THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN CONTRACT

LABOR PROGRAM, 19^2-1966

APPROVED:

Z W l V £ O m Major Professor

Minor Professor

the Departm^dx^f History

Dean of the Graduate School

TEE HISTORY 0? THE MEXICAN - CONTRACT

LABOR PROGRAM, 19^2-1966

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

North Texas State University in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Marion Beth Morris, 3. A-,

Denton, Tsia?

January, 19c?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1

II. WORLD WAR II PROGRAM: 19^2-19^7 9

III. THE EVOLUTION OP PUBLIC LAW 78 AND THE WETBACK CHALLENGE: 19^7-1955 ^3

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM: 1955-1964- . . . 79

V. THE POST-BRACERO ERA, 1964-1966: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 107

BIBLIOGRAPHY' 126

111

CHATTER I

INTRODUCTION

The seasonal movement of Mexican agricultural workers

to the United States has ebbed and flowed with the tides of

war, depression, and prosperity. Prior to the system of

contract labor which began In 19-!-2 and continued until 1964,

agricultural laborers had entered, the United States in

large numbers, especially sinc^ the turn of the twentieth

century. The first significant immigration occurred in the

period 191? to 1921. Prior to tne outbreak of World W&r I,

farmers borrowed Mexican workers f;» cm railxo&cl conpan5 es

which had imported them for temporary maintenance work.

With the shortage of agricultural labor which accompanied

the war, farmers and citrus fruit growers petitioned

Congress to allow large importations of Mexican workers.

Although the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1917

prohibited foreign contract labor, the Ninth Proviso of

Section Three of the Lot permitted the Commissioner of

Immigration, in cooperation with the Secretary of Labor, to

establish certain criteria under which -coinporaTy workers

could gain on trance to the country. noting under the

authority of the proviso, Secretary of Labor ¥. B, Wilson

on May 22, 1917, ordered the suspension of literacy tests

and. exemption from payment of the head tax for agricultural

workers. The modification of the immigration laws created

an influx of workers numbering approximately 73>000 during

the five-year period 1917 to 1921.

Although not so highly regulated as the World War II

program, this system represented the informal beginning of

the "bracero^ program. In order to obtain, workers, the

growers signed a contract with the United S.tates government

which specified the conditions of importation and re-

patriation. The employers arranged for housing, trans-C<

port-ation, and food, the cost of which was deducted from

2

the workers' wages. ' The initial entrance of workers was

only the vanguard for a stream of migrants that would.

increase in volume throughout the decade of the 1920's.

Some estimates maintain that as many as <0,000 workers were

admitted yearly along with an unknown number of "wetbacks,"

or persons illegally entering the United Scates from Mexico,"'

"Literally translated from Spanish the term "bracero" means "arms" and has been applied to day laborers. Since the inception of the Lexican farm labor program, the term refers to agricultural laborers in the United States.

2 "U. S., Congress, House, Committee of the Judiciary,

Subcommittee No. 1, Study of "Population and Immigration Problems, 83th Congress, 1st Session, 1963. pp. Zh-, 27, Hereafter cited as "Study of Population." See also, Ray N. Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore, "The Bracero in California," The Paci f ic Historical liev lew, XXXIT (August, 19637* 263.

-^"Study of Population," p. 27,

The trend of immigration reversed itself in the 1930's

as the abundance of seasonal jobs and high wages vanished

with the onset of the depression. Aliens still found

employment in the United States but in smaller numbers and

at decreased wages. Of the e.stimated 1,^-22,553 Mexicans

working on a year-round basis in the United States in 192^,

approximately 300>003 to ^00,000 returned to their homeland

during the depression. The exodus reached a peak of 155<3'+^

persons in 1931 > but dropped to 31,4-8^ by 1933 •

Repatriation of the Mexican workers who were displaced

by domestic labor created problems for both the United States

and Mexico. Although many returned voluntarily to Mexico,

wholesale forced deportation was not feasible since many of

the workers' children were American-born citizens. More

indirect yet equally effective methods were used to encourage

the unemployed workers to return to Mexico, In some cases,

they were threatened with the denial of relief allowances;

while in other instances, they were bribed with the offer

of free transportation to the border.

k Robert D. Tomasek, "The Political and Economic

Implications of Mexican Labor in the United States under-the Non-Quota System, Labor Program, and Wetback Movement," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1957, p. ^7. Hereafter cited as Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States."

^Ibid., p. 1^6.

k

Unless the workers received free transportation, the

Mexican government had to subsidize their return trip, since

the majority of them had experienced long periods of un-

employment and related economic hardships. The added

expenses created by the destitute migrants were a strain on

the Mexican national budget. Moreover, the situation in

the 1930!s influenced the attitude of Mexican officials

with respect to the World War II program. Part of the

hesitance with which the Mexican government approached the

later negotiations was directly related to the distresses

its citizens experienced as migrants to the United States.^

One of the interesting similarities between the early

immigration of workers to the United States and the contract

system developed in 19^2 is the areas of Mexico from which

the workers came. In both periods, the central plateau of

Mexico provided the largest number of migrants. Guanajuato,

Jalisco, and Michoacan were the principal contributors, with

fewer migrants coming from Sonera, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and

Nuevo Leon. States situated in the .coastal regions pro-

duced the smallest number of migrants. There were, however,

exceptions to the pattern of immigration, In the Imperial

Valley of California, approximately 50 per cent of the

immigrants originated in Mexican states with borders con-

tiguous to the United States, such as 3aja California.

°"Study of Population," p. 27

5

There it was estimated that only 35 per cent of the laborers

7

came from the central areas of Mexico.

The condition which prompted such large-scale immigration

of Mexicans to the United States, particularly during the

1920's, resulted from a combipation of factors, There was

the important "pull factor" of the prospect of higher wages

in the United States. If the Mexican situation had offered

more satisfactory living conditions, higher wages possibly

would not have been a sufficient inducement for a £eon to

leave his traditional environment and migrate to the United

States. But such conditions did not exist and their absence

contributed to "push factors,"

One would naturally think that a dense population

would be a push factor, but this was not necessarily true.

Of the three most highly populated states in the 1920!s,

Veracruz, Puebla, and Jalisco, the latter state was the

only one to contribute substantially to the immigration 8

flood. Although many Mexicans doubtless emigrated to

escape political insecurities and economic vicissitudes

resulting from the 1910 Revolution, the Revolution itself

does not account for the tremendous surge in migration. -In

fact, the trend of immigration increased in the period 7 Manuel Gamio, Mexican Tmmlgrati on to the United States:

A Study of Human Migration and Ad justment (Chicago, 19 30), pp. 21-23. Hereafter cited as Gamio, "Mexican Migration."

8Ibid., p. 21.

t)

1923 to 1928 after the violent stage of the Revolution had 9

ended.

A more sophisticated answer is found in the system of

landholding in Mexico. In the central area of Mexico, as

represented by Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacan, and in

the northern parts land is distributed in large estates

owned by a few wealthy families. Population pressure on

the land forces the peon class to emigrate periodically.

The coastal and southern areas are not plagued with such

extensive landholdings and, therefore, contribute almost -j Q

negligible amounts to the migration pattern,"

^ The effect of the early migration on the individual

worker an<i on Mexico is at best controversial. It was

hoped that the money earned in the United States would be

used to purchase land and farm equipment, but a majority

of migrants spent most of their money in the United States,

usually for luxury items, before returning to Mexico.

Many of the skills learned in the United States were

not applicable to the home siuuatjon In Mexico, In this

period, Mexican industry and railroads were not highly

developed. The stoop labor skills were used neither on the

large estates nor on the small plots of land that belonged

11 to the peones,'

9: Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the united States," pp. l6-1?'.

10

],bidSee also, Garni0, '"Mexican Migration," pp. 22-2,3.

"^TomaseK, "Mexican Labor in the United States • ,J

7

From the economic viewpoint, Mexico benefited from the

migration. Her workers received better wages and improved

conditions. But even in the early period of immigration,

observers of the trends realized that unregulated migration

portended difficulties for both the United States and

Mexico, j/one of the observers, sociologist Manuel Gamio,

rejected the contention that laissez-faire migration was a

more satisfactory policy than controlled migration. He felt

that unregulated migration would be acceptable if it was

concerned with goods such as cattle; but when related to

human beings, the fluctuations of supply and demand were not

an adequate gauge.jGamio suggested that border authorities /

cooperate to dispense information concerning wages and con-

/ ditions of employment./ The author also urged, as a part of

/

the work contracts, that American employers pay trans-

portation for the worker from the border to his point of 1?

destination and return. " His proposals contain several of

the guarantees which Mexican officials later demanded in

negotiating the international agreement of 19^2.

Thus the pre-World War II immigration influenced the

development of the later program. This was especially true

during the 1920's when the influx of, workers created a

pattern of Mexican migration to the United States. It also

established a precedent of relying on foreign labor among 19 '"Gam:1 o, Mexican Migration, pp. 178-182

• . 8

American farmers and growers by which they partially

justified their pleas for the importation of contract labor

during World War II. The Mexican government, remembering

the chaotic conditions of the 1930's, found justification

for the guarantees it demanded during the negotiations of /

19/12. / Lastly, the mass migration aroused perceptive ob-

servers to encourage cooperation between the United States

and Mexico in order to assure that benefits accrue to the

two nations; and, more importantly, to the individual

worker. / /

CHAPTER II

WORLD WAR II PROGRAM:

19^2-19^7

With the approach of World War II and the resultant

orientation of the economic resources of the United States

from consumer production toward heavy industry, the high

wage rate and regular hours of industrial employment caused

many agricultural workers to leave the farms. Growers in

the country became apprehensive that a sufficient number of

domestic agricultural workers would not be available to

harvest crops. As early as September, 19^1. farm groups

which had used Mexican laborers during World War I and the

1920's reported a critical labor shortage in the country.

These groups petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization

Office to waive restrictions again'on immigration in order

that Mexican nationals could be recruited for the harvest

1 season.

Within the United States government, a possible farm

labor shortage as a result of the war effort was being

discussed. Opinion, particularly in' the Department of

1

"Wayne I). Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program. 19^3-19-/t7. U. S. Department of Agri-culture Monograph No. 13 (Washington, 1951)> 200. Hereafter cited as Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program."

10

Agriculture, was divided concerning the manner with which a

farm labor program should be developed in order to counter-

balance defense shortages. Secretary of Agriculture Henry

Wallace represented the group which felt that the problems

of agriculture centered around a surplus rather than a

shortage of labor. According to the position held by the

Secretary, the problem of a labor shortage reported by the

growers could be solved by an active nationwide recruitment

and transportation program designed to attract domestic

workers. Therefore, the early requests in 19^1 for foreign. ..

labor, coming primarily from cotton growers in the states of \ •

Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico, were" denied by Immigration \ "

and Naturalization authorities. The plan to obtain workers

through interstate recruitment initiated by the United

States Employment Service was successful and temporarily-

met the growers' demand for labor.-''

However, as the 19^2 harvest drew near, the availability

of farm labor had been influenced by several factors, not

the least of which was the Selective Service Act passed in

late 19^0. Whereas the armed forces had only .5 million

men in 19^0, by 19 -1 there were 1.6 million.^ The number

^Ibid., pp. 13-1^.

3Ibid., p. 200.

David Graham Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program—Its Friends and Foes," unpublished master's thesis, Department of History, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas, I963, p. 1 -. Hereafter cited as Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program."

11

expanded to ^ million in 19^2 and 9 million in 19^3* The

decline of potential laborers in the United States occurred

as the world demand for agricultural goods increased. A

study in 19 -2 estimated that in the first month of the year,

as many as 8,^-03,500 agricultural workers would be needed

as a result of the demand foi farm products. The same study

pointed out that in June, the peak harvest month, the need

would increase to 12,068,000. Of the January figure,

1,708,000 would be hired labor, while in June approximately

3 million of the laborers would be hired.^ The problem

which faced the farm employer was one of locating the needed

help.

All farmers, and particularly those who raise perishable

crops, want trie assurance that at harvest time adequate

labor will be available. To make a profit, the harvest •

costs, including labor, must be less than the market prices,

but insufficient labor at the peak of harvest season can in

itself destroy a farmer's investment. The combined effect

of economic and psychological pressures often causes the

harvest labor demand to be more intense than is warranted

6 by the growth cycle.

Growers, thinking their only recourse lay in importation

of foreign labor, renewed their earlier requests to

-Rasmussen, "Emergency i''arm Program," p. 200.

