- -I. . * A - - - _

YOL. XSXI. lS87. No. 139.

ON THE PERSOiWEL FOR SUDJlARlNE MINING. l3g Licutcnrnt-Colonel J. T. BUCKKILL, lntc R.E.

I)ifroditcfory.

TORPEDO warfnrc has n o r nrouscd SO much pnblic ntfcntion, its import:incc has bccomc so fully rccognizcd ; tlic novelties crolrcd in its clcvclopxncnt nro so nnmcrous and coniplcs; thc opinions, cvcn of ndcpts. nrc frcqucntll so dircrgcnt ; ntid tlie dificiillics to bc over- C O ~ C aro oftcn so formidable ; that I tn is t tbc following i-cmnrks on onc of tho mnin difficulties will at tmct tho attention of my nudicncc, nnd will also bc tlic incans of starting a uscful discussion. Tho 6iil)ject on which I nm to address you is tho “Pcr~onnc l

rcquircd for Sobmnrinc Mining,” i.c., for tlic duties coiincctcd with tlioso dcfenccs of our Empiro which consist in t h ~ c m p l o p c n t of fixed torpcdocs or sea mines.

In dcnling with this subjcct tho personnel rcquircd for the locomo- tivc torpedocs nnd torpcdo-boats will also t o considered, as tho two duties arc so closcly nllicd. ’ My cxciisc for hnring the tcmcrity to nddrcss you is thnt I hnrc

carcfullp studied submnrinc mining for eighteen ycnrs, a i d ll3\’C bccn employcd upon it for D largc portion of tilo time, dnring which 1 Itnrc lind cxceptionnl opportunitics for watching our instructional, cxpcrimental, and prncticc operations.

Coinplicafcd Genr.

Fortunntclp for the nntion, nnfortunntcly, pcrhape, for tkc Sordcc, wc hace ncrcr yct hnd s clinnce of trying our sjstcrn in nctunl war-

FOL. xxx1; T

2 64 ON TIIE PEIISOSXL FOR SUBXiILISE JIISISQ.

fnrc. Tlic natural dcsirc to nttain thcorcticd pdcc t ion lias consc- queiitly pro'o'lacctl coriiplcxity of dcsigri with its concomitant difli. cultics ; among which tliu most scrions of all is prob,ibly tIic training of thc ~~cl~soI1ucl.

Add to this tltc fact that SO soon as a man is Lccorning really uscful nntl IicIpfiil Iris tcrm of, limited cngagonicnt (used to be cight years nnd four in tlic rcscrrc ; IIOW sewn ycnrs nud fiw in thc rcscrvc) cspires, aiid the gravity of thc sitnation is cIriI:li:isizd. Pcrfcction may bc piirc1i:iscd too dcnrly-. A subiiiarinc mining test-room, with its mnltitiidc of \\;ires and instriimcnts, may cngcndcr bcantifnl idcns in thc contcmplntivc sapper, but dcpcntl upon it. that OW lt:tlt of this gcar might with tlic grcotcst advan tap to the Servico Lc swcpt into tho sea.

' nir!k qf S.-lI. {it dimricn.

Onr Amcricnn cousins ivcrc tlic first to nsc sulinwinc mines succcss- fully, i.c., so ns to alfcct tlic iiiilitary and naval operations to any con- sidcrablc cxtrmt. Tlic great \Vni* of Scccssioii couiiiiciiccd without c*itlicr side possessing n i i j storcs, or an)- pcrsonricl for this piirposc. 111 f a d tlicrc was R scntitticrttal fccliiig prcvalciit against tlic cmploy- mcnt of t o i y d o c s , :iiii1 the Confcderittrs crciiscd thttmsclvcs on thc plca of f idh i icss :ud dirc ncccssity. Tltcy st:irtcd opcr;itions h j tho careful orgaiiizatioii of n mAab1,lc ~tcrsoniiel, thus pl:icing tlic Scrvirc? on a pm.tic:il ,:isis from tlic first, nnd avoiding thc scicntific fndtlist with his iiitcrii1iitd.h cspcrinicnts, volumiuous rcpcrts, a i d com- plicatcd apparatus.

The Coiflejedernie S.D. Service. The Confcdcratc Submnriiic I3nttcry Scrvicc " spccdily invcntcd

trusttvortliy storcs, tlicii tried tltcni, and at oncc applicd tltcrn, if succcssftrl. 'I'lic csccllent results liavc bcconic innttcr for history. 1 110 )crsonricl is c-oinposcd of " flrosc itot ofltericise licillc to militmy ditty '1 (I{;irncs, 1). G ) , n i i ~ foruictl a secret scrvicc corps. ~y nxi nct of tlic Sootlicrii Coiigrrss i t w i s considcrcd its bclonging to tho Pro- visional Amy of tliu Coiifculci-.itc States ; mid tliu riicrribcrv wcrc ' I ciititletl when c*apturcd to all tho privilcgcs of prisoncis of war not always aiccortlctl to tlicm.

Tlic uirn ciilistcd wcrc sworn to secrecy, and grantctl xnnny pri- vilcgcs. Nr. A1. F. M:iiirr, prcvionsly of tlic U S . Nnvy, was xnailc chief of thc 'I'orpcdo l311rcau :it Iticlitiioiid, c o d OJkcrs o j fhe old i\"cy o f liifili stancling nnd ability wcrc couiuiirsiorictl to organize and drill tlic xiicn, :und to pcrfcct tlic sptcni. 'I'liis occurrc!d towards tlic c ~ i d of 1862, niid thc ciitr:inccs to Cmrlestoii, Mobile, nnd \\'ilrnington Iiarboiirs, as well ns iniport:iiit poiiits on tlic.v:irioits rivers, wort3 soon blocked with iriincs so tl1ororigltly ns iiiatcrinlly to clicck thc naval opcrxiolis of tlicir focs in thuic whtcrs.

I 1

I'rizc iitoiicy iviis givcn for daring opxtioris.

0s ‘11iE PEItSOSSEL FOR SUINARISE IIISISC. 265

Ck cap !l‘orpc[lo-l?ocilx.

Norcovcr, clienp torpcdo-boats m r c irnproviscd, some of rrliicli, nrnrly submerged, \ ~ c r c riiost difficult t o dctcct at n ight ; and these wcrc a l l nianiicd nnd dircctcd by tlic corps.

Tlic xiurnbcr of vcsscls dcstroycd by niiiics and torpcdocs so011 bcc:imo 60 considcr:iblu as to pi~oducc thc rnoit important moral rffccts ‘on tlic foc. Tlicsc circun1st:inccs sliould rici-or Lc forgottcii by tlic torpcdoist nnd submnrinc niiricr, for t h y constitutc the birth in 11r;ictical forms of tliosc t c r r i l h ~riodcrri wcnpons wliich now forni such powerful niisilinrics to tlic giiii and tlic rniiskct in all scn tlcfcnccs. I hnrc alludcd to thein licrc in ordcr to draw nttcntion to t h e pcrsonncl, nnd to tlic fiict tlint this cornbirinti~in of soldicrs, s.iilors, :iriJ civilians workcd succcssfully nntl Iinruioniously undcr tIic coiuiiinntl of tlic G c n c d Officcrs coriirnnudin,n thc shtirc dcfciiccs, :inJ tlic g c n c i d dircction of :L biircnii :it thc cnpital (Ricliriioiitl). . \Viicn tlic U.S. sloop of wiir “Uousntooic I’ was sunk by

D.ivid ” torpedo-boat. off Chnrlcston h r b o n r , the fact was oflici:illy y p o r t c d to I ‘ 3Injor-Gcncrnl D. H. AIoury I ’ by I ‘ Cnpt:iiu 11. 11. Gray i n clinrgc of torpcdocs.” Tkc lct tcr \\.as datcd (29.4.6i) at ttiu I‘ O!ticc Subuinrino Defcnccs, Chrlcs ton .”

U.S. Sercicc.

Pissin: to more rcccnt tinics, thc pci*sonncl of tlic U.S. torpcdo arid fiiilirnnrinc miuing scrr-ices has becn divided ; tlio former Ijcing dr:rmn from tlic U.S. Xnvy, nnd tlic lnttcr frorn tho U.S. ICnRinccrs, i n a mnnncr \-cry sinii1:ir to tliu arrnrigemcnts which obtniii in 1-1 riglaud.

D i d c d Ilcsponsibility.

This division has ono vcry decided disadmntngc, viz., divided r-sporisibility, tlic torpcdo-boats c m p l ~ y c d RS nusilinrics iii . tlic tlcfcnce of n 1i:irhour fortress Lcing uritlcr tho coniniantl of tlic senior ~inval O(liccr, who is riot uiidcr tho orJcrs or control of tlic Grncrnl Oficcr commniiding tlic fortress. Such a st:ite of nff.lirs -migl i t cnsily 1c:id to serious dificultics, biit i t rriiiy be sorncwhnt, prirrint tire iu our Sen-icc t o consider tlicrn-iiinsmiich as thcr: :irrl ;rt. prcicrlt biit R ~111nll iiumbcr of torpedo-lionts for the l i n r b u r defences of tho Isritisli ISrripiix?. unloss a nuliilrcr of boats now belonging to t l ~ c Xiivj- bc transferred and used f u r 1i:irbour dcfcnce.1

2GG 0s TIIE PERSOSSEL FOR SUDJIARTSE MIhXSC.

wit11 the snbmnrinc clefenccs of thc country, including tbc manning of thc Lmts rcqnircd for laying thc mines, nre now cntrnsted to tlic h y n l Engineers."

Each eubmnrine mining company, R.E,, contains two sections. and cacli section bas thirty-one tmincd rncn, many of \r-hom arc artificcrs of rnrious .t rndcs.

It bnsdso Lccu officially laid down that " theso traincd rncn . . . . . nre not iu suficicnt niimbcrs to man tlio h a t s and do thc

Inbonrer's work on slioro in addition to their special duties; t hc j must,' thcrcforc, 'bc supplcmentcd by an auxiliary corps to provide Loatmcn,Qc., to t l c number of rcbont thirty to cadi section of traincd mcn. The men composing this corps should be a pcrmanerit l o c ~ ~ l body, kept up n t all timesdo tlio full n u m h r s required n t each port. Thcj should bc raiscd from the 6Cafaring popnhtion, \\-ell nccustomcd to ljoatwork, rcndy whcn wanted, and amcnnblc to clisciplirie. They should bc called out ever j par, and assist in tlic annual pmcticc."l

This is a description of thc prcscnt organization, tho Snbmnrine Mining Militia liaving Lccn rniscd in ordcr t o provide the above- mentioned " ruxilinry corps:" This organization has been made moro particnlnrly to provido thc pcrsonncl for our '' importnnt naval stations." For "commcrcial Iinrbours nnd other ports at homo and nlrond, nn OHiccr may hnvo to rnako usc of such rncn nnd boats ns can bo at tlic time procured on tho spot," and " ivbcncvcr thrrc nre Voluntccr Enginccrs, a ccrtnin proportion ot thcm should LO tn ined ns far ns possiblo i n tho priiicipks of snbmnrinc mining. . . . . A t most places, men such as tclcgraphic opcrntors mill bc found, with a certain knodedgo of electricity, and n t all important com- nicrcinl ports boats can bc procnrcd, wliich, wlien provided with thc ncccssnry fittings . . . . .. will bo suitable for lnjing dovn mines."

Still moro rcccntly: "It has been decided at tho War Ofiico to promotc the formation of n corps of Voluntccr Snbmarino Jlincrs, iritcriilcd to co-opernte with tlio Rojnl Engiiiccys for tlic dcfcncc of o r t a i n commcixinl ports of t hc United Kirigdoin. It is intended tlint thc corps shall couaist of independent compnnics, each of threc Oficcrs nnd sixty non-commissioned officors nnd rncn, irtiscd ns follows :--For thc Clyde, n t Greenock ; tlic h-lcrscy, n t Idivcrpool ; tlio Tync, n t Tpxnon t l i ; tlic Sc rem (tn-o compnnies), at Cardiff ; tho Hutnbcr, nt Hull; tho Tccs, at Middlcsbrough; the Forth, at Leith; tho Tny, at Dundcc; and a t Fnlmoiitli. It is furtlier proposcd tlint thc Adjutants nnd Instructors shall Lo eclcctcd from tlic Royal lhginccr Coast Battalion, and thnt bcside 3 scrgeants and 2 Lnglcrs, cnch company shall coiitnin 21 men wcustomcd to boat-work, ti mnrinc cnginc-drircis, G fitters, 2 smiths, 1 tin-smith, 2 joincrs, 1 ship's carpcntcr, 2 pnintcrs, 1 instrument makcr or repairer, 4 electricians, 8 tcIegmplicrs, nnd 1 clcrk. L o d gentlomcn aro to to sclcctcd, i f ossiblc, to n i so tho compmics, nud nssnmc thc command; but i F this latter bo not convcnicrit i t is proposcd they bc

I Omcia1 lfanud.

OS THE PEIlSOSSEL FOR SUBHARIXE JIISISG. 267

made lioiioixry comniandants, in order to rctain their support and irrtluencc, whilc actual command would Lo givcn to carcfully sclccted Captains.”’

0rgaiii:atioir for Naval Slations.

JVc will examino tlic organization for thc important naval stations first.

It lras bccn laid down officially that one section (thirty-onc trnincd ILE.), togcther with tlic nuxiliarics, will bc snfficicnt for tho ininu clcfcuce of R port with R singlo cliauncl of critriiiicc, or two cliauncls close togcthcr. This then is tliu acceptcd sulinariric mining unit of pcrsonncl. Tlic total for 1 company = 1 Captain, 3 Licutcnants, 1 company sergeant-major, 3 sci-geants, 4 corporals, 42rid cor~~umls, 49 laiicc-corporals nnd s:Lppei’s, and 2 bu$m ; 3 laucc-corpon~ls may LO paid, and tlicrc iuny bc 6 unpnirl Inncc-corporals. Total 61 non-conimiasioiicd oniccrs aud nicn nnd 2 bug1ci.s. Of these, 4 mcn pcr coiiq)any (2 per scctiori) aiu ccrtificntd divcrs. ’h distributiou of thcsc, with their nudiorics, is oficially laid

do\m thus :-

.

Satun? of work, Lc., to bc pcrformcd. r\’.c.o.’s niid men H.E.

E x t n men, Militia E n p e c r s .

Storc b a t s . . ............................ Crcw of mincr ...........................

,, stcam 13urich.. ................... Preparing ~ u d l q i u g nliuci.. .............. Juiictiou hs- loat . . ...................... 0;:: .................................... 1)iugIiy. ................................ lc3t-roorn.. ............................. Storemn (nsistaiit) ...................... Sll l i l l l3 . . ................................ Carptiit crs .............................. CllSU315, c30k3, Lc.. ......................

,.

Total ...................... - 3

33 -

This oaicinl cstiriiatc is assumed as Liirig adcquatc for n11 stations possessing R nnit h a t and stc:inier cquipmcnt, 1-iz., 1 tug, 2 liglitors, 1 mirier, 1 stcaru lnuuch, 1 pnllirig l:iuuch, ‘1 pinnaeo or cuttcr, 2 dingliics, 1 gig.? It lins Lccu dccidcd, mid vcry propcrly, tu. cmploy niincs controllcd by iiieaiis of clcctricitr, thcrcby occ;isioning tho minimum of inconreuicnco to our ow1 shipping, diicli ~ v c liopu may always lm ablo to kccp tho scas. Wem \vc a wcnk uaval I’owcr, it

I Cl ippd from R d d r paper. f Tlic iuiner or inooring stmmcr, thc steam lnuncli, 3nd the piilliog lnuiick arc

cuck fitted with derrick, tviucli~ &c.

268 0s THE PERSOSSEL FOR SUBJIAIXSE JIISISO.

might bc neccssmy to cniploy an cntirclg diffcrexit system ir i order to producc a xiiorc rapid dcfcucc, arid pcrliaps il xilore thorough miuc block.

l'reparatioiis prior 10 1Pnr.

Prior to tlic dcclaration of war, thc \rho!o of tlio sliorc arnngc- xiicxits slioald bc completed as far ns possible, tlic test-rooms, tho ixistriiritcxit-rooms, clcetric light cmpIaccrucnts, engine-rooxxis, kc., fittcd :irid conncctcd with cnch 0 t h cIcctric;iIly ; arid tlic main cablrs laid to tho shore. All tlio stores prcparctl and labcllcd; mixics loadcd, &c. Cltnuucls bnolycd, or rcbnojcd; nxid tkc partics told OK and orgiiiizcd for tlic various operations.

Dislribution f o r Wur Il'orE.

On tho dcclnixtion of war, or :on rccciving tlrc order to lay the xiiiiics, tlic followixig working pnrtics nxid distribution would bc required :-I

At Storc DcnAt :- 1 supcri'utcndcnt, trustwortliy nnd cxpcricticcd ....... 1 leadiiig liarid 1 2 working pnrtics connecting up (i traiiicd mcii

. 1 ' xnirics.. ..................... 1 tester.. .........................................

