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The Arab middle east and the question of democratization: Some criticalremarksOliver Schlumbergeraa Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Eberhard Karls-Universitt, Tbingen,Germany

To cite this Article Schlumberger, Oliver(2000) 'The Arab middle east and the question of democratization: Some criticalremarks', Democratization, 7: 4, 104 132

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510340008403686URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403686

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The Arab M iddle East and theQuestion of Democratization:Some Critical RemarksO L IV E R SC H L U M B E R G E R

W hile many of the contemporary writings on M iddle Eastern political change contendthat democratization is under way in the A rab world, this article maintains that muchof the recent optimism is due to a lack of terminological clarity. Neither are there anyArab democracies today, nor is there any tangible democratization in this region.Adherents of the democratization hypothesis in the Arab world invoke mainly twoarguments: that of a strengthened civil society and that of economic transformation,which are supposed to trigger demo cratization. Both argum ents are discussed w ith thefinding that they do not provide convincing evidence to support such hypotheses.Rather, systemic transitions from non-democracies to other non-democratic systemsare likely developments in the Arab Middle East. Comparative research shouldtherefore focus not only on the 'breakdown of democratic regimes' or 'democratictransitions', but develop models better to grasp non-democratic transitions.IntroductionWhile for decades, the idiom of 'oriental despotism" expressed much ofwhat was assumed about Arab political rule, a more differentiated picturetook hold in academic writing from the late 1980s onwards, when scholarlyliterature began to concentrate on processes of political change. Afterdecades of seemingly unchanged patterns of authoritarianism, a growingnumber of observers felt that 'something' was moving in the 1990s. Areaand country studies on questions of political l iberalization anddemocratization in the Arab world are today abundant, with three majorpositions represented in literature. First, some scholars still hold that Arabpolitical systems, in spite of tangible changes, remained authoritarian inessence.2 On the other hand, the numb er of authors who detect processes ofOliver Schlumberger is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science at EberhardKarls-Universitt, Tbingen, Germany. This article is a revised version of a paper presented atthe 6th annual conference of the German Middle East Studies Association (DAVO), 2-4December 1999, Hamburg, Germany. The author would like to thank Holger Albrecht, AndrBank, Martin Beck, Eberhard Kienle, Markus Loewe, Peter Pawelka and the anonymous refereesof Democratization for helpful comments and criticism on earlier versions of the draft and/orencouraging discussions on the subject, Kerstin Eberle for great research assistance, and Rose,Jonas, Esther and Charlotte for their invaluable support during the time of writing.Dem ocratization, V ol.7, No .4, Winter 2000, pp.104 -132PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRATIZATION 105democratization (or at least the emergence of conditions that makedemocratization a more likely scenario in Arab countries) has grownenormously.3 Third, some scholars even claim to find some existing Arabdemocracies at the turn of the century: 'Some regimes have sought tointroduce a full parliamentary democracy, with all the major political forcesin the country able to participate on a reasonably equal basis ... those ofJordan, Yemen and Algeria ... Elsewhere, there are regimes that haveworked towards forms of 'managed democracy' . . . Tunisia, Egypt,Lebanon, Kuwait and Morocco all fit within this category'. 4 One scholarimplicitly even places the Arab world's experience in a row with thesouthern European, the Latin American and the East-Central Europeantransitions of the 1970s to 1990s, when he contends, in allusion to SamuelHuntington's ' third wave', that the Arab Middle East had witnessed a 'miniwave of democratization'. Further he maintains that ' the Arab world isevolving along the same broad trends and processes that hav e been at workelsewhere in newly democratizing societies'.5 Thus, although currentopinion is greatly divided, the 1990s were a time of growing awareness ofsignificant political changes in the Arab world, with an increasing numberof scholars interpreting these changes as processes of democratization.6

Since current research reaches so disparate and, at times, evencontradictory conclusions concerning the state of political liberalization inArab countries, this article aims to critically evaluate the processes ofpolitical change in the contemporary Arab Middle East. In brief, are theregimes, as has been assumed, in fact democratizing, and to what extent isthe notion of a democratic Arab Middle East a realistic prospect for thefuture?To find answers to these questions, a conceptual frame, drawing mainlyon the findings of recent literature on democratic transitions, is needed: thequestion of what democracy and democratization actually mean must beclear before asking whether these phenomena occur in a certain regionalcontext. This theoretical background will be presented as a point ofdeparture in the second section. A brief history of the authoritarian legacyin the Arab world, in the third section, leads to the finding that there is noArab political system that could today reasonably be termed democratic.Yet, processes of democratization might still be under way. Concerning theArab M iddle East, two m ain arguments are usually invoked in favour of thishypothesis. First, that of strengthened civil societies that will increasinglypose a challenge to authoritarian regimes and eventually trigger systemictransformations to democracy. Second there is what might be called 'thefree market argument', a broad and rather old claim that views marketeconomies as a precondition for democracies and hence, in the context ofdeveloping countries, predicts the arrival of democracy in the case of

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106 DEMOCRATIZATIONeconomic transition to market orders. Both, as is argued below, do notprovide convincing evidence for the assumption of democratic procedures,norms, institutions or social structures taking hold in the Arab systems inthe early twenty-first century. After a discussion of these arguments theaccount revisits the conceptual basis in the final section, in order toconclude by reflecting on possible lessons to be learnt from looking atMiddle Eastern processes of political change.Social Science, Democracy and Democratization: Some TheoreticalConsiderations'That democracy is capable of resolving the acute social, economic andpolitical problems of the Arab world is as questionable an assertion as is"Islam is the solution".'7 This is precisely the point that will not be dealtwith in this article. Rather than focus on the possible benefits of democracyfor Arab countries or discuss the goods and evils of a normative idea, theterms 'democracy' and 'democratization' will be employed as analyticalconcepts only.8 Similarly, the article does not ask why there is a presence orabsence of democracy or democratization. Instead, this contribution isconfined to the issue of whether, irrespective of the findings being good orbad or what would be desirable from a normative viewpoint. The morelimited effort here is to try to reduce some of the confusion prevailing inrecent literature concerning the existence and shape of democracy anddemocratization in the Arab Middle East.The debate on democratization was long determined by modernizationtheory and its assumptions about what was necessary for democraticregimes to emerge and survive,9 but during the 1980s a new current oftheoretical studies, focusing on democratization as a process shaped bystrategic actors rather than by structural socio-economic prerequisites, tookhold. Actors, it was argued, determine the outcome of transitional processesby their interests, perceptions, strategies and interactions.10 This relativelynew theoretically oriented literature is at the basis of the definitionsadvanced below , that set the conceptual framework of this analysis.While the analysis focuses on democratization as a process, it isnecessary to determine the points of departure and possible 'arrival': ifdem ocratization is a process that may lead to a dem ocratic po litical system,a definition of what is to be understood by 'democracy' is needed. This isno easy task; within the academic community there is still today nocommonly agreed upon definition of what distinguishes democracies fromother systems." Accordingly, when it comes to the classification of certaincountries such as Turkey, Ghana or Indonesia, there are widely differingviews as to their democratic or non-democratic nature. This difficulty is

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEM OCRATIZATION 107today exacerbated by the large number of countries in transition; thisconcerns states in Eastern Euro pe, Central Asia and the Cauc asus, SoutheastAsia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and, finally, the Middle East andNorth Africa. Many of these countries lack some of the 'ingredients'deemed necessary for some of the possible definitions of democracy thathave been suggested, but on the other hand they do display some essentialfeatures of democratic political systems, such as multi-party elections and amore or less democratic institutional frame. Not surprisingly, innovationsl ike ' semi-democracy ' , 'quas i -democracy ' , 'guided democracy ' or'managed democracy' have spread to blur the lines of analyticalcategories.12 It is, therefore, unavo idable to specify what exac tly is meant by'democracy'; and it is also obvious that some analytical rigour must bemaintained in order to avoid sliding into catch-all phrases that lead toambiguity and misunderstandings. If democracy is used as an analyticalconcept, its meaning must invariably remain independent of the examinedsubject, that is, in this case, independent of countries, societies or regionsunder consideration. Here, a definition of representative democracyprovided by Diamond, Linz and Lipset13 is adopted, according to which asystem of government is democratic if three conditions are met:(1) Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals andorganized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positionsof government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use offorce.(2) A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection ofleaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, suchthat no major (adult) social group is excluded.(3) A level of civil and political liberties freedom of expression, freedom

of the press, freedom to form and join organizations - sufficient toensure the integrity of political competition and participation.14No doubt, this definition does have weaknesses, especially as concernsthe usage of 'soft' vocabulary such as 'meaningful', 'sufficient level','highly inc lusiv e', and the like. Bu t on the other hand, it has two significantadvantages over others:First, it is not a mere procedural definition, so that distinctions can bemade between ('pseudo-democratic') regimes that might have multi-partyelections or parliaments and display other 'democratic' institutionalcharacteristics but where political competition is still ruled out, and 'truly'democratic systems such as Germany or Sweden.Secondly, it does not include the social and econo mic elem ents found insome other definitions as proposed by, for instance, the philosophers ofcritical theory like Jurgen Habermas.15 The fmitfulness of the theoretical

