REVIEW ARTICLE

ON SAMENESS AND NECESSITY

PATRICIA H A " A

NAMING AND NECESSITY, r ev i sed e d i t i o n By Saul Kripke (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univers i ty P r e s s , 1980, pp. 172)

Since i ts i n i t i a l pub l i ca t ion i n 1972, Naming and Necessity has exe r t ed a n enormous in f luence on d i scuss ions i n philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. Perhaps i t s g r e a t e s t impact has been on i s s u e s concerning r e fe rence and e s sen t i a l i sm. form t h e b a s i s f o r t he causa l theory of names, which i s a l l e g e d t o over turn d e s c r i p t i o n t h e o r i e s . H i s defense of e s s e n t i a l i s m has occasioned i t s phi lo- soph ica l r e v i v a l .

Kripke 's views on r e fe rence

Kripke 's i n f luence is due p a r t l y t o t h e n a t u r e of h i s claims: phi los- ophers are o f t e n cap t iva t ed by a vigorous defense of prima f a c i e implaus ib le p o s i t i o n s . Subs tan t ive ly , Naming and necessity o f f e r s d i scuss ions of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l foundat ions of phi losophy of language, epistemology, and meta- physics . Consequently, Kripke 's work is of t h e g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t t o anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n the foundat ions of ph i losoph ica l i nqu i ry , d e s p i t e (o r perhaps even because o f ) t he f a c t t h a t he is more concerned t o cons ider t h e con- cep tua l requirements of t h e o r i e s than t o provide f u l l y developed t h e o r i e s of h i s own.

The p resen t volume is a l i g h t l y r ev i sed e d i t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l lec- t u r e s . There a r e no subs t an t ive a l t e r a t i o n s , beyond a b r i e f p re face which o f f e r s s e v e r a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n s and an account of t he genes i s of Kripke 's i deas . t u r e s have provoked comment and cr i t ic ism, b u t t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y has been l i m i t e d b t h e s u b s t a n t i a l cos t of t h e volume i n which they i n i t i a l l y appeared; I indeed p a r t of Kripke 's aim i n prepar ing a second e d i t i o n has been t o produce a less expensive and more widely d i s t r i b u t e d vers ion of t h e lec- t u r e s . A heav i ly r ev i sed e d i t i o n would thus have reduced its va lue t o those seeking t o understand the con t rove r s i e s generated by the o r i g i n a l l e c t u r e s .

This absence of subs t an t ive r e v i s i o n i s a v i r t u e . Kripke 's lec-

The v a r i e t y of t o p i c s which Kripke addresses is almost s t agge r ing ; h i s d i scuss ions inc lude remarks on names, re ference , meaning, i d e n t i t y

91

92

PATRICIA HANNA

s t a t e m e n t s , cont ingency and n e c e s s i t y , t h e a p r i o r i and t h e a p o s t e r i o r i , p o s s i b i l i t y , c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , e s s e n t i a l i s m , and materialism. It would b e impossible i n l i m i t e d space t o d i s c u s s a l l o r even most of t h e s e t o p i c s i n d e t a i l , and I s h a l l n o t a t tempt t o do so. I n s t e a d I s h a l l focus on two of Kripke 's most provoca t ive d i s c u s s i o n s , namely t h o s e concerning e s s e n t i a l i s m and t h e s t a n d a r d meter.

1. E s s e n t i a l i s m

Kripke 's views on e s s e n t i a l i s m are connected w i t h h i s concept ion of r i g i d d e s i g n a t i o n , i t s e l f impor tan t ly r e l a t e d t o complex i s s u e s of r e f e r e n c e and t ransworld i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . t h a t d e s i g n a t e s t h e same o b j e c t i n a l l p o s s i b l e worlds";2 hence h i s i n t u i t i v e test of r i g i d i t y : " L e t ' s c a l l something a r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r i f i n every p o s s i b l e world i t d e s i g n a t e s t h e same o b j e c t , a n o n r i g i d o r a c c i d e n t a l d e s i g n a t o r i f t h a t is n o t t h e c a ~ e . " ~ Now on t h e assumption t h a t names and g e n e r a l terms d e s i g n a t i n g n a t u r a l k inds ( h e r e a f t e r , kind terms) are r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s , i t is r e l a t i v e l y easy t o see how one might conclude t h a t a s t r o n g , n o n - t r i v i a l vernion of e s s e n t i a l i s m must be t r u e . Names desi;:nate t h e same o b j e c t i n a l l p o s s i b l e worlds , whi le kind terms d e s i g n a t e t h e same kind of o b j e c t in a l l p o s s i b l e worlds . Thus, f o r example, "Kripke" must always denote Kripke, and " t i g e r " must always denote t i g e r s , j u s t as "Kripke" cannot denote W i t t g e n s t e i n , and " t i g e r " cannot denote f i s h o r dogs (though of course W i t t g e n s t e i n might have been named "Kripke" o r t h e word " t i g e r " used as t h e kind term f o r dogs) . i t seems t h a t t h e r e must be some f e a t u r e ( o r set of f e a t u r e s ) i n v i r t u e of which Kripke and t i g e r s are ( o r i n theory could be) marked o f f from Wittgen- s t e i n and dogs r e s p e c t i v e l y , i .e., each must have some p r o p e r t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y . Moreover, t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s cannot be exhausted by such t r i v i a l l y e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s as being s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , be ing four-s ided i f square , be ing warm- blooded o r n o t warm-blooded, o r be ing t h e same weight as o n e s e l f . erties" can b e taken as e s s e n t i a l t o an o b j e c t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e o b j e c t w i l l possess them i n every p o s s i b l e wor ld ; they are only t r i v i a l l y essent ia l , however, s i n c e e v e r y t h i n g has t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y . I n consequence, t h i s s o r t o f proper ty cannot s e r v e t o d i s t i n g u i s h one o b j e c t o r kind of o b j e c t from a n o t h e r , and cannot t h e r e f o r e be r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of terms as r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s .

