on the epistemology early chinese thought · supports th~ contention that early chinese cosmology...

ON THE EPISTEMOLOGYOF THE SENSES IN

EARLY CHINESE THOUGHT

The Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Monograph Series

was started in J974. Works are published in the series that deal with

any area of Asian philosophy, or any other field of philosophy

examined from a comparative perspective. The aim of the series is to

make available scholarly works that exceed article length, but may betoo specialized for the general reading public, and to make these

works available in inexpensive editions without sacrificing theorthography of non-Western languages.

MONOGRAPH NO. 19

SOCIETY FOR ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

ON THE EPISTEMOLOGYOF THE SENSES IN

EARLY CHINESETHOUGHT

Jane Geaney

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I PRESS, HONOLULU

© 2002 University of Hawai'i PressAll rights reserved

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Chapter 1: An Overview of Sense Discrimination

Chapter 2: Hearing and Seeing

Chapter 3: The Heartmind's Relation to the Senses

Chapter 4: Names and Their "Filling"

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Notes

References

Index

v

VII

I

16

50

84

109

136

175

251

261

Acknowledgments

My study of the early Chinese view of sense discriminationbegan with dissertation research at the University of Chicago. Theearly stages of the work profited greatly from careful criticalreadings by Anthony Yu, Chad Hansen, and Paul Griffiths. Thework also profited immensely from the advice and encouragementof Henry Rosemont Jr. I have benefited more from thesecolleagues' insights than I can adequately acknowledge.

I am thankful to a variety of people who generously helpedwith the completion of the final draft, especially Lam Ling Hon,for his painstaking attention to the Chinese quotations, SharonBrinkman for her careful copy editing, George Hardy forrepeatedly adjusting the workings of my computer, and KeithLeber for kind and efficient editorial advice. In addition, I wouldlike to thank the anonymous readers from the University ofHawai'i Press. I am also grateful to Dan Robins and Chris Fraser formany fruitful discussions on questions of translation andinterpretation. Although I tried to incorporate improvementssuggested by these people, the mistakes that remain are soley myresponsibility.

Unless otherwise noted, the translations contained hereinare my own. Nevertheless, I am inevitably indebted to thefollowing translations, which are doubtlessly reflected in my own:A. C. Graham's Ch'uang-tzu: the Inner Chapters (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin, 1981); James Legge's The Works of Mencius(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895. Reprint, New York: DoverPublications, 1970); W. K. Liao's The Complete Works ofHan FeiTzu (London: A. Probsthain, 1935-59); John Knoblock's Xunzi:ATranslation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1994); Burton Watson's Hsun-tzu:Basic Writings(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); YP. Mei's TheEthical and Political Works ofMo Tse (London: A. Probsthain.1929); D. C. Lau's Mencius (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970) and

vii

viii On the Epistemology of the Senses

Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books,1963); and Robert Henricks' Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A NewTranslation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-tui Texts

(New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). (I use the Mawangdui

edition of the Laozi, following Henricks in providing the readerwith the more familiar Wang Bi chapter numbers. Occasionally, in

cases where software incapacities or matters of interest make theWang Bi edition more appropriate, 1 use that edition and note the

change.)1 am thankful to the University of Richmond for its

generous support in the preparation and publication of this book.

Introduction

This monograph is about sense discrimination in theclassical period of Chinese thought.! It focuses on the ordinaryfunctions of the human senses, as presented in philosophical textsof the Warring States era (roughly dating from the fifth to thirdcentury B.C.E.). As the title suggests, the main senses underconsideration are hearing and sight, particularly in relation to thefunction of the heartmind.2 A culture's understanding of thephysical senses may reveal implicit features of its world view. Withthat in mind, this work attempts to identify the views on sensediscrimination in these texts and subsequently tries to detenninewhat such views imply about the construction of reality in WarringStates thought.

This work may have significance for a controversial topic.The results of this analysis seem to corroborate a particularinterpretation of early Chinese cosmology--one that views it asdistinctive and as having great value.3 Many features of earlyChinese cosmology have been used to argue for its distinctiveness.In this Introduction, I will focus on two of them: its holism and itsappreciation of change. The distinctiveness of these features maybe highlighted by means of a contrast to the history of westernmetaphysics.4 I will outline that contrast in order to explain howmy analysis may' be used to advance the argument for thedistinctiveness of early Chinese cosmology. Then I will describehow the view of sense discrimination in Warring States Chinasupports th~ contention that early Chinese cosmology is indeedholistic and rooted in change.

Warring States China

A brief historical overview may help situate the texts used in thisstudy. This work is based on the classics of Chinese philosophy,written during what is known as the Warring States period (480-

1

2 On the Epistemology of the Senses

221 RC.E.). The Warring States refers to a succession of civil warsamong competing territorial states, which took place as a result ofthe disintegration of the Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1050-256 RC.E.). TheWarring States period ended with the unification of the empireunder the Qin, 221-206 RC.E. Both before and during the WarringStates period, a variety of important changes occurred. Within thisperiod, there were significant changes in standards of living: the useof iron developed, especially in agricultural use, and farmingreplaced hunting as the primary means of sustenance. At thepolitical level, something like a feudal system, based on ahereditary nobility, was replaced by a proliferation of smallcompeting political units, in which power was concentrated in thehands of local. monarchs. Through direct taxation on landcontrolled by the military and hereditary elite, the monarchseffectively eliminated the earlier manorial management system.The result was an increase in social mobility in the form of anopportunity for official court appointments not based on kinrelations. In this context, a lower order of artisans emerged andvied for jobs at court. The competition among the statesthemselves also helped foster an environment in which capableindividuals could take on roles that were previously hereditary.

These developments contributed to the rise of a culturalelite that interpreted social ideals. This cultural elite passed ontheir instruction through disciples, who normally paid a token feefor instruction. Those who were educated could sell their servicesto territorial states as specialists in things like ritual or evenwarfare. They often traveled from state to state, in search of anaudience for their recommendations regarding social reform.Certain territorial states in particular "collected" some of the mostsought-after scholars, giving them titles and stipends, in an effortto enhance their state's reputation. In this role, scholars mighthave had some small effect on matters of state. More significantly,some of these scholars' words were gathered and written down,forming the texts that are now referred to as classical Chinesephilosophy.

Introduction

Texts

3

As a particular tradition was passed down from master to disciples,

one might speak of "schools of thought" developing in Warring

States China.5 The texts discussed here are later considered to

belong to three schools: Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism.

However, because organizing texts into schools of thought was not

significant in the Warring States period, it is best not to think of

these texts in such terms.6

Given modern developments in the field of sinology, it is

no longer possible simply to treat Warring States texts as the

products of individual authors.7 Thus, the six texts drawn from

here should not be taken as authored by Confucius (d. 479 RC.E.),

Mozi (ca. 480-390 RC.E.), Mencius (ca. 382-300 RC.E.), Zhuangzi

(ca. 365-280 RC.E.), Xunzi (ca. 310-215 RC.E.), or Laozi (dates

unknown). Rather, it is probably safest to assume that all of these

texts are compilations by a number of authors (of more or less

similar persuasion) written over extended periods of time. In other

words, we should probably think of these books as layers of texts.

Nevertheless, the multilayered nature of these texts need

not undermine the main arguments proffered here. The claims I

make should be taken as either claims about the philosophical texts

of the Warring States period in general or claims about tendencies

specifically located within one or another of these texts. (While

the latter type of claim involves positing some minimal amount of

consistency in the philosophical position represented in a given

text, it by no means requires that the texts be the product of single

authors.)8 At this point in the development of sinology, it does

not seem possible to do more than make tentative general claims

about the view of sense discrimination within the period and within

the individual texts. There is barely enough information about

sense discrimination in these texts to support even that goal.

Given the dearth of data, it is not yet possible to identify nuanced

changes in the function of sense discrimination terminology over

the course of the Warring States period. If such a thing can ever

4 On the Epistemology ofthe Senses

occur, it must wait until sinology arrives at a greater state ofconfidence and precision regarding the dating of the layers in thesetexts. In the meantime, studies like this one may be of use indepicting a particular aspect of the historical period as a whole ortrends in individual texts.

There is a reason why this analysis of sense discriminationfocuses on philosophical texts, from among the dozens of receivedtexts of the Warring States period. The texts I have chosen arephilosophical in a sense that does not necessarily accord with thestandards of modem western philosophy. That is, they arephilosophical insofar as they employ arguments that have "depthand intricate implicit structure" to engage the subject of ethical andpolitical reform ..9 Because of the deep structure of the arguments inthese texts, focusing on them presents a double opportunity. Itallows me not only to suggest the current predominant view ofsense discrimination, but also to test that hypothesis. In otherwords, after establishing what I take to be the overarching view ofsense discrimination from these texts as a whole, I can also use theindividual texts to check the validity of my thesis, by showing howthe overarching view functions differently in the deep structure ofcompeting arguments.

The main body of the work describes the predominant viewof sense discrimination. The first chapter introduces some generalideas about the senses as a group. The second and third chaptersattempt to explain the significance of hearing and sight, as well astheir relation to the heartmind. The fourth chapter develops thediscussion in relation to a polarity that is particularly important indetermining how these texts represent a world view. Finally, thelast chapter aims to establish the validity of what I identify as theoverarching view of the senses by providing some examples of howthat view is put to different uses. The final chapter describes howthe shared view of sense discrimination actually functions tosupport different philosophical positions represented in differenttexts.

