on species preservation and non- cooperative exploiters lone grønbæk kronbak university of...
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On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak
University of Southern Denmark
Marko Lindroos
University of Helsinki
Outline
Motivation
Model
Results
Motivation
Combining two-species models with the game theory
What are the driving force for species extinction in a two-
species model with biological dependency?
Does ‘Comedy of the Commons’ occur in two-species
fisheries?
What are the ecosystem consequences of economic
competition?
Modelling approach
Two-species
n symmetric competitive exploiters with non-selective
harvesting technology
Fish stocks may be biologically independent or dependent
What is the critical number of exploiters?
Analytical independent species model
S-G model
Derive first E* as the optimal effort, it depends on the
relevant economic and biological parameters
An n-player equilibrium is then derived as a function of
E*and n.
Relate then the equilibrium to the weakest stock’s size to
compute critical n*, over which ecosystem is not
sustained.
Dependent vs independent species
Driving force of extinction:
Independent species Biotechnical productivity Economic parameters
Dependent species Biological parameters must be considered Gives rise to a complex set of conditions For example:
Natural equilibrium does not exist‘The Comedy of the Commons’
Numerical dependent species model
Cases illustrated: Biological competition, symbiosis and
predator-prey
Case 1: Both stocks having low intrinsic growth rate
Case 2: Both stocks having a high intrinsic growth rate
Case 3: Low valued stock has a low intrinsic growth rate,
high value stock has a high intrinsic growth rate.
Case 4: Low valued stock has a high intrinsic growth rate,
high value stock has a low intrinsic growth rate.
Parameter values applied for simulationp1 p2 Rlow Rhigh K1=
K2
c q OA MS θ1 θ2
1 2 0.3 0.9 50 7 0.5 60 60 [-0.2;0.2] [-0.2;0.2]
Case 1: low intrinsic growth rate
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2 -0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0
20
40
60
theta2(beta)theta1(alpha)
ncrit
Case 2: High growth
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2 -0.2-0.1
00.1
0.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
theta2(beta)theta1(alpha)
ncrit
Case 4: Low valued stock has a high intrinsic growth rate, high value stock has a low intrinsic growth rate.
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2 -0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0
20
40
60
theta2(beta)theta1(alpha)
ncrit
Opposite case 3
Conclusion
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ does not always apply
A small change in the interdependency can lead to big
changes in the critical number of non-cooperative players
With competition among species a higher intrinsic growth
rate tend to extend the range of parameters for which
restricted open access is sustained
Discussion
From single-species models to ecosystem models
Ecosystem approach vs. socio-economic approach
Agreements and multi-species