11 lmatmcn, and for othcr work 011 shore ............. 3 lilnclismiths ...................................... 1 telcgrnpliist.. ...................................

2 carpcntcxs ...................................... Total 0 S.31. arid 20 civilians.

For cnch Minc Ficld, 011 shorc :- 1 supcrixitctidcut, trnstwortliy and cspcricnccd.. ...... 1 tcstcr and tclcgnphist. .......................... 1 tclcgnpliist .................................... 2 electric light nicn.. ............................ 1 engine-driver.. ................................. 1 stoker.. .......................................

. ? mcn for observing stntion.. ...................... = G txaincd S.11. and 3 civilians.

Most st:itions would hnvc at least 2 mine ficlds, con- sequently for inixic ficld s1ioi.c mcn :-Totnl = 12 S.X. and G civilinxis.

1 Oficcr ........................................ Oil tlic Watcr, cncli moorixig sttnmcr :-

1 lending linritl .................................. 6 S.X., liiglily traincd in Ikis work.. ...............

S.JI.2 : SJI. s.31. Cir. s.11. Civ. Cir. Civ. Civ.

S.N. . SJI. Civ. S .JI . Civ. C iv. S.31.

s.11. S."

I Thi3 is not oficinl. * S.X. iiicm3 traiiicd submaritlo inincr,' Cir. Ii1c:i'ns that tllc tlutr nwntioiicd can

bc performed by a cirilim wlio is not traitled speciollj n3 3 subui:trit~c miner.

0s TIIE PERSOSSEL FOR SUUUAIXiE JIISISG.

2 sailors (A.D.) for h a t work.. .................... 1 mnstcr 2 engilic-drivers 1 stokcr 2 sailors

Total = 16 S.N. :iiid 1G civilinris.

For Korking stcamcr I ............ =, 8 S.M. nnd 8 civilinus. Hcncc for 2 minc fields,

Each junction bnr-boat rcquircs :- 2 S.31. (joiutcrs). ................................ 2 assistants.. .................................... Hcucc for 2 Jliuc Fields :- 'l'otal = 4 S.11. uud 4 cirilians.

from thc civilian boatmen a t dcp5t.

2 s.11. ......................................... 2 asistnuts ..................................... Hcncc? for 2 > h e Fields :- Total = 4 S.11. and 4 civilians.

Onc of tlic S.M. n t cncb plncc sliould bc a lcnding hand. Onc Oficcr at lcnst sliould bo at the depbt ; t w a supcrilitcnding shore work : and two 011 tlic 2 miricn (one on mcli)-tlic lnt!cr bciiig good boatlncn.

Tlie crews of cuttcr nnd gig nrc nlrcndr provided for

Thc Storc Lighter \vould rcquirc :-

.

Total for 1 ltclicf for 1 Port of unit sizc :- 5 Oficcrs, tixincd thorougkly .....................

10 bcirig Icndirig hnnds ...............

6 bciiig cuginc-drivcis ............... 50 civilians< 3 bcing stokcrs .....................

I 2 bcingsmiths.. .....................

3 bcing tcstcrs arid 1 olcctric light ~iicii. 3 bcing tclegrapbists .................

45 s.x .. { I 3 being cnrpcntcrs.. .................

Say LOO men per station (under 5 Officers), half bein; S.31. nrid half bcing civilian artizans, sailors, au( labourers.

2c,9

Civ. 1 g;:

Civ. [cir.

sx. Civ.

S.AI. Civ.

sx. } s 11.

1 I

It will be noted tlint I make no provision for diwrs. I do not con- Hider they nrc rcquircd for submnrinc riiiniug-csccpt at the lhpcri- Iiicntul.ScLoo1 (at prcscut noii-csistcnt). The diving gear costs ncnr 4001. per set; :L suitable storc for it costs say nnotlicr 1501. It is Qrooblcsonic nud costly to kecp in or.dcr, cspccially in warm climnte? whcrc the cspciisivc iudin-rubber drcsscs rapidly dctcrioratc. Tlio training of divers at Clintlinin ndds to the troublcs and dillicultics of tlic iiistructional st:iff; nil(\ I Iiaro ucrcr known stores recovcrcd by diving a t niiy station whose vduc was cqual to tlic intcrcst per

270 0s THE PERSOSSEL FOR SUUJIARISI: NISISG.

nnnum on tho cost of tlic plnut. A t ouc stntion, wlicn tlic diving gcnr was pmcticnlly tricd on tho rnino ticld, tlio diver s:iiik up to liis wnist in mud and could uot move. Of whnt usu could a divcr and the diving scar Lc n t such n station ?

Thcsc iiuinhei*s and distribution will vary with cnch port, nccord. iug to tlic numbcis of tlic miiic fields, stcnmcrs, olscrviug stations, clcctric lights, test-rooms, lighters, thc ciaucs cmplp~ed, tc., S;C.

l h c csnniplc clioscn may, ho\rcrcr, Lo ccceptcd ns ;t fair type, and thc nurnbcrs stated form 11 minimum for bnro rcquircmcnts, for orrly ono relief, and allow nothing for cilsunltics duc to sickncss nnd other c;iiiscs. A morc nccurntc mcthod of arriving nt tlic pcx.jo~i~i~l rc- qnircd n t any l i a rbu r would Lo to mako tho iiiino field parties nud tlio corincctiiig-up partics bcar some rclntion to tho riuriibcr of mincs; but this could not be doiie and cmbodicd in published tables, LCC:~USU the numbcr of mirics nt cnch port might thcu Lu dcduccd from tho pcrsoiiucl 0x1 tlic tables.

A IiLcral increnso niust bc nllowed for thesc nnd for night dutics ; say YO pcr ccnt. nt least. This riiiscs tile nunilcrs to GO trained S.X. (tho prcsciit strcngth of a S JI., C.1LlL) nnd GO civi1i:iri auxi1i:iries. This total csccc& thc ofIicial cstiiiinto laid down iii tho xniinual for submnriiic mining by 50 pcr ccnt.; but i t is very xiiuch sninllcr t l i n ~ i the estiuinto dixwn up by a joint iiav.01 nnd niilitnry Comiiiittcc of cxpcrts that roportcd 011 thc subjcct of boat equipment for subniarino mining sonic gcnrs siiicc.

Moreover, when ttiu niines nrc bcirig laid in cnrncst, subrnarinc iiiincrs (if soldicrs could not Lc spared for rcgimcutnl nnd otlicr

It will tlicrcforo Lo rieccssnry to prnvido for cooks, messengers, ordcrlies, niid guards from tho troops of the garrison for the pcriod iluririg wliich thc mincs aud thc booxiis mo bciiig laid out ; nud if boistcrous wcntlicr or an :rctivc attack Lo experienced, this assistoice may rcquirc to h prolongcd.

Kot only nro tlic nnmbor:, given in tho oficinl Iiandlook nltogctlr~r iiisnliicient, but tlic proposed nrr;ingcmcnt of using tlio militia en- ginccrs ns auxiliaries fails to mcct the rcquircmcnts of tlic casc. 'l'hc wilolu of the tmincd subrnni*inc miiiers would Lc rcquircd 11s such, and conscqucutly it would bo ncctssnry to find telejppliist:. smiths, mrpcnteiu, engine-diivcrs, stokcrs, 11s \roll ns boatmen, and labourers from the aaxilinrics. But artizsns do not culist ixito tho militia. Ucncc, thc only iatiorial way to crnploy thc militia is to gi1-o them 1i:irlours to uiinu mliicli aru of somewhat secoudnry im- portanoc, and to esercisc tlicm tlicrc during thcir iiniiual training, SO that Ofliccrs and mcn may lcarri the local pcculiaritics of tlic p1:iccs they will bc cullcd upon to niinu. This lcads to the most important rnattcr which I havo to bring to

)our notice this day.

I 1

duties n t tlieir own 1 nrracks.

Local l~brccs , or Forces with Local ILnoiulcJp, regiiiretl f o r S.11. It niiiy be statcd without fear of coiitradictioli t1i:ib snbuinrinc

milling differs from gunnery, musketrj, Sc., in thc fact that it is

0s TI1E 1’EItSOSSEL FOR SUL)JIAIUSE JIISISG. 251

much morc i i i t i- idcly intcrwovcn with tho local peculinritics of nny fiitnatioti. 11 guiincr taught to work a gun a t Sliocbury caii a t oticc work n gun a t a Spitbc;id Fort. h ritlcrunii taught a t Iiytlic to us0 his musket can fire it c f fcc t idy a11 tltu world over. Uut a sub- iiinriuo pincr taught to Inyh mine in tlic IIcdivay will find himsclf all adrift, in tlic fullcst sense of thc tcriii, wlicn lnjing XL minc in the iiurst Chnnucl with R &knot ctnrciit nnd n depth of 30 fathoms.

Tlic most vnlunblu snbffinrinc iiiiticrs, Officcrs or u~cn, arc, ctclcris purilics, those n-lio liavo bccu tho longest n t niiy giveii station. I ask wlictlicr our prcscut or iiidecd aiiy purely military orgniiizntioii is the bcst for tlic Scrvicc. Thc ndvocntcs of tlic systcm say, “You cniiuot ernploy civi1i:ins ns soldiers ; ” . . . ’‘ tho v:iluu of :b corn- p:wy as soldicrs, including tlic power which the State has of moving them nbout, tkc., kc.’, i r i nddition to tlic militnrj- orgmimt ion Lcinx tlic uicans of giving thc NCU tlic rcquisito kuowlcrly which cu:iblcs tho Oflicers to cffcctivcly use civilian :issistnncc in carrying out soino of the opci-atiotts.” Tlicsu :we tliu words of :iii :iblc Oliicer, high in authority last ycar, wLcu hc w o t o tlieui to IUC. I sliould like to quota R few scutcnccsfrom my reply.

lu rcgiirds thc atlmntngc wliicli you claim, viz., that civilions cannot bc used ns aoldicrs, tho qucstioii arises, do JOU wiiiit soldicrs or even sailors-figlitiitg men-for laying aud repairing sublnariiiu uiiucs? I may Lc wrong, but it scculs to rne that fighting lncn up(? 110 iiiorc rcquirctl for this work tlinii for tho light-vessels, or tlio buoying of the chanucl.~, or tho rigging of thc ships iii tho dockyard, or tho iuovcinctit of war stores from thc Gun 1Vli:irf diiring imr. Aud tho :idvantage JOU claim iu the poivcr of moving the soldiers about seems to be XL positivc disndvmtngc, as the cfticicncy of submarine miniug work dcpciirls fio much ou local knowledge of the witcxs, nnd of the

‘‘ I giant that tlic mcn ou shore wrho may fire the mincs and may bc exposed to tho firu of a foe should Iiu’soldicrs or snilors (soldiers by prcfcrence) undcr tho orders niid disciplinc of thc sciiior Ofliccr prcscnt. But thcsc fighting muu might Lo voluntccrs if tho systcm of mincs uscd were not so iutricatc ns at prescut. “ It tjcems to me that uulcss tho Goveimlncut will snuctiori liberal

numkrs of R.E. at cacli station, \vc sliould say distiiictly that the problcm set us to perform with prcsctit meaiis is impossiblc, and will only bring discrcdit on all conccrncd if a scrious 1iav:il war should brcak out. I firmly believe that coufidcnco c;1ii only bu sccured l?y much morc pcrrnnncnt locd nrrnngciricnts than at prcsciit. A 1 pcrmnnentstaff of liighly tmincd R.E. Oiiiccrs and staff sergeants, nidcd in war by 10c:il suliriiiriiie millers, volunteers, ~ i u d in pencu by IL pcrmnnciit est:tblislimcnt of civiliau nrtiznns and woi*kmcu fitted into tlie various posts, each pcrson knowiitg prcciscly wliat lw would bave to do in war, is oue solution.”

“ L ~ Y J J ~ ~ n d Navy Guxt te ” Schane. Since writing tliesu lines the subjcct hns rcccived considcrablc

nttention, both ofliciallg nud iu thc p b l i c press, and souc leadiug

people :1nd the plncc gcncrally.”

272

articles wliicli linvc nppcarcd in tho Army and Navy Gazcttc ” arc espcci:illy noticcnblc for tlic seiisiblc vicws ciiunciatctl. On tlic 15th Jnuunry. Inst, olio oE tlicsc Ic:ic1cis coricliidcd with tlio words, ‘6 Olgmiize, oipnizc, orgiiiizc ! or S O I ~ C clay it will bc too Into {’ arid no bcttcr atlvicc could bc given. tho crcatiou of :I perriiniicnt Coast Dcfcncc Corps, combining artillery, snbmarinc miners, arid thc p c r s o n d for torpedo arid vidcttc h a t s nud electric lights. Thcrc slirmld bc sufficicut rcgnlais in timc of pcncc to look nftcr the stores and tho boats, . . . . thc rernaindcr being voliinrccrs or militia, who wonld have an anriunl tnininf.”

This is R h r g c sclicmc. Thcrc is much to l o said in its favour, but i t is outside my provincc arid tlic subject of this papcr.

With rcgnrd to tho submnriiic mining, it is ccrtainly not suflicicnt only to look after tlic stores nnd tlic h a t s ” in time of pcncc. TLc pcrsoiinel inust bc carefully trnirictl in tlicir various clutics, and b told off nnd instructed in thc details of tlic posts they should fill in tinic of war. It \voulcl bo a coiiiplicatcd picco of machinery, but cncli part slioiild Gt, and Lw? :idaptcd to perform its special work. Following o u t this siiiiilc tlicrc can be no ncccsdy for making cadi portion iittcrchangcnllc; that is, for tcacliiiig each siibuiarinc miner tkc wliolc of tlic dutics conncctcd wit11 thc work in d l its bi-anchcs.

Division of tlic Dtitics adrocntetl.

OX TIITE PERSOSSEL FOR SUD.\l.\ItI?;E JIISISG.

Tho lcndcr also ndvocntcd

It must bc far bcttcr to dividc tlic work, atid to train sections of the pcrsonncl to Lo pcrfcctuin each portion. Thus clcctriciaiis would not rieccssnrily bc trained in lajiiig or misiug mines, mid tlio mincrs nccd not bc tr:iined ns clcctriciniis; Similarly, the iueii nflont nccd not be tiniiicd i n nll tho shoro dutics, nor thc shore incn in tlic clutics afloat. Until tliis division of labour and of instruction bc ndoptcd, as well as simpler gear, it is liopclcss to cndcnvoiir to train citlicr voluiitccrs or iriilitinriieri to bccoiuc cflicicnt submarine rniucis-for tlic siiriplc reason that theru is LLO tinic to tcacli thcm.

If, Iio~vcvcr, this division of duty be adoptcd, tho question at oncc suggests itself, ns to wliotlicr tho work can then bu clone best by local forces of n military or iiavnl cli:irnctcr, or by civilians.

Cicilinns aclcoea fed. I liavp, for the pnst fcw Scars, pcrsistcntly and consistcntlr urged

npon tho authorities the grcnt ndvantngcs to be gained b j tlic omploj-- mcnt of civilians, both during pcwc a i d war, bcing convinced thnt, for aitizaiis, 1:tbonrcrs. niid boatmen, thcy nro nwrc suitnlJc than soldicra. But I now go furtbm, nnd stotc tho conviction that a srnnll body of civilinii sililots’:it cacli station could ciisily bc trninccl to Iity arid rnisc mines, arid to porlorni tlic work on tlic rniuc ficlds. 1’0 assuiiic that tlicso mcu \vould decamp in timc of war, is cqui-

valcrit to assuming th:it tlic civiliniis cmploycd in our dockyards and arscunls, :ind in the Engineer and O~.diiaricc Storc Dcpnrtments, would do so too !

0s THE I'ERSOSSEL FOR SUDZIABISE JIISISG. 2i3

Civilians arc ns patriotic:ind conragcoiis ns soldiers,-and tho dutics on tlic wntcr coiiricctcd with siibniarinc mining will ccrt:iinly be no moro t1:ingcrous tlia~i tliow .coiincctecl with the chaniicl buoxs and light-ships of tliu snmo waters. JIorcovcr, tlic civiliniis ciiiploycd Immnient l r may bo cirraii,ocd to iiicludc ninny incii in tlic rcservo forccs wlio linvo t ccn tr:iinctl i n S.M. ; also old soldicrs who are no longcr iri tlic rcncrvc of any Lmncli of tlic Army j also naval pcn- sioncrs past lrcnll into tlic Itoyal Xavy.

lidratitages of Use of Civiliaiiz. J I n n j ndrnntngcs would Lo obt:ii"xl b j tho cmploynictit of civilianc.

First and forcmost-tlic1 would I c essentially local, ant1 would sooii bcconio vcrscd in tlic tidcs, currcnts, bc., of tho matcrs on wlticli tlicir work 1:iy. Sccoidly-Tlicy \vould iiot bo moved nbaut from stntion to station, :ind R clieck woiild tliereby bu gircn to tlic prcscnt sjstcm of pcrpctually iuoving tlic men, which is so dctrinrcrital t o iliu intcrcsts of tho Scrvicc. Thirilly-If R iiinii uiisbclinvo liiinsclf, 110 is dischnrgcd and you nro quit of Iiirn, wliercm n soldier with n bail chnx-.ictcr disarranges the nliolc of tl iu works uvcrj tiiiiu ho gets into trouble, Incii Icing takcu from tho diffcrcnt working partics for cscort, evidence, and whnt not. YoitrfItZy-A swing is cflcctcd 11s rcgnrds cost. On tliis there is IL. gcncral nikipprclicnsioii to thu effect tlint snppcr labour is clicnpcr tliau civilian labour.

