olsen-the origins of european citizenship

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The origins of Europeancitizenship in the first twodecades of European integrationEspen D.H. OlsenPublished online: 22 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Espen D.H. Olsen (2008) The origins of European citizenship in thefirst two decades of European integration, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:1,40-57, DOI: 10.1080/13501760701702157

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The origins of Europeancitizenship in the first twodecades of European integrationEspen D.H. Olsen

ABSTRACT By tracing conceptions of citizenship in the early period of Europeanintegration until 1971, this article argues that the Maastricht Treaty was not yearzero in the EU citizenship discourse. In contrast to previous research, this article con-tributes theoretically by studying citizenship as a status of individuals in relation to apolitical unit, differentiated analytically into membership, identity, rights and par-ticipation, and subsequently focuses on the interplay between them. Further, it con-tributes empirically by highlighting those treaties, judicial decisions, policies andpractices that affected the status of individuals. The analysis finds that citizenshipelements in early European integration created a frame upon which laterconceptions of citizenship developed, including Union citizenship. It must,however, not be overstated as anything resembling a status akin to national citizen-ship. European citizenship should rather be understood as a status emerging fromconcrete judicial, legislative and political practices.

KEY WORDS European citizenship; European Court of Justice; Europeanintegration; founding treaties; free movement; rights.

INTRODUCTION

When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in1951, nobody could have foreseen a European Union (EU) of 27 memberstates, with a European Parliament (EP), wide-reaching common policies anda common currency. Further, they would surely not have been able to anticipatethe intensity of debate over citizenship that emerged after Union citizenship wasinstitutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). After all, the dominant under-standing has been to link one citizen and one nation-state with one prevailingnational identity (see, e.g., Heater 1999; Schnapper 1998).

Indeed, in one of the first articles that dealt explicitly with the interface con-cerning citizenship and the European Economic Community (EEC), the Frenchsociologist Raymond Aron (1974: 653) succinctly stated: ‘[T]here are no suchanimals as “European citizens”. There are only French, German, or Italian citi-zens.’ In this reading, owing to the lack of explicit rights of a political character, a

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Journal of European Public Policy 15:1 January 2008: 40–57

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‘European’ citizenship was neither descriptively visible, nor theoretically viable.In Aron’s analysis, political rights are seen as unequivocally national in charac-ter – and separated from other types of rights in their significance for the ethosof citizenship (Aron 1974: 642–3, 651).

Contrary to this, it has been argued from a legal point of view that an ‘incipient’form of European citizenship was visible already in the first treaties and developedfurther through subsequent political and legal practices (Evans 1984; Plender1976; see also Closa 1992). This has been corroborated by studies that havefocused on the institutional construction of ‘citizenship practice’ from the1970s onwards (Wiener 1998), on identity issues raised by the relationshipbetween European institutions and individual citizens (Kostakopoulou 2001),and the gradual evolution of a European ‘social citizenship’ (Meehan 1993).The sceptical stance of Aron has also been opposed by Willem Maas (2005),who in an article on ‘the genesis of European rights’, argues that the study ofEuropean citizenship should focus on understanding and explaining the develop-ment of rights as a political struggle even pre-dating European integration. A focuson rights is further evident in Everson (1995) who emphasizes a ‘legacy of themarket citizen’ at the core of early European integration as the background fora normative discussion of what Union citizenship might become.

These studies are all valuable contributions to our understanding of issueslinked to citizenship within European integration. Still, it is puzzling that, forinstance, Wiener does not even consider that citizenship could also have hadan impact before the 1970s. Given the impetus of the ECSC and Rome Treatieson the institutions and subsequent policies of the European integration project,one should also consider how they affected the status of individuals. Conse-quently, in this article the focus is on the period which preceded the launchof the ‘official’ European citizenship discourse in the 1970s (see Kostakopoulou2001: 41). The aim, then, is to ascertain what kind of conceptions of citizenshipwere part of the ‘fabric’ of European integration from the outset.

Although Maas, Everson, Meehan and Kostakopoulou provide some empiri-cal insights on this, what is lacking in this body of work is a more systematicdiscussion of citizenship based on a broad theoretical framework encompassingmore dimensions than just (social) rights or identity. Thus, besides stretchingthe historical focus back to the founding treaties, the narrow theoretical scopeof these studies is improved upon in this article by studying citizenship as astatus of individuals in relation to a political unit, differentiated analyticallyinto four dimensions: membership, identity, rights and participation. Thisamounts to a more general and dynamic approach as it focuses on the potentialinterplay between dimensions rather than on a definition of citizenship as apriori consisting of ever present attributes. By providing such a theoretical fra-mework, the contribution of the article is to highlight that empirically we needto ascertain how European integration has activated (or possibly omitted)dimensions of citizenship. Thus, the article demonstrates that citizenship is aphenomenon which is not conjured up ex nihilo, but which emerges, evolvesand changes within concrete practices. More specifically, this is done by locating

E.D.H. Olsen: The origins of European citizenship 41

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citizenship within those treaties, legislative measures and practices that arelinked to the status of individuals. In this paper the following instances are ana-lysed: the ECSC and Rome Treaties, jurisprudence from the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) in the 1960s and free movement legislation in the 1960s/1970s.