Introduction

Contrasting Metaphysics

5

In a work of this sort, comparison and contrast are unavoidable.My ability to understand sense discrimination in the Warring Statesdepends in crucial ways on how I see it in relation to my owntradition. Throughout the work, I explicitly use elements of thetradition more familiar to me to explain what I think isnoteworthy about the views represented in the Warring Statestexts. I presume similarity in the process of selecting the items Ithink can be compared.! 0 But of course I also presume difference,because there is no sense in comparing things that are identical.!!In my attention to difference. I do not mean to fall into theOrientalist trap of implying that Warring States thought is merelyremarkable for its contrast to "the West." As far as possible, thisstudy endeavors to present the intricacies and internal dynamics ofWarring States views on its own terms. I hope my determinationto do that conveys my conviction that Warring States China has asubjectivity of its own. Still, the best justification for thelegitimacy of the comparative elements in this work may be itsresults. As Ben-ami Sharfstein puts it,

The question is not whether the differences exist. becausethey do. but what we should make of them; and the answeroften lies in the conscious or unconscious decision to payno attention to the context, or, more accurately, to makeuse of only the criteria that fit our need at the time, thatis, to intuit or hypothesize or discover the context that ismost pertinent to our need.12

To that extent, the value of this work may depend on whether Ican put these things I have compared into a meaningful context.Especially for non-sinologists, that comparative context may bethe most important implication of this study.

6

The History ofWestem Metaphysics

On the Epistemology of the Senses

The search to identify a permanent substrate of reality was ashared problematique in ancient Greek philosophy. The ancientGreeks considered a variety of candidates for this role. Forinstance, Thales (c. 640--546 RC.E.) contended that everything wascomposed of water; Anaximenes (c. 611-547 RC.E.) argued for theprimacy of air. When single elements seemed insufficient, otherthinkers proposed combinations, like earth and water, or earth, air,fire, and water.B Even Heraclitus (c. 500 RC.E.), famous for theclaim that "everything is becoming," still posited something-fire-as a fundamental eternal substance. Starting with Pythagoras(fl. 540--510 RC.E.) and his theories of numbers, determining thepermanent substrate could also capitalize on the notion of a super-sensible, intelligible world. Hence, in spite of his mistrust of senseperception, Plato (c. 428-348 RC.E.) could find solace in theclarity with which the intellect knows things like the super-sensibleform of the Good. Likewise, Aristotle's (384-322 RC.E.)confidence lay in a purely formal and unchanging God and the ideathat, as matter decreased in proportion to form, things becameincreasingly stable and knowable. The sensory world of flux andbecoming could be transcended in favor of a permanent and eternalfoundation. Thus, in various ways, the Greeks managed to identifythe permanent foundation of reality.

Underlying their project was the belief that the eternalalone is real. The idea is expressed in its most extreme form by theEleatic school, which denied the reality of change. Parmenides (fl.5th cent. RC.E.) argued that there is no such thing as change, andZeno (fl. 5th cent. RC.E.) defended this with various argumentsagainst motion.

The critique of the heritage of this conviction is wellknown. As Jacques Derrida describes it, the subsequent history ofmetaphysics perpetuates a particular contradiction.14 It constructsits notion of presence on the basis of a metaphor of perceptualpresence-the moment, or "now." But the now itself is a form of

Introduction 7

absence, because it is defined by what it is not (the past and thefuture). If reality is understood on the basis of being present in themoment, then it must in some way be absent. According toDerrida, this language of presence spawns a string of metaphysicaloppositions, like intelligible and sensible, soul and body, that arealways haunted by the absence of full-presence. Thus, regarding thehistory of western metaphysics, he says,

Its matrix.. .is the determination of Being as presence in allsenses of this word. It could be shown that all the namesrelated to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centerhave always designated an invariable presence eidos, arche,telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance,subject), aletheia, transcendentality, conscious-ness, God,man, and so forth. 15

Derrida surveys the later history of western metaphysics, notinghow such names for fundamentals continue to designate invariablepresence. He identifies "Being as full-presence" as the foundationfor the Cartesian cogito. He also finds appeals to a similargrounding in Kant (in the transcendental unity of apperception,which is the noumenon beyond the flux). He uncovers it as well inHegel's use of self-consciousness. (This condition of allconsciousness, Derrida argues, depends on a notion of Being as purepresence.) Likewise, Derrida contends that, in spite of Heidegger'sdesire to think presence differently than the Greeks, he toopresumes that something that is must be identical to itself.

All of this, Derrida argues, inherits the Greek conceptionof eternal self-presence, which is rooted in a metaphor tainted withabsence. The language Derrida uses to express this absence isdifferance-difference and deferment. But for the purpose ofcomparison to early Chinese metaphysics,16 this might be phrasedin terms of change. At the risk of oversimplifying, Derrida's pointcould be taken as saying that the history of metaphysics succeeds


only by repressing change-because change is the differencebetween the past, the present, and the future. The Greek denial ofchange (a denial frequently associated with a rejection of thesenses) contributed a persistent problem to the history of westernmetaphysics. According to one interpretation of early Chinesemetaphysics, this is a problem that the Chinese of the time did notshare.

Metaphysics in Wa"ing States China

The search for something permanent is one of the deepest of theinstincts leading men to philosophy.-Bertrand Russell I 7

At least according to some sinologists, Russell might havefound Chinese thinkers to be lacking in a basic philosophicalinstinct. By contrast to the Greeks, the Warring States Chineseshowed no apparent interest in identifying a permanent substrateof reality. Their cosmos was continuous and holistic (in the sensethat the parts had to be understood in relation to the whole). It wasalso subject to a continual process of change.I8 Its philosopherssought only order (rather than Russell's permanence), and thecosmology merely presented a variety of forms of constancyamidst change.

Holism and change are only part of what has been calledthe "organismic" nature of the early Chinese cosmos.I 9 Manyadditional signs of early Chinese organicism have been highlightedby sinologists. As Donald Munro points out, the application of theterm organismic to early China dates back to the work of JosephNeedham, for whom organicism meant, among other things,having developmental patterns like an organism.20 The idea oforganicism is taken up by Frederick Mote, who argues thatorganicism is evident in the dearth of early Chinese creationmyths. Like an organism, he argues, the early Chinese cosmos is

Introduction 9

not presented as something created ex nihilo. Instead, he contends,it is a spontaneous self-generating process.21 Although Tu Wei-ming disagrees with Mote's claim about the absence of creationmyths, he views early Chinese creation myths as still confonningto the framework of organicism. Tu identifies this framework ashaving three features: continuity, wholeness, and dynamism.22 Thenotion that organicism means continuity is elaborated by Kwang-chih Chang. Chang understands the early Chinese cosmos to beorganismic in the sense that it posits no rupture between humanityand its natural resources. Chang's interpretation of organicismsuggests (although it does not say so explicitly) that even thenature/culture divide was not fundamental to the fonnation ofearly Chinese thought.23 While all of these understandings oforganicism may be valid, in this Introduction I will focus only onholism and change. My purpose will be to show that these twoorganismic features are also characteristic of the view of sensediscrimination in Warring States philosophical texts.

Determining the nature of Warring States cosmology isdifficult, because it is neither as overt nor as systematized as itlater becomes. When cosmological speculation is fully synthesized(perhaps as early as the end of the Warring States, but certainly bythe first century RC.E.), the cosmos is seen as being composed of qi~, which appears in two main aspects: as yinqi ~ ~ and yangqi~ ~. Qi is sometimes rendered "energy/matter," or "psycho-physical stuff'-both translations emphasizing that, although it ismaterial, it resembles energy in being volatile. Qi is also connectedto breath and wind, but it is sometimes rendered as "vapor" todistinguish it from "air," which is an element (and hence acandidate for a pennanent substrate of reality). Unlike an element,qi is context dependent. Yinqi andyangqi, the two main aspects ofqi, indicate dark, cold, and passive, on the one hand, and bright,warm, and active on the other. But it is significant that somethingcan be yin with regard to one thing and yang with regard toanother. (In addition to its yin/yang aspects, in post-WarringStates fonnulations, qi also appears as part of the so-called five


phases-wood, fire, soil, metal, and water-which relate to oneanother as conqueror to conquered.) Thus, even in latersystematized cosmologies, qi is not an eternal substrate-its formchanges according to its context.

In the Warring States period, the cosmology based on qiwas not yet fully systematized in this way. In the philosophicaltexts, many instances of the character qi refer to human qi (and,to a lesser extent, animal qi). There are also some rarer referencesto atmospheric qi. For instance, there are cases of cloud qi(Zhuangzi 1/29), heaven and earth's qi (Zhuangzi 6/68), and nightqi (Mencius 6A8). In one case, qi does seem to refer to afundamental constituent of things. The Xunzi notes,

71< 1< # ~ mH!l€ ~Water and fire have qi but do not have life.(Xunzi 9/69)

However, as of the fourth century RC.E., the term qi did notconnote the single basic component of all things. This is apparentin the Lunyu 16/7 reference to "blood and qi," which suggests thatblood did not consist of qi. We must be careful then, not to readlater cosmological systems back into the Warring States use of qi.In Warring States texts, qi is an important feature of the cosmos,but it does not have the singular position it later gains. In any case,it is not, in the Warring States or later, a permanent substrate ofreality.