By a r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r Kripke means "a tern

Hence

Such "prop-

I n view of t h e foregoing , i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Kripke defends a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m in Naming and Necessity. sugges t t h e c h a r a c t e r of h i s p o s i t i o n :

The fo l lowing passages

. . . f o r a l though t h e man (Nixon) might n o t have been P r e s i d e n t , i t is n o t t h e case t h a t he might no t have been Nixon (though he might n o t have been c a l l e d "Nixon"). (NN 49)

Perhaps i n some p o s s i b l e world Mr. and Mrs. Truman even had a c h i l d which a c t u a l l y became t h e queen of England and w a s passed o f f as t h e c h i l d of o t h e r p a r e n t s . This still would n o t b e a s i t u a t i o n i n

93

REVIEW ARTICLE

which this very woman whom w e cal l El izabe th the Second w a s t h e c h i l d of M r . and Mrs. Truman, o r so i t seems t o me. (NN 112-13)

L e t us suppose t h a t s c i e n t i s t s have inves t iga t ed the na tu re of gold and found t h a t i t is p a r t of t h e very. na tu re of t h i s subs tance , so t o speak, t h a t i t have the atomic number 79. . . . Suppose [ coun te r f ac tua l ly ] t h a t a l l the a reas which a c t u a l l y conta in gold now, contained i r o n p y r i t e s i n s t ead , o r some o t h e r substance which coun te r f e i t ed the s u p e r f i c i a l p r o p e r t i e s of gold but lacked its atomic s t r u c t u r e . Would w e say , of t h i s counter fac tua l s i t u a t i o n , t h a t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n gold would not even have been an element (because p y r i t e s is no t an element)? It seems t o me t h a t w e would no t . . . . One would not say t h a t i t would s t i l l be gold i n t h i s poss ib l e world, though gold would then l ack t h e atomic number 79. It would be some o the r s t u f f , some o the r substance. (NN 124)

Kripke's e s sen t i a l i sm is no t only a s t r o n g (non- t r iv ia l ) e s sen t i a l i sm, bu t a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y based e s sen t i a l i sm as w e l l . Kripke t o be e s s e n t i a l i nva r i ab ly t u r n o u t t o be p rope r t i e s d i scoverable by s c i e n t i f i c i nves t iga t ion and (somehow) recognizable as "pa r t of t he nature" of the ob jec t o r kind i n ques t ion . I s h a l l at tempt t o raise some doubts about t h i s s c i e n t i f i c b i a s , and about Kripke's e s s e n t i a l i s t p r o j e c t as a whole, by focusing on h i s claim t h a t t he o r i g i n of an o b j e c t is e s s e n t i a l t o t he o b j e c t ; my remarks w i l l be capable of ex tens ion t o o t h e r purported e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s , such as molecular s t r u c t u r e , atomic number, and so on (though I s h a l l no t so extend them e x p l i c i t l y ) . The reason f o r t h i s focus is twofold. F i r s t , t ak ing an ind iv idua l ' s o r i g i n as e s s e n t i a l is i n t u i t i v e l y very p l aus ib l e , and is perhaps t h e most i n t u i t i v e l y convincing of Kripke's e s s e n t i a l i s t claims. Second, Kripke's t h e s i s of t h e necess i ty of o r i g i n h i g h l i g h t s a problem i n h i s treatment of e s sen t i a l i sm as a whole, namely h i s f a i l u r e t o take adequate account of cons idera t ions of context and purpose. By concent ra t ing on t h i s t h e s i s , t he re fo re , i t is poss ib l e t o expose a genera l problem f o r t he essen- t ial ist pos i t i on .

To f i x ideas , w e may note a passage from Colin McGinn's "On t h e

The p rope r t i e s he ld by

Necessity of Origin," i n which Kripke's t h e s i s of the necess i ty of o r i g i n is vigorously defended:

. . . a d u l t s are commonly i d e n t i c a l wi th ch i ld ren , and ch i ld ren with i n f a n t s , i n f a n t s wi th f e t u s e s , and f e t u s e s wi th zygotes. Any attempt t o break t h i s obvious b io logi - c a l cont inui ty he re would su re ly be a r b i t r a r y .

. . . What of gametes and zygotes (and hence persons)? We cannot, i t seems, a v a i l ourse lves of the necess i ty of i d e n t i t y aga in , f o r gametes a r e two and persons are one. But n e i t h e r can w e s t o p s h o r t a t t he zygote, s i n c e i t seems e s s e n t i a l t h a t you come from t h e gametes you

94

PATRICIA HANNA

ac tua l ly come from, as the following t r a i n of thought makes p la in , Come from Nixon's a c t u a l gametes, i .e., consider a world i n which t h i s occurs. with the f i r s t supposit ion, add my ac tua l gametes t o the aforementioned world and suppose they dewlop i n t o an adu l t . t i t l e t o be m e ? the la t ter individual.

McGinn's idea, then, is t h a t a person's o r i g i n is cons t i t u t ed by the

Suppose, with a view t o z d u c t i o , t h a t I

Now, what is su re ly cornpossible

Which of these individuals has the s t ronger My i n t u i t i o n s seem decis ively t o favor

"actual gametes" from which the person comes, and t h a t o r ig in so conceived is an e s s e n t i a l property of the individual i n question. rendering of the i n t e n t behind Kripke's proposal. idea?

