on the uses of cultural knowledge

8/6/2019 On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge

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ON THE USES OF CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Sheila Miyoshi Jager

November 2007

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FOREWORD

Culture has become something of a buzz wordamong Americas senior military and civilian leaders.Faced with an brutal civil war and insurgency in Iraq,the many comple political and social issues confrontedby U.S. military commanders on the ground have givenrise to a new awareness that a cultural understanding ofan adversary society is imperative if counterinsurgencyis to succeed.

This monograph, by Dr. Sheila Miyoshi Jager,eplores the role that cultural knowledge must play inthinking about a new strategy for counterinsurgency.Although the importance of cultural awareness andunderstanding of adversary societies has been widelyrecognized as essential to operations and tactics on the

battleeld, Dr. Jager argues its signicance has beenlargely ignored in formulating the broader strategicgoals of counterinsurgency. This monograph highlightsthe importance of culture, and cultural awareness, informulating a broad strategy for counterinsurgencywhich also has wide-ranging implications for U.S.foreign policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SHEILA MIYOSHI JAGER is an Associate Professor ofEast Asian Studies at Oberlin College. She is currentlya Visiting Research Professor of National SecurityStudies for the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S.Army War College. Her publications include AGenealogy of Patriotism: Narratives of Nation-building inKorea (2003) and (with Rana Mitter) Ruptured Histories:War, Memory and the Post-Cold War in Asia (2007). Herbook, Korea: War Without End, is forthcoming.


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SUMMARY

The wide-spread recognition of the need for culturalknowledge in counterinsurgency has been notedand actively promoted recently by the Departmentof Defense (DoD). General David H. Petraeus,commanding general of the Multi-National Force Iraq(MNF-I), has been at the vanguard of these efforts. As thecommander of the 101st Airborne Division in the initialinvasion of Iraq in 2003, he later took responsibility forgoverning Mosul, Iraqs second largest city. Relying onhis eperiences in Mosul, General Petraeus is currentlyin charge of a major new counterinsurgency effort inIraq.

In sharp stark contrast to former Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfelds heavy-handed approachto counterinsurgency which emphasized aggressive

military tactics, the post-Rumsfeld Pentagon hasadvocated a gentler approach, emphasizingcultural knowledge and ethnographic intelligence asmajor components of its counterinsurgency doctrine.This cultural turn within DoD highlights effortsto understand adversary societies and to recruitpractitioners of culture, notably anthropologists, tohelp in the war effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The recent focus on cultural knowledge in coun-terinsurgency operations and tactics is a welcome devel-opment insofar as it has allowed eld commanders inIraq and Afghanistan to radically reassess the failedoperations and tactics in counterinsurgency in boththese places. However, what has so far been absent fromthe discussion on cultural knowledge is the effort to

link this new knowledge to formulating an overarchingstrategic framework. If cultural knowledge has helpedU.S. forces to refocus their efforts to better achieve


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their operational and tactical goals, the question ourpolitical leaders should be asking is whether cultural

knowledge can also help them to redene a broaderstrategic framework for counterinsurgency.

The aim of this monograph is two-fold. First, itattempts to distinguish between the various levelsof cultural knowledge and how they are used atvarious levels of warfarestrategy, operations, andtactics. Although not mutually eclusive, culturalknowledge informs these distinct levels in differentways. For eample, the kinds of cultural knowledgethat are required at the tactical level (e.g., the culturalknowledge of specic customs) is quite separate fromthe kinds of cultural knowledge that are required toformulate grand strategy and policy.

Second, the monograph attempts to eplorehow cultural knowledge might help to redene an

overarching strategy on counterinsurgency. Whilethe military has been at the forefront of signicantnew and innovative thinking about operations andtactics, revising its old doctrines on the y, Americaspolitical leaders have failed to provide the necessarystrategic framework to guide counterinsurgency. Theinnovative insights about cultural knowledge adaptedin operations and tactics by our military leadershave so far not yielded any comparable innovationsfrom our political leaders. While the use of culturalknowledge is transforming military operations andtactics in signicant and revolutionary ways, thissame knowledge is not being adapted by our politicalleaders to help redene a compelling new strategy forcounterinsurgency.

The monograph concludes by suggesting fourdistinct ways in which cultural knowledge can work


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to help redene an overarching strategic frameworkfor counterinsurgency.

1. Reconceptualizing the war on terror not as onewar, but as many different wars.

2. Focusing less on the moral distinctions betweenus and thema major centerpiece of the BushDoctrineand more on the differences betweenthem.

3. Building support and relationships among bothfriendly and adversary states by taking into accounthow other societies assess risks, dene their security,and perceive threats.

4. Building support for counterinsurgency amongAmericas civilian leaders. Especially amid the domesticacrimony spawned by the Iraq War, inadequatecoordination between military and nonmilitarypower will severely hamper U.S. counterinsurgency

capabilities. Cultural knowledge of both military andcivilian institutions is therefore vital if the coordinationbetween them is to be effective.


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ON THE USES OF CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as importantas, and sometimes even more important than, theknowledge of the geographical terrain. This observationacknowledges that the people are, in many respects, thedecisive terrain, and that we must study that terrain in thesame way that we have always studied the geographicalterrain.