The cosmology of the Warring States period is holistic inthe sense that all parts are interrelated within the functioning ofthe whole. Warring States astronomy and calendrics convey aconception of heaven and earth as macrocosm, to which humanlife should be microcosmically synchronized.24 With the help ofastrology, the Warring States period witnessed the creation of acalendric system that formed a blueprint for the king's behavior bymimicking the regularity of the stars. The Yi Jing (Book of

Introduction 11

Changes) presents similar clues as to the implicit holism inWarring States cosmology. In the Yi, one also finds a strongtendency to relate human affairs to natural affairs. Moreover, itshexagrams and line statements indicate inter-dependent relationsbetween important pairs in the cosmos, such as heaven and earthand male and female.25 Archaeological evidence also points toholistic tendencies in early Chinese cosmology. Mortuary customsfrom as early as the Shang Dynasty (approximately 1570-1050B.C.E.) indicate a belief that material goods, such as servants andchariots, would continue to confino one's status in the afterlife.26

In a sense, there is nothing "outside of the world," or "otherworldly" in this type of afterlife. Oracle bone inscriptions suggest abelief that recently dead ancestors linger close enough to theirdescendants to be propitiated by sacrificial offerings. With thepassage of time, the ancestors show less involvement with theliving and presumably become increasingly tenuous, beforedissipating entirely. In this holistic picture, heaven and earth, andeverything in between, are part of a self-contained continuouscreation in which there is no external creative agent and no drasticrupture between creator and created.

Because there is nothing outside the world, Warring StatesChinese cosmology cannot help but reconcile itself to changes. Asthe title of the Yi Jing indicates, change is fundamental to theearly Chinese cosmos. The Yi is a book about change, and within it,even the associations attached to specific images alter according totheir context.27 The creation of astronomical and calendricalsystems also depended upon change, that is, they depended uponthe ordere~ celestial regularities associated with the seasons, whichset the standards for proper human conduct. Moreover, thetransition undergone by deceased ancestors-becoming increasinglydetached from social affairs-also represents an afterlife that isnot static or atemporaJ. Rather, the dead ancestor continues to bepart of an inevitable dynamic of change.

Like the conception of great cosmic powers, theconception of ordinary people in the Warring States is also


holistic. As is frequently noted, the same character (xin JL\heartmind) denotes the source of both emoting and thinking. Thusthe human person is not broken down into separate reasoning andemoting capacities. The person is also not divided into oneimmutable soul and an impermanent body. Instead, there are manysouls, which separate and disperse after death.28

Holism is also apparent in the emphasis on the value ofsociety. From periods prior to and including the Warring States,artistic representations of humans favor depictions of anonymouspeople working collectively, rather than individual well-knownheroes.29 These collective social relations are also indicated by theNeolithic and Shang practices of burying accompaniers-in-death.3o

Although the p~ctice may have died out by the Warring States, itsearlier existence represents a reminder that the bonds unitingpersons go beyond even the boundaries of death.

In addition to being holistic, the understanding of thehuman person also reflects the centrality of change. One of themedical conceptions in the Warring States period identifies healthwith change.31 In this conception, the free movement of blood andqi in the body's "vessels" guarantees the body's health. Hence,stagnation is the cause of illness. Insofar as freedom of movementwas necessary for sustaining the body, a sick person was treated byencouraging a holistic internal motion. Thus, like the cosmos, theancestors, and the ruler, the composition of the human person washolistic and rooted in change.

In sum, early Chinese cosmology appears to be organismicin its emphasis on holism and change. Perhaps as a result of theseorganismic features, early Chinese cosmology did not create ametaphysics of presence. This is not to say that early Chinesecosmology is alone in managing this feat, or that early Chinesethought did not create its own set of baneful philosophicalproblems. However, at least in light of this contrast, early Chinesecosmology seems to have some distinctive value.

Introduction

Organismic Cosmology and Sense Discrimination

13

In order to briefly describe the connection between organismiccosmology and the view of sense discrimination I find in thesetexts, I will, once again, focus on holism and change.

Holism

The presentation of sense discrimination in these texts supports aholistic conception of the human person:

(1) There is no sign of the view that sense discrimination must betranscended in favor of a super-sensible form of knowing.

(2) Sense discrimination itself is characterized by holism, insofar assensing is integrated into the world. The senses' discriminations area system constituted by contrasts. The senses discriminate amongthese contrasts, rather than making contact with bruteuninterpreted sense data. Hence, there is nothing in the process ofsense discrimination that is pure and untouched by human sig-nification. In other words, there is nothing to mediate and alienatethe senses from the world. (For instance, in discriminating betweensounds, there are no bare, uninterpreted sound data. Before the earseven hear-which is to say, while they are listening-theyestablish a continuous interpretive contact. The effort of listeningitself channels what is being listened to, framing it within a rangeof human significance.)

(3) The heartmind is integrated with the other senses. It behaveslike the senses and seems to be considered a sense function. It isnot distinguished from the other senses in its ability to know itsdiscriminations. Moreover, although it does have a specialknowledge capacity (for verifying the operations of seeing andhearing), it does not do so from a position of detachment from the

body.


(4) In contrast to the role of vision in Platonic and Cartesianmodels of knowing, vision is not privileged in this scheme.(Hearing is not privileged either. )32 The ears and eyes, whileperforming a more important function than the other senses,maintain a parallel relation with one another. This is not a pseudo-equivalence, veiling a superior term's mastery over an inferiorterm. Each of the two senses is valued for its strong points andcriticized for its weak points. Trust and verification of knowledgerequires the participation of both.

ChangeNo element of sense discrimination escapes change or has contactwith a realm ou~ide of change:

(1) The heartmind's pondering is likened to moving eyes in searchof a needle. This suggests that the heartmind moves. Ideally, itmay be "unmoved"-in the sense of not being led astray by theattractions and repulsions that tug at it. But this sense of beingunmoved merely clears the way for the heartmind to respond like amirror to everything it encounters. (The Warring States metaphorof the mirror indicates responsiveness, rather than re-presentationand detachment.y 3

(2) Change also plays a significant role in the aural/visual parallelsin the text. Change, in the form of action, is the correlate ofseeing, just as speech is the correlate of hearing.34 A form ofchange is therefore one-half of the equation that constitutes thefoundation for trusting people and for verifying knowledge.

(3) The analysis of sense discrimination reveals that there is anelement of change implicit in the use of an important character inWarring States philosophical texts. Standard translations of shi •(as "reality," "substance," or "stuff') do not do justice to thenotion of change inherent in the use of the character. Drawingupon the implications of the parallelism between the ears and eyes,

Introduction 15

this work calls into question the translations of shi in WarringStates texts. Traditional understandings of the term shi seem topresent it as comparable to analytic philosophy's "medium-sizeddry goods"-the hard stuff that forms the basis of reference.35 Onthe contrary, I argue that the way shi functions is best understoodas "fruit," due to its organic connotations of growth anddevelopment. Although fruit does suggest solidity, my argument isthat uses of shi have more to do with something brought tocompletion or fruition, rather than solidity or substance. (After all,in a cosmos where heaven is simply tenuous, while the earth issolid, there is no pressing reason why substance should connotereality.) Translating shi as reality, as if that consisted of dry hardgoods, leads to a misconception of the notion of reality in WarringStates philosophical texts.

This view of sense discrimination fills a gap in ourunderstanding of Warring States thought. Moreover, theseelements of holism and change in the view of sense discriminationsupport the claim that early Chinese cosmology is organismic.They seem to represent one coherent way of understanding thesenses from the context of a cosmology in which there is noeternal substrate of reality.

Chapter 1: An Overview of Sense Discrimination

This chapter describes the overarching view of sensediscrimination in the philosophical texts of the Warring Statesperiod. I The individual texts vary in some of their opinions aboutsense discrimination, but certain shared views about the sensesform the backdrop for these variations.2 In brief, the chapter aimsto accomplish two main things: (l) identify the senses and (2) de-scribe their relation to knowledge. The chapter begins byintroducing the senses through two focal points of theirappearance in these texts: the metaphor of the senses asadministrative.officials and an image of sense processes carriedthrough the wind. These two focal points highlight some of thecomplexities and ambiguity of sense discrimination in these texts.They also lay the groundwork for a discussion of the role that thesenses play in the acquisition of knowledge, which forms thesecond half of the chapter.

Identity of the Senses

The Warring States philosophical texts suggest that there are fivesenses.3 This number happens to conform to a general tendency tofit things into five-fold schemes.4 The "fives" include five colors,five tastes, and so on.5 The Xunzi labels the senses as the "fiveofficials" (wu guan 1i '8), and the texts often list five senses.6

Moreover, many of the lists of senses look quite a bit like thefamiliar five-senses model. For instance, Xunzi 4/44-45 and Xunzi19/3-5 both list the senses as mouth, nose, eyes, ears, and body;and Xunzi 17/11 and 18/116 list the senses as eyes, ears, nose,mouth, and form. Mencius 7B24 is similar-it lists mouth, eyes,ears, nose, and limbs. In addition to these lists of five senses, thereare also lists of four that sometimes look like the five-sensesmodel with one sense omitted. For example, three cases mentionmouth, body, eyes, and ears (not necessarily in that order)-

16

An Overview of Sense Discrimination 17

Mencius lA7, Xunzi 22/80-81, and Mozi 32/3-6. With oneelement replaced, we find eyes, ears, mouth, and form in Xunzi21/14; body, nose, eyes, and ears in Xunzi 19/6-8; and ears, eyes,nose, and mouth in Xunzi 12/6l.7 In sum, although these lists ofsense functions vary and omit items, they are said to number five,and they often include eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and body.

