operation askari

OPERATION ASKARI(A SUB-COMMANDER'S RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE OPERATION)

Brig R.S. Lord*

INTRODUCTION

By 1983 the war in SWA/Angola haddeveloped a predictable cyclical pat-tern. The seasonal variations allowedSWAPO to take up the offensive duringthe summer passage of the Inter-tropi-cal Convergence zone (ITCZ) acrossNorthern South West Africa. The ITCZisthat low pressure belt of unstable moistair, that traverses southwards to thelatitude of Rehoboth during late Octo-ber and November and returns north-wards across Owamboland in lateJanuary through to April. The passageof this belt gives rise to the phenom-enon of the "small rains" before Christ-mas and the "big rains" from Februaryto April.

The rainy season gave mobility to theSWAPO insurgents. It supplied the wa-ter they required for their trek to thesouth. The foliage on the trees andbushes provided concealment fromthe security forces. The very heavyrains washed out the tracks they hadleft, making follow-up difficult andthey criss-crossed the full shonas to in-crease the difficulties of the trackers.Therefore, the SWAPO insurgency, usu-ally commenced in late January ofevery new year and continued untilthe end of April, or early May, whenthe water started to dry up.

The onset of the dry season broughtabout a change in the tactical situa-tion. SWAPO withdrew its forces tobases in Angola for the so-called "re-hearsals" - the regrouping and retrain-ing of their members, prior to the nextyear's incursion. With Swapo concen-trated in bases, it became cost-effec-tive for the SADF/SWATF to launch of-fensive operations into Angolanterritory during the dry winter months.The mobility of vehicles in the torrentialrains of summer was always consid-ered a restricting factor.

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For many years, up to the spring of1983, this had been the pattern of theconduct of the war. A summer incur-sion by SWAPO PLAN and a semi-con-ventional/convential offensive by Se-curity forces into Angola during thewinter.

The military results of these activitieswere overwhelmingly in the favour ofthe security forces, as can be deducedfrom the following table of Operationallosses:

YEAR SWAPO SECURITYFORCES

1981 1494 611982 1280 771983 913 96

The economic and socio-political ef-fects on South West Africa and theSADF were however appreciable. Tocounter an insurgency requires the de-ployment of a large number of forces,in the ratio of about 1 insurgent to 8security force personnel. The directcost factor is therefore considerable,as is the insidious effect of keepingable bodied men out of the economicwork force. An additional factor wasthe war weariness of the population.The war had become so predictablethat it was difficult to foresee how thisprocess of violence could be halted.

In an attempt to surprise the enemyand to alter the pattern of predictabil-ity, Operation Askari was planned ..Bearing in mind the difficulties of mo-bile operations in the wet season, itwas decided that Askari would be asemi-conventional operation usingconventional arms against Swapo Plan,while they were still massed in theirtraining bases before the start of their1984 insurgency campaign. The timingof the operation proper was thereforeset to commence just after the "littlerains" in mid-December 1983.

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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 22, Nr 4, 1992. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

PLANNING

The planning for Askari was conceivedand carried out at the HQ Sector 10 atOshakati under the guidance of Brig J.Joubert for the ground forces and ColR.S. Lord for the Air plan.] From con-ception the plan was a joint plan, withthe air involvement being in support ofthe ground forces objectives. Theoverall aim of the operation was "toprevent a Swapo special forces infiltra-tion to the South". The operation hadto begin in Nov 1983.

Among the general guidelines werethe following:

a. The enemy must be stopped ex-ternally.

e. Security forces must maintain theinitiative.

f. An infiltration during 1984 mustsimply not take place. Not even10 terrorists must successfully infil-trate.2

The SAAF aims for Askari were as fol-lows:

a. To gain and maintain a favour-able air situation over Cahama-Mulondo-Cuvelai.

b. To prevent the expansion of en-emy air defence capabilities inthe Mulondo-Quiteve-Cuvelai ar-eas.

c. To expand the SAAF interdictionprogramme:

d. Extend Maanskyn (Impala nightoperations) north of the 150 kmline.

b. Deep reconnaissance coupled tooffensive actions must be com-menced at an early stage.

c. Maximum use of mobile elmentsfor follow-ups must be made.

d. Security forces must operate pro-actively, not re-actively.

i.

ii.

iii.

Up to Chibemba.

North of Mulondo.

Up to Cassinga.