General David H. PetraeusCommanding General

Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I)1

Culture has become something of a buzz wordamong Americas national security leaders. Faced witha brutal civil war and insurgency in Iraq, the manycomple political and social issues confronted by U.S.military commanders on the ground have given rise toa new awareness that a cultural understanding of an

adversary society is imperative if counterinsurgency isto succeed. Now embroiled in a counterinsurgency inIraq with no clear end in sight, the broad outlines ofwhat went wrong in Iraqfrom insufcient post-warplanning to de-Bathication and demilitarization ofIraqi society that led to the subsequent emergence of oldtribal networks and ethnic and religious cleavages

have been traced to a glaring misunderstanding ofIraqi culture and society by American occupationplanners and U.S. military forces. American occupationplanners simply assumed that the civilian apparatus ofthe government would remain intact after the regimewas decapitated by the military defeat. But in fact,when the United States cut off the hydras Baathisthead, power reverted to its most basic and stable

formthe tribe.2 Without a rm understanding of thecultural dynamics of Iraqi society or the brutal legacyof colonialism and Sadaams persecution of Iraqs


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Shiite and Kurdish population, American occupationalforces in Iraq were basically working within a cultural

and historical vacuum.The new efforts to infuse cultural knowledge into

U.S. military operations and training in Iraq havecoincided with a broad shift within the Department ofDefense (DoD), once the etent of the debacle in Iraqbecame more widely known. In July 2004, retired U.S.Army Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., wrote anarticle for the Naval Institutes Proceedings magazinein which he disagreed with the commonly heldassumption that was prevalent within the Pentagonat the timethat success in war is best achieved byoverwhelming force. Instead, he argued that the typeof conict we are currently waging in Iraq requires aneceptional ability to understand people, their culture,and their motivations.3

Since then, the widespread recognition of the needfor cultural knowledge in counterinsurgency has beenrecognized and actively promoted by the Pentagon.General David H. Petraeus, commanding general ofthe Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), who also boastsa Ph.D. from Princeton in International Relations,has been at the vanguard of these efforts. As thecommander of the 101st Airborne Division in the initialinvasion of Iraq in 2003, he later took responsibility forgoverning Mosul, Iraqs second largest city. Relying onhis eperiences in Mosul, General Petraeus is currentlyin charge of a major new counterinsurgency effortin Iraq. Desperate to stem the on-going violence, theBush administration is pinning its hopes on GeneralPetraeus and his advisors to x the asco in Iraq.

In sharp stark contrast to then Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfelds heavy-handed approachto counterinsurgency which emphasized aggressive


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military tactics, the post-Rumsfeld Pentagon hasadvocated a gentler approach, emphasizing

cultural knowledge and ethnographic intelligence asmajor components of its counterinsurgency doctrine.This cultural turn within DoD highlights effortsto understand adversary societies and to recruitpractitioners of culture, notably anthropologists, tohelp in the war effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan. InFebruary 2006, Petraeus invited an array of academics,human rights lawyers, journalists, and practitionersof counterinsurgency to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, tovet a draft for a new counterinsurgency manual, Field

Manual (FM) 3-24, which was published on December15, 2006. Owing to its enormous popularity, howeverwith 1.5 million downloads the rst monthit wasrecently republished by the University of ChicagoPress with a forward by Sarah Sewell, a former DoD

ofcial who now teaches at the Kennedy School ofGovernment at Harvard University.

While the focus on cultural knowledge incounterinsurgency operations and tactics is awelcome development insofar as it has allowed eldcommanders to radically reassess the failed operationsand tactics in counterinsurgency, what so far has beenabsent from the discussion on cultural knowledge isthe effort to link this new knowledge to formulating anoverarching strategic framework. As Sarah Sewell hasput it, because counterinsurgency is predominatelypolitical, military doctrine should ow from a broaderstrategic framework. But our political leaders have sofar been unable to provide a compelling one.4

If cultural knowledge is now viewed as a major

component of counterinsurgency operations and tacticson the ground, what can cultural knowledge teach usabout strategy and policy? This question requires us to


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distinguish the various levels of cultural knowledgeand how they are used at various levels of warfare

strategy, operations, and tactics. Although notmutually eclusive, cultural knowledge informs thesedistinct levels in different ways. For eample, the kindsof cultural knowledge that are required at the tacticallevel (e.g., the cultural knowledge of specic customslike do not spit in public, or take off your shoesbefore entering a house, etc.) is quite separate fromthe kinds of cultural knowledge that are required toformulate grand strategy and policy (e.g., the culturalknowledge that inuences such broad issues as howthe legacy of Japanese imperialism has inuencedcontemporary Sino-Japanese relations).

However, within the current literature on cultureand counterinsurgency, there has been a tendency toconate the practical application of empirical cultural

knowledge (as applied to operations and tactics) withthe more abstract notions of cultural knowledge as theyapply to the formulation of an overarching strategyand policy for counterinsurgency. The kinds of culturalknowledge that inform military operations and tacticson the groundthe how-to practical application ofcultural and ethnographic knowledgeis very distinctfrom the forms of cultural knowledge that are neededto formulate national strategy and policy. However,although quite distinct, the uses of culture as theyapply to all three levels are interrelated and mustcomplement one another: a sound strategic frameworkbased on a deep cultural and historical understandingof an adversary culture will necessarily give rise tosound operations and tactics necessary for waging a

successful counterinsurgency.Thus far, there has been a great deal of concern with

the application of cultural knowledge on the battleeld


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and far less interest in how this knowledge mightbe applied to formulating an overarching strategic

framework on counterinsurgency. Without a cleararticulation of our strategic objectives, our politicalleaders have confused operational and strategic goals.Achieving stability in Iraq is an operational goal; itis not a strategic objective. Devising a broad strategyfor counterinsurgency requires our political leaders tofocus their attention beyond the counterinsurgency inIraq and Afghanistan.

If cultural knowledge has helped U.S. forcesrefocus their efforts to better achieve their operationaland tactical goals, the question our political leadersshould be asking is whether cultural knowledge canalso help them redene a broader strategic frameworkfor counterinsurgency. The answer to this questionrequires an eamination of cultural knowledge and

how it operates in different ways according to thedifferent levels of war-making (strategy, operations,and tactics).

Cultural Knowledge for Strategy.

