on the road to disengagement? envisioning a long-term strategy for afghanistan and pakistan

7/31/2019 On the road to disengagement? Envisioning a long-term strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

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AbstractThe situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan is alar-ming. In Afghanistan, the planned 2014 withdrawalof international troops is likely to usher in civil war.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan is shaken by repeated cy-cles of social, political, and economic crises. Despitethese daunting challenges, the US and its Europeanallies have yet to formulate a coherent, long-termstrategy for their engagement in South Asia afterinternational forces pull-out from Afghanistan.

Lasting stability can be achieved only through politi-cal conflict-resolution and social change. Accom-

plishing these objectives requires a multi-level stra-tegy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the larger re-gion. Such a strategy should prioritize a politicalsolution for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Kash-

mir, support for moderate parties and local owner-ship, and strengthen initiatives for regional coopera-tion. However, implementing such an ambitiousmulti-level strategy will be possible only if policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic can convincetheir constituencies that continued engagement inthe region is in their long-term interest.

As the 2014 deadline for NATOs withdrawalfrom Afghanistan edges closer, a growing num-ber of policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic

are calling, publicly and privately, for disengage-ment from both Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 Aftermore than a decade of intervention, military en-gagement in Afghanistan is increasingly unpopu-

note n05/12

M i c h a e l F . H a r s c h ,

H a n n e s E b e r t ,

a n d L i n d s a y P . C o h n

On the road to disengagement?Envisioning a long-term strategy

for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Transatlantic Security Paper N.6

June 2012


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lar at home and amongst Afghans. Human andfinancial costs are stark, yet security, effectivegovernance, and sustainable economic develop-ment remain elusive. Many in Washington alsoclaim that Pakistan is not a trustworthy partneranymore. They have begun to advocate contain-ment of Islamabad rather than engagement.2

The stability of this region remains crucial forEurope and North America, however, in terms ofthe international narcotics trade, terrorism, andnuclear confrontation and proliferation.

Disengagement from Afghanistan and Pakistanis tempting, but it is a dangerously short-sightedanswer to the tremendous challenges that thesecomplex neighboring countries pose. Without apolitical settlement of the conflict between thegovernment and insurgent leaders, Afghanistanfaces the possibility of a protracted civil war. Ashistory has shown in Afghanistan, another pe-riod of conflict over local and national authoritywould likely make its terrain a fertile breedingground for extremism and illicit trade alike.From a normative political perspective, the via-bility of Afghanistans and Pakistans representa-tive political systems will serve an important sig-naling function for democratic aspirations in theregion and in Muslim-majority countries world-wide.

What is needed is a revised transatlantic strategyrather than a premature disengagement. As

NATO troops begin to leave Afghanistan and theresponsibility for internal and external securityis given over to the Afghan government, it ismore important than ever to formulate a long-term strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therecent NATO summit in Chicago produced agreat deal of consensus that the combat missionis complete and the NATO partners can nowhand over responsibility to the Afghan forces.Yet policy-makers have struggled to implement acommon long-term approach. The Chicago Sum-mit Declaration states clearly that the task of

NATO partner states and the international com-munity is not finished, but it does not specifyany actions beyond the continued financial andlogistical support of the Afghan security forces.NATO leaders must adopt a coherent, long-term,and multi-level strategy for Afghanistan, Pakis-tan and the greater region. This strategy musttranslate Western values into concepts that arelocally accepted, encourage incremental societalchange and promote regional cooperation.

To this end, a new transatlantic bargain must bestruck between the US and its European NATOallies. The US and Europe should, to use theterm coined by Joseph Nye project smartpower by leveraging their hard and soft powerwithin a joint strategy. The European countries

will have to define their own interests in the re-gion and increase their civilian engagement,while the US will have to include the Europeanallies in decision-making and refrain from mili-tary actions that alienate local populations. Im-proving transatlantic synergy is particularly im-portant now, at a time when most NATO coun-

tries face severe budgetary crises.The need to strike a new transatlantic bargaindoes not imply that the US and EU must bejoined at the hip when implementing securitypolicy in South Asia. However, closer coopera-tion has the potential to reduce ineffective use ofresources and to increase delivery capacity. Fa-cing the possibility of an Afghan civil war and anescalation of the lingering conflict between thenuclear powers Pakistan and India, it is hightime to get serious about transatlantic coopera-tion in this crucial region.

Flaws of Existing StrategiesThe formulation of a transatlantic strategy forAfghanistan and Pakistan faces one key chal-lenge: on the one hand, it must stabilize bothstates, such that they cease to pose a threat toglobal and regional security; on the other hand, atransatlantic strategy should fulfill the norma-tive requirements of Western political thought.These two goals have tended to lead to contra-dictory, sometimes hypocritical Western policies

in the past. Yet stability and political reformmust be combined into a coherent strategy inorder to address security concerns abroad andremain acceptable at home.

Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in2001, the NATO allies under the leadership ofthe USA have revised their strategy severaltimes. Most recently, in 2009, the Obama admi-nistration adopted a more comprehensive ap-proach to the conflict in Afghanistan. PresidentObama preferred a mix of negotiation with mo-derate groups within the insurgency, offensive

military action against groups who were not wil-ling to enter into talks, and efforts at winning thehearts and minds of the Afghan population. Inpursuit of these goals, the USA and other alliesincreased their military and civil engagement inAfghanistan and continued their attempts to co-operate with Pakistan on cross-border issues. Atthe same time, they announced the plan to with-draw the lions share of international troops by2014. Through an intensified effort to train Af-ghan security forces, the NATO forces hope toachieve a complete transfer of responsibility forsecurity to local forces by the end of that year.

Yet, Obamas Af-Pak strategy has sufferedfrom three major weaknesses. First, the strategy


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has neglected the regional dimension of the con-flict in Afghanistan. Pakistan, Iran, China, theformer Soviet Republics in the North, and Russiaall hold significant influence over the situation inAfghanistan and need to be included in attemptsat conflict resolution. The broadening of thetransatlantic Afghanistan strategy and the crea-

tion of new for a such as the International Con-tact Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan and theIstanbul Process are steps in the right direction.However, many American and European policy-makers have underestimated in particular Pakis-tans importance for reaching sustainable peacein Afghanistan. Since Osama bin Laden wasfound in Pakistan in 2011, the dominant feelingin Washington is that Pakistan is not a trustwor-thy partner. The US governments attempts toact in Afghanistan without or even sometimesin direct opposition to Islamabad have been

counterproductive. Mutual distrust and lack ofcommunication led to the deadly NATO air at-tack against a Pakistani border post in Novem-ber 2011, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers werekilled. In reaction, Pakistan refused to attend thehighly anticipated December 2011 Afghanistanconference in Bonn and closed the NATO supplyroutes to Afghanistan. In short, the transatlanticpartners need to reassess their attempts at in-cluding Pakistan and other crucial regional po-wers in conflict resolution efforts in Afghanistan.

Second, NATOs engagement has concentratedtoo heavily on military solutions to insurgencyand extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Inparticular, the US has relied on problematicmilitary tactics such as night raids in Afghanis-tan and the increased use of drone strikes inPakistan. The heavy-handed military tactics haveled to an increasing animosity towards the USand NATO among the people of the region, pro-ducing new volunteers for the struggles againstthe Afghan and Pakistani governments. Thetransatlantic allies have failed to define a politi-

cal and economic development perspective foreach state and the region as a whole. Recent de-velopment initiatives such as plans to turn Af-ghanistan into the trade hub of a modern SilkRoad resemble a romantic ideal rather than apractical suggestion.

Finally, Germany and other major Europeanpowers have been fairly passive in the interna-tional debate over strategy, preferring instead toreact to US policies.3 For example, in 2010 theEuropean allies followed President Obamas newstrategy without significant critical discussion

and agreed to increase their military engagementwhile announcing a pull-out date. The lack ofserious debate is surprising when one considersthe strategys risks: while yielding only the vague

possibility of lasting effects, the troop surge ledto more violent conflicts with the insurgents andsignificantly increased the number of Afghanand Western casualties. In addition, the an-nouncement of a pull-out date for the NATOtroops creates few incentives for insurgentgroups to look for a political compromise, as

their bargaining position is likely to improve inthe future. The European governments ought todefine their own priorities in the region in orderto re-enter in an open dialogue with Washingtonover strategic questions.

Political Dilemmas of an Afghanis-tan-Pakistan PolicyWestern policy faces difficult political dilemmasin Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two dilemmas arelikely to dominate the post-2014 period. First,

how can liberal values and human rights be pro-moted such that strongly conservative societiesembrace them? Second, how can a sustained fi-nancial engagement be justified in times of aus-terity?

With regard to the first dilemma, advocacy forhuman rights appears to be directly opposed toboth the Realpolitik mantra of stability and topowerful social norms. In Afghanistan, the mili-tary intervention may have produced a constitu-tion that enshrines human rights, but theserights exist largely only on paper. In Pakistan,

conflicts over the countrys blasphemy law givesome indication of how dramatic the humanrights situation is. This law punishes any dese-cration of the name of the Prophet Mohammedwith death and is often used to prosecute mem-bers of religious minorities such as Christians. Inearly 2011, two of the most prominent critics ofthis law the governor of Punjab, Salman Ta-seer, and the Minister for Minorities, ShahbazBhatti were assassinated. Both had advocatedleniency for a Christian woman who had beensentenced to death under the law and both had

urged reform of the law.4 By doing so, however,they drew the ire of religious extremists fromvarious sections of Pakistani society. The mur-ders of Taseer and Bhatti illustrate the magni-tude of the human rights challenge in Pakistan.

Classical Western politics relying primarily ondialogue with political elites seems unlikely todeliver results in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Con-servative elites are particularly averse to mea-sures regarding the rights of women and reli-gious minorities, and those supporting such

measures are often not socially organized. Allexperience since 2001 indicates that the Westneeds to re-think its policies to promote humanrights and social change the region.


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The second major dilemma will be to justify fur-ther financial engagement in Afghanistan andPakistan while states on both sides of the NorthAtlantic find themselves in deep debt crises.Every foreign policy strategy must deal with theconstraints of domestic politics and financial re-sources. Yet this dilemma is particularly acute

with respect to states such as Pakistan and Af-ghanistan, where corruption is widespread and itis hard to establish whether development aid isending up in illicit channels. Thus, a transatlan-tic policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan faces thedaunting task of having to reconcile liberal va-lues and realpolitik, and addressing widespreadpublic skepticism towards engagement.