ANGOLA: 5 MILITARYREGION

] This plan should have been initiated at the strategic level of planning. ie Army/Air Force HQ in Pretoria.It should have been part of the SADF military strategy. which in turn should have evolved out of thenational strategy.

2 In retrospect this guideline was totaily impracticai and shouid therefore not have been included.

2 Militaria 22/4 /992


e. Preference was to be given tojoint attacks on SWAPOtargets.3

The plan was divided into four phases:

a, Phase 1. Deep reconnaissanceby Special Forces followed by aSAAF attack on the "Typhoon" /Volcano" base close to Lubangobetween 1 November and 30 De-cember 1983.

b. Phase 2. Offensive reconnais-sance/isolation of Cahama, Mu-londo and Cuvelai from 16 No-vember to mid January 1983. Theaim being, to cut enemy commu-nication and logistic lines in thedeep area and to terrorise anddemoralise Fapla to such an ex-tent that they would withdraw.

c. Phase 3. To establish a domi-nated area from west of theCunene River, through Quiteve,Mupa, Vinticet, eastwardsthrough londe, by the beginningof Feb 1984.

d. Phase 4. The final stopping of theincursion, internally if necessary.

PLAN APPROVAL

The joint Army/Air Force plan was pre-sented to GOC SWA and OC WesternAir Command and approved withoutmajor alterations. It was then pre-sented at Army HQ to the Chief of theDefence Force. Present in the audi-ence that day were 12 Generals plusone Admiral. At the presentation theArmy plan was accepted in toto. TheAir plan however, was only acceptedafter much discussion and much al-teration. The reason for the changesbeing made are not open for discus-sion - but the fact remains that the Airplan was altered.4 Limits and restric-tions were placed on the employmentof the aircraft, which did not co-incidewith the limits of action of the groundforces. In addition the deception strike

on Caiundo was completely removedfrom the plan.

After all the discussions and alterationsAskari was approved, to the relief ofeveryone present. At that stage every-body was glad to be able to comeaway with the authority to go ahead. Idid not realise it at the time, but nei-ther did the twelve Generals and oneAdmiral, that what had started life as ajoint plan, was now no longer a bal-anced joint plan. What should havehappened was that we should havegone "back to the drawing board"and rehashed the situation to oncemore come up with a joint plan. Thiswas a vital lesson.

RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIESPHASES 1 AND 2

While I do not intend to go into detailabout all the involvement of the "Rec-ces", there are a few points that needto be brought up. It must be statedfrom the outset, that ASKARIcalled forthe largest Recce effort of the war. Atotal of five teams of varying sizesweredeployed. They were deployed westof Cahama, east of Cahama, in the vi-cinity of Mulondo, in the outskirts ofCuvelai and were also tasked to rec-onnoitre the Lubango area.

These teams provided the tactical in-telligence on which the battle planswere made and in general performeda difficult task well. The command andcontrol of these teams was however abit of a problem from the Air Forcepoint of view. Each team operated asa separate entity. Each team had itsown tactical HQ at Xangongo - buteach in a separate locality. The AirForce had provided a Mobile Air Op-erations Team (MAOT) to be co-lo-cated with the Army HQ at Xangongo.Air support which had been promisedto each of the recce teams was thusdisjointed .. The problem that couldhave arisen was one of priorities. If allthe teams were in trouble, who woulddecide on the priority for air support?

3 An additional Air Force aim was a night strike by Impalas on Caiundo. Although the FAPLA garrisonstationed there was no real threat to our planned operation. the idea was to sow confusion in the mindsof the FAPLA high command as to what our exact intentions with Askari were. This option was notauthorised.

4 It is my opinion that there was a personality clash between C SADFand OC Western Air Command, ThisI believe was the only reason that the air plan was changed.

Militaria 22/4 1992 3


5 MILITARY REGION

In future, a joint HQ is the only answer,with a representative of all involvedparties present.5

At 0920B on 29 Dec 1983 four Bucca-neers attacked the Tobias HanyekoTraining Centre, (THTC), just outsideLubango. This SWAPO training centrehad over the years been responsiblefor the training of SWAPO recruits.From THTC they were posted straight tothe various front headquarters. Theaim of the strike was to demoralise therecruits before they had even left thesafety of their training base. 32 x 460kgbombs were dropped into the targetarea. Approximately half of the bombsexploded on contact, and the otherswere fitted with delay fuzes from oneto thirty six hours, rendering the centreuninhabitable. The air strike was ontime on target and suffered no losses.Round one to the "Boere"!