What do we mean by cultural knowledge as appliedto the level of grand strategy? How is it distinguishedfrom the kinds of cultural knowledge needed to wagesuccessful operations on the battleeld? Let us beginby using the denition of culture as articulated by thenew National Cultures Initiative at the Department ofNational Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army WarCollege (USAWC).

Culture is a difcult concept to grasp with any certainty,but a fundamental one for dening and understandingthe human condition. It is also an important dimensionof policy and strategy, because it affects how peoplethink and respond and thus how policy and strategy


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are formulated and implemented. We can considerculture as the way humans and societies assign meaningto the world around them and dene their place inthat world. It is manifested in languages, ideas, beliefs,customs, traditions, rituals, objects and images that aresymbolic (therefore symbolic forms that represent and/or contain certain meanings) of the values, interests,perceptions, and biases of individuals and of the collectivesociety. . . .5

Largely in response to the setbacks in Iraq, the

USAWC has introduced major new changes to itscurricula which have sought to directly address theissue of culture. As part of the cultural turn within theDoD, new lessons on National Cultures in the standardStrategic Thinking course and a new series of RegionalStudies courses were introduced into the curriculum in2006-07. The aim of these courses is to teach studentsabout the importance of cultural awareness andunderstanding of how other regions, nations, andsocieties view themselves and others and the effectof this awareness on policy and strategy formulationsand outcome. This is a signicant shift away from thetraditional focus on American interest and policy inforeign areas. Led in large part by Colonel Jiyul Kim,Director of Asian Studies at the USAWC, theAnalytical

Culture Framework, which serves as a master guide tothese major new efforts and which he authored, listssi dimensions for the study of culture that form theintellectual framework for the new Strategic Thinkingand Regional Studies courses.6 These dimensions are(1) National Identity, (2) Political Culture, (3) RegionalIdentity, (4) Political System, (5) Strategic Culture, and(6) Globalization and Culture.

A common theme that infuses all si dimensions isthe critical place occupied by the study of history:


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Every dimension of the framework must be appreciatedas both a cumulative and revisionist process of notonly the actual historical eperience, but also memoryof that history for memory often distorts history forcontemporary purposes. Thus history serves twoimportant functions, as agent and process that actuallydetermines specic cultural forms (both tangibleand intangible), and as an instrument of culture to bedistorted and used for contemporary purposes (mostoften political).7

These new curricular initiatives are signicant in theirattempt to link the understanding of foreign culturesat its most abstract level (national identity, politicalculture, strategic culture, etc.) with American strategyand policy: We live in a world without the comfortableand simple dichotomy of the Cold War . . . reads theNational Cultures lesson,

Greater cultural prociency at the strategic level isimperative in working with the rising powers such asChina and India, dealing with new partners and alliesas well as new challenges with old allies and partners,responding to etremism in its many forms, learningto wage an effective counter-insurgency campaign,coping with increasing anti-Americanism, handlingtransnational threats and issues, and building coalitionsacross the regions and the world.8

While this linkage between cultural knowledgeand U.S. strategy appears to be new, culture guredprominently in Americas post-World War II planning.The successful military occupation of Japan (1945-52) isa good eample of how cultural knowledge informedAmericas long-term strategic objectives in Asia. The

U.S. decision to preserve the Japanese imperial systemand shield Emperor Hirohito from being tried as awar criminal (something that was ercely opposed by Japans neighbors and many political groups withinthe United States) allowed the American Occupation


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to rewrite a new role for the Japanese Emperor:Hirohito was miraculously transformed from Japans

preeminent military leader who oversaw a brutal15-year war against Asia and the United States to aninnocent Japanese victim and political symbol dupedby evil Japanese militarists. The surprising and rapidtransition from Japanese militarism to Japanesedemocracy was made not through the imposition ofAmerican democratic values and norms, but by a not-so-subtle manipulation of Japanese cultural symbolsand meanings, including a rather blatant manipulationof history.9

Applied to the level of strategy, cultural knowledgemust therefore take into account the vital role of historyand historical memory. Culture is not unchanging, nordoes it entail a set of enduring values and/or ancientpatterns of thought from which we can predict

behavior. This is where the usage and understandingof culture as applied to the level of strategy differssignicantly from the application of cultural know-ledge at the operational and tactical levels. The uses ofcultural knowledge in counterinsurgency operationsemphasize the need for soldiers to understand theintricacies of customs, values, symbols, and traditionsin order to be able to adapt and ght in a foreignsociety. It is hoped that this anthropological approachto war will shed light on the grammar and logic oftribal warfare, and create the conceptual weaponsnecessary to return re.10

Against this denition of culture as an enduringgrammar of values and customs rooted in a timelesstradition, cultural knowledge as applied to the level of

strategy assumes that cultures are dynamic entities, notstatic categories. Hence, in formulating an overarchingstrategic framework for counterinsurgency, it isimportant to grasp not merely the cultural logic of


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say, Sunni identity, including their values, customs,traditions, etc., but how Sunni etremists have invoked

these traditional values, historical eperiences, andbelief-systems in the contemporary contet to justifytheir etremist actions. Culture as applied to the levelof strategy focuses on the issues of interpretation andreception. Cultural knowledge at this level thus requiresa comple understanding of culture as a dynamic entity,an on-going process of negotiation between past andpresent. Far from reproducing the values and beliefs ofa static and unchanging culture, etremist groups likeal-Qaida have appropriated and reinterpreted Islamictets, belief-systems, and traditions to justify theirown radical ideology; in other words, they have usedculture instrumentally. Cultural knowledge as appliedto the level of strategy must be concerned with thedynamic understanding of culture and how different

Islamic radicals emphasize different aspects of theirhistorical past and traditions to legitimize their politicalactions and behavior in the present. Such knowledgebecomes useful in formulating a grand strategy oncounterinsurgency that, instead of lumping all Islamicradical enemies together, differentiates them accordingto their various cultures within radical Islam. To pryapart violent Islamic radicals, the United States has tobecome knowledgeable about these internal culturalcleavages and be patient in eploiting them.11Cultural knowledge at the strategic level serves thispurpose.