This ccrtniiily is not tlio c:iso if tlic wags of oven skillcd civiliaiis Lo compnrod with tho par of subninriiic mincrs, ILE., as tho following figurcs, takcli by iiic iii 1865, mill prove:-

Coniparalicc Cost of R.E. aiul Ciciliciiis. A company, R.E. (subniarinc niincrs) was working uudcr my

Tho total liours of work (S.M.) pcrforInet1 by R.E., from 1st hiigust to 30th Septcmbcr, wcrc.. ...... 504.3

The nvcngc uunibcr of R.E. on tho ~ o r k s was 35.6 The totitl liumbcr of R.G. 1iic11's liours svcro.. ...... 10,840 About linlf (is ninny ndditionnl men, lt.14;., ~vcro oIf

tbo works, hiit in nccordnncc with the rcgulntions rcccivcd S.X. pay. They wcro crnploycd thus : 1 ordcrly corpoid, 1 orderly, 1 pionecr, 1 policc- man, 7 cooks and cooks' matts, 2 clcrks, 1 tailor, 1 shocmnkcr, 3 on I C ~ V C , sick, or cnsunls 1 18

Tlic rcgimcntnl pa)- for tliu ~oriip:iriy (not Ofliccrs) for a h v o pcriod \\-as ............................ $355 13 9

Tlic subninrine mining pay, ditto, ditto.. .......... 183 G G

Total = $539 0 3

supcriiiteiidcncc a t Fort Victorin, Tslu of Wight.

....

........

= 10,780s. Captain \Vrottcslq, R X . , ulio \vn3 in commniid of tlic compnr , corrcrts iiic

hcrc lo tlic e5rct that t:d& iiud sllociidcrs wor4iog t i t tlicir m d c s for tliu IIICII,

2 74 ON TIIE PEISOSSEL FOR SUDJIAI1ISI: 3IISISO.

This is :is nenrlj- a s possiblc 1s. for each ILE. man hour of actual S.31. work, and i t does riot inclurio tho cost oE barracks, fucl, light, niid of subinorinc mining clothing, d-c. If tho rcgimcutal duties ritovc cuumciatcd were otherwise crforrncd, and if tliero wero no

A t the same period, I was supcrinteiiding tlio employment of R civilinn crcw on thc mooring stciuicr " Gordon," two of whom, tho inaster arid cliicf cnpiiiccr, \vcrc each receiving 42s. n we&, arid the nssistnut engineer 359. a \veck, also n stoker, two dcck hands, and ;L h y . Tliis stcamcr was working ubout ten houis a day, sir dajs a \vcck, mid tlic cost per mnii hour nriiouiited to about Sd.

E'iJlhly.--lf civiliiins be einplojcd in' placo of soldiers, thc OEccra would not hare their timc taken up, ns it now is, in rcgimcritnl duties iirid in iunkitlg cvcrlnstiug rcturns tibout trifles like part-vx-m Loots. 'l'hu Oficers would Lo :ivoil;iLle for submiiriiic tliiiiitlg work during most of the day, and thc Scrvicc would greatly bcxicfit by this ulonc.

nu t if wo cnri teachcivilians to perform thc duties afloat, what is to prcscnt us from teaching civiliaus to do the nioro advaiiccd arid scicritific work OIL slioro ? Iri our dockjards nnd arsenals slid Small-hrns Factory, we arc constnntlj- tcocliing civiliaus to perform much marc dificult duties, many ol which nru sccrcts, arid 110 fault lins cver bccri fourid with tlic sjstcm. Tho good incu rise to bo forcmen, inaster shipwriglits, or leading linuds; thc bad nicn go to the right. about. So with sulmarino riiiiiiiig work both nsliorc arid allont. Soldiers arc not required for it-nor are fighting sailois, except for tlic guard and picket h a t s , which nro to bc manucd by the lloyal X a v ~ in accord:ixice with tlio regulations laid down in tlic official book on thc subject.. If the Savy wniiot find the men and boats for this duty, local voluutecr forccs should bc orgnnized for this tjervicc, nnd thc bods and steniucrs provided. I know that at least onc gcntlcman of considcrnblc jiichting experience made the proposal that iriduccnicnts 6110~ld bc hcld out to tlio p c h t i n g world to build stcnmers wliicli could Lo converted quickly into torpctlo-boats ; but lic rcceircd small eiicouragcmciit, although he felt lialf inclined to follow tho proposal by nctivc mc~surcs, nud to enlist thc crew as volu11tcers.

l ' l i~r Ojkers. If civilinns tverc emplojcd in uuml~ci-s permanently ns snbmnrinc

miners at each port, they would rcqiiiru t l iu nctivc and daily sriper- visiou of trained ORiecis, and it mould bu a wilful waste of kiio~vlcilgo acquircd through ruariy jcars of labour to placc this in any other hands than tliosc of tho 1t.E. or R.N. As Xajor Ring-Hnriiinii slid in this tlicntre, not long ago, " trained Ofiicerv do iiot grow likc lcavcs ou n trcc." Thc organizatiou of tho llopl Enginecrs is very

nud men on leare or rick, (lo not rcccirc engineer paj. Fire of the nbore 18 men tlicrcfon. reccired 110 engincrr 1x1~ us submarine miucm This fact docs not alter the figivcs given nlore.-J. T. U.

ciisual~, tlio cost pcr rnnn hour woulc T liavo Lecn somewhat lcss.

X o t l h g .

0s THE PERSOShTL FOR SUBUARISE JIISISG. 275

elastic, and conscqnontly is pccnliarly adapted to subrnarinc mining, if tlic armngcmcnts arc framed with n littlc cnrc. Tlic organization of tlio pcrsonncl on tlic Orcliianco Sorvcy is probably the h s t to work upon. Wc thcro find civilian and ILK. labour working togctlicr in a rcry cfficicnt way undcr a single cliicf. Similarly, for sub- inarine mining many of thc civilians should be pcrmancntly cm- ploycd, and should sign nrticles binding tlicmsclvcs not to Icavc czccpt nftcr n long notice (pcrhaps s i r months), receiving R similar pledgc in return not to bc dischnrgcci, csccpt aftcr thc s:irnc noticc, or for gross niisbchnrionr. Tlic mcn 6 l l0~ld also contract not to lcavo during n tirue wlicn tlic conntry is a t ivai’.

Assuming that civilians can bc trained to do tho grcntcr portion of the submarine mining work both in pcnco aiid Kar. nnd that thc ltoyal Engineers can find tlic Officers suficicnt in timc of pcnco, it is qnes- tionahlc whcthcr thcro would bo a snfficicnt nnmbcr of 11.E. Ofliccrs available to carry ont thc work of nn nctivc dcfrtncc in timc of war. Personally, I am distiuctly of opinion tlintat siicli a timc R much larger numbcr of OIIiccrs would bo required tlian is now deemed snfiicicnt. Tlicrc arc so many things to bc donc, so many working partics, 60 inucli dispersion of dn t j , that a Iargc numbcr of ORiccrs to look nftcr it would bc indispcxisable, or a grcat deal of tlic snpcroision of important duties woiild haro to bc cntriistcd l o subordintrtcs. This must bo avoided if possiblc, bcuusc thc cfficicney of a dcfcncc by mincs controllcd clcctrically dcpends so muoh on each link of thc c h i l i bcing sound. That is the Forst point abont clcctriul mincs. Wlicro tlicn can thc additionnl Oficcrs be obtnincd ? It will not bo neccswry to seek far nficld. At cacli important harbour tit homc, rctired nnd hnlf-pay Officers of tlic Army and N a ~ y arc to bc fourid who ~rould probably be glad to cnrol themsclrcs for the local dctericcs, and to submit to nnniinl training in tho duties tliey would liarc to pcrform. Thc K ~ r a l Officers would work afloat, thc Army Ofliccrs on shore. Tlicsc ndditional Officers arc not shown on tho tables at tho cxid of this pnpcr.

Foreign Roster. In a11 our wnr nrrangcmcnts, the dificulties nro grcntcst. in con-

nection with our foreign stations; and subniarinc mining is no cxccption to tho rnlo. At prcscnt they nrc R constant. sonrco of trouble, for no sooncr docs a man prow liimsclf to he n fnirly good mincr, nnd bccornc iiscful by lenniing tho local pcculiaritics. than aiva~- lie goes at a few da;ys’ noticc to LIong Kong, Sinpporc, or some such place. A constiint changc in thc pcrsonncl is thus caused, and to makc mnttcis worsc, cutiro c o m p t i i e ~ aro frequently changed from onc liomc station fo another. Similarly, if tlic arimgcmciits which I Iiavc liccn suggesting wero ndoptcrl. thc grcntcst dilficiiltics would bc met n-ith a t the foreign stations. Tlicrc ivc should find no rctircd or half-pay Officcrs, nor arc cnginc-drivers, stokers, nrtiznns, electricians, kc., to be fourid a t tho Rtrect corners sccking for work. h’cvcrthclcss, it is at tlic foreign stations that the ncarcst nppronch to the scheme I now ndrocatc has obtai~icd. A t Singapore, Uong Kong,

2iC; 0s TIIG PEIlSOSSEL FOR SUDJIIIIISE JIISISG.

hXaiiritins, and Trincornnli, fairly c5icicnt work lins bccn donc with a siu:iI~ staff of rcgii1:irs iinclcr R.E. 018ccrs, tlic pcrsonncl priiicipIIy coiisistiiig of Cliincso coolics mid l\fnla.vs, wlosc 1:ingiingc CWII \v:is not iintlcrstood liy tlic Oliiccfs and X.c.0.'~ who siipcriiitcnded thcir work. n u t cncli man wns gircn n ccrtnin duty to pcrforrri, and was kcpt to it. If, tlicn, n-itli sncli mcri, : i d undcr such ndrersc circum- stniicc~, i t lins Lecn possiblc to do this, it forms n strong argument in f.lvoui* of aii cxtcrision of tlic plnn.

TIic pmcticc at tlicsc stntioiis was cnrricd out with n wry small pcrsonnel of 1t.R during tlic winter montlis. Jf I:urolicnns work dny tiftcr day i i i tLc suii a t pl:ices likc Houg ICoiig, Triricorriali, Cc., i t prodiicci sickricss ; niid ns the nuinlei. of trniiictl Europnris zit thcso stations must bc nmplo for ncccssnry snpcrrision a t nll sc.~soiis of the yenr a strong stnff of trnincd Europcnns is iridispcnsallc.

Iiistcnd of working in this dircctiou, iioivcvcr, tlic opposite rtppcnrs to Lc iu favour, for wc iiow Iicnr of tlic E:tstcrn Thttaliori, wliicli riicnns, I suppohc, tlint tlicsc poor bootuieii nrc to bc initiated iri t l c mystcrics of tlic goosc step (inorc or ICSS), and tlicir uscful- ~ i c s s hampcral by tlic trnrnmcls of ~iiilitnrisrn. If wc iiinst Larc snbninriiic mincrs militant, let tlicm bc collcctcd nt tho fortresses in kohl and scrviccnblc Lotlics, cncli with its p r o p r quota of OtIiccrs ; :tnd Ict tbc S.N. forces for tlic conirricrcinl hrbours and tlic conliug h t i o i i s be organized on tlic bnsis of cirilinii workriicii or voluntccrs, or both, supcriiitcndcd by Otiiccis of tlic R.E. arid R.X.

Present Arrurzgcnieds.

. A t prcscnt tho R.E. conipnnics S.11. arc smttcrcd, nre moved Iiithcr nnd thitlicr, oiid scldorri hnre morc tLnn linlf tlicir proper iiunibcr of Olliccrs. Tlicre is no proper organization for vn r . No idea of wlicrc tlic diffcrcnt Ofliccrs or compnnics would go. nttcriipt n t n plnn; and conscqucntly no siuglc Olliccr is nblc to post hiiiisclf with nriy ccrtaiutF in tho dctnils of the dcsign, or stores, or boats and stenmcrs, or local prculinritics with wliich 110 would Iinvc to work in c:isc of IKIC Kor is any singlc OIIiccr :iskcd to do 60.

I<:ic11 Officer works :it'tlic detnils of tlic dcfcnccs of tlic linrlmur \\*hero lic happeris to Lc qnnrtcrcd. If war hrcnks out ho arid his iiicii m:iy lJc sciit suddanly, n t the Inst moineIit, to niiothcr station, about which he n i d t l i q arc totally ignomut.

\\'c Law 10 conipiics, 11.13., onc being n dcpBt company, and cnch has, or sliouicl Iinvc, 1 Cnptnin nnd 3 subnltcims. This riinkes n total of 40 coriipiiy Ollicors. Tlirec of tlicsc compaiiic.s iirc usiinlly qiinricrcd nt Clintlinm, ivlicro tlicrc is LI st:ilf of Oficcrs coiisisting of 1 Cornrnnritlnnt, Z Adjutant, rind 1 Qunrtcrriinstcr. This stnlF 1i:is no clcnlirigs, lio~vcvcr, with tlic coiiipmies n t otlicr stations. wliicli a rc undcr the militwy control of tIic Cominnndiug lhgiiiecrs of tlic sub-dist rick in wliich tIicy h p p c n to be qunrtezcd,.sucli Colnniniidiiig Engiiiecrs knowing (ns :L i d c ) iicst to iiotliiny nbont sulmnrinc riiiiiing.

As a nuiiiber of Ficld Offic-rs of tlic R o ~ d Artillcry hnvc just hcr i

No,

A t prcscut there arc 2.1.

0s TIIE I’ERSOSSEL FOR .SUB.\l.\ RISE JIISISG. 277

sent to Clinthnni to pass tlirongli n coiirsc of siibiiiariiic minirig, it is to IIC Iiopcd t l i n t thc ncxt clnss w l l t c coinposCr1 of tliosc Comxiinridiiig ]loyal Eugiiiccrs who moro cspecially Iiavc to deal with subrnariiic iniiiiiig niid miners.

Sonictimrs thc dntics :ii*o under tLc direct contiol of,tlic Cornmnnd- iug Enginccr of tlic district wlio is on tlic st:itf.

X1:ittcrs conncctcd with tho discipline, mo\-cmcnts of troops fiam onc station to nnotlicr, kc., nrc dircctcd IJJ- tlic Uqiiity Adjutant. Gcnccil, R.E., who corre.ipoiids direct with tho C.1i.U. of tlic s i i b district. 4”ic works :ire tlircctcd by tlic I.G.F. a!id E., irorkiiig tliror1gli tlic 1.S.D. :it tlic \V.O.. atid somctiiiiw, not nlrv:iys, tliroiigh tlic G.O.C. of tlic district. \\‘Iicii :L question nriscs atfccting tlic iiiilitia cnginecrs, tLc Conirnanckint of that half b:ttt:iliou Lns to bo corlslilt cd.

I t somctinics occnrs that a minntc pnpcr pnsscs tliroiigli tlic olIiccs of nll tlicsc oflicinls nnd back by the sniuc route, caiisiiig grcnt m s t c of timc niid clerical labour. Dircctlr n timc of criicrgciicj nriscs, tlic system is swept to tlic wiiids, and t c l c ~ n i i i s ~ arc sciit clircct to tliosc concerncd. Siniilirlj- with sioics : dircctly rr war scare :irises tlic irliolc fnbric of W.0. purchnsc falls to tlic groiind, nnd tho OlEccrs who know exactly wlint is rcqiiircd arc givcu a frcc 1i:irid both as rcgnrds ])iirchnsc and inspection. rhc rcsult is tli:At storcs purchnscd in a Iiurrj on IL wnr scam arc oftcn tlic bcst storcs iri tlic Scrricc. And no woiidcr, for thc c;m:illcr nnd niorc conccntr:itcd tlic cxccutim, if cllicicnt, tlic bcttcr tlic rcsiilts.

Iktiiriiirig to tlic 1icrsonno1, it is cridciit that a much simplcr organizTtion of tlic direction is csscntid for cnsy and good work. An rirraiigcmcnt of this kiiid will be suggested prcscntly.

There nrc 10 companies, R.E.S.31., 6 U C of wliich is a dcpt t COW- p~nj niid ricvei* 1c;ircs Chothnm. If nriotlicr conipny wero adtlcd, tlicrc could t o 5 serrico. companies a t liornc nnd 5 nbroad. ?‘liese compniiics slionld l o qiiartcrcd nt tlic importnrit fortrcsses, .and iiuycr rnorcd tlicrcfrom. Tlio only clinngcs should be tliosc duc to the tour of foreign scrricc. Tho 3 coiiipinics, 1t.E.. n t ClintLnru (inclotling tlic dcpijt compny) could, in war, xninc tliu l‘hnmcs and I\Icdway.