By highlighting the empirical development of citizenship elements already inthe first two decades of European integration, this article therefore disprovesgrandiose theoretical claims such as that of Aron on the impossibility of regard-ing the concept of citizenship on another level than the nation-state. Tracing theinitial conceptions of European citizenship also provides evidence of how theMaastricht Treaty should not be seen as ‘year zero’ in the EU citizenship dis-course. In fact, the founding treaties and subsequent practices created distinctfeatures of European citizenship such as its dependence on prior national citi-zenship and free movement as a core principle on which later conceptionsclearly developed (see, e.g., Closa 1992). Furthermore, this empirical insightalso poses a challenge to key theoretical and normative suppositions in thepost-Maastricht literature such as the non-viability of citizenship on the supra-national level among no-demos theorists (see, e.g., Grimm 1995; Shore 2004) andthe purported separation of nationality and citizenship among post-nationalists(see, e.g., Curtin 1997; Gerstenberg 2001; Habermas 1996, 1998).

The article will proceed as follows. First, the theoretical framework will bepresented. As citizenship is a contested and normatively laden concept, attentionwill be focused on four analytical dimensions that cover different issues raised bythe concept. In defining each dimension, attention will also be directed to howthey work in operational terms providing empirical indicators for the study ofcitizenship. Second, in the empirical part of the article, four different instancesin the early period of European integration will be scrutinized to the extent thatthey have affected the status of individuals. In doing so, the focus will be on illu-minating how dimensions of citizenship were explicitly or implicitly invoked ineach instance and how they were translated into conceptions of citizenship.Further, with regard to the empirical analysis, the trajectory of the period willbe discussed, with specific attention to similarities and differences betweenthe instances. Third, in providing concluding remarks, the findings of the analy-sis will be linked to a brief appraisal of the main strands of the current theoreticaldebate on European citizenship.

DEFINING DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

On the most general level I will define citizenship as a status of individuals tied toa political unit. With this in mind, the concept of citizenship involves issues bothof individuality and collectivity (Heater 1999). Citizenship would hold nomeaning if it was devoid of a collective component – it is always granted bysome political unit (see, e.g., Walzer 1983). In fact, it is exactly at the interfacerelating the individual with a political unit that conceptions of citizenship arise.

Stating that citizenship is a status of individuals does not, however, providemuch in empirical terms. How is it constituted? As Bellamy (2004: 3) has

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emphasized, ‘[t]o be recognisable as accounts of citizenship, conceptions mustshare certain common . . . conceptual features.’ I will argue that by breaking citi-zenship down into membership, identity, rights and participation, specificaspects of its practical reconciliations are readily observable. The dimensionsshould be understood theoretically as complementary facets of citizenship. Itis important here to point out that while each of the dimensions has an analyti-cally independent status, they are also (potentially) interrelated in specificconceptions of citizenship. This obviously does not rule out that one or moredimensions can be omitted from such conceptions. It is, for instance, notgiven that identity issues figured to any extent within the predominant econ-omic mode of integration in the period covered by this article, but thisshould not be precluded theoretically. A dimension has analytical import, there-fore, whether it was activated or not as this will either way provide evidence ofthe kind of conception of citizenship that was present at a given juncture. Thus,one should scrutinize the four dimensions as the potential of citizenship ratherthan as always consisting of certain attributes linked in a fixed way (seeKratochwil 1994: 486). How and to what extent the analytically distinct dimen-sions are empirically related can only be ascertained by analysing actual practicesin which issues of citizenship emerge. The theoretical point here is morespecifically that the traits of one dimension will often have a bearing on otherdimensions in practice. By way of a brief example, the manner in which, say,membership is defined clearly has an effect on the bestowal and extension ofindividual rights. That said, however, one cannot rule out that the way rightsare delineated can also affect the definition of membership – not least in circum-stances where the notion of membership is not formally settled. Analysingcitizenship from the vantage point of dimensions thus provides the opportunityto flesh out such linkages in polity-specific conceptions of citizenship.

Turning to definitions, I will argue that the question ofmembership connects tothe notion of inclusion and exclusion in a political unit (see Brubaker 1992: 21–2).Through membership, citizenship ‘ties’ a human being to some collective organ-ization presupposing a ‘self’-understanding of the choosing community (Walzer1983: 31–5). This phenomenon is not necessarily only visible in terms of aformalmembership principle such as nationality, but also through more informal,sometimes identity-oriented criteria (that might not coincide with the formal)through which citizens and outsiders are distinguished (see Isin 2002: 22).Thus, in operational terms, membership can be ascertained by identifying whoare seen as members and on what basis they are included. The notion of member-ship inherent in practical conceptions of citizenship is, then, visible in terms of thecriteria by which members and non-members are differentiated.

