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On the Power of Evidence-Based Analysis
Daniel Kaufmann
Plenary II: Peace, Equality and Social Justice: Fighting Corruption in Development and
Investment Beyond 2015 #16IACC, Malaysia, September 3, 2015
1
Data
The scale of the challenge and its impact:
• Extent of worldwide bribery is roughly US$1.5-US$2 trillion, about 2 percent of world’s GDP.
• However, this figure is not the whole “cost” of corruption.
• The 300 percent development dividend of good governance matters for per capita income, infant mortality, education.
• The 20 percent “corruption tax” on foreign investors; the tax on the poor, financial instability.
Governance Matters: Development dividend of improved governance in resource-rich (and other) countries
Sources: GDP per capita (atop each column) from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2012. Corruption Control data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2012. Countries grouped into terciles based on WGI Control of Corruption scores. “Resource Rich” country classification according to IMF (2010).
Poor Corruption Control Average CorruptionControl
Good CorruptionControl
GD
P p
er
ca
pit
a (
PP
P)
Resource-Rich Countries Non Resource Rich
5,000
0
10,000 6,851
3,941
12,712
10,272
45,000
30,820
3
Select countries showing large improvement or deterioration in voice and accountability (2000-2013)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Vo
ice
& a
cco
un
tab
ility
% r
ank
2000 (Improved) 2013 (Improved) 2000 (Deteriorated) 2013 (Deteriorated)
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://www.govindicators.org
Improvement from 2000-2013
Deterioration from 2000-2013
Select countries showing large improvement or deterioration in rule of law (2000-2013)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Ru
le o
f la
w %
ran
k
2000 (Improved) 2013 (Improved) 2000 (Deteriorated) 2013 (Deteriorated)Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://www.govindicators.org
Improvement from 2000-2013
Deterioration from 2000-2013
Accountability must complement transparency : control of corruption vs voice & accountability (WGI)
6
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
20
13
co
ntr
ol o
f co
rru
pti
on
Wo
rld
wid
e
Go
vern
ance
Ind
icat
or
sco
re
2013 voice & accountability Worldwide Governance Indicator score
r = 0.78
Note: Red data points are the 55 resource-rich countries according to the IMF. Source: IMF, 2013 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Select countries showing large improvement or deterioration in control of corruption (2000-2013)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Co
ntr
ol o
f co
rru
pti
on
% r
ank
2000 (Improved) 2013 (Improved) 2000 (Deteriorated) 2013 (Deteriorated)
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://www.govindicators.org
Improvement from 2000-2013
Deterioration from 2000-2013
Malaysia: Worldwide Governance Indicators for voice & accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption
25
50
75
100
Voice & Accountability Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Go
vern
ance
Ind
icat
or
% R
ank
2004 2013Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://www.govindicators.org.
Corruption has Morphed: Networks, and Legal & State Capture
10
11
Media
Private Sector
Municipal Government
Military
State (Bureaucracy) Political Parties
Civil Society
International Legislative Branch
Judiciary
1
Entrenched corruption networks: the case of Montesinos in Peru
Source: “Robust Web of Corruption: Peru’s Intelligence Chief Vladimiro Montesinos,” Kennedy. School of Government Case Program, Case C14-04-1722.0, based on research by Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo; Peru: Resource Dependency Network, 2000.
Vladimiro Montesinos
Alberto Fujimori
Source: AFP, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/sports/06/02/15/look-key-players-fifa-scandal.
Petrobras
Source: Ministerio Publico Federal, http://pt.slideshare.net/arykara7002/fluxograma-do-dinheiro-da.
Cross-cutting mechanics: secret corporate vehicles
Image source: Radio Free Europe (2012), “Azerbaijani Government Awarded Gold-Field Rights To President's Family.”
Corruption across the decision chain
License allocations e.g. Griffiths (Chad), Cobalt/Nizaki (Angola)
Subcontracting e.g. Petrobras (Brazil), Skanska (Argentina)
Saving revenues e.g. SocGen/Goldman Sachs? (Libya)
Commodity sales e.g. Sphynx/AOGC & Gunvor (Congo-B), Swap contracts (Nigeria)
Implications
• View corruption differently: beyond an illegal transaction between two individuals it is a problem of high-level capture of state assets, policy, regulation and laws. Hence: Corruption as “the privatization of public policy.”
• Understanding corruption as a problem of networks and use of innovative tools
• To make progress on fighting corruption, integration needed between rule of law (end to impunity), vibrant civil society and effective transparency (incl. political and corporate [beneficial ownership])
• #16IACC “Small Idea”: a multi-stakeholder initiative to fight impunity and corruption
• Toward an “impunity index”