b~~~~

-0 - l }/U S A/- rComptroUerGeneralof the United StatesWihtn&Un, DX, 20.P8 REDACTED VERSION

a2BW~Wahington, D.C. 20648

7Lg Decision

Matter of: Enstrom Helicopter Corporation

File; B-253014

Date: August 13, 1993

Kenneth A. Martin, Esq., and Andree B. Katz, Esq., Elliott,Vanaskie & Riley, for the protester.Kenneth S. Kramer, Esq., Catherine H. Winterburn, Esq., andLawrence E. Ruggiero, Esq., for Bell Helicopter TextronInc., an interested party.Craig E. Hodge, Esq., and Stephanie A. Kreis, Esq.,Department of the Army, for the agency.Richard P. Burkard, Esq., and John Van Schaik, Esq., Officeof the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparationof the decision.

DIGEST

1. In considering protests against an agency's evaluation,our Office will not make an independent determination of themerits of an offeror's proposal, or in the case of ademonstration, tne performance of the offeror's product;rather, we will examine the agency evaluation to ensure thatit was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluationcriteria.

2, Selection of awardee's higher cost helicopter on thebasis of its superiority in other evaluation areas, such astraining effectiveness, management, and past performance, isunobjectionable where the solicitation did not state thatthe award would be based on low cost and where the agencyreasonably concluded that the overall superiority of theawardee's aircraft was worth the additional cost.

DECISION

Enstrom Helicopter Corporation protests the award of acontract to Bell Helicopt,.tr Textron Inc. under request forproposals (RFP) No. DAAJ09-91-R-0514, issued by the

The decision issued on August 13, 1993, containedproprietary information and was subject to a GeneralAccounting Office protective order. This version of thedecision has been redacted. Deletions in text are indicatedby "[deleted]."

Department of the Army for helicopters to be used in thetraining of entry-level helicopter pilots at Fort Rucker,Alabama, Enstrom argues principally that the Armyunreasonably evaluated the ','training effectiveness" of itsproposed helicopter and that the Army did not justify payinga significant cost premium for the Bell Helicopter,

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The RFP, issued May 1, 1992, contemplated the award of afixed-price contract for 157 new training helicopters (NTHs)and 12 cockpit procedure trainers with an option to purchasean additional 157 helicopters and 12 trainers. The RFP'spurchase description provided that the NTH is a"Non-developmental Item (NDI) commercial helicopter, builtto Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Normal CategoryRotorcraft airworthiness standards . . . ." The RFPspecified that the NTH shall have a minimum of three seats.In addition to a pilot and co-pilot seat, the helicopterswere to include a third seat to allow an "observer" to viewthe primary flight instruments and the outside flightenvironment. The Executive Summary issued with the RFPstated that:

"(t~he primary objective of the NTH program is toreduce operating and support cost for the coreInitial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) training withoutdegrading training effectiveness. This will beaccomplished by displacing the UH-1, as thecurrent primary trainer, with a commerciallyavailable helicopter."

In addition to requiring submission of past performancedata, as well as technical, management, logistical support,and cost proposals, the RFP stated that the agency wouldconduct a training effectiveness user evaluation (TEUE) ofthe proposed aircraft where the "candidate aircraft will beevaluated as a potential trainer" for the Army's IERWtraining program. The RFP provided that during the TEUE,Army-selected instructor pilots were to "fly simulatedtraining missions from the (Army's) Flight Training Guide(FTG) in each candidate aircraft." The pilots were toevaluate the performance of each helicopter and, among othertasks, score each selected FTG maneuver. The RFP alsostated that "a qualitative assessment will be conducted byexperimental test pilots to more precisely define anyweaknesses identified. . . ." The RFP provided that the"NTH at the TEUE shall represent the 'as delivered'production NTH configuration."

2 B-253014

The RFP provided, however, tw) exceptions to the "asdelivered" requirement, First, offerors were permitted toparticipate in the TEUE with an aircraft that was only"experimentally certified" in the event that the"crashworthy fuel system, crashworthy seats and dual pilotIFR [instrument flight rules) certifications have not beenobtained prior to the TEUE,"'l Second, the RFP authorized"minor deviations" to the production aircraft.,Specifically, it stated that the Army "recognizes that somerequirements for the production aircraft are not vital tothe conduct of the TUEU," Tore RFP stated that all requestsfor deviations must be in writing to the contracting officerand "to be considered, a proposed deviation may not impactthe evaluation of either training effectiveness, maintenanceor safety."

The RFP provided that award would be made to the offerorwhose proposal met all critical requirements in the purchasedescription and met program objectives in all otherevaluated areas. The critical requirements represented theminimal prerequisites and were evaluated in the "technical"evaluation on a "go/no go" basis. The RFP stated that theArmy "reserves the right to select the proposal which itdetermines will provide the best overall value, inconsideration cf all evaluated areas - technical, trainingeffectiveness, cost, logistics, management, and pastperformance." The evaluation of each area was to include anassessment of risk. The RFP stated that "trainingeffectiveness" was the most important evaluation area. Costwas considered more important than logistics, which was moreimportant than management or past performance, Managementand past performance were to be equally weighted, Since thetechnical evaluation concerned cily minimum requirementswhich were to be evaluated on a "go/no go" basis, thetechnical evaluation area was not yanked by the RFP,

With respect to the evaluation of price, the RFP stated that"(tlhe overall cost and affordability of the program will beevaluated" considering: (1) the acquisition price/; (2) lifecycle cost; and (3) other "cost/benefits" which was toinclude costs peculiar to an offeror's proposal such asequipment, government facilities, and personnel required tosupport a proposed helicopter and benefits such as costsavings the government will realize from a particularhelicopter. The RFP stated that life-cycle cost wasconsidered to be significantly more important than the othercost elements. Offerors were to "provide life cycle costdata for a five (5) year period for each NTH configuration,"

2An offeror with an experimental IFR certification wasrequired to provide an IEP. certification plan as part of itsproposal.