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108 DEMOCRATIZATIONdebate notwithstanding, an inclusion of such aspects in a definition ofdemocracy risks classifying undeniably democratic countries such as theUnited States or Great Britain as non-democratic on grounds that are, atbest, hard to measure. For operational pu rposes there is no point in defininga form of political rule so narrowly, since the category of 'tru e' dem ocraciesmight then w ell rema in emp ty. Rather, the genuinely po litical dimensions ofdemocracy are to be focused on in this analysis. For this purpose, thedefinition taken from Diamond, Linz and Lipset seems empiricallypracticable and theoretically sustainable in spite of its semantic deficiencies.While democracy can thus be seen as one possible outcome of politicaltransition, 'transition' or 'transformation', often used interchangeably, is thesystemic change from one form of political rule to another.

One of the main contributions of the actor-oriented school in theories oftransition has been the introduction of a phase model for the process oftransition to democracy that is not contested by adherents of othertheoretical approaches, and that - though an ideal-type frame - has todaybecome commonly acknowledged as the main guiding frame in analysingdemocratic transitions. According to Przeworski, '6 within the process, twodistinct phases can be discerned, at least analytically: first there is theliberalization of an authoritarian regime. That is the controlled and partialpolitical opening in an authoritarian setting. It may entail a widening ofcivic rights for individuals and groups, but does not include broaderpolitical participation or meaningful com petition. Leav ing aside the fact thatempirically liberalization can overlap in time or even take placecontemporaneously with democratization, liberalization can mark thebeginning of a democratic transition, but does not necessarily do so. Theessential distinction concerns not the time of their occurrence but theirrespective content. Secondly, there is democratization of the system. Th is isseen to consist of the demise of the authoritarian regime and theestablishment of democratic institutions that guarantee political competitionand participatory chances for the population, as well as the formation ofnew political elites that usually are drawn, at least in part, from the formeropposition. This phase is normally considered to end with the first free andfair elections in which proto-democratic forces are elected to form the firstdemocratic government. These two phases delineate the transitional processproper." The core of any democratic transition, however, isdemocratization, while 'liberalization does not always lead to transition'. 18The q uestion of when a new d emoc racy can be regarded as consolidatedis of minor importance for this article.19 The point here is thatdemocratization as a concept in social science is not synonymous with whatit circumscribes in everyday language. Though this may sound trivial, evenleading scholars hav e recognized the need to clarify: 'dem ocratiza tion

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEM OCRATIZATION 109entails liberalization, but is a wider and m ore specifically political concep t.Democratization requires open contestation over the right to win control ofthe government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, theresults of which determine who governs. Using these definitions, it isobvious that there can be liberalization without democratization. '

20'Democratization', then, describes a special case of systemic politicaltransition, namely the one from a non-democratic system to democracy.Yet, 'democratization' as used in current literature, especially byregional experts with regard to the Middle East, is often understood in asecond, rather different way: According to their understanding ofdemocratization, it is not necessary to know the precise outcome of atransition to speak of democratization. Rather, all one would need to knowis that the change be such that the criteria for classifying a system asdemocratic are satisfied to a greater degree than earlier in this process ofchan ge. How ever, this notion of 'dem ocratizatio n' m ust be rejected -although it is adm ittedly qu ite widespread - since it applies the same termfor transitions in the Middle East as for transitions that resulted indeed indemocratic polities, such as in Latin America or in Central and EasternEurope. Furthermore, it ignores the progress made during the past twodecades in theoretical research on political transitions.

In analysing the Arab world, Rex Brynen et al. were among the first tohave explicitly referred to this point.21 It is precisely the distinction betw eenliberalization and democratization that is essential for the purpose of thisanalysis. Having thus made clear some conceptual exigencies, an eye shallnow be cast on the Arab world with its authoritarian heritage, up to itspresent situation of slow, but tangible political change.

The Authoritarian Legacy, or the Political Economy of Non-democratic PolitiesThe Arab world has experienced a strongly authoritarian history of politicalrule s ince i ts independence; 'praetorianism' , 'patr imonial ism' ,'authoritarianism', 'presidential monarchism', 'sultanism' or 'autocracy'are but some of the attributes that have been used to circumscribe Arabregimes and their forms of political rule. As has been noted, Arab states'generally lack much previous democratic experience'22 - unlike, forinstance, a significant number of Latin American states which haveundergone successful democratic transitions.The prevalence of non-democratic political rule in the Arab world hasstrongly been reinforced by economic developments up to the late 1980s:with the sharp rise of the oil price in 1973-74, the income accruing directlyto the states multiplied. It is important to note that this does not only hold

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110 DEMOCRATIZATIONtrue for the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf, but also for those Arab stateswith little or no mineral resources to exploit. They benefited from largeam ounts of mainly official transfers from the oil prod uce rs, mo re often thannot in the form of unconditional budgetary support. A political-economicsub-system that has been termed 'political petrolism'23 thus evolved, linkingall the Arab states in a regional circulation of oil revenues. Secondly,international aid flows from the Soviet Union as well as from the westernhemisphere have additionally increased the dependence of Arab statebureaucracies on external capital inflows. As a consequence, the statesbecame the largest economic agents by far in all countries underconsideration, irrespective of their ideological orientation (socialist orconservatively western-oriented).24

More importantly, these economic aspects of rent-dependency havepolitical correlates: the state came to be seen as a distributor of resourcespositioned relatively autonomously above domestic society. As long aspolitical elites were able to run free health and educational systems,guarantee jobs for everybody in ever-expanding public sectors and statebureaucracies, there was little threat to the legitimacy of authoritarianregimes: 'Even limited revenue from abroad dramatically improves thestate's ability to buy legitimacy through allocation and increases regimestability.'25 Although some conservative economists still doubt the fact,many autho rs and virtually all of the relatively few international econom istswho specialize in Middle Eastern affairs now recognize the importance ofrents as maybe the single most important structural factor that has shapedArab economic and political life.26 'Rentier states, because they do not haveto rely on taxing citizens to gain revenues, have a tendency to be lessdemocratic and accountable than governments that must engage fiscallywith their populations.'27 Mostly, regimes in such states have paid lip-service only to the introduction of democratic institutions and procedures,and 'even such lip service is intended more to serve the wishes of publicopinion abroad than to satisfy any substantial pressure domestically'.28

These patterns have changed since the second half of the 1980s. Theformerly successful Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) lost much of its influence on the development of oil prices, whichdecreased structurally. Except for a short period at the beginning of thesecond Gulf W ar, oil prices (in real terms) nev er again rose to the levels theyhad attained in the 1970s. The regional system of petrolism started to erodein the mid-1980s, when Gulf transfers to the non-oil states dropped sharplyand mo st of the Arab coun tries (specifically the oil-poor states) slipped intoforeign exchange crises that soon widened to become serious fiscal crises ofthe state. Therefore, previous mechanisms of legitimacy-creating rentierismcould no longer be sustained. Many states had to follow paths of stern