Thc 2 companies, RE., at Gosport, could mino tlic Islc of Wight rriino fields.

Tlic coup:iny, R.E., at Plymouth, would mine thcrc. Tho 5 scrr-ice coinpanics n h o a d would rniuc 1 at Halifax, N.S., 2 n t 13crmudn, and 2 nt hlnlta. Tho Clintliam conipnnics \rould i\l\vnys cvcliarigc to tlic Jlcditcri*:iiican, and tho l’ortsinoutli (Gosport) :ind l’lymoiitli conipanics woiild nl rvr,js escliniigc to tbc. At1;intic.

All thcsc cornpanics slioultl Lnrc doublc tliu usual Iiiiinlm of N.C.O.’s, and this surpliis should lo distributed to foriu the st ill for S.11. a t tlic otlicr st.itions, an arr;ingorncnt siiriilal. to tlint follovicd in tlic surrcy cotnpnnies.

Thc conip i ies should ncwr bc diritlcd or nscd clsc\rlierc, nor slioiild n n j of tlic saplierj bc dctnclcd from their coinpniiics. Tlio othcr statious rcquiring S. rniucs arc probably 11s follow3 :-

I l o m e . Bclfnst (cornmcrcial harbour).

Cork (fortrcss). C ~ J - ~ C (commcrcinl IiarLonr).

IIcnni Straits, to protcct t h c

Nilford l h v c n (fortrcss). Scvcrn (a donl lc station, offing

to tho sizc of tlic minc ficlds). 3Tnrmicli (fortificd hnrbonr). JIumbcr (conimcminl hnrbour).

Forth, t o prntcct thc bridges, &C. Yay, t o protect thc Lridgcs, &c. TCCS, and othcrs.

. Dublin ( ditto 1.

Ncrsey ( dit to 1. I1Pidgcs.

Tync ( dit to 1.

Coiiinicrcial Harboiirs nt Ifoine.

Thc rcmaindcr of t h c homo ports, Tiz., Dclfnst, Dulilin, Clxdc, Jlcrscy, Alcnai Straits. Scrcrn, Uunibcr, T p c , Forth, Tiiy, Tces, and pcrlinps Fnlmouth, Dartrnoutli, nnd othcr harbours of t h a t dcscrip- tion, should 110 rnincd by a local personncl organizcd undcr Olticcrs pcrmnncntly appointed nt thcsc stations, nnd who might very ad\-an- rageously Lc rctircd Ofiiccrs of t h c R o p l Nnvj- posscssing tlic requisite knowlcc!ge, or willing t o ncquirc i t by pnssing t l r o u g h n courso nt Chatham, or at tlic K:rral School of Instruction a t Portsmouth.

Tlic SJI. mining dcfcnco of fiomc of tlic principal comrncrcial liar- Lours and rivers at liomc rcccivcd much rttcntion from tho Iatc T.G.F., who Rdoptcd t b c idcn of doing tlic work Ly Voluntcers, aidcd by Oficcrs of t h c R.E. Const Dnttalion, \FIIO Iiavc rcccircd com- missions for l o n ~ and faithful scrr ice in thc ranks of tlic Royal Ihgineers. If tiicse Officers a r c intciidcd to nct simply .as instruc- tors, tlic plnn may snccccd, b u t thcy ought t o tnkc tlicir tu rn of scrricc :ibroad. Tlic H.E. Coast nnttnlion cannot bo snit! at prcscnt to cxist apnrt from t h e Voluntcers. \Vitliout them therc rcniain &out half-a-

J'oreigii. LTong Kong. Singnporc. Triucomnli. llnuritius. Jamaica.

and othcrs.

0s THE PERSOSXEL FOR SUBUAItISE 3IISIS(I. 279

~ O Z C I I Oniccrs, Iialf-n-dozen \wrr.int olliccrs, nnd half-a-dozcu IUCU. This forcc ~~osscsscs a Comninndaut, ntid ns it n i n j clurclop into somrtliiiig important. it is iiaturnl to suppose that lie lias bccri selected ns being well ricquaiiited with const dcfcncc, and ns Icing highly tniiiicd in siibniarinc mining nnd torpedo warfare, arid also as bciug nii Otlicer of rank and position. Wlictlicr this be 60 or not, the dcfcncc forcc at m y h h u r riiicsl be uridcr tlic dircction of ib

skillcd Ofliccr of stnndiiig nnd cxperiencc, nrid who is wcll vctsetl in giiiiiicry, toipcdo work, and subinariuc xriiiiiug. Such an Officer iniglit with great advantngc to thc Statu bc nppointcd for R number of yenis, during wliicl he would organize tlio forces and mathicl to bc employed iindcr Iiis direction. Such nri Officcr might bc tnkcn froin tlie retired lists, but as long as tlint cxtiaordinnrj- clausc, KO. 4 4 (L), of thc Ito~-al Warrant rcmaius iri forcc, no Army OfEccr of rnuk wonld bc found to ncccpt such R post, involving as i t would iuucli I:ibour and responsibility. The rctircd Ofiiccrs of tllc Itoynl Navy arc not bouud i1owi to idlcricss by any 6UCh rcgulntioii, aiicl if military pre- judice could bc o~ercome, 1 nm strongly of opinion that rctircd xinval Ofliccrs of cqunl rnnk to Ficld 0ffi~c1.s \vould bc vcrysuitable for such nppoiritments. Tlicy \vould ccrtaitily bo thc bcst nicn possible for organizing thc flotillas of boats and ste;i~~lcrs, torpctlo-lmats 2nd guubo.its, tlint must form 60 important a part of any 1i;irLour dcfcucc. 0 1 1 this p i r i t n fcw words will bc said presently. As bclbrc stated, tho dificulty in trairiirig Volunteers as fiu\)inariiic

inincis is otviug to the great coriiplesitg of OUF qs tcn i of mining. :ind forms thc principal objection to Si r Audrow Cl;irlie’s scheme. Wcrc the nppanitns and proccs..cs simpler i t would probnblj bc thc clicapcst and would pcrhaps bo cffcctive enough. I n niig case tlicru ought to bc a pcrrnnricrit body of civilians working under t l iu direction of R

d l - t r a i u c d staff. I tliink tlint tho Voluntceis arc j p a t l y snpcrior to tlic Militia for

snch work-becansc the mnk nnd filc of thc lnttcr are of n less intclligcnt type, and also bccausc tho ttaining of the Volunteers is morc continuous. A cornpnuy of S.11. Voliintcerj should, 1 thiuk, IK: 100 strong, thus decreasiri civilian labour to say 30 pcr unit.

Tho Eiigiriecr Militia Q.31. havc thcir headquarters at Gospo1.t. Tlicrc nrc fourcornpanics : 2 Hampshire, 1 Davoxi, 1 Keiit. As bcforc stated, if this half-battalion is still to Lo continued, t h y should carry ont tlio work at s o ~ m stations independently, c i d i a n artienns being liired ns nuxiliarics. But it would bc far bettcr to convert tlicm into a battalion of Fortrcss Enginccr Jlilitia, tho duties of ahicli can be learnt br tho class of rncn rccruitcd in tlic timo allowed for training.

Such o conversion would give promotion to thc prcsent Olficcrs, nut1 tliose who dcsircd to stick to S.Jl., and l i d passcd tho ORiccrs’ S.X. course n t Chnthnm, could pobably bu rctaixied ICS the Dircctirig Officcrs at SOIUO of tho homo ports. Tlio Militia is not mcntioucd in the tnblc a t the end of this piper, bccausc I could not sco how to employ thorn ndmntagconsly. I f convcrtcd, the prcscpt R.E. Staff would be nrailablc for thc instructioii of S.11. Volunteers at scrcrtll stations.

For.. XXSI. U

280 0s TflE PERSOSSEL FOR SUBJlARISE JIISISG.

T'i'lintcvcr is clccidcil upon shonld bc known. If tlic Militin S.N. nro to work with tlic 11.E.S.BI. in wnr, thcy slionltl prnctisc togcthcl. i i l pence, niicl the OIliccrs of tho conipnnics sliould be informed coil- cerning tlic clefcnc&s, nod cxerciscd in thc work tlicy will have to perform in timc of wnr. It sccms absurd to linrc to stntc sncl1 cvidcnt triiisms. Yct it is neccssnry, for they nrc not follo~rcrl.

TorpcJo-Boats, $c., for Uefeiicc. Submnrinc mininp must bo nllicd with R sj-stcmntic nnd nctiw

wntcr dcfcncc, composccl of torpcclo-boats, gunrd-bonk, nnd perhaps gunbo:its. Tlicrc cnririot lic n donbt tlint xinvnl Oficcrs citlicr on tlic nctivc list o r rctired should bc cmploycd to orgnnizc and dircct such n scrrice. Yct tlicsc boats nnd stcnmcrs sliould bc undcr tho coni- mniid nncl control of tlic Olficcr commnnding tlic district or fortress. Xnvnl Officcrs may not likc this vicw, but it is i n d i s p c ~ i ~ ~ l ~ l c thnt tlicro slinll bc no division of nuthority in tlic nctivc dcfenco of n linrlx~ur, whether i t bo n riFer like tlic Jlciscy, or an nrni of tho scn rnnning into n fortress like Portsmouth. The main difficiilties nrc cnnscd by thc ixtrnordinnrj division of nntb0rit.y on wnrlikc mnttcia in E~igland- tlio Ariny nnd xavy hing so grcntl? Fcpnrntcd. Finniice nlOnC thcn bccomts :I sttinibling block, niid it often occurs that matteis, which nll ngrcc in considering ns csscutinl, nro postporicd ycnr nftcr jcnr liccniisu tlic Wnr Officc nnd hdmirnlty cannot ngrcc! ns to which dcpnrtment slinll Iicnr tlic cost, Tlic provision of n propcr flotilln for tlic clcfcncc o f our p e n t iinrnl fortrcascs is cnsc i t 1 point, nntl is :b mnttcr to bc fnccd nt oncc. All conccimcd should rcmcmbcr that the iintion cnrcs not onc cent wlictlicr the cost bc dcfr;ijc I by n r m j or iincy fnnds, if i t lins to bc borno n t nll.

Tlic torprtlo-boat flotillas bcinp strictly locnl might bc mnnncd b~ T'oliintecrs from tho nniiticnl popiilntion. nnd tlic Officcrs might mostly bc T'oloiitccrs nlso. I bclicro tl int gcntlcmcn mnj bc found, if lookctl for, \Tho would Indd stcnm ynclits that might nftcrivnrds bc cnsil1 ndnptcc! for uscfnl dcfcnco work in time of wir, : i d tlint tlicsc owncrs would cnrol thcir c r c m ns Voluiitccis nnd tnko n grcnt intcrcst in tlic innttcr. Tho work of fighting n torpedo-boat is difficiilt DO doiibt, biit thcrc nrc not ncnrly so many things to lcnrn ns in subninrinc mining, nnd good sailors con be tanglit if wcll iii- structcd for n short pcriod nrir innl l j .

I am conrinccd that thcsc flotillns slioiilcl bc undcr thc snmc directing hcnd ns tlic subninrinc mining, and it will lic conrcnient iiow to cxnminc thc orpnizntion which I prnposc should bc ntloptcd iu ordcr to ccntrnlizc nnd simplify thc wliolc of tlic nrrnngcmcrits.

Orgaiiization of Ordiiaiice Swrcy. In tlic first plncc lct 11s crnminc tlic orpnizntion of thc Ordnnncc

Snrvcy. It costs nbout !?lTj,OOOZ. pcr nnnum pnid by thc Uonrd af Works. It cniplojs 2,631 civilinns including bop, nnd four com- panics of R.E., nctunl strcngth 366 nt thc prcscnt timc, crclnsiw of Oficers. There arc 29 1i.E. Officers, including thc coriipnny OEccrs.

09 TIIE PERSOSXL FOR SUI1IIARISE JIISISG. 2s1

Tlic inorcrncnts of tlic oficeis and men, inchiding thc civilians and direction of tlieir uork, is absolutely controllcd by tlic cliicf, '' tlic

Director-Gcncrnl of thc Ordnniicc Siirwy." Ho hfis tlic fu l l poncrs of c.0. ovcr tho ofliccrs and mcii R.E., and Iic is tlic civil cliicf nnd director of all tlic work. He posscsscs the powcr of rnising thc working pay of tlic R.E. up to tlic limit of 4s. per dicrn, witliout rcfcrencc toanjonc. uc cnn scudbnck to tlic scrricc companies men d o do not suit. Tho inen nro not uiifrcqucutly cmploj-ecl on piccc-work wlicn suri-cyiiig, ,kc., in the country : 2s. per clicrn Icing tlicn deducted for regirncntnl pay, S-c. Tho service is rcry popular both with Officers and rncn, nnd the best spiiait pcrvnclcs it, nll working linrd from the cliicf to tlio smallest boy. Tlic piiiiislimciit most drcnded by thc incii is to bc sent bick to Chntliam ns unsuitable. Tlic men gcncmlly try to IT- cngnge, to prolong tlicir serricc to 12 years, or 21 pm-s and pension. During 183G, with 3GO rank niicl file, tho rcgiilar offciiccs \wro i w d y viZ.

All rncn mnst posscss :I 3rd class certificate of cilncztioii bcforo coiiiiug to tlic survcy, niid most of ihcrii posscss a 211d clnss ccrtifimto. 13:icli corripnnj Ii:is dou1)lc tho usi~nl iiiimbcr of p:iid riori-coniniissioiie(1 afIiccrs, as t h y nro requircd :is snrrcy supcrintcndcnts. Soiiiotiincs ercii n. snppcr, of p o d clinrnctcr and at lcnst thrcc years' service, \vill finpcrintcnrl n party of 20 incii-10 survcyors and 10cli:iiiiuicn. Ciri- Iinns arc not cmploycd :is suIicriiitcndclits owr soldicis.

Each is n inistiire of 1t.E. and ciriliaiis iindcr nii Officer ILK. (nud somctimcs trro Officcrs). h ilivisioii scrgxmt on tlic nctive list is iii gencrnl c h r g c of tlic work under the Oficcr, nnd in his abscncc acts for him. Tlicsc scrgcants nrc picked rncn, with much crpcriciicc niitl gcncml knoirlcdgc of thc work. At tlic limdqunrtcrs of tlic Snrvcy, tlic Director's Staff con- sists of scvcii Olliccrs, cadi of whom directs n scparntc dcpartnicnt.

The duties of cacli a rc clearly defined. This pcrmcatcs tlic \rlicJc ~ I J - . Tlic rncn arc not tniiglit tlic work in nll its LrancIics, but nrc cncourngcd to pcrfcct themselves in their ow11 special b ~ i n c h , wlintcvcr i t inz~y be.

Tlicrc nrc 12 dirisions.

There is n completc division of work.

S.X.' ComparcJ.

I n submnrinc mining w e t 5 to tcach n iiinii cvcrjtliiiig. HCIC is R list of Chc qunlificrrtions required iii ordcr tlint n sapper

may rcccivo thc pay of IL supcrior or very supcrior sub-niiricr.1 l'hc inen do not, as n rule, endeavour to qualif1. TLuj f i r id it unn_cccs- s"ry to do so, bccansc tlic regulations nrc so fi*amcd in tlic wnrraiit ns to crinblo tlicni to cmdc it.

In accardnncc with certain paragmplis, subniariiic miners (Ira\\- ciiginccr or cstra working pay daily (Sundnps, tc. , includcd), tllcir

I !Chis list k i n g nn ollicid p q c r is not printed Iierc. Tlic qualifcatiow rcqiiirc(1 fill a sliect of foo1zc:ip printccl smdl. I S I I O U I ~ be qiiitc contcntccl if oiic-tliini of thc personnel mcrc taught uiic-third of the work mentioned, another section unothcr third, a i d tlic rciii;iiudrr of thc incn tlic rcat of tLc work.-J. T. B.

u:!

252 0s TIIE I’ERSOSSEL FOR SUINARISE JIISISQ.

,atj?ig (IS artificers gciicmlly cnabling tlicin to draw a Iiiglicr i d c subrnnrinc miiicis than t L n t for wliicli they hare qualihcd. Con. Scq11cntly nll mcii who hold ccrtificatcs as superior or vcrr w~icrior nrtificcrs, &c., do not cara about pcrfccting themsclrcs in sulrnariilc iiiining, arid, knowing how diflicult it is to qualify, t h y do not try. If the A.G. wcrc to call for a rctiirn of tho A. nnd L). mtecl S.31. in tlic 1Z.E. Cos., on tliu 1st Jnnuary, Irc would find tlicsc statcrnmts fi i l lj pro\*cd. Tlic regulations on11 nrc to bl:rnic. TLcy ouglit to lie framcd so as to cncoungc ~irofi~ie~icy, nrid so thnt thc Officers may reward the diligent and punish the idlc, through the pay slicct.