Identity signifies that the boundaries between political units established interms of membership raise the further question of what constitutes a given com-munity and its more specific ‘differentials’ from other communities. Identitythus relates to the questions of ‘who we are’ and ‘what distinguishes us fromothers’ (Taylor 1985: 34). In operational terms, therefore, identity can be dis-covered by investigating notions of what draws the community of citizens


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together, the way in which membership is framed in terms of belonging, andwhich attributes are used to distinguish between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

As a dimension of citizenship, rights can be defined as the entitlements thatderive from this status (Baubock 1994: 233). In simple terms: citizens have anarray of rights that non-citizens do not enjoy. When assessing conceptions ofcitizenship, we must investigate the extension of rights, that is, who are givenwhich rights – and how exclusive are they? Are there clear boundaries betweenthe rights of citizens and non-citizens? And, if so, where is the line drawn?

In addition to these three dimensions, citizenship entails if not the outrightduty, then at least the potential of citizenly participation. Citizenship does notonly have a bearing on how the community relates to the citizen, but also onhow the citizen relates to the community of which he or she is a member(Carens 2000: 166). In operational terms, participation is therefore visible intwo ways. First, through what I will call the facilitation of voluntary partici-pation. Such facilitation connects to the types of participatory rights that arelinked to citizenship and how the community promotes participation.Second, it is visible in the specification of duties that derive from the status ofcitizenship. See Table 1.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND CONCEPTIONS OFCITIZENSHIP

ECSC Treaty: sectoral integration, embryonic citizenship

The ECSC Treaty signed in Paris (1951) marks the institutional advent ofEuropean integration. Through this Treaty, the Benelux, France, Germanyand Italy sought to create a single market in the sectors of coal and steel(Dinan 2004: 52). One could thus argue that issues pertaining to individualsand citizenship were not deemed important for European integration in itsfirst political and institutional approximation. This is, however, not necessarilythe case if one studies the text of the ECSC Treaty more carefully. Indeed, Maas

Table 1 Dimensions of citizenship and empirical indicators

Dimensions Empirical indicators

Membership Criteria for who are seen as members (and hence non-members) and on what basis.

Identity What kind of community citizenship is linked to.Notions of what draws the community of citizens together.

Rights Exclusivity in terms of who are held to have which rights –extension of rights.

Degree of boundary between rights of citizens/non-citizens.Participation Facilitation of voluntary participation.

Specification of duties linked to the status of citizenship.


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(2005: 985, 997) has shown that arguments over European rights were presentalready at the beginning of European integration, and even predated the nego-tiations on the ECSC Treaty.

Notwithstanding the integration of only six countries in the fields of coal andsteel production, the ECSC Treaty was still comprehensive in its outline of thehistorical and political foundations for such a community. It stated aims of theECSC such as ‘maintenance of peaceful relations’, ‘the establishment ofcommon bases for economic development’, and to raise ‘the standard ofliving and . . . furthering the works of peace’. Finally, it asserted that the abol-ishment of historic rivalries was to be countered ‘by creating an economic com-munity, the foundation of a broad and independent community among peoples,. . . and giving direction to their future common destiny’. Obviously, one mustbe careful of overstated interpretation regarding ‘lofty’ considerations in a pre-amble. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the fields of coal and steel gave rise tosuch towering assertions of the ‘rationale’ behind integration. In fact, as Dinan(2004: 46) points out, choosing ‘the word community, rather than simply associ-ation or organization, connoted common interests that transcended economicgoals.’ In terms of shedding light on the conception of citizenship within theTreaty, the crucial question is thus how far it went in its effect on the statusof individuals – and more specifically whether this in fact surpassed themarket core of the venture.

Clearly, there was no direct, formal designation of individual membership in theECSC Treaty. In fact, there was furthermore no direct reference even to rights ofindividuals that could emanate from the Treaty. In spite of that, a notion of indi-viduals and their rights did figure in it. To the extent that individuals were rendereda status within the framework of the Treaty, it was primarily in the capacity of con-sumers, workers or producers.1It seems obvious that within the established under-standings of citizenship at the time these roles would not be seen as part ofcitizenship. To be sure, the aforementioned scepticism of Raymond Aron (1974)concerning even the conceptual possibility of European citizenship as somethingsimilar to the national counterpart would possibly have rung even more true in1951. Is Neunreither (1995: 5) then correct in his claim that the ECSC represented‘European integration without the citizens’? On the contrary, I will argue that someaspects of the ECSC Treaty did indeed activate issues of citizenship.

The thrust of provisions on individuals in the Treaty is found in Article 69.This referred to the renouncement of employment restrictions based on nation-ality for workers in the coal and steel industries. Hence, the assertion ofpromoting peace did not foster any directmeasures to integratemember state citi-zens further. There was no notion of a European identity common to citizens ofdiverse nation-states – concerning what drew individuals together in communalterms. The Treaty explicitly dealt with the status of individuals in their limitedcapacity as potential workers in clearly defined sectors. The basis for individualmembership under the ECSC thus emerged as an effect of other dimensions – itwas linked, not to formal membership criteria, but to participation as a prospec-tive individual activity, sectorally defined and circumscribed.