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMO CRATIZATION 111austerity and embark on stabilization and liberalization programmes asprescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.As the experience of many developing countries has shown, such structuraleconomic changes invariably bring about adverse social effects, andtherefore impose additional costs, at least in the short run. Since regimelegitimacy throughout the past decades was founded mainly on the state'sallocative power, both the fiscal crises of the 1980s and the liberal eco nom icreforms of the 1990s contributed to a severe loss of legitimacy of the Arabgovernments,29 which was most strongly felt in the non-oil states. Thesewere affected most by the crisis, since they had accumulated higher levelsof external debts than the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, and were thus obligedto adopt more far-reaching structural reforms instead of mere austeritypolicies as did, for instance, Saudi Arabia.30Case studies as well as analyses of the Arab world as a wholedemonstrate that crises of legitimacy, mainly as a result of poor economicperformance of the states, were the main reason for political liberalizationin this region.31 Bread riots, Islamist resurgence and other protests were thevisible symptoms of this in states like Egypt, Algeria or Jordan, so that therespective regimes reacted by relaxing political control. Of course, theextent of political liberalization during the late 1980s and early 1990s variedsignificantly within the region and emphasis was placed on differentmeasures; it remains striking, however, that - with the exception maybe ofLibya and Iraq - no regime escaped such processes.In Algeria and Jordan the first (relatively) free and fair elections in theArab world for decades were held. In Kuwait, too, the role of parliamentwas significantly expanded after the second Gulf war. In Syria, the numberof parliamen tary representatives was increased to include 60 'independ ent'candidates without formal relation to the ruling Ba'ath party. King Fahd ofSaudi Arabia introduced a written 'basic law', that guaranteed for the firsttime in the history of the country individual civic freedoms and establisheda so-called consultative council (majlis as-surd), that was expanded toinclude 60 members by the mid-1990s. Similar institutions are todayeffective in Bahrain and Om an. In Yemen, Jordan and Moro cco, the m ediaexperienced an unprecedented degree of freedom, and Tunisia as well asEgypt, in terms of political liberties on a comparable footing, both haveregular multi-party elections and specialists accord to both countries aflowering civil society.Obviously, these developments contrast sharply with the findings ofearlier comparative studies that conceded to the region only 'little prospectof transition to even semi-democracy'.32 More than a decade after the nowclassical influential comparative works have been published,33 things mighthave changed m ore than marginally. Are there any Arab dem ocracies today?

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112 DEMOCRATIZATIONIn case a country lives up to the three conditions indicated in the foregoingdefinition, the picture of the contemporary Arab world would have to berevised. Yet, the answer to this question is a clear 'no'.Certainly, there are different concepts of democracy, but democracy asan analytical category is 'not entirely in the eye of the beholder ... if thenotion of democracy is not to be debased to mean all things to all people'. 34It is not worth discussing countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Syria in thiscontext, for absolutely no serious study suggests that democratic regimesare in place the re. Bu t view s diverge w hen it comes to the more liberal A rabcountries such as Yemen, Egypt, Morocco or Jordan. Even such countries,however, cannot today be characterized as democracies according to thedefinition already given.

The existence of multi-party elections and some form of pluralism is notenoug h to fulfil the criteria of 'd em oc rac y'. In Jordan as well as in M orocco ,we have, as some would argue, 'constitutional m ona rchies' in the sense thatthere are monarchs and constitutions. They are not comparable to GreatBritain or Belgium, however, since the monarchs are equipped with politicalpowers uncontrolled by any democratic procedures. Not only can theydissolve their parliaments but they are the only decisive authority in everysensitive issue area of politics. No government can design foreign policies,important foreign trade relations, or act in the field of internal securitywithout prior consultation and consent of the king. Rather than fulfillingrepresentative functions as European monarchs do, the kings of Arabcountries are effectively guiding their countries and exert the leading rolewithin the political system. Political competition cannot be said to takeplace 'for all effective positions of government power': the crux is thatgovernments in these states do not hold all effective positions ofgovernment power, nor is their legitimacy founded on participation andcontestation.Jordan, where political reforms might have gone farthest and which isoften considered to be the vanguard of democracy in the Arab world, mayserve as an example. The Jordanian parliament is bicameral, with only oneof the houses elected by vo te. It has no say in the formation of the exe cutive,where the prime minister is an appointee of the king. In Egypt, too,President Mubarak has proven more than once that he appoints anddismisses ministers and cabinets according to wh at he deem s suitable to 'theco un try's ' po litical needs. Where there are elections, fraud is comm on, andthe use of violence against opponents of the regimes is not excluded in anyArab country. In states like Kuwait, there is no doubt at all that even thesimple condition that 'no major (adult) social group is excluded' fromparticipation has never been met.35 Instead of arguing that certain Arabcountries are 'more democratic' or less than others, it is more appropriate to

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRATIZATION 113say that the regimes in power grant civic and political liberties to varyingdegrees, but definitely none of them is dem ocratic in the analytical sense ofthe term used here. Epistemologically, this statement is entirely differentfrom speaking of 'greater or lesser degrees of democracy', since democracyis handled here as an analytical category that in itself cannot be present tovarying degrees or percentages.36It is important, however, not to confuse the absence of democracy withthe question of prospects for democratization. In fact, most specialists statethat such processes are currently taking place in the region. The two mainarguments put forth by adherents to this view are outlined below.

The Debate on Civil Society'Civil society' has today found its way into the speeches of political leadersof industrial and develop ing coun tries alike. Ap art from its relevance for thepolitical debate and for practical policy-making, discussions about thecontent and value of this concept constitutes a major academic debate in itsown that has become fashionable both outside the Arab world and within.37Again, there is a definitional problem, since strongly normative overtonesassociated with the concept as well the innumerable definitions provided inrecent years prohibit any swift adoption and empirical application of theconcept.38 A long and diverse intellectual history adds to the ambiguityprevailing today.39 There is simply no room here to engage in a discussionof how far a concept of western origin is applicable in the different culturaland social setting as the Arab world. The fact is, however, that much of therecent literature does deal with civil society in the Middle East.40Roughly speaking, the argument that the emergence of civil society inthe Arab Middle East leads to democratization, runs like this: the politicalliberalization addressed above has widened the public sphere. In all Arabcountries, various groupings, associations and non-governmentalorganizations (N GO s) have formed to pursue their interests in fields such ashuman rights, women empowerment and ecology, that are all regarded asconducive to the development and deepening of greater pluralism and,ultimately, democracy. Moreover, economic liberalization has strengthenedprivate sectors and its institutions like chambers of commerce and industryor professional associations. The conclusion is that there are by now a w iderange of aggregate interests represented in non-governmental bodies, whichcan lead, as Eastern European lessons have taught, to the demise of long-established authoritarian regimes. It is against this background that someauthors continue to speak of 'ongoing democratization processes in theMiddle East'.41 It seems useful to examine the meaning of 'civil society' inthis context before discussing the validity of the argument.

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114 DEMOCRATIZATIONTwo basic features seem common to most of the recent definitionsproposed for 'civil society'. Since it is considered to form the intermediatesphere between the individual and the state, a significant degree of(financial, personal, and so on) independence of the state, its bureaucracy

and governmental agencies is required. Second, membership in associationsof civil society is implicitly or explicitly, assumed to be voluntary and notsolely dependent on a religious, ethnic, regional or sectarian basis.42 To beclearer analytically, and to be challenged m ore easily, it is worth referring toan important contribution by Mustapha Al-Sayyid for a few conceptualcharacteristics of what the concept could include: his following points areadopted here as necessary conditions of a civil society: In a civil society, the state abides by certain rules in dealing with societalactors, recognizing in particular their autonomy. Citizens relate voluntarily to each other on the basis of shared intereststhat do not exclusively replicate primordial ties. State and society accept and protect the exercise of the right to dissentby citizens, including expressing views at variance with those of themajority, provided that dissenting minorities do not use force inpersuading others to adopt their views.43But before assessing the state of Arab civil society, it might be useful to takea brief look at some of the key features that shape the Midd le Eastern socialfabric, irrespective of the attribute 'civil'.It is textbook kno wled ge and hardly contested that Arab socio-politicalsystems are characterized by strongly neo-patrimonial (or, to be usedinterchangeably: 'neo-patriarchal') political rule and thus by asymmetricrelations of superiority and subordination.44 This is paralleled in society atlarge by networks of patronage and clientelism that pervade not onlythe political realm, but also societies as a whole.45 This is the context inwhich wasta works, wasta being the Arab term for 'intercession' or'intermediation', meaning personalistic networks for mutual benefit. It isthe social mechanism that determines allocative political decisions insociety and econom y - the question of 'wh o gets w hat '. Wasta is to be seenas the 'lubricant of the patronage system'46 and as 'the societal norm'.47Rather than labour, personal capability or merit, it is the personal contactto political decision-makers able to allocate resources (thus build upclientelist networks) that secures social status and material well-being forthe individual. Because the state, as has been explained above, has longbeen the largest economic agent and operated to a large extent as adistributor of resources, rent-seeking by individuals and social groupsparallels the state's international rent-seeking behaviour domestically andis a major characteristic of Arab societies.48 When trying to grasp what