‘l’liis is, Iiowcrcr, but n smnll uiattcr wlicn coinparcd with what I ilow cnvc your apccinl attention to. Sulmariiio rniiiing nt pirseiit bUffCrS nndcr that most objcction:iblc form of nutliority which consisth in n iiiultitudo of muteis. I’hc I.G.F. and E. Tlic 1.S.n. l’lic C.R.li.’s nf districts. Tho G.O.C.’s of districts.

Also tlic R.E. Comiiiittcc for Expcrimciits nnd for Pnttcriis of Stoics, ond tlic Commandant Coast Buttalion R.E. for the Voluritccr Siibrnnriric Alincrs.

Simil:irlX tLc boat and stcanicr flotillas for guard nnd torpcdo work which must come will probably be directed by an cqiial number of Admiralty arid Dockywl and h’nrnl lkrervc, and n’nvnl T‘oluntccr nnd othcr officials, making prcsent confusion worst? confnuirdcd.

Thcsc arc as follows:- The U.A.G., 1Z.E. Tlic Coniinaudant S.1f.l.:. Tlic C.R.E.’s of sub-districts.

I I Tlic staff of G.0.C.k of districts.

Proposed Orgniiizntioii.

W i y cannot tlic Harbour Torpedo Defciico Forccs bc placed tinder oiic cliicf, indcpcndciit alike of thc I1.E. arid tLc R.X., but criiplojing them ns rcqiiired by thc Service?

W l i j cannot thc wliolc of the mtniariiic miner3 nud torpciloists for nll tlic linrbour clcfcnccs lic formcd into oiic compact scrvicc, in wliicli soldicis, sailors, ~olniitccrs, niid civiliaiis arc orgpizcd undcr a sin@ licad ? Call hiin Diirctor-Gancnl, or what you will; girc him compctcnt staff, with his Iicadqoartcrs iu London. Abk Iriiii to orpnizc with tlic Ordnaiicc Surrcy RS R modcl.

IIc shoiild I c an Ofliccr of mnk, with a strong will, niid possessin:: kiio~r- Icdgc of tlic spccinl work, and onc who would no longcr allow tlic scrricc to bc starved into incfficicncj through an uttcrly irindcquatc pcrsoiincl, ktli of Officcrs arid mcn.

1’110 Dircctor-Gciicrd woidd rcquirc on his Staff :- 1. A Cot)iniatidaiit of the SuLniariiie Jfiicers, \die should be a I h p l

Engirwcr of rank and crpcriciicc in S.N. IIc would orgnnizc tlic wliolc of t1ieS.M. pcrsonnel, armngc ttic morcments and diitics of the Ofliccis, nou-coiiimissiouctl oflicers, sappcrs, Militia, Volunteers, aiirl civilians cmplojed on sulirnnrinc miniiig.

2. A Coiiitnniiclnrat of F”lofillns, who should be (I naval Oficcr of rnnk

Tlio Director might be citlier a irnrnl or a rni1itai.j Oficcr.

ON *rIw PERSOSSEI, m i S U U J I . ~ I ~ I ? ~ ' E JIISISQ. 2s3

(pcrlinps ittircd) and of cxpcrieacc in torpcdo work. IKc wonlcl orgiiniec tho wliolc of tlic pcrsoiinel coiincctcd with thc flotillns, in- cluding that of tlic boats niid stcniiicrs cmployccl iii snbmarino Ililulng.

9. d Uircclor of S.M. Stores, wlio slioultl Iw a ltogal Engiiiccr Oliiccr wcll vcrscd i i i S.N. Hc would sc'c that all tlic store3 for S.11. wcrc porcliascd wcll, sciit to thc stations, kcpt in good order, niid civctcd iii tho propcr positions or storctl r c d y for usc. HIC would bc rcsponsiblc for p t t cn i s , spccificntions, and contimts. 4. d Dircctor of I'orpedo Stores, who sliould bo a naval Oficci-

(perhaps rctircd) wcll vcrscd in torpcdo w o k Hc woiilil S W that 1111 tlic boats, stcnnicrs, and storcs for torpcclo work, ns wcll :is tho boats ;ind stcamcis for submnrinc mining, aru pnrclinscd wcll, stored \vcll, ;in(\ kcpt ready for usc a t short notice. Hu wonld be rcsponsiblc tor tho patterus, speciiications, arid contracts.

Each of thcsc Oliiccrs would rcqiiira nssistnncc. Tho dutics of tlic present Storc Oiliccr for sub-miniiig-and of tlic

Sccrctnry 1t.E. Coinmittce--:irid thut part of tlic dutics of tho I.S.D. rhnt rcfcis to tho storcs would bo mcrgcd in tliosc of tlic Director of

Tlio lLE. Comruittcc would no longcr dcal with submnriuu mining.

A Cornuiittcc would bo formcd iindcr tlic presidency of thc Director- Gciic'id, and woultl deal witli both torpcdocs nnd snbniarinu rniiics as npplicd to h:irbour dcfcncc. This Coniiiiittcc woulil combine tliu nnvnl witli tho niilitiiry as nicnibrs. Tho Secr ,tnry would Lw re- l i e d from all otLcr diitics csccpt that lic would iilso b o

5. Krpcritneufnt Q#ccr.--LIo should bc an Officer wcll veised i i i torpctlo work nnd iti siibinnrinc xiiiniiig. Hc would bo placed in tlircct coinnruiiicatioii with tlic Oliiccr coiiumnding H.3I.S. " Vcmon," ;iiitl witli t l i o 6. li'.ecctcticc Oflccr for S.X. E.cpcrintettb, who should bc s Royal

1':n~iuccr assisted by n proper stalf, person~~cl, nnd mztdricl for cnrr~-ing out all S.N. cxpcrimcnts at n, propcr school, with its licad- qiinrtcis probably at Gosport, and organized on IL siniilar basis (but iiiucli smnllci* sc;tlc) to tho School of Gunner1 at Shocbnryn~ss. Ono conipniij R.E., nt Gosport, might bo :ilwn~-s rcscrvcd for usprimelits t lu~ing pcace.

N.U.-Tlic " Vcrnon '' Scliool will probably carry ont all nccessary 1s miments witli torpcdccs nnd torpctlo-boats.

jl'lioso tliitics in tlic 1.G.F.k Dcpartnicnt coiincctcd with tlic con- striiction of buildiugs, cmplaccmcnts for clcctric lights, firing and observing stations, m;icliincry, also of buildings which will bo requircd for t o r p l o gmr nnd b a t s aud stcamcis, would still rcmsin in tlic Con- struction Urniicli for Portificntions. h i t thc Ofiicer who would supcr- iutcnd and gnidc tliis work could no longer bc tcrrnccl tho Inspector of Subinnrim Ilcfenccs, but would bc dssktanl Director uf Works for 'f'urpcilo Defeiiccs. LIc would bu nn Oliicci. in tlie J.G.P.'s Depnrtnicnt 11s now, nnd would not bc under tho proposed Dircctor-Gcnerd. 1Ic would net as a coiinccting link bctwccri thc T.G.1'. and E. nnd

. .

s.11. stores I lO\Y proposcd.

284 0s ‘ r m PERSOSSEL FOR SUBJIARISE JIISISG.

t t c IIiiector-Gcncrnl T.D. iosponsiblo for tlic dcfciicc plans S.N., which nrc SO iutiniatcly connected with tho aruauicuts, aucl otlicr mattcis, tlic dctailcd records of which ore gu:inled in tlic I.G.F. Dep:irtmciit.

Tlic ncw schcmo propouIided may alq‘car costly, but it should not bc coniparcd with existing armngcmcnts, which do not mcct our iicccssities. It is of littlc raluc to provide storcs without organiziug a suflicicnt and cficicnt force to usc tlicm ; nnd tho provision of a pcrsoiincl for guard and torpedo-bmts has ncvcr bccn fnccd.

~ f i long ns submnrinc mining rcmaiiis eiitircly iu tho hnuds of thc Ropd Engiiiecrs, i t scculs Iiopclcss to espcct any siriiplilication of dctail in tlic a p p a t u s , tho tciidcucy scar by p a r being in tlic othcr dircction. Ncw riilcrs would probably nltcr this stntc of affairs, by thc adoption of niuch lcss complicatccl clectriczl nrraiigcIiiciits, nt all cvcxits at tliosc harbours uot ruiiicd by tLc R.N.

Snch nil altcmtion v;otild smootll tlic way for thc cmploynicut of \‘oluiitcers as submnrinc miners.

Tlic iuorc important p in ts wliicli may bc claiiiied ns advcntagcs iii tl!c sclicmc proponndcd a r c

(1.) Tlic introduction of thc xinval clcmciit tlirougliout tlic pcrsonncl.

(2.) Tho liarnionions working of torpedoists and submnrinc miiicrs undcr onc chicf. . (3.) Thc indcpcudcncc of thc wholc, thus avoiding wholcsalc inter-

fcrcncc b j xiuuicrous oflicials. (4.) Simplicitx of working, due to its Geing dircctcd b j oiic rcspon-

siblc chicf. (5.) The omplojmcnt of Voluntccrs in a capacity which . t h y

could bc tiaincd to fulfil (torpedoists and submariuc iiiiucrs with Icss complicatcd gear). (G.) The gcidual sprcad of civiliaii cmplo~mcnt, causing cvcrp

thing to bc douc iu a lcss military, and I nm couvinccd niorc cflicicrit

(7.) Tlic localization of tho forccs to tho stntioris whcrc tlicr will be usctl in tixnc of war.

Thc proposcd sclicriic providcs for tlic cmplo~mcnt of all the csisting submariiic rnirtcrs, czccpt thc militia, tind would in ndditiou rcquirc a largo increase in tho numbcr of OMccrs nnd h’.C.O.’s, togctlicr Kith nnothcr service company R.E. It would rcqiiire :I numbcr of naval Oficcrs (who might bc on the rctircd list), R numhi* of Naval Voliiiitecrs witli tlicir Ofliccrs, and a considcrnblc expcnditnro for torpedo and guaid-boat flotillas. Thc nnrubcrs arc given in detail on Tnblc A.

Tho chicf work of tlio dirccting shff in London would for sonic t h e bo ccntied in tho orgauization of tliesc several forccs, aud I a111 convinced that no satisfnctorr rcsults can evcr bc produccd until a11 organization be crolrcd that is bnsed, riot so mucli ou tho rcquircmcnts of tlio forms, as on thc rcquirciucnts of tlie stations, takcn onc by one.

Thc more important stations should be taken first, and all tlicir

IIo would still, in all probability,

l~i~rincr.

OX THE PERSOSSEL FOIL SUDXXI1ISE JIISISC. 2%

rcquircincnts satisficd and cverpthing prcpnrcd for thcir suddcii dcfcnce by mines and torpedoes. Thc cniplorment of each Olliccr, soldicr, sailor, civilian, boat, stcainci*, nud storc should be scttlcd bcforcliaiid iu dctnil, so that wlien tlio ordcr to minu in cnrncat is rcccimd, all tlic work may commeiico without dclay, nud be prose- cutcd without intcrruptiou.

Tlic wliolo of thc work at each station should bo likc n wound-up clock, wliicli only wants to be started on tho ordcr Icing gircn. Thcrc is no real diniculty in ariiinging tlic forccs, kc., so that they work together harmoniously. II‘Iicn Enecutivo Oniccr for Submarine BIiuing n t L’ortsmoutli, I drew up a rcport sliowiiig Iioiv every working asliorc or afloat wonld act during encli period of three or four lours o f cacli di~y nfter thc order to lay mines W:LS receivcd. Such n rcport sliould Lo drawn up for each stntiou 1)y tho Oflicer in cliargc. A kuo\vlcdgc of the persotitic1 and boat e q u i p c u t rcquircd a t aiiy par- ticular lmrbour would tlicrcby bc obtniiied ; nud tlic timo rcqui rd to lay the Iiiincs bccomc known, but bc gunrdcd :is :in importniit sccrct. A description of other prepartitioiis slionld also Lo dnwn up nud carefully guarded. It is far more iniportaiit to nct thus tliau to issnc Icugtlig mcmoranda conccrniiig trumpery details iu thc stores.

At such n time it is far too lntc to orgnnize tlic forces.

rrty

Y’he Wur Scare of 1655. Tlic ‘‘ war scarc” (tlio word scarc is cspccinlly ap t as rcgnrds S.11.)

of Nay, 1S85, proved ill the most coiicli-sive mnnncr that tho S. miuera wcrc uttcrly unprcpnrcd, bccauso no nttcmpt nt orpnizii- tion bad been mado by t.hc autlioritics, and bec;iusu thc S.31. dcfcncc of our harbours had bucu :ittcmptcd with o pcrsonncl iiisufli- cicnt for half, or even onc-third of tlio uumhr. It would bu o siii to kccp such n fact sccrct. A t 11 tinio when it was proposcd to scud away a flcct on distnnt cntcrpriscs, tho S.11. dcfcuccs of onc of our grcat ports (tlicli iii n xilost unprepard stntc), which, wlieli all shore orcingomcnts a18 rcadr, rcquii-c two ful l companies S.X.R.E., and 110 artizau and sailor auriliarics, were to bc prcpnrcd 110 linlf n. cornpany RE., nssistcd br t h u S.11. Nilitin, tho latter pojscssiiig only OII.C fully txxincd Oficcr, 110 artitniis, nud but fcm bntxncii, and t l iu greatcr portion of tlic men bcing wry iniperfcctlg tixiiied, nnd nevcr cscwiscd

.wi th tlic 1t.E. This at a most iriiportaut n:rval ccntrc, with OUI’ flccts preparing to lcnvo for tho Udtic, &c., :iud--Yiancc a fcw uiilcs of€. Gcrmnnj, homvcr frjcndly slic may bc to us, caiiiiot liold back tlic E’rcDcli flcct, wlikh, if cmploycd nt nll, would fly at Liglier gamu tiinn the commercial ports. All soldicrr. and sailors ngrcc that our fortrcsscs sliould bc iundc imprcgnnblc, and that tlic dcfcucu of the cornmcrcial linrbours is of secondary importance. I! w e look :it tlic harbours of otlicr conntrics, for instsucc 3loiscilles mid Toulon, wc fiud tliis idca folloivcd.

If then the sclienic brought bcfore you this afternoon nppenr to bc too lnrgc, sweeping, and costly, tlic onlj- judicious proccdurc will be

Lct 1x10 givc an instaricc.

2 a ON TIIE I’ERSOSSEL FOR SUIIJIARIS~: JIISISO.

to adopt that portion of it (or of sonic similar schcmc) which rcl’cis to Loudou nnd to our fortresses and coaling stations ; and to lcnvo tlic comrncrcinl liarboon to thcir fate, until money can bo fourid for thcir clufcrico without dnngcrously wcakciiiiig thnt of o m vital stmtcgic: positions. Unt TW arc rich cnougli to dcfctid thcm nll, niid it is onr dnty to do so, tnrniny a dcnf &w-two deaf cars-to those who prcncli an cconolny tlint is fraught with tlic utmost ilnngcr to our po\\~i*, our wmltli, arid our Empire.

Tnblo Il shows that our minimum rcqnircmcnts for hnrhiir dcfciicc nniount to 88 OIliccrs 1t.E. (including 1 Qunrtcrrnnstcr), 43 0ficcr.s R.X., 1’11 1iighly-tr.lincd S.c.0.’~ R.R. stall; arid G8 ditto R.N.

Of tho S2 Ollicers R..E., 13 aiyf rcquircd ns h1jut:int Instructors foy thc Voluntcers nt tho 13 comrncrcinl ports a t home. S i r ~lndiew Clarkc proposd to fill thcsc posts with Oficcrs of thc C a ~ t Datt:\lion RE., who wcru to bo IJroO’UOtcd from tho rnriks R.E. Tnking into corisidcmtiori tlic scicntih nnturc of torpcdo and subrrinriiic rriiriiiig wnrfiire, and tlic ncccssity that csists fo r an Instrncting Ofliccr to be well vcrscd in all mnttcig coniicctcd with linrbour dcfcncc iu addition to thc tcchnicditics of his own dcpartmeiit, i t nppcais inerpedieiit nnd dnngcrous to cIlicicucy to sctcct any bnt Iiiglily ediicntcd Officers for such posts. Moirovcr, tho clifiiciilty of rclicving Olliccrs obrond will bc greatly increased if tlicsu Voluiitccr Adju- tniicics Lu fillcd by Officcrs who arc not nrnilable for Fcrricc aLroild.

The 111 Stnff N.C.0.k R.E. rccpircd could bc obtained from 10 scrvicc coiripnnies if tliu suggcstioii mado in tlic palm bc f o l l o t d , viz., to provido each company with a doublo n u m k r of h’.C.O.’s, OW- half Icing nvailnblc for staff duty nwny from thcir comp;inies. Each coinpnny could tlicii providc for tliis purposc 1 conipnnr scrgcnlit- major, 3 scrpmits, 4 corporals, niid 4 second-corpods ; t o td IS N.C.O.’s, OT 120 for 10 conipniiics. Tlicy wonld bo made into s t o w kccpers, kc., n t tlic various sfatioiis, arid mccivc spccinl pay as such. If ineficicnt thoy would rcrcrt to tlicir companics :it oncc and not becomc a permanent clog on thc local staff nt nu1 stntioii.