Cultural Knowledge For Operations and Tactics.

Cultural knowledge as applied to the level ofoperations and tactics is concerned with the practicalapplication of this knowledge on the battleeld. In


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contrast to the dynamic understanding of culture and itsusage at the level of strategy, culture at the operational

and tactical levels is dened as a more or less stableand static set of categories that include distinct belief-systems, values, customs, and traditions that can beusefully applied to enhance the cultural awareness ofAmerican-led forces on the ground. It is primarily thisunderstanding and usage of culture that have becomeprominent features of the counterinsurgency efforts inIraq and Afghanistan.12

Two major efforts in this regard are notable. As partof a new program to help address the shortcomingsin cultural knowledge by soldiers on the ground, theForeign Military Studies Ofce (FMSO), a U.S. Trainingand Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organizationthat supports the Combined Arms Center at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, is overseeing the creation of

the Human Terrain System (HTS). According to itscreators,

This system is being specically designed to addresscultural awareness shortcomings at the operational andtactical levels by giving brigade commanders an organiccapability to help understand and deal with humanterrainthe social ethnographic, cultural and economic,and political elements of the people with whom the forceis operating.13

HTS is built upon seven components, or pillars: (1)human terrain teams (HTTs), (2) reach-back researchcells, (3) subject-matter epert-networks, (4) a tool kit,(5) techniques, (6) human terrain information, and (7)specialized training.

Each HTT will be comprised of eperienced culturaladvisors familiar with the area in which the commanderwill be operating. The eperts on the ground, theseadvisors will be in direct support of a brigade commander.


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All will have eperience in organizing and conductingethnographic research in a specic area of responsibility,and they will work in conjunction with other socialscience researchers. HTTs will be embedded in brigadecombat teams, providing commanders with an organicability to gather, process, and interpret relevant culturaldata. In addition to maintaining the brigades culturaldata bases by gathering and updating data, HTTs willalso conduct specic information research and analysisas tasked by the brigade commander.14

These efforts represent the how-to practicalapplication of cultural knowledge at the operationaland tactical level. Designed specically to teachcultural awareness as a battleeld skill, HTTs arealso designed as data gathering systems for acquiringcultural knowledge for the purposes of providingnew and incoming commanders and units with theinstitutional memory about the people and culture

of their area of operation. In 2006, ve HTTs deployedfrom Fort Leavenworth to Afghanistan and Iraq. If theyprove successful, an HTT will eventually be assigned toeach deployed brigade or regimental combat team.15

Another central feature of the Human TerrainSystem is the emphasis on human relationships.To be successful, you must understand the Iraqi

perspective. Building trust, showing respect, cultivatingrelationships, building a team, and maintainingpatience are all central features of the human terrainsystem which emphasize the power of peoplefriendship, trust, understandingthe most decisivefactor in winning the war in Iraq.16

The other signicant product that has comeout of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the new

counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24. Released onDecember 15, 2006, FM 3-24 is the rst U.S. Army


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manual dedicated eclusively to counterinsurgencyin more than 20 years.17 The 282-page document, like

the HTS, highlights cultural knowledge and humanrelationships as central aspects for waging a successfulcounterinsurgency. These are highlighted in the rstchapter under Ideology and Narrative:

Culture knowledge is essential to waging a successfulcounterinsurgency. American ideas of what is normaland rational are not universal. To the contrary,

members of other societies often have different notionsof rationality, appropriate behavior, levels of religiousdevotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, whatmight appear abnormal or strange to an eternalobserver may appear as self-evidently normal to a groupmember. For this reason, counterinsurgentsespeciallycommanders, planners, and small-unit leadersshouldstrive to avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on aforeign cultural problem.18

Chapter 3, Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,denes terms including society, social structure, rules,and norms and social norms. It also emphasizes theimportance of culture as a web of meaning sharedby members of a particular society or group within asociety. Culture might be described as an operationalcode that is valid for an entire group of people. . . .[it]inuences how people makes judgments about whatis right and wrong.19 Another section highlightsidentity, values, belief systems, and cultural forms.Listed under the cultural forms section are ideologiesand narratives:

The most important cultural form for counterinsurgents

to understand is the narrative. A cultural narrative is astory recounted in the form of a casually linked set ofevents that eplains an event in a groups history andepresses values, character, or self-identity of the group.


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Narratives are the means through which ideologies areabsorbed by members of a society. . . . By listening tonarratives, counterinsurgents can identify a societyscore values. Commanders should pay particularattention to cultural narrative of the HN (host nation)population pertaining to out-laws, revolutionary heroes,and historical resistance gures. Insurgents may usethese narratives to mobilize the population.20

In chapter 5, Eecuting CounterinsurgencyOperations, the manual encourages the development

of counternarratives which provide a morecompelling alternative to the insurgent ideology andnarrative. Intimate cultural familiarity and knowledgeof insurgent myths, narratives and culture are aprerequisite to accomplishing this.21

One of the major innovations of FM 3-24 isits rejection of the notion that human behavior is

motivated purely by rational self-interest. Instead, FM3-24 proposes that culture informs individual actions,whether one society deems these actions rationalor not. Culture, it insists, shapes the ways in whichothers perceive us and the world, and hence culturalknowledge of the adversary society must be a majorcomponent of counterinsurgency.