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS PHASE 2

Chama. Throughout the duration ofthe war, Cahama had remained a

. tough nut to crack. FAPLA's 2nd Bri-

gade had ensconced themselves infortified positions in the environs of thelittle town, to the north and south ofthe Caculuvar river. Numerous foraysand probes by our ground forces overthe preceeding years had been under-taken against Cahama's perimeters.The Air Force had attacked radar andAnti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) sites in thearea on many occasions. None ofthese activities had succeeded in dis-lodging FAPLA, or in fact even dentingthe peripheral defences. Our analysisof the situation was that we had neverconcentrated all our effort into tryingto take Cahama. If it had of been ouraim, we could have taken the place.

FAPLA's analysis of the continual as-saults was that they had always suceededin chasing the "boere" away. Theywere therefore confident of their abilityto hold Cahama, and contrary to ourown widely disseminated intelligenceon the troops in the town, their moralewas in fact high.

61 Mechanised Battalion plus artillerywere tasked to pressurise FAPLA's 2nd

5 All arms of the service, particularly the Recces, tend to be parochial. That is, they plan within the limitsof their own involvement. Although security of an operation is a definite factor, especially with clandes-tine operations, joint planning is always the best solution.

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Brigade, by probes, feints and artillerybombardments. Offensive recce teamswere to cut FAPLA's logistic lines be-tween Cahama and Chibemba, whilethe Air Force carried out strikes againstidentified targets within the defensiveperimeter of the town. The combinedresults of these actions were to demor-alise and terrorise the FAPLA andSWAPO forces, to such an extent, thatthey would either withdraw or desertfrom Cahama. It was envisaged thatthis "uitmergeling" would take placebetween 16 Nov 1983 and mid-January1984. Time was required to allow allthe desired effects to play their part.

In the event this was naive planning inthe extreme. Between mid-Novemberand mid-December the recce forceswere indeed active, but a Brigade gar-rison, which in their view had success-fully beaten off the "boere" repeat-edly, would not be disturbed by theactivities of two small recce teams.The real offensive pressure startedaround 16 December, with the ad-vance of 61 Mechanised Battalion fromthe Quiteve area. This approach musthave been detected by the defendersin Cahama. The bombing and bom-bardments which were then startedand continued around the clock, musthave had a detrimental effect on thedefenders. Had the time limit of mid-January been open-ended, then theplan might have been successful be-cause by the end of December, themorale of the 2nd Brigade was still rea-sonable.

It was known that SA-8 batteries werepositioned about 2 kms South West ofthe town, close to the road to Ediva. Asub-operation within Askari was Opera-tion Fox. This called for a combinedeffort of ground and air forces tobomb and bombard in such a pattern,that the SA-8batteries would be forced tochange their position by moving to thesouth. The idea was to drive them outof the protective ring surroundingCahama, into the vicinity of FAPLA'sAAA defensive sites in the area ofEdiva. Once in this area a concertedeffort by the ground forces, (both Armyand Recce), was to attempt to cap-

ture an SA-8 system. Thissection of theoverall Askari plan, was given top prior-ity.

This plan was well on the way to suc-ceeding. The SA-8 batteries had beenforced to move their position twice,both times towards Ediva as planned.By the end of December, the clamour-ing in the world press to censure SouthAfrica, because of the military pres-ence in Angola, had reached a cre-scendo. A political decision was thenmade to cease all activities on theCahama front by 31 December 1983.6

All forces were withdrawn, FAPLA obvi-ously breathed a sigh of relief, and thestatus quo around Cahama returnedto normal. Once again the 2nd Bri-gade had beaten off a determined as-sault by the "Boere". We lost thatround!

Mulondo. The aim here was:

a. To isolate and demotivate FAPLAin both Quiteve and Mulondo tothe extent that the troops wouldwithdraw or desert.

b. To monitor the route Matala-Mulondo-Quiteve, to see if Swapowas using it as an infiltrationroute.

The time period for this sub-operationwas to be 16 Nov to 15 Jan '84. Theground forces used would be the samethat were to take Cuvelai. The AirForce was to carry out speculativebombing against selected targets, inand around Mulondo, to heighten thetension prior to the final assault by theground forces.