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116 DEMOCRATIZATIONor political rights - survival or we ll-being. Th ere is no evidence wh atsoeverfor any significant change in these foundations of modern Middle Easternsocieties. Such social structures, whether called 'traditional' (this writerwould refrain from that, for various reasons), neo-patrimonial, orpatriarchal, are respons ible for essentially hierarchically organized societiesthrougho ut the Arab world. This effectively precludes the emergen ce of anyorganized opposition strong enough really to challenge regime politics andpress for greater liberties."Three groups are most likely to possess the necessary organizationalcapacities, are said to be an opposition, or are desired to grow into a seriousopposition by observers: the national bourgeoisie, the Islamic opposition,and a secular democ ratic opposition . It is empirically e vident that 'in all thecountries under consideration, demands for democratization were notbrought forth by the private sector or a bourgeoisie growing in strength'.52Thus, those hoping for democratization in the Arab Middle East are welladvised not to set their hopes on private sector agents such as Weberian-style capitalist entrepreneurs or a Schumpeterian bourgeoisie. Alluding tothe various currents of Islamism as the only serious contestants of Arabregimes (though without much in terms of political agendas other thanthe demise of these latter), 'the major challengers to the incumbents inthe Middle East do not ... offer democracy as the alternative toauthoritarianism'.53 Secular democratic oppositional movements are in noArab country a challenge to the rulers.54 In essence, the conclusion is thattoday, the only alternative social organizations cap able of countervailing th estate and its interference in the creation of autonomous socio-political lifeare Islamist circles. Plausible evidence for anything that comes close towhat Alfred Stepan conceptualizes as a 'democratic opposition' cannot befound in any Arab country today.55

More important than the question of counting Islamists as parts of civilsociety or not, however, are the problems that the concept itself entails. Assoon as we start to operate with a concept that, as Au gustus N orton says, 'isresistant to analytical precision',56 we get trapped in what could be called a'conflict model' .5 7 Michael Hudson asks the right question: ' Isdemocratization driven by a vibrant civil society or bestowed by a monarchwho sees it as a survival strategy?'58 The contenders of the argumentdiscussed in this section opt for the former possibility. While, for reasonsexplained above, H udso n's terminology ('dem ocratization ') is questionable,the question posed here is important. It is clear that the process of politicalliberalization has been initiated 'from above', from the incumbent regimesthemselves. Yet, the possibility of civil society driving democratizationcould still hold true. This would be the case if the process of politicalliberalization would trigger dynamics that could no longer be controlled by

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRATIZATION 117the regimes and would result in a civil society that then proves independentof the state.59All observations today show that, with the exception of Algeria, nosingle Arab regime has allowed political liberalization to grow beyondcontrol, or, in other words, to cross the line from liberalization todemocratization. On the contrary, in all those states praised as thespearheads of 'democratization' during the first half of the 1990s, recentdevelopments indicate a clear 'de-liberalization'.60 This applies to Jordan aswell as to Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait and Yemen. Therefore, tomaintain that civil societies exerted such a high degree of pressure on theirregimes that they had no choice but to give in triggers uncomfortableconsequences. We would then have to answer the following questions: Inthe light of de-liberalization, why did these civil societies stop pressing forfurther reforms? What other reasons (apart from strong states) account forrenewed restriction of public spheres? And why did strong societies thengive in? To the best of this writer's knowledge, nobody has ever asked thisquestion, let alone provided a plausible answer.

This is not to deny the fact that NGOs and other non-statal associationshave spread throughout the Arab world. But when it comes to independenceof the state, be it in organizational, financial, political or, maybe mostimportantly, personnel matters, it rema ins true today that 'meaningfulpolitical participation and ac countability is generally absent from the policyprocess'.61 Civil society in the Arab Middle East, whatever the concretemeaning attributed to the concept, is in no position to impose reforms oreven exert pressure to an extent beyond the control of the state.This qualitative difference between Middle Eastern civil societies and,say, the one in East Germany in 1989, is to a large part due to thepredom inant socio-political patterns of interaction. It owes to the prevalenceof neo-patrimonial social relations and the pervasive presence of patronagenetworks fuelled by wasta-seeking, that give the socio-political fabric ahierarchical shape hardly compatible with the independence and autonomyassociated with the concept of civil society.One could add that while the importance of contingent process variablesin transitions is beyond doubt, there are also structural contexts that aremore and less conducive to democratic transitions. As has been shown invarious comparative studies, political systems in that neo-patrimonial socio-political relations prevail are extremely 'unlikely candidates' for transitionsto democracy.62Thus, while it is possible to debate the relative strength of civil societyin a given country and its relative independence of the state, the assumptionthat Arab civil societies are leading the Middle East to systemic democratictransformation is to go against all the odds. Furthermore, most writers on

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118 DEMOCRATIZATIONArab civil societies and their growing influence in the public sphere restricttheir observations to cross-time comparison (pre- and post-liberalization,while begging a huge question mark over the direction of the causal arrow).They omit cross-country comparisons that would quickly demonstrate thefundamental differences between the civil societies of, say, Tunisia orJordan, on the one hand, and pre-1989 Hungary or Chile, on the other. 63Political liberalization in the Arab Middle East is, by and large, not aprocess initiated by pressures from below, nor is it invariably leading tosystemic transformation in a democratic direction. Rather, it is adequatelydescribed as a 'survival strategy' of the regimes64 that did not go far b eyondthe introduction of a mechanism for venting popular political dissent. Theconceptual differences about civil society notwithstanding, there is hardlyany evidence for societal actors independent of the state and its elites whocould be said to shape the political process to any significant degree. Muchof the literature on civil society in the M iddle E ast reflects an optimism thatfinds little empirical ground in the Arab world and that seems bound to bereversed over the next few years.65 But there is another very popularargument for democratization in Middle East studies, namely that based onthe economic market.The Free Market ArgumentAs has been explained, in the late 1980s and early 1990s economicliberalization in the Middle East was paralleled by simultaneous processesof a political opening of sorts in most Arab countries. This coincidenceseem s striking, and it is very tempting indee d to invo ke, in the light of thesedevelopments, the liberal argument of the conduciveness of marketeconomies to democratic political systems, in a way that has gainedconsiderable popularity in the context of developing countries: 'Theconventional wisdom in Anglo-American political science, it should be saidstraightaway, is that a market economy is a precondition for democraticpolitical institutions, and that therefore economic liberalization anddemocratization as processes should go hand in hand.'66Even though the liberal assertion of a causation between market-oriented economic policies and democratization, or, in a wider frame, thenecessity of capitalism for democracy, has long been challenged in politicaltheory,67 as well as in empirical comparative analysis, the coincidence ofeconomic and political liberalization has proven to be compelling. It ledmany area specialists to the conclusion that, in fact, democratization wastaking place in Arab cou ntries, or that even the M iddle East as a who le, likemost other developing regions of the international system, wasdemocratizing. In the same context, 'specific government-supported

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMO CRATIZATION 119programs in this area ... usually emphasize economic liberalization as avital concomitant of political reform'68 and maintain that western politicalpressure for market-oriented economic policy reforms in itself, therefore,were a viable means of spurring democratization. The relevant questionsare, therefore: does economic liberalization in the Arab Middle East lead tothe emergence of market economies and, if so, are they a means to furtherdemocratization?Once again, the problem is a conceptual one: ' the market' is nomonolithic block, and it would be very surprising if markets as such wereconditioning democratic political rule. Following Gordon White, whocorrectly speaks of a 'wide range of variation between ma rket econ om ies' ,69arguing against simplistic notions of 'the market', it can be noted that someessential criteria must be met in order to speak of a market economy. Like'dem oc racy ', the concept is overloaded w ith normative ascriptions. We faceproblems of definition similar to those of 'democracy with adjectives': whatmarket economy are we talking about? Here a degree of analytical rigourcom parable to the discussion of democracy and dem ocratization is required:'It is necessary to define market economy and democracy in ideal-typeterms, and in abstraction from particular societal contexts.'70