Yet this notion of five senses may be deceptive. Many ofthe things that appear to be lists of the senses vary remarkably intheir number and content.8 For example, Mozi 47/20 seems to listphysical organs associated with sensing-mouth, nose, and ears-but fails to mention the eyes and instead includes hands andfeet.9 As in this Mozi 47/20 example, the fifth sense is not alwaysthe only point of variation. In the Xunzi's lists of the senses,sometimes one or another sense is missing, while the heartmindand body (or form) are both included as the fourth and fifth sensesrespectively.lo Even more surprisingly, in the Xunzi, a possible listof the senses that begins "body, nose, eye, ear," continues with"trust, awe, and peace."11 Another list mentions eye, ear, mouth,body, form, happiness, and name.12 Yet another lists eye, ear,mouth, form, and name.13 The challenge posed by these examplesmight be evaded by saying that they do not count as lists of thesenses. But we might equally well permit these examples to raisedoubts about whether any of the lists refer to the senses as weunderstand them. At the very least, these lists draw attention tothe question of what constitutes a sense. Moreover, these listsshould be reminders that while there is a compelling reason for thetexts to identify the senses as numbering five, there is no firmconsensus about the constituents of the senses.

Bureaucracy ofthe Senses

The metaphor of the senses as officials, and the image linking thesenses to the wind ([eng }j,), constitute two of the most strikingtreatments of sense discrimination in these texts. On the one hand,the metaphor of the senses as officials portrays them as orderly


and controlled. Each sense occupies its own office, allowing itsdesires to be restrained by a superior for the benefit of the"government" of the whole. On the other hand, the role of thewind in sense operations emphasizes a much less controlledenvironment. The wind turns the senses into a nexus fortransformations, both good and bad. With the wind sweepingthrough them, the senses expose the subject to a potential forradical change. The conflict between these two treatments of thesenses does not appear to be resolved in these texts. Perhaps thetensions between these two presentations of the senses are theinevitable result of culling information about the senses fromindirect textual references. Or perhaps they are the result of thetexts' uncertainty about how the senses function. In either case, anattempt to resolve these tensions might err by forcing coherenceon material that is not thoroughly coherent. Hence, I include bothdescriptions for the sake of accuracy and as a reminder of theconfusion in the treatment of the subject of sense operations inthese texts.

The primary title for the senses in Warring Statesphilosophical texts identifies them as officials. In addition to thefive officials, the Xunzi also refers to the senses as the "heavenlyofficials" (Iian guan *- '8').14 The bureaucratic title should not besurprising, because the matter of proper governing is a pressingconcern in the Warring States period, evident in all of thesetexts. 15

In their behavior as official, each sense is an office with itsown area of concern. Many lists articulate the specific role of eachfunction, insisting that they are not identical. For instance, theXunzi emphasizes the specialization of each sense structure:

:El= § .. 0 ~ /f' "ilJ PJ ;f§ ffl' g-Ear, eye, nose, and mouth cannot trade offices.(Xunzi 12/61)

• An Overview of Sense Discrimination 19

The Xunzi and the Mencius also emphasize that the officials areruled by the heartmind.16 The Xunzi says,

1+ § .. [] ff3 ff~ ~ ff ~ffiPF :f§ ff~ 1h~ ~ z m7( '§'iL' g cp ~ tJ m1i '§'~~Zm7(;g

Ear, eye, nose, mouth, and form, each has its own contacts[lit. "receptions" or "meetings") and does not do things forthe others. Now, these are called the heavenly officials.The heartmind dwells in the central cavity and governs thefive officials. Now, this is called the heavenly ruler.(Xunzi 1711 1-12)

Similarly, Mencius 6A5, which also attributes 'offices' to thesenses, indicates that the heartmind's job is superior. Hence, just asofficials function like senses, the senses behave like officials underthe control of a ruler.

The general opinion--expressed rather clearly in theXunzi, the Mencius, and the Mozi-is that, because of theirwayward desires, the senses make better officials than rulers. Thesenses instigate their own desires. Rather than attributing thedesires to a person, or to the heartmind (the ruler of the senses),the Xunzi speaks as if the ears themselves desire sound and the eyesthemselves desire appearances.! 7

:B~ § tiffg1+tif§ [] ~1~iL' tif flJ ~ e rI J:!I! tif 'M'tr ~~11'f~m- AZ'ti'ftE~1h

The eyes' love of color,18 the ears' love of sounds, themouth's love of flavors, the heartmind's love of profit, thebones, flesh and skin-lines' love of pleasure and ease: theseare all born of a person's qing [condition? disposition?) andnature.Xunzi 23/25-26


The senses also share the same respective desires, as the Mencius,and the Mozi point OUt.19 The Xunzi notes that we are born withthese desires and speaks of them as the human qing 1W (condition?disposition?), while the Mencius speaks of them as human xing JI1(nature/what one is born with).20 Thus, sensory desires appear to besomething very fundamental in human beings that interfere withordering the person.

These shared sense desires pose dangers to the order of theperson by disturbing thinking and tending toward excess. Sensedesires contact things, and when their desires make contact,thinking is lost. The Xunzi says,

If § ~.~ ~ ~lJ J& ~ ~ !I& !Irt ~ ~ ~ ~lJ ~ :Jt ~[re: a man sitting in a cave, trying to concentrate] If thedesires of the ears and eyes contact [what they desire],then his thoughts will be defeated, and if he hears thebuzzing of mosquitoes or flies, his concentration will bedamaged.(Xunzi 21/62)

The Mencius says something similar, noting that the heartmindgets what it seeks, but the senses are pulled by things:

If§~'§"/F~ffijlim-~

~~¥JJ WJ 51 ~ ffij B ~IL\ ~ 'Er ~lJ ,W JW ~lJ m. ~ l' ,W ~lJ l' m. -tl!.Thinking is not the office of the eyes and ears, and theyare clouded by things. Things interact with things and pullthem astray. That is all. The office of the heartmind isthinking. It thinks and thus it obtains. If it does not think,then it does not obtain.(Mencius 6A15)

In addition to distracting one's thinking, sense desires are alsoinherently inclined toward excess. As the Xunzi says,


§ ~~fg~~~'t

tJ ~ ~ '* .. ~ ~ ~ IL' ~ ~ ~The eyes desire the greatest extreme of colors, the earsdesire the greatest extreme of sounds, the mouth desiresthe greatest extreme of tastes, the nose desires the greatestextreme of smells, the heartmind desires the greatestextreme of comfort.(Xunzi 11/46-47)

This tendency toward excess is implicit in the Mozi'scondemnation of wicked kings for not checking the "flow" of theirears and eyes.21 (This notion of flowing seems to derive from theirinability to remain within bounds.)

-=--.ftL~:E1'~Jt~ § L~l' t~ Jt IL' 7tS; L $The wicked kings of the Three Dynasties did not controlthe flowing of their ears and eyes and did not restrain thepartialities of their heartmind's aims.22

(Mozi 36/18)

The distraction and excesses of the sense desires seem barelycontrollable. In addition to sharing similar desires, the senses sharea similar inability to control them.

In sum, the senses are born instigating desires. Thesedesires distract the heartmind from its ability to think andaccomplish its aims. They are also dangerously excessive and leadnaturally toward inauspicious and immoral extremes. Because theirdesires are distracting and excessive, the senses must be restrained.This seems to account for why the senses may function only asofficials under the control of a ruler, without ever being rulersthemselves. With characteristic iconoclasm, the Zhuangzidisagrees. It implies that the vassals and concubines of the bodymight take turns being ruler.23 But even the Zhuangzts objection


supports the point-if the purpose is order and control, the sensesshould be officials (guan) rather than rulers (jun).

Sensing the Wind

The sensory aspects of the wind ([eng 100.) provide a contrastingillustration of how the senses function.24 Instead of being clearlyorganized officials with separate offices, sensing the wind hints atsubtle, blended forms of sensing. For example, while being carriedon the wind, music seems to spontaneously transform through thesenses, at the infinitesimal level of qi *" (vapor) and de ~(charisma/virtue).25 In addition to this audible sensing, harmoniouswinds/airs seem to have simultaneous effects on olfactory andgustatory sensing. From this perspective, sense discriminationappears to be a chaotic and unmanageable process.

Oracle inscriptions from the Shang Dynasty (eighteenththrough twelfth century Re.E.) suggest that winds were an object ofpressing concern for the ancient Chinese. The evidence indicatesthat divination rituals were performed to determine all kinds ofquestions about winds.26 The importance of wind continued tofigure in Warring States philosophical texts. The Zhuangzi depictsthe movements of the cosmos as a great blowing wind, impellingforce in cavities like ears, nostrils, and eye sockets (Zhuangzi 2/4-9). The sensory aspects of wind apparent in the Warring Statestexts may explain some of this concern about winds. Sensing thewind produces automatic transformation. It seems to involve apowerful mix of elements that immediately alter whomever hearsor "ingests" it.