On their advance towards Cahama 61Mech took Quiteve almost without fir-ing a shot. This phase was so success-ful that it was then decided to send asmall fighting group with artillery sup-port, northwards on the western side ofthe Cunene river, to begin the processof isolating Mulondo.

As a result of the high state of alertthroughout Angola, FAPLA's 19th Bri-gade in Mulondo had sent out their

6 Maintenance of the aim is a fundamental principle of war. All the effort put into the Cahama operationwas not only wasted. it reinforced the enemies morale.

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ANGOLA: "PHASE 2 - CAIUNDO"

own recce teams to protect their front.These troops performed an excellenttask for FAPLA, in that they pin-pointedthe position of our fighting team. Theynever used the intelligence to comeout offensively against our forces but,whenever we moved our artillery intorange, they proceeded to bombardour positions with their D-30 cannons.These guns outdistanced our artilleryby 3 to 4 kms, which resulted in ourforces having to undertake a quickwithdrawal after firing just a few salvos.

This diversion from the original Askariplan, had repercussions on the airplan. Support had to be flown for theground forces in the area, thus utilisingaircraft hours and weapons that wereset aside for the Cahama and Cuvelaibattles. It had a further tactical disad-vantage in that the element of surprise,that was to be gained with the air at-tacks on Cahama, was lost. After ourMulondo strikes the entire air defencesystem of Southern Angola was placedon the highest alert states.7

On 23 Dec 83, 2 x Impalas attackedtorgets in the Mulondo area using

68mm rockets. The weather was atro-cious with large cumulo-nimbus clouds.After the fourth attack in the area, thewingman was struck by a SAM in thetail, but he managed to land safelyback at Ondangwa.8

The pre-amble to the plan for forcingFAPLA to leave Mulondo was unsuc-cessful. Political considerations in earlyJanuary 1984 were such, that the SADFdid not continue with the Askari planfor Mulondo. In the eyes of FAPLA's19th Brigade they had succeeded inbeating off a determined attack bythe "Boere". We lost that round!

Caiundo. This small stronghold on theeastern bank of the Cubango river wasnever a part of the original Askari Armyplan. The Air Plan however, had in-cluded a strike on the HQ unit, as partof the overall deception plan. This re-quest was not approved, and there-fore no operational or logistical plan-ning was carried out for operations inthis eastern sector.

The offensive actions, as detailed inthe Askari plan, commenced around

7 Surprise. as a principle of war. has become even more important with the advent of SAM defences.

8 Repeat attacks in the same target area are recipes for disaster!

6 Militorio 22/4 7992


16 December. Both air and groundforces were engaged in offensive ac-tions in the Quiteve-Mulondo-Cahamaareas. Imagine my surprise, shortlythereafter, when I was casually in-formed that there was an Army groupof ours that was deployed within 20kms of Ca/undo, on the western bank.When I enquired about their presence,I was told that they had been orderedto act as a deception force in thatarea and that they were in fact troopsfrom Sector 20, who would otherwisenot be utilised in Operation Askari.

This was never part of the joint Askariplan, and as such, it had a detrimentaleffect on the outcome of Askari. To

londo fronts, to the unplanned forCaiundo area, which continued unin-terrupted for the remainder of opera-tion Askari. There was a substantial re-duction in the air effort over theplanned Askari key points, which re-duced the pressure on the enemy andallowed FAPLA to remain in control oftheir troops and their emotions, in bothCahama and Mulondo.

In spite of a large air effort over a pe-riod of 21 days, Caiundo was nottaken. Despite a heavy air bombard-ment and a determined ground assaultthe FAPLA minefields and defensivebunkers remained intact. FAPLA's 53rdBrigade had reason to celebrate their

ANGOLA: "PHASE 2 - CUVELAI"

everyone's surprise and consternation,this force was attacked on the night of19/20 December. FAPLA recces haddiscovered that one platoon of thisforce were deployed outside the maindefensive perimeter, and were muchcloser to Caiundo than they shouldhave been. During the night FAPLAsent a Company to attack this platoon.This they did successfully, killing fiveand capturing one SWA Territory Forcesoldier, plus 13 light machine guns, 3rifles, 3 radios, a 60 mm mortar and aUnimog.

This set-back resulted in a switch of airactivities from the Cahama and Mu-

successful defence of Caiundo againstthe "Boere". We lost that round!