This seem a p rec i se But m u s t we accept t h i s

Before doing so, i t i s worth considering some remarks of Wittgenstein 's:

" A l l r i gh t : the concept of number is defined f o r you as the l o g i c a l sum of these individual i n t e r r e l a t e d con- cepts: cardinal numbers, r a t i o n a l numbers, real numbers, etc.; and i n the same way the concept of a game as the log ica l sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts."-- It need not be so. For I can give the concept "number" r i g i d limits i n t h i s way, t h a t is , use the word "number" f o r a r i g i d l y l imited concept, but I can a l s o use i t so t h a t the extension of the concept 18 not closed by a f r o n t i e r . And t h i s is how w e do use the word "game." For how is the concept of a game bounded? What s t i l l counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; f o r none has so f a r been drawn.5

Wittgenstein 's remarks might seem of doubtful relevance t o a b s t r a c t i s sues of transworld iden t i f i ca t ion . But I think they are very relevant . For on examination it appears t h a t o r ig in essent ia l ism rests on j u s t such a decision t o draw a boundary--in the case under consideration, for the concept of the same person--quite i n general , i .e., without regard fo r t he s p e c i a l purpose which would render the concept usable (cf . P I 6 9 ) . I n the absence of such a purpose, o r ig in essent ia l ism must not only be a r b i t r a r y but is bound t o appear a r b i t r a r y as w e l l . This may be i l l u s t r a t e d as follows.

L e t us consider a case i n which two possible (counterfactual) individ- uals , X and Y, are to be compared with H i t l e r . We w i l l place Hitler's o r ig in a t to. X, w e imagine, l ikewise o r ig ina t e s (from Hitler's gametes) a t to, and from to t o tl has a l i f e which resembles ilitler's i n a l l respects . however, X's l i f e diverges dramatically from Hitler's: l e t us imagine t h a t k i eventually converts t o Judaism, is ordained as a rabbi, and devotes his t i m e , enezgy, and resources t o the f i g h t against anti-Semitism. By con t r a s t , Y does not o r ig ina t e a t t but instead appears on the scene a t tl. But a f t e r tl, w e imagine, Y's l i f e Ps indis t inguishable from Hitler's: he serves i n the Austrian army i n World War I, becomes p o l i t i c a l l y ac t ive , rises t o power i n Germany, succeeds in exterminating mil l ions of J e w s , and so on.

After t

95

REVIEW ARTICLE

Both X and Y represent coun te r f ac tua l ly poss ib le persons. The important question is whether we can i n t e l l i g i b l y d i scuss counter fac tua l s i t u a t i o n s involving Hitler i n which Hit ler ' s l i f e i s i d e n t i c a l i n a l l r e spec t s t o X ' s l i f e o r t o Y's l i f e . represents such a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r H i t l e r , and t o a f f i rming t h a t X's l i f e represents such a p o s s i b i l i t y i n every relevant contex t (i.e., i n every poss ib l e world i n which H i t l e r e x i s t s a t a l l ) . H i t l e r i n v i r t u e of o r i g i n , while Y cannot be so i den t i f i ed . descr ibed , our counter fac tua l case sugges ts t h a t t h i s is coun te r in tu i t i ve a t b e s t ; and two var i a t ions on the case may expla in why t h i s is so.

Kripke's e s s e n t i a l i s t views commit him t o denying t h a t Y

On t h i s view, i n o the r words, X must be But as so f a r

(1) I f w e imagine t h a t X and Y a r e considered i n sepa ra t e and inde- pendent contex ts ( d i f f e r e n t poss ib l e wor lds) , then i t is easy t o understand the p o s s i b i l i t y of i den t i fy ing each ind iv idua l wi th H i t l e r . Suppose, f o r example, t h a t one's i n t e r e s t i s i n considering what Hitler's l i f e would have been l i k e had he found i n Judaism a source of i n s p i r a t i o n and comfort; he re it may be poss ib le t o i d e n t i f y X wi th Hitler (or i t may n o t , depending on y e t f u r t h e r contex tua l cons idera t ions) . By c o n t r a s t , Y might e a s i l y represent a poss ib l e Hitler i n a context i n which one wishes t o consider a poss ib l e world where l l i t l e r is somewhat younger than he i n f a c t w a s .

(2) If both X and Y are pos i t ed i n a s i n g l e counter fac tua l contex t , i t might s e e m t h a t only one of them could be i d e n t i f i e d wi th Hitler. I n a sense t h i s is t r i v i a l l y t r u e , bu t i t should n o t be allowed t o obscure t h e f a c t t h a t w e cannot decide i n advance which of them i s Hit ler . Indeed, t he re is nothing t o be decided absolutely--or i n general--at a l l . the purpose f o r which the counter fac tua l s i t u a t i o n is being employed is required f o r any such dec is ion . Depending on the po in t of our i nves t iga t ion , i t might turn out t h a t o r i g i n i s over r id ing , i n which case ( i n the absence of f u r t h e r competitors) X would be H i t l e r ; o r t he charac te r of Hitler's subsequent a c t i v i - t ies might be over r id ing , i n which case Y could be so i d e n t i f i e d .

A f u l l e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of

The poin t of t hese cases i s simply t h i s : what counts as the same ob jec t (or kind of ob jec t ) can be determined only wi th in the context i n which the question of sameness i s r a i sed . contex t , then it i s l i k e l y t h a t they w i l l be s e t t l e d i n accordance wi th the s t r i c t u r e s of sc ience ; w i th in such a contex t , f o r example, o r i g i n (e.g., gametes), atomic weight, o r molecular o r gene t ic s t r u c t u r e w i l l l i k e l y decide the i s sue . I n such contexts w e can d i scuss , e.g., persons i n terms of a " r i g i d l y l imi t ed concept," j u s t as the concept of number can be thus l imi t ed f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. But s c i e n t i f i c contex ts are not t he only contexts wi th in which w e can l eg i t ima te ly raise t h e ques t ion whether a is t h e same ob jec t as b, and s c i e n t i f i c purposes are accordingly n o t t he only purposes f o r which counter fac tua l v a r i a t i o n s on the a c t u a l world may be en ter ta ined . Once t h i s i s seen. w e remove the temptation t o view counter fac tua l inqui ry as d is - c los ing e s s e n t i a l f ea tu re s of ob jec t s witliout regard t o the context of such inquiry i t o e l f . To bel ieve i n A pr iv i leged d i sc losu re of t h l s eort is anal- ogous t o be l iev ing t h a t a person whose s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t is i n board games can cha rac t e r i ze games i general by a de f in i c ion t a i l o r e d t o those of h i s own i n t e r e s t ( c f . P I 3).