Key Elements of a ComprehensiveStrategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan,

and the RegionEvery foreign policy strategy must formulategoals and describe means to achieve them. ForAfghanistan and Pakistan, what is necessary is acomprehensive two-level strategy that lays thefoundation for long-term cooperation with bothcountries and development in the region. For thelocal/national level, the strategy must outlinehow political goals can be translated into localtraditional norms and processes. For the region,the strategy should suggest a political processthat involves all neighboring states and induces

regional powers to exercise more responsibilityfor the region.

A comprehensive strategy must coordinate po-litical and military measures with projects fordevelopment and effective governance and ad-ministration. Closer civil-military coordinationdoes not mean that development personnel inAfghanistan should work directly with militarypersonnel. Collaboration in the field blurs theline between civilian and military actors andputs at risk aid agencies relationships with localcommunities.5 That being said, it would be ap-propriate to coordinate civil and military ap-proaches better through dialogue and, wherepossible, joint planning.

In order to make the transatlantic efforts in Af-ghanistan and Pakistan more effective and effi-cient, the NATO allies should develop a commonpost-2014 strategy for South Asia and presentunited positions to the Afghan and Pakistanigovernments. Yet this will require the willing-ness on both sides of the Atlantic to make diffi-cult compromises to overcome the diverging in-

terests of the various NATO allies.The following sections will outline a comprehen-sive strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and theregion. Each section begins with an overview of

current challenges and discusses Western short-term and longer-term goals. Based on this analy-sis, the authors suggest appropriate means toattain transatlantic goals in Afghanistan, Paki-stan and the region as a whole.

Afghanistan on the Edge: Encouraging

Political Solutions and Self-RelianceThe operation in Afghanistan has been one of themost ambitious state-building endeavors inmodern history. Yet after more than a decade ofinternational engagement, security, effectivegovernance, and sustainable economic develop-ment remain elusive. The armed conflict bet-ween the Afghan government and the interna-tional troops on one side and a growing insur-gency on the other increasingly threatens to re-verse the precarious progress that has beenmade in areas such as education, health and in-

frastructure. Conservative estimates from theUN mission in Afghanistan indicate that almost12,000 civilians have died between 2007 and2011.6

The NATO countries have invested vast re-sources in their counterinsurgency campaign,but the insurgents momentum has not been ef-fectively slowed. According to data provided bythe independent Afghanistan NGO Safety Office,insurgent attacks have constantly increasedsince 2006 and reached the record number of

almost 14,000 attacks in 2011.7

Preliminarynumbers indicate a downturn in the number ofarmed clashes in 2012 but the level of violence inthe country remains high. By May 2012, morethan 3,000 international coalition soldiers hadlost their lives in Afghanistan.

At the same time, support for the internationalmilitary presence has been waning. Although thevast majority of civilian deaths are attributableto insurgent activity, the tolerance of the Afghangovernment and population for civilian deathscaused by foreign troops has worn thin. Inci-

dents such as the February 2012 Koran burningat Bagram Airbase and the March 2012 massacreof 16 civilians by a US soldier in Kandahar pro-vince continue to erode the support for the inter-national troops.

It is important to recognize that the main chal-lenge for Afghanistans future is not the militarystrength of the insurgents but the weakness ofthe countrys political system and its nascent ins-titutions. Western powers, in particular the US,intervened at critical junctures of the political

process and have promoted a highly centralizedand personalized political system centeredaround President Karza. On the one hand, thissystem lacks checks and balances to hold thegovernment accountable for its actions. The go-


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vernments legitimacy suffers from corruption,nepotism, and an inability to offer protectionfrom injustice. On the other hand, the politicalsystem has failed to include important politicalgroups and prevented the development of politi-cal alternatives to Karza.

The main driving force behind the violent con-flict now lies in the struggle of various politicaland ethnic groups to gain access to power andresources.8 The Karza governments unpopula-rity allows the insurgents, as Mao put it, to swimlike fish in the water.9 Without a fundamentalchange of course, Afghanistans post-2014 pros-pects are bleak: The country risks collapse intovarious zones of influence and protracted figh-ting for supremacy between armed factions.

The dramatic situation requires the NATO alliesto revisit their ostensible ends and means in Af-

ghanistan. At the 2011 Afghanistan conference inBonn, the international community promisedthe Afghan government comprehensive politicaland financial support for a Decade of Transfor-mation from 2015-2024.10 At the 2012 summitin Chicago, NATO members promised againstrong and long-term political and practicalsupport to Afghanistan and announced plansfor a post-2014 training and advisory mission inthe country.11 Still lacking, however, is a strategicconcept that goes beyond vague declarations ofintention and addresses the structural weak-

nesses of the Afghan state. Western governmentsroutinely insist that they cannot influence inter-nal decisions of the Afghan government, in par-ticular with regard to the post-2014 phase. Giventhe massive dependency of the Karza regime onexternal military and financial support, however,such assertions are neither credible nor helpful.The Western reluctance to demand substantialpolitical reforms seems more likely to be rootedin concerns about Afghanistans stability. Stabi-lity is currently fatally linked to maintaining theexisting political system. Yet the Arab Spring has

shown how deceitful the stability of personalizedforms of government can be.