David Be etham 's definition of market econom ies is elegant because it isshort: 'an economy based upon the free exchange of commodities undercondit ions of competi t ion, together with the minimum necessaryinstitutional framework to make exchange possible over time - apredictable system of law guaranteeing property rights and the security ofcontract'.71 This deserves some explanation since it com bines three elem entsthat are part of most definitions of market economies.In all concepts of capitalism or market systems, emphasis is laid on thefreedom enjoyed by buyers and sellers alike. And, as Milton Friedmanpoints out, 'our mind tells us, and history confirms, that the great threat tofreedom is the concentration of power'.72 In any given economy, the greatestthinkable concentrations of power are monopolies, since in such a situationone agent only remains in the market-place to determine prices and supply.This is why competition has been stressed as a necessary component ofa market economy, from Adam Smith73 to Friedman who, not accidentally,speaks of 'competitive capitalism'.74 'Liberty in market systems exists onlyif everyone is able to escape coercion at the hand of any one buyer or sellerby turning to another', as another now classic commentator, CharlesLindblom, explains . This connection 'makes l iber ty dependent oncom petition' ,75 Modern neo-liberalism, which stands behind much of therecent endeavours by the IM F's and the World B an k's recent efforts towardsliberalization, draws heavily on the theoretical basis provided by classicaleconomics. One of the main proponents of this school, Walter Eucken,

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120 DEMOCRATIZATIONconsequently places competition as the 'Grundprinzip' (founding principle)above all other characteristics of market economies.76 W hile liberty dependson competition, competition, in turn, requires markets open for the arrivalof new com petitors, an openn ess that does not only exclud e closures createdby the state, but also by private powers. 'All sorts of "hindrancecompetition" ... are to be prohibited.'77Beetham's second point concerns a 'predictable system of law'.Obviously, the implication here is not merely a predictable system, but onein which actors can rely on what is commonly called the rule of law: a legalenvironment in which laws are applied equitably and that guaranteesproperty rights and contract security. Yet, there is at least one moreimportant point to the rule of law: one of the most persistent myths inconventional economics is that 'the free market' was a neutral sphere wheredemand, supply, and thus prices, only matter. This may be assumedtheoretically, but often leads analysts to forget that markets, like any otherfield of human interaction, are shaped by the actors operating in them andthe resources they possess. Some may say: 'The "political market" is cruderand harder to study than the market system. Market transactions can bemeasured and analysed in the common unit of money ... Political actioninvolves the exercise of authority, power and influence.'78 What is omittedhere is that economic action, too, may involve the exercise of authority,power and influence. Markets are no neutral or non-political realm, but'embody political processes of conflict and co-operation and politicalrelations of dominance and subordination' .79 If, assuming all legalregulations are absent, the 'invisible hand' was to reign solely, it wouldsurely be the hand of the most powerful agent, whose main concern assuming utility maxim ization - would hav e to be the exclusion of as manycompetitors as possible in order to maximize his marginal revenues. Thus,unchecked powers in a market will inevitably tend to rule out competition.For 'competitive capitalism' or a 'market economy' to survive (or emerge),a possibly impartial and institutionalized check is needed. Hence, theequitable application of laws is a necessary (though not sufficient) conditionfor market economies. The rule of law and competition are intimatelyrelated, with the former being the single most important guarantor for thelatter in any given system.

The argument here is that any effort representing merely a shift ineconomic policies and the legal or institutional framework in whicheconomic agents operate, is highly unlikely to alter significantly thepredominant socio-political patterns of interaction as outlined above(societal rent-seeking, patrimonial leadership, patronage networks), that areat the heart of social as well as economic life, even in a changed economicsetting. Therefore, the current processes of economic liberalization in the

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRATIZATION 121Arab Middle East will not, in the short and medium term, cause theeme rgence of what are called market eco nom ies. Even privatization, whichhas been the most sensitive issue by far in all countries in their course ofeconomic liberalization, can hardly overcome social norms that are mostlyde-linked from merit and rather tied to loyalties based on family, clan orinformal group membership. These fundamental characteristics of Arabsocieties inhibit the functioning of markets in a western or Weberian sense.Since productivity is largely disconnected from gains, the connectionlinking work or investment to reward or profit, does not hold. Competitiondoes take place, but rather in the diwans of public administration for theestablishment of personalistic ties to patrimonial decision-makers, muchmore so than in the market-place.

Also, the public versus private dichotomy maintained in conventionalecon om ics is insufficient to account for the widely observed 'inefficiency'of Arab economies: 'The primary problem is not public versus private, theproblem is excessive intercessory wasta.'80 Likewise, Friedman's argumentis invalid in this context. He maintains that 'the kind of economicorganization that provides economic freedom directly, namely competitivecapitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economicpower from political power and in this way enables the one to offset theother'.81 In the econom ically liberalizing A rab world, there is overwhelm ingevidence, not for an offset, but for an amalgamation of economic andpolitical elite interests.82 Instead of acting as a check on one another,political and economic powers tend to further one another's interests. Themere fact of an economy being run privately does not provide for anycontrol of governm ental pow ers. Indeed, it has becom e increasingly popularamong governmental bureaucrats to establish private businesses whileretaining their strategic privileges gained through official positions. Thoseare often used to secure non-market advantages for themselves or their loyalclientele over potential competitors.83 Throughout the Arab Middle East,elites have been extremely flexible in adjusting to changes in economicconditions beyond the influence of national decision-making. After morethan a decade of economic liberalization in the Middle East, powerstructures have change d in so far as som e elements of private business ha vebeen co-opted by state administrators who, either themselves or theirfamilies, have increasingly started to run private enterprises themselves.Yet, the unofficial power structures of patronage networks, and informalcliques that underlie political and econom ic policy-ma king, remain in place .Competition, as understood in the West, open markets and an equitableapplication of laws, is systematically ruled out in most parts of the ArabMiddle East.

What can be witnessed in the Arab world today is the structural

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122 DEMOCRATIZATIONeconomic transition of the systems successful under conditions of'petro lism '. The state sectors are on the retreat in all countries of the region ;they seemingly adopt the orthodox economic course that many developingnations have already em barked upon. It is a misunderstanding, however, toconclude that this first systemic transition since the oil boom of the early1970s will lead to market economies in the short or medium-term. Most ofthe fundamentals that are associated with market economies are neitherpresent today nor are they likely to evolve in the foreseeable future. On thecontrary, by forging closer alliances and amalgamations between thepolitical and private econ om ic elites in all the states unde r consideration, th eeconomic liberalization of the 1990s has tended to reinforce socio-politicalpatterns of informality and cronyism that contradict the very idea of marketeconomies.The socio-politically dominant patterns of interaction among thegoverning elites, among private business and within society at large, play avital role, not only in a political context, but also shape macro-economicrationality as well as the economy as a whole. It is their predominance thatmakes the emergence of competition-based market systems unlikely, eventhough econo m ic reforms have been implem ented for more than a decade inthe region. 'The patronage networks, rent-seeking behaviour, and tendencyto fall captive to narrow interests that are characteristic of manyauthoritarian regim es may all serve to derail reform efforts.'84One can disagree about terminology, but regardless of whether thereform process is conceived as 'derailed', 'distorted' or without implicitnormative content, that is as simply an alternative development, theecon om ic liberalization in the Arab w orld in the 1990s is most likely to leadto a transformation of state-led systems to economies where the privatesector dominates. But by no means can they be considered marketecon om ies. As in the political dom ain, the absence of 'meaningfulcom petition', the closed nature of the ma rket (or the political arena) for n ewentries of participants and, by and large, the absence of the rule of law, mayresult in systems that display the outward signs of a market economy, butlack its core elements. Similar to developments in the political realm, theeconomies become more liberal on paper, while firmly entrenched elitistinterests find way s and means to avoid the threat of serious competition andprevent an application of laws that could be called equitable.Therefore, the question of whether market economies tend to create anenvironment conducive to democratization or democracy is insignificantin this context: competi t ion-based 'market economies ' in theirconventional economic sense do not exist today in the Arab Middle Eastand are unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future, in spite of economicliberalization.