With rcgnrd to thc R.N. staff givcu on t l iu tnblc it is probnblc that tlic numbers rcquircd would cxcecd tlioso sliowii ; Lilt tliis is n innttcr to bc decidcd by naval mcn. Certainly the numbcrs arc quitu a n h i - niuni. Somo civilians pcrmnnuutly cmplolycd could not as asistniit storckecpcrs both of tho torpedo and of submorino xiiiniiig gear. Without such nssistancc tho nnmbeis of N.C.0.k oii tlic staff must be increnscd.

I’ostscript.-As r c g r d s tho tnblcs: A csplnins itsclf.

Tho following lcttcr from Licut.--Gcncml S i r Gcorgo Willis, K.C.U., Coiiimanding Southern District, was read :-

Qorcriiineitt Zousc , l’orkmoctfh, lGlh rllnrch, 16%.

DEAR COLOSEL BCCKSILL, I nm cxtrcmrly sorry to bc prcrcntcd by illnc.3 from being prcscnt durin,o thc _ _

rciiditig of Tour nper.

lirly to hear Tow paper, and tlic discussion wliicli niiglit fullow. As JOU know, ~nte~miielr iitercit in Stibmnrinc Dcfcncc, nntl I wished particti-

O?: TIIE PERSOSSEI, FOR SUUJIARISE JIISISU. 2S7

I hopcjou mill iniprc93 lipon jonr uiidiencc thc irnpcmtirc iicccisitj for I w n l i ~ i ~ ~ g the coinp:iiiics of subrnorinc miiierj.

I t ig nb<olutcly ncccrsary that they should bo so lw.~lizcd, b c u ~ ~ s c , if they iiru llOt, thcrc would nlwajs bc sonic station n t which thc suhinnrine minerr might bc l l ~ r and iuiacqiuiintccl \ d I i l m l pculinritics, nnd bc out of touch with niiF ciriliiii \Vorknicn nttachcd to thcm. For inshncc, n c o m p m j tcnt from Fort Victoria to JIa1t:L to rclicrc unotker wliich would t:iLc its placc. Tlic Fort Yictorin coi i ip iy \rould 60 from 3 station wlicrc i t liad to contend with strong tides, rnr j ing dnj by tlar, froni thc sprin,n to the ncap tidcs, t o JInlta, wlicrc they would t i ld no title. Tl;c bottoin in tho Sccdlcs pssngc would hare bccn shifting nnd bad for holdin,~; lit Mnlto i t would be rocky, with 6harp c11n11p in depth. conld i t bc cspcctctl that tlic c o i i i p n m coultl inaster tlicsc great cliaiigcs under scrcml irecks? Duriiig t l m o weeks the conipanv would bc incllicicnt.

Tlic ncccsnrj cliarigc; froni liouic to foreign rcrvicc cocld nlwijs bc corricd out h j rcocliitg detaclimcnt3 froin the liomc conipinics to relicrc similar numbers nbroad.

'Thcn thcrc is the question of thc personnel of tho iinnl-boats, torpcclo-boats, n i l t ~ nttcnt1:int tugs or gun-bodtr, wliicli milst bc p r o r i t d as part of thc prriivlncnt local aubninrinc tiefencc3.

Thcx reds r i l l IVJVC to be manncd, oncl tho crcw3, both fighting and nnri- ptiiig, shoiiltl bo undcr thc control of tlic OKccr ch:lrged v i th tlic defence of tho portt. \\'hat nro they to be? I saj, for nnr ip t ing purposes they slioiild l o rctircd Savy OIliccri, wit11 n mixturc of n ~ v d pcniioiicrs, and tluy sLould bc untlcr the military. 110 rroiiltl 11:irc the w q o i n g portion of the work, and bc would support thc Oniccr in l w ~ l coiiiiiiaiid a~ iiiucli n3 possible.

'The .1wrsoniicl of the subinnrina defences of t h e grcat nlilitarj and naval stntions niid c d i n g places should bc military and r c p h r . Of thc grwt nicrcmtilc ports it shoiild bc chiefly Volutrtccr, with D uucleus of Kopl Engineers, ~ h o \voiiIcl bc pcriiinncntlj stntiotictl nt thc ports, nnd bo placcd in c l inrp of thc niinirig geir, Sc., and who n.0111~1 bo iir~tructors to thc Vohiitccrs. An Ofliccr or Wnrninc Otlircr slioiilcl be in clinrgc, and tlic miners might be pciisioiwrs froni the Eiigi- iicers.

JLr: Willan's schciiie for roltintccr torpcdo-bonfa ~roulcl work in well for the clcfciicc of incrcnntilc ports, ns well LIJ for some of tlic military. Thc clcrelopiiient of Voluiitccr Subniarino Jlining Corps at tlic mercnntilc ports

sliould bc ciicourqcd nj iiiucli ns p3sibIc, niid thcrc L no rc:iscn whj jotiiig iticii who nrc foiitl of b i t i n g should not work up ton high stntc of cKcicnc? in the ilcliratc t p t c n i of rubuiariiic dcfmcc.

110th thc p w n n c l uiid tlic niatdricl of tlicsc dcfenccs should bc f c p t a t 311 timrd in n pcrfcct stntc of prepardiics, and thcx sliould bo m p b l o of bcitig utilized in

\Vnr3 coiiic quickly now, and n nnral blow can bc quickly and rnrcly dclircrcd. Tlicrc will bc 110 titrio for inlcriiicdinto discussion and orders nnd conntcr-orders, in t Iiesc i l n p , bcforc an enemy may bc a t our door. Of courscif oiir X3rj \ragall thnt i t sholt~d bc, nolicntpattack rroiild bc probable,

but iiiiist nl\vo;r be prcp'cd to relist nttncLs by R f c v swift ships, which could do an imnicnsity of dalIl'Ig0 bcforc they wotild hare to rctirc, if tlirir attack wad dr l i~r rc t l with circiuiirpcclioii nnd with o good k~io\vlcdg~\ of the rrlicrczbouts of w r dccts.

Soiie of tlic loc.11 defence rhoultl be under tho Aclmirnl.

i l fclr d3J3.

IYishing ;YOU crcrr SIICCC.;S, Bclicvc me to bc,

Tours wry truly, 0. it. WILLIS.

l'.S.-Tlicrc is no ;iiinIog~ between a coi i ipni i~ of submarine niincrs and 3 gnrri30n Their work i j totnllj diifi.rciit. -G. 1I.lV. kittcrj. of artillcrj.

288 0s THE PERSOSSEL FOR SUBUhRISE ?IISISG.

-- Ti :

8 . : : : m::::::::: n

C1G.i' C1 C1 C1 $1 d f N N N C1 0 C I

on ci cc o o u ca ci 2 u 0 o o La 0

m . . . . . . . . . C I r ( F 4 H r r c) . . . . . . . . . e

c 0 0 c) Fl r( e v 0 a c a d l-4 d d 2

=I - " F l c a c a r ( F l H d C 1 c a r - l . . . . . . . . . . . . r( : ,+ : : : : . . . . . r. . . . . . . -

H e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : . . . . . . . I . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ::+

Di&ctor-Gcncrd of Harbour Torpedo Defences and his {I staff. London . . . . . . . . . . . .

{ Unlifns . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Uong Kong ... .... ..

IIcadquartcrj of R.E. S.11. llattn. with staff for smne as now, but incrcaxd po\vcrs orcr a11 the llattn.

1 dcpbt colnpany, 2 serricc coinlxiiiiej). *l scrricc conimnr with Ciriliau Ausiliaries would take

Saino n j Plymouth. (Snval Toluntccri.-Loc;il I;i+licr-

2 OLTIccr3 R.E. nntl staU. Chincse coolies, s u m ~ perinn-

2 Officcrs 1t.X. untl stall'. Chiucsc coolics, sonic pcriiia-

mcn.)

ncntlj ciiiploycd.

nently ctnplo~d.

--------- -

Uamich

--

I Ports- Spitlicad

... I Inoutll. { Solent

c

TLamcs clcfinc&. 1 scrricc company vitli Ciriliuu Ausiliarics for tlir.

3Idrraj defence, Loaer . 1 clcpbt company with Cirilian busiliarics woultl taLc

' 3Icdir.q dcfcnccs, &per. 2 flotillas. h'nval \'oliiii- ~ tcer:, dirccted by 3 Xnvnl Oliiccrs.

Ausiliaricj to be dircctcd by tlic Oniccm peruunciitly employed, nnd some collcctcd wlicn m r is iuiluiuciit.

2 couipanici I1.E. (I for cxpcri- mcntr, 1 for dcfcncc work during lic'wc). 1 Xxccutiro OUiccr for Esperinicnts.

1 couipany H.E. with Civilian Ausiliarics would mine Solent.

1 company R.E. nnd Cirilian Ausiliarica the Portsiiioutli waters, 1 flotilla to i:ch of tlicw, ninnned b j Karal Yoluntccr Forccj und diwctccl b r Surd Oflirerj.

--- Hcadquirtcrs, Oosport.

1 coiiipany R.E. and Ciiilian Auxiliirics. 1 Ollicer

2 Oficcrs R.I.:. nnd X.C.O. staff. 1 compncVolunlcers

1 OLTIccr ILK. and 1 flotilla. Xavul Yoluntcers.

H.S. nnd 1 flotill~. Xnvnl Yohintccrs. --- nnd Civi1i:iii Auxiliaries pcrunwntlg cruplo~cd.

Samc a j Portsmouth without espcrimcntnl staff, aud with on?y 1 flotilla a i d Oliiccr H.S. BInlta . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

-- {I- - Snme, but 2 Officcrs 1t.X. nnd 2 flotillas. (Xcgro Yolun- Bermuda.. . . . . . . . . . .

stations 1 Officer R.E. nnd staff. L o n 1 forccs. 1 O5ccr I1.S. (I and star. Loci1 force3 far + flotilla at eacli. -- Coumcrcial ports Same, but 1 flotilln nt cncli, tlicie being large harbours.

Cnptnin COLOIID, R.S.: I liavc no specid knoaledgc of this quwtion, though I Iriirc of course that gciicr.il knowlrcl e rliicli any naval Otliccr wlio has bccn in wm. iuunc\ in rcrcnl jam must n e c c s J y pick up. I cannot s:iy t ~ i a t I li0W StUdictl tlic rubjzct nt nll from the tecliniral p i n t of rica, still froin the g e n e ~ d point of r i m I think, q i d i i i g ns a n r v a l Oflicer, I uciglit contribtite oiic or two’iivftil word,. Tlic quc:tioti or coinmaiitl, wliicli bus bccn toiiclirtl on iii Sir George JYillis’s lcttcr, is uiiqucitionnblj tlic krynotc of the nbolc poiition. I think, spc:ilr- iug ns n nnvnl Ofliccr. that natal Olliivm, tictire or rctirrd, woultl find no clillici~lty in cxrryiug out to rp t lo tlcfciicc work undcr thc onlcrr of tlic Oerlcrnl corntiinnding tlicdirtrict or the Gcnrral coinrmniiin;: tho garrison; but I tl~inli i t \rnrilcl bc nu ttbsalate Iieccsiitj, if riirli tin nrrnngcnicnt BCM to work zniootlt l j , t1i:it cvcry clefcncc conncctid with tlic w t r r alioultl be rmder tlic coiitrol of a snilor. That 6:iilor \ronltl bc again iiiidcr the control of tlic Qciicrnl in rouiuinncl of tlic district or of tlic garrison, nntl if that wcrc co such nn Omrcr nould linvc n o tlificnlty in ohcyinn tho Genmil, and no Olliccr cinployecl rintlcr Iiini, ~vhctlicr nard or lnili- tar j , P fancy w o u ~ c ~ ~mrc nny diilicultj. ~t.c;tiizc a militnry Oniccr so ciiip~oycd ~c.ould still be undcr the Gcncml of the clijtrict or the prrizon, wliilc lic n m rtiore ininiediatclj unilcr the pcrson n.110, a t n n j mtc in tlicory, is supposed to know niost itbout thc wntcr. That, Sir, appears to nic to bc tlic k p o t c of tlic quc+tion, and L :m not quitc x r e thnt tlint is not IIrcttj- well tllc wliolc question, bccausc tlicrc is 110 tlitliculty in incorpomting civi1i;tn.g wit11 n a r d t11id tiiilitnr Ofliccrs in auch busi. ncss a3 tcrpcdo work. I myself nui, and ulaajs hare bwn for JMN, n vcrj strong uclroc-do for tho cnrrjiiig out of tho dcfrnco of niir cossts. c~prr iol ly so far ns torpcdo aork and subiiinriiie niining go, b j the nrsistanrc of J’oluntwrs, and 1 nut \cry much gmtikxl to w e how stronglj Coloncl 1lucLnill, t1c:tn wlioiii iiobody is iiiorc compctcnt to cxprrrs nu opinion, dnclls upoii that point. I a p e very btrongly iilso wiili whiit tbc lccturrr h 3 said ns to tlic nccrsity of Lecl~ing 0111- torpedo tcrcc cntirclj localirctl. I l iolt l t1i:it tlic wllole succcss of t ~ i c pleii wilTclc- pelld on erery inan bring familiar wirh rrcty bit of tlie r n t c r and c r c r j bit of the niid with which lie lins to do. I think that is the most ioqmrtaiit p i n t \diiclr l i u

h e n brought k f o r o ui. As to tho qucdion of tho J’oluiitcrr dcfcncc. and coiifining IiiFsclf to tho dcfcncc of tlic lionic coasts, KC uiust remllcct that wliilc wc I i l v e un iuiuicnsc Voluntccr forcc in tho conictry roiiipetcnt to nirct an ciieiiiy nftcr I I C l iar I;indctl, \rc Iinrc tnLcn no prcmutions d i a t c r c r to prcrcnt his ~a~ldi i ig . W c trust to tlic Era forces ; wc trust to the Snvj, u.lo.io bitrintsi it is to Lrcp tho l i i ~ l ~ n n y of tlic ~ c 3 clear, to do work which tlicj n ~ l l y nrc not coinlwtcnt to do. If ~ o u urc to ioiiceiitmtc p u r nard forccs-jour scn-going forws-round jour coastz, it has k e n A 1 often in this Institiction, and i t cinuot bc too oftcn e d , that jour garrison iii Eiiglanil woiild siiiipll bc sturrccl o u t bcforc you kncw wlicrc ou wcrc. Thc plaro for your w-geir ig ncct is wlicrc tlic cncmj i3 so tar ns yoti Enow, t ~ i a t is, O ~ F his ports, or following up rrhcrcrcr you know that he U, but wlicti ~ O I I arc off Iih ports, 1 tliiiik thc rrrr gcnrrnl opinion of naral Oniccrs bcst instructed in that iiiattcr is tlist, nltl~ough the Snrj w11 punrantee, if t c p t up to it cutlicicnt forcr. tlint no large squadron-nu m d c m t o cquadron cren-will rscipc front the cneniy’s 1wrt without bcirig fought rcry emn after i t cscapcs, j c t that tlic Sary crniiot guanutcc th:rt one nidr r , two nidcrs, t h e miclcrs, may uot slip out on a dark ~iioonlcz~ night, and if JOU arc not prcpnrcd for it on tlic roast of 1Sngl:rntl, (lo ilii i n h i t o amount of tlanulge, not bo caiiglit, nnd slip back into port ngnin wit11 tho pnxecds of their nids. Sow siibmnriiio mining is not of tuiirsc quitc zo i u i p r b n t for that t ind of clcfcncc, bu t locoiiiotive torpedo defcnce niid tlic gcncral sjyrtcru of mast dcfciicc u tho r e r j tliing diich is nanted for that. I t sccms to uie tha t our ports, \vlmtcrcr tlicj ,tiny do a t the prcicnt tiuic, will prclcntlj, whcn tlicj bcgiii to rcdirc wlnt is bcloro tlicin, be mntly to piit their Iiandj in tlicir ockcts in tbo niattcr of Volunteer forcrs nnc1 crcn \‘oluntccr inatcrinl, for t ~ i e icfcncc of tlio port3 npins t thr-sc raids, nnd tlicn i t scans to m c tlint nny Yoluntccr corpi mhicli tnkcs for thc coast lino tho plncc which the crirting \’oluittccrs tnkc for tlic intcrior of tlic countrj, will ni lminbl j fall in with the plan zkctclicd out by tho lecturcr to- claj-thcj will forill part of the prr isous of tbc ports. Those Volunteers who wen. ncccesnry for tho submnrinc mining dcfcncc woultl be r m p l o p l on that scrrice, and tlioic who ~ c r c nrvcsiry for tlic loconiotivc t o r p l o dcfciice ~ o i i l t l k so eniplojctl,

0s THE PEItSOSSEL FOR SUDJIBIIISE JIISISG. I,Y1

wliilz conridcntblc niinibcrs of tlicin uo doubt would bc cmplolcd in titps aiid siiinll etr:iiiicrs nrined with sucli guns or were suitable fur tlic puqmc of liccping tlic niidcn at long range off the port. I t wcms to iiic tlint the seliciiic of r0a.t defclicc is .cotitinii:ill~ dcrclo iiug itrclf. I munot liclp sajing. listcniiig, as I hare doiic. mo+ nttentircly to thc paper wlticli has bccn r e d , th:it n gmit niniir p i n t s which ecrc doubtful in iiir iniiid liarc bccn clcorcd up bF tlic Iccturcr. 1 grzatlv cuin- mend Iiirii for his fiirncss. for his steadr, good milinion wnw. nnd for his rticliing to tlic point tlist lie starts witli. and I an1 quitc siim tliat this piper w\.hcii rmd, ns I 113TC no doubt i t will bc iiiort cnrefitll.r, by tlic Iirgcr sidicncc which i3 ciitridc t l i i ~ tlicatre, will mar t n point of ndrancc towards that propcr drfciice of our coasts rliicli ouglit to bc sct in hnucl, if we onlr liad oiir wit3 nbout 113. n t this moment.