CUVELAI. Phase 2 of the original Armyoperational plan called for the isola-tion of Cuvelai, between 16 Nov 1983and 15 January 1984. The aim wasthreefold:

a. To isolate, grind down "Uitmergel"and terrorise Cuvelai, to the ex-tent that FAPLA would eitherleave on their own accord, ortheir soldiers would desert on alarge scale.

b. To carry out operations againstSWAPO elements such as the Mos-

Milifaria 22/4 7992 7


cow, Alpha and Bravo battalionsin the Cuvelai area.

c. To give early warning of a SWAPOincursion.

The Air Force plan thus called for:

a. Extensive photo-recce of Cuvelai.

b. Speculative bombing day andnight of SWAPO targets in the vi-cinity.

c. Air attacks on AAA sites that hada direct bearing on ground forceoperations.

In mid-December the photo-reconnais-sance (PR) was flown, and up to datephotos of all the AAA sites in Cuvelaiwere obtained. It must be remem-bered that in the history of our activi-ties in Angola, the PR flights were al-ways understood by the enemy to bethe precursor of an attack. Round 1 ofthe psychological battle had beenwon!

On 27 December at 1405B,two Impalasdropped lOx 120 kg bombs on aSWAPO target in the area. At 1628Bonthe same day, four Canberras dropped600 Alpha bombs, 2 x 460kg bombsand 16 x 250kg bombs on targets inand around the town.

The following day at 1335B,two Impalascarried out a further recce of the AAAsites in Cuvelai. At 1439B Canberrascarried out attacks on targets close tothe Cuvelai airstrip, dropping 17 x250kg, 2 x 460kg as well as 300 Alphabombs, which obtained a 90% cover-age of the target. At 1610B eightImpalas dropped 32 x 250kg bombs onvarious targets in and around thetown.

All these flights were undertaken withthe aim of achieving results against theenemies AAA defences, as well as ob-taining the psychological advantagewhile attempting to grind-down(uitmergel) FAPLA.

The Army meanwhile had sent a battlegroup, consisting mainly of citizenforce troops, to engage the SWAPOheadquarters and logistic base 5 kmsnorth-east of the town, This group was

attacked in turn by the FAPLA 11th Bri-gade and were in real danger of be-ing cut-off. It was then decided to re-assign 61 Mech under the command ofCmdt Van Lill, who were then on theoutskirts of Cahama, to assist the en-dangered battle-group. In a little over16 hours, 61 Mech moved, under bat-tle conditions, from the Cahama area,across the temporary bridge over theCunene river to the outskirts ofCuvelai. This forced march was itselfan epic of determination and perse-verance, especially as those troopshad to go straight into battle atCuvelai when they arrived on 3 Janu-ary 1984.

On the afternoon of 3 January the ac-tual attack on Cuvelai took place. Itcommenced with a co-ordinated airattack aimed at all the known AAAand artillery sites. Each pilot wasequipped with up to date enlargedphotographs of his particular target.10 Impalas led the raid, followed by 4Canberras. Between them theydropped 60 x 120kg, 18 x 250kg, 2 x450kg and 600 Alpha bombs. A sec-ond wave of Impalas dropped a fur-ther 32 x 250kg bombs. This was argu-ably the most effective strike flown bythe SAAF, throughout the history of thewar in Angola.

On completion of the air strike, an in-tercepted message from the OC ofCuvelai to his Lubango headquarterswas picked up. The gist of what hesaid was "You better send help, 75% ofmy artillery is out of action as a resultof the SAAFbombardment."

The SAAF played another importantrole while supporting the ground forcesas they attacked the town after the airstrike. The Army was faced with twomajor problems - navigation throughthe minefields and the destruction ofthe last remaining resistance. TwoAlouette gun-ships, led by Capt CarlAlberts, provided the assistance theArmy required, against all doctrineand at great risk to themselves. CaptAlberts was awarded the Honorus Crux(HC) for his dedication to task.

After bogging down and losing a Ratelin the minefields, the ground forces en-tered Cuvelai to find that the enemies,

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both SWAPO and FAPLA, had fled, Infact, 32 Battalion who had troops inthe Tetchamutete area, used thesetroops as stoppers to capture a largenumber of FAPLA who were runningnorthwards,

The battle for Cuvelai was a success,Large amounts of war materiel werecaptured, The reason for the successwas that for the only time during thefour major battles that comprisedAskari, air power was utilised correctly,followed by a determined assault bythe ground forces, The aim was main-tained and the concentration offorces, using a joint plan, overcamethe enemy, Measured against the prin-ciples of war, this sub-operation wasbound to succeed, The "Boere" wonthis round!