What can and should be the goals of transatlan-tic engagement in Afghanistan? We argue that itis both in Americas and the European statesinterest to ensure that the country becomes areliable partner for regional stability, humanrights, and the fight against terrorism, ratherthan a battlefield for national and regional rival-ries. In the short term, the main goal must be tocreate a political order that can survive the with-drawal of foreign troops by reaching a politicalsettlement with the insurgents. In the mid-to-longer-term, the international community musthelp the Afghan society to build the prerequisitesfor a durable peace, broad political participation

and economic development. In order to promotethese ambitious goals, it is necessary to rear-range the foreign policy tool chest of the Westernstates.

The first priority should be immediate measuresto guarantee the viability of the Afghan state.These include training and capacity-buildingmeasures in the security sector as the countryfaces a civil war that threatens all existing politi-cal structures in Afghanistan. NATO efforts mustfocus on producing a financially sustainablenumber of well-trained, ethnically balanced se-curity forces. Training efforts also have to becombined with significant capacity-building inthe justice sector and the search for a politicalsettlement. The insurgents cannot be militarilydefeated; at most they can be kept limited intheir reach.12 Unless an inclusive political settle-ment to the conflicts in Afghanistan can befound, the Afghan National Security Forces arelikely fracture along ethnic lines after 2014.13

Afghan and international efforts to reach a po-litical settlement with the Taliban have long re-mained lukewarm and patchy.14 The negotiationsbetween the Afghan government and the Talibanhit a crisis point following the September 2011murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the formerleader of the Northern Alliance and head of theHigh Peace Council. Hectic attempts are nowbeing made to ensure a last-ditch agreement be-

fore the self-imposed 2014 deadline.The US and its European allies must ensure thatthe search for a political settlement in Afghanis-tan becomes more inclusive and structured. Spe-cifically, the UN should organize a broad-basednegotiation process and function as an honestbroker. In contrast to the Geneva accords of1988 and the Bonn agreement of 2001, all im-portant stakeholders and political groups mustbe included in the process to make the accordviable. Insurgent groups should be offered credi-ble opportunities for integration into the politi-cal process. Negotiations should explore the pos-sibility of forming a government of nationalunity which prepares new presidential elections.

To support a sustainable solution to the conflict,longer-term efforts should concentrate on threecore areas:15 First, the transatlantic partnersshould encourage a gradual reform of the politi-cal system. More political and financial authorityshould be transferred from Kabul to the Afghanprovinces. This would provide provincial gover-nors with the means to initiate development pro-

jects without entering each time in a cumber-some process of obtaining approval from thecentral bureaucracy. At the same time, provin-cial councils need to be given the authority to


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exercise scrutiny in order to make local adminis-trations more accountable for their actions.These structural reforms could improve thespeed and quality of services and increase localacceptance of the government.

Second, support for traditional forms of gover-nance while keeping in mind the dangers posedby empowering such institutions. Support forparticipatory governance institutions such asShuras and Jirgas should be cautiously encour-aged and expanded in areas where the Afghanstate is largely absent. While these institutionsbear the risk of making arbitrary and sociallyrepressive rulings, they also have the potential toclose a crucial gap in the provision of justice thatthe Afghan authorities are currently unable tofill. In contrast, support for local security mecha-nisms poses greater risks: on the one hand, theymay produce desperately needed public safety;on the other, many local militias are involved incriminal activities such that empowering themcan lead to more insecurity than security.16 Thus,when considering support for a given local secu-rity provider it is crucial to determine whetherthe group is accepted by the local population andwhether its empowerment may have destabili-zing effects on regional and/or national powerstructures. Based on this assessment, local secu-rity groups should either be supported or pro-gressively disarmed.

Finally, it is important to promote the develop-ment of rural areas in Afghanistan, where threequarters of the population live. One key focusshould be the improvement of rural livelihoodsthrough better agricultural infrastructure suchas irrigation systems, roads, and access to elec-tricity. Development projects must also increasethe financial security of farmers via micro-credits and micro-insurances and the ruralpopulations access to education. A more profi-table and secure agricultural sector will createviable licit job opportunities for young Afghans.

Rural development is likely to reduce both manyfarmers dependence on opium and the numberof volunteers who join the insurgency due to alack of economic opportunity.17

In the past decade, there have been multiple in-ternational initiatives to reform the Afghan stateand billions of aid dollars have been pumpedinto the country. Yet the failures of the past sug-gest that these initiatives need to be more con-text-sensitive, internationally coordinated, andimplemented under Afghan leadership to pro-duce viable results.

Rediscovering Pakistan: More Engage-ment with New PartnersMilitary withdrawal from Afghanistan will allow

both Europe and the USA to concentrate theirefforts on the most daunting security problem inSouth Asia: Pakistans instability. Given Pakis-tans size six times the population of Afghanis-tan and second largest Islamic country in theworld , its strategic position between Iran, Af-ghanistan, and India, its nuclear arsenal, and its

large diaspora in the West, Pakistan presents amuch more substantial challenge for regionaland international security than Afghanistan.18 Itis also the key to both greater stability in Af-ghanistan and more regional cooperation in ge-neral.