^"Agricultural Labor Relations--The Other Farm Problem," Stanford law'Review, XIV (December, 1961), 121. 4

Immigration and Naturalization Service. The requests

reflected heightened urgency and apprehension with regard

to the approaching harvest season. Particularly vocal in

its requests for labor was the Farm and Livestock Bureau of

— 7 ~

Dona Ana County, New Mexico. Added to the Dona Ana

requests were those of the sugar "beet growers in California

whose estimated need for agricultural workers was placed at O

33.000 persons. Careful investigations proceeded under

the direction of the United States Employment Service to

obtain workers again by interstate recruitment. This time,

however, efforts to secure sufficient workers to fill the

growers' vacancies proved futile. And the Employment Service

certified the existing labor shortage within the country to g

the Office of Immigration and Naturalization.

The growers' demand for imported labor was naturally

receiving attention by governmental agencies interested in

developing an overall solution to the manpower shortage and

in averting possible crop losses as a result of the shortage.

A special committee created within the Department of

Agriculture in April, 19 -2, was assigned the duty of

examining the procedures by which Mexican laborers might be

imported. The committee, headed by Raymond C. Smith of the "^Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 200.

^Lloyd H. Fisher, The Harvest Labor Market in California (Cambridge, 1953). P-

o /Bas"fflussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 200.

• . 13

Department of Agriculture's Interbureau Labor Committee and

composed of representatives from agencies concerned with

national and international affairs, consulted with growers

relative to their labor needs and discussed standards which

10

should be set prior to importation. In the meeting of

the special committee, the important issue was to determine

the wage rate that should be offered to the Mexican workers.

One recommendation presented to the group would have allowed

the Department of Labor, cooperating with the Employment

Service and the Department of Agriculture, to establish the

wage rate. A second suggestion would have given the

Employment Service authority to determine wage rates equiva-

lent to the average wage being received by an industrial

laborer working in the same geographic location in which the

imported, agricultural worker would be used. The Department

of Agriculture, representing the growers' interests,

rejected the latter recommendation arguing that it would

create increased labor costs for the grower sin^e wages

received in industry would be higher than those for agri-

culture in any given area.

Although plans were being formulated in the United

States to contract foreign labor, formal negotiations with

10 "'Ibid, , pp. 200-201. Membership on the special com-

mittee included representatives from the War Manpower Commission, Department of State, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Department of Justice, and Department of Labor,

^ "l'bid , , p. 2.01.

Ik

the Mexican government to ascertain if a program of re-

cruitment would be acceptable or feasible had not as yet

begun. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles instructed

Ambassador George C. Messersmith to mention the subject of

a temporary pact for the importation of agricultural

workers, but Messersmith was not to seek an immediate reply

from Mexican Foreign Minister Esequiel Padilla. In the

talks, Messersmith was to assure him that the United States

was well aware of the i&i sfortunes connected with earlier

migrations and that every possible precaution and safeguard

would be established.

Following his instructions, Messersmith contacted the

Foreign Ministry and talked with Under Secretary Jaime

Torres Bodet. As anticipated by the State Department, one

of the objections tc negotiating a pact, a point stressed

by Torres Bodet, was the troubles of earlier immigrants.

He felt that good relations between Mexico and the United

States might be jeopardized if such incidents reoecurred.

The Under Secretary also discussed internal problems wh: oh

the Mexican government had to consider before signing a

pact. He pointed out that news of a recruitment program

would flood Mexico City with thousands of workers who would f

think they were going to "El Dorado." Instead of returning

to Mexico with money, many would be penniless. Torres Bodet

said that agencies within the Mexican government were dis-

cussing the possibility of setting aside a certain part of

15

the wage of each worker contracted. He also asked that a

part of the wages be given in farm tools that could be used

in Mexico on small tracts of land. Despite the hesitancies,

Torres Bodet suggested meeting on July 10 for further

discussion, but emphasiz.ed that there should be no public

announcement. To do so would only provide additional

material for those of anti-American sentiment to criticize

12

both governments.

Further discussion on the topic occurred at the Second

Inter-American Conference on Agriculture held in June, 19^2.

When approached by representatives of the Agriculture and

State Departments, Mexican officials were receptive to the

suggestions of contract labor, but demanded certain 13

guarantees to protect their citizens. ^ Agreement con-

cerning terms and standards was reached July 10-15 in Mexico

City and made effective by an exchange of notes on August

19 ;-+2.1/+

Immediately following the July meetings, the Mexican

government defined the duties of each department within the 12 Foreign Relations of the United. States: The American

Republics, VI (Washington, 19 -2), 538 —539, 5^-5^5* Here-after cited as Foreign Relations.

13 "^Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Pr'ogram," p. 201.

" Is x U. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of

Mexican Agricultural Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed August 4-, 19^2," U. S. Statutes at Large, LXI, Part II, 1759-1769. Hereafter cited as "Temporary Agreement, 19^2."

16

government toward the contract labor program. The Ministry

of Foreign Affairs was responsible for securing all the

guarantees promised to the worker. The problem of labor

recruitment, so as not to hamper Mexico's harvest and

establishment of the savings fund, was assigned to the

Ministry of Labor and Social Provision. • The Ministry of

Government was to prevent illegal entries into the United

States while the Ministry of Agriculture was made responsible

15

for educating laborers in the use of farm implements.

Throughout the negotiations and the establishment of

the necessary governmental machinery, the reaction of the

Mexican government to the international agreement evidenced

a great deal of ambivalence and reluctance. The transcending

consideration of the officials was a realization that no

Mexican government could politically afford to send workers

to the United States without stipulating certain guarantees.

The reaction of the Mexican people to the worker who re-

turned with tales of abuses and discriminations could be

violent enough to bring a downfall of political power. Con-

sideration also had to be given to the effect a great exodus

of workers would have on the economy of Mexico. The Allied

need for agricultural and mining products might create a

demand for workers within Mexico itself. Yet the

^Robert C. Jones, Mexican War Workers in the United States : The Mexic.o-fJn11ed States Manpower Recruiting Program and Its Operation (Washington, 19^5)» P- 2. Here-after cited as Joixis, "War Workers,"

17

war-associated increase in the Mexican economy was mainly

due to fulfillment of United States's needs, and Mexico did

l6

not c^re to offend its best customer.

^Before the final decision had been reached, the bene-

fits that would accrue both for Mexico as a country and for

the individual worker were weighed. It was felt that the

contract labor program could serve as an educational

experience to Mexican subsistence farmers by exposing them

to more advanced farming techniques which could later be

introduced in their home communities. Even more important,

the program would hopefully bring cash into the depressed 17

rural areas of Mexico. To soma Mexican officials, the

benefits to be gained from the program did not outweigh the

potential disadvantages. When discussions opened at the

Second Inter-American Conference on Agriculture, the recal-

citrant members gave their consent only because use of

Mexican laborers in harvesting vital crops was viewed as 18

Mexico's contribution to the x\iar effort.

The terms of the 19^2 International Agreement therefore

reflected a desire to satisfy the labor needs of the United

States, but more important, the agreement reflected the

V

1 *

Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 19^2," Agricultural History, XXXIII (July, i960), 1^3. Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Evolution."

1 '7 Ma than Wnetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago, 19^8), p. 2.70.

18 Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 202,

18

concerted effort by both United States and Mexican officials

to provide adequate protection for the cooperating parties.

Under the provisions of the agreement, the Farm Security

Administration of the Department of Labor was considered the

employer and the guarantor of the performance of the grower

19

or farmer, who was termed the sub-employer. ' The two

governments hoped that, since the United States government

was to be responsible for the treatment accorded the workers,

exploitation similar to that which occurred in the 1930's

could be circumvented. The agreement provided that workers

could be employed only under the following terms: (1) Workers could not be engaged in military

service or made to suffer acts of discrimination. (2) All transportation and living expenses from

the place of origin to destination point and return, as well as expenses incurred in the fulfillment of any requirement of a migratory nature should be met by the employer.

(3) VJages paid to the worker would be the same as those paid for similar work to other agricultural laborers in the respective regions of destination. In no case could the wage be less than thirty cents per hour in United States currency. If piece rates were employed, they should enable the worker with average ability to earn the prevailing wage.

(4) Workers were to be exclusively engaged in agr i cultural employm e n t,

(5) Workers domiciled at migratory labor camps could purchase articles for personal consumption wherever most convenient to them.

(6) Housing conditions, sanitary and medical services enjoyed by the workers were to be identical to chose enjoyed by other agricultural workers in the same location.

(?) Workers could enjoy the same guarantees related co occupational diseases and accidents as

"'"Temporary Agreement, 19^2," p. 1766.

19

other agricultural workers under United. States legis-lation.

(8) Workers were toj be allowed to elect repre-sentatives to deal with t;he employer.

(9) Workers were guaranteed employment for 75% of the contract period with a subsistence allowance of three dollars per day for time not meeting this guarantee. For the remaining 25% of the contract perjod during which the worker might be unemployed, he was to receive subsistence on the same basis established for United States farm laborers.

(10) The United States Government was to deposit money contributed by the worker to the Mexican Agri-cultural Credit Bank (Banco de Credito Agricola) for the purpose of establishing saving funds.20

The reaction to and acceptance of the 19^2 International

Agreement on the part of the interest groups directly con-

nected with the program was a combination of relief and

concern. The growers throughout the country rejoiced that

a supposed labor shortage had been averted, yet they were

opposed to extensive governmental participation. They

wanted all immigration restrictions lifted, allowing growers

? j to recruit workers on a private'basis in northern Mexico." "

The three-fourths work guarantee also met with opposition.

The growers' position was that the worker should assume the

risk of bad weather and other natural occurrences associated

22

with agricultural work."" The major concern of the growers

was that the guarantee of a thirty-cent-per-hour wage rate

20Ibid., pp. 1766-1763,

^Scruggs, "Evolution," p. 1^3 •

9 9 George D. Coalson, "Mexican Contract Labor in American

Agriculture," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIII (December, 1952)- 231"

20

to Mexican nationals was part of a plan to extend the

minimum wage to domestic agricultural workers, driving the

domestics under the "umbrella of social security legis-

23 lation." They quickly noted that Congress had specifically

excluded agriculture from the.provisions of the National

2i| Labor Relations Act and the fair Labor Standards Act.

Labeling the restrictions and limitations of the 19^2 Inter-

2

national Agreement as "bureaucratic obstructionism," the

growers voiced their concern but complied witn the pro-

visions in order to obtain the labor.

Two other groups whose welfare would be affected by

importation of foreign labor registered their reaction to

the international agreement. Labor feared that after the

war Mexican nationals would compete for jobs in the cities.

Even though the agreement restricted the activity of

Mexican nationals to agricultural employment, labor interests

were adamant that they be quickly returned to Mexico at the

end of each harvesting season."" Mexican-American opposition

centered primarily around the fear that a great influx of

foreign workers would tend to lower farm wages. Inasmuch as 23 "^Otey M. Scruggs, "The Brecero Program under the Farm

Security Ad mini strati on, 19^2-19^3 > " Labor "History, III (Spring, 1962), 157• Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Braceros."

^ Ibid.. , p. 15S.

~-'Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (Mew York;, 19^5) > P* 122.

"^Scruggs, "Fvolution, " p, l !-2.

21

Mexican-American labor was largely restricted to agri-

cultural work, they opposed introducing any factor which

97

might even further depress wages offered on the farm. '

In view of the mixed reaction of all interested parties

to the program of contract labor, as begun in 19'+2, an

evaluation of the agreement is pertinent. The growers'

accusations of the socialist overtones of the program were

without validity. The three-fourths work guarantee,

subsistence pay, and the minimum, wage were necessary

inclusions in order to prevent exploitation and to gain the

receptive ear of the Mexican government. Since the

guarantees were made integral parts of the international

agreement, the agreement likewise did not solely reflect 28

the growers' desire for a cheap source of labor. And,

several of the guarantees which accorded equal treatment- to

Mexican nationals to that of American domestics under United

States legislation were unenforceable. For example, the

clause which granted subsistence "on che same basis

established for United. States farm laborers" offered the

Mexican worker no security since domestic migrants were not

protected by statutory law. Another example of a hollow

guarantee was one which permitted Mexican nationals to have

similar sanitary and medical services as enjoyed by other 2?iMd.

^Ibid, , p. 1^9.

22

agricultural workers in the same area. Domestic workers

did not have such facilities provided for them.

By the following year, 19^3» "both- governments realized

that alteration of the program was necessary. The Mexican

government wanted specific inclusion of Article 29 of the

Mexican Labor Law. Although the guarantees granted "by

Article 29 had been implied in the 19 -2 Agreement, the

Mexican government felt that definite reference to the

Labor Code should be made in the 19^3 revised agreement.

Under the provisions of Article 29. Mexicans entering the

United States would be given free transportation, living

expenses, and repatriation costs by the contracting party.