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMO CRATIZATION 123Conclusion: What about Non-democratic Transitions?Political liberalization in the Arab Middle East has not shown any of theintrinsic dynamics that lead invariably to democratization and whichPrzeworski observed in Poland and Brazil, for instance, and upon which hebuilt his game-theoretical model of transitional processes. Rather, politicalliberalization has so far proven instrumental to the incumbent regimes. Itserved as an adequate m eans to fasten their grip on political power, a partialreshuffling of elites and changed patterns of co-optation notwithstanding.Most of the contemporary writings on political change in the ArabM iddle East are deficient in that they do not define w hat is to be und erstoodby 'democratization', and they lack a clear theoretical background. Suchanalyses fail to provide the necessary tools to test whether the politicalchan ges that are taking place in A rab countries are addressed ad equately, orif 'democratization' is rather used synonymously with 'anything that looksmore humane'. Such a usage of the term will hardly help in furthering ourunderstanding of what democratization is. Yet, more importantly, itthreatens to make misleading assessments of the political situation in agiven country and to arrive at simplistic or misspecified policyrecommendations. Hence, for both practical and theoretical reasons, it isnecessary to maintain (or revitalize) clear categories of political chan ge andits directions. The temptation to extend 'democracy' or 'democratization'into catch-all categories should be resisted. Instead, the somewhatprovocative conclusion is that, while there certainly is a structuraltransformation of Arab political systems today, they are no examples ofdemocratization. 'That Middle Eastern nations have indeed been a part ofthe global movement towards democracy'85 is against all indicativeevidence. Democracy is only one of several possible outcomes of politicaltransition that might emerge in the Arab Middle East. Suggesting such anoutcome, even for the medium-term, comes closer to wishful thinking thanto an analytical evaluation of the variables decisively shaping the process,namely the predominant socio-political patterns of interaction discussedabove. The possibility of democratization happening in the Arab MiddleEast in the future cannot be entirely dismissed, but it could hardly beexplained by the arguments reviewed here. In reality, transitional processesin the Middle East are in the direction of an 'uncertain "something else'". 86While the outcome is unknowable, new forms of non-democratic politicalsystems, but with a more liberal outer appearance, are a far more likelyresult than liberal democracies.

This implies that our view with respect to non-democracies needs to besharpened and differentiated. If, in the past, the dichotom y of 'autho ritarian 'versus 'democratic' failed to fully grasp the variety of political systems, it

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124 DEMOCRATIZATIONseems even more necessary now to develop typologies able to take intoaccount the growing systemic diversity of non-democracies. The mostpopular attempt to differentiate political systems on a global scale is the'Freedom House Index'.87 One well-known problem, however, is that therange of (1) to (7) used in the surveys is compo sed of a mu ltitude of -arbitrarily weighted - variables that are not independent of their respectivesocial, institutional and cultural settings. Thus the ranking of a givencountry may not necessarily be a fully satisfying indicator of the degree ofde facto existent liberties. Secondly, and more importantly for this analysis,it neither takes into account the procedural nature of transitions nordistinguishes qualitatively between democratic and non-democraticregimes.88 This is where vocabulary such as 'sem i-dem ocrac y' and 'partiallydem ocratic' becom es relevant. The contention here is that we are in need ofa typology to adequately categorize all those countries that have not (or notyet) entered the phase of democratization, but where some political changeis evident. In addition, such a typology must accommodate those countriesthat (were assumed to) have initiated democratization, but where theprocess has been interrupted and non-democratic regimes are nowconsolidating (Belarus or Turkmenistan are exam ples).

Much v/ork has been done in typologizing democracies.89 But while thevariables relevant for a categorization of democracies (characteristics of theparty system, electoral system, federal versus unitary traits, patterns ofgovernment coalitions, and so on) are widely acknowledged and agreedupon, there are few comparable efforts in respect of non-democraticsystems.90 This is all the more necessary, since many of the post-communistand transitional states in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are in factundergoing systemic transitions, with many of them not, or not clearly,moving towards democratic governance.

The space between 'democratic transitions' and the 'breakdown ofdemocratic regimes' is large and the real world has many other paths inbetween these two poles on offer. A clearer understanding of processes ofchange would presumably require models that take into account thisdiversity, thus allowing for a mo re differentiated view of system ic po liticalchange. Very little is known and understood about transitions from non-dem ocracies to non-democracies.91 It is countries in system ic transition w itha non-democratic point of departure and a likely non-democratic point of'arrival' that provide fertile cases for further inquiry into non-democratictransitions. Such cases can be found in various parts of the globe, includingAfrica, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, but as the findings presented hereshow, the Arab Middle East might become a rich area for testing.Without speculating too much, the following can be said: the oil-richGulf monarchies like Saudi-Arabia have tended to implement only partial

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THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRATIZATION 125systemic changes of rather marginal practical importance. Because they stillhave the material means to maintain their traditional mechanisms ofcreating legitimacy, transitions to fundamentally different political systemsseem to be likely only in the long run, if at all. In contrast, in thosepresidential republics that, at least for a time, had, or still have nominallysocial is t const i tut ions and were formerly ruled by bureaucrat ic-authoritarian regimes (for instance Algeria, Egypt, Syria or Tunisia), thepolitical changes have indeed reached a stage of systemic transition that ismainly due to changed elite behaviour and composition. The old 'stateclasse s' have largely 'privatized' the wealth they accumulated w ith the helpof political office and will cease to exist in the form they took followingtheir revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s. New members, mostly privateentrepreneurs, have gained formal or informal access to the inner circles ofdecision-making. Today they are to be counted among the political elites,even if their representatives do not always hold official posts. However,these changes do not take place abruptly or in openly violent ways, butrather 'behind the scenes', and the population at large is hardly involved.Thus, elite studies, which have barely figured in the literature on MiddleEastern affairs since the early 1980s, are among the desiderata of futureresearch.

As for political liberalization, and de-liberalization, they are likely tocontinue to occur in the oil-poor states as temporary phenomena, but thereare no signs of either democratic transitions or the breakdown ofdemocracies. In which direction the pendulum swings will, for the next fewyears, continue to depend to a great degree on the fiscal situation of thestates. That is unlikely to improve in the short-term, due to the costs ofstructural economic adjustment. While in the past this gave momentum forliberalization, it seems likely that this pattern may change: liberalizationserved in the past as a means to set off decreasing legitimacy, but the limitsto how far such a strategy proves functional are rather narrow and havealready been reached in countries like Egypt. An increasingly pro-westernexternal orientation, economic systems with a more liberal face and adominant private sector (though not market economies), might come about.So might political systems with better instutionalized mechanisms to takenotice of public opinion as some sort of 'early warning systems'. Suchmodernized non-democratic systems will serve as alternatives to democraticparticipation and contestation for power.

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1 2 6 D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O NN O T E S

1. Th e term dates back to K arl Wittvogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1957).2. See, for instance, Eberhard Kienle, 'More than a Response to Islamism: The PoliticalDeliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s', The Middle East Journal, Vol.52, No.2 (1998),pp.219-35.3. This is the predominant view in, among others, the two-volume edition by Augustus R.Norton (ed.). Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994/96).4. Tim Niblock, 'A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?', in Haifaa Jawad (ed.), TheMiddle East in the New World Order (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1994), p.9.5. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Civil Society and Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World',in Norton, op. cit., Vol.1, p.27.The term 'Middle East' is used in a political rather than in ageographic sense; it shall include not only the M iddle East proper (that is, the Arab M ashriqregion plus the Gulf peninsula), but also the North African states of Morocco, Tunisia,Algeria and Libya.6. Among many others, see the following: Katherine Rath, 'The Process of Democratization inJordan', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30, No.3 (1994), pp.530-57; Heather Deegan,'Democratization in the Middle East', in Haifaa Jawad (ed.), op. cit., pp.13-30; ShafeeqGhabra, 'Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993', Middle East Policy,Vol.3, No.1 (1994), pp.102-19.7. As'ad Abukhalil, 'Change and Democratisation in the Arab World: The Role of PoliticalParties', Third W orld Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1 (19 97), p.161.8. This is not to deny the fact that in dem ocratic decision-mak ing, personal autonomy, wh ich inthe west is seen as a value, is respected. In other parts of the wo rld, however, the autonomyof the individual is not so unanimously seen as a moral value in itself. What perception ofthe individual in a given community might be of higher ethical value is a point explicitlyexcluded from this analysis; the debate on democratization is already highly emotional andoverheated. Of course, this normative aspect, neglected here, does have an impact on thedefinition of democracy chosen. The Syrian regime, for instance, and the former WarsawPact countries have defined themselves as 'popular democracies'; yet, attention will not bepaid here to politicians' rhetorics, but to those elements of democracies that have becomeunanimously agreed upon in social science. By doing so, it is possible to separate the accountof democracy from an account of its value.9. Famous early examples are, for instance: Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisitesof Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.53 (1959), pp.69-105, and Talcott Parsons, 'Evolutionary Universals in