INTERNA TIONAL PRESSURE

By the first week in 1984 the pressure onthe South African government reacheda peak, Our military presence and op-erations in Angola were being con-demned from all quarters, with threatsof even greater sanctions and boy-cotts, This pressure, plus the relativelyslow progress of the weather ham-pered operation, made the politiciansdecide to halt Askari on 10 January1984, Captured equipment was recov-ered to South West Africa and all par-ticipating forces were stood down.

PHASE 3

A dominated area was established byFebruary 1984 that included all the ter-ritory between the Cunene and Cu-bango rivers, as far north as a line run-ning east/west through Tetchamutete.The area west of the Cunene was still"Injun territory", but for purposes ofAskari it can be assumed that the"Boere" won that round,

PHASE 4

This phase was to be the final stoppingof the incursion internally, if necessary,This always seemed to be a contradic-tion of the guide-lines set for Askari, Astudy of the results of operationallosses for 1984 are an indication ofwhether this phase was successful ornot, SWAPO suffered 916 dead in 1984,

of which 361 were killed during Askari.The remainder were as a result of thenormal summer incursion. The onepositive factor was the reduction in Se-curity force deaths, from 96 in 1983 to39 in 1984, 13 of these 39 were killedduring Askari.

Nevertheless an incursion did occur, soit must be stated that the "Boere" lostthat round,

SUMMARY

Over the years Askari has been lookedon as a major success, This perceptionbegan right from the first de-brief heldat Oshakati in February 1984, It cer-tainly is true that:

a. We captured Cuvelai along withmasses of war materiel.

b, FAPLA suffered a severe defeat interms of men and equipment,

c, Apart from their successful attackon a platoon of ground forcesoutside Caiundo, FAPLA neverachieved any other offensive suc-cess,

The question remains "Is it true thatAskari was a success?"

The Rhodesians were fond of statingthe fact that, "they never lost a battle"in their bush campaign, but they didlose their war! Did the same happen inAskari? Let us examine the facts,

Our acknowledged enemy was SWA-PO, They used Angola as a safe har-bour, from where they launched theirattacks into South West Africa, Afterthe initial large scale raid by the SADFto Cassinga during operation Reindeer,Swapo realised the inherent dangers ofestablishing permanent bases thatcould be attacked by the SADF, Toprotect their Headquarters and train-ing establishments, they moved thesefacilities under and behind, the um-brella protection provided by theFAPLAforces, thus making FAPLAa "le-gitimate" target,

During December 1983 - January 1984we lost 32 soldiers compared to the 407

Militcria 22/4 7992 9


SWAPO terrorists that were killed. A ra-tio of nearly 13:1. The overall figuresfor 1983 were 96 security force to 913SWAPO's, a ratio of just under 10:1,The ratio increased in 1984 to 23: 1, soin that respect Askari reaped benefitsand in fact for the remainder of thewar this ratio stayed over 20: 1. SWAPOPLAN never succeeded in regainingthe offensive capability it had prior toAskari.

The overall aim of Askari however, wasto prevent an infiltration to the south in1984. 555 Terrorists were killed during1984, in addition to those killed duringAskari, indicating that although theysuffered losses, the pattern of the insur-gency war continued. We failed toachieve the main aim.

Phase 2 of the plan called for offensiveaction against FAPLA strongholds. Wecomprehensibly beat the 11th Brigadeat Cuvelai, but we did not achieve ourgoals at either Cahama or Mulondo.In addition we did not succeed in dis-lodging the FAPLA forces out ofCaiundo. Seen out of FAPLAs'eyes,they lost Cuvelai but won the battlesfor Cahama, Mulondo and Caiundo.

Askari became the watershed in thecourse of the Angola/SWA war.SWAPO PLAN was reduced in militarystrength and from then onwards nolonger posed a major threat. On theother hand FAPLA grew in stature andevolved into the major factor in thepursuance of our war against SWAPO,Our readiness to attack FAPLA, wher-ever or whenever they protectedSWAPO, provoked them into aquiringan air defence system to protect theirinterests, that was second only to thatassembled in the Warsaw pact coun-tries.