Two other important changes in the terms of the inter-

national agreement were the extension of the thirty-cents-

per-hour minimum wage guarantee to piece rate work and

29

rewording of the subsistence clause. The guarantee of

75 per cent employment with a three-dollars-per-day sub-

sistence allowance for any time not meeting the guarantee

was maintained. The clause granting' subsistence equal to

that given to domestic workers during the remaining one-

fourth of the contract period when unemployment occurred

was amended to grant Mexican nationals subsistence without

cost. Since the 19^2 Agreement had given little security

29 IJ. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of

Mexican Workers: Agreement Between the United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed April 26, 19^3," U. S. Statutes at Laige, LVII, Part II, 1160-136l.

• . 23

to the Mexican worker, the 19^3 amendment which inserted

the words "without cost" provided substantial protection

for him.

The Mexican government was adamant concerning the

amendments. Aware of their attitude, Messersmith advised,

the State Department that refusal to accept the Mexican

proposals on food and lodging would result in unpleasant

consequences and if . . a flat rejection /is given/

simply on the basis of our present policy we may be fairly

QQ

certain the present negotiations will collapse.xxJ From

the Mexican viewpoint, the guarantees contained in the 19^3

Agreement did not discriminate against the American domestic

worker in favor of the Mexican laborer because the American

worker could depend on his family for aid when not earning

wages. Also he could change employers freely if not

satisfied with his wages. 'The Mexican had neither of these

assurances, and particularly not the latter, since it would

constitute a violation of his contract. J

At the same time the international agreement was being

revised, the United States Congress was devising a com-

prehensive farm bill, Public Law . It emerged April 29,

and provided funds to be made available through December Jl,

30, 'orelgn Relations; VI (19^3)» 5^6,

•^Ibid

2'J-

19 -3. recruitment of both domestic and foreign workers.

According to the provisions of Public Law certain

regulations would be waived until the end of the war for

aliens entering the country to do agricultural work.

Sections II and III of the Immigration Law of 1917» which

dealt respectively with bond payment and prohibition against

contracting foreign workers, would be lifted in order that

importation could take place. Other privileges granted to

aliens included exemption from withholdings or deductions

on earned wages under the Internal Revenue Code and

33

exemption from establishing positive proof of birthplace.

Farm pressure groups had skillfully fashioned Public-

Law ^5 to fit their particular needs. The waiving of

statutory regulations on the entry of farm labor amounted

to establishing an open border. Section V(g) of the law

authorized Immigration and Naturalization officials to

issue cards to foreign laborers which permitted them to work

for one year in the United States. On May 11, 19^3• border

officials issued the first cards and within three days over 3'+

two thousand Mexicans were working in Texas and New Mexico. 32-u. Congress, Making an Appropriation to Assist in

Providing a Supply and Distribution of Farm Labor for the Calendar Year 1J9 3> Public iMiTk5, U. S. Statutes at Large, LVlT," Part il","70.'

, p. 73. ok J Otey M. Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program,"

Pacific Historical Review, XXXII, No, 3 (August, 196?), 253 • Hereafter cited as Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program." Unless cited otherwise, information concerning Public Law ki) will he based on the above artic?Le.

25

The farmers' and growers' motivation for sponsoring Public

Law 4-5 was their desire for cheap and plentiful labor, and

they therefore considered the law favorably. Ambassador

Messersmith took a different point of view and described it

as a "concerted effort" to undermine the bilateral agreement.

He wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull:

. . . in spite of the hue and cry from some of the border states about their need for labor, they have not requested a certification of workers for that area. This is an indication to you that some of the states are not interested in getting workers under the agreement but are more interested in trying to break down the arrangement so as to get workers under arrange-ments that are quite impossible.

The Mexican government also considered the arrangements

as "quite impossible." It warned that if the indiscriminate

recruiting did not cease, the international agreement would

be abrogated. Messersmith felt: the attitude of the Mexican

government was " . . . considerably stronger than it permits

itself to express at this juncture . . . . He advised

the State Department 'chat ". . . if through domestic, laws

we /the United States/ undermine the international agreement

such as permitting us to recruit- labor . . . the Mexican

Government will be justifiably indignant and will denounce

37

the agreement."'5 A few days later, he reported that Mexico

was considering closing the border.'

3-^Fore 1 jgn Relations, VI (19^3), 551.

36-IMd.

o r ;

Ibid., p. 553.

26

The strong negative reaction of Mexico prompted re-

evaluative conferences in Washington. And in deference to

the wishes of the Mexican government, Hull notified Messer-

smith that Section V(g) of Public Law ^5 did not apply to

Mexico and that the Justice Department would act to prevent

the entry of Mexican agricultural worker's not contracted

under the international agreement.

The Mexican position and the quick response of the

State Department convinced growers, especially Texas

growers, that they would have to recruit workers under the

terms of the international agreement or rely on wetback

labor. When Texas growers submitted their requests for

contract labor, the Mexican government refused to honor it

and justified its refusal on the grounds of racial dis-

criminations. Denied labor under Public Law ^5 and the

contract system, Texas growers, aided by the state govern-

ment, undertook various steps to remove the state from the

blacklist.

Interested Texas parties sent Judge Cullen Briggs of

Nueces County to Mexico City to consult with officials con-

cerning workers for the state, In talks with Ezequiel

Padilla, Briggs surmised that Mexico might reconsider its

ban on Texas if the state took certain corrective measures.

On his return, Briggs suggested two proposals to Governor

Coke R. Stevenson. First, he urged the Governor to reaffirm

-^Ibld. , p. S5U'

27

the Good Neighbor proclamation passed by the Texas legislature

on May 6, 1 9 ^ 3 . T h e proclamation, known as the "Caucasian

Race Resolution," gave equal privileges to all Caucasians

in the state and denounced those who used the position to

llQ

. . violate the good neighbor policy of our state."

Stevenson accepted the suggestion and made the declaration on

June 25. Secondly, Briggs felt Stevenson should write a

conciliatory letter to appropriate Mexican „officials ex-

plaining the need for labor in the state and outlining the' ' if 1

efforts taken to reduce discrimination.

Having submitted his recommendations to Stevenson,

Briggs travelled to Washington and 'conferred with officials

of the War Food Administration. He told them that the

Extension Service was being asked to certify a labor shortage

in Texas and that disturbed glowers were collecting money to ij-2

be used to combat racial inequities.

Meanwhile, Padilla responded to Stevenson's letter.

The Foreign Minister felt " . . . the governor's action was

unequal to the magnitude of the problem." A communique

from Messersmith reporting an interview with Padilla on 39Ibid., p. 557

IpQ Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 255.

il "1 """Foreign Relations, VI (19^3)» 5^1.

Li? Ibid., p. 5^9.

I4.3 , •^Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 256.

28

July 19. one day before his reply to Stevenson, revealed a

more candid interpretation of the Foreign Minister's

position. He told Messersmith that domestic problems made

it difficult for the Mexican government to alter its

position and that he regretted the situation. Padilla

feared that " . . . failure of Mexico to let workers go

might bring about a reaction to public opinion in Texas

which would delay the solution of these problems of dis-

44

crimination."

Shortly after receiving the official Mexican reply to

his letter, Stevenson told the Mexican government that a

Good Neighbor Commission would be formed to investigate

complaints of discrimination and to initiate an educational

and propaganda program designed to reduce racial prejudices

The commission was the result of a conference between

Stevenson and two representatives from the State Department Robert M. McGregor, Secretary of the American Embassy in

3itj

^5

Mexico City, and Consul General for Ciudad Juarez, William

Blocker,

By early August, it seemed that Texas had been

successful in its efforts to remove the ban. The Mexican

government announced contract workers would be authorized

for Texas. Still acutely aware of political repercussions,

^Foreign Relations, VI (19^3) » 5&1

^Ibid. , p. 565-

• . 29

the government said selection would be made from workers

already in the United States. If recruitment occurred in

Mexico City, it would be done for the "southern states" but

with the understanding that the workers were bound for

Texas. The recruitment process would not begin, however,

until Stevenson announced publicly the formation of the

Good Neighbor Commission. The Governor withheld the

announcement until September k, when he learned that

federal funds were available for the project. By this time,

the Mexican government decided that because of political

considerations, workers for Texas could not be supplied.

Texas growers, therefore, in 19 +3» harvested their crops

with a motley collection of students, prisoners of war,

Mexican-American migrants, and wetbacks, but without con-

4- - ^

tract laoor.

Even though efforts to gain laborers for Texas con-

tinued throughout 19 '+» domestic politics did not permit

the government of President Manuel Avila Camacho to issue

the authorization. He and Pad!11a preferred to allow workers

to enter Texas because they did not want to antagonize the

United States or hinder the nascent efforts to erase

racial discrimination. Since the political opposition and

the socially discontented capitalized on any difficulty in

the contract labor program to embarrass the Mexican

' ScruR-gs, "Texas and the Bracero Program," p. 25?

30

government, alteration of its position was not feasible.

Large commercial farmers in northern Mexico objected to the

program because they disliked, the disruption it might cause

in their labor force. Small farmers and their supporters,

on the other hand, viewed the contract labor program as a

possible substitute for continued land distribution.

Mexican nationalists, who traditionally opposed cooperation

with the. United States, joined labor leaders who disliked

the government's catering to labor as well as business

interests. In la.be April, 19 -f-, Messersmith casually

approached Padilla on the topic of laborers for Texas, but

he did not press the subject since it was " . . . insistence

on a point which is politically impossible in Mexico at the

7 present time." '

As the summer harvest season approached, growers in

the El Paso area intensified their efforts to secure con-

tract labor. They sent representatives to Mexico City, but

the Mexican government maintained its inflexible position.

When the Justice Department began to repatriate workers who

entered under Public Law ^5 and as it stepped-up its wet-

back campaign, the Mexican government became more conciliatory

and in mid-June, 19^4, agreed to supply workers for El Paso

County, provided Stevenson took a public stand against racial

discrimination. Cit this occasion, the Governor responded to

47Ibid., p. 260.

3:

the Mexican stipulation; but in August, Mexico reversed its

Zj. 8

decision and refused to allow contract labor in Texas.

Stevenson and the Good Neighbor Commission could not

remove Texas from the blacklist for a combination of political

and social considerations already discussed. During the

month of August, however, these considerations were am-

plified by reports in Mexico City newspapers of continued

racial discriminations. One of the capital city's papers,-

El National, published an eight-page monthly, Fraternidad,

which listed acts of racial prejudice in Texas. In addition,

the Mexican Committee Against Racism organized in August

and included among its members such prominent persons as

Jaime Torres Bodet end leftist labor leader Vicente k- o .

Lombardo 'Toledo. The following year, 19h-3< the Mexican

Chamber of Deputies established a special committee to

inform the legislators of all cases of discrimination.

Popular opinion and national indignation had been aroused.

Padilla, in a San Francisco speech, raised the hope of the

growers that agreement was near when he stated that he was

confident the prejudices did not reflect the views of all

Americans, but the ban against Texas remained throughout-SO

the World War II program. k-8 ^

Ibid., p. 261. k-9 yTomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,"

PP. 73-7^. •5° lb id- , p. 7 k .

32

Aside from the regional difficulties surrounding con-

tract labor in Texas, problems of an administrative nature

also interrupted the smooth functioning of the labor program.

One of the first difficulties was that of working out an

orderly recruitment and selection process. The Mexican

government acted quickly; and when American representatives

arrived in Mexico City to begin processing workers, Mexico

had already established a registering service. Selection

began September 21, 19^2, and by the 29th, 500 workers had

been recruited for work in Stockton, California. Within

two months, over 3.000 workers were in California alone.^

Just as Torres Bodet predicted in his initial talks

with Messersmith, the major problem faced by the Mexican

government was the tendency of th« workers to congregate

in Mexico City, creating tremendous sanitation. and housing

problems. The situation became increasingly acute for the

Mexican government because the first American authorizations

for labor simply were not large enough to absorb all the

workers who responded. By J&vuary, 19^3 > the American

.Embassy estimated that there were nearly ^,000 workers in

Mexico City who could not be recruited under the existing

authorizations. Because of the strain on the Mexican

budget, Messersmith urged the State Department to enlarge

<3 y Basmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 206.

• . 33

the authorizations or possibly face the collapse of the

4-. 52 entire program.

By August, the situation worsened, and the Mexican

government began to return to their home states many appli-

cants who could not meet the qualifications. Officials

hoped to improve the situation in Mexico City and also

discourage a further influx of workers by spreading the

word that only a limited number of jobs were available. At

the same time, Padilla, in a conference with Kessersmith,

asked that the rate of contracting be raised from 2,500 to

6,000 workers a week. The Mexican government offered to

pay for the extra costs involved in a stepped-up program of

recruitment. The Ambassador concurred with Padilla's

proposal and, in addition, suggested to the War Food

Administration (WFA) that requirements be lowered so that

recruitment could continue for a longer period of time. In

September, the WFA authorized recruitment of 70,000 workers;

and Messersmith assured Padilla that the number would be

S3

raised to 75»000 within a short time.