I f such ques t ions are r a i sed i n a b io log ica l

2 The language of "disclosure" i s , however, misleading; t h e cons idera t ion

96

PATRICIA HANNA

of counterfactual contexts need be no more mysterious than t h e consideration of Wittgenstein's bui lders i n P I 2. than anyone t o remove the sense of mystery of ten associated with t a l k of possible worlds: as he i n s i s t s , "[pJossible worlds are s t i p u l a t e d , not d i s c o v e m d . . .'I (NN 44). But although w e are thereby disabused of the notion t h a t t he propert ies of possible worlds are t o be discovered by a raeta- physical journey, Kripke's e s s e n t i a l i s t s t i pu la t ions seem confined t o what is s c i e n t i f i c a l l y discoverable i n the actual world. And he appears t o have been l e d to h i s e s s e n t i a l i s t views by the way i n which he conceives of r i g i d desig- nation, when the latter is viewed as an adequacy condition of theories of prop- er names and kind tenus. important passage on names i n Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s :

Kripke himself has perhaps done more

In explaining t h i s i t v i l l be useful t o cite M

Consider t h i s example. I f one says "Moses did not ex i s t " , t h i s may mean various things. It may mean: t he Israelite@ did not have a s i n g l e leader when they with- drew from Egypt--or: t h e i r leader w a s not ca l l ed Moses-- or: t he re cannot have been anyone who accomplished a l l t h a t the Bible relates of Moses--or: etc., etc.--We may say, following Russell: the name '!Moses'' can be defined by various descriptions. l e d the Israelites through the wilderness", "the man who l ived a t t h a t t i m e and place and was then ca l l ed 'Moses'", "the man who as a ch i ld w a s taken out of the N i l e by Pharaoh's daughter" and so on. And according as w e assume one de f in i t i on o r another t h e proposit ion "Moses did not exist ' ' acquires a d i f f e ren t sense, and so does every other proposit ion about Moses. . . . ready t o s u b s t i t u t e some one of these descriptions f o r "Moses"? I s h a l l perhaps say: By "Moses" I understand the man who did what the B i b l e relates of Moses, o r a t any rate a good deal of i t . But how much? H a v e I decided how much m u s t be proved f a l s e f o r me t o give up my propomition as f a l s e ? H a s t he name "Moses" got a fixed and unequivocal use f o r me i n a l l possible cases?-- Is i t not the case t h a t I have, so t o speak, a whole series of props i n readiness, and am ready t o lean on one i f another should be taken from under m e and vice versa?

For example, as "the man who

But when I make a statement about Moses,--am I always

. . . Should it be s a i d t h a t I am using a word whose meaning

I don't know, and so am t a lk ing nonsense?--Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the f ac t s . (PI 79)

Russell 's "s ingle description" theory i s obviously implaueible, both f o r reasons developed by Kripke and f o r those suggested by Wittgenstein him- se l f . i t s e l f a theory, i s recognizably r e l a t ed t o the "cluster concept theory" of names which Kripke g r i t i c i z e s a t length.7 Although Kripke's criticism eeem to me unsuccessful, Instead I wish

Wittgenstein 's view likewise emphasizes descr ipt ions and, while not

I s h a l l not discuss t h e point d i r ec t ly .

97

REVIEW ARTICLE

t o no te the e s s e n t i a l i s t b i a s i n Kripke's use of t h e concept of r i g i d desig- na t ion . E a r l i e r w e no t i ced how one might conclude t h a t a non- t r iv i a l ve r s ion of e s sen t i a l i sm must be t r u e : i f names, f o r example, des igna te the same ob jec t i n every poss ib l e world, i t i s tempting t o conclude t h a t Moses, e .g . , must have some p r o p e r t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y . our previous remarks concerning con tex t , w e can sugges t a way of r e s i s t i n g t h i s temptation.

By combining Wit tgens te in ' s view of names wi th

Put somewhat s t a r k l y , i t is a mistake t o suppose t h a t t h e no t ion of r i g i d des igna t ion , when taken a lone , has any impl i ca t ions f o r e s sen t i a l i sm. It appears t o e n t a i l e s sen t i a l i sm i n t h e context of Kripke's d i scuss ion ; bu t t h i s appearance is due t o t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i m p l i c i t i n t h e d iscuss ion i t s e l f . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t can seem impossible t o s a t i s f y t h e require- ment of r i g i d i t y without e s sen t i a l i sm only i f we read "objec t of t he same essence" f o r " the same objec t . " f o r we a r e a p t t o seek a guarantee of sameness of des igna t ion across p o s s i b l e worlds; and i f a l l cons idera t ions of purpose and contex t are l e f t ou t of account, we a r e l ikewise a p t t o p o s i t contex t - f ree p r o p e r t i e s of th ings which cha rac t e r i ze them abso lu te ly ( i . e . , e s sences ) , Now considered i n i s o l a t i o n , t he search f o r a guarantee of sameness i s no t wi thout motivation. From the f a c t t h a t "Moses" has no f ixed meaning, o r t h a t "game" has no f ixed boundary, i t does no t follow t h a t anything can count a s Moses o r as a game; the re are l i m i t s of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y on our purposes, however s p e c i a l they may be i n a given contex t . But t h e reading of "objec t of t h e same essence" f o r " the same object ' ' is emphatically not re- qui red , f o r i f we have enough of Wi t tgens te in ' s "descr ip t ions" of Moses, then w e have Moses. And the re is no reason t o suppose t h a t some i n v a r i a n t desc r ip t ion o r set of desc r ip t ions i s necessary t o in su re r i g i d i t y of des igna t ion , any more than us ing the word "game" commits us t o a set of necessary and s u f f i c i e n t con- d i t i o n s governing i t s use. For a s Kripke himself is aware, the s o r t s of th ings we can say of poss ib l e worlds are t h e s o r t s of th ings w e can say of t h e a c t u a l world.