The transatlantic allies need to revise their goalsand means in Pakistan based on a thoroughanalysis of the countrys turbulent domesticsituation and its regional aspirations. An essen-tial cornerstone of Pakistans development as astate and a nation remains its enduring conflictwith its dominant neighbor India. Since 1947,the two states have fought no fewer than threewars with each other (1947, 1965 und 1971).Most recently, in 1999, the Kargil conflict overKashmir raised the spectre of nuclear war.19 Theunresolved conflict with India strongly deter-mines Islamabads foreign policy towards thelarger South Asia region. Specifically, Pakistanmaintains ties to Afghan Taliban and other in-surgent groups as a strategic hedge against po-tential Indian aggression and seeks to deepen its

partnership with China.In Pakistans domestic politics, separatist andIslamist movements are increasing their influen-ce and have in many regions either underminedor co-opted the security forces. Fueled by therevolutionary mass movements that have spreadthroughout the Muslim world since early 2011,politicians and analysts speculate openly aboutthe possibility of a state collapse and an Islamicrevolution in Pakistan. In the worst case sce-nario, the nuclear arsenal might fall into thehands of radical religious actors.20

These fears are only exacerbated by the struc-tural deficits in Pakistans political system. Po-litical parties function primarily as dynastic pa-tronage networks and are seldom anchored inpopular sentiment. The weak regime in Islama-bad lurches from one crisis to the next, and isperceived by the public to be thoroughly corrupt.The legal system is inefficient and highly politi-cized. High unemployment, inflation, and short-ages of energy and foodstuffs bear the risk of so-cial unrest. Natural catastrophes such as the2005 Kashmir earthquake and the floods ofsummer 2010 increase social pressure on thepolitical system. Pakistans only effective stateinstitution is the military. The military has go-verned the country for long stretches of its his-


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tory. As the self-declared defender of nationalunity, it continues to exercise political controleven after the transition to a civilian governmentin 2008 and plays a dominant role in all sectorsof the Pakistani society.21

Despite the clear weaknesses of Pakistans politi-cal institutions, the oft-repeated media warningsof a power takeover by religious parties are anunlikely scenario in the near future. Support forIslamist groups has generally been limited in na-tional elections and has also not developed into acountry-wide mass movement spreading into themajor cities of Lahore and Karachi.22 The mili-tarys strength and the ruling classes persistentcapacity to defy internal and external pressuresfor reform cement the status quo and give Pakis-tan a stability that many other Asian states lack.In addition, a relatively free and diverse mediasector and a growing middle class reduce the riskthat radical elements will gain the upper handwithin Pakistani society.

However, recent events in Pakistan indicate theloss of influence of moderate forces. The 2011murders of liberal politicians Taseer and Bhattifound widespread support among the populace including the legal classes, who used to be cele-brated as a democratic opposition group. Thefragile situation in Pakistan hence requires thehighest level of political attention from policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic.

A Pakistan at peace with its neighbors and withitself is of central interest to both the US andEurope. It is key to achieving stability in Af-ghanistan, regional security, and to contain nu-clear proliferation. In the short term, the goalshould be to support moderate forces in stateinstitutions in order to limit the influence ofradical, violence-prone groups. In the longerterm, the goal must be to secure Pakistan as areliable partner and to encourage reforms in thecivil service as well as the electoral, judicial andsecurity sectors that will create lasting stability.From a Western perspective, it is important tosee Pakistan not merely as an instrument for sta-bilizing Afghanistan but as a complex society fa-cing many existential challenges. Solutions tothese challenges are as necessary from a humanrights perspective as from a security perspective.Up to this point, Western policies toward Pakis-tan have concentrated far too heavily on the fightagainst terrorist groups and on securing the bor-der region between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The means by which these goals shall be accom-

plished are even more contested than the goalsthemselves. The opportunities for external actorsto influence Pakistani politics and society arevery limited. On the one hand, constrained

Western resources are significantly mismatchedagainst the immense challenges in Pakistan. Onthe other hand, there is a distinct lack of possiblestarting points for an expansion of cooperation:The Pakistani side is primarily interested intechnical projects and not in measures aimed atchanging social structures or the political sys-

tem.23 Ultimately, sustainable change towardsmore stability can come only from within Paki-stan. Yet while the West must recognize the li-mits of its influence in Pakistan, the transatlanticallies should cautiously support stability andgradual reform in Pakistan.

In the short term, the most promising way tostabilize the situation in Pakistan seems to becooperation with moderate forces within themilitary. The NATO allies should use economicand political incentives to strengthen these ele-ments and encourage them to play a more cons-tructive role in Afghanistan. Some constructivecontributions the Pakistani army could makewould be the cessation of logistical support tothe insurgents, effective policing of the border,and the support of peace negotiations. A genuineappreciation of Pakistans legitimate nationalsecurity concerns and its inclusion in a peacedeal in Afghanistan could help to persuade im-portant parts of the army and the political eliteto work towards a stable Afghanistan.