In early fall, however, with the peak of the harvest

season approaching;, WFA informed Messersmith that only

20,000 agricultural "workers were needed during the winter,

and requested that he ask permission to use the excess

^'Foreign Relations, VI (19;+3)» 535 •

. PP. 567-570,

• _ 3^

laborers In industry. The Ambassador foresaw several dif-

ficulties involved in the transfer of workers from

agricultural to industrial work, and he did not approach the

Mexican government on the topic. To illustrate his ob-

jections, Messersmith used the request of the WFA to transfer

1,000 to 2,000 surplus farm laborers to'jobs in meat-packing

houses. He doubted if the plants could provide the sains

housing and feeding conditions as the workers had received

in agricultural pursuits. Unless these provisions were met,

the proposal would not be acceptable to the Mexican govern-

ment. In addition, Messersmith felt the higher wage scale-

would create problems when the men returned to agricultural

work.J

As originally set up in the 19^2 agreement, the final

selection of workers occurred at Mexico City in the National

Stadium. There a joint team of American and Mexican officials

investigated prospective workers concerning their agricultural

background, character, and health condition. A routine health

clearance included X-ray of the lungs and digestive tract and

a smallpox vaccination. After 19 (4, the Pan American Sanitary

Bureau gave serologic tests for syphilis. Initially, re-

jections because of health problems were quite high but

declined as the requirements became better known. ^

^Ibid. , pp. 571, 579-580.

Jones, "rfar Workers," pp. c-7.

35

Concentration of the recruitment process in Mexico City

soon proved unsatisfactory for several, reasons. As men-

tioned above, housing and lodging of the prospective workers

created problems for the Mexican government. Also many of

the workers arrived without valid certificates of eligibility

which they were to obtain from local authorities before

travelling to Mexico City. Without a certificate, the men

could not begin the selection process. Early in the

operation of the program, a booming blackmarket developed in

eligibility certificates. It was reported that three

national deputies (congressmen) and numerous government em-

ployees were indicted for their involvement with the black.-C

market activities.J

As a partial solution to problems, decentralisation of

the selection process began in 1QW-, when Mexico designated

the cities of Irapuato, Guanajuato, and Guadalajara,

Jalisco, as recruitment centers. Other changes included

setting up quotas for states which had surplus labor and

using the lottery system as a basis -for recruitment. By the

latter innovation, the Mexican government hoped to reduce 57

the opportunities for bribery and graft.-'

Upon receiving clearance in Mexico, workers were

shipped to reception centers located on the United 56T, . /• Ibid.., p. o

-'Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 21?.

' 36

States border. At these centers, the men signed contracts

with the growers, who transported them to their area of work.

In the new and often totally different environments, some of

the men had difficulty adjusting to the situation. One of

their most frequent complaints concerned the food they

received.

Depending on the labor camp facilities, the workers

either prepared their meals on a cooperative basis or were

served by the growers' associations. Their complaints cen-

tered not so much around the quantity of food but rather

its quality. American cooks simply did not season food

correctly for the Mexican workers. In many cases, the

growers imported Mexican cooks with gratifying results in

the increased work capacity of the men and in their im-

proved morale.^® Between October 23, 19^2, and April 8,

19^+. of the 29.302 workers repatriated from California.,

Nevada, and Arizona, approximately 1,000 listed food as the

<9

reason for their dissatisfaction.

Oftentimes unpleasant conditions such as those con-

nected with food were rectified on a personal basis between

the workers and employer. If this method failed, however,

the Mexican worker had difficulty making his complaint known

because of the unsatisfactory grievance procedure. Part of

Jones, "War Workers," pp. 16-17•

KO -"Rasmussen, "emergency Farm Program," p. 231.

37

the inadequacy of the procedure revolved around the fact

that the worker felt isolated, was intimidated by his new

surroundings, and either spoke no English or had only a

limited knowledge of the language. In addition, the Mexican

consuls, although they had complete access to the camps, and

representatives of the WFA were not always available.

Further, many of their inspection trips were made while the

workers were in the fields.

If the worker and his employer could not settle their

dispute personally or by use of the formal grievance pro-

cedure, the worker was eligible to be repatriated. Any

workei who terminated his contract early for a certified

reason .and defrayed his own expenses could be contracted

another time. But, if the WFA paid for the repatriation, he

60

was not eligible for re-selection. " In 3 9^5 the repa- •

triation procedure was modified so that the WFA agreed to

pay expenses if a worker left because the grower failed to

comply with the contract terms, or because of bad treat-

ment or discrimination. The WFA did not pay for repatriation

if the worker offered no reason for terminating his con-

tract or if he was working for an employer who was not in 61

the WFA program.

No doubt one reason for the number repatriated was

simple homesickness. Since the main concern of most of 60 Jones, "War Workers," p. 1 -.

(5 * Rasmus sen, ''Emergency Farai Program." pp. 223-22^-.

38

the officials was recruitment, transportation, and pro-

duction, educational and recreational activities which might

have cured the loneliness were overlooked. California's

Bureau of Agriculture, however, made some efforts to provide

educational training for, the workers. The agency set up

classes which the worker attended on a voluntary basis.

Initially, course content centered around farming techniques,

but later in response to the participants' requests, English

classes were added to the curriculum.^

As organized under the 19 -2 agreement, the Farm

Security Administration (PSA) was responsible for super-

vision of the contract labor program in the United States.

Its control of the program terminated in 19^3 > primarily

because of the growers' discontent with the FSA. The

growers' strategy from the outset of the program was to

eliminate the F'SA's control because they considered the

agency responsible for the guarantees written into the con-

63

tracts. v Thus friction between the growers and the FSA

developed early.

In the Imperial Valley of California, for example, the

two groups argued over the interpretation of the work con-

tracts. The contracts stipulated that hours worked on days

of less than eight hours employment should be totaled at

p. 67.

^Jones, "War Workers," pp. 21-22.

6 "3 ^'Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,"

• . 39

the end of the contract period to determine unemployment

compensation. The growers maintained that it did not matter

if they provided eight hours of employment daily as long as

they provided forty-eight hours during a six-day week. The

FSA rejected their argument and insisted on a strict in-

6k

terpretation of the contract.

The growers' campaign to remove the FSA was successful

with the passage of Public Law 4'-5 in April, 19^3- The bill

placed the WFA in control of the program and, at the same

time, transferred the Farm Placement Service of the United

States Employment Service to the Department of Agriculture.

In practice, the changes jn the administrative machinery

meant that county agents of the Department of Agriculture

in cooperation with the Office of Labor of the WFA would

certify the number of Mexicans needed in particular areas.

Although there was no outstanding deterioration of the

program under the WFA, the number of workers needed was

sometimes exaggerated because of the close contact between 65

local county agents and growers. *

While difficulties in the daily operation of the con-

tract labor system were being worked out, additional changes

in the international agreement occurred. In 1 9 ^ and 19^5

the amendments were directly related to subsistence.

^Scruggs, "Braceros," pp. 156-157.

^Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States," pp. 67-68.

• he

The 19^+ change clarified the procedure for calculation of

subsistence by providing that for any day of less than four

hours that an employee worked, he was to receive subsistence

without cost for that day. The change was specifically de-

signed to cover the 25 per cent time of the contract period

not covered by the' three-dollar-per-day subsistence allow-

66

ance. The negotiating officials felt that by stating

the number of hours which composed an unemployed day,

growers could more easily determine whether the worker was

owed the three-dollar allowance for subsistence or sub-

sistence without cost.^

According to the 19^5 modification, subsistence pay

owed the employee would be paid at the end of each payroll

period,^ Prior to the 19^5 arrangement, workers were not

paid any subsistence allowance due them under the three-

fourths work guarantee until, the end of the contract • /> 69 period.

By the following year, the subsistence provisions

again posed a problem, but between the United States

government and the grower rather than between Mexico and

the united States. Since the 1 9 ^ and 19^5 changes in

^°"Study of Population," p. "jl. S ri Rasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program," p. 207.

6R "Study of Population," p. 31<

60 'Iiasmussen, "Emergency Farm Program, " p. 209.

hi

subsistence calculation had increased the' cost to some

growers, the terms of the grower's contract with the govern-

ment was amended to require the government to reimburse the

grower for subsistence payments. It was agreed that if un-

employment for less than four hours a day was caused solely

by rain or snow on the day of employment or the day imme-

diately preceding, the United States government would

reimburse the grower for the subsistence costs.' Also in

19^5. the minimum wage rate was raised to thirty-seven cents

per hour or a guaranteed $33*60 per two-week payroll, period.''7'1'

The most notable changes in 19 -7 limited the cost of

food sold at farm labor camp commissaries to $1.50 P©r day ry r\

and established procedures for repatriation of the workers.

If not returned to Mexico within fifteen days after termi-

nation of contract, the Department of Agriculture would pay

the worker a stipend of fifty cents a day which would be

added to subsistence benefits.

Since Public Law 45 had only provided operational funds

for a one-year period, the program was maintained by granting

X

Study of Population,'' p. 31-

71Ibid.

72 J U. S., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of

Mexican Agricultural Workers: States and Mexico; Supplement 19^2, as revised April 26, 19 Notes, Signed Mexico City, Ma Entered into Force April 2, 19''-7»" U. S. Statutes at LXI, Part k, 37-^3-37^.

Agreement Between United ing Agreement of August h, ^3; Effected by Exchange oi rch 25 and April 2, 19^7.

42

additional appropriations on a yearly basis. Public Law 229

7 3

(1943) extended the program until December, 1944, ^ and in

1944 the WFA, as part of a general appropriation bill, was -

given twenty million dollars to continue recruitment of 9 Zj.

foreign workers until December, 1945. The 1944 appro-

priation also provided that foreign laborers could enter and

remain in the country for the duration of their contracts

even though World War II should end. 73 '- U. S,, Congress, Making an Appropriation to Assist

in Providing a Supply and Pistribution of Farm Labor for the Calendar Year 1^44, Public Law 229, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, U. S. Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part I, 11,

74 U. S., Congress, First Supplemental Appropriation

Act, 1945; Public Law 5^9, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, U, S. Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part I, 862-863.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC LAW 78 AND THE

WETBACK CHALLENGE: 19^+7-1955

With the termination of World War II, the Mexican con-

tract labor system as originally provided for in the 19^2

International Agreement- and Its subsequent amendments also

ended. No appropriations were made to continue recruitment

later than December 31 > 19^7 > a cl in Hay, 19^7. act of

Congress provided for the sale of labor supply camps,''' Seme

congressmen and other interested parties felt it v:as appro-

priate that the wartime program of recruiting foreign labor

should cease. They argued that the emergency in farm labor

had passed and that sufficient domestic labor would soon be

available,

Opposed to the idea that importation of Mexican agri-

cultural workers should end were the growers and

representatives of related industrj.es. This group, having

grown accustomed to Mexican labor, wanted to continue the

contract system. Nevertheless, there was no congressional

"U. S., Congress, An Act to Provide for Six Months Extensi on and Final Liquidation of the Farm Supply Program, and for Other Paroos-js, Public Law *K), 80th Congress, 1st Session, U. S. Sta tutes at LXI, Part 1, 55 • See also (J. S. , Congress, Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 19 -7, Public Law 76, 80tF Congress, 1st Session, U. S. Statutes ar- L-aJ:_g_e, LXI, Part- 1, 109-

£|4

appropriation or authorization for the United States govern-

ment to continue as the guarantor of the contracts. A

series of talks with officials of the Mexican government

took place in El Paso, Texas, followed "by conferences in

Washington between representatives of the Immigration and

Naturalization Service, the Agriculture, and State Depart-

ments .

As a result of these meetings, it was decided to con-

tinue the contract system but under radically different

terms and standards from the 19- 2 Agreement. One of the

outstanding changes in the new international agreement and

a major reason for the lack of securities for the braceros

was that the United States government no longer employed

Mexican workers and, therefore, did not serve as a guarantor

of their contracts. It was specifically understood by the

19 -8 Agreement that the term "employer" would mean the

owner or operator of a far?? in. the United States and would

not apply to trie government, Whereas the United States

government had operated recruitment -centers in Mexico under

the original agreement, the 19^7 Agreement arranged for

^Pfeif'fer, "The Mexican Contract Labor Supply Program," P. 3^-

\t. 3., Department of State, "Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico Superseding Agreement of April 26, 19^3> and March 10, 19^7; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed Mexico, D. F., February 20 and 21, 19^8; Entered into Force February 21, 19^8," U. 3, Statutes at Large, LXII, Part III, 3888,

^5

the growers to recruit workers on an individual basis in

northern Mexico.