3 B-253014

and the REP stated that the evaluation under this elementwas to consider 5-year costs,

The Army received five proposals in response to the REP,including proposals from Dell and Enstrom, The TEUE tookplace at Fort Bucker between September 14 and December 2,The Army reports that each candidate aircraft was flown forapproximately 180 hours and evaluated by twenty experiencedinstructor pilots.3 During the TEUE, the pilots evaluatedthe performance of each aircraft in completing maneuversselected from the Army's FTG, The training effectiveness ofeach aircraft was based on two courses of instruction--contact reand instrument, with ten pilots evaluating eachcourse. Contact training involves the performance of basicmaneuvers, while instrument training emphasizes flying whilerelying on the aircraft's instrument panel without referenceto the outside world.

The instructor pilots generated a wealth of data regardingthe training effectiveness of the competing helicopters.For exampl.e, they were asked to provide numerical ratingsfrom 1 to 7 for each training maneuver, with 4 meeting thestandard as defined by the Army's FTG; they responded to amultiple choice questionnaire; and they provided detailedwritten comments relating to specific aspects of trainingeffectiveness. The Army also evaluated each candidateaircraft at the TEUE with respect to fuel consumption andendurance, human factors, and safety. In addition, eachaircraft was evaluated by Army experimental pilots todetermine whether the proposed helicopters met RFPrequirements and to more precisely define any weaknessesreported by the instructor piLots during the TEUE.

The TEUE data was provided to an agency source selectionevaluation board (SSEB) in January, 1993, The SSEE analyzedthe data and advised each offeror of its strengths andweaknesses noted in the TEUE, After conducting discussions,the Army received BAFOs by March 2. The' SSEB analyzed. theraw data compiled during the TEUE and, while the TEUE datacontained summaries and overviews of the instructor pilots'responses, the SSEB independently arrived at its conclusionsabout the training effectiveness of the aircraft. The SSEBdivided the data into four categories: (1) maneuverevaluation contact; (2) maneuver evaluation instrument;(3) human factors; and H) fuel endurance.

With respect to the maneuver scores, the data which the SSEBpresented to the source selection advisory council (SSAC)

3The Army states that the instructor pilots have flown anaverage of 9,000 flight hours and trained over 400 studentseach.

4 B-253014

included detailed charts of the scores assigned by theinstructor pilots during the TEUE. These charts representedthe average, or median scores, assigned by the instructorpilots for particular maneuvers, and the high and lowscores, thus giving a representation of the range of theTEUE scores, The SSEB charts summarized the scoring on13 contact maneuvers and 6 instrument maneuvers, Enstrorn'smedian maneuver scores ranged from (deleted), with fourmeeting the standard as defined by the Army's FTG, includingscores below (deletedi for the instrument takeoff,instrument approach and partial panel maneuvers, Incontrast, Bell's median maneuver scores ranged from(deletedJ, The SSAC met with the scurce selection authority(SSA) on numerous occasions prior to his final selectiondecision. These meetings were attended by instructor pilotuand evaluators.

Based on the evaluation of the technical proposals and theproposed aircraft, the SSA concluded that all five proposalsmet the "go/no go" critical requirements of the RFP.Concerning training effectiveness, the SSA concluded thatthe Bell helicopter was slightly more effective for"facilitating student learning and skills transfer" whileEnstrom's aircraft offered slightly less trainingeffectiveness.

The SSA specifically noted that while the Enstrom helicopterwould enhance training of some maneuvers, that aircraftwould. require changes in the instrument instruction programfor three maneuvers: instrument take-off, instrumentapproach, and partial panel, The pilots found that thehelicopter had a "power margin" problem during the executionof the instrument takeoff maneuver, The agency also foundthat vibration in the Enstrom helicopter would have anegative impact on training effectiveness during theexecution of the instrument approa.h maneuver and thepartial panel maneuver and that the instructor pilotsnoticed excessive vibration and "cyclic feedback"4 whentraveling above 85 knots indicated airspeed. In thisregard, the RFP required that the NT11 be able to achieve asustained true airspeed of 90 knots.) The SSA noted thatthe vibration would cause fatigue and reduce the ability ofstudents to learn new skills.

4The cyclic is the primary control for airspeed; "cyclicfeedback" refers to vibration or shuddering of the cyclic.

5The Army states that the difference between "true" and"indicated" airspeed is approximately 2-3 knots. Thus, itstates, an indicated airspeed of 87 knots is equivalent to atrue airspeed of 90 knots.