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The rights attached to this status of ‘worker-citizen’ were further meant tofacilitate what the Treaty referred to as ‘movement of labour’. In theoreticalterms, the possibility to move freely across national boundaries constitutingthe reach of state jurisdiction and citizenship rights can be interpreted as the‘abolition of the disabilities of alienage’ (Preuss 1998a: 145). Being an alien– a non-citizen – is then no longer such a precarious status given that rightsof free movement to some extent ‘trump’ the state’s right to deny foreignersaccess to its territory. But, given the clearly limited character of movement pro-visions under the ECSC, this cannot be interpreted as the backbone of a genuineEuropean citizenship status which cut across national citizenship institutions andterritorial jurisdictions. The free movement provision inherent in Article 69 ofthe ECSC Treaty was even stated under the heading ‘movement of labour’,2

rather than, say, ‘free movement of persons’ which would have signified amore profound curbing of the traditional exclusiveness of states in terms of ter-ritorial control on its citizenry.

What this analysis has highlighted is that, concerning the status of individ-uals, certain narrow issues of citizenship were raised, if not explicitly, certainlyimplicitly under the guise of the ECSC. As there was no direct designation ofindividual membership under the Treaty, the focal point regarding the statusof individuals was exclusively linked to the participation of workers throughrights of free movement. Hence, already in the ECSC Treaty dimensions of citi-zenship were dynamically interconnected in generating a thin status of individ-uals. More concretely, this can be interpreted as an embryonic citizenship – andnothing by way of a more comprehensive conception taking into account differ-ent dimensions of citizenship.

The Treaty of Rome: economic integration, market citizenship

Through the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the European EconomicCommunity (EEC), the scope of European integration was broadened. The newCommunity was designated as ‘economic’ rather than confined to two sectors asin the ECSC. In fact, on the back of the failure regarding the European politicalcommunity in 1954 (see Griffiths 2000), one of the priorities of that process wasretained: the establishment of a common market in Europe (Dinan 2004: 64).

The more comprehensive scope of integration inherent in the Treaty ofRome is evident in its preamble. It reiterated the aims to foster peace through‘eliminating the barriers which divide Europe’, by ‘constantly improving theliving and working conditions of their [the member states’] peoples’, andfinally ‘to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty’. Furthermore, whatis striking about the preamble in terms of issues regarding citizenship is theemphasis on integration, not only between member state citizens as such, butthe determination to establish ‘an ever closer union’ among Europeanpeoples. This did not bring the individual citizen to the forefront of the aimsof European integration. Yet, the focus on peoples rather than merely statesdid signal that the link between the institutions of the integration process and


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individuals was not only mediated by the member state level. European inte-gration clearly signified something more than a simple international treaty orregime. It was perceived to have ramifications for the collectives of individualsunderpinning the member states in terms of community and legitimacy.

It is thus not surprising, notwithstanding the lack of focus on integrationamong citizens as such, that issues pertaining to the status of individuals werescattered throughout the Treaty of Rome. Again, the prevailing image is oneof a focus on individuals as workers and producers.3 Yet, there was some devel-opment compared to the ECSC. The Treaty explicitly stated in Article 7 that‘any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited’,without specification of the precise circumstances to which this principlewould apply.4 The principle of non-discrimination thus seems to have beenbroader – at least in terms of the exact wording of the provision – than anarrow focus on the prohibition of such measures exclusively for specificgroups, such as workers. The designation of membership, the criteria for whowere seen as members and on what basis were thus not straightforward. Onthe one hand, it is clear that the Treaty established the individual as meaningfulwithin the framework of European integration in his or her capacity as a worker,albeit on a general level. Membership was related to participation contingent onthe traversal of political borders in order to work within the common market.Without the primacy of such work-related participation through market-oriented rights there would be no activated status of individuals underthe EEC. On the other hand, the broad wording of the article on non-discrimination points to a tension between a conception of the ‘worker-citizen’ and the individual citizen to be protected from discrimination on thebasis of his or her nationality per se.

The thrust of individual rights provisions was linked to the principle of freemovement.5 This was clearly related to the notion of workers as the primaryindividual actors in European integration. Yet, it was not a universal principle.First, the right was bestowed on member state nationals only. Second, freemovement could be curtailed by arguing for reasons of public order andpublic safety. When theorizing types of boundaries involved in ‘polity-making’ in modern Europe, Bartolini (2006: 7–13, 28) has underlined thatthe limits surrounding market transactions can be seen as fringes, that is,rather malleable boundaries subject to ongoing developments of marketrelations and practices, while politico-administrative units are delineated bymore settled borders. Thus, the principle regarding free movement of personswhich was to facilitate a common European market through the ‘abolishment’of the fringe boundaries between national markets could cut across the bordersof politico-administrative units previously holding exclusive jurisdiction overnational territory. However, the radical clout of this in theoretical terms wasnot emulated in practice. There was no profound challenge to the basic bound-aries of states and thus of national citizenship institutions. Ultimate decisionsabout citizenship remained national, conceivably because of the persistence ofstatehood in the final instance. Further, the potential challenge to the link


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between the individual and the nation-state posed by free movement was clearlythwarted by the concentration on economic integration and market-making inthe EEC. The range of rights linked to free movement did not entail a deep‘intrusion’ into the political borders of member states.