In the longer term, a Pakistan policy that focuses

on stability must be replaced by a more compre-hensive approach that helps to create the foun-dations for social and economic development.This requires a strategic consensus between thetransatlantic allies on how to build functionalcooperation with moderate political forces inPakistan. Just as in Afghanistan, security pro-blems in Pakistan can be solved only through apolitical approach and a strengthening of thecivil society. Thus far the idea of democratizationhas been too strictly understood as strengthen-ing large political parties. Yet these parties have

historically proven as willing as the military re-gimes to use repressive means to secure theirpositions.24

On both the local and national level, Westernstates should pay attention not only to partiesand status-quo oriented political elites but alsothe representatives of economic and middle classinterests, human rights groups, intellectuals, andmoderate clerics.25 Through political and eco-nomic exchange, dialogue, and participatory lo-cal projects, these groups should be enabled toorganize themselves, pool their resources andget a stronger voice in the political process. Theycould then demand more accountability from thegoverning parties for their policies. Strengthen-ing moderate political and religious groups in


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Pakistan might also gradually reduce tensionswith India: unlike the military that draws its le-gitimacy from the enduring rivalry with NewDelhi, the Pakistani civil society has no institu-tional interest in maintaining that conflict.

In addition to engaging with new political part-ners, Western development policies should setnew geographic and substantive priorities. De-velopment aid should include more projects thatpromote effective and accountable governancestructures and concentrate less on the Pakistaniregions that border Afghanistan. In the longterm, the future of Pakistan will be determinedin the Punjab and Sindh provinces: the former isthe most populous and politically influential andthe latter is the home province of the feudal elite.A focus on new partners for dialogue, on key re-gions, and good governance issues in these re-gions is necessary to address the root causes ofviolence and instability in Pakistan.

Exerting pressure on the Pakistani elite via con-ditional development and military aid, in con-trast, might prove counterproductive. Suchmeasures are likely to weaken reform-orientedgroups within the Pakistani society who areready to partner with the West. Western policyshould rely more on carrots than on sticks andtry to identify common interests with the Paki-stani government from prevention of a mili-tary conflict with India to the stabilization of

state institutions. One important measure tobuild trust would the cessation of US dronestrikes, as formally demanded by the Pakistaniparliament in April 2012. Ending the dronestrikes would not only be an important politicalsignal but also remove a prominent argumentused by extremists to recruit new fighters againstthe US and the Pakistani government.

Finally, the US and the EU should rethink theirdivision of labor in Pakistan. Currently, the US ismuch more strongly engaged in Pakistan thanthe European states. Yet broad segments of thePakistani population and the political elites areskeptical or even openly hostile towards Ameri-can engagement in Pakistan. American agenciesthus face problems finding appropriate projectsand local partners who are interested inmeaningful cooperation. The Europeans shouldtry to fill this lacuna by improving their capabili-ties for development cooperation programs,while working closely with Washington DC toavoid duplication of effort.

Its the Region, Stupid! Key Elements of aSouth Asia StrategyThe situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan areheavily influenced by the political tensions in theSouth Asia region where the diverse interests of

multiple global and regional powers meet andclash. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,the warp and woof of issues in the broader crisisregion that ranges from Afghanistan to Kashmirhas become even more tangled. Neither thesituation in Afghanistan nor Pakistan can be un-derstood and changed without taking into ac-

count developments in the larger region.The traditionally conflict-prone relationship bet-ween Afghanistan and Pakistan has worsened inthe last years. The Afghan government continuesto refuse to recognize the Afghan-Pakistani bor-der (the Durand Line), and accuses Pakistan ofsupporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.Pakistan, for its part, accuses the Afghan govern-ment of supporting the rebellion in Waziristan.As India continues to increase its activities inAfghanistan, large parts of Pakistans militaryand political establishment see their countrybeing strategically encircled. In October 2011,India and Afghanistan signed a strategic part-nership agreement which includes an Indianpledge to train and equip Afghan securityforces.26 As a result, Afghanistan increasinglyconstitutes a major field of battle for the India-Pakistan conflict. The two nuclear powers haveresumed political dialogue after a hiatus follow-ing the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in Novem-ber 2008 and have taken significant steps to im-prove trade relations, but relations remain

plagued by suspicion. In April 2012, both Paki-stan and India conducted ballistic missile testswhich highlighted ongoing tensions and thethreat of a new arms race in Asia.

A number of regional neighbors exercise in-fluence over this crisis region. Iran borders bothAfghanistan and Pakistan and is directly affectedby refugee flows and the smuggling of drugs andweapons from Afghanistan. Yet it plays an am-biguous role in the Afghan conflict: The regimein Tehran seeks to prevent the radical SunniTaliban from returning to power, but also seeks

to weaken its long-time enemy, the US. SaudiArabia, Irans major regional rival, was one ofonly three states to recognize the Taliban regimein the 1990s. Despite its close ties to the UnitedStates, the royal house of Saud still sympathizeswith the Taliban movement. Russia and theother central Asian states want to avoid a perma-nent NATO presence in the region. Yet they offerlogistical support to the ISAF troops to preventthe expansion of extremist movements in theregion.27

China has a vital interest in stability on its bor-ders and seeks to limit US influence in the re-gion. Beijings role in the region depends pri-marily on its relations with Pakistan. Islamabadconsiders the Peoples Republic to be its most


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reliable and influential ally especially as theUnited States increases its cooperation with In-dia.28 In Afghanistan, China invests in the ex-ploitation of raw materials deposits, but has thusfar been noticeably reluctant to interfere withAfghan politics. In the medium term, Chinaseconomic and military rise will likely increase

Chinese influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.In the light of Chinas emergence as the domi-nant regional power, the transatlantic allies willhave to increase the unity of their actions to re-main relevant in South Asia.