5 B-253014

The SSA also noted that, while the Enstrom helicopter metthe RFP's critical requirement for 2 hours and 30 minutes offuel endurance, the fuel tanks on the Enstrom helicoptercould not be completely filled, or "topped-off," withoutexceeding the maximum gross weight of the aircraft.According to the S$A, since its fuel tanks could not betopped-off, the Enstrom helicopter required a cumbersome andtime-consuming refueling procedure, and this proceduredetracts from training efffectiveness since it shortens thetime availble for flying, In comparison, the SSA notedthat the Bell helicopter has a fuel endurance of more than3 hours and that this allows additional flying time whichenhances training effectiveness.

The record indicates that based on the TEUE, the SSEB andthe SSAC concluded that there were training effectivenessproblems with the Enstrom helicopter in the area of humanfactors. For example, the third seat in the aircraft wascrampen and (deleted]. The Army also noted that ingress andegress for the student in the third seat was difficult(deleted], and the helicopter did not include adequate stepsor handholds.

With respect to the management factor, the SSA found thatBell's proposal offered low risk and exceeded the RFP'srequirements; Enstrom met the requirements, but the SSAassigned moderate risk under one of the managementsubfactors (deleted). Bell and Enstrom were evaluated asessentially equal with respect to logistics. Concerning"past performance," the SSA assigned low risk to Bell basedon its record for on-time delivery of helicopters and parts.Enstrom was considered to preSent low to moderateperformance risk.

For the aircraft at issue here, the Army determined that thetotal costs, including the acquisition price, 5-year lifecycle costs, and other costs/benefits, were as follows:

Costs. (in millions) Enstrom Bell

Acquisition (deleted) (deleted]5-year life cycle costs (deleted] [deleted]Other costs/benefits' (deleted) (deleted)Total (deleted] $216.5

The SSA noted that the Bell helicopter was the-third mostexpensive based on overall cost, including acquisitionprice, life cycle costs, and other costs/benefits, while the

6These figures represent the savings to the governmentresulting primarily from the proposed warranties andenhanced delivery schedules.

6 B-253014

Enstrom helicopter was the lowest, With respect to lifecycle cQsts, the SSA noted that the Bell helicopter wasthird low, Enstrom's was lowest, and that all proposedaircraft offered substantial. operating and support costsavings when compared to the currently used UH-1 trainer,which has an estimated operating and support cost of $646per hour in fiscal year 1994 dollars,'

The SSA noted that "(tlhe Enstrom proposal, despite itslower cost, does not provide the best value because of thetraining effectiveness problems revealed during the userevaluation at Fort Rucker," Although another firm offered ahelicopter considered to be more effective than Bell's infacilitating student learning and skills transfer, the SSAfound that offeror did not present the best value because ofits higher cost and performance rizk, The SSA concludedthat "when each of the (evaluation areas is] considered, theBell Helicopter offers the best overall value to theGovernment." Accordingly, the contract was awarded to Bell.This protest followed.

PROTEST OVERVIEW

Enstrom primarily challenges the Army's findings concerningthe training effectiveness of its aircraft. Enstrom arguesthat the weaknesses identified by the Army were eithernonexistent or immaterial and could not reasonably haveserved as grounds to downgrade its proposal. In addition,according to Enstrom, it was treated unfairly during thetraining effectiveness evaluation, since Bell's helicoptersuffered from similar weaknesses yet was considered moreeffective as a trainer, In addition, Enstrom argues thatfor Bell the Army relaxed the RFP requirement that thestudent in the third seat be able to view the primary flightinstruments. Finally, Enstrom challenges the Armils sourceselection decision, arguing that the agency failed todetermine whether the Bell helicopter was worth theadditior.al acquisition cost and life cycle cost over theEnstrom helicopter, According to the protester, the Bellhe; topter will cost the Army (deleted) over the next20 years more than the Enstrom helicopter. Enstrommaintains that the SSA failed to consider this disparity andargues that the Army cannot justify this additional e:xpense.

At a hearing held in connection with this protest, we heardtestimony from the chairman of t.,e SSEB and a member of theSSAC. The testimony primarily concerned the agency'sconclusions concerning the training effectiveness of the

7The operating and support costs for the Bell helicopter areestimated at (deleted] per hour in fiscal per 1954 dollarswhile for Enstrom the figure is (deleted].

7 B-253014

competing helicopters. Based on our review of the entirerecord, including the hearing transcript, thecontemporaneous evaluation record, and the submissions ofthe parties, as we explain in detail below, we find no' legalbasis upon which to object to the award to Bell,

ANALYSIS

1. Training Effectiveness

In considering protests against an agency's evaluation, ourOffice will not make an independent determination of themerits of an offeror's proposal, or in the case of ademonstration, the performance of the offeror's product;rather, we will examine the agency evaluation to ensure thatit was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluationcriteria. The evaluation of technical proposals isprimarily the responsibility of the contracting agency; theagency is responsible for defining its needs and the bestmethod of accommodating them, and must bear the burden ofany difficulties resulting from a defective evaluation.Litton Sys., Inc., B-239123, Aug. 7, 1990, 90-2 CPD ' 114.Mere disagreement with the agency does not itself render theevaluation unreasonable. Allied-Sional AerosDace Co.,B-250822; B-250822.2, Feb. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD c 201; RandMcNallv-TDM, Inc., B-248927, Oct. 7, 1992, 92-2 CPD c 352.

A. Vibration

The Army found that when the instrument approach and partialpanel maneuvers were executed in the Enstrom aircraft,training effectiveness was degraded as a result of excessivevibration, During an "instrument approach" maneuver, thestudent relies on the helicopter's instrument panel toperform a landing approach, A partial panel maneuver, whichcan be performed during any instrument maneuver, i.L'..8without reference to the outside world, is performed withouta complete set of instruments. The purpose of this maneuveris to train a pilot to safely complete an instrument flightwhen one or more instruments fail.