FM 3-24 has been described as radical and

revolutionary by Time Magazine, and it has receivedrave reviews in the New York Times.22 Understandingthe cause for FM 3-24s enthusiastic reception is itselfnoteworthy, notes Sarah Sewell, because it seemsto point to the overwhelming feeling of a majorityof Americans that the United States is adrift in theworld with no foreign policy to guide it in Iraq and

elsewhere.23

Americans are simply confused aboutthe nations strategic purpose in wake of September11, 2001. . . .24 Once again, Americans are wrestling


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with a disillusionment about politics and militarypower, and the debacle in Iraq has reinforced a

familiar cynicism that risks disengaging Americansfrom their government and America from the rest ofthe world.25 In an attempt to understand Americasnew role in the world and also to stem the growingdisillusionment about politics at home, they havelooked to FM 3-24 for answers: The doctrines mostimportant insight is that evenperhaps especiallyin counterinsurgency, America must align its ethicalprinciples with the nations strategic requirements.26But in explaining what ghting well means, FM 3-24raises profound moral and ethical questions aboutwhat counterinsurgency actually entails.

Anthropology and the Uses of Cultural Knowledge.

Nowhere have the questions raised by FM 3-24been argued more passionately and more ercelythan among anthropologists for whom these issueshave both deep personal and professional resonance.As eperts on cultural knowledge, anthropologists inparticular have been eagerly sought out by the militaryfor recruitment into counterinsurgency in Iraq andAfghanistan. Reactions to these recruitment efforts,however, have been decidedly cool, if not downrighthostile.

Once called the hand-maiden to colonialism,anthropology had enjoyed a long and fruitfulrelationship with national security agencies like theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoD, but thisrelationship abruptly ended following the close of the

Vietnam War. Today, largely due to the disciplinesethical codes and also its tendency to look inward and itsturn toward postmodernism and critical self-reection,


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anthropology remains a rather insular eld whichattracts few readers beyond its disciplinary boundaries

(ask anyone to name the latest ethnography they haveread recently, and you get the point). Furthermore,in sharp contrast to the other social sciences (namely,political science and economics), anthropologyremains the least engaged with national security andpolicymaking agencies within the U.S. Government.The American Anthropological Associations (AAA)current Statement of Professional Responsibilitystates that Anthropologists should undertake nosecret research or any research whose results cannotbe freely derived and publicly reported . . . no secretresearch, no secret reports or debriengs of any kindshould be agreed or given.27

It therefore comes as no surprise that FM 3-24has been received with scathing criticism by many

anthropologists, but most notably by Roberto Gonzalezwho has criticized the manual for is numbingly banalmaterial which, he notes does not reect currentanthropology theory but reads more like a simpliedintroductory anthropology tetbook.28 But the moreserious matter of Gonzales critique is what he seesas a dangerous trend in the co-optation of culturalknowledge for military purposes.29 These concerns areshared by other notable anthropologists, namely DavidPrice and Hugh Gusterson, who are deeply troubledby signs that connections between anthropologists,military counterinsurgency eperts, and intelligenceagencies are multiplying and deepening.30 They arealso concerned by the implication of this relationshipand what it means for anthropologys professional

ethics. And they are concerned that when ethnographicwork is performed clandestinely, it can endangerinformants by putting them and their families at


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risk. But mostly, they wonder whether using culturalknowledge for covert military operations will threaten

the disciplinary integrity of anthropology itself bycreating mercenary anthropology in which culturalknowledge itself is used as a weapon.31

Largely as a result of these critiques, Gonzalesand Kanhong Lin submitted two resolutions to theAmerican Anthropological Association (AAA) inNovember 2006. One condemned torture and the useof anthropological knowledge as an element of torture,while the other condemned the U.S. occupationof Iraq. If passed, these resolutions, will send anunambiguous message to the military and intelligenceagencies seeking to recruit anthropologists (as well asanthropologists working on their behalf), namely thatAAA members oppose wars of aggression and willstand united against activities that might breach our

professional ethics.32

As Gonzales noted:

Although academic resolutions are not likely totransform U.S. Government policies (much less thepractices of contractors to the military) these doarticulate a set of values and ethical concerns shared bymany anthropologists. They could potentially etendand amplify dialogue among social scientists aroundissues of torture, collaboration with the military, and

the potential abuse of social science in the war onterror. Anthropologists may well inspire others toconfront directlyand resistthe militarization of theirdiscipline at this critical moment in the history of thesocial sciences.33

Although the resolutions in themselves arenonbinding, their effects on the profession have

been chilling, especially for new anthropology Ph.Dswho are contemplating working for the military orparticipating in programs like HTS. Steve Fondacaro,


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head of the Human Terrain project, conded recentlythat since the HTSs inception in 2006, he had been able

to hire only a handful of anthropologists. One of thoserecently hired:

admitted that the assignment came with huge ethicalrisks. I do not want to get anybody killed, she said. . . . Iend up getting shunned at cocktail parties, she said. I seethere could be misuse. But I just cant stand to sit back andwatch these mistakes happen over and over as people getkilled, and do nothing.34

The important issues raised by Gonzales andthe AAA about the relationship between ethics andethnography, namely, that FM 3-24 does look quitelike a suspect marketing campaign for an inherentlyinhumane concept of war, also raises signicantquestions about the uses of civilians in military

operations. How should civilians respond to a war theycondemn as immoral yet which requires their epertiseto save American lives? Since the militarys mission isto eecute the policies of our democratically electedofcials, can Gonzales and other anthropologists reallydeny commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan the culturalknowledge they need to wage a war they were chargedby their political leaders with ghting? Is it ethicallymore correct for them to retreat from the world andleave others to do the ghting? Is the moral responseto cynicism about politics and military power to donothing, or in Gonzales case, to censure those whochoose to do something?