Society', American Sociological Review, Vol.29 (1964), pp.33 9-57 .10. I am referring here mainly to Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and LawrenceWhitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press: 1986), as well as to the following writings by Adam Przeworski:'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in O'Donnell, Schmitter andWhitehead (eds.), op. cit., Vol.3: Comparative Perspectives, pp.47-63; Democracy and theMarket. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.51-99; and 'The Games of Transition', in ScottMainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in DemocraticConsolidation (Notre Dam e, IN: University of Notre D ame Press, 1992), pp . 10 5-5 3. Ofcourse, the actor versus structure dichotomy has meanwhile given way to a more moderatedebate; structures are recognized as constraints to the options of actors, while at the sametime the importance of strategic actors within the limits of a given socio-economic contextis accepted.11. See the now classic discussion of this problem in Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory(Detroit, ME: Wayne State University Press, 1962), esp. Chs.I and VII.12. For a critique of such innovations, see David C ollier and Steven Levitzky, 'Dem ocracy withAdjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', Wo rld Politics, Vol.49, No.3(1997), pp .43 0-5 1. For arguments against conceptual 'stretching', see also Giovanni Sartori,

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T H E A R A B M I D D L E E A S T A N D D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N 1 2 7'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', American Political Science Review,Vol.64, No.4 (1970), pp.1033 -53.13. The fact that the following definition does not capture direct forms of democracy, in whichthere is no system of elected representatives, does not matter in an analysis of Arab states,since there is no sign of doubt that elements of direct democracy are not the subject ofdiscussion in this respect. Thus, with regard to the Arab w orld and, in fact, m ost developingregions on a global scale, this definition can largely p ass as one of dem ocracy pe r se.14. L. Diamond, J. J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Dem ocracy in Developing Countries, Vol.2:Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p.xvi. Not accidentally, this definition isreminiscent of earlier 'classics' like Robert Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter, to whom theauthors refer explicitly.15 . David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: From Horkheimer to Habermas (London:Hutchinson, 1980), is a good introduction to this school and its representatives. See also thecontributions by Habermas and others in John B. Thompson and David Held (eds.),Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: M IT Press, 1983).16. Przeworski, Dem ocracy and the Market, pp.54-88.

17. For a similar distinction between liberalization and democratization see O'Donnell,Schmitter and Whitehead, op. cit., Vol.4: Tentative Conclusions, Ch.2.18. Przeworski, Dem ocracy and the Market, p.65.19. There is no commonly agreed upon definition of when a democracy is consolidated. SeeSamuel Huntington, The Third W ave. Dem ocratization in the Late T wentieth Century(Norm an, OK and London: University of Oklahoma P ress, 1991), pp .26 6-8 , for his proposalof a 'two-turnover-test'. It must be noted, however, that most Middle Eastern governmentsare overseen and controlled by powerful presidents or m onarchs and in reality do not decideon the state's policies in all issue areas . Such a test, howeve r, is applicable only in countrieswhere governments are de-facto determining all issue areas of politics, including foreign andsecurity policies. An alternative definition is presented by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan,Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America,and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),pp.5-6.20. Linz and Stepan, op. cit., p.3. This draws on a fuller discussion of the difference betweenliberalization and dem ocratization by Alfred Stepan, Rethinking M ilitary P olitics: Brazil andthe Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), Ch.1. Authors whohave dealt with the problem in a similar way include O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead,op. cit., Vol.4: Tentative C onclusions, pp.7-11; Giuseppe di Palma, To Craft Dem ocracies:An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990),esp. pp.81-9, and Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, Ch.2.21. 'Indeed, far from automatically preceding or accompanying democratization ... partialliberalization can be intended to stave off democratic pressures.' Rex Brynen, BahgatKorany and Paul Noble, 'Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization andDemocratization', in Brynen, Korany and Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization andDemocratization in the Arab World. Vol.1: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, 1995), p.4. It is obvious that in such cases (which prevail in the Arab world) itwould not be helpful, but rather confusing, to speak of 'democratization'. See also note 36for further epistemological concerns about an understanding of 'democratization' in thesense of achieving ever-increasing 'degrees of democracy'.22. Diamond, Linz and Lipset, op. cit., Vol.2: Africa, p.xix.23. The term has been introduced by Bahgat Korany, 'Political Petrolism and ContemporaryArab Politics, 1967-1983', Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.21, Nos.1-2 (1986),pp.66-80.24. For this point see Bradley Glasser, 'External Capital and Political Liberalizations: ATypology of Middle Eastern Development in the 1980s and 1990s', Journal o f InternationalAffairs, Vol.49, No.1 (1995), pp.45-73.25. Giacomo Luciani, 'Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework', in HazemBeblawi and G. Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London, New York and Sydney: CroomHelm, 1987), p.76.

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128 DEMOCRATIZATION26. Apart from country-specific studies, and among many others, see the first scholarly analysisof a modern rentier economy by Hossein Mahdavi, 'The Patterns and Problems of EconomicDevelopment in Rentier States: The Case of Iran', in M.A. Cook (ed.), Studies in theEconom ic History of the Middle E ast from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.428-67; N. Shafik, 'Rents, Reform and EconomicMalaise in the Middle East and North Africa', Research in Middle East Economics, Vol.2

(1998), pp.221-45; and, most importantly, the contributions to Beblawi and Luciani (eds.),op. cit., who first conceptualized the 'rentier stat e', focusing specifically on the Middle Eastand the Arab world.27. Shafik, op. cit., p.224. See also Luciani, 'Allocation vs. Production States', pp.73-8, andJohn Waterbury, 'The State and Economic Transitions in the Middle East and North AfricaRegion', in N. Shafik (ed.), Prospects for Middle East and North African Economies(London: Macmillan, 1997).28. Luciani, 'Allocation vs. Production States ', pp .74 -5.29. This is discussed in detail by Peter Pawelka and Claudia S chmid, "The M odern R entier Statein the Middle East and its Strategies of Crisis Management', paper presented at the 22ndannual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), 2-5 Nov. 1988, LosAngeles, CA. See also Giacomo Luciani, 'The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State, andDemocratization' in Ghassan Salam (ed.), Democracy without Dem ocrats? The Renewal ofPolitics in the Muslim World (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1994), pp.130-55.30. See Martin Beck and Oliver Schlumberger, 'Der Vordere Orient - einentwicklungspolitischer Sonderfall? Rentenkonomie, Markt und wirtschaftlicheLibe ralisierung ', in P. Pawe lka and H .G. Wehling (eds.), Der Vordere Orient an der Schwellezum 21. Jahrhundert. Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,1999), pp.57-79. The authors develop a model-categorization of Middle Eastern states thatinterprets the degree of economic liberalization as mainly dependent on the level and natureof external capital inflows.31. This is widely accepted b y both scholars and politicians; among m any others and apart fromcountry-specific studies, one of the best essays is by Luciani, 'The Oil Rent'. A partialexception from this rule is Saudi Arabia, where a tighter economic situation coincided withthe legitimation problem created by the presence of large US military deployments, whichresulted in discussions of the legitimacy of 'no n-be lieve rs' protecting the holy Mu slim placesof Mecca and Medina from a potential Iraqi (thus Muslim) threat.32. Diamond, Linz and Lipset, op. cit., Vol.2: Africa, p.xix.33. One could add to the above cited study by Diamond et al., the massive work edited byO'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, op. cit., which also omitted the Arab world.34. Brynen, Korany and Noble, 'Introduction', in Brynen, Korany and Noble, op. cit., Vol.1, p.3.