Other significant changes were made in the area of

wages and subsistence. The stated minimum wage rate for

both hourly and piece-rate work was deleted from the con-

tracts. A similar change appeared in the determination of

subsistence. The three-fourths work guarantee remained,

but the stated three-dollar-per-day subsistence allowance

did not appear in the contracts.

Since the lack of guarantees was obvious, a system

whereby grievances could have been heard and contracts en-

forced would, have been a valuable asset to the 19 -8

Agreement. Such compliance would necessarily have involved

the active participation of both governments. But, since

the United States government was not so deeply involved -in

the 19 -8 Agreement as in previous arrangements, the pro-

cedure for compliance did not evolve until a new agreement

was negotiated in 19^9- the interim period, the "good

offices" of the United States Employment Service (USES) were

6

used with a "view toward compliance."

Under the procedure set up in 19^9» violation of con-

tract could be registered (1) after an official and periodic

Ibid

"'Ibid. , pp. 3890, 3693.

6Ibld., p. 3890.

'46

investigation of working conditions by the USES in conjunction

with Immigration and Naturalization officials, (2) by a dis-

contented grower, and (3) by the Mexican worker. In each

case, if the grievance were valid and corrective measures

were not taken, the Mexican consulate could terminate the

individual work contract, and the laborer would be returned

7

to Mexico at the grower's expense.

Though the 19^9 procedure improved the situation as it

existed under the 19^8 Agreement, the system of compliance

was never entirely satisfactory. It was particularly un-

satisfactory to the Mexican worker because he lacked

knowledge of the English language and was unfamiliar with

his environment in the United States. For example, the pro-

cedure was written into the International Agreement in

English, which the typical Mexican worker could not read.

The individual work contract was in Spanish and was given

to the worker; but it contained only references to a

compliance system, not detailed information regarding its

operation. If a worker desired action on his complaint, his

most common move was to locate the Mexican consulate in his

area. As a rule, timidity and isolation prevented him from

7 'U. S,, Department of State, "Mexican Agricultural

Workers: Agreement Between United States and Mexico; Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed Mexico, August, 19 -9 Entered into Force August 1, 19^9» and Amendments and Interpretations Effected by Exchange of Notes," United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1951i Part 1, pp.' IO56-IO58.

• k 7

attempting to initiate action by notifying a representative

of the USES. And. even if the worker preferred the latter

procedure, it was difficult to locate a USES inspector since

there were only nine of them who handled the entire com-

pliance program.

Because the enforcement system was 'cumbersome and in-

volved several governmental agencies, there was always the

possibility that a worker's complaint would be misplaced

rather than processed. A large number of workers, there-

fore, deserted or "skipped-out" on their contracts lather

than waiting for the established system to rectify an un-

pleasant situation. Desertions in 19^8 in one area studied

were 20.8 per cent, indicating that the compliance system

was not completely effective. A 1950 survey of workers

revealed that one-third were in an illegal status, primarily

s by deserting their contract.

It is apparent that during the period 19^8 to 1951 the

operation of the contract labor program deteriorated.

Possibly the best explanation for the deterioration was the

lack of governmental supervision by both the United States

and Mexico. Since the United States did not serve as the

guarantor of contracts, growers who used Mexican labor did

not always comply with the contract terms. For example,

'U. S., President's Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture (Washington, 1951)» pp. hk-ho. Hereafter cited as "President's Commission, 1951."

48

although the international agreement did not allow braceros

to work on farms which used wetbacks, the growers often em-

ployed both legal and illegal workers at the same time.

Sometimes full wages were not paid, or the Mexican did not

receive the guaranteed 75 per cent employment. The inter-

national agreement'also stipulated that Mexican workers could

not continue work when labor strikes occurred. But on

October 1, 19^7. when the American domestic workers struck

the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation in California, braceros

9

were not removed from the job until the following month.

The Mexican government was also lax in implementing

the program. It did not limit the -number of Mexicans

leaving the countrys nor did it operate the contracting

centers efficiently. Instances of graft which had charac-

terized the World War II program increased as the program

expanded in size. There is also evidence that the Mexican

government not only countenanced a system which exploited

the braceros but actually made several concessions to the

United States in order to prolong the program. It agreed to

establish additional recruitment centers in Monterrey,

Chihuahua, and Hermosillo, all of which were located rela-

tively near the United States border. In the past, Mexico 3 0

had insisted on recruitment centers being placed in the interior.

22.9

C' •^Tomasek, "Mexican Labor in the United States,'1 pp. 228-

1 0 T > " ^ Ibid,

Lf-9

By 1951. in addition to the overall deterioration in

the program, several other factors were operating which

influenced a complete reorganization of the contract labor

system. One of the most influential factors which aided in

arousing public concern was publication of the findings of

the President's Commission on Migratory Labor. The Com-

mission pointed out the harmful effects that imported labor

had on domestic labor with z egard to wage rates and job

displacement. Concerning the problem, the Commission

report noted that farmers, assured of access to Mexican

labor, agreed to a low wage prior to the harvest season.

When the Commission asked the president of the New Mexico

Farm and Livestock Bureau what criteria were used for de-

termining the prevailing wage scale, he responded, . .

the farmers have a meeting and they determine, roughly,

what they are going to pay. It doesn't mean that they -1

will hold to it; it will vary, as a matter of fact."1

Often these arbitrary wages weie not adequate to provide

a domestic laborer with a decent living. He was thus

forced to migrate, creating a labor vacuum to be filled by

imported Mexican nationals.

To substantiate the conclusion that the availability

of Mexican workers depressed the wage rates offered in

any locality, the Comnission compared wage rates offered in

1 1 "President's Commission, 1951»" P. 59

50

Texas and California. In 19^5 California got 63 per cent of

the contract laborers, and it raised cotton wages 136 per

cent. Texas, as a result of the blacklist, received no

Mexicans; and in the same period cotton wages rose 236 per

cent. Under the post-war program, the situation reversed

itself. Texas got 46 per cent of the contract labor (19^9)

and lowered its cotton wages 11 per cent. California, on

the other hand, with only 8 per cent of the contract

laborers, raised its cotton wages 15 per cent. After citing

the comparison, the Commission stated it was . . useless

to pretend that the prevailing wage has either the fairness

or the precision of a wage developed by the employers and

12

workers meeting on an equal footing."

The lack of guarantees given the domestic migrant was

also discussed. The Commission contended that an agri-

cultural labor shortage which necessitated the importation

of foreign workers would not exist if guarantees such as

workmen's compensation end other similar benefits were

offered to domestics. S'ven though these benefits were not

extended to domestic labor, the Commission concluded that

" . . . by better recruitment and placement of domestic

labor, we would have eliminated most if not all of the

occasion for the certification of labor shortage during

the years 19^7 to 1950.

""'"Ibid., pp. 59-60.

13 ";Ibj_d, , p. 61

51

The second powerful factor influencing a reorganization

of the program was the position of the Mexican government.

It wanted to abandon the post-World War II arrangements and

reinstate the United States government as the recruitment

agency. In talks with American officials, the Mexican

government expressed its desire for a more adequate com-

pliance system. To indicate the need for Its demand, claims

were presented in which Mexican laborers had not received

In-payment for their work. In accord with the President's

Commission, the Mexican government was also dissatisfied

with the method for determining the prevailing wage.

Mexico became more adamant in its demands for re-

organization of the program to include United States

government participation after the El Paso incident of

October 16, 19^8. As a result of the improper functioning

of the contract system, large numbers of workers gathered

at the border across from El Paso, Texas. Without waiting

to be recruited, the workers streamed illegally across the

border. Instead of deporting them, border officials by

unilateral action "paroled" the Mexicans to farmers in the

area. As a result of this incident, Mexico abrogated the

international a g r e e m e n t . T h e two governments nevertheless

14 U. S., Congress, House, CorAm.ittee on Agriculture,

Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, H, Rept, 326 to accompany H. R. 3283, p. Hereafter cited a s ' ' I iouse Report I-io, 3 2 6 . "

" ''-'President's Court!ssion, 1951 >*' p. 53-

52

were able to come td a ncv; agreement in l'9-9 which extended

the program for one year. By 1950; however, Mexico pressed

strongly for drastic revision of the farm labor supply

16

along lines of the World War II arrangements.

From January 26 through February 3» 1951. & commission

of thirteen Mexicans and twelve Americans conferred in

Mexico City on a reorganization plan. The two prominent

American delegates were Allen J. Ellender, chairman of

the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and

W. R. Poage, chairman of the House Committee on Agri-

culture. By and large the meetings between the two dele-

gations proceeded smoothly, but occasionally they were 17

interrupted by "friendly but obstinate bickering."

Primarily the misunderstanding occurred because the

Mexican government did not fully recognize the difference

between the respective governmental systems. It wished to

negotiate with a "responsible" United States governmental

agency, one that could force compliance with any standards 18

set forth in an international agreement. Mexico likewise

failed to realize that the United States did not have laws

to protect agricultural workers, with which a government ^"Study of Population," pp. 3^~36. 17 'Howard F. C'Jine, The United States and Mexico (New

York, 19^3), p. 392. Hereafter cited as Cline, The United States and Mexico.

l8Ibic., po. 392-393.

<3 J

agency could demand compliance. Unlike the United States,

Mexico, by constitutional law, prescribes certain minimum

standards for its nationals who leave the country for em-

19

ployment- purposes. '

A draft of a new agreement which was acceptable to both

teams of negotiators finally emerged, and the leaders of the

United States delegation returned to Washington prepared to

present the provisional agreement to the Senate. Certain

provisions of the agreement encountered heavy and, on oc-

casion, vitriolic opposition on the Senate floor. During

the debate, opposition also arose in Mexico. Newspapers in

Mexico City carried stories of mistreatment received by

Mexican nationals in the United States, especially the

braceros. As a result, the government of President Ruiz;

Miguel Aleman announced on June 15, 1951> that no more

braceros could be contracted. Although the declaration

portended major difficulties in reaching a fina.l agreement,

members of the joint commission continued their efforts.

Finally, in August a workable compromise emerged which con-

tained nearly all the guarantees originally demanded by the

Mexican government. Mexico, however, stipulated that a .

final treaty was contingent on the United States taking

actions which would indicate that the guarantees would be

implemented. In addition, Mexico demanded that the

1 9 "President's Commission, 1951»" PP- 50-51-

5^

United States move to curb wetback migration to the United

States.

At the time of the Mexican cancellation of the bracero

pact, Congress had not passed any legislation which would

permit continuation of a contract labor system. Within a

month, however, Public Law 78 emerged from Congress in the

form of an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 19^9• With

subsequent modifications, Public Law 78 defined the terms

under which recruitment of Mexican nationals took place

until the final termination in December, 1964-. According

to Public Law 73, the Secretary of Labor was authorized to

perform the following duties: ' *

(1) Recruit Mexican agricultural workers. (2) Establish and operate reception centers. (3) Provide transportation; subsistence, medical

care, and burial expenses (not to exceed $150 Per worker) from recruitment centers in Mexico to reception centers in the United States.

(4-) Assist in negotiation of contracts between workers and employers.

(5) Guarantee performance of employer as related to wage payments.

The authority of the Secretary of labor in the re-

cruitment process was further expanded by the stipulations

of Section 503 of Public Law 73. No Mexican worker could be

employed unless the Secretary of Labor certified that

(1) sufficient qualified domestics were not available,

(2) that employment of aliens would not adversely, affect

wages or working conditions of domestic agricultural workers,

^vCline, The United States and Mexico, p. 393-

; i

55

and (3) that reasonable efforts had been made to attract

domestics at wages and standards comparable to those offered

to foreign workers.

In order to qualify as a participant in this con-

tracting of foreign labor, Public Law 78 required growers

to enter into an agreement with the United States on the

following matters:

(1) To indemnify the United States in its role of guarantor against losses.

(2) To reimburse the United States for trans-portation and subsistence costs in an amount not to exceed fifteen dollars per worker.

(3) To pay the United. States a sum determined by the Secretary of Labor for any worker not properly returned to the reception center.

It was also stipulated that no employer who knowingly used

illegal aliens would be eligible to employ Mexican workers

21

under terms of the contract system.

Even though Public Law 73, after Mexican termination

of the international agreement, passed through Congress

rather rapidly, several provisions of the proposed bill met

heavy opposition. For example, there was opposition to the

amount of reimbursement growers .were required to pay. As

approved by the House Committee on Agriculture, growers w ou.Id have reimbursed rhe United States in an amount not to

2? exceed ten dollars per worker. Representative Harold

U. S., Congress, An Act to Amend the Agricultural Act of 19 -91 Title V, Agr i cul cura 1 Workers, Public Law ?S, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» §,• Statutes at Large, LXV, Part 1, 119-121. Hereafter cited as "Public Law 11

' . 56

Cooley (D., N. C.) explained that the ten-dollar limit was

established to protect growers from excessive and wasteful

23

governmental expenditure.