Two significant events occurred afterAskari. Firstly, initiatives were taken tobring the South Africans and the An-golans to the negotiating table, SouthAfrica, being in the position ofstrength, welcomed the proposal asdid the Angolans, who were sufferingmilitarily and psychologically at thatstage. South Africa saw the opportu-nity as a chance for peace in the re-gion. Angola on the other hand siezedthe opportunity as a tactic. Commu-

nist inspired organisations have a his-tory of going to the negotiating tablewhenever they are in trouble, and thenutilising the breathing space to re-plan,re-organise and re-equip. This is pre-cisely what they did during the pro-tracted life of the Joint MonitoringCommission (JMC), that was broughtinto being for the purposes of negotia-tions.

The second significant occurrence wasthe subtle change in the whole struc-ture of the war. FAPLA gradually re-placed SWAPO as our main enemy.The war entered a phase of greater so-phistication and the low intensity coun-ter-insurgency bush war, escalatedover the next four years, to a high in-tensity undeclared conventional war,between the armed forces of the RSASWA and UNITA on the one hand, andFAPLA the Cubans plus their Russianadvisors, on the other.

The war was no longer a regional con-flict. It had become internationalisedand as such the solution was no longerin the hands of SWAPO or the RSA. Aninternational solution had to be soughtwith all the accompanying implica-tions.

CONCLUSION

"Was Askari a success?" It can befairly stated, that as an operationagainst SWAPO, Askari produced re-sults that effectively eliminated SWAPOPLAN as a major element in the militarystruggle. Although the organisation stillexisted, their military efforts had lostpotential and were easily countered.Although we required a large eco-nomic outlay to maintain this statusquo, they realised and we realised,that they could not beat us militarily.In this aspect Askari was successful.

I do not believe that the conse-quences of Askari, in terms of factorsother than SWAPO, were originally en-visaged. The four years, from 1984 tothe culmination of hostilities outsideCuito Canevale and Calueque in 1988,stretched our reserves and capabilitiesseverely. The wholesale build up of So-viet arms, within this time period, cre-ated a situation that was becoming



daily more difficult to handle, The costfactor in terms of both men andmateriel was placing a critical burdenon our resources,

The internationalisation of the conflictled to us becoming increasingly in-volved with extricating UNITA from situ-ations that they could not handle,These unmanageable situations for theguerilla forces of UNITA were broughtabout by their inability to counterheavy equipment, such as the tanks,helicopters and artillery, that FAPLAhad aquired specifically to counterSouth African attacks, These factorslend support to the belief that the con-ventional attacks on Fapla, during

Askari, had repercussions that affectedthe entire future of the war,

Many lessons can be extracted fromthe limited success of Askari, that af-fect all levels of authority in the Repub-lic, An operation of the magnitude ofAskari requires vetting and authority tobe granted at Sector, Theatre, Chief ofStaff and Cabinet level. War is an uglything which possesses the potential toescalate beyond imagination, Beforeone commits forces to battle, it mustbe ensured, that the operation is in ac-cordance with the countries militarystrategy, that in turn must be part ofthe national strategy, No future opera-tion should be approved that does notsatisfy these two criteria.

* Brig R.S. Lord. Officer Commanding AIR FORCECOMMAND POST

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ALPHA BOMB, A circular shaped anti-per-sonnel bomb weighing 6 kg's, Droppedfrom level flight that gave a naturaldispersion pattern, The bomb wouldstrike the surface activating the fuzingmechanism, and then bounce into theair to explode about 6 meters abovethe ground, This bomb was an im-proved version of that used by the Rho-desian Air Force and 300 of them couldbe loaded into the bomb-bay of theCanberra bomber,

AAA (Anti-aircraft artillery), Triple A wasthe overall term used to describe theanti-aircraft guns that were employedin a limited manner by SWAPO, but ex-tensively by the Angolan DefenceForce, These guns covered the com-piete range of Soviet supplied weap-onry and include the following

a, 12,7mmb, 14,5 mmc, 20,0 mmd, 23,0 mm Note This included the

towed twin barrelled version which wasprobably the most widely used and ef-fective gun used in the entire campaignby either side, both in the ground to airand ground to ground mode, The fourbarrelled tracked version (Shilka) wasalso utilised,

e, 37,0 mmf, 57,0 mm Note, These radar guided

guns were originally equipped with thefire-can radar, and later this was up-dated with the flap-wheel system,

"Boere", A general useage term used byboth SWAPO and the Angolans to de-scribe the RSA/SWATF security forces,