Th i s reading can indeed appear t o be requi red ,

Our conclusion, then, is t h a t i f r i g i d des igna t ion is given a non-

Indeed one's theory may be question-begging i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t is poss ib l e t o s a t i s f y the requirement of r i g i d i t y wi thout a commitment t o e s sen t i a l i sm. q u i t e a n t i - e s s e n t i a l i s t , as is i l l u s t r a t e d by Russe l l ' s s i m p l i s t i c s i n g l e desc r ip t ion theory. For although t h i s theory is untenable, i ts d e f e c t s are not t r aceab le t o e r r o r s about r i g i d des igna t ion . For desc r ip t ion t h e o r i e s , sameness is determined by desc r ip t ions . Thus i f our desc r ip t ion of A r i s t o t l e is " the last g r e a t philosopher of an t iqu i ty , ' ' then i f some ind iv idua l is t he l a s t g rea t philosopher of a n t i q u i t y , t h a t person is ( i d e n t i c a l wi th) A r i s t o t l e . To oper- a t e w i th such an impoverished desc r ip t ion may be p o i n t l e s s i n most contex ts , bu t one does not thereby s i n aga ins t t h e requirement of r i g i d des igna t ion , nor incur an ob l iga t ion t o produce an essence.

Thus Kripke's claims concerning e s sen t i a l i sm and r i g i d des igna t ion seem t o me very doubtful. There is, however, i i c e r t a i n c l a s s of terms covered by Kripke's account which is of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . These are what might be c a l l e d "standard" (or"paradigm") terms , such a s "one meter"; and Kripke's views regarding such terms have important ep is temologica l impl ica t ions , s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r h i s claim t h a t t he re is contingent a p r i o r i knowledge. I n the next s ec t ion I s h a l l consider h i s i n t e r e s t i n g and con t rove r s i a l d i scuss ion of t he s tandard meter bar.

98

PATRICIA H A " A

2 . The Standard Neter Bar

Kripke's d i scuss ion of t he s tandard meter i s of i n t e r e s t f o r many For example, he has argued elsewhere9 t h a t s t rong e s s e n t i a l i s t reasons.

theses depend on preserv ing a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between the ep is temologica l no t ions of a p o s t e r i o r i and a p r i o r i on t h e one hand, and the metaphysical no t ions of necess i ty and contingency on t h e o the r . t he ex i s t ence of contingent a p r i o r i knowledge, he w i l l obviously have sus- ta ined t h i s sharp d i s t i n c t i o n . Again, h i 3 d iscuss ion provides an i l l u s t r a t i o n of how t h e re ference of c e r t a i n r i g i d des igna tors is f ixed ; i f success fu l , his ana lys i s au tomat ica l ly c a s t s doubt on r i v a l desc r ip t ion accounts. F i n a l l y , Kripke's d i scuss ion of t h e s tandard meter raises independent i s s u e s concerning s tandards and t h e i r r o l e i n language which a r e of ph i losophica l i n t e r e s t i n themselves.

Thus i f he can e s t a b l i s h

Kripke's d i scuss ion of the s tandard meter ba r i s based on a well-known passage i n Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Wittgenstein writes :

There is one t h ing of which one can say n e i t h e r t h a t i t is one metre long, nor t h a t i t is n o t one metre long, and t h a t is t h e s tandard m e t r e i n Paris-but t h i s , of course , i s not t o a s c r i b e any ex t raord inary proper ty t o i t , bu t only t o mark its p e c u l i a r r o l e i n t h e language-game of measuring wi th a metre-rule. ( P I 50)

Kripke, however, remarks: "This seems t o be a very ' ex t raord inary proper ty , ' a c t u a l l y , f o r any s t i c k t o have. I th ink he m u s t be wrong" (NN 5 4 ) . Several i s s u e s seem t o d iv ide Kripke and Wit tgens te in on t h i s p o i n t , which I s h a l l t r y t o d i s t i n g u i s h and treat sepa ra t e ly as f a r as poss ib l e .

Of Wit tgens te in ' s conten t ion , Kripke f i r s t asks : " I f t he s t i c k is a s t i c k , f o r example, 39.37 inches long ( I assume w e have some d i f f e r e n t s tandard f o r i nches ) , why i s n ' t i t one meter long?" (NN 54). is assuming no t merely t h a t w e have some d i f f e r e n t s tandard f o r inches , bu t t h a t t h i s s tandard may se rve as an independent s tandard of t h e meter. Now a necessary condi t ion of i ts func t ioning i n t h i s capac i ty is t h a t i t be capable i n p r i n c i p l e of ove r r id ing judgments a r r ived a t through measurement by the meter bar . But t h e l a t te r w i l l then f a i l t o represent t h e s tandard meter i n t h e (perhaps s p e c i a l o r a r t i f i c i a l ) sense Wittgenstein seems t o in tend: its "pecul ia r r o l e i n t h e language-game" w i l l be assumable by a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s tandard , and hence not be p e c u l i a r a t a l l .

Here, however, Kripke

Kripke next a l l e g e s t h a t " [ p l a r t of t he problem which is bother ing Wit tgens te in is, of course, t h a t t h i s s t i c k serves as a s tandard of length and so w e can ' t a t t r i b u t e length t o it" (NN 5 4 ) . But once aga in i t is unclear whether t h i s is what is bother ing Wit tgens te in ; w e s h a l l address a few remarks t o tho guomtion b a l m . What W l t t g e t i a t e l n evidently dnea mnintaln I n t h a t WP

cannot i n t e l l i g i b l y asulgii a l r l i R t I i ( e , ~ . , one M L U r ) L o Lila ataiidard iibettar ba r , when the l a t t e r ir, conceived ati the (not a ) standard of measurement t h a t we a r e using.