Minority membership of the Senate Committee on Agri-

culture and Forestry disagreed with the House and

Representative Cooley. Headed by Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.),

the senators declared the ten-dollar limit unrealistic. The

committee a.rgued that if workers were not hired immediately

upon arrival at reception centers, the cost of subsistence 24

would increase. As noted above, the Senate was able to

raise the reimbursement cost an additional five dollars.

The recruitment procedure as approved by the House of

Representatives did not meet with Senate approval. Ac-

cording to the House bill, the regional director of the

Bureau of Employment Security was authorized to certify a

shortage of sufficient domestics, and whether the employment

of Mexicans wouHd adversely affect wages and working con-

ditions.^ Contending that labor shortages should be

determined on a national perspective rather than on a

regional basis, the Senate committee recommended that the

^Ibid. , p. 5«

24 U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture

and Forestry, Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» S. Kept. 21^7 Part II to accompany S. 984, p. 8. Hereafter clued as "Senate Report No. 214."

^"'"House Report No. jZ6," p. 9-

57

Secretary of Labor be vested with the certification power.

Paraphrasing the President's Commission on Migratory Labor,

the Senate noted that labor shortages often resulted from

unattractive wage offers. The committee suggested therefore

that before the Secretary of Labor could certify a shortage,

an additional provision should be added which required

growers to make reasonable efforts to secure domestics.^

Again the Senate was successful at the conference table,

and both recommendations appeared in the final draft of

Public Law 78.

Besides the discrimination against the American do-

mestic with regard to wages, the Senate minority report

objected to the more subtle provisions of Public Law 78,

which would be disadvantageous to domestic laborers. The

report argued that Section 505 which exempted Mexican agri-

cultural workers from old-age and survivors insurance

benefits of the Social Security Act discriminated against

the Mexican, but at the same time gave him employment

preference over a domestic. Since an employer did not pay

Social Security on his Mexican workers, he would havo

27 another financial incentive not to hire American migrants.

The third, area in which the Senate desired modifi-

cations of the House bill was related to the control of

9f)

"Senate Report No. 21^," pp. J-k'.

^Ibid. , pp.

5 8

illegal aliens or wetbacks. Using the findings of the 1951

report, the Senate suggested Immigration and Naturalization

officials be given a search warrant if wetbacks were thought

2 8

to be employed. Although the House had been amenable to

most Senate suggestions, it would not acquiesce by providing

Immigration and Naturalization personnel with what it con-

sidered to be broad statutory power.^

Quite naturally the controversy in the committee

hearings on the bill spilled-over onto the floor of Con-

gress. Leading the opposition forces in the Senate chamber

was Senator Dennis Chavez (D., N. Mex.). In extensive de-

bates, Chavez questioned Ellender on the merits of the

proposed bill. When Chavez stated that the only purpose of

the bill was to gain labor for the farmer, Ellender re-

plied, "That is one of the purposes, yes, and the chief

source of foreign labor in this hemisphere is Mexico."

Chavez retorted that he felt the chief source should be

American labor. Senator Edward J. Thye (R., Minn.) aided

Ellender in the defense of the bill and gave Chavez one of

the perennial justifications for' the need of foreign labor: . . . there is a certain work which must be performed in the harvesting of root crops, such as sugar beets and potatoes which involves what is called "stoop labor." It is the kind of work which is most tedious.

2 8 x , . , Q Ioio., p. o.

2Q U. S. , Congress. House, Importation of Foreign AgrjL-

cultural Workers-, Conference Report No. T>68 to accompany S. 985, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951. P- 6.

59

If a job of that kind were offered to the average American worker, under present conditions, when fac-tories and the employment in every other field are bidding for workers, he would take the job which was far more pleasant than the stoop labor . . . .30

Another section of the bill which generated much debate

was the stipulation that no employer who knowingly used

illegal aliens could be eligible to use contract workers.

The provision had been included not only to attempt to

solve the troublesome problem of wetback migration but also

to placate the Mexican government. As noted, Mexican of-

ficials would not sign a permanent international agreement

until the United States took action on their mutual prob-

lem. There was a divergence of opinion in Congress with

regard to the adequacy of the provision. Representative

Harris Ellsworth (R., Ore.) felt that without the bill,

conditions along the border would worsen. On the other

hand, Emanuel Cellar (D., N. Y.) argued that the bill would

only aggravate the wetback situation since it contained no

safeguards against illegal immigration. Representative

W. R. Poage (D., Tex.), who sponsored the bill in the House,

doubted that the bill would intensify the situation since

it provided legal means of immigration. By way of sum-

marizing his rebuttal, Poage candidly stated the majority

opinion of the Committee on Agriculture:

We are simply saying all the way through that we are trying to provide adequate agricultural labor for

O A JKJCongiessj ons.l Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session,

IV, k'4lQ-Wl9.

6o

the country. When we have done that the Committee on Agriculture is not concerning itself with social reform or immigration laws or with the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of the United States.31

Many of the opposition's opinions were reflected by

President Truman's reluctant signing of the bill (S. 984).

He stated that even though the Secretary of Labor had been

given authority to determine shortages and possible adverse

affect on wages, the guarantees would be meaningless as long

as illegal entrants into the country continued unabated.

Pour recommendations which the President felt could

strengthen future legislation were presented:

(1) Legislation should be enacted to provide punishment for harboring or concealing illegal aliens.

(2) Immigration and Naturalization should be given statutory authority to inspect places of em-ployment without a warrant in search of illegal aliens.

(3) Supplemental appropriations should be given to Immigration and Naturalization to expand personnel in the Southwest.

(4) Supplemental appropriations should be given to the Farm Placement Service of the Department of Labor to aid in recruitment of domestic labor.32

Considering the commission's report of 1951 which

indicated an inverse relation between wage rates and the

presence of alien laborers as well as the problems of com-

pliance, it would have appeared logical to have allowed

31 Ibid-. V, 7151-7156,

S., Congress, House, Message from President of the United States Transmitting Recommendation Supplementing: Provisions of. S. 934, An Act Relating to Recruitment and Employment of Agrlcultural Workers from Mexico, House Document No. 192, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951» P» 2.

the entire program to lapse when the Mexican government re-

nounced the international agreement. However, as the

original 19^2 Agreement had been initiated, to combat war-

time manpower shortages, justification given by the

supporters for continuation of the contract program was to

counterbalance labor shortages created by the Korean con-

flict.

By the late 19^01s and early 1950's the influx of

wetbacks presented problems for the United States, and it

challenged the continuation of the bracero program. In-

asmuch as the entry of illegal aliens had on earlier

occasions posed a threat to the perpetuation of the bracero

program, the situation of the late 19 -0' s and early 1950' s

was not an entirely new .problem. The wetback had received

his name because he often swam or waded the Rio Grande in

order to enter the United States undetected by border

guards. Regardless of the way the;'" entered, the wetbacks,

who were without any legal protection, were so readily

available as a source of cheap labor that growers often

preferred them to braeeres or domestic migrants. One aim

of the 19 -2 Agreement had been to curb the flow of wetbacks

into the United States, but officials on both sides of

-^T. Richard Spradlin. "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation program---Review and Reform," The George Washington Law Review, XXX (October, I961T, 8?. Hereafter ciTecf' as Spr&dl in7~~"The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program."

62

the border realized that the agreement only stimulated

illegal entries.

When the terms of the 19^2 Agreement became known in

Mexico, workers from the interior flocked to the border towns

of Ciudad Juarez, Tiajuana, and Mexicali, thinking that the

recruitment centers would be located near the border.

Instead, the Mexican government established the centers in

Mexico City. Many of the workers who had gone to the

border towns were thus faced with the decision of returning -

southward or illegally entering the United States in search

of employment. Lured by the prospect of high wages, they

flooded across the border before transportation to the

interior could be provided. Growers in the border states

who disliked the guarantees under the bracero agreement

encouraged the wetback immigration. In Texas the grower.s

were particularly eager for wetbacks since Mexico had

refused to authorize braceros for the state.

A year later, 19^3 > 110 efficacious solution had been

found to curb the high rate of illegal entrants. At this

time another situation arose, adding to the problem. The

Mexican government refused to grant the quota of contract

labor that the growers felt necessary to harvest their crops.

31\, • Otey M. Scruggs, "The United States, Mexico, and the

Wetback," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLIII (May, 19617~, 31^-329• Unless cited otherwise, information related to wetbacks will be taken from the above article, pp. 316-329.

63

Unable to gain sufficient laborers through the contract

process, many farmers began to hire wetbacks. Although the

Mexican government could not escape partial responsibility

for the resurgence of wetbacks, the United States was warned

that unless it took action to discourage illegal migration,

the bracero program would be in danger of unilateral can-%

cellation.

Concerned with the exploitation of the wetbacks and the

threat posed to the bracero program, the two governments

agreed to take joint action. The Mexican government promised

to strengthen its border patrol but was unsuccessful in re-

ducing the number of wetbacks leaving the country. In the

United States, the Commissioner of Immigration assured the

Secretary of State that action was being taken to prevent

the illegal entrance of aliens. Even with these efforts,

the wetbacks could not be controlled; and the violations

created difficulties on both sides of the border. Texas

growers became more flagrant in their defiance by crossing

the border and engaging workers on an individual basis. The

workers were transported to the fields and either given

shelter in labor camps or returned to Mexico. The influx

of migrant workers into the Mexican border towns of Ciudad

Juarez and Mexicali created overwhelming sanitation and

welfare problems.

Unable to improve the situation, the two governments

decided that stronger action was needed and signed a joint

6k

agreement which went into effect June 1, 19^. By its terms,

the Mexican government was to issue decrees forbidding the

departure from Mexico of all non-contract labor. The

United States agreed to reenforce its border patrol and to

repatriate illegal entrants immediately. In compliance with

the terms of the agreement, Immigration and Naturalization

officials repatriated ^5,000 wetbacks between June 2 and

December 1, 19^. The high number apprehended possibly

reflects the failure of the Mexican government to publish

the decree forbidding departure of non-contract labor and

the failure to augment its own border patrol.

The second agreement, dated June 9> 19^5 > concerned

the ports of entry through which the wetbacks would be

returned to Mexico. United States officials agreed to

diversify the border towns used for repatriation purposes.

Prior to the agreement, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS) processed wetbacks through the closest port

of entry, which resulted in drastic social welfare problems

for the Mexican border town. After the INS repeatedly

refused to use the cities of Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo

for returning wetbacks, as requested by the Mexican

government, Mexico closed the ports of entry in Baja

California and ultimately caused the United States to

diversify. The towns of Mexicali and Tiajuana were used if

the wetbacks originated in Baja California; Nogales served

as a center for the wetbacks who came from the states of

65

/

Sonora, Sinaloa, and Jalisco; and Ciudad Juarez for those

who lived in other parts of Mexico.

Conditions might have improved had there been strict

adherence to the two agreements. But the Mexican government

did not strengthen its border patrol, and the American

growers continued to offer inducements to Mexican workers

that encouraged illegal entries. A statement by Mexican

Foreign Minister Manuel Tello indicated that perhaps the

agreement would never be effective unless the American

growers were penalized for their role in the wetback prob-

lem : Without presuming to suggest any action to the Govern-ment of the United States, yet if the problem were attacked at its economic source, imposing sanctions on American employers who employ illegal entrants, the result would promptly come about that Mexican workers would not in the future embark upon adventure made both difficult and unprofitable.

By 19 -7 > the wetback situation became increasingly

acute when the two governments decided to solve the prob-

lem by placing the wetbacks under contracts similar to the

braceros. The contracting of wetbacks, a plan described as

3 K

"more insidious than ingenious,allowed illegal aliens

in the United States to be returned to border cities of

Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, and Reynosa in order to obtain a

work contract. They got a minimum wage of thirty-seven

cents per hour, an eight-hour day guarantee; and they

-^"President's Commission, 1951." p. 53

66

received the same housing, transportation, and medical care

as given to American laborers. As a part of the 19 -7 accord,

the Mexican government agreed to control the sale of rail-

road tickets on the Punta PeiTasco, the only railhead from

the interior into the Baja California area. Also, Mexico

was to prevent the accumulation of workers on its side of

the border.

The results of the program differed greatly from its

stated purpose~-to curb illegal entries into the United

States. The 19^7 Agreement, in fact, fostered lawbreaking.