To conclude, then, the answer to ‘who are the Europeans?’ in the vocabularyof the Treaty of Rome was obviously not the democratic citizen as a participant ina political community, rather the individual-as-worker and market participant.As Preuss (1998b: 11) points out, ‘[t]he political term citizen was thoroughlyalien to the wording of the original Treaty’. There was no notion of abroader identity which transcended the links generated by market integration,common institutions and the legal framework on the European level. Still,the tension regarding non-discrimination possibly points to at least a broaden-ing of the potential effect of European integration on the status of individuals.Already at the very outset of the integration process, therefore, a dynamic linkbetween different dimensions is visible – primarily by way of an informal deter-mination of individual membership through the corollary of free movementrights exclusive to member state nationals and participation through work. Inaddition, there were some (more inconclusive) elements of a notion of person-hood in the Treaty. In the end, however, it is clear that the Treaty of Romeamounted to a conception of citizenship with heavy emphasis onparticipation through work in the common market by the potential crossingof previously pervasive boundaries of national markets and nation-states.

ECJ jurisprudence: citizenship-as-rights

The jurisprudence of the ECJ is often put forward as one of the main factors inthe development of European integration as a project with state-like features,but still not a state in its own right (see, e.g., Conant 2002; MacCormick1999; Weiler 1999). Part of the interest regarding the ECJ in the literaturestems from its so-called seminal decisions in the 1960s which established thebasic principles of supremacy, direct effect and protection of fundamentalrights within the EU order (Weiler 1999: 19–26). These decisions – andespecially those on supremacy in Costa6 and direct effect in Van Gend enLoos7 – were not brought to court only to adjudicate the status of individuals.In terms of the subject matter, they focused primarily on specificities of thecommon market such as rights of establishment after the exercise of free move-ment in the former and customs duties in the latter. Yet, in these cases, the ECJchose to enunciate principles which reached well beyond the technical minutiaeof the cases as such. It can be argued, therefore, that the principles as such, andthe practices which emanated from these cases, signified the establishmentof a direct link between the EU as a political unit with certain powers andindividual citizens ‘formerly’ linked only to their nation-states throughcitizenship (Preuss 1998a; Weiler 1999).

In Van Gend en Loos, the Court ruled that ‘Community law . . . confer upon[nationals of member states] rights which become part of their legal heritage’. It


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further stated that these were rights ‘which national courts must recognize andenforce’, and emphasized that it has ‘direct effects in the relationship betweenMember States and their subjects’. In Costa, the emphasis was on the‘precedence of Community law’. This was affirmed by the declaration thatany European legal norm overrides national legislation in conflict with it (see,e.g., Weiler 1999: 20–1). Through these judgments, European law thuscircumscribed the exclusive discretion of nation-states in relation to their citi-zens’ rights and obligations. In one sense, the judgments can be read aspartial responses to the question of ‘who the Europeans are’ and what bindsthem together in a community. In short, the ECJ answered people withEuropean rights. This answer, I will argue, highlights that the ECJ providedelements of a dynamic conception of the status of individuals where rightsthrough direct effect provided the gist of a thin notion of identity.

What is interesting, furthermore, is the assertion that rights derived from theEuropean level would have implications on the level of each member state. TheCommunity created a status which cut across the borders of previously insulatedlegal-political systems in terms of membership and the scope of rights. In thissense, the conception of citizenship was not only linked to the European levelas such, but to two levels – European and national. It was not just transnationalin the sense of cutting across national boundaries, but also supranationalthrough the creation of a direct link between European institutions and individ-ual member state citizens – a link that was not present in the founding treaties.

From this discussion, we see that the Court evidently brought issues regard-ing the status of individuals much more to the fore than was the case in thefounding treaties. The citizen was ‘established’ as significant per se throughEuropean rights. In this sense, primacy was given to the dimension of rightsin the location of individuals within the system. From the ECJ judgments, itwas further the case, and not surprisingly so, that individuals were givenrights as a consequence of national citizenship. Thus, membership was basedon the national level in terms of formal citizenship, but European rights canalso be interpreted as stipulating a kind of membership as an effect of other acti-vated dimensions. This again illustrates that a dimension such as membership –in addition to formal criteria on the national level – was also determined infor-mally through the development of concrete rights that were related to partici-pation in the common market.