The agency states that the vibration of the Enstrominstrument panel would distract a novice pilot in performingthese maneuvers by adding stress to an already stressful,high workload maneuver, resulting in a negative learningenvironment. In addition, the Army found that the vibratiDnover long periods of time caused fatigue.

The protester does not claim that vibration problems did notoccur at the TEUE; (deleted]. Alternatively, at thehearing, the protester suggested, for the first time, thatthe vibration experienced in the Enstrom helicopter could bereduced by "calibrating the rotors."

8 B--253014

The Army points out, initially, that if the vibrationproblem had been easy to resolve, it, would have beenaccomplJshed during the TSUE, noting that "Enstrom conductedseveral unscheduled maintenance actions during the TEUE thatappear to hlave been directed toward this problem, withoutsuccess," In any event, as stated, the RFP allowed offerorsto modify the aircraft presented at the TEUE only byrequesting a written deviation for changes that do not"impact the evaluation of either training effectiveness,maintenance or safety," Here, Enstrom did not request adeviation for any of its proposed solutions to the vibrationproblems. Further, it is clear from the record that arequest to modify the aircraft in an effort to eliminate thevibration would have been denied since the modificationwould (if successful) affect the evaluation of trainingeffectiveness, As the Army points out, to allow suchspeculative "paper" changes after the actual demonstrationsat the TEUE would invalidate the data obtained and thepurpose of the "hands on" evaluation of the "as delivered"aircraft. Thus, in our view, the ALmy reasonably relied onthe TEUE results and was not required to consider proposedchanges to the helicopter.'

Enstrom also argues that the vibration problem associatedwith its aircraft can be eliminated by reducing airspeed to85 knots and below. The agency responds that reducing theairspeed to 85 knots is not an option. According to theagency, a reduction in speed would have a negative impact ontraining effectiveness since the FTG calls for flying at airspeeds greater than 85 knots, Indeed, the SSEB chairmantestified that the pilots spend much of their training timeduring the instrument phase operating the aircraft at90 knots, Tr, at 32. In addition, the Army reports thatFort Rucker is used by many different types of aircraft, allof which operate routinely at 90 knots or faster and thatslower aircraft would adversely affect traffic patterns andincrease congestion at Fort Rucker, Other than merelydisagreeing with those reasons, the protester has not shownthem to be unreasonable, We therefore have no basis to findthat the agency acted unreasonably by not deciding to reducethe speed at which it operates the aircraft.

8In its comments, the protester asserted that the Army"admitted" that Enstrom had resolved the instrument panelvibration problem. The agency explains, and the recordshows, that in response to discussions, Enstrom "revised itsIFR certification to satisfy the FAA with respect tovibration" Hearing transcript (Tr.) at 70. As stated bythe Army, its acceptance of the plan "did not represent asubstantive judgment on the part of the Army about thelikelihood of certification or the success of any fixesproposed in that plan." Tr. at 70-71.

9 B-253014

Finally, with respect to the vibration associated with itsaircraft, Enstrom contends that the findings of theinstructor pilots are inconsistent with the numerical scoreassigned to the Enstrom helicopter by the Army'sexperimental test pilots. The experimental test pilotsassigned the Enstrom aircraft (deleted] a level whichindicates that "experienced aircrew are aware of thevibration but it does not affect their work, at least over ashort period," As the agency points out, the aircraft to bepurchased are not intended for experienced pilots but willb-,used to train students with little or no flightexperience, In addition, the experimental test pilotevaluation was not intended to address the impact thevibration may have on students but to investigate theunderlying causes of the aircraft vibration, In thisregard, we point out that 19 of 20 instructor pilotsindicated that the Enstrom helicopter exhibited theundesirable flight characteristics of vibration and flightcontrol feedback. We have no basis to conclude that thevibration assessment rating assigned to Enstrom's helicoptercalls into question the instructor pilots' evaluation of thetraining effectiveness impact of the vibration experiencedin the Enstrom helicopter.

We therefore find that, based on the TEUE, the agencyreasonably concluded that vibration in the Enstromhelicopter degraded training effectiveness With respect tothe instrument approach and partial panel maneuvers. Inaddition, with respect to the partial panel maneuver, theArmy states that the poor placement of the compass was acontributing factor in assessing a weakness, AlthoughEnstrom argues thac the compass could be moved withoutaffecting the operation of the aircraft, there is nothing inthe record suggesting that Enstrom requested a deviation tomake this change after completing the TEUE. Even ifrequested, the record shows that the modification would havean impact on training effectiveness anl therefore, thedeviation request could not have been granted.