Under the bracero program, the worker had to comply with

the entire recruitment process which included quotas, se-

curity checks, and medical examination. As an illegal alien,

the wetback had only to enter the United States, be appre-

hended, and returned across the border to be quickly

processed as legalized farm labor. According to a subse-

quent study, the 19 *7 Agreement allowed 55>00° illegal

aliens to become legal in the year 19^7 alone. In the same

year, the number of workers imported directly from Mexico

on under the bracero program was only 19,632, The figures

3 U. S. , Department of State, '''Agreement Between the

United States of America and Mexico Replacing the Agreements of June 2, 19'^ and January 9» 19 *5> Respecting Mexican Agricultural Workers: Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed, at Mexico City, March 10, 19^9; Entered into Force March 10. 19 -7." U. S. Sta r-utes at Large, LXI, Part IV, ^106-^107.,

37 „ President's Commission, 1951>" P- 52.

67

recorded, for 19^9 were even more revealing: 19,625 Mexican

farm workers were recruited in the interior, while 8?,220

wetbacks were legalized.

A partial answer to the rise in wetback migration was

the uncooperative attitude of the American grower. He

objected to the contract provisions of the legalized wet-

backs for the same reason he did not approve of the regular

bracero pacts--both contained stated wage rates plus

housing, transportation, and food guarantees. Since he dis-

liked legalizing wetbacks, the grower often violated the

contract terms. Refusal of the El Paso Cotton Growers'

Association to pay the thirty-seven cents an hour wage

forced the Mexican government to sever relations with this

organization.

When the 19-+7 Agreement expired, neither government made

efforts to renew it. The following year, workers were re-

cruited in the interior of Mexico. But bhe arrangement soon

proved unsatisfactory because the selection process was not

fast enough to assimilate all the men wanting jobs. Trying

to by-pass the long recruitment process, the men flocked to

the border cities, such as Ciudad Juarez. They crossed the

border illegally and, instead of being returned, were em-

ployed in the surrounding area. Mexico abrogated the 19 -8

Agreement; but in August, 19^9, the two countries signed an

agreement renewing the contracting of wetbacks. Presumably,

the Mexican government reversed its position because it

68

wanted its nationals to have every protection possible when

they worked, in the United States. The practice of con-

tracting wetbacks continued to 1950."^

Instead of diminishing, wetback immigration continued

to increase during 1950 and 1951. A series of articles by

Gladwin Hill in The New York Times focused public attention

on the problem. Particularly revealing was the study of

three counties (Hidalgo, Cameron, and Wiliby) in the Lower

Rio Grande Valley of Texas which indicated the intensity of

the wetback problem. The three counties in 1950 had a total

population of approximately 300.000 persons and a gross

area of 3.000 square miles under cultivation. Wetbacks

performed, most of the labor on the farms. In fact, a ran-

dom survey of 1^ faims in the counties disclosed that 93

out of every 100 workers were illegal aliens. The Lower-

Rio Grande was not the only area of the country which used

wetback labor. They were used extensively by farmers in

the Salt River Valley of Arizona and'in the Imperial and

San Joaquin Valleys Ox California.

Regardless of where the wetbacks were found, Hill's

articles noted one similarity among areas using wetback

labor--the presence of available labor, without contracts

or guarantees, depressed, wage rates. In the Rio Grande

Valley, the prevailing wage paid for thinning cotton was

13 J Coalson, "Mexican Contract Labor in American Agri-

culture," p. 233«

69

$2.25 per hundredweight, but the rate rose in areas further

from an excess of available laborers. For example, Hill

noted that Texas farmers on the Coastal Plains paid $4.00;

on the Rolling Plains, $5.00; and on the High Plains the

rate was $5-25-"^

The problem of illegal aliens came under close scrutiny

during debates on Public Law 78. On the same day that

President Truman sent his message to Congress accepting the

law, Senator Joe Kilgore (D. , Tex.) introduced a bill

prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service de-

signed to effectuate the first two recommendations suggested

2|0

by the President, As introduced, the bill provided that

any person who " . . . landed or transported, or concealed,

harbored, or shielded an illegal alien, or encouraged, or

induced, any alien to enter the United States illegally, was

guilty of a felony punishable by a fire not exceeding

$2,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or

both, for each alien in respect to whom the law was vio-

41

lated," The bill also allowed Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Serv3.ce employees to enter 'any place of employment,

excluding dwellings, in search of illegal aliens. The First J % h e New York Times, March 26, 1951. P« 25-ILQ ,

See pagv bO for Truman's recommendations.

4 i Irving rf. Sa/bgfiir, "Mexican Contract Labor in the

United States, 1948-1953." unpublished doctoral dissertation. Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953. P*

70

Session of the Eighty-Second. Congress adjourned without

taking action on the bill. Meanwhile the contract labor

pact which expired February 11, 1952, was extended to May 11,

1952. The short duration of the 1951 Agreement was de-

signed. to pressure Congress into taking measures against the

4 2

wetbacks.

In the interim period between sessions, groups opposed

to the wetback legislation organized their forces for the

reconvening of Congress. When the Second Session opened,

an amendment to the Kilgore Bill made it necessary to prove

that an employer "willfully and knowingly'' harbored, con-

cealed, or encouraged an illegal alien. The ultimate

victory for the opposition was that the employment of an

alien did not constitute "harboring or concealing." As

long as an employer made no attempt to harbor or conceal a

wetback, he did not commit a felony.

Other amendments to the original bill equally re-

stricted its effectiveness. Rather than being allowed to

search for wetbacks without a. warrant, the revised bill

called for Immigration and Naturalization officials to

obtain warrants. Even though the Kilgore Bill as amended

did not entirely fulfill the President's recommendations,

Truman signed it March 20, 1952. J

"Study of Population," p. 33. I , Q

Ibid. See also, The New York Times, March 21, 1952, pi "17.

71

Wetback migration continued to increase throughout

1952. In the Delta Lake Section of South Texas alone, the

Border Patrol rounded up 1,200 wetbacks in early August. By

April, 1953 > illegal entries reached a new record peak with

the apprehension of 87,4-16 along the border from Brownsville,

Texas, to San Diego, California. Even though the American

Border Patrol attempted to curb the high number of illegal

entries, its officials admitted that the wetback situation

could easily soar "out of sight."

One reason Border Patrol spokesmen feared that the

wetback flow would accelerate was the difficulty the Patrol,

had in guarding the border. Including administrative

personnel., the Border Patrol had only 600 men in service.

With so few employees, the Patrol did not try to maintain

any kind of cordon along the border but rather adopted, a

"defense in depth" method of patrol. This operation ex-

tended several hundzed miles back from the border and

functioned by mass round-ups of wetbacks in towns and on

fan,.* 5

After the wetbacks were apprehended, the Border Patrol

transported them to Mexico. For a time it airlifted them

to Mexican cities located in the interior, such as Guadala-

/ 46 jars., San Luis Potosi, and Durango. Another method of

hh

The New York Times, May 10, 1933

"Ibid. ^°lbid., June 3, 1951> P- 34.

72

deporting the wetbacks was to transport them "by train to

areas in the interior. Initially the Mexican government

provided military escort for the train until it was 700

miles from the United States border. Later, however, the

military guard provided escort for only sixty miles into

Mexico. Withdrawal of the guard, which encouraged "train-

jumping," combined with the closing of the airlift because

of insufficient funds, served to heighten the x^etback prob-

i ^7

lem.

The "push factors" in Mexico which stimulated the wet-

backs to migrate were similar to those which motivated the

braceros. One main consideration was the obvious disparity

between wages in Mexico and those in the United States.

Because Mexico was unable to provide high standards of

living for all its citizens, the situation became more gx.ave

with the rapid population expansion. Mexico's population

grew from 16.5 million in 1930 to 19.6 million in 19 +0,

and to 25-5 million in 1950. In 19^9 the Mexican birth rate

was '^A per thousand compared with a birth rate in the If. 8

United States of 2.5-3 pe*1 thousand.

In addition to pressure of population against the

economic resources, rampant Inflation stimulated the wetback

migration. In the cotton growing areas of Matamoros, **7Ibld. , January 27, 1953. p. 32.

LR "Study of Population," p. 71.

73

Mexico, and in other areas near the Unite'd States border,

farm wages in December, 19^7, were $1.10 a day (figured in

United States currency). Through inflation, the real wage

in October, 19 *9» was 69 cents per day. Wages in interior

Mexico were even less, only 38 cents per day.^ Besides

Mexico's "ancestral poverty" and the traditionally low

wage rates, the early 1950's were drought years in Mexico.

The lack of water resulted in crop failures and intensified

an already bad situation. In the state of Durango in 1953,

^0 per cent of the cattle, or 379.200 head, perished in the

t. Q

drought with an estimated dollar loss of 8.7 million.

At the height of the wetback influx, the bracero pact

came up for renewal, but negotiations halted on the wage

question, Mexico wanted a fixed wage rate written into the

international agreement, instead, of accepting the prevailing

rate for its workers. In anticipation that negotiations

might fail, the United States had discussed possible

alternatives to the bracero pact prior to the negotiations.

One alternative suggested was to legalize wetbacks once

again. The other alternative, and the one eventually

attempted, was to contract workers unilaterally until the

two countri es readied a new agreement. The "stop gap"

^Ibid. , pp. 71-72,

R. ?. Eckels, "Hungry Workers, Ripe Crops, and the Non-Existent- Mexican Border." The Reporter, X (April 13, 195*0. 29.

7^

recruitment program was announced, jointly by the Departments

<1

of State, Justice, and Labor.

The official, position of the Mexican government in

response to the unilateral recruitment was reflected by

President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines who said the failure to

reach agreement was "not a problem, but only an incident."

Prominent officials within Mexican governmental circles

expressed quite different views and claimed the United

States deliberately adopted a "too tough" position. Out-

side the government, many segments of the population united

in opposition to the unilateral recruitment. In January,

195^. Mexico placed guards along the Mexican border across

from Calexico, California, to prevent the crossing of

several hundred, workers, but with lit'cle success. Braceros,

eager for work, continued, to congregate In the border ar.eas.

By February it was reported that nearly 5,000 had entered

the Western States since the failure to negotiate a new

agreement. -/~

The Eisenhower Administration continued its talks

aimed toward a new migrant pact with the Mexican government.

Finally in March the two governments reached terms to be in

effect through December Jl, 1935• The program to recruit

J 1The New York Times, January 16, 195^» P. 3-5; January 17, 19 5^ > P« 6' 2.

-^Ibid. , January 18, 195^» P- January 23> 195^» p. 3; January 2^, 195^. P» 10: February k, 195~K p. 16.

75

workers unilaterally was never officially' in operation since

the new agreement was reached eight days before the law was

signed on March 18, 1954. On the controversial issue of

wages, the new pact reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary

of Labor in determining the prevailing wage; but it em-

phasized the right of the Mexican government to request

periodical reviews of the wage rate. J Even though the

bracero situation had been temporarily settled, the wetback

problem persisted as a disruptive element for both countries.

Yet, with publicity, congressional legislation, and the

obvious acuteness of the situation, no aggressive action

designed to curb the wetback influx was taken until mid-

summer of 1954. After touring the border areas in early

June, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., announced

that the Commissioner of Immigration, Major General Joseph

Swing (United States Army, retired), would soon begin to

round up setbacks. Commissioner Swing's plan called for

the re-enforcement of the Border Patrol from California to

Texas with guards from other parts of the United States.

The additional help along the Mexican border would allow one

part of the guard to seal off the border while the other

half apprehended wetbacks for repatriation. Chartered buses

•5-'"Study of Population," p. 39.

^The New York Times, June 10, 1954, p. 25-

-^Robert D. Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem and Pressure Group Politics," The Journal of Polltics, XXIII (May, 1961), 314. Hereafter cioed as Tomasek, "Trie Migrant; Problem."

?6

would take the wetbacks to Nogales, Arizona, where the

Mexican government would then transport them to the in-

<6

terior. Swing assured farmers that every effort would be

made to fill vacancies created by the loss of wetbacks with

either domestic or bracero labor. For the most part,

farmers seemed willing to cooperate, primarily because they

thought the wetback drive would be pursued with equal vigor

all along the border, thus minimizing competitive dis-

57 advantages."

California was the first testing ground for Operation

Wetback. The plan proved successful. When the Border

Patrol began its roundup, arrests were as high as 2,000 per

day, but later decreased to 1,000. Loss of the wetbacks

did not interrupt bhe harvesting because, as Swing 58

promised, braceros replaced the illegal aliens. With the

initial California successes, Swing, in mid-July, swept into

the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas.

In Texas there was much resistance to Operation Wet-

back, and the Border Patrol encountered ". . . a campaign

of protest and vilification of a sort rare in the . . . KQ

annals of law enforcement."^* At times Bord.er Patrol ^The Mew York Times, June 13, 195 ', P* 24.

^"ibid., June 27, 1954, p. 36.

^8Ibid., June 28, 1954, p. 39-

~^Ibid. , August 2, 195'+, P. 8.

77

employees were refused service in restaurants and motels,

and were sneeringly called the "army of occupation." One

drug store in Harlingen displayed a sign which read, "Price

Double to Border Patrol till cotton is picked."