These debates among anthropologists, althoughacademic and insular, are nonetheless instructive

because they bring attention to the much larger debatethat FM 3-24 raises for all Americans. These entailsignicant questions about civil-military relations and


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the uses of civilians in military operations. The majorpremise of FM 3-24 is that successful counterinsurgency

will require the efforts of both the military and civilians.The manual states quite eplicitly that the burdens ofwaging counterinsurgency must be shared equally, andthat it will require the efforts of the entire Americanpopulation:

Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often notas well as the civilian agencies with people trained in

those skills. Further, military forces performing civiliantasks are not performing military tasks. Diverting fromthose tasks should be a temporary measure, one takento address urgent circumstances. . . . The nature of theconict and its focus on the populace make military andcivilian unity a critical aspect of COIN operation.35

FM 3-24 asks civilian actors and agencies to be centrally

engaged in the eld alongside combat forces andshare the risks of counterinsurgency equally with themilitary. As Sewell puts it, it stresses the importanceof effectively employing nonmilitary resources aspower to share the burdens of a long-term, difcult,and morally questionable war. It tells Americans thatif we ght these wars and if we wish to succeed withany approimation of honor, counterinsurgency will

demand more than we are accustomed to giving. 36Ultimately, however, the demands of counter-

insurgency may be too great for the American publicto bear, not because of the signicant costs andcommitments involved, but because the ethical andmoral dilemmas posed by counterinsurgency maydrive Americans, like Gonzales, to retreat from the

world and leave the ghting to the military.


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Cultural Knowledge for National Strategyand Policy.

The greater challenge of counterinsurgency,however, lies not at the operational level but at thestrategic one. While the military has been at theforefront of signicant new and innovative thinkingabout operations and tactics, revising its old doctrineson the y, Americas political leaders have so farfailed to provide the necessary strategic frameworkto guide counterinsurgency. The innovative insightsabout cultural knowledge adapted in operations andtactics by our military leaders have so far not yieldedany comparable innovations from our political leaders.While culture is transforming the military in signicantand revolutionary new ways, it seems to have had littleimpact on dening overall U.S. strategic goals. Now

that U.S. Armed Forces are in Iraq, Americas politicalleaders are consumed by how to get them out of it.Without an overarching strategy on counterinsurgency,our political leaders are focused on achieving short-term goals rather than long-term strategic objectives.Furthermore, the insights gleaned from culturalknowledge on operations and tactics are not beingadapted by our political leaders to help redefne acompelling new strategy for counterinsurgency.

What is needed from our political leaders is anoverarching strategic framework for counterinsurgencyinformed by culture. Internationally, the pursuit ofregime change and radical visions of transforming theMiddle East that were a primary tenet of the Bush Doc-trine have proven costly. They have created instability

in the region and resulted in the overetension ofU.S. military power. President George W. Bushs for-ward strategy of freedomso far has failed to produce


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positive results in large part because it has advocatedfreedom without taking into account how that freedom

would be received by other cultures.37

The Bushrevolution was about the imposition of Americanvalues, not about laying the groundwork for creatingthe necessary conditions for their reception.38

Moreover, by creating a rigid line between us andthem, the Bush Doctrine lumped like and unlike foestogether.39 Unable to distinguish Americas enemiesabroad, the Bush administration treated all terroristsas a monolithic enemy (in Iraq and elsewhere). Butthis is precisely what George Kennan, who was avery good student of culture himself, had warnedAmericas Cold War leaders against. Communism, heargued was not a monolith, and policymakers ought tobe emphasizing and eploiting the differences amongthem (as former President Richard Nion did when

he went to China in 1972). By failing to eploit thecultural distinctions and inherent tensions among ourenemies, we have indirectly empowered them. Whatthese groups want argued Hilary Benn, the Britishsecretary of state for international development, isto force their individual and narrow values on others,without dialogue, without debate, through violence.And by letting them feel part of something bigger, wegive them strength.40

Dissecting the calamities of the last 6 years ofAmerican foreign policy has become something ofa sport, only because it has become all too easy tocriticize. But as Samantha Powers warns, it does notitself improve our approach to combating terroristthreats that do in fact loomlarger, in fact because of

Bushs mistakes.41 The challenge is to learn from thesemistakes. What the failures of the Bush Doctrine havemade abundantly clear is that cultural knowledge


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must be an important dimension of policy and strategybecause it inuences the way people think and respond

and thus how policy and strategy are formulated andimplemented.

How would cultural knowledge work to redenea new policy and strategy for counterinsurgency?First, we could begin by reconceptualizing the waron terror not as one war but as many different wars.This means ghting terrorist groups and networks,even transnational ones like al-Qaida, as separate butrelated conicts. This in turn implies exibility andadapting our military operations and tactics to meetthe distinct challenges of our enemies.

Second, a related aspect of this strategy would be tofocus less on the moral distinctions between us andthema major centerpiece of the Bush Doctrineand more on the differences between them.42 This

implies separating terrorist groups (as distinct social,cultural, and political entities) and also recognizingthat although all of them hate America, they might hateeach other even more. The more we learn to recognizeand eploit the cultural differences among theseterrorist groups, the better we will be able to isolate anddefeat them. Of course, any effective campaign againstterrorism must include political, economic, military,and paramilitary efforts along with cultural efforts.Stabilization is obviously a major strategic objective ofcounterinsurgency. But the ability to neutralize terroristgroups by playing up their differences, thus containingthem by forcing them back into a local criminal or evenpolitical bo, requires cultural knowledge.

In a related contet, by lumping North Korea,

Iran, and Iraq together as one ais of evil, insteadof dealing with North Korea as a distinct cultural andpolitical entity with its own history and grievances,


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the Bush administration got locked into an hostile,unproductive, and stubborn policy approach that went

nowhere. It was only after the debacle in Iraq becamefully apparent that the Bush administration nallybacked down, but by then North Korea already had anuclear bomb.