Music is the most outstanding thing sensed through contactwith the wind. It changes people by affecting their winds/airs. (Likethe word "air" in English, the termfeng 00. also functions to meanthe style that is characteristic of a place or a group of people.)The Xunzi extols the powers of music to improve such winds:


~~~Azf1f~-tH

jffi riJ P..-t ~ ~ IL' ;!'t ~ A ~ ;!'t f$ fj. ~ %Music is the joy of the sagesP It can improve people'sheartminds. It stimulates people deeply. It influences theirwind [{eng] and changes their customs.(Xunzi 20/22-23)

The metaphor of people's wind being transformed by musicpresumes that sound is sensed via its carrier: the wind. It seems thatbecause the style of a group is its wind, the style can be molded bythe sounds of music, which are carried on the wind.

At a more intricate level, the power of music can beexplained as the transmission of infinitesimal things like qi and de.Both wind and music are spoken of in terms of qi. This isnoteworthy, because references to the qi of specific things arequite rare in these texts.28 From the reference to the piping of qiin the Zhuangzi and the two references to music's qi in the Xunzi,we can infer that qi is more closely associated with wind and musicthan it is with most things. According to the Zhuangzi, wind is theqi that the earth exhales while piping its music.29 If wind is thepiped qi of. earth, then to an extent, qi, wind, and music areinterchangeable. Moreover, the Xunzi refers to music as qi, whenexplaining the powerful effects of the sounds of singing. It says,

}L~5'it~Affij~~JJ!z

~~p'x;fI{ffijtm.~~

lE~~Affijni~JJ!z

RTh1~p'x;fI{ffijm~~

P~~D~1f!~~ffi~

a ;g T m ;!'t rJT *gt -tH'Yhen chaotic sounds stimulate a person, the response is anoppositional qi. When an oppositional qi forms a shape,thereupon disorder is born. When upright sounds stimulatea person, the response is a compliant qi. When acompliant qi forms a shape, thereupon order is born. The


singer and the harmonizer have [mutual?] responses. Goodand bad take shape correspondingly. Therefore, noblepeople are careful about their goings and comings.(Xunzi 20/26-28)

The pattern of stimulation and response, along with the referenceto singer and harmonizer implies that music achieves its effect-whether positive or negative-through the power of resonatingqi.30 In another reference to the qi of music, the Xunzi warns thatthis stimulating resonance must be restrained. (As the passagebegins, the Xunzi notes that chaos will ensue if people are not freeto use the expression of music/joy as their guide.)

Jt x ~ ~ fJiL * i'& if1l1 ft 1l Z ~ ):) m: z{@ ;1t ~ JE ):) ~ ffij :F w:{@ ;1t )( JE ):) mffij :F ~{@ ~ Ht! 1r~ ~ • ~ 111 *JE ):) ~ 1fIJJ A z ~ Ie.\{@~$tfZ~1I\€ EI3 t-!jo~~The kings of old hated such chaos. Therefore, theyregulated the sounds of the Odes and Hymns in order toguide [dao] them [the people]. They caused the sounds tobe sufficient for joy, but not flowing. They caused theforms to be sufficient to discriminate, but not restrictive.They caused the intricacy or the directness, the abundanceor the scarcity, the modesty or the corporeity of therhythm and performance to be sufficient to stimulate andmove people's good heartminds. They thereby made surecorrupt and impure qi could not make contact therein.(Xunzi 20/3--4)

The passage's reference to not letting the qi of music gain"contact" (jie ~) suggests that the resonating qi described here iscontacting the senses.31 Thus, this contact with musical qiprobably indicates contact through the senses.32 This clarifies whatoccurs when a people's style (wind) is influenced by music (as in


Xunzi 20/22). Music transfonns the wind via the intake of qithrough the senses. The resonance of the musical qi automaticallyalters the person who senses it, causing an expulsion of similar qi.In other words, qi is the music that enters the senses as well as thewind that the music causes to emerge from them.

In addition to qi, the potency of music also works bymeans of de-something that is accessible to the senses, but asnebulous as qi.33 The Mencius notes that de can be heard throughmusic.

r~B~~m@~~~oo~~@~~~

Zigong said, "By viewing his ceremonies we know hisadministration. By hearing his music, we know his de."(Mencius 2A2)

De is as light as a hair (Xunzi 16/75), but it is often referred to as"ample" or "thick." This is because de can accumulate.34 Theaccumulation of de fills out into visual, and especially aural,fonns.35 The Mozi and the Xunzi speak repeatedly of the effects ofIIde and tone"--emphasizing the transmission of de through sound.In the course of explaining that the ancient kings increased their

efficiency by seeking help from others, the Mozi suggests that thelips that emit speech are the medium by which de is spread:

~F fit! -ttt ::K at l'i~ ~ A ~:Et 13 WJ a m~~A~umWJa§~

~ A ~ JL\ WJ a ,~ Jfi~A~JH[na:WJaJ!JJfF

WJ ~ mft ;fj XfJ. J!U ~ ffi 00 j[ ;fj m*WJ ~ § ~ 11 XfJ. J!IJ ~ ~ if ~ ffi~ WI ;fj iW *WJ ~ m, Jfi 11 XfJ. J!U ~ ~ ~ J!t ~ f~ *WJ ~ j}ljJ fF 11 XfJ. RP Jt ~ $ W pX,*[The ancient kings said] "It [their own effectiveness] wasnot the spirits,36 but only the ability to use others' ears andeyes to help their own hearing and sight to use others' lips


to help their own speech and talk, to use others' heart-minds to help their own thought, to use others' limbs tohelp their movements and acts." When those who helpone's listening and looking are many, then one can hearand see far. When those who help one's speech and talk aremany, then the soothing and compelling aspects of one'sde and tone are extensive.3 7 When those who help one'sthinking and pondering are many, then one's talk, plansand operations can be attained quickly. When those whohelp one's movements and acts are many, then one'sundertakings can be quickly accomplished.(Mozi 12/65-67, emphasis added)

This claim that de is enhanced by the lips of others suggests thatde functions orlallyla:urally. Moreover, the association of de withtone reinforces the claim in Mencius 2A2 that music providesevidence of de. A less literal interpretation might take all this torefer to spoken descriptions of virtue. But interpreting de at thatlevel of abstraction does not explain why de is so often spoken of,rather than seen.38 Nor does it explain the connection of de tomusic.

The power of music may also be linked to the harmonythat produces de. De and tone are "soothing and compelling" (Mozi12/66 above); they "fill and soothe the hundred clans" (:Jt ~ 1fJEPJ fJi ~ s M:, Xunzi 12/102).39 This power to soothe maywe]] derive from the harmony that seems to create de. TheZhuangzi explains de through the concept of cultivating harmonyto the point of completion:

~ 1fAX: fO z {rtf if2De is the cultivation of completed harmony.(Zhuangzi 5/47)

It seems justifiable to take this harmony as referring to music,because the Zhuangzi also speaks of the harmony of de via a


metaphor suggestive of wind (which, as we have just seen, is thecarrier of music). The metaphor implies that the harmony thatcreates de is like a wind upon which people can roam:

'Hi ii:.' f ~ Z ~They let the heartmind roam upon the harmony of de.(Zhuangzi 5/8)

This roaming is suggestive of the wind, because the Zhuangzi'ssages tend to roam on wind and/or qi. For instance, the Zhuangzichastises the character Liezi, whose riding on wind seems inferiorto riding on qi (or roaming in the boundless):40

JU T mJ mit ffii ff~B~ftr~~m~~iliE~*~~ZKffiimJ

;\ *" Z mPJ J!fi ~ iJ ~ 1B{ J3. ~ f 1{f~Liezi moved with the wind as his chariot.. ..Although thisavoids walking, it still depends on something. But ascendingstraight through heaven and earth, taking the changes ofthe six qi as one's chariot, and roaming that which has noboundaries-how is that depending on anything?(Zhuangzi 1/19-21)

This airborne "roaming" links roaming on the harmony of de toroaming on wind or qi. As the passages discussed above indicate,music is transported on wind or qi. Because it travels on wind or qi,the harmony of de may well be musical, and it may derive itscapacity to soothe from its musical tones. If so, it is because windcarries resonant (musical) qi and the soothing (musical) harmoniesthat create de. By this means, the wind enters the ears and trans-forms the person who hears it.

But the powers of wind are not limited to hearing music. Attimes, wind transforms through being ingested in other ways, and attimes its effects overlap with more than one sense. The metaphorin Zhuangzi 2/4 (see Chapter 1, footnote 29) of exhaling the qi of


earth is one example wherein wind and qi are exhaled. They canalso be inhaled and, in a surprising number of circumstances, affectone's desire for food. For instance, the Zhuangzi mentions aninverse relation between depth of breathing and relish of taste.Regarding the true people of old, it says,

.it4--;r,:-++.it§~~/ ..... ~ /1' 1=1 ""' ...... J~" "VI' 'PJ".

Their eating is not sweet. Their breathing is deeply deep.(Zhuangzi 6/6)

Similarly, the Zhuangzi also describes a "spirit person" (shenren 1$A), who inhales wind instead ofeating:

~MM L tl1 #1$A~~ ...1'jtli~IQk}j\~1i

In the mountains of far-off Guyi resides ashen-person,who...does not eat the five grains, but inhales the wind anddrinks the dew.(Zhuangzi 1/28-29)

By inhaling (odorless?) wind and (tasteless?) dew, the person istransformed into an airy creature of the mountain heights.Although the quality of the taste/smell is not mentioned in thispassage, one can only imagine that, as in Zhuangzi 6/6, thisinhaling has replaced ordinary food with a rather bland diet.

A similar phenomenon may be operative in the Lunyu.Confucius loses his appreciation for food upon being exposed toimpressive music:

T ft 1ft fig iffI-=. Ji l'm~ ~When the Master was in Qi, he heard the Shao music-forthree months he did not know the taste of meat.(Lunyu 7/14)

An Overoiew of Sense Discrimination 29

Of course, the main point is that Confucius was completelyabsorbed in the joy provided by the music. However, themanifestation of his preoccupation is striking. Like the person inZhuangzi 1/29 who inhales wind instead of food, Confucius'singestion of music seems to counteract his desire for savory food.This may explain why Confucius does not know (the desire for)taste-he is already filled by the winds of music.