Captain I~.USJFOI:U IiAss.ip, H.E. : Tlic per3onncl of snbniarinc mining at tlic prcwnt iiionicnt is attmctiiig a good deal of attcntion. nnd tlic iiiittcr ~Iioiiltl i i iost ccrtain1y bc rcfy full1 disc i i rd . In that \ray I think Colcncl lhckiiill’s palicr coiiic~ wry opprtuncly. I i c makes mine remarks nbout our p r o m t pwsoniid wliicli Iic tnkcs froin tlic “ Stibin.irinc Jlining 3 l n n d , ” a book Irhicli i? iiow nn oh1 book, haring k c i i piiblisliccl coniitlerablr more tliaii fivc jc:irj ngo, nod within tlic laat fire p i r s tlic 1icrsouiicl 1133 bccn iiiorc than doubltd, so that \re cannot quitc tntc hi3 figiirl.3. A great iiisiiy of his nrgiiniciits nrc, Iioircvrr, most rxccllwt, uiorc prticulnrly a9 to the diridccl rczpansibilitj- and tlic grcnt ncccssitr of 1a:iIiz:~- tioli. Tlic OIIC point which I nllitdo to iiiiinlr ir in tlic pragnpli aliicli rcfcrs to cirilhns. In Cnptain Co1o:iib’s rcmnrks I I C mndc no itlluzion to tlic cinlians. S o w if Coloncl Ihielinill in tlic coliunn iii which lic puts II rcry largc iiuinbcr of eirilhiin Iind in tlicir plncc put Voliiiitccrs, I should liarc gone with liini nlniost cuttr-lr. I Ic r a p that soldicrs iirc not rcquircd fur submarine mining w r k , iicitlicr arc figlit in- sailors, and t1iclL cirilians uiiglit c:r,ily be trainccl for tlie purpcsc. ow, I tliini t mining and diicipline arc ns iiiucli or rliore rcquircd in siibur~rinc miniiig tliau in niiy otlicr rcrrice, bctnusc 60 much dcpclitls ii),wii tlic indiridii 11. Tllc rliolc object of liaring soldierd is to tmin tliclii for wur. . tliiiili that if ririlianr wcrc cuiplovcd tipon wort of tliis kind in actual wnrforc tlley n-oii~d 1ianUy coinc n sccoiid day, voii would hare no hold owr tlicni, althougli 1 quite ngrcc tlint a certain number bf cirilians miglit IC iiiost uscfiil. Coloncl IjttckniII nlso compare3 tlic cost. xow I linrc linrl EOIIIC littlc eslwicncc in company work, and I think that liis proportion of sewn cmks nnd rook‘s iiiatcs out of 3 t o t d of fifty uicn is ratlicr n largo one. I think tliat 111: prolwrtion of ciglitecn incii ciliplojcd outsidc tlic works to thirty-fire nixi ciiiplcpd on thc works i3 rather cxccssirc. bfy owii idcn \vould bo d i n t ;bout nine tncn would be suliiciciit for tlic purlmc. I slioiild like to know wlietlicr lie proposes to put all tlicrc c i r i l i~~ns into thc tcst rooms, obscroing stations, nncl rlec- tric light emplacements, n3 if lie prayscs to tnLc cuflicient A~III~ inen to do nll this wort and only to hart ciri1i:iru for t IC extra labour, tlicn I qriito agrrc wit11 Iiiiii. Colcncl Iliictnill says tlint stores purch3sr.d in a t iu i r j nrc rcr? oftcii Lctter tlian storcs not, purcliscd in n liiirr:. I tliink that is rather D dangerous Iirupo?itioii to 137 down; i t ntlier ndrocntcz sprndiog notliiug in tiiiie of pcncc nnd thcn buying nll goiir storcs in n liurrr in tinic nf war. I t so linppcns tbat I took orcr stont tlutirj two ycars a,no wlicn tlic nnr mar0 Itad bccn on. Large quantities of storrz wcru ordcrcd nnd could iiot be inzprutd nt tho time, but tlic war scare having iascd nwnr, wlicn \re 1iad time to inspcct tlrcrc were n great mnuy rejcetiond.

{Vitli wprh to coinmercid li:irboiirs, n good dcnl liw bccn dcnc Iatclyin tlic niattcr of tlie coJst Lattnlions nnd Voliintccn. I tliint that is tho riglit nmngcincut ; wc should hara n niiclciis of highly trained Oliiccrs nud mcn, niid Voluntccn clioulcl do the rcmaiiidcrof the work. I sliould n y c o in tlic uiaiii with Colcncl Ducknill i f lic \vcrc to plit ‘‘ Voluntrer~” iustcad of “cirilians ” in tlic tnblc a t thc end of hi*

I c o’iiot, Iioaevcr, quilc agree Kith hi0 totnlr, k a u j c I do iiot think Iir K!?suflicicnt nutiilier of traiticd Iucn. I would linrc inorc Ropl Engineers niid fcwcr Voluntccrs. Iliit tlic whole thing to IUJ mind Iiingcs on n miicli lnr,yr o:g.iniration tlion one of subnuriiic mining onlj. You mu?t I i n ~ c an organiziticri for aubinarinc mining, gunnl-hats, electric lights, and garri-on nrtillrrj, nnd thry uiiist nll bc under one head. This matter lins bccn uiucli conjidercd Iatelj, and 1 0 rliy tiiind it is n Iargcr question tlinn siinply tlic organization of rubniirine niiniug.

Captain S. Loso, X.K.: There are one or t w o point, in the lesture wliicli I

.

292 0s TIlE PERSOSSEL FOR SUnIIARISE JIISISG.

think I might \ritli ndrnntngc rnr 3 word or two upon. I n the first place Coloncl Uiicknill introtluccs tlic nnrnl clriiicnt tliroughoiit tlic pcrronnel. It n i q be pep hap9 \\enkncc9 on inc part, but I think that n n j niattcr wliich is to bc donc 011 t]le se3 is n~ticli better under tlic control of sailors. and I Aoulcl likc to bnck up what Cnptnin Colonib 1 1 ; ~ rnid n i t h r c p d to tlint. If wc conridcr what sort of iittnck is likclr to be made on our p r t a now1d3y. 1 think there aro two kinds that nre ertrcmcly probablr. such ns a torpcdo-boat rushin irp to a Iiirboiir nncl pcrIrap torpcdoing soiiic rnlu3blc slii or blowiiig in n fock gntc ; an cnterpriring iiinn miglit do tlint if tlicrc was n o L j lookina* out; ant1 t~ten, of coursc, wc ~ i n r c t1lc po,ribilitr of n cruitcr going off 3 port anB throning in slirlls from n grcnt clistnncc.

think thcrc mattclu nrc very much mircd up with tho ciibmnrinc niiiiin; qticttion, brcnuzc i t i3 i m p s i l i l c to E ~ J thnt oncstntc of t l i inp np lics to ercry port. I f a c want to Itnrc an cffcctua~ organirntion for tlic clefencc or our coasts, I niust n-rcc \villi the 13.1 spnkcr that tlic qucstion is ronicwlint Inrgcr tlinn siibmarinc liii&g only, it rcquircs to bo consitlcrrtl for crery port, niitl local knowlcclgc, ns Coloncl Iiucknill so acl l put9 it, is more important probably iindcr tliorc circunistinccs thaii air)- oclicr kiiitl of knowledge. Tlicrc i3 oiic body of nicti in thc c0untr.r which nIuay3 appcars to bc bnorcd nl icn qucitions of coast dcfcncc comcnlout. I nllutlo to tlic fidirniicn. It & 8 gn-t p i t j that wc linrc not Inom fi~lirrnicn cnrollcd for tlic clcfcnce of the coast. The)- nrc tlic people tvlio porrcrs lwnl lino\rlcdge in tlic grcntcst tlrircc; tlics arc very niimcroua, nrid i t ~vould r x n i that tlrcv ccrtniiily ooglit to play tlicir part in tlic burdm of tlic dcfcncc of the country. I should h o p that if they ncrc to Ix cnllcd u n to roliinticr tlicrc would bc no diflicriltj in p t t i n g thciii to dcfcnd tlirir own c i i i c j . I bclicvc u c liarc nt prcrcnt n niiiiiber of Voluiitccr stibiiiarinc miners, I mi Iinrdly in R psi t iou to how mnnj. bu t I nin siirc we nrc till of opinion tlint tlic more tlicrc nrc tlrc bcttcr, that t h y arc doing r r ry vnlii:iblc work, awl woiiltl bc nbioliitcly rcqiiirctl in thc crcnt of n war for tlic clcfc*ncc of our ports. W n h:itl last j enr a t l’ortaiiioutli conic of tlic Ilojal Knrnl Artillcry T’oltrntccrs, ~ l i o sltorctl grmt nptitirtlc in pipking up nll matters con- ttcctctl a i t l i snbmr~rino iiiiiiing, nntl 1 t1iii.r tlicre ~vould bc no tlifliciilty wlintcrcr in gctting nicn who noiiltl be conipctcnt to perform 1111 tlrc dutics of siibninrinc niiuio if tlicy could bc intlirccd to volunteer; nt prcrcnt the nunibrr i9 I fcnr too fctr. F wirli to thank Colonel lluchiiill for brin$iig this Inattcr forward in tlic w r y nblc iiianncr in which lie 11is clone, nntl nlso to I : y strcss on IIiosc t w o pints-!lint the cniior slioul~i linre n gmd clcnl to do with it, and that the fisllc*rmnn altoirld bo broudit into i t sonielion:

A n i n l Ijors : hrr. ~ ~ i n i r m n n . joii harc bccn kind cnoug~t to look at mc, nnd tlicrcfon? I fccl bound to rirc, tliouglt I rcnllj ran ndd vcr? littlc to rhnt 1 3 3 nlrcnd bccn mid on I l i i a subject. Tlic qucstioii of command IS n most important one ; f oprcc wit11 Cnptnin Colomb tlint i t i s t ~ i c ~ c 1 of tlic position nltogctlicr. \Wwn tll& stibjcct of suhmnrinc inining fiat bccnnic prominent i t m s sonicahat in iny dcpnrtincnt tvlion 1 v n s :It tlic Aduiir.iltT, and nil nminccuient wag niatlc tlint tlic nnutirnl part of eii1)ln:irinc mining rliodcl bc pcrformcd-bF thc S a w , nnd tlic plniiiiing nncl ninnipiilntion of tlic niinrr be done b~ tlic Rop1 Engincrr3. Tlic system \vns then cstnbliilicil of c:irrving out, tmining, nnd thc laring-oiit of ni ine~ a t ccrteiti ports oncc a y : i r ; tlic :iciniir;lItj wcro to fin11 t ~ i c ~io:iis atit1 tlie ~iicn to innti thein. T h t p1:in IRIS tricd for a fcw !em, but i rns not found to nn3~rcr. T11c.r~ a n 3 gciicrall>- sonic diflicult~ about getting tlic nicn nnd tlic boat3 n t tlrc right tiiiic, iiiitl i t \\a3 iiltiriintclj ilccidcd tlint tho \rliolc thing wa3 to hc piit in tlic R o p l Eiiginecrz, nnd I brlicvc that tobc tlrc riglit place for it. C;iptain Imng l i a ~ nlliitlcd to the bod1 of nirn wliorc diitr it oirglit to bc iiiorc ininietlintelg conncctcd witlt tlils siibjcct tlinn nnx other, tliit forcc i3 iioa c:illcd tlic Ifojnl X:i~nl Art i l lc r~ \‘o~ontccrs. It chodd bc cspccidlj thcir dutj- to do the boat work in conjunction uitli the Eiiginccrs in l q i n g down submarine minrs. I think, lio~vercr, tlint tlie offtwirc p r t , or rathcr tlic protrction of sitbninrinc mirc-ficldi, t l c torlicJo-loite, yiinbontr, giinnl-bonta, nnd nnj fi$ting olxlntioni that nin1 bc rcqiiind on tlic \rutcr must rctriniii unclcr tlic unrd aiithoritic3. I FCC no rcnion wlintcrrr why tlic protccticm of rirbrri:trinc tiiinc-ficlds b r sca slioitld not bc iintlcr tlic n:ir.iil Con)- niantlcr-in-Cliicf n t n nnvnl port ; n l ~ i l c the Oficcr r h o coininnndr tlic battr*rics niid opcr.itt-s with the siibiiinrina niincs 1133 iindcr his direction thc naiitical p r t of tlic plocing of thosc mincs.

OX THE PERSOSSEL FCR SUIPJARISF. IIISISG. 233

Ocncrnl S n - n r , R.A: It pcrlinpi might bc urcful that I slloultl ncccntuntconcprt of ,iclinirnl Bop's r c m a r l ~ , n ~ thcy nlrr:itly inrludc in gcncml tcmis most of what I tliouglit of sajing. Captain Long did not quito eatisfy mc in nseigning the hoat p r t of the clcfcncc so clistinctlj to sailors, Gslicrinen, nncl such-likc, mtllout in&t- Ing on thcir bciiig rindcr the absolute cotnmnnd of the Gcncrnl OfTccr coniiiiandin,o tlic district or hi9 rcpresentrtirci. The rcason tha t I iiin bold cnongli to lay tlint &mm in strong lnnguagc when tlierc may be so many otllcr ricws about it, i,, tlint tllo one fact whicli forcecl itsrlf n p n tlic notice of tliosc who had thc arlrantngc of nttcnding thc opentions a t 1IiIford Ilnrcn wag, tlint no clcfcncc, 1ioivcrr.r gnllnnt :ind me11 nianngcd tho scpintc branches of i t may be, cnn succccd n p i n 4 nn uctirc t t3d skilful cncnir unless t1ic.v nork with coniplctc 11iutua1 untlcrztanding and

n t ion and nro thorouglilj- interdcpcndcnt, n i d tha t t l i c j will only coino to $:Ef thcy work scpnritelr iind indcpcridcntly. Tlint i9 tlir oiic lcszon tha t I linvc bccomc poseesretl of, nritl wliich I bclicre to bc worth contributing to this t1ii.ciiision.