99

REVIEW ARTICLE

Rripke himself seems t o view t h i s as the most basic and c ruc ia l In addressing i t he appeals t o h i s technical notion of "f ixing the issue.

reference" of a term:

We could make the de f in i t i on more precise by s t ipu- l a t i n g t h a t one meter is t o be the length of [ s t i c k ] S a t a fixed t i m e to. . . . [The def iner is] using t h i s de f in i t i on not t o give t h e meaning of what he cal led the 'meter, ' but t o fix t h e r e f e r e n c e . . . . There is a ce r t a in length which w e wants t o mark out. . . . Even i f t h i s i s the only standard of length t h a t he uses, t he re is an i m u i t i v e d i f f e r - ence between the phrase 'one meter' and the phrase ' t h e length of S a t to.' t o designate r i g i d l y a c e r t a i n length i n a l l pos- s i b l e worlds, which i n the ac tua l world happens t o be the length of t he s t i c k a t to. On the other hand, ' t he length of S at to' does not designate anything r i g i d l y . In some counterfactual s i t u a t i o n s the s t i c k might have been longer and i n some shor t e r i f various stresses and s t r a i n s had been applied t o i t . (NN 54-55)

These claim seem t o rest on a curious conception of using a standard I s h a l l examine these ques-

The f i r s t phrase is meant

of length, and on a s u b t l e equivocation as w e l l . t ions in turn.

Does Kripke's conception express a usable standard of length? L e t us

Although I have never seen t h i s s t i c k , and have consider a f anc i fu l case. there is a s t i c k i n my study. but the roughest idea of i ts length, I decide t o use i t t o pick ou t a length which is t o be my standard of measurement. I therefore pronounce t h a t "one Hanna" is t o be the length of t he s t i c k i n my study a t 11:OO P.M., 25 February 1981." i n the community.

Suppose t h a t I a m t o ld by a r e l i a b l e source t h a t

This standard is then general ly adopted i n view of my exal ted s t a t u e

Suppose now t h a t while I and my followers rush t o my study, with the aim of hermetically sea l ing the environment, my dog chews off p a r t of one end of t he s t i c k i n an a c t which is never detected. a t 1 1 : l O P.M., w e have not preserved a s t i c k which exemplifies the length of S a t 1 1 : O O P.M. W e must now ask whether a l l of our measurements made Subsequent to 1 1 : l O are necessar i ly mistaken, even though w e are completely unaware of it. Kripke's view seems c l e a r l y t o imply t h a t they are, no matter how extensive our p rac t i ce of measurement may become. But t h i s charge of e r r o r has no real force. Would its subsequent acknowledgement a l t e r any calculat ions, o r lead any buildings t o collapse?

Thus when w e seal up the s t i c k

Of course, t he case is f anc i fu l , and i n p rac t i ce a standard independent of t ha t o r ig ina l ly specif ied w i l l imp l i c i t l y be assumed. But nothing i n Kripke's remarks on r i g i d designation suggests the necessi ty of multiple standards. And t h i s point of p r inc ip l e is c ruc ia l where usable standards are a t issue, f o r Kripke's account provides no motivation f o r an important and common pract ice . In many contexts, w e treat our physical standards i n a very

100

PATRICIA HANNA

spec ia l fashion: w e would not allow j u s t any s t i c k t o serve as the standard meter; w e take spec ia l measures t o preserve a s t a b l e environment; we improve our means of securing constancy of measurement; and so on. W e could view t h i s p rac t i ce as an attempt t o remove the difference between, e.g., t h e expressions "one meter" and "the length of S a t to."

This difference cannot of course f i n a l l y be removed. indeed an i n t u i t i v e difference between the phrases "one meter" and "the length of S a t tot ' . B u t t h i s difference is not the difference Kripke requires f o r h i s argument, and therein l ies the s u b t l e equivocation previously referred to. The reason for the difference is t h i s : without an e x p l i c i t declarat ion t o the contrary, w e would not normally assume tha t the length of some given s t i c k S is the o n l y standard of the meter i n use. But t h i s assumption governs the hypothetical s i t u a t i o n which Kripke descr ibes; and once t h i s i s appreciated, Kripke's " i n t u i t i v e difference" disappears. In assessing h i s argument, i t i s v i t a l t o d i s t ingu i sh what Kripke terms a "cer ta in length"--namely the l e n g t h of S a t to--from the s t i c k which happens t o be of t h a t length. cannot vary with varying counterfactual s i t u a t i o n s ; f o r it is p rec i se ly t h i s l e n g t h which Kripke's def iner wishes t o mark out when f ix ing the reference of "one meter". The l a t t e r , harever--the s t i c k S which a t t o has t h a t length-- can of course vary i n length i n d i f f e ren t counterfactual contexts. And i t is i n terms of t h i s l a t t e r possible va r i a t ion t h a t Kripke ul t imately explains the i n t u i t i v e difference between the two phrases o r ig ina l ly c i ted. But h i s argu- ment requires an i n t u i t i v e difference between "one meter" and "the certain l e n g t h of S a t to," since the connection between these f ixes the reference of "one meter". He does not , however, o f f e r any reason whatever fo r assuming such a difference, nor does i t seem possible t h a t t he re could be any.

For the re i s

The former

On t he main point a t i s sue , Wittgenstein appears t o hold a view whose t ru th i s unremarkable, namely t h a t where the standard meter bar is the standard of length w e are using, i t cannot be s a i d t o have a c e r t a i n length. For i f one aff i rms the contrary, one immediately confronts the question "What is i t s length?", which, i n the absence of some independent standard, has no c l ea r sense. (Such an aff i rmat ion seems t o presuppose t h a t the standard meter is not "a paradigm i n our language-game; something with which comparison is made" [ P I 501.) Of course, one might respond vacuously t h a t t he standard meter bar is whatever length it is; and oddly enough, Kripke becomes committed t o t h i s response i n h i s discussion of t he contingent a p r i o r i . a t i on of h i s discussion may iden t i fy more c l ea r ly h i s misapprehensions concern- ing the standard meter.