Like music in the case of the Lunyu, de causes a loss oftaste in the Mencius. Explicating a passage from the Book ofPoetry, it says a person who is full of de is like a person with a fullstomach:

~ -:A ret M P) @ ret M!! P) ~§~3JZt~{g

mP) ~ Jjj A z Jf ~ z '* lli~ ~ 1111 ¥ Dl!! 1P: ,!1t mP) ~ Jjj A z )( tit {gThe Book ofPoetry says, "He intoxicates us with his wine.He satiates us with his de." That is, he satiates them withhumaneness and righteousness, hence they do not desirethe taste that people have for fat meat and fine millet. Afine reputation and broad praise are bestowed upon theirpersons, hence they do not desire people's elegantembroidered garments.(Mencius 6A7)

Here too de is as satisfying as food, and it overwhelms the ordinarydesires of taste.

Another passage from the Mencius may also suggesttransformation via inhaling wind, although "hearing reputation" isthe more acceptable translation. Mencius 5B1 speaks of peoplebeing influenced by the wind of a person of good character. It says,

7b. ~ fs ~ z ma :1iJiJi :1C it 11 :1C lLfL it


Therefore, of those who hear/sme1l41 the wind of Bo Vi,the obstinate become pure, the weak become erect in theirintent.(Mencius 5Bl)

If wind is taken to refer to Bo Vi's reputation, the passage maydescribe the sound of Bo Vi's good name being transmitted by thewind. But the passage does not mention reputation. Thus, becausethe wind can be smelled as well as heard, this passage may also beinvoking the transformative power of inhaling wind. Hence, inaddition to the transformative powers of hearing music, the windcan transform in other ways. Its effects are felt in the senses ofsmell and tast~, as well as hearing.

A loose connection seems to bind these elements carriedon the wind--one hears them, exhales or inhales them, and evensometimes has them substitute for oral ingestion. Wind is thecarrier of music, whose influence seems to derive from theresonance of qi and the harmonies of de. In whatever form,however, sensing the wind has powerful transformative effects.These effects account for some of the perceived power of thewind. They also suggest a somewhat unruly potential inherent inthe senses, through which the wind operates.

Knowledge and Sense Discrimination

Whether sense discrimination resembles a bureaucracy or a wind-storm, the senses indisputably play a role in the acquisition ofknowledge. The references to the senses' participation in knowingare often brief or cryptic. However, I will argue that they yield anintelligible portrait of the senses' role in knowing.

Briefly, there are two kinds of knowledge associated withsense discrimination in Warring States philosophical texts: (1)"Sensory knowledge" refers to knowledge of the senses themselves,independent of the heartmind. (2) "Verifying knowledge" refers toknowledge that is constructed by a combination of certain senses


and the heartmind. In order to clarify the nature of these twotypes of sense knowledge, I will compare them with three modelsof sense knowledge in Western philosophy: sensation, perception,and aspect perception. I will argue that sensation and perceptionare significantly different from the kinds of knowledge associatedwith the senses in these texts, but that aspect perception bearssome resemblance to them.

Comparative Models ofSense Knowledge

Sensation

Sensation is a model of sense knowledge that arises in the contextof a realist versus idealist debate about sense discrimination.Broadly speaking, in that debate, realists argue that the senses havesome kind of direct contact with external objects in the world. Bycontrast, idealists maintain that objects as we know them aresignificantly constructed by their contact with the mind. Idealistsargue that realists underestimate the role of the operations of themind in the sensory process. Thus, according to idealists, we do nothave direct contact with external objects.

The model of sensation I describe here derives from aposition called representative realism that attempts to bridge thetwo poles of realism and idealism. For the representative realist,the term "sensation" means the direct, private awareness of sensedata. Sense data are content neutral and uninterpreted. Forinstance, I might have the sensation of seeing a patch of red.42 If Ihave that sensation, I may insist that I see the sense data, regard-less of whether anyone else sees it or whether there is an actualexternal object that corresponds to it. Sensation is supposed toindicate what the experience is like "to me" (once again, regardlessof what is outside). The knowledge attributed to sensation isinfallible: I cannot be wrong about having a sensation that I see ared patch.43


PerceptionPerception also plays a role in the representative realist model ofsense knowledge. Unlike sensation, perception is indirect. Itinterprets the sense data.44 Thus, it is supposed to indicatesomething about the object, as opposed to the red patch that I see.Because the beliefs involved in perception are interpreted, they arepotentially fallible. Whereas sensation cannot be wrong aboutamorphous things like patches of red, perception's interpretationof such data contains the possibility of error-for instance, when itidentifies a patch of red as, say, a fire engine.

As this brief sketch of representative realism indicates,sensation and perception refer to two different (often opposed)modes of undt:rstanding how knowledge may be acquired by thesenses. The knowledge that is possible in sensation involves 'rawdata,' no interpretation, and no error. Knowledge in perception isindirect, and beliefs based on perception can be wrong because ofthe interpretation of raw data.

Aspect Perception

Ludwig Wittgenstein's model of "aspect perception" draws adistinction between "seeing" and "seeing as."45 The latter refers toseeing "aspects." For instance, seeing an aspect means seeing a faceas a face and not a flesh color with a certain shape. In looking at asketch that sometimes seems like a rabbit and sometimes a duck,one sees aspects, when one regards it as a rabbit or as a duck. Evenif we quickly switch back and forth from seeing it as a rabbit toseeing it as a duck, aspect-seeing is characteristically continuous ina particular sense-it is not a disjointed inference drawn from ahypothesis. As Wittgenstein explains, upon viewing a duck/rabbitsketch, we do not say "Oh, if I see this part as an ear and this partas the top, then it looks like a rabbit." Rather, we say, "Now it's aduck! Now it's a rabbit!" In other words, seeing aspects is not akind of seeing that is followed by thinking and then drawing aninference about what is seen.46 That is, although it involvestreating things as something, aspect-perception is not the same as

An Overview oj Sense Discrimination 33

perception (described above). Unlike perception, it is not mediatedby an act of interpreting raw data. It is embedded in a context (inwhich, for instance, knowing rabbits and ducks is taken forgranted). This background gives it a spontaneity not characteristicof making hypotheses and drawing inferences.

In spite of its immediateness, aspect perception does nothave the infallible certainty of sensation. Unlike sensation, itregards things meaningfully, in the sense that things are perceivedas something.

Neither perception nor sensation fits the models of sensediscrimination in these Warring States texts. The knowledgeaffiliated with the senses is not sensation, because it is not theprivate knowledge of sense data. Furthermore, because there is nonotion of sense data, the sensory knowledge also does not fit theperception model-wherein the mind interprets the data.

The fact that these models are not appropriate is notsurprising, because the idealist/realist debate is not operative inWarring States philosophy. In these Warring States texts, thedistinction between things "as they seem to us" and things "as theyare in themselves" is not a philosophical problem. Of course, thetexts notice cases where one or more of the senses seems un-reliable, but they do not proceed to express skepticism about thesenses as a whole.47 They manifest no concern about the sensessystematically distorting "things as they are." Thus, ideas aboutprivate, immediately known sense data do not appear in thesetexts. In other words, in keeping with the fact that the texts donot doubt the reliability of the senses as a whole, they also do notneed a notion like sense data to allay their doubts.

Although the realist/idealist debate is not evident inWarring States philosophical texts, their epistemological positionis not naive realism. It might be called naive, insofar as it is naivenot to entertain questions about being systematically deluded bythe senses. Yet, by not debating realism versus idealism, theposition does not, by default, become the naive realist confidencethat colors and sounds are somehow in the surfaces of objects. It


treats things like colors and sounds as things in their own right, notas things that belong to objects.48 Moreover, the default positionin these texts does not take the stand that colors and soundssimply belong "out there" in the world. Although the texts do notassert that consciousness shapes things like colors and sounds, theirdefault position is not that things exist without any connection tohuman context. Rather, the epistemological position seems to takefor granted the influence of background in sense discrimination.The texts suggest that things are sensed in terms of theirconnections to a range of similar types of things. This is evident inthe Xunzi's selection of the character "discriminate" (bian ffl) toindicate what the senses do.49 Discriminate is also the term theXunzi uses to describe what names do. Thus it is not that the sensesare natural and names are conventional-names and the senses aresimilar. Just as names depend upon a system of differences (onename can only function by means of not being another name), sotoo any given sense discrimination (such as sweet) gains its identityby not being something else (such as salty or sour). The identity ofwhat is sensed depends in part on relations to other sensed things.Furthermore, the subjects who make sense discriminations are alsopart of the constitutive relations among things. Rather thanbracketing the role of the human beings who sense, in theirdiscussions of sense discrimination the texts emphasize factors likedesire and aversion (that is, often the examples of sensing involvedesirable and undesirable things). The texts also imply that thevery attempt to sense something already entails regarding thething in some way. Thus, if there is such a thing as a range ofcolors "out there," it would have to be unavailable to even themost basic form of sensing. Moreover, the texts begin theiranalysis of the senses with the human being in the midst ofsensing.50 Although it is not naive realism, this position is realisticin its confidence that it is possible to have constant standards forsensory and naming discriminations. In these texts, this positioncontrasts with relativistic perspectivism-a position that