Third, antiterrorism efforts must also includebuilding support and relationships among bothfriendly and adversarial states. It can be no longera question of you are either with us or against us,because counterinsurgency requires too much work forthe United States to go at it alone. This in turn impliesboth exibility and deference in how U.S. strategicobjectives for counterinsurgency are dened andeecuted.43 Cultural knowledge of how other societiesassess risks, dene their security, and perceive threatsall serve to underscore that cultural knowledge is an

important dimension of how the United States mustgo about winning allies in the global war(s) on terror.Americans are not good at conceptualizing how othersocieties perceive the world and, in particular, howother societies perceive us. FM 3-24 represents a goodstarting point of how the United States must learn toget inside the minds of its adversaries.

Finally, the role of counterinsurgency and itsrelationship to U.S. national security must be eplainedto the American people. Americas politicians mustbuild support for counterinsurgency among Americascivilian leaders. Especially amid the domestic acrimonyspawned by the Iraq War, the inadequate coordinationbetween military and nonmilitary power will severelyhamper the kinds of U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities

that FM 3-24 has called for.To this end, cultural knowledge of both military

and civilian institutions is vital if the coordination


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between them is to be effective. In particular, culturalknowledge of the military, its institutional values,

traditions, historical role in society, and how it operatesmust be eplained to the American public. Morethan the damage that Abu Ghraib did to Americasimage abroad, the scandal and its poor handlingtarnished the militarys image at home. Lingeringmoral doubts about the uses of counterinsurgencycapabilities (like those epressed by anthropologists)in military operations may even provoke isolationistsentiments among the American public, leading to anunsteady retreat from abroad. As Sewell notes, thevery word counterinsurgency has become associatedso closely with Iraq and a strategy of regime changethat civil servants were loathe to consider themselvespart of a U.S. counterinsurgency effort.44 Eplainingto the American public why counterinsurgency

operations are important, and coordinating theseefforts between military and civilian agencies to builda national consensus must be part of an overarchingstrategic framework for counterinsurgency in the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) world.

But counterinsurgency is just one of the manychallenges to U.S. security in the 21st century. Nuclearproliferation is another major challenge as is the riseof China. All these challenges will require our politicalleaders to provide a new strategic vision for U.S.security. Already many scholars and practitionershave begun to interpret events like the U.S.-Chinastandoff over a downed spy plane in 2001 or escalatingtensions between Japan and China through the lensof national identity and culture.45 These trends, like

those already going on in the military, have profoundimplications for U.S. foreign policy. Armed withcultural knowledge, the United States will be better


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able to restrain our adversaries through engagementby using shrewd diplomacy to dampen the strategic

competition with China, Iran, and other potential rivals.A foreign policy guided by a deep understanding of theforces of nationalism, identity, and collective memoryis a powerful tool to shape and mold adversarialbehavior.

These forces, unwittingly unleashed by the Bushadministration in the aftermath of the U.S. invasionof Iraq in 2003, now threaten the integrity of the Iraqination and have led to our current quagmire there.Although it may too late to save Iraq, it is not too lateto apply the lessons that we have learned there to dealwith other troubled spots in the world, namely NorthKorea, Iran, and China. If cultural knowledge has beenable to reverse some of the operational and tacticalblunders set forth by Rumsfelds Pentagon, perhaps it

not too late for culture to also rescue the United Statesfrom the strategic failures of the Bush Doctrine.

ENDNOTES

1. General David H. Petraeus, Learning Counterinsurgency:Observations From Soldiering in Iraq, Military Review, SpecialEdition Counterinsurgency Reader, October 2006, p. 51.

2. Montgomery McFate, The Military Utility of UnderstandingAdversary Culture,Journal of Defense Analysis, Issue 38, p. 44.

3. Major General Robert H. Scales, Culture-CentricWarfare, Proceedings, October 2004, p. 21. See also Scales, ArmyTransformation: Implication for the Future, Testimony before theArmed Services Committee, Washington DC, July 2004. See alsoCounterinsurgency Reader: Special Edition, Military Review,

October 2006. This manual complements the Army/Marine CorpsField Manual (FM) 3-24 on counterinsurgency operations.


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4. Sarah Sewell, Introduction to the University of ChicagoPress Edition: A Radical Field Manual, Counterinsurgency FieldManuel, Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007, p. l.

5. Colonel Jiyul Kim, The Analytical Framework, CourseReader for the Strategic Thinking Course, Academic Year 2008,Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, p. 2.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Colonel Jiyul Kim, National Cultures, Course Reader for theStrategic Thinking Course, Academic Year 2008, Carlisle Barracks,PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 1.

9. The post-war American occupation of Japan also possesseda great intangible quality that simply was never present in Iraq:it enjoyed virtually unquestioned legitimacymoral as well aslegalin the eyes not merely of the victors, but all of Japansneighbors who had been victimized during the course of Japansbrutal 15 years of war. There had been a formal surrender bythe Japanese, and the American occupation and reconstructionhad been endorsed by Emperor Hirohito. Furthermore, eceptfor the military, the Japanese government remained intact at alllevels, and, of course, the Japanese already had a tradition ofdemocracy and civil society on which to draw (during the Taishoera, 1912-26). There were also no hostile or religious factionswithin the country. But mostly, planning for the occupation ofJapan had begun already in 1942, giving planners ample time tothink through many of the cultural and political issues that theAmerican Occupation would confront after the surrender. SeeJohn Dower, A Warning for History: Dont Epect Democracyin Iraq, Boston Review, February/March 2003. On the Americanoccupation of Japan, see John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan inthe Wake of Word War II, New York: W. W. Norton, 1999.

10. Patrick Porter, Good Anthropology, Bad History: TheCultural Turn in Studying War, Parameters, Vol. xxxVII, No. 2,Summer 2007, p. 49.


