-
X u m b
-36-
medis;iea, anything In writing which the Oernans could use to
suggwt that negotiations were i n progrets.
LXV. 9 A p r i l , X signalled the trubsthace of a seoond memo
from Critic (See # 648 from Bern), wherain Critic confirmed
8, 4-g his' obli&t%tione wlth regard to preventing destruction i n Hoxth h
\ i Y W
Q\ Italy but stated that in 8 0 m instancss t h i s would be imposoiblg
t o control, Urltia further rtated that military act ion against
' the Partiranr could only be vithbeld insofar as the Partisane
desi o t ad f r o i guerrll la ver f are'. Crf t i c emphasi zed that $oms
sxohange f o r Psrri and Uemlani was mot urgent, or at least a
written Indication that aomethiw In the w a y of an exchange was
being prepared,
LXVX. 10 April. fL assured Uicholaon that nothing had been dono
which the Germans could construe as evidence that actusl negotiation*
were i n progresn, 4 6 ~ 2
Nicholeon's meoeage (See Paragraph LXIV above) I\vcm GL had been aonveysd to Pari111 md Graduate, both of whom vere returning
to Ifsraxm the bight of 10 April. c
- If the matter were not set t led by the weekend of 15 Apri l ,
35 arked advice on the poss ib i l i ty of aendlag 4'16 and LI radio
operator t o hillan in order to fac i l f ta ta aonmtmlcationcs.
LXUII. 11 April. 8 signalled llcholron that 476 vat convinced 'x ldb %- %L
. * . .
, ..
-36-
. . .
. . . . .
,
-37-
X signalled Nicholson suggesting that he
interview Mallaby who, through pereonal contact, might bo able
to firrni8h ~ u 1 evaluation of Critic's motives.
1 .
-38-
& 6 3 3 +' L
L X U I . 13 A p r i l . X signalled that P a r r i l l l wae expected t o
re turn 14 - 16 April, that Oritic ut38 fatill hopeful of reoul ts
and hail ha8 phone caL1 from the Bmperor' I new HQ.
who had 50,000 men in his command, would approve crurrender.
Von Pobl ,
LXXITI. 13 April. X r l p a l l e d that he had borroued radio
operator from Eyds and had sent him into Milan t o ~+oalntsin
contact with SU88l[SE groupn and would communicate d i rec t t o us.
Operator t o l d nothing about SUZJBISE.
i n mlnd that any maamge from him would be material reaeived from
8
I t wa8 intportant t o keep
Cr i t i c , P s r r i l l i , Graduate, e t al, end all message$ muat, therefore,
be uarefully mcreenod.
L X I V . 13 llgril. 808 wired X that after careful consideration
they dlsapprovcsd 476's proposed t r i p to Wllm.
There was no sa t i s fac tory evidence that O r i t l u had g&
v i s i t e d the Emperor, that SO3 believed there was always an even
chanoe that the German8 would attempt to mrke trouble betwoen the
Allier.
3f was &ten germirrion to &how hi8 cable $ 626 from
~ i c h o l a o a to 476.
LW, 14 April. neesage in Oarman stated that radio operator Walter
had safe17 arrived in H i l e a , asked if le t ter f o r 110 vas meant for
Crftlo. who vas 4769 Bsqueot that tho staff map of Rovereto a r o a L
. . ':. ;. .. f . . .
.*
.. , . . . . ... ... - I '
-39-
be given the Profeosor.
,
LIUEVX.
had been m a k i n g contact8 with suoh A l l i e c l secrat agenciea with
which he could get in touch.
14 A p r i l . Signal from WcEsely t o 110 s tated that Critie
On 7 April, in a meeting at Bogliaeco attended by k a s o l i n i ,
O laz i e r , Critic, Roetitiger, DoZlmann md others, it hsd been decided
to carry out A f ight ing withdrawal t o the Adige.
At sn unspeaified date, Critic had Informed one mbsource
that he knew negotiations had taken place betueen a repreasntative
of the Allied Cornand and Qraziani and Pavolini, which negotiations
were viewed with disfavor bg the German Command i~ Italy.
commented that t h i a seemed t o f i t i n with Mallaby's etory about hiu
meting with Qrazianl.
Xicholson
According t o Critic, the Gernian Command in I t a l y was afraid
of possible Gestapo r e p r l d r , and they were waiting for the
inevitable disintegration of Germany which they considered iaJninsnt.
McNeely's own view vaa that Critic hoped t o hsve it both
ways i n that, vhfle w a i t i n g for the disintegration of Germany and
planning a fighting ,witbdroval, he and other CIOSSUOBD personalities
felt they vera inrurlng themselves and at the rame time helping general
Q~rman policy by arousing Runrim suepidon of Auglo-Americsn intentionr.
LXXVII. 16 A p r i l . Message t o Hyde requestsd a l l details OD.
inatructlono given to Walter and preclrs detailrr a* to contento
of ' l e t t er .
% d 4 3 +* XeVn,
LXXVIII. 15 April. Messege in Germen from Waltor addreooeb to
Veibol i n Lucerne said c o ~ e c t i o n r with S v f 8 ~ telephone excharye
BAWUW had been good for several d,ayr.
L i h I X . 16 A p r i l . Xessege from 679 (Barrier) rtcited that Graduate
had come t o Lugano ot noon that dey, that Frofausor Humam and
Wsibel had conferred for an hour and a balf at Luzerne.
Graduate carried a gereonsl letter from Critic stating
in mbatanae that he regretted the death of President Rooawelt ; and
whatever happened X cogld count on Critic since he wa~ convinced of
the l og ic of ideas discussed ( in first meeting 19 Harch); that
in lrpite of m u dif f iaul t ieu , Critic '~OQI) convinced of the final
B U C C ~ Z I S of fitheir mutua3 effort#.