B. Power Margin

Based on the TEUE, the Army found that, in perfolming theinstrument take-off maneuver, Enstrom's helicopter had a"power margin" problem. The Army reports that the primaryobjective of the instrument takeoff maneuver is to "clearunseen obstacles in the vicinity of the helicopter byclimbing prior to gaining horizontal speed" and that "I(themaneuver is accomplished using a fixed power setting whichis calculated prior to initiation of the maneuver." Theagency explains that the Enstrom helicopter required[deleted] pounds per square inch (psi) of torque to performthis maneuver, the maximum power which the aircraft's torquegauge indicated was available. Tr. at 87. *In addition, the

10 B-253014

needle on the aircraft's torque gauge fluctuatedcontinuously, As a result of the "zero" power margin andthe fluctuating gauge, several of the instructor pilots atthe TEUE inadvertently exceeded the power limitationlisted on the torque gauge of the Enstrom aircraft, or"overtorqued" the helicopter, The Army reasoned that sincethe experienced pilots exceeded the power limit,inexperienced pilots would frequently overtorque theaircraft,

The Army explains that exceeding the specified torquelimitation of a helicopter has significant consequenceswhich would negatively affect the training of studentpilots, Specifically, it states that consistent with thepolicies of Fort Rucker and the FAA, when an aircraftexceeds a torque limitation, it must be immediately landedand inspected for damage. In addition to the costsassociated with inspecting and maintaining the aircraftunder such circumstances, this procedure disrupts training.

Enstrom contends that the Army based its conclusion thatEnstrom's helicopter had a power margin problem on itsinability to climb 500 feet per minute while traveling at90 knots. Enstrom argues that since the REP does notrequire that both of these requirements--500 feet per minuteand 90 knots--be met at the same time, it should not havebeen downgraded. The record does not support theprotester's position.

The Army conclusion that Enstrom's helicopter had no powermargin when performing the instrument take-off maneuver wasbased on the reports of the TRUE instructor pilots, Two ofthose pilots state that they unintentionally overt.orqued theaircraft while performing this maneuver, The reportsprepared by those pilots include no indication that thehelicopter was overtorqued because the pilots performed themaneuver in a manner inconsistent with the FTG. Enstromclaims that the agency evaluated its "power margin asineffective only after purposely overtorquing the engine toachieve a standing take-off rate of climb of 500 feet perminute," and that the pilots attempted to perform theinstrument take-off maneuver at 90 knots. Although Enstr:rnhas had access to the records of the technical evaluationand the TEUE, the protester has provided no evidence tcsupport this assertion. Under the circumstances, we thinkthe agency reasonably assigned a weaknesc. to the Enstrort.proposal based on its lack of a power margin during theinstrument take-off maneuver.

In its comments on the hearing, Enstrom asserted for thefirst time that while the Army's finding was based on itsunderstanding that the power limit of its helicopter was(deleted], Enstrom's "operating manual disclosed that

11 B-253014

(deleted) for 3 seconds or less imposed no operation stresson Enstrom's helicopter." Our Bid Protest Regulationsrequire that a protest be filed within 10 working days afterthe basis of protest is known or should have been known.4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2) (1993). Each new protest ground mustindependently satisfy the timeliness requirements. RRRSEnters., Inc., B-241512; B-241512.2, Feb. 12, 1991, 91-1 CPDS 152. To allow the piecemeal presentation of evidence ordevelopment of protest issues would undermine the goals ofour bid protest function to produce fair and equitabledecisions based on consideration of all parties' argumentson a fully developed record without unduly disrupting theprocurement of goods and services. See RC 27th Ave. Corp.--Recon.,, B-246727.2, May 20, 1992, 92-1 CPD cl 455.

Here, the agency report, provided to the protester onMay 24, clearly stated that the Army understood that thetorque limitation of the Enstrom aircraft was (deleted].Therefore, at the latest, Enstrom knew by that date thebasis for the agency's finding regarding the overtorqueingproblem. Since Enstrom's argument that the Armymisunderstood the maximum capabilities of its aircraft wasfirst raised in its hearing comments submitted on July 21,more than 10 days after May 24, it is untimely.

In any event, the Army states that the only FAA approvedpower limit for Enstrom's helicopter was (deleted] and thatthe operators manual was in draft form and not approved bythe FAA, The agency states that even if Enstrom hadsuggested the [deleted) limitation at the TEUE, it would nothave allowed the pilots to operate the aircraft at powerlevels in excess of those approved by the FAA. We have nobasis to disagree with the Army's judgment.

Enstrom next notes that the instructor pilots commentedabout the lack of power in the Bell aircraft and thereforeargues that Bell should have been similarly downgraded.The protester complains that the Army's failure to do sodemonstrates unequal treatment in the training effectivenessevaluation. Enstrom has not, however, explained how anyalleged power problems associated with the Bell aircraftdegraded training effectiveness, nor has it identified aparticular maneuver for which training was adverselyaffected, Rather, it simply lists isolated comments of theinstructor pilots and concludes that the agency should haveassigned a weakness to Bell for "limited power margin."

Many of the instructor pilot's comments appear to bedirected at the aircraft's performance of the contactmaneuvers, "simulated maximum performance takeoff" and"hover." The negative comments appear to be reflected inthe relatively low average scores assigned to Bell for thosemaneuvers: 4 and 4.5, respectively. We therefore do not

12 B-253014

think that the pilots' comments demonstrate unequaltreatment.

C. Refueling and Fuel Endurance

The RFP provided that the NTH fuel system "(sihall providethe fuel required for 2 hours endurance plus 30 minut~esreserve . . *" and that the "flight shall start at themaximum mission gross weight as defined in (section] 5.b.(of the RFPI)." Section 5.b. stated that the "MaximumMission Gross Weight (MMGW) shall be within the certifiedmaximum gross weight and includes the NTH with . . .sufficient fuel for required endurance, all lubricants full,flyaway equipment including aircraft logbooks, and with aminimum crew of 3 at 200 pounds each (600 pounds total).."The RFP also contained a "noncritical" fuel endurancerequirement of 3 hours with 30 minutes reserve.