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11. Samantha Powers, Our War on Terror, New YorkTimes Sunday Magazine, July 29, 2007, p. 8. See also Ian Shapiro,Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

12. In addition to the practical application of culturalknowledge advocated in FM 3-24, the U.S. Army War Collegehas adopted Richard D. Lewiss When Cultures Collide: ManagingSuccessfully Across Culture (1999) in its curricula. This book alsorepresents a how-to approach to cultural knowledge.

13. Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and CaptainDon Smith, The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the21st Century, Military Review, September/October, 2006, p. 10.Human Terrain Studies date back to Lieutenant Colonel RalphPeters work on human terrain operations. See Ralph Peters,The Human Terrain of Urban Operations, Parameters, Spring2000, pp. 4-12.

14. Ibid., p. 12.

15. For a good report and description of the rst HTTsdeployed to Iraq and Acfghanistan, see David Rohde, ArmyEnlists Anthropoligy in War Zones, New York Times, October 5,2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?_r=2&hp+slogin&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin .

16. Ibid., p. 13.

17. Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. The FM mentions culture 88 times andcultural 90 times.

18. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 1-5.

19. Ibid., p. 3-8.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid, p. 5-1.


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22. Joe Klein, Good General, Bad Mission, Time, January12, 2007; and Samantha Powers, Our War on Terror, New YorkTimes, July 29, 2007.

23. Sewell, p. l.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. ii.

27. American Anthropological Association (AAA), Statementon Ethics: Principles of Professional Responsibility, adoptedMay 1971 (as amended through November 1986), on-line at www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethcode.htm.

28. Roberto J. Gonzales, Towards a Mercenary Anthropology?The New U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 and theMilitary-Anthropological Comple,Anthropology Today, Vol. 23,No. 3, June 2007, p. 15.

29. For a rebuttal of Gonzales criticisms of FM 3-24 andanthropologys contributions to the manual, see David Kilcullen,Ethics, Politics, and Non-State Warfare: A Response to Gonzales;and Montgomery McFate, Building Bridges or Burning Heretics:A Response to Gonzales, in Anthropology Today, Vol. 23, No. 3,June 2007.

30. Gonzales, p. 17. See also Hugh Gusterson, Anthropologyand the Military1968, 2003, and Beyond? Anthropology Today,Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 25-26; and David Price, Interlopers and InvitedGuests, Anthropology Today, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2002, pp. 16-21;Lessons from Second World War Anthropology, AnthropologyToday, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 14-20; and David Price, AmericanAnthropologists Stand Up Against Torture and the Occupation ofIraq, Counterpunch, Vol.20, November 2006, www.counterpunch.org/price11202006.html . The Diane Rehm Show also recently hosteda program entitled Anthropologists and War on October 10,2007. See [email protected] for more information.

31. Price, p. 3.


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32. Gonzales, p. 19.

33. Ibid.

34. George Packer, Knowing the Enemy: Can Social ScientistsRedene the War on Terror? New Yorker, December 18, 2006,p. 6.

35. FM 3-24, pp. 2-9, 2-10.

36. Sewell, p. i.

37. Forward Strategy of Freedom was a phrase included inPresident Bushs remarks at the 20th anniversary of the NationalEndowment for Democracy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,Washington, DC, November 6, 2003.

38. The current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) isreferred to as the Bush Doctrine. Developed in response tocircumstances confronting the United States and its allies inthe wake of 9/11, it provides a stated use-of-force policy thataddresses the requirement for offensive action to prevent threatsfrom materializing on American shores. Lieber and Lieber (2007)have identied four key themes of the Bush Doctrine that havegenerated controversy. First, it calls for preemptive military actionagainst hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to developweapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, it advocates thatthe United States will not allow its global military strength to bechallenged by any foreign power. Third, it epresses a commitmentto multilateral international cooperation, but makes clear thatthe United States will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary todefend national interests and security. Fourth, it proclaims thegoal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe,epecially in the Muslim world. See Keir A. Lieber and RobertJ. Lieber, The Bush National Security Strategy, usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm.

39. See Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy AgainstGlobal Terror, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.


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40. Quoted in Samantha Powers, Our War on Terror, NewYork Times, July 29, 2007, p. 4.

41. Ibid.

42. A variation of the us verses them strategic outlookis the recent attempt by the Bush administration to create a newstrategic alignment in the Middle East by separating reformersand etremists, with Sunni states the centers of moderationand Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the other side of that divide.This new policy for containing Iran is complicating the Bushadministrations strategy for winning the war in Iraq. By insistingonce again on imposing divisions from the outside instead ofworking to eploit the natural divisions within etremist groups,the Bush administration clumps our adversaries into one group,thereby empowering them. For a good overview of the newpolicy on Iran, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Redirection: Is theAdministrations New Policy Beneting Our Enemies in the Waron Terrorism? The New Yorker, March 5, 2007.

43. Sewell, p. liii.

44. Ibid., p. li.

45. See Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Politics of Identity: History,Nationalism, and the Prospect for Peace in Post-Cold War Asia, CarlisleBarracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,April 2007. See also Graham E. Fuller, Americas UncomfortableRelationship with Nationalism, Policy Analysis Brief, Muscatine,IA: The Stanley Foundation, July 2006; Thomas Berger, Set forStability? Prospect for Conict and Cooperation in East Asia,Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, 2000, p. 420; ThomasBerger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germanyand Japan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; Setfor Stability? The Ideational Basis for Conict in East Asia,Review of International Studies, Spring 2000; The Construction ofAntagonism: The History Problem in Japans Foreign Relations,in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing theAlliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Normsand National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; Peter Katzenstein, ed., The


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Cultures of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.See also Gerrit W. Gong, ed., Remembering and Forgetting: TheLegacy of War and Peace in East Asia, Washington, DC: The Centerfor Strategic and International Studies, 1996; G. John Ikenberryand Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory andthe Asia Pacifc, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003; andG. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing theAlliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, NewYork, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

on the uses of cultural knowledge

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