maintains that we cannot have constant standards for sensory andnaming discriminations, because there is no constant perspective.51

In sum, the poles of idealism versus realism do not seemimportant in Warring States philosophical texts. Whether things,such as colors, are out there or in the sensing subject is not inquestion. But that does not mean that, by default, the texts implythat colors are merely out there. Instead, a color must bediscriminated in terms of a background of other colors and thepreferences associated with that form of discrimination.

Sensory Knowledge in Wa"ing States Philosophical Texts

My contention is that there is sensory knowledge in these textsthat is independent of the heartmind. This knowledge is mentionedin the Zhengming (Rectification of Names) chapter of the Xunzi,in a lengthy passage that describes the operations of the senses. Italso appears in a number of other passages.

Before presenting the evidence for sensory knowledge, it isnecessary to briefly sketch the Zhengming's discussion of sensediscrimination. The Zhengming introduces the function of thesenses in the course of its description of the "causes for samenessand difference." The context of the discussion of the senses is anexplanation of how a qualified ruler would go about rectifyingnames for the purpose of establishing order. A knowledgeable rulerwould clarify important distinctions-like those between nobilityand baseness and the very difference between sameness anddifference itself. The Zhengming inquires about what constitutesthe causes for sameness and difference and then answers its ownquestion. The answer seems to come in three stages: (I) adescription of sameness, (2) a description of difference, and (3) adescription of knowledge.

The reference to the senses having knowledge occurs in thethird section, along with a more detailed description of somethingcalled "verifying knowledge" (in which the heartmind works withcertain senses). The Zhengming notes a series of conditions


required for verifying knowledge. It seems to say that if there isrecording without knowing, or verifying without speaking, then the

person will not be credited with knowing:52

?&ffij~m&:'~tti7('B'M$~~

?&fit11Jii!.Ii 'B $ z ffij l' ffl Ie., fJ& z ffij 1if€ m~u A ~ l' ?& tiW Z l' fflHowever, verifying must await the heavenly officials'meeting and recording their kinds in order to be possible. Ifthe five officials record them without knowing, or if theheartmind verifies without speaking,53 then people will notfail to pronounce it "not knowing."(Xunzi' 22/19-21 )

I take it that the agent with the potential to know in the third linerefers to the sense officials themselves, rather than the heartmind.

This is not the only passage in the Xunzi that seems toattribute knowledge to the senses themselves. In another passage,the Xunzi also considers cases in which the senses do not know in away that implies that ordinarily they do know. The passagedescribes cases wherein sensory knowledge is in jeopardy-whenprinciple is treated lightly, when external things are valued, whenbehavior departs from principle, and when the body is threatened.When the heartmind is distracted in these ways, the Xunzi says,

Dm~~ffij1'm~~

:Ej: IWHii rot ffij l' m:!'t !It§ tJU.illll'@ ffij l' m:!'t M~ 1~!PP: Ii ffij m l'm~ ~The mouth may be holding fine meats, but it does notknow their flavor. The ears may listen to bens and drums,but they do not know their sound. The eyes may seeembroidered, ornamented garments, but they do not know


their fonn. Though it has cold and wannth, peace and afine bamboo mat, the body does not know their ease.(Xunzi 22/80-81; Knoblock trans. modified 3:138)

A passage from the Mozi confinns that the senses can be spoken ofas knowing. The Mozi says (of music, ornament, delicious food,

and nice places to live),

... ~m~ Y: 0 m~ 1=t§ m~ ~ J.} m~ ~-Ift

...the body knows their comfort, the mouth knows theirsweetness, the eyes know their beauty, and the ears know

their music.(Mozi 32/5-6)

Even if this type of knowing might translate more readily as"awareness," the fact is, the texts developed no distinct tenn forawareness.54 Hence, the same tenn for knowing is used both for thesenses and for the knowing attributed to the heartmind. To that

extent, it is fair to say that the senses do know.If the senses know, then the Zhengmings long description

of sense operations should yield some clues about the nature oftheir knowledge. The Zhengmings description begins with the

"cause for sameness":

J'L lI'tJ !Jffi lI'tJ '~ tf~ ::F:. 15 ;L ~ ~ -1ft lI'tJil& J:t 11 ;L ~ {P) ffiJ mi~mP) ~ ~ t.0 ~ P) ffi Wl i!1For anything of the same lei [kind] and the same qing[condition? disposition?], the heavenly officials'"intentional thing"55 is the same. Thus, by lining up their[the senses'] areas of doubts and similarities, and makingthem universal,56 they [the knowledgeable rulers alluded toearlier?] make public [common?] the respective limits of

"fixed names."57(Xunzi 22/16)


This brief comment on the "cause of sameness" culminates with anassertion that sameness builds from public agreement about habitsof naming.58

It is easy to see how this description of the cause forsameness leads to misinterpretations of the Xunzts view of sensediscrimination. In the first line, the term qing 'If.!f has beentranslated as "essential characteristics."59 However, in this context,the term qing mis probably no more philosophically weighty thanthe term lei ~ (kind). Hence, "things of the same kind andcondition/disposition" together suggest "generally similar things."This section on the causes for sameness seems to claim that thesenses move in similar directions toward similar things, that is, thepassage asserts that, regarding things that are generally similar, theheavenly officials will have similar yiwu ~ ~. The Chinesecharacter yi ~ is frequently translated as "idea," which in thiscontext, might give the unfortunate impression of something likerepresentative mental ideas.60 An immediate reason to reject suchan interpretation of the passage is that the yiwu belongs to thesense officials, not the heartmind. Furthermore, translating yi ~as "representation" or "idea" is misleading, because of the visualconnotations of these terms in much of the Western philosophicaltradition.61 Emphasis on the visual is belied by the aural element inthe constitution of this character-"tone" yin if, over the"heartmind" xin iL\. Finally, such an interpretation is also unlikelybecause yi is not internal.

Yi ~ is better translated as "intent"-in the sense ofsomething external and manifest in movement. This is apparentbecause the Xunzi attributes "intentionality" to a dance:

.~*-m~....~pjm.z~

B§/f§~:E}/f§Il1-tl!.

7'& ffij tlHrfJ {llJ mil nnl~ MU~ ~!Ii: :f t{fi Wl


The intent [yi ~] of the dance joins with the way ofheaven....How can one know the intent of the dance?-The eyes do not themselves see, the ears do notthemselves hear,62 and yet the order of the bowing, raisingthe head, crouching and stretching out, advancing andretreating, slowing down and speeding up is such that noneof it is not modest and controlled.(Xunzi 20/37-39)

Thus, yi is not an internal mental picture at all. As in the orderlymovement of the dance, yi is a manifest and measurable tending ormovement. On these grounds, it seems that the senses' yiwu(intentional thing) refers to the direction of the senses' movementor inclination in relation to things. Thus, the description of thecause for sameness describes a process whereby the senses share atendency with regard to similar things-a tendency to move insimilar directions toward similar things.63

This notion that the senses have an intention or adirection helps explain sensory error and, by extension, sensoryknowledge. These texts mention two things that cause the sensesto fail to know. Xunzi 22/80-81 (see above) describes how theheartmind's preoccupations can distract the senses from knowingwhat is right in front of them. The implications of this are oftennoticed, and the passage is taken as saying that the senses'knowledge is like perception-the mind is necessary for the sensesto know. However, the presence of other obstructers of sensoryknowing-like darkness, distance, and pressure from the hands-suggests a different conclusion.64 That is, sensory error can becaused by any obstruction in the direction toward which it isheaded. For instance, the Mencius cites hunger and thirst as suchobstructions:

M~iftt~~ifttt~*f~tttttz1Eift

M~*zift


The hungry sweeten [or "find sweetness in"] eating. Thethirsty sweeten drinking. This is not obtaining thecorrectness of eating and drinking. [It is because] hungerand thirst obstruct them.(Mencius 7A27)

Hence, sensory knowledge depends, not on the heartmind'sattention per se, but on freedom from having itsdirections/intentions obstructed (whether by the heartmind or thehands, or anything else).

Xunzi 21/70 attributes sensory error to the influence ofvarious things on other things. It notes that darkness will make aperson confuse.a stone for a tiger and that drunkenness will changea person's ability to judge spatial distance. It also addresses thesenses specifically:

JIR § rm m:ti m- tJ ~ ~~£I:rm~:ti

~ ~ ~ rm t) ~ lIij Il(;gjA person who presses the eye and looks, looks at one,65deeming it as two. A person who covers the ear and listens,listens to m o-m 0 but deems it as hong-hong. 66