Coloncl SALNOSD, R.E.: In this r c ~ adminblc Iccturc to wliicli we linrc lictcnctl tlierc i3 riotloubt that Coloticl Bucknill 1x1s indicotcd tlic troc notiire of the tlcfcricc of our for t rcws nnd cornmcrcial ports. I t ought to bclocnl, ant1 iw ought to nrnil ouriclrcr to the full of lwnl adrnntagcz; wc ought to linrc Militin. we ou$it to hnvc Toluntccrs, nnd thcn, Iic say, we ought to a:eocinte in tlic clcfcncc civilians. Thcrc conics n point on which I cannot npcc with Iiini. \\-lint is to bcconic of tlic cirilinns iri timc of Tar ? Tlicrc is no plncc for tlicin on thc h t t l c - ficlcl, wliicli in tliiscar'e would bc the minc-f;zlcl. Tlrcrc is no doubt t l i q wmdd Lw rcry uscftillr ciiiplojcd in tho 1ajing of nrincs nnd so on bcforc tlic tinic for action aimc, nnd this undcr pmpcr supcrriiion would bc tliorntighlr \ ~ c l l clo~ic ; but apart from thc question of control, on irliich'tlielcctiirerlinj touclird, thc (1ill;rcncc betmen tlic rolclicr and tlic cirilinn is that tho cirilinn, no matter how kccn, is subject to rnrious circumstanccs wliicli nrc to n g c a t crtcnt bcrontl his oi~ i i imnicdintc control. Tlicrc arc sircli thing3 as strike?, n, 'xitles 1rnion3, nnd n t tlic critical inonicnt tlic cirilinna voiild no tloiibt (1rin:intl highcr wngcs, nntl $0 r o i l would loso their wrriccs a t the rcci-c t h e wlicn they ircrc moit rcquircd. Tlicrc is a point in connection with t ii3 in al i~e l i I think tlic lccturcr went n littlc too far in his nnrictr t o p r c what you mnr call t l i c i t is a cntcliwonl no\cndnrs-"cconoruy conibincd with cilicicncy." Any sclicmc ~vliich L brought forunrtl niurt bc a h o w to bc cconoinicnl, nnd of course thc plan of employing cirilinns i5 nl. oncc cI~o\rii by figures to bc more ecoiioruicnl t1i:it t h c crnploymcnt of tlic soldier ; but figiircr, unlcrj t h y nrc tlioroiiglil>- gono into, am oftcn very clcliisirc, nnd srhilc I was quitc prcparcd to scc this point of ccorromj madc in tlic pnpcr, I tliiiili it i3 n grcnt inirtnkc ; I do uot hclicw in i t for onc moment. As I r:iid bcforc, you losc tlic ccrviccs of thcsc mcn a t tlic moincnt you rcquiro tlicni, or clw you L ~ T C to pir wry h r i l y indiwl to rctniii thcm, and alicn rctaincd t!icy \roiilcl not take the soldiers' p r t in tlic dcfcncc which would bc so csscntial for all c ~ i g n p l \vlicn tlic nttnck is tlclirercd. Tlicre ore ccrtain ports vlicrc, if you coiild gct suitnblc mcii, tlicy iiii$it bc cmploycd with advantage during pcacc. b u t nt skitions nbrond wlicrr cirdians linrc bczn bird the rceult is nn almost nnnrnimous rccomrncndnt ion tlint the incn should be soldicrc. Tlicsc nrc tho men tlic Iccturcir rcfcrrctl to n j nt Irong Icon:, Singn orc, nnd tlic East. In tliclocalizntion or submarine niincr?, which is R most desir.ibfe thing nnd R rev n e c c s s q object to work up to n3 f ir 11s possible, YOU mcct with thi9 clilliculty : that JOU cannot kccp Four trJinccl subiiinrinc mincrs blwnjs nbrond, you cannot localirc your tninccl Europcons at Iron: Konp nnd Singiporc; tlierc must bcsoine intcrclian,oc, and tlint of coiirsc 113) to bc proridcd for. \Gth regnrtl to the home rtr, 1 nni not quite siirc up lo what clnle tlic lcctnrer'!, knorlcclgo i j cnrricd, but i&ou rcfcr to tllc drrny Ikt you m l l Rnd tlint n corpz of Volunteer Subninrinc JIincrj 113s nlrcntly hccn f o r m d . This corps is groiring crcry dnr ; i t i, n corpg without nil oitcnsiblc licod, that is to ~aj, i t 11ns no battalion or&izntion, i t is not dealt with in n n j scnec ns n bntlnlion ; t h e colnpany or tlic conipiiies a t the local p r t s nrc the working units, but t l ~ c nrc not controllccl by 11nrIm1y nrvay from thcir ports. They loot to the Gcncrnl dlliccr cominnnding for instrurtions. TIit*,ic nrc gircn by thc Ocncrnl tlirougli his Staff in t l ic u s u ~ l courr-c. TIierc is no occasion for n commanilant for tho c o r p as 3 corps ; in fact, t h c j arc

f ::

291

bcttcr without one. l h t , of coiirsc. is rc.illy'tlie dirrction in HliiCh tlic lcctiirrr i j workiiig-tliit, c t c r j tliiiig alioiiltl bc lornlizrd. Aguiii. Coloiicl Uiickiiill cnlls nttc1:- tioii to tlio nbrolutc nmit of nnytliing like wlint niaj br cnllrd n niobilirition rclicnl,., nri nrrnngriiicnt wliicli coiild l o surldrnly cnllrtl out by tclcgmpliiiig tlic riiiglc wort1 '.l'rep.irc'' to tho Grncnl. rclirmr. I t i3 not prwirclj for iiic to say what 11- bccn arranged, but I think 1 slinll not bc Iirld to bo indircrwt in mjiiig t l i i ? iiucc Colonel I3iickiiill piit down liis armiigriiiciit in print a r r ~ g r w t atrp l ing bcrii tnkeii in that clircctiori, nnil tlint re iirr not a t tlic prcjcnt tilnc so unprcpurrd 39 would be inferred froiii tlic p p c r trliiclt Iins b c , ~ r d .

Coloiicl ~IIXXSILL : With rcfcrcncc to tlic rcuinrh iiiarlc on m y pii cr I note tlint C:iptniii IIn~nny said he rroiild afrec with tbc Icctiirrr if tlic wori! "Voliirl- tccrs" oiaj aubjtitutcd for "cirilians." If the nppicitio H a 3 siiflicicntly s iuplc 1 coiild quite ngrce with that : i t aoultl bc clrcnpcr arid' bcttrr pcr1i:ip in c r r r r waj . 'zlic only rcnson ~ h y I linrc ndrocntcd civilians in prefcrciivc to \'oIuntr.cn and JIilitin is tlint you wniild linrc tliciii daily, iiiid tlic OlGccrj wlio iiiidcrstwd the work tliorouglily ~ o u l d be ablc to train thciniri all tbnt ~ o i i l i l br xixrsiorv to 1iinL-e tlicur tliorouglilr efficient. CoIoiicI Snlrnond tliinks u i ~ t ip rcs iiiny br LisIcadiiig, liut 1 took the grtntcjt cnro to go into it, nnd I can assiirc JOU tLnt tbc figures arc :is iiccur:ifc OJ 1 could posriblrinnkc them. lIc aIsd sajs tlint whcii w i r is dcclarrd t Lc ciriliniij woulil prob:iblg strikc for liiglicr irngci. or pricticnllj bolt. IVdl, rconoinj i i II tliiiig t l i i t gocs on in pcicc-time, w a r aftcr jcur ; whcrcij during wir iiicrcnscd cspriiditiirc is unnroidnblc. I f t l i k cirilinud should aak for liiglirr w n p diiring wnr it would iiot bu of much conseqiicnrc. I do not know f l i n t tlicrc is nuFthirig rlic to rcply to. The nnral Oniccrs who linve brcn kind enough to iittciid this Irctiirc h r c appnrcntl omecd with tlie rcmnrh I liovc iiiadc, and I w n j r~pccially p1C.15Cd to lirnr A d m i r d c o p sny tliat Iio thounlit the Xnril Volunteers iiiiglit rrork r c r j uiiiicnbly with 11 : IInginccrs under one 3iicf.I

0s TIIE PEIEOSSEL FOR SUIl.\I.\RlSE 3IISISC.

IIe spoke rcry nbl j on the want of rue11

~~~ ~ ~

A, lnrtinl rlcnfncsa prcrcntcd niy Iicnriog the diacus>ioii, I brg to ninkc t l iu fulloniiig nrlditionnl rtiiurk9 tlicrcon. I liar0 to tliaiik Captaiii Colornb und C;iptniii Long and Sir H'illinni Croraiiinii for tlie flattering war iii wliicli t h q r p k e of tlic pfiper. 1 an1 not sure that I quit0 understand Cnptnin Hainrfonl linnnnp's rcmirk concernin tho Submorine 3Iiniiig 3Ianua1. I t is truc thaL tlic totnl pcrsonncl Iins bwii iiiorc' t fa i i doubled during the pust iirc ycnn, bccnusc wc Iinrc tnkcn iii 1i:iiiil the ininc dcfcnce of o still grrnter proportion of Iinrbourr. But no ofIicial incinoi3iidiini liw bccii i s s u d in which any irnportunt addition to tlic tiiimbcrs in tlie iiiiit of Iicrzoiiricl for n unit station is inentioncd. Conscqucntlr Cnptnin IInnnar's rrinnrk i s bcdide tlic poiiit wliicli I mode in thc lccturc. to the cfkct that thc &if of Iicrsoiincl sliould be lnrgcr by 50 per ccnt. (it docs iiot riqiiirc to bc "rnorc tlmii doublrd") tlinii tlint which is g n c r i l l p ncccptcd us thc oKicid unit at thc prrsrnt tinic. Again, Cnptai? lfnnnay MJS tlint 18 R X ' s off thc work9 to 3; R.E.'s ou tlic worLs is csccssirc. I rcply thnt my figiircs ~ e r c not nu cctiiiutc but a fnct, aud tlint rlicii thc coiiipanp wm qunrlcrcd ot Gosporl thc numbcn wcrc frcqucntly still u o r c uiifnrour:iblc. Coptnin Ilnnuny nakcd iiie if I would proposc to place civilians in thc tcst roonis, obscrriug stations, and elcctric light cm Iaccmcnt-. 111

tlic Iccturc I snid that fi Iiting mcn wcrc reyuircd iii thc two rattcr hhicli arc csposcd to tlic firc of tho foc, nnd wlicrc but fcw uicn nrc rcquircd. But I scc no difficu1t.v in tminiiig ciriliin clcctricinns to work satisfactorily in tho tedt rooms, nntl a t tlic depht. Cnptnin ~nnnaydi rpgrccs with moconccrninn tlic purchnso of @tore, in a Iiurrj. But my point in list 6uch stores arc then purc7inscd b j tbc riglit mcii, Tiz., thaw HLO 1inrc t o udc them nnd knoa ahat ther requirc. Tlic stores arc tlicii purclinzrd from firms rcputrd for good nnd trustrrorthy work. On tho otlicr hand, storcr Iiurclinxd in the ususl RILJ aro obtained by otlicinls ~ 1 1 0 s ~ role idea nppcnrs t o bc to plscc the orders nt the loaer t ps j ib le tcndcr, which briugs tlic worst po-iblc storcs tha t will just pass ins cction. Tliu.4 high clsss work is throttled and rhoddj rcigns supreme. I hare I i n i a p e a t dcal to do with the purchwc nntl i n a r t i o n of stores obtained by tLe W.E. during a time of prcesure (1878)--3s 3150 wit the inqicction of storrj obtained in the uaual iiiaiiner a t other times-and I

OH TIIE PERSOSHEL FOR SUDJIARIAT IIINIXG. 295 is not my intention to dctnin mc in thinking th3t \YO 113~0 tlic ricas cxprcsjcd of many

gdlnnt Olliccm who aro wcll cipnblc of forming an opinion upon tho subjcct. I t 113s opcncd up n wry importint subjcct, tlio kcpoto king, ns Caphin Colonib lin3 so well poiritcd out, tlio tii3ttcr of conimand. It I i i ~ nlwrjs bccn m y opinion- nnd I linrc hcld tlic ollicc of Iniprctor of Subm3riuo Drfenco for sonic jcars- froin tho fiat, 3 3 ~ h h ~ i r d l i o p probably lition-3, that nny work to bo doiic 011 Llio ~ a t c r slioiild bc douc by sailot~. Of coursc ire know th3t tlic Snrj will not tnlio orcr thc subnxnrinc mincs, n3 tlicj my c r c r j man in time of w3r, c rc r j rcniiinn atid nwal pcniioncr, rrould be rcquircd for the scagoinz flcct. Thcrc i3 o good den1 to b: said for tltit, but :.till I do not j e t rcc why sulin3rino mining sliould not bc a JWt of tlic work of thc Xarj-n pcrmancnt n a r d forcc under thc Admird t j being

~ori iml for thnt pur wrc. Gcntlcmcn, thcro can bo no doubt that thc wholc of tho forccs cmplo~ctl in tic‘clcfcnco of a n j plan must bc under ono l i e d , riz., tlic Gorcr- nor of tlic fortrcsr or thc port; nntl if tlio Xary s i l l not tnkc orcr tho subm3rino mining ‘dcfencc, I do not tliink tho nirnl Comnaandcr-in-C\iicf shou?d h r c m y - thing to do with t h guard-bo3:~ ~ii iplojcd for thc protection of tho niincs; but tlic wholo of thojc giinrd-boat9 sliould be 11andd orcr n t oncc froin hi3 control to that of tho Comuiandiiig Officer nho may bc cntrustcd with tLc defence. So long, too, ns tlic Kary do not takc orcr tlic work on tlic rater , I think it \rotild be 3 folly to t3ko submnriiic mining out of tilo linnda of the I tojd Eiigiticcrs wlio liar0 c.rrncd i t on no nbly for so many ycard. 1 h3To kcad i t inootcd-1 do not know 1 1 0 ~ Ltr it is true-but tlicro w3q n p n p p l i in tho “Tinics” tltc 0 t h c 1 : y wliicli ctatcd that ccrtain artillcry OMccrs had bccn acnt to Chithnm to go tliroiigli R coilrse of submirinc miuing. tcnding to sliorr that tlicrc i3 nn idc3 of takiug it front thc Enginccrs nnd handing i t orcr 1.. tlic Itoynl Artillcrj, bccaitsc, t h y ray, thc guns to protect tho mincr should bo uodcr tlic smio command ns thc niinci thcm- sclrcs, Thcy aro all undcr on0 licad now ; tlrnt is, tltc Gcncrnl Olliccr comuinnding. Another rcason against making thc cliangc is that, tlic garrison nrtillcrj 1iarc qrtitc suflicicnt work of their o m . I c3n tell it littlc nncccbtc conccming that busiiicjs. I do not know if my gallant friend Gcricrnl filllyth irns a t l’ortstiiooth 3t thc timc, bitt I rcmcmbcr it Icing stotcd to u c by nn artillery Olliccr t h t on onc occasion nt Portsmouth wlicn t h o wcro somc iiuportant cq&rncnts to bc cnrricd out a t one of tlic fo!ts a t Spitltcrd, somc rop l pcrsonagu c3inc from London on Iiij r r 3 ~ to Osbrne, and, on nccount of it3 bctng ucccszary to fir0 n rop1 saliitc. i t waa inipoziiblc to carry out tlic crpcrinicnt~ a t Spithcnd. I n thi3 cnoniiou3 girrisoii nt Portsmouth tlicrc wa9 no dctnchnicnt of trained artillcry nt tho timo capablo of carrxing out both dutics. So tlint I think i t muck

I do not sce nky that nccd be.

know \ r h t I say to be truc. If the purcli~sc of Engineer storm m r c nlwaja mndo by thc Enzinccn iny point \rould fall, ns dclibcnte piircliaso ia cridcntly prcfcrnblc to 11asty p~rch3sc-otlicr things bcing cqud. This i 3 n most important mittcr in sltbniorinc iiiinin,n nnd torpedo work, nnd I tkcrcforo proridcd in tlic rcliciiic In id down in tho papcr, for pu”rlr3ring Oficcrs, ndcpt3, for each of thclic dcscriptions of slon.3.

\\‘it11 rcgnrd to Adniinl DOTS’S opinion, that tlrc watcrwork dcfencc should bo Iindcr tlic trnrnl Coriininnilcr-in-C1iicf, I slicltcr mjsclf bcliind tho opinion of Sir George \Villis ns csprcrrd in his Icttcr, and which was cndorscd b j tho r e n d i s of rcrcril Oficcrs during the dircursion. A n a r d Com1n3udcr-in-Cliicf csiits nt only 0 few stations-nd tlic snmo rulc s l i ~ u l d apply to nll station$, riz., t l in t unity in dcfcncc of a fortrcss or linrbour should bo nssurcd by phcing tlic authority undcr onc hcnd. If not, thc torpcdo-bo3t~ might bo ordered to attack n foo a t tlic rcrr monicnt when tho land forccs considcr i t to bo csscntid that it rlioiild bo ~ ~ i f l i l ~ c l d , or g,lad-bmts might not bc nithdrmrn whcn i t had bccomc importaiit to do so. But thc Comnrnnding Officcr of thc dcfcnco of n sea fortress or of R comincrcinl liarboiir shoultl lime o nard O5ccr and ndriscr n t his right hand ; niid thi is onc tf thc niojt important matters which I had tlrc privilcgo to Eugp t in my ppcr.- - -. J . ‘I. u.

TOL. SISI. S

2% 0s TIIE PERSOSAZL FOR SUBMARISE XISISG.

bcttcr to Icnrc our submrinc ininiiig in it:, sent condition, with thc crceptioll t h a t in timc of m r tlio gu3nl-bnt3 rqi i i rafZ thc dcfcncc of tiic mincs slioulc1 be Iiindcd orcr to tho Ocncnl Ofliccr in command. A s rcgards Coloncl l3uckniU's lccttirc, 1 ngrcc with Coloncl Salinoiid, thnt it woiild not bc odrisablc to crnplor ciriliins, and that 311 mclr cni l o p d 011 this rork sltoiild bc undcr militnrj diS. cipllino and control ; and iu rci!rcncc to tho rcmirk which Colonel Ducknil! niadc t l i n t thcrc woultl bc no niorc dingcr in 1ajing tlicic niinca tpan in 13JiIig cltanncl buoys, 1 iroiiltl point out that wry mobably tliesc niinci might c t out of ordcr, nntl t1ic mcn.would Iiarc to go out iii t o i t s to rclinir tlicni, nith p c A a 3 nn cncmJ's fleet, iiot v a r j far off, vhcn tlic u c n looking nftcr tlic niinci would t o subjcct to attack at ntiy lime. Sor do 1 ngrcc with Coloncl Bucknill whcn Iic EnrJ tlint storcz bought in R hurry arc tlic bcst ; this was well pointcd 0111 by Cuptain IInrinny. Dill on thc \vliolc tlic lccturc was a Iiiojt nblo OW, ond I tliint tlio cordial thanks of thc rncctiiig ought to be gircn to Colonel Buchnill for it.