One should, however, be somewhat cautious in drawing too far-reachingconclusions on this. Empirical research regarding the impact of these principleson the actual use of individual capacities to legal action, for instance, shows thatthese have been utilized to a very small extent: ‘There is still today a persistentcleavage between the theoretical individual rights granted by EU integrationand the rights that private individuals can actually benefit from’ (Costa2003: 744). As a result, empirical findings of this sort warn us of inferringanything close to democratic qualities from legal provisions on individualrights. Its scope was the private market actor, rather than the public politicalparticipant. In this manner, it did not develop significantly compared to the


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embryonic and market-oriented conceptions of the ECSC and EEC respect-ively. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that calling attention to the fact thatthe Community not only dealt with states, but also with individual citizens,marked a significant shift insofar as it brought about fundamental questionsregarding sovereignty and autonomy as well as its impact on the bearers oflegitimacy in modern states – individual citizens. To summarize, then, theECJ brought forward a conception of citizenship-as-rights as part of abinding legal and political system.

Free movement legislation: citizenship-as-qualified residence

As the analysis of the founding treaties and ECJ jurisprudence have highlighted,the status of individuals within European integration was primarily linked torights for citizens as workers and more specifically to the issue of free movement.This principle contained the thrust of the idea of economic integration. But, ashas been shown, the exact content and scope of free movement was not entirelyclear in the Treaty of Rome. Subsequently, a series of legislative acts8 towardsthe end of the 1960s sought to underpin the principle with policy.

For instance, Regulation 1612/68 was a broad piece of legislation which inremarkable language underlined the principle of free movement for the ideaand functioning of European integration. Interestingly, it stated in its ‘pream-ble’ that ‘freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workersand their families.’ The principle was further linked to a guarantee of ‘the possi-bility of improving his living and working conditions and promoting his socialadvancement’. In this setting, the status of individuals was thus connected, notonly to their potential participation in the common market, but also to theirbasic well-being. Interpreted broadly, the wording of this regulation thusimplies that the individual citizen was to be seen as an end in herself and notjust as a means for the amalgamation of markets.

This was further underlined in Regulation 1251/70 which stated that post-work, citizens had a right based on previous occupation to remain in the ter-ritory where they had worked without being national citizens. European citi-zens were thus granted a kind of membership based on what could be called‘qualified residence’. What qualified for rights enjoyed under European lawwas again participation as workers, albeit increasingly linked to a broader con-ception of their worth as individuals. This orientation was upheld by the sub-sequent Regulation 1408/71 which laid down the principles for theEuropeanization of social rights in the wake of free movement of persons.Here, the aim was to facilitate free movement and mobility in Europethrough the transnationalization of certain social rights and benefits linkedto work and family.

In this sense, even though it was still the worker who was at the forefront ofthe relationship between European integration and the individual, a somewhatbroader conception of citizenship slowly evolved. Individuals mattered not onlyas participating workers, but also to some extent as citizens who enjoyed certain


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fundamental rights. This is further visible if we focus on the identity-question ofwhat binds citizens together in a community. Free movement legislation did notcast this question only in purely technocratic terms. Emphasizing that freemovement was created for individuals as well as collectives – for the potentialimprovement of the individual’s social (and economic) well-being – can beinterpreted as an approximation of a European identity beyond the image ofthe worker or market actor. This is also evident in the importance granted tothe need for ‘equality of treatment’ based on ideas of the ‘freedom anddignity’ of individual citizens – as in Regulation 1612/68.

Obviously, these points cannot be interpreted as laying the ground for anythick and comprehensive form of identity akin to those based on language, acommon heritage and history or ethnicity. It was rather indicative of a verythin conception of citizenship centred on the given scope of rights and partici-pation – the worker remained at the forefront of the status of individuals.But, as De Burca (1995: 29) argues, ‘[i]n the face of the apparently overwhel-mingly economic impetus of the Community, the language of fundamentalrights offered potential to articulate and establish a place for other values.’Such values were, however, not pronounced inside free movement legislation.The rights of free movement andmarket participation dominant in the foundingtreaties were retained as basic elements. On this basis, the legislation outlinedsome measures which point to a broadening regarding the status of individualsto include something more than simply their function as workers. This wasprimarily connected to a more fundamental status being accorded to rights ofresidence and equality of treatment in addition to free movement rights. Thus,the prior establishment of economic rights affected further rights, elements ofbelonging and the designation of significant individuals related to Europeaninstitutions. What needs to be investigated further is therefore not only theextent to which the integration process after its initial phase actually fosteredmore concrete conceptions of citizenship rooted in economically circumscribedrights, but also conceptions geared towards a grounding in notions of politicalcommunity, belonging and participation, beyond the private sphere of themarket.

The early period of European integration: ‘what kind’ of citizenship?

It is clear that issues concerning citizenship throughout the period analysed werelinked primarily to the dynamics of market integration in Europe. Individualswere first and foremost significant members through their function as workers –as (potential) participants in the common market. Rights were further linkedto this narrow inclusion of individuals contingent on the mode of integration.In this sense, there was no explicit notion of what European citizens would havein common – of a specific identity which surpassed their function as ‘factors ofproduction’ (see Plender 1976: 39). To the little extent that identity issues werein fact activated, it was as a knock-on effect of changes in the scope of rights andparticipation as the primary dimensions of European citizenship established


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already in the founding treaties. The emergence of issues linked to citizenshipclearly did not generate conceptions of a thick citizenship on the Europeanlevel. Ultimately, citizens were not perceived as directly taking part in a politicalproject with further collective aims. The collective aim of peace in Europe wasperceived to be attainable through market integration, not by the integration ofcitizens politically or culturally.