HC (Honoris Crux), The highest decora-tions for military valour that can beawarded to members of the South Afri-can Defence Force, There are threeclasses namely:

a, Bronze HCc, Silver HCSc, Gold HCG

JMC (Joint Monitoring Commission), Thiscommission was brought into being bythe recognised need by both theSouth African and Angolan antagoniststo estabiish a forum wherein mattersthat could lead to a peaceful settle-ment were to be discussed, Thejointness of the commission was em-phasised by the fact that members ofthe Defence Forces and Foreign Affairsdepartments of both countries were in-cluded, It was oniy after the secondJMC was formed, after operationsModuler,Hooper and Packer, that a fi-nal peaceful settiement was negoti-ated,

LMG - Light machine gun

MAANSKYN, The name given to thehighly successful night interdiction op-erations that were carried out byImpala aircraft from the early 1980'suntil the cessation of the war, A highlyskilled form of flying requiring intense

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concentration, that dominated thebattle area of Angolas Cunene prov-ince for a large period of the war.

MAOT (Mobile Air Operations Team).These small teams were usually underthe command of a Pilot with Majorsrank, and consisted of an OperationsOfficer, an Intelligence Officer and aradio operator. They were sometimesdeployed by air, but were more oftenmounted in Buffel, Ratel and laterCasspir vehicles. They were co-locatedwith the Army ground commander forinternal (within SWA) and external op-erations. Their main function was to as-sist the ground forces commander withplanning for his air requirement, andthe liason back to the next Air ForceHeadquarters.

PR (Photographic Reconnaissance). Amost important intelligence gatheringfunction of the Air Force. Good up todate photography often meant the dif-ference between success and failureof air operations.

Recces. A general term of commonuseage that could be used to de-scribe:a. A member or Unit of the South Afri-

can Reconnaissance Regiment.

b. A ground intelligence gathering op-eration.

c. A special air sortie aimed at gainingintelligence.

RSA - Republic of South AfricaShona. An open area in the bush that fills

with water during the rainy season, andis invariably dry during the wintermonths.

SAAF - South African Air ForceSADF - South African Defence ForceSWA - South West Africa (Now Namibia)SWAPO - South West African Peoples Or-

ganisation (A misnomer as the organi-sation truly represented only theOwambo people)

SWAPO PLAN (The Peoples LiberationArmy of Namibia). The militant wing ofSWAPO that used the territory of neigh-bouring states from which to launch at-tacks against the peoples and staterepresentatives of the South West Afri-can government.

SAM (Surface to Air Missile). A missile,guided by either infra red or radar,fired from a launcher on the ground atan airborne target. By the end of thewar the Angolans had an array of mis-siles that included the following

a. SAM-2 Fixed siteb. SAM-3 Fixed sitec. SAM-6 Mobile trackedd. SAM-7 Shoulder launchede. SAM-8 Mobile wheeledf. SAM-9 Mobile wheeledg. SAM-13 Mobile trackedh. SAM-14 Shoulder launchedi. SAM-16 Shoulder launchedNote: During Askari an Impala was hit at

Mulondo by a SAM-7while another hadhis right tailplane removed by a SAM-9over Cuvelai. Both aircraft returnedwith battle damage. The first to its baseat Ondangwa. while the secondlanded at Ongiva. This Angolan basehad been resurfaced by the AirfieldMaintenance Unit of the SAAF shortlybefore this emergency.

TYPHOON. The name given by SWAPO totheir elite group of most highly trainedtroops, whose specific task was the in-filtration of SWA. Although highly prizedby SWAPO they did not in fact achieveany more notable successes than theirnormal PLAN contemporaries.

UNIMOG. A four by four transport vehi-cle, based on a Mercedes Benz chassisand engine, that bore the brunt ofbush operations until SWAPO mine-lay-ing forced the introduction of mine-protected vehicles.

UNITA. The breakaway party led by JonasSavimbi that was eventually supportedby the western powers, including SouthAfrica, in the fight against the commu-nist backed MPLA in Angola. It must benoted that it was in the interest of theRSAto support UNITA, as their presenceprotected the long SWA border fromthe eastern edge of Owamboland rightthrough to the end of the Caprivi strip,from SWAPO insurgency.

"Uitmergel". An Afrikaans word that liter-ally translated means to exhaust orgrind down.

Volcano. The name given by SWAPO tothe training base approximately 14kilometers north east of Lubango,where specialised training was con-ducted for their Typhoon troops.



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