A b r i e f consider-

According t o Kripke, t he s t a t u s of "S is one meter long" is a p r i o r i ,

Kripke's idea, i n o the r words, i s t h a t h i s de f ine r (see the pre- epistemologically speaking; whereas metaphysically speaking i ts s t a t u s is contingent. viously quoted passage) can know a p r i o r i t h a t S is one meter long, but t h a t i t is nevertheless a contingent f a c t t h a t S is one meter long; f o r i f , e.g., heat had been applied to S a t t then a t to S would not have been one meter long. Focusing f i r s t on Kripke s "metaphysical" claim, w e may note t h a t h i s a rgmen t from counterfactual va r i a t ions i n the length of S requires t h i s construal of "S is one meter long": the s t i c k S has some s p e c i f i c length (e.g., 39.37 inches--not merely some length o r other) a t to. ce r t a in ly a contingent t r u t h .

0'

Now t h i s , i f t rue , is But c l ea r ly i t is not a t r u t h which Kripke's

101

REVIEW ARTICLE

d e f i n e r knows a p r i o r i . s t a n d a r d , i t may very w e l l be something which t h e d e f i n e r does n o t know a t a l l . Epis temologica l ly speaking, t h e n , what is known ( i f anyth ing) about t h e s p e c i f i c l e n g t h of S is known a p o s t e r i o r i .

Indeed, as sugges ted by our d i s c u s s i o n of a "Hanna"

What t h e r e f o r e does Kripke 's d e f i n e r know a p r i o r i when he knows t h a t "S is one meter long"? Merely t h i s : ( a ) t h a t S h a s whatever l e n g t h i t h a s , and (b) t h a t whatever i t s l e n g t h , t h i s l e n g t h w i l l ( through h i s own act of " d e f i n i t i o n " ) be h i s s t a n d a r d of one meter. On Kripke 's view, i n s h o r t , one can h e r e know a p r i o r i t h a t an o b j e c t i s one meter long wi thout knowing, n o r indeed having any i d e a , how long t h a t o b j e c t i s ; S can b e known a p r i o r i t o be one meter long, r e g a r d l e s s of i ts l e n g t h a t to, and i r r e s p e c t i v e of any changes i n l e n g t h i t may undergo a t any o t h e r t i m e s . T h i s , one might remark, i s an "ext raord inary proper ty" f o r anyone w i t h knowledge of t h e metric system t o p o s s e s s ; c e r t a i n l y t h e r e is an enormous " i n t u i t i v e d i f f e r e n c e " between t h i s and customary examples of knowing t h e l e n g t h of an o b j e c t . Kripke 's view t h u s seems t o come t o t h i s : t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d meter b a r is known t o b e as long as i t i s - - sure ly a paradigm case of a u s e l e s s p r o p o s i t i o n ( c f . P I 216).

Once aga in , t h e r e f o r e , Kripke seems t o g e n e r a t e confus ion by c o n f l a t i n g "having length" wi th "having a c e r t a i n length." unavoidable . For Kripke seems t o imply t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a l t e r n a t i v e account conunits one t o t h e paradoxica l view t h a t w e cannot a t t r i b u t e l e n g t h t o t h e s t a n d a r d meter b a r , i .e . , t h a t i t i s a l t o g e t h e r wi thout l e n g t h ; and t h i s seems t o be a s t r a n g e s t a n d a r d indeed--a s t a n d a r d , wi thout l e n g t h , w i t h which com- p a r i s o n s of l e n g t h are t o b e made. But Wi t tgena te in is n o t so committed, as h i s r e l a t e d d i s c u s s i o n of c o l o r s t a n d a r d s makes clear :

But t h i s c o n f l a t i o n may seem

L e t us imagine samples of c o l o u r be ing preserved i n P a r i s l i k e t h e s t a n d a r d metre . W e d e f i n e : "sepia" means t h e co lour of t h e s t a n d a r d s e p i a which is t h e r e kept h e r m e t i c a l l y s e a l e d . Then i t w i l l make no s e n s e t o say of t h i s sample t h a t i t is of t h i s co lour o r t h a t i t is n o t . (P I 50)

Obviously Wit tgens te in is speaking of samples of c o l o r ( n o t , e . g . , of shape) ; n o r does he commit himself t o t h e c u r i o u s metaphysical s p e c t a c l e o f , e .g . , an o b j e c t ' s becoming i n v i s i b l e by i t s assuming t h e r o l e of s tandard . then , i s t h e obvious one, namely t h a t , e.g., "It makes no s e n s e t o s a y of t h e s t a n d a r d meter t h a t i t i s of t h i s l e n g t h o r t h a t " does n o t e n t a i l "The s t a n d a r d meter is wi thout length ."