Onstrom was assessed a weakness for aircraft refuelingbecause its fuel tanks could not be "topped-off" or filledcompletely without exceeding the maximum gross weight of theaircraft. According to the Army, since the Enstrom fueltanks could not be topped-off, to avoid exceeding theaircraft's maximum gross weight, a cumbersome and timeconsuming refueling procedure was required. Determining theamount of fuel which may be added requires "precise missionplanning" and entails the use of a "dipstick calibratedspecifically for the aircraft." Further, because of thelocation of the fueling port at the top of the aircraft, theuse of a ladder and two refuelers were required. The Armyconcluded that the procedures required will result inincreased refueling times causing delays to other aircraftin the "refueling sequence" and lost training time.

The Protester does not dispute the existence of therefueling problem described by the Army. Rather, it assertsthat the Army should have considered a "minor design change"to its aircraft to resolve the problem. The Army states,however, and the record shows, that there was no basis toconsider such a proposed modification to the aircraft afterthe TEUE. As discussed, other than in limited dircumstancesnot present here, offerors were required to provide thetas-delivered" production model at the TEUE.

Next, Enstrom asserts that the Army treated it differentlythan Bell because, according to Enstrom, Bell's helicopter"possessed refueling characteristics identical to"Enstrom's. According to the protester, since the Bellhelicopter had the same problem, it was unreasonable for theSSAC and SSA not to have considered the alleged problem inthe award decision.

13 B-253014

The record does not support the protester's position thatthe Bell helicopter suffered from the same problem as theEnstrom. The record shows that at least once during theTEUE the Bell fuel tank could not be filled to capacity ortopped-off because the helicopter was carrying a crew thatweighed 667 pounds. Nonetheless, this was not considered aweakness because the refueling evaluation was based upon theRFP requirement of three 200-pound pilots, or a pilot weightof 600 pounds. Tr. at 98-99. The Army states that the fueltanks on the Bell helicopter meet the refueling requirementsince they can be filled to capacity without exceeding theaircraft's maximum gross weight when carrying a total pilotweight of 600 pounds.

The Army found that while Enstrom's aircraft met the fuelendurance requirement, the Bell helicopter had greaterendurance and therefore allowed a wider selection ofalternate training routes and landing sites. The agencyexplains that if a student pilot cannot land at his planneddestination, for example because of poor visibility, theinstructor may choose to use an alternate airport. The Armyfound that this increased flexibility would have a trainingbenefit. The protester has not challenged the agency'sposition, which in our view, is reasonable.

D. Third Seat

The RFP required that the NTH have a minimum of three seatsand stated that the "position of the third seat shall allowthe observer to view the primary flight instruments and theoutside flight environment from the seated and restrainedposition." It contained the following non-criticalrequirements: (1) "(tthe occupied third seat should notinhibit the (instructor pilot's) access to the studentoperating the controls, and (the pilot's] ability to regaincontrol from the student and recover the aircraft;" and(2) "(tjhe occupant of the third seat should have anunobstructed view and full readability of all flight andnavigation instruments as well as a view of the controlmovements of the other student."

The Army states that the cockpit design of its currenttraining helicopter has the third seat behind the pilots,yet allows the observer to view instruments, the actions ofthe pilots, and allows that occupant to ingress/egress theaircraft without climbing over the pilots seats. Althoughin the NTH competition the Army sought a training helicopterthat allowed the same training effectiveness as the aircraftwhich it is to replace, the record shows that agencyofficials concluded that this goal would not be achieved.At the hearing held on this protest, we heard testimony onthis issue from Major General John D. Robinson, theCommanding General at the Army's Aviation War Fighting

14 B-253014

Center at Fort Rucker. General Robinson, who was a seniormember of the SSAC, testified concerning the cockpitconfiguration, that while the Army had "hoped that it waspossible [for an offeror to achieve] the full roominess andthe capability we currently enjoy . . . , neither (Bell norEnstrom] did it in the fashion I would like to have had as atrainer." Tr. at 206-207.

Enstrom offered (deleted]. The Army found that this designcreated a cramped cockpit. In addition to the discomfort ofthe occupants, (deleted]. The Army also found that enteringand exiting the aircraft was difficult for the third seatoccupant. (Deleted]. The agency also noted that it wouldbe extremely difficult for the occupant of the third seat toexit the aircraft if one of the pilots became incapacitated(deleted],

With respect to Bell, the agency found that the helicoptermet the minimum requirements through the use of a videomonitor which enabled the student in the third seat to seethe primary flight instruments. The Army noted severalsignificant weaknesses with the video system: it was hardto read at night, caused glare problems, and vibrated. TheSSEB concluded that the third seat provided only limitedtraining benefit and no training benefit at night.'