35. Women are restricted from voting in Kuwait. Additionally, of course, the limitations ofliberalization, as noted for other states, apply to Kuwait also.36. To assert that, for example, Egypt was 'more democratic' than Iraq is analogous with thestatement that, say, a butterfly was 'more bird' than a lion on grounds that it has wings andcan fly. Yet, just like the lion (a mammal), the butterfly belongs to an entirely different classof animals (insects) and is no bird whatsoever, even though it shares some of the latters'characteristics that a lion admittedly does not. It belongs to the essentials of science(regardless of the discipline) that definitions should be independent of the object and time ofcomparison and, at least indirectly, this principle would be neglected if various 'degrees ofdemocracy' were assumed.37. For an account of the problems arising from the application of the concept to contemporaryArab societies, see Mustapha K. Sayyid, 'The Concept of Civil Society and the Arab World',in Brynen, K orany and No ble, op. cit., Vol.1, pp. 131-47.38. In a remarkably self-critical essay, Michael Hudson discusses some of the most pressingmethodological problems of the concept of civil society when used to analyse MiddleEastern reform processes. See his 'Obstacles to Democratization in the Middle East',Contention, Vol.5, No.2 (1996), pp.81 -105 . The civil-society discussion is on pp .91 -3.39. See John Keane, Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London: Verso,1988).

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T H E A R A B M I D D L E E A S T A N D D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N 1 2 940. Most important is the two-volume collection by Norton, op. cit.41. Nasser Momayezi, 'The Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East', International Studies,Vol.34, No.1 (1997), p.37.42. Some w ill consider these features to be not enough to label a society as 'c ivi l': they demandthat there be 'ethics of tolerance' among institutions of civil society, the prevalence of a

democratic political culture within societal associations. See Mustapha Al-Sayyid, 'A CivilSociety in Egypt?', The Middle East Journal, Vol.47, No.2 (1993), p.230. The author doesnot want to m ake this a precondition he re, since he agrees that a tautology might then arisewhereby civil society is necessary for a democracy to evolve, and a democratic setting wouldin turn be needed for civil society to emerge. Furthermore, the taming effect of acceptingallegedly non-democratic actors (Hizbullah in Lebanon or the Islamic Action Front inJordan, are examples) within the political game, where they learn to adopt far morepragmatic attitudes, learn to play by the rules and do not hesitate to coalesce 'with strangebedfellows', is supported by empirical evidence. See, for instance, Augustus R. Norton,'Reflections on the Dilemma of Reform in the Middle East', Critique, No.13 (Fall 1998),pp.63-6 for a discussion of inclusion versus exclusion of Islamist oppositions.43. Mustapha K. Sayyid, 'The Concept of Civil Society', p.136.44. For the concept of neo-atrimonialism and its Middle Eastern forms, see Shmuel N.Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-Patrimonialism (Beverly Hills, CAand London: Sage, 1973); Robert Springborg, 'Patrimonialism and Policy-Making in Egypt',Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.15, No.1 (1979), pp.49-69; Robin Theobald,'Neopatrimonialism', World Politics, Vol.34, No.4 (1982), pp.548-59. The standardtextbook explanation of neo-patrimonialism in the Middle East is by James Bill and RobertSpringborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994, 4thedn), Ch.4.45. Among many others, see S. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends:Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984); Ergun zbudun, 'The Politics of Clientelism', in S. Eisenstadt andR. Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientelism, Patronage, and D evelopment (Beverley Hills,CA and London: Sage, 1981), pp.249-68; Olivier Roy, 'Patronage and Solidarity Groups:Survival or Reform ation?', in Salame (ed.), op. cit., pp .27 0-8 1.46. Hisham S harabi, Neopatriarchy. A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York:Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch.4, quotation from p.45.47. Robert Cunningham and Yassin Sarayrah, Wasta. The Hidden Force in Middle EasternSociety (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p.36. This book includes aconceptualization of wasta as an analytical category. For wasta as a possible obstacle todevelopment see R. Cunningham and Y. Sarayrah, 'Taming "Wasta" to AchieveDevelopment", Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.16, No.3 (1994), pp.29-41.48. For a conceptual outline see Hazem Beblawi, 'The Rentier State in the Arab World', inBeblawi and Luciani (eds.), op. cit., pp.49-62, as well as, in a more economic and generalcontext, Anne O. Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', TheAmerican Economic Review, Vol.64, No.3 (1974), pp.29 1-3 03 .49. See Bill and Springborg, op. cit., Ch.3 for a detailed account of this point.50. Ibid., p.96.51. On this point, see, for instance, John Waterbury, 'Democracy without Democrats? ThePotential for Political Liberalization in the Middle Ea st', in Salame (ed.), op . cit., pp .23 -47 .See also the contribution by Volker Perthes to the same book, 'The P rivate Sector, Econ omicLiberalization, and the Prospects of D emocratization: the Case of Syria and som e other A rabCountries', pp.243-69. He states: 'We should bear in mind that a succession of politicaldemand s and governm ent acts meeting them does not necessarily prove the strength of thosewho brought forward the demands' (p.261), and concludes that 'any hope that authoritarianregimes will ... implement political reforms of more than a defensive or limited nature,seems to be void of substance'.52. Perthes, op . cit., p.267.53. Waterbury, 'Democracy without Democrats?', p.45.54. Ibid.

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1 3 0 D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N55. See Alfred Stepan, 'Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory', Government andOpposition, Vol.32, No.4 (1997), pp.65 7-73 .56. Norton, Civil Society, Vol.1 (Introduction), p.7 .57. I owe the term and idea to Peter Pawelka w hose d iscussions helped me clarify my view s.58. Hudson, op. cit., p.93.59. In essence, this is what Przeworski has observed elsewhere and upon which much of hisgame-theoretical model rests. See also his Democracy and the Market, pp.54-60.60. The term was introduced by Kienle, 'More than a Response to Islamism'.61. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, 'Conclusion: Liberalization, Democratization,and Arab Experiences', in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, Political Liberalization andDemocratization, Vol.2: Comparative Experiences (Boulder, CO and London: LynneRienner, 1998), p.277.62. See, inter alia, Mark Ruhl, 'Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of StructuralContext in Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development,Vol.31, No.1 (1996), pp.3-23, and Richard Snyder, 'Explaining Transitions fromNeopatrimonial Dictatorship', Comparative Politics, Vol.24, No.4 (1992), pp.379-99, aswell as, for Africa, Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, 'Neopatrimonial Regimesand Political Transitions in Africa', Wo rld Politics, Vol.46, No.4 (1994), pp.453 -89.63. A notable exception was the Palestinian society of the West Bank and Ghaza strip underIsraeli occupation, and especially during the years of the Intifada. A Palestinian state beingabsent from the territories and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) being exiled inTunis, civil society had organized truly autonomously to stand up against Israeli militaryrule. After the return of the PLO to the now-autonomous territories, however, there isincreasing evidence that another neo-patrimonial system is in the making , in which m any ofthe leaders from 'within ' hav e been pushed out of the closer circles of decision-m aking. O neof the first to examine these developments w as Rex Brynen, 'The Neopatrimonial Dimension

of Palestinian Po litics', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.25, No.1 (1995), pp.2 3-3 6.64. Daniel Brumberg, 'Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World', inBrynen, Korany and Noble (eds.), op. cit., Vol.1, pp.229-59.65. This reversal has already begun. One good example is Michael C. Hudson, in 'Obstacles',op. cit., who states clearly that he dislikes the concept of (neo-)patrimonialism, butgrudgingly admits that patrimonial socio-political characteristics 'deserve a place,provisionally at least, on any list of hypothetical obstacles to dem ocratization' (p.98). Also,he 'raises some concern about our work to date. We seem to have underestimated thedurability of authoritarianism' (pp .92 -3). Augu stus Norton, an even more op timistic scholar,also writes far mo re cautiously in his 'Reflections on the Dilemm a' (1998) than in his earliervolumes on 'Civil Society' (1994 and 1995).66. David Beetham, 'Market Economy and Democratic Polity', Democratization, Vol.4, No.1(1997), p.7. See Milton Friedman's classic argument in his Capitalism and Freedom(Chicago, IL and London: Chicago University Press, 1982, 2nd edn), Ch.1.67. The reader will have noticed the logical inconsistency in the above quotation: to assert thatsomething is a precondition of something else is not the same as the assertion that it is acause. Thus, according to the laws of logics, the inverse conclusion is not allowed. Withregard to the relation between market and democracy, this is a methodological

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