The moral ,

But t h e r e i s a less obvious moral as w e l l . For W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s - cuss ion of bo th t h e meter b a r and c o l o r samples i s h i g h l y c o n t r i v e d and a r t i f i c i a l . Earlier w e c h a r a c t e r i z e d , somewhat metaphor ica l ly , t h e common p r a c t i c e of s t r i v i n g t o remove t h e d i f f e r e n c e between "one meter" and " the l e n g t h of S a t to.'' s c i e n t i f i c o r t e c h n i c a l c o n t e x t s . But t h e s e are n o t t h e only c o n t e x t s , and as always o u r aims are d i v e r s e . d i s c u s s i o n is n e c e s s a r i l y a r t i f i c i a l ; b u t even more a r t i f i c i a l is t h e i d e a of s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t one meter is t o b e t h e l e n g t h of S a t a f i x e d t i m e t o . Once

This a i m can assume s i g n i f i c a n c e i n a v a r i e t y of

It is f o r t h i s reason t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s

102

PATRICIA HANNA

more the concept of r i g i d des igna t ion can lead us t o th ink t h a t such an exac t concept must be used; how otherwise can "one meter'' des igna te t h e same length i n every poss ib l e world? But w e do n o t use such a concept (normally). Nor can w e be requi red t o do so, unless " the same length" is s t i p u l a t e d , c i r c u l a r l y , t o car ry t h i s impl ica t ion of exac tness ( c f . our earlier d iscuss ion of "the same person"). I n P I 69 Wit tgens te in denies t h a t i t took t h e d e f i n i t i o n 1 pace = 75 cm. t o make the measure "one pace" usable. H i s e l abora t ion seema t o m e dec i s ive : "And i f you want t o say 'But s t i l l , be fo re t h a t i t wasn't an exac t measure', then I rep ly : very w e l l , it was an inexac t one.--Though you s t i l l owe m e a d e f i n i t i o n of exactness" ( P I 69).11

3 . Concluding Remarks

I n h i s preface t o t h e new e d i t i o n of Naming and N e c e s s i t y , Kripke sugges ts t h e c e n t r a l i t y of r i g i d des igna t ion t o t h e ideas developed i n the l e c t u r e s . I be l i eve t h a t i t is central, and I have suggested how flaws i n h i s d i scuss ions of e s sen t i a l i sm and t h e s tandard meter ba r may be t r aced to t h i s conception. But I have not attempted t o meet poss ib l e r e jo inde r s t o these c r i t i c i s m s , and I have d e a l t wi th only a few of t h e many top ic s discussed i n Kripke's r i c h and e x c i t i n g book. o r depth of h i s d i scuss ions , a l l of which repay d e t a i l e d examination. Kripke's concern is with i s s u e s which are abso lu te ly fundamental t o philosophy. His treatment of t hese i s s u e s is highly o r i g i n a l and inva r i ab ly i n t e r e s t i n g . I t is t he re fo re t o be hoped t h a t t h e p re sen t e d i t i o n of t h e l e c t u r e s secures a wide audience, f o r few philosophers could f a i l t o p r o f i t from t h i s outstand- ing con t r ibu t ion t o philosophy.12 9

Nor have I managed t o convey the complexity

DEPARTMENT OF PHIMSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84112

103

REVIEW ARTICLE

NOTES

'The l e c t u r e s o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Donald Davidson and G i l b e r t Harman, (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Re ide l P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1972) .

' " Ident i ty and Necess i ty ," i n I d e n t i t y and I n d i v i d u a t i o n , ed. Mil ton

3Naming and Necessity, p. 48; h e r e a f t e r a b b r e v i a t e d N N , succeeded by

4't0n t h e Neccesi ty of O r i g i n , " The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) : 132.

5Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n , Phi losohpical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 3d ed. , t r a n s .

Munitz, (New York: New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971) , p . 145.

page numbers.

G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968) , sect . 68; h e r e a f t e r abbrevia ted P I , succeeded by paragraph numbers.

6I have developed t h i s type of cr i t ic ism a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h i n P a t r i c i a Johns ton , "Origin and Necess i ty ," Philosophical S t u d i e s 32 (1977). But t h i s earlier paper e x h i b i t s confusion about i d e n t i t y , which l e d m e t o underest imate Kripke 's e s s e n t i a l i s t commitment.

'The c l u s t e r concept theory is developed by John R. S e a r l e , "Proper

'1 f i n d myself i n s u b s t a n t i a l agreement w i t h Michael D u m m e t t ' s r e b u t t a l of t h e s e criticisms; see h i s F r e g e : Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). pp. 110-51.

Names , " Mind 67 (1958). Kr ipke ' s criticism occurs a t NN 71-97.

911dent i ty and Necessi ty , ' ' pp. 152-53.

"Lest t h i s seem t o v i o l a t e t h e s p l r i t o f Kripke 's account , i t is worth n o t i n g t h a t Kripke does n o t r e q u i r e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of i t e m s i n terms of which r e f e r e n c e is f i x e d : see, e .g . , h i s d i s c u s s i o n of "Hesperus" a t NN 78.

"A few paragraphs of t h e foregoing d i s c u s s i o n are adapted from P a t r i c i a Hanna Johnson and T. M. Reed, "The Standard Meter Bar'' (1974, unpubl ished); t h i s material is used wi th permission of D r . Reed.

12My t rea tment of t h e t o p i c s cons idered h e r e h a s b e n e f i t e d from d i s - cuss ions w i t h T. M. Reed over a p e r i o d of many y e a r s ; more r e c e n t l y , d i s - cuss ions wi th Fred Hagen have improved my unders tanding of Wi t tgens te in on s e v e r a l p o i n t s . They are n o t , of course , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any e r r o r s .

130n r e c e i p t of t h i s review a r t i c l e t h e E d i t o r of Philosophical Inves- t i g a t i o n s k i n d l y s e n t m e a pre-publ ica t ion copy of Norman Malcolm's "Kripke and t h e Standard Meter" (Phi losophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , Winter 1981). o f which I had been unaware, r e q u e s t i n g any c r i t i c a l comments I might deem a p p r o p r i a t e . Even t h e c a s u a l reader w i l l n o t i c e t h a t my c r i t i c i s m s over lap a t many p o i n t s w i t h Malcolm's, and n a t u r a l l y I a m i n agreement w i t h him a t t h e s e p o i n t s . I n a d d i t i o n , I f i n d t h a t I a g r e e w i t h Malcola 's e x c e l l e n t paper on every major p o i n t of subs tance , though t h e contex t of my d i s c u s s i o n y i e l d s d i f f e r e n c e s of emphasis o r formula t ion which may d i s g u i s e t h e e x t e n t of my agreement.