A long-term stabilization of the whole region canbe achieved only if it includes a solution to themost important conflicts in South Asia. Afterlong hesitation, NATO governments have finallybegun to acknowledge this fact.29 Most notably,in November 2011 thirteen Asian states launchedthe Istanbul Process on Regional Security andCooperation, which has been promoted by theUS and other leading NATO member states.30

Yet the Istanbul Process lacks substance andbinding commitments, and has thus far failed toproduce a framework for regional security. Theinitiatives weakness is exacerbated by a lack ofpermanent structures and effective coordinationwith existing groups working for regional stabili-zation such as the Contact Group on Afghanistanand Pakistan, the Friends of Democratic Pakis-tan and the trilateral dialogue among Afghanis-

tan, Pakistan, and the USA.The transatlantic partners should promote thecreation of one comprehensive regional forumfor dialogue, exchange, and cooperation on prac-tical issues. This forum could resemble the Con-ference for Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), which managed to facilitate cooperationbetween East and West during the Cold War.31 Inaddition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, it shouldinclude Iran, China, India, Russia and the for-mer Soviet Republics to Afghanistans north. TheUS and the EU could be either members or per-

manent observers. Specifically, the forum couldsupport an Afghan peace process and promotemeasures to improve political and economic re-lations between Pakistan and India.

Within such a framework it might be possible toreach agreement on basic principles of inter-state cooperation and on concrete projects in theareas of trans-border security, trade, and scien-tific and cultural exchange. It will be particularlyimportant to encourage stronger economic linksbetween the member states. India and Pakistanhave made an important step in this direction bysigning a joint statement in 2011 in which bothvow to improve trade ties. While important traderestrictions remain, the easier movement ofmany goods, services, and businesspeople bet-

ween the two countries promises new economicopportunities for India and Pakistans youth. Af-ghanistans economic modernization will stilltake decades, but efforts should be made totransform the country into the economic linkbetween Central and South Asia, serving in par-ticular the transport of electricity and energy re-

sources. In the long term, the goal must be toimprove relations among the relevant statesthrough a process of political and economic rap-prochement.

ConclusionsThe situation in Afghanistan and in Pakistan islikely to remain one of the greatest foreign andsecurity policy challenges in the coming years.Accordingly, US and European states shouldalign their policies in order to make optimal useof their comparative strengths, avoid beingplayed off against each other, and increase theirimpact in this crucial region.

We have recommended a comprehensive, two-level strategy for building a long-term partner-ship with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In order toestablish lasting stability without a foothold forextremist groups, foreign powers strategy mustaddress political conflict and the structural im-pediments to development at both the nationaland regional levels.

In the short-term, the transatlantic allies central

goal must be the stabilization of Afghanistan andPakistan by promoting an inclusive political sett-lement of the conflict in Afghanistan. Westernmilitary operations in the region should cease by2014. This should explicitly include an end to US-run drone strikes in Pakistan. In the longerterm, the US and the European states shouldsupport the construction of governance institu-tions in Afghanistan and Pakistan that can gua-rantee political participation, fundamental hu-man rights, and basic state services. Americanand European governments and civil society

must strive to support progressive forces inclu-ding the growing economic middle classes, intel-lectuals and moderate clerics. Public diplomaticinterventions are likely to be useful only in ex-ceptional cases, for example where dramatic hu-man rights violations occur with significance forthe whole state. Development initiatives shouldconcentrate on improving governance and ex-panding opportunities for secure rural liveli-hoods through better agricultural infrastructureand education.

At the regional level, the US and Europe shouldpromote a process of deepening political andeconomic cooperation across South Asia. Re-gional powers must be involved more closely in a


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1. For instance, the newly elected French President Fran-cois Hollande has pledged to withdraw Frances 3,300 sol-diers by the end of 2012 instead of 2014. The Netherlandsand Canada pulled out the bulk of their forces in 2010 and2011, and Poland will follow in 2012. Australia and NewZealand have both announced an earlier withdrawal, pled-

ging to pull all troops out of Afghanistan by the end of2013.

2. See Bruce Riedel, A New Pakistan Policy: Contain-ment,New York Times, October 14, 2011.

3. Michael F. Harsch, A Reluctant Warrior: The GermanEngagement in Afghanistan,PRIO Paper, PRIO, 2011.

4. Jane Perlez, Extremists are Suspected in Killing of Pa-kistani Minister,New York Times, March 2, 2011.

5. Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, January 2012,Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship

between Aid and Security in Afghanistan (Medford: Feins-tein International Center, Tufts University), p. 22.