(Xunzi 21/70)

In this explicit reference to sensory error, interference in the formof pressure from the hands diverts the senses from knowing.

Nothing in the Xunzi 21/70 passage implies that the senses'operations are inherently dubious. The passage does indicate adisparity between how things ordinarily look and how they cansometimes look; however, this disparity is not the differencebetween "things as they are" and "things as they seem to oursenses." The cause of the error is a diversion in the direction of thenormal effort to look and listen. The context of the rest of thepassage-where darkness, distance, and alcohol affect things-alsoshows a disparity between things as they seem to the ordinary


attention of the senses and things as they seem when sensoryattention is misdirected. However, the passage presents themisdirected state as a rare occurrence, rather than as the normalstate of affairs. It assumes that ordinarily, when we are notpressing on our eyes, we need raise no doubts about how we look at'one.' Moreover, the passage blames the cause for doubt on unstablestandards--or the undue influence of other things. The senses arenot unreliable. The fault lies in the influence of things like anunstable heartmind, darkness, or blindness. The passage ends withthe assertion that we should be careful about what we take as ourstandards. In terms of the senses, this frame implies that, like theheartmind (when it is stable), the senses are acceptable standards,provided other things do not interfere with them.

In Xunzi 21170, sensory errors occur within the very act oflistening and looking. These are not errors in hearing and seeing.6 7

Although it does not translate well into English, the passagerepeats the characters for "look" and "listen," rather thanswitching to "see" and "hear" in the second half of each line. Itsays that a person who puts pressure on hislher eye "looks at one,deeming it as two," instead of saying slhe "looks at one, but seestwo." To understand the significance of this, we must investigatehow listening and looking are distinguished from hearing and seeingin these texts.

In part, hearing and seeing refer to the completion of theeffort represented by listening and 100king.68 Looking impliesmaking an effort to pay attention, as in the following examples:

H if 1CjJ fJUiTI ::f J! EIBlind persons raise their heads and look, but do not seestars.(Xunzi 21172-73)

The same is true of listening, which also indicates an exertion ofeffort:


~~:!tffil*J::f~ft:!tffi::f1*J

~~:!tffi5!::f;mm:!tffi::f5!

Each is careful about what he hears, and does not strive tolisten to what he does not hear. Each is careful about whathe sees and does not strive to look at what he does not see.(Xunzi 11/111-112, emphasis added)

The notion that seeing and hearing indicate completion of thiseffort is evident in a variety of places. Just as "completion" is theterminus of "doing," the Xunzi says, ordinarily, seeing is theterminus of looking and hearing is the terminus of listening. TheXunzi condemns those who strain at looking and listening beyondtheir natural outcome:

~ ffi ~m~::f"iiJ 5!~~::f"iiJ1*J

1.)~::f"iiJRX

This is what is called looking for what cannot be seen,listening for what cannot be heard, and doing what cannotbe completed.

(Xunzi 12/116-117, emphasis added)

By the same token, the Xunzi's praise for exceptional people whocan see without bothering to look also implies that seeing followsfrom the effort of looking:

::fmffij~

[Such a person] does not look yet sees.(Xunzi 12/64, 24/2)

The Mozi also makes it clear that a certain amount of looking andlistening constitutes an effort that normally produces acorresponding amount of seeing and hearing:


flfili-mffiijiJil,-f-1I!iZJf.1&-~ffiijiOO-f-1I!iZJf.1&

How were they [the sage-kings] able to see across athousand Ii with one look? How were they able to hearacross a thousand Ii with one [attempt at] listening?(Mozi 13/54)

Thus, part of the difference indicated by listening/looking versushearing/seeing is the difference between making an effort andachieving a goal.

Aside from indicating effort, we might call the otherfeature of listening and looking "organizational." To look andlisten is to organize things, in the sense of taking a certain attitudetoward them. This is particularly obvious in certain uses of theterms. That is, shi m (look) can function as "to considersomething to be something," and ting ~ (listen) can function as"to judge." This explains why the person in Xunzi 21170 can forma mistaken impression merely on the basis of looking and listening.Because shi functions as visually "consider" and ting functions asaurally "judge," looking and listening involve deeming things incertain ways.

Thus, sensory error can occur during the very effort tosense, which is an act of organizing the sensing in some particulardirection. The fact that the error occurs during a process that issimultaneously the attempt to sense and a kind of deeming (effortand organization) rules out the perceptual model of error. That is,the error is not a matter of misreading the raw data caused by"things in themselves." It is not a miscalculated inference emergingat the completion of hearing and seeing. Because organizingalready occurs during the effort to sense, there is no possibility ofthings giving rise to raw data that could be subject tointerpretation. To use the examples from Xunzi 21170, thisdepiction of sense discrimination does not present some "one"thing, sending out data, which is then misinterpreted as "two."Instead, it depicts the normal trajectory of looking-organizing in


a visual effort-being misdirected by pressure on the eyes. So too,it does not present mo-mo data being misinterpreted as hong-hong. Instead, it depicts the normal trajectory of listening beingdeflected by pressure on the ears. The interference in the look'sdirection (which, in theory, could come from anything) changesthe direction of the effort of sensing. The mistake is not due tomisinterpretation-it is due to an obstruction of direction.

This treatment of sensory error in Xunzi 21/70 also makessense discrimination seem like aspect perception. The notion thatlooking and listening are aimed at organizing things in a particularway resembles the continuous "seeing as" and "hearing as" ofaspect perception. The organization is part of the senses' aim inone direction rather than another. In the very act of trying tolook, the eyes look at something as something. As with aspectperception, the emphasis is on things being regarded. Indeed, thesection of the passage begins with a person looking at "one" andlistening to mo-mo.

The resemblance to aspect perception is also evident in theZhengmings description of the senses differentiating. Thisdescription occurs in the cause for difference section, whichfollows the cause for sameness. The cause for difference presents amuch more detailed analysis of each sense operation:

~ets~p) § J!~ '§f m1; ~ ~ ~ ~ P) 1+ J!it E • ilk $ ~ ~ ,*P) D :WW~ 3j: ~ Jm[ Mk Wi ~ ~ ~ P) .. J!~ jf tit ~ iff JBi ~ 11! P) ~ fit J!~ i'& :g ~ R ~ ~ ~ ~ P)JL\ ~Forms, bodies, colors, and patterns are differentiated by theeye. Sounds and tones, clear and muddy, modes andharmony,69 and strange sounds are differentiated by theear. Sweet, bitter, salty, bland, pungent, sour, and strangetastes are differentiated by the mouth. Fragrances andstenches, perfumes and rotten odors, putrid and rancid


smells, dank: and sour smells,70 as well as strange smells aredifferentiated by the nose. Illness and weIIness,71 cold andhot, smooth and sharp, light and heavy are differentiatedby the form and body. Speech and causes,72 happiness andanger, sadness and joy, loves, hates, and desires aredifferentiated by the heartmind.73

(Xunzi 22/17-19)

These lists of things that are differentiated seem to cover thebroadest possible range for each sense. The addition of "strange"sounds, tastes, and smells virtually guarantees that nothing is leftout. Hence, the categories to be differentiated seem to designateeach sense's range of possible forms of distinction.

This notion of differentiation implies something likeaspect perception.74 The categories that the senses differentiateare already too specific to suggest the sense data experienced bysensation. For example, tastes that are qualified enough to be calledsalty cannot be said to be raw sense data. At the same time, thereference to colors and shapes does not imply a perception model,wherein the senses take in data and the mind interprets it. Theheartmind's role here is no different from the other senses. Eachsense seems to perform its own differentiation within a system ofcontrasts.75 In some cases, the contrasts are explicit. For example,the nose distinguishes between appealing fragrances and repulsiveodors. Even when it is a question of differentiation among thingsthat do not appear to have an opposite, like shapes, they are stilldetermined by contrasts, because contrasts are inherent in the verynotion of differentiating. Nothing can be differentiated withoutother things being rejected. Each selected differentiation inclinestoward one direction and away from another (or others). Thus, thefocus of attention in the passage is on a spectrum of humanlysignificant differentiations.

In saying that the Xunzi describes aspects of sense, I amnot attributing a terribly complex view to the text. In spite of thefact that my explanation derives from Wittgenstein, it is not an


extraordinary perspective. As Martin Heidegger points out, thecomplicated and abstract achievement is hearing sounds as distinctfrom whatever creates them:

What we "first" hear is never noises or complexes ofsounds, but the creaking waggon, the motorcycle. We hearthe column on the march, the north wind, the woodpeckertapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial andcomplicated frame of mind to "hear" a "pure noise."76

The discussion of sensory error in Xunzi 21170 gives no indicationthat the Xunzi adopts such a complicated frame of mind that isrequired to thiIfk of sound as this kind of abstraction. The

on the epistemology early chinese thought · supports th~ contention that early chinese cosmology...

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