Nevertheless, there were some differences between the four instances pointingto a certain trajectory regarding conceptions of citizenship. Not surprisingly, theconception was broader in the Treaty of Rome than in the ECSC Treaty. Onecan impute a more basic market citizenship in the former compared to theclearly sectoral and embryonic citizenship in the latter. Notwithstanding thesedifferences in the scope of incipient citizenship politics, on the whole both trea-ties signified market actors as the primary category of citizens, through the estab-lishment of non-discrimination based on nationality and free movement as coreprinciples of European integration.

The early case law of the ECJ established that individual citizens hadcertain European rights enforceable against the member states. Citizenshipelements of the treaties were mainly implicit. Through the ECJ they wereclearly more pronounced. The domains in which the Court ruled were verymuch linked to economic integration – its adjudication was in the firstplace centred on the functioning of the common market. Yet, it did focuson the rights of individuals derived from the Treaty of Rome as more thanan international treaty.9 Thus, through a more marked notion of membershipand rights a supranational conception of citizenship emerged, which possiblycreated the impetus for later, more pronounced discussions on European iden-tity, culture and citizenship. The membership assertion was furthered in sub-sequent free movement legislation towards the end of the initial phaseof European integration. Even though the focus was still on the creation ofa common market, these legislative acts also emphasized free movement asa fundamental right of citizens.

In terms of the time frame, the vocabulary thus shifted from no explicitmention of individual rights in the treaties, via acknowledgement of the linkbetween citizens and the Community as a legal-political entity throughcertain rights, to the perception of these rights as fundamental for the traversalof boundaries between markets, if not the settled territorial borders of nation-states. These findings point to an increasing awareness of citizens as individualsalready in the first phase of European integration. Yet, the prevailingimpression remains one where the status of the individual citizen in theinitial phase of European integration was secondary to the aim of integrationbetween states. The integration of workers and citizens seems mainly to havebeen a facilitator for the aim of market integration and peace-building inEurope. This is further highlighted by the fact there were no duties of partici-pation inherent in these conceptions of citizenship. The emphasis was alwayson how the Community as the collective unit could facilitate participation ina common market. Citizenship in this phase was then not so much a practice


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in itself, as a partial, derivative individual status dependent on the emergence ofjudicial, legislative and political practices. See Table 2.

The analysis has thus revealed that the image of the citizen was not at the fore-front of integration efforts – conceptions of citizenship rather developed as thescope of principles and policies gained practical momentum. Yet, throughoutthe period, this piecemeal development was based on two main components.First, already in the founding treaties, individual European rights weregrounded on prior national citizenship. Second, the principle of free movementprovided the focal point through which other elements of European citizenshipsuch as social rights and the right of residence gained substance. The ‘addition-ality’ of the European status derived from national membership (Closa 1992:1160) and free movement as the ‘nucleus’ of European rights (Maas 2005:998) are both elements that have been pervasive throughout the European inte-gration process. When the concept of citizenship was inserted into the Treatyframework at Maastricht, they provided the core of Union citizenship.10

Regarding European citizenship post-Maastricht, legal scholarship has furtherpointed out that free movement remains at the centre of major developmentsmainly through ECJ case law (see, e.g., Castro Oliveira 2002; Mather 2005;Nic Shuibhne 2002). More specifically, these developments have exposed

Table 2 Conceptions of citizenship in early European integration

ECSC (1951) Membership: coal and steel workersRights: free movementParticipation: workIdentity: not activatedConception: embryonic citizenship

EEC (1957) Membership: workers and nationals of member statesRights: free movement and non-discriminationParticipation: market-basedIdentity: not activatedConception: fundamental market citizenship

ECJ judicial activism(1960s)

Membership: through rightsRights: economic and European (direct effect)Participation: market-basedIdentity: thin (direct effect of rights)Conception: citizenship-as-rights

Free movementlegislation(1960s–70s)

Membership: residence contingent on participationthrough work

Rights: fundamental right of free movementParticipation: workIdentity: thin (equality of treatment and freedom/dignity of

individuals)Conception: citizenship-as-qualified residence


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knock-on effects on other dimensions such as membership and participation. Assuch, these dimensions have to some extent moved away from a market orworker status towards an increasingly more pronounced notion of personhood(see Castro Oliveira 2002: 94–101, 126; Nic Shuibhne 2002: 731, 749–51).Such dynamic effects between dimensions were already visible in the earlyperiod of European integration. Thus, I will argue, the historical tracing ofthis article has provided empirical evidence of how the politics of early Europeanintegration provided the frame upon which more pronounced and explicit con-ceptions of citizenship were later built.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

European citizenship is not a recent invention courtesy of the Maastricht Treaty.By breaking citizenship into membership, rights, identity and participation,conceptions of citizenship were already visible in the ECSC and Rome Treaties.These nascent conceptions were concretized as well as broadened through ECJjurisprudence and free movement legislation in the Council. In addition toacknowledging this as a frame for later conceptions of citizenship, the findingsof this article also provide a starting point for an empirically grounded critiqueof the current literature on European citizenship.