Enstrom argues that given the respective weaknesses of thetwo offerors, Bell should have been severely downgraded inthe training effectiveness area for limited training valueof its third seat. It asserts that "l(the Army's ability totrain two pilots for the price of one was a major factor inCongress' decision to appropriate funds for this program."The protester argues that the Army should have "factoredinto Bell's training effectiveness score a 50-percentevaluation penalty commensurate with the 50-percent loss oftraining effectiveness (associated with the Bell third

'The protester argues that the inability to use the thirdseat for night training degraded training effectiveness ofthe Bell helicopter. The agency explained, however, thatthis had no impact on training effectiveness since "primary"training is not conducted at night, nor are there any plansto do so. While the protester questions the use of theterm "primary," it is clear that this term refers to the"introductory" nature of the training for which thehelicopters are to be used. The protester also argues thatthe-specifications require exterior lighting and thereforecontends that night flying must be intended. As the agencystates, however, even though the NTH aircraft will not beused to train students at night, it will be necessary onoccasion to operate the aircraft at night, for instance, formaintenance purposes. Tr. at 115.

15 E-253014

seat]." We find the protester's argument to be withoutmerit.

There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that theability to 'train two pilots for the price of one" was agoal of the NTI acquisition. Moreover, even if this were agoal, it was not reflected in the RFP on which thecompetition was based. There is simply nothing in therecord to suggest that the Army expected that the occupantof the third seat would receive the same training benefit asthe primary student. The only RFP requirements concerningthe third seat are those stated above relating to the cabinconfiguration. At the hearing, General Robinson describedthe training value of the third seat as providing "vicariouslearning." Tr. at 203. He stated that "([there is nosubstitute for a student to be on the controls and to havethe instructor pilot there . . . demonstrating the maneuveror to have the student doing it with the pilot. . ." ' Tr.at 207-208. He described the "vicarious learning" to astudent with no prior experience with helicopter flight as"the excitement of being up in the air and moving around andsort of seeing where .he is, experiencing turns andapproaches and takeoffs and in hearing the instructorpilots. . . " Tr. At 203. In addition, use of the thirdseat "gets the second student on out to the stage fieldswhere the contact (flight training] work is done or to adistant air field where the student changeover may be forinstrument flight training . . . ." Tr. at 205.

In light of the above, we have no basis to disturb theArmyts conclusions concerning the relative trainingeffectiveness of the third seat in each of the competingaircraft. The Army found that both Bell and Enstrom hadweaknesses associated with the third seat which aresupported by the record and, in our view, none of theweaknesses were of decisive significance to the overallassessment of the training effectiveness offered by pitheraircraft *10

In sum, we find the agency's training effectivenessevaluation of both the Bell and Enstrom aircraft to bereasonable and supported by the record.

'0Enstrom also complains that the Army unreasonably foundthat its aircraft had inadequate storage space for maps andpublications and that it had inadequate overhead clearancein the third seat. Similar weaknesses were noted withrespect to the Bell aircraft and, based on our review, theseweaknesses provided no basis for the agency to distinguishbetween the two aircraft.

16 B-253014

2. Technical Acceptability Of Bell's Helicopter

Enstrom complains that the Army relaxed a solicitationrequirement to accommodate Bell. Specifically, it arguesthat the position of the Bell third seat does not allow theobserver to view the primary flight instruments from theseated and restrained position, as required by the RFP. Theprotester quotes the narrative evaluations of a number ofinstructor pilots who expressed concern about the trainingutility of the Bell third seat. For example, the pilotsnoted that the student in the back seat "cannot see movementof the flight controls" or "view is restricted on manyflight instruments." Many of the comments were generalobservations about the Bell video monitor system such as thedifficulty in reading the information displayed on thescreen or the glare it caused.

The SSEB determined that, when looking at the video screen,the student pilot could, in fact, see all of the primaryflight instruments. The SSEB chairman testified that "wesent several individuals down to Fort Rucker and theyphysically ensured by virtue of looking . . . at theaircraft (and) turning on the (video monitor) that . . . infact you could see the primary flight instruments." Tr. at109. While the SSEB found, based on the TEUE comments, thatthe instruments farthest away and at an angle are shown withsome distortion and that the screen was affected byvibrations, the information was still readable. The SSEBstated, however, that several instructor pilots werecritical of the video system, noting that "some felt thatthe entire instrument panel . . . need(ed] to bedisplayed. . a ."

Based on the record before us, we simply cannot concludethat the agency unreasonably found that the Bell aircraft'svideo system achieved compliance with the criticalrequirement, that the student in the third seat be able toview all primary instruments. The protester's reliance on alist of pilot comments criticizing Bell's video system doesnot demonstrate that the agency's conclusion regarding thevisibility of the primary instruments was unreasonable. Wepoint out, in this regard, that the pilots were not taskedwith assessing the aircrafts' technical compliance withcritical requirements such as tile one at issue here. Whilesome of the pilots had concerns that all primary flightinstruments could not be seen under all lighting conditions,the pilots' concerns related to training effectiveness, notcompliance with the critical requirement. Indeed, it is notclear from the protester's submissions which flightinstruments it believes cannot be seen. Since the protesterhas merely highlighted concerns which the Army was aware of,the protester's argument amounts to disagreement with theagency's conclusion concerning the visibility of the

17 B-253014

instruments. Such disagreement does not demonstrate thatthe agency's ultimate conclusion was unreasonable.

3. Source Selection Decision

Enstrom asserts that the Army failed to conduct acost/technical tradeoff; it contends that if the Army hadperformed such an analysis, it would have determined thatEnstrom's proposal, which included a lower acquisition priceand lower life cycle costs, was the best value. Theprotester also contends that the cost difference between theBell and Enstrom aircraft, as presented to the SSA, wasunderstated and that it was unreasonable for the Army toaward the contract to Bell at a substantially higher pricethan that. offered by Enstrom.