Graducbts reported that he had reached Pasano 11 April. Critic
had been "very pleaoed# with the meesage Graduate brought him (Sgs
Paragraph LXIV for Xicholwn'o suggeisted mesoago that no d r a t copy
of any capitulation oould be handed to h i m unt i l the arrival o f
paxlirrraentsircas ut an appropriate EQ).
Parano to v i s i t t3lazlar who gave them a cold reception, the reaeon
Critic aad Orkuate had left
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . ..: ' . , . .
. . '... , . ,
. . , : . .. , ~ . . , . , . /.. r.. , . . . .
-41-
being that Glae io r had heard that a British officer, --e unknownl
had contacted 8 s ta f f off icer of the 5ilr;Uriaa Corps and asked t o
be precrented t o Glazier f o r the purpose of dis,cussing surrender.
Thie Englirhmnn referred t o negotiations vhi'ch had already been
had between Glarier aad X, identifying X by Ma aorrect name.
Olaltisr did not see) the Englishman but, believing himself
betrayed, threatened t o eend a cover-up l e t t e r t o Joedl agating
that the Allier, wiuhed t o puoh negotiations but that Olaaier did
not d a h t o do ao u n t i l he ha& received Josdl'r clearance. Rrhn, I
Roettiger and C r i t i c had persuaded Glaeier aot t o send the l e t t e r .
13 A1)ri l . E l d e r cal led Critic and instructed him t o leave
immediately f o r Berlin by f a s t e s t possible meanti. Instead, Critio
e a t Himmler a l e t t e r by off icer courier stating that it vas uselem
f o r him t o aomo t o Effrdrr, that the Allied invaoion of CSerPslvly
vould bu a oomplete auccesa and that EUmmler rhould come t o Crith
and make use of exioting &lied contact8 t o Eurrendsr tha whole of
Germany t o tha Allies.
14 A g r i l , Rimmaler called Critic's HQ f i re t in the morning and
e g a n in the afternoon 88ldng why C r i t h had not arrived. Gritip'8
&Jutant t o ld h i m that Cr l t lc WSI sbaent but that a special aouriar
had been B e n t v i th a meooaga t o H i d e r ,
Qrlrduete otartod that ar i t ia was now determined t o surrender
with o r without the eonrent of Glazier. Though he waa not completsly
-42- .
. .' . '
sure of Glasrier, Critic had aeen the C h i e f Commaadem on 12 and
13 April anit felt aure they were with him regardleao of Glazier.
Critic begged X to atop my intaneified offenoive.
" f u l l responsibility and guarantee that during present week all
Be would take
would be surrenderedn.
an0 vould join Weibel, HusmaJm and Graduate to meat wfth X and
476, planning t o be in Bern late the night of 16 A p r i l .
Pari111 was waiting f o r Himmler's reply
Oauleiter Bofer, vho wa6 completely i n accord with Critic
W&P resorted t o have talked t o Hitler and Himler '12 April and
t'o have learned that they planned to stsy in Berlin and, instead
of disoussing the nreduittt, were crazily talking of a nev offensive.
' , LXXX. 16 April. firther aignal from 679 gave intelligence items
reported by Uraduate:
1. The locastion of Eilsaisr's EQ at Recoaro (South of Rovereto).
2. T h a t huff, second i n command of SS i n Italy, waa nou wholly
in aacotd with Critic.
3.
ferred f r o m C8la4ier'cr command t o Loohr'8.
h is Luftwaffe perroqpsl West of the Isonro and, subsequent t o
Crltia's letter to BimrriLnr, had blocked the Brewer with flak
t o protect egainst entry from the Wast.
?hat the territory last of the Xsr>nro River had been trans-
P~hl had place& all
Badio operator Walter was oecure in Graduate's houre in
M i l a , but that bombings were maklng l i f e and radio trsnomisrion diffioult.
c
. .
. .
LXXXI. 16 April . X oignallod for further information on Oritic's
allaged contacts uith other Allied agencies. Did Eicholeon and
McHoelt know snythfng about tho lngliahmnn who had w e d X I 8 nav
The letter given Walter by Hyde m e completely innocuous.
nov boon recovered.
I t hwd
LX3[XII.
f o r 109) nupplernented earlier report6 on the 15 A p r i l conference.
~ i e s Parngrapho LUX and LXXT above). P a s i l l i had seen Criticla
letter t o Hider whiah vas dispatched by Say16 who reached Berlin
at 1700 hour8 18 A p r i l .
17 A p r i l . 94saa1tqp from X (copy of which was sent to Paris
3. At 0700 hours 16 h r i l buff ( O r i t i o l r eecond in commend
of SS) called P a r i l l i t o taslhno uhers Venner told h i m - that after
receiving Critic's lotter, Himmlar had oel lsd Critic several timoe.
Critic had left for Berlin via Munich vhere he vas regorted t o have
arrived 1000 hours 16 A p r i l . There wa8 no confirmation of Mu
arrival in Berlin.
Oritiu had given t o Ve~ner a mesaage t o be delivered by
Fu.rri l l1 t o X f a the effect that Orftia vas going to Berlin becanre
he thought tharo -8 e chance t o do somathing for the entiro German
people. Be expected t o return 17 A p r i l . Oritfe ordered Graduate
t o wait new at the Chisroo frontier ctnd check periodically at the
EQ at Fa8aaa.
. . , , .. . ' ..
. : . .
-44-
X commented that Bimmlrr m i g h t nov eliminate Clritio;
alternatively, he might uoe Crftia. to eetablfnh some mntaat for
Blmular himself. X vould nrturally refure to b v e anything t o
do with the latter alternative.
. ..