Can we interpret the gradual emergence of citizenship issues in the earlyperiod of European integration as a nascent post-national citizenship (see, e.g.,Curtin 1997; Gerstenberg 2001; Habermas 1996, 1998)? Was it already inthe initial phase of integration pointing towards what Gerstenberg (2001:312) has deemed ‘[the] promise to release the ideas of citizenship and democracyfrom territorial sovereignty and shared nationality’? Or, is it rather indicative ofconceiving citizenship in ways which empty it of substantial content – of themeans for meaningful political communication among citizens – and renderit, in the words of Thaa (2001), as a ‘lean citizenship’? If so, does this lendclout to the no-demos thesis (see, e.g., Grimm 1995; Shore 2004) whichclaims that concepts such as citizenship and democracy are empirically unfeasi-ble and normatively undesirable at the supranational level?

This article has illuminated the strong emphasis on the individual citizen inthe founding period of the EU as an actor in private, in a ‘civil society’ of econ-omic matters, shielded from the public character of a democratic citizen. It wastherefore closer to a ‘lean citizenship’ – in this case a thin, fractional statuswithin the realm of the market – than a genuinely political citizenship. Thisis, however, not surprising, given the market impetus of European integration.No-demos theorists should, however, not celebrate and claim victoryprematurely. What has also been revealed is that different dimensions ofcitizenship – especially rights and participation through the link to work andfree movement – were no longer circumscribed exclusively by the borders ofnation-states. By highlighting that there was a political space wherein a particularstatus of individuals had already emerged at the outset of European integration,this article has therefore shown that issues of citizenship are not incompatible


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with institution-building and polity-formation ‘beyond the nation-state’. Evenso, in its early conceptions the European status was grounded on national citizen-ship. The concept of citizenship was thus clearly not released from the corollaryof nationality on the European level as asserted by post-nationalists. I will there-fore argue that both no-demos theorists and post-nationalists can learn lessonsfrom the careful empirical tracing of concrete practices before precluding thatissues of citizenship on the European level are even feasible or asserting therelease of the idea of citizenship from the issue of nationality.

To conclude, this article has shown the fruitfulness of historically and empiri-cally grounded research regarding citizenship within European integration.Through such an approach, one can avoid the protracted quarrelling betweenopponents of theoretical debates and rather illuminate the real influence ofpolitical projects on the status of individuals. In doing so, we also gain insightsthat not only have an import for our understanding of European integration andcitizenship in historical terms, but which also relate to the ongoing process ofbringing Europe ‘closer to its citizens’, not least in the aftermath of the insertionof Union citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty.

Biographical note: Espen D.H. Olsen is a Ph.D. candidate in the Departmentof Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Address for correspondence: Espen D.H. Olsen, European UniversityInstitute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Badia Fiesolana, Via deiRocettini 9, 50014 SanDomenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy. email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For their critical and helpful comments on earlier versions the author would liketo thank two anonymous reviewers, Donatella Della Porta, Alun Gibbs, DavidMcCourt, Friedrich Kratochwil and Caroline de la Porte. An earlier version ofthe article was presented at the EUI Colloquium for Problems inWorld Politics,Florence, December 2006, and the 12th National Conference of PoliticalScience, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim,January 2007. Participants on both occasions provided critical comments, ofwhich some are reflected in the article. Needless to say, all mistakes are stillthe sole responsibility of the author.

NOTES

1 ECSC Treaty, Articles 3c, 3e, 4b, 46, 56, 69.2 ECSC Treaty, in the title of Chapter VIII: ‘Wages and Movement of Labor.’3 EEC Treaty (original EEC numbering), Articles 3, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 92,

117, 119, 123, 220.4 Article 7 further stipulates that the principle of non-discrimination must fall

‘[w]ithin the field of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to thespecial provisions mentioned therein’. A narrow interpretation of this could be


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that as the Treaty was geared towards economic integration and the facilitation of acommon market, the principle would only apply to individuals as they engagedwithin spheres falling under these specific aspects of European integration.

5 EEC Treaty, Article 48.6 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964, ECR 585.7 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963,

ECR 1.8 Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of

movement for workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19 October 1968; Regu-lation (EEC) No. 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right ofworkers to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employedin that state, OJ L 142, 30 June 1970; Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of theCouncil of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employedpersons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 149, 5 July 1971.

9 See section II.B of C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v.Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belas-tingen, 1963, ECR 1.

10 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 29 July 1992, articles 8–8a.

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olsen-the origins of european citizenship

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