First, the record clearly shows that the SSA conducted acost/technical tradeoff in which he considered theevaluation areas set forth in the RFP. With respect to thepotential cost savings, as indicated above, the SSA basedhis decision on the Army's evaluation data which showed thatthe total 5-year costs of the Bell helicopter were [deleted]more than those associated with the Enstrom aircraft.Enstrom has not challenged the agency's evaluation of theacquisition price, life cycle costs, or other cost/benefitsfor either Bell or Enstrom. Rather, Enstrom asserts thatthe savings over the 20-year life of the U'TH program ofchoosing the Enstrom helicopter would be (deleted], or fourtimes the 5-year costs and it contends that the Army shouldhave considered this figure in the selection decision.

The Army argues that Enstrom's 20-year "extrapolation" isoverly simplistic. In this respect, the agency notes thatby simply multiplying the 5-year cost by four, the protesterassumes that the Army will incur the acquisition cost of theaircraft 3 more times within 20 years. In any event, sincethe REP contemplated an evaluation based on 5-year lifecycle data, we see nothing improper in the agency's use of5-year costs as the basis for its eoaluation.

"To the extent that the protester alleges that theselection decision should have been based on a 20-year totalcost analysis rather than 5-year, this argument is untimelysince it is based on an alleged defect in the solicitation.In this respect, protests based on alleged improprieties ina solicitation are required to be filed nrior to thetime set for receipt of initial proposals. 4 C.F.R.§ 21.2(a)(1). Here, the RFP stated that the agency wouldconsider 5-year life cycle cost data and any complaint thatthe selection should have been based on consideration of20-year data is untimely.

18 B-253014

With respect to the protester's challenge to thereasonableness of the selection of Bell at a highercost/price, under a solicitation such as the one here, whichcalls for award on the basis of best overall value to thegovernment, there is no requirement that award be made onthe basis of low cost or price. Agency source selectionofficials have discretion in determining the manner andextent to which they will make use of the technical and costevaluation results. Technical and cost tradeoffs arepermitted and the extent to which one may be sacrificed forthe other is governed by the test of rationality andconsistency with the established evaluation factors. SeeGrey Advertising. Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111 (1976) 76-1 CPD¶ 325. We will accord due weight to the judgment ofselecting officials concerning the significance of thedifference in technical merit of offers and whether thatdifference is sufficiently significant to outweigh the costdifference. Litton Sys., Inc., supra.

Here, the primary Justification for the award to a higher-cost offeror was the Army's determination that the Bellhelicopter would provide greater training effectiveness thanthe lower-cost Enstrom helicopter. The RFP specificallyadvised offers that training effectiveness was moreimportant than cost or any other factor. The record showsthat Bell's proposal also was considered somewhat morefavorable under the past performance and management factors,and the protester has not challenged those conclusions. Asdiscussed above, the training effectiveness evaluation wasreasonable and fully supported by the extensive hands-ontesting performed by the Army. Since the aircraft will beused to train incoming students, we think it was reasonablefor the Army to conclude, based in large measure on thetraining effectiveness evaluation, that the superiority ofthe Bell aircraft outweighed the cost difference.

Enstr6m also complains about the methodology used by theSSEB in analyzing and presenting the TEUE data to the SSACand SSA. Enstrom argues essentially that the selectionofficials were given an inaccurate picture of the relativestrengths and weaknesses of the training effectiveness ofthe Bell and Enstrom helicopters and that the numericalscores associated with those proposals were flawed, Forexample, it argues that the Army's data from the TEUE wasunreliable and requests that we recommend that the Armyreconduct the TEUE.

We find nothing in the record to support the protester'sassertions. While the SSEB synthesized the raw datagenerated by the TEUE and made specific assessmentsregarding training effectiveness, the protester has notshown these findings to be unreasonable. These findingswere, in turn, presented to the SSAC and SSA along with the

19 B-253014

TEUE data. We find nothing improper with the Army'sapproach, and as discussed, we think the conclusions reachedwere reasonable)2 To the extent that the protester arguesthat the conclusions of the SSAC and the SSA did not mirrorthe views of particular instructor pilots or the SSEB,source selection officials in negotiated procurements arenot bound by the recommendations or evaluation judgments oflower-level evaluators, even though the working levelevaluators may normally be expected to have the technicalexpertise required for such evaluations. Benchmark Sec.,Inc., B-247655.2, Feb. 4, 1993, 93-1 CPD c 133.

CONCLUSION

We find no legal basis to disturb the award. In reachingthis conclusion, we have carefully reviewed the extensiveevaluation record in the context of all of the protester'scontentions and arguments. While we have not treated indetail each and every one of the protester's allegations,they have all been considered and have played a role in ourdecision.

The protest is denied.

James F. HinchmanGeneral Counsel

"Enstrom also objects to the Army's statistical analysis ofthe TEUE scores which emphasized examining "clusters" ofpilot scores to ensure that isolated comments did not skewthe evaluation. Enstrom argues that the SSEB scores shouldhave been determined by averaging the pilot scores. Enstrorrhas not shown that the Army's approach was eitherunreasonable or inconsistent with the REFP. In any event,there was no requirement that the selection decision bebased on the point scores which are merely guides tointelligent decision-making. See Harris Corp. PRI, Inc.,B-247440.5; B-247440.6, Aug. 13, 1992, 92-2 CPD c 171.

20 B-253014