6. UNAMA and OHCHR Afghanistan - Annual Report

2011. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Kabul,February 2012, p. 1.

7. Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO Quarterly DataReport, Q. 4 2011, ANSO, January 2012, p. 9.

8.Thomas Ruttig, 2009, The Other Side. Dimensions ofthe Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors an[d] Approaches to'Talks' (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network).

9. Mao Tse-Tung, 2000 [1937], On Guerrilla Warfare(Urbana: University of Illinois Press).

10. International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn,Afghanistan and the International Community: FromTransition to the Transformation Decade, Bonn, 5 Decem-

ber 2011.

11. Chicago Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads ofState and Government Participating in the Meeting of theNorth Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, http://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm,para. 6.

12. A recently leaked ISAF report suggests that despiteheavy losses the Talibans strength, motivation, funding,and tactical proficiency remains intact. ISAF, 6 January2012, State of the Taliban, http://www.nytimes.com/in t era ct ive/worl d/a s ia /23a t wa r- t a l ib a n - report -docviewer.html, p.2.

13. Barbara J Stapleton, May 2012, Beating a Retreat.Prospects for the Transition Process in Afghanistan, ANNThematic Report 01/2012 (Kabul: Afghan Analysts Net-

work), p. 29.

14. Hamish Nixon and Caroline Hartzell, December 2011,Beyond Power Sharing: Institutional Options for an Af-ghan Peace Process, Peaceworks No. 78 (Washington, DC:USIP); James Shinn and James Dobbins, 2011, AfghanPeace Talks: A Primer (Santa Monica: RAND); Interna-tional Crisis Group, 26 March 2012, Talking About Talks:Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan, Asia ReportNo. 221.

15. See Michael F. Harsch, 2009, Verkrzte Debatte, man-gelhafte Strategie. Warum der Afghanistan-Einsatz kaumffentliche Zustimmung findet, Neue Gesellschaft/ Frank-furter Hefte, 12/2009, pp. 46-48.

16. See Seth G. Jones, 2010, It Takes the Villages: Bringing

NotesChange from Below in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs 89:3and Mathieu Lefvre, May 2010,Local Defence in Afghani-stan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives, The-matic Report, Afghanistan Analysts Network.

17. William Byrd and David Mansfield, May 2012, Drugs inAfghanistan - A Forgotten Issue? Implications and Risks forTransition, Peace Brief 126 (Washington, DC: USIP).

18. See Anatol Lieven, How Pakistan Works, Policy Paper

No. 5, The Global Policy Institute, 2008, p. 7; AnatolLieven, 2011, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: AllenLane). For a fundamental treatment of the emergence anddevelopment of the Pakistani state, see Stephen P. Cohen,2004, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution Press).

19. For an explanation of the origins and unfolding of theKargil war the first military confrontation between twoneighboring nuclear-armed states see Sumit Ganguly,2001, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since1947(New York: Columbia University Press).

20. See Stephen P. Cohen, (ed), 2011, The Future of Pakist-an (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), andHassan Abbas, 2004, Pakistans Drift into Extremism

Allah, the Army and Americas War on Terrorism

(Washington, D.C.: Pentagon Press).

21. See Hussain Haqqani, 2005, Pakistan: Between Mili-tary and Mosque (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace) and Ayesha Siddiqa, 2007, Mili-tary Inc.: Inside Pakistans Military. Economy (London:Pluto Press).

22. See Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, 2009/10,Why Support Islamist Militancy? Evidence from Pakistan,

International Security 34(3): 79-118.

23. Conrad Schetter and Katja Mielke, Entwicklungszusam-menarbeit mit Pakistan. Eine Analyse aus Ankerland-perspekive, Discussion Paper, Deutsches Institut fr Ent-

wicklungszusammenarbeit, May 2008, p. 57.

24. The problematic distinction between democratic anddictatorial regimes in Pakistan is treated in Lieven, Pakis-tan: A Hard Country, pp. 63-65.

25. See Xenia Dormandy, Reversing Pakistans Descent:Empowering its Middle Class, The Washington Quarterly,35(2): 157-173, Spring 2012.

26. Jack Healy and Alissa J. Rubin, Afghanistan FavorsIndia and Denigrates Pakistan, New York Times, October4, 2011.

27. For a useful overview of the converging and diverginginterests in the region, see Ashley J. Tellis and AroopMukharji, (eds), 2010, Is a regional strategy viable in Af-ghanistan? (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace).

28. For example, through the signing of a nuclear agree-ment in 2007 and the assurance in 2010 of US support forthe Indian efforts to get a permanent seat on the UN Secu-rity Council.

29. Cf. Chicago Summit Declaration, para. 10.

30. Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperationfor A Secure and Stable Afghanistan, 2 November 2011,http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/4598

31. Cf. Mir A. Ferdowsi, 1992, Von Europa lernen? DieKSZE als Modell fr regionale Sicherheits- und Friedens-ordnungen in der Dritten Welt, in Volker Matthies, (ed),

Kreuzzug oder Dialog. Die Zukunft der Nord-SdBeziehungen (Bonn: Dietz): 57-74.

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on the road to disengagement? envisioning a long-term strategy for afghanistan and pakistan

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