Despite the lack of local cooperation in some areas

and of insufficient funds originally appropriated, Com-

missioner Swing fulfilled a successful mission. Estimates

f 1 indicated that about one million wetbacks w„ere deported.

One Texas grower, who despaired at seeing the wetbacks given

official government escort across the Rio Grande, later

commented on the thoroughness of Operation Wetback:

The abruptness, completeness and finality of this campaign is still hard to believe after eight years. Had Herr /Walter/ Ulbricht had the services of any-one as able as General,Swing, the Berlin Wall would never have, been built.°2

Operation Wetback definitely affected the contract .

labor program. The Labor Department announced increased

demands for braceros in the border states of Texas,

California, Arizona, and New Mexico. In California re-

quests for membership in growers' associations, the agency

which normally contracted the braceros, doubled in Imperial

and San Diego counties. By September, 195^» there was a

60T. . , I Did.

6i "Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem," p. 315-

6 2 John G. McBride, Vanishing Bracero: Valley Revolu-

tion (San Antonio, 19^3)> P- 8.

78

25 pe^ cent increase in the use of Mexican nationals in

California over September, 1953-

In Texas there was not only a demand for additional

braceros but also a rise in wage rates. To maintain the

domestic laborers normally displaced by the wetbacks, cot-

ton growers increased wages from $1.50 a- hundredweight for

cotton to $2.05.^ As a result of the demands for braceros,

the Labor Department requested an additional 90,000 contract

workers, or a total of 350,000, compared with only 200,000

in 1953.

^Edward F. Hayes, "'Operation Wetback'--Impact on the Border States," Employment Security Review, LXIII (March, 1955), 17-18, 21.

^The New York Times, July 15, 195^» P« 12.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION AND LIQUIDATION OF

THE BRACERO PROGRAM: 1955-1964'

Following the 1955 struggle to renew the international

agreement, the years to 1959 were quiescent ones for the

Mexican contract labor program. On August 9» 1955> Public

Law 78 was extended, for nearly four years, to June JO, 1959.

At the same time, two amendments were added with little

controversy. One amendment provided that if a worker had

cX 1 1 ready been paid, but not returned to the reception center,

the employer need not pay the transportation and subsistence

costs within the United States, The other change required

the Secretary of Labor to consult with employers and workers

regarding the availability cf domestic migrants and the

possibility that wage rates were adversely affected. The

information was to be posted in public places. During the

four-year period, the international agreement which governed

recruitment of contract workers was also renewed, without -

effective opposition or major difficulties in the negotia-

tions. It was extended on December 23> 1955» to be in

effect until December 31> 195&; and eleven days prior to

expiration, the agreement was renewed until June 30, 1959.

''""Study of Population," pp. 39-^0.

79

80

Several reasons for the decline of the opposition to

the bracero program can be cited. Undoubtedly one reason

was that after Operation Wetback the influx of illegal aliens

dropped sharply. Thus the wetback problem did not attract

so much unfavorable attention to the program as in the mid-

19501s. The absence of wetbacks likewise did not impede

2

negotiations of che international agreement. Secondly,

organizations which regularly opposed the program became

less active. For example, the National Farm Labor Union

(NFLU), composed of small farmers and representing the

dome,st;ic migrant and workers, dropped its traditional role

of opposing the bracero program. At least one reason for

its inactivity was the weaknesses inherent within the NFLU.

Its a ember ship came primarily free, seasonal workers who

lacked extensive financial resources and dynamic leadership

ability.^ Another group which took a less energetic stand

against the importation of foreign labor was the National

Agricultural Workers Union (NAVU) of the American Federation

of Labor. The objective of the NAWU was to organize do-

mestic agricultural workers into an effective pressure

group similar to that of th^ growers. But in December,

1956, its president, H. L. Mitchell, expressed his

^Ffelffer, "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program,

Toraasek, "The Migrant rtotles," p. JOh.

81

discouragement with 'the efforts to organize domestic mi-

k-

grants into labor unions.

Behind the facade of tranquility which characterized

the program in the late 1950's, the forces opposed to the

bracero pact were organizing. Much of the opposition

developed outside governmental circles, and public interest

over the program's operation was similar to the concern

evidenced when the non-governmental program was in effect.

These groups, upset with increased farm subsidies and crop

surpluses, could not understand the necessity of importing

foreign laborers when there was a high unemployment rate

among domestic workers. Their position was candidly stated

in an article by Gladwin Hill in The New York Times: "What are those people doing?" asked Alice,

surveying a vast fertile southwestern valley. "They're cultivating surplus cotton and lettuce,"

replied the Red Queen, "Who are they?" asked Alice, tactful],y ignoring

the matter of why anyone should produce surplus crops. "They are Mexicans, imported because of the labor

shortage," explained the Red Queen. "Labor shortage?" asked. A] ice. "I thought we had

5,000,000 unemployed and a million or so migrant farm laborers who need, work."

"Obviously," retorted the Red Queen testily, "you don't understand the American agricultural system. "5

An even more decisive factor in renewed opposition to

the program was the position of Labor Secretary James P.

Mitchell, Mitchell, more thsn any of the earlier Labor

Pfeiffer, "I'ae Mexican l-'ana Labor Supply Program." P. 7'i-.

^Ibid ., p, 76. See also, The New York Tim°s, April 5> 1959. p. 53r arKl Tos,?.sek, ''Tr.e Migrant Problem, " p. 295-

82

Secretaries who had administered the contract labor system,

had a deep interest in the bracero program. Upon accepting

his post, he began to study the farm-labor situation. As a

result of his investigations, several bracero camps were

closed and improvements undertaken in various others. He

also began working on ways to improve the condition of mi-

grant workers. Mitchell's position contrasted sharply with

that of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. Through-

out the history of the contract labor system, the Department

of Agriculture rather consistently represented the needs of

the large, prosperous farmers. Benson did not break with

tradition. During the Eisenhower Administration his

position, and that of Mitchell, often clashed with regard

to the bracero program.^ One of the most aggressive steps

taken by Mitchell concerning the reorganization of the con-

tract labor system was to appoint a committee of four

consultants to study Public Law 78. The committee's lengthy

report was extremely influential in shaping future amendments

to the law.

The committee noted that Public Law 78 had two prime

objectives: to obtain agricultural workers from Mexico to

meet the demands for seasonal labor shortages and to insure

that domestic migrants were not adversely influenced by the

'Arnol Mayer, "Grapes of Wrath, 'Vintage 1961," The Reporter, XXIV (January-June, I96I), 35- Hereafter ^ited as Mayer, "Grapes of Wrath.See also, Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem," r>. 30* .

83

importation of Mexicans. The committee felt that Public

Law 78 fulfilled its first objective but had. been less

successful with regard to the second, primarily because of

the difficulty in administering Section 503 of the law.

This section prohibited the Secretary of Labor from issuing

authorization for Mexican workers unless (1) domestic

workers were not available, (2) employment of Mexicans

would not adversely affect wages and working conditions of

domestics, and (3) reasonable efforts had been made to

attract domestic workers at wages and standards comparable

7

to those offered to Mexican workers.

One of the major difficulties,- the committee explained,

in the administration of Section 5^3 was that of determining

an acceptable interpretation of the term "adverse effect."

In its strict sense, the term meant that the use of Mexican

nationals should not deprive the American worker of jobs,

lower his wages, or impair working conditions. If this

interpretation was accepted, the Secretary of Labor's role

would be to insure no "worsening of conditions" and thus to

maintain the status quo of domestic migrants. On the other

hand, adverse effect could mean that employment of braceros

prevented wages from reaching higher rates. Closely related

to this interpretation was a possible third meaning, that the

7 'U. S., Department of Labor, Mexlcan Farm Labor Con-

sultants Re_go;r_t (Washington, 1959) > P. 1« Unless cited otherwise, information on the committee's report will be based on pages 1-17 of the above report.

84

employment of Mexican nationals interrupted the "normal

interplay between labor and employer."

In order to minimize adverse effect, the Secretary of

Labor, prior to the report, had established several proce-

dures. The Labor Department made pre-seasonal "supply-

demand" analyses to determine labor shortage, and then tried

to provide workers for these areas by interstate recruitment.

The Secretary also attempted to reduce the chances of ad-

verse effect by placing restrictions on employers who used

Mexican nationals. They were required to supply acceptable

housing and working conditions and to pay the prevailing

wage to Mexicans. These safeguards protected domestics and

also prevented the exploitation of foreign laborers. In

addition, employers were sometimes required to hire qualified

domestics to supplement or replace Mexican nationals.

Despite the efforts of the Department of Labor, the

committee felt that domestic agricultural workers continued

to be adversely affected, especially by job displacement.

There was a tendency for Mexicans to work' in skilled or semi-

skilled positions. Increasingly, they were entering the

areas of packing and sorting fruits and vegetables. This

type of work was usually done by packing-shed operators at

higher wages; but with new kinds of machinery, the Mexicans

could perform the work in the field. The American workers

often lost their jobs because they could not easily transfer

• . 85

to field jobs, or they were obliged to continue working at

the lower wages paid to field hands.

There were at least two other ways by which the do-

mestic was displaced from his job. One was through the use

of braceros in year-round occupations. Although Public

Law 78 did not prohibit the full-time use of Mexicans, it

had generally been used to acquire workers for seasonal em-

ployment. Secondly, the influx of a large number of workers

shortened the work season for domestics since the crops could

be harvested more quickly. And, the availability of a

potential labor force not only shortened the work season

but also depressed the wages of the American migrant.

The committee explained in depth the interrelation of

the two factors. The Mexican agricultural workers received

the prevailing domestic wage, which was determined by con-

ducting periodic and random surveys of areas where foreign

workers were needed. By a formula adopted in 1958.- the wage

rate paid to k-Q per cent of the workers was considered the

prevailing wage. In cases where no single wage could be

8

determined, a special method was used. The committee con-

cluded that the concept of the prevailing wage was

8 Ibid., p. 6. By the special method, the prevailing

wage is found by placing the wages along a scale, starting with the largest rate and proceeding upward until 51 per cent of the workers are included. The highest wage paid to any worker in the 51~P^r cent group becomes the bottom of the range while the top of the range is the highest rate paid to any worker in the survey.

86

satisfactory in areas where rates were competitively de-

termined. But it considered the method inadequate in

situations where a potential labor reserve existed. The

potential reserves depressed the domestic wage rate which

then tended to stabilize. To substantiate its conclusion,

the consultants pointed out that farm wages from 1953 to

1958 increased Ik- per cent. But in areas where Mexican

nationals were used, the average rate paid to domestic mi-

grants remained, unchanged or decreased in three-fifths of

the cases studied. In the cotton-growing areas which em-

ployed about one-half of the Mexicans, three-fourths of the

cases studied indicated that the wage rates for domestics

were unchanged or lowered.

Again the committee noted the difficulty in inter-

preting the term "adverse effect." If the Department of.

Labor's obligation under Section 503 was to (l) restore

wages to a level they would have reached without foreign

labor, (2) obtain a level at which supply and demand

balance, or (3) keep wages in line with areas in which

foreign labor was not used, then the committee felt that

procedures for determining the prevailing wage were in-

adequate. Not only was it unsuccessful but also the report

termed it "meaningless" in areas that were totally dominated

by foreign workers, such as the lettuce and citrus crops of

California or the cotton fields of New Mexico. To set the

prevailing wage in dominated areas, the Secretary of Labor

87

used wage rates in non-dominated but comparable situations.

The difficulty proved to be one of locating a comparable

area which had not been influenced by foreign workers.

The report pointed out obvious advantages given to the

Mexican worker which had not been extended to the American

migrant. The latter did not have the security of a minimum

wage guarantee, he did not receive housing or transportation,

nor was he protected by insurance coverage from occupational

risks. The braceros, on the other hand, had all the se-

curities with the added assurance that the United States

government served as the guarantor of the contract.

After careful investigation of the bracero program and

its relation to the situation of domestic migrants, the

consultants suggested that Public Law 78 be extended on a

temporary basis but with several amendments. Simple re-

newal of the law without any changes would tend to postpone

necessary reforms. In the committee ' s opinion adverse

effect could not be avoided but could possibl3r be minimized

by implementing the following recommendations:

A. Future legislation should clearly confine em-ployment of Mexican nationals to necessary crops in temporary labor shortages and to unskilled, non-machine jobs.

B. The Secretary of Labor should be authorized to insure active competition for the available supply of domestic agricultural workers with the objective of reducing the reliance on Mexican labor. To stimulate active competition, the commit bee suggested limiting the ratio of Mexicans to domestics on individual farms and Hairing the number of Mexicans that could be em-ployed in any crop area.

88

C. The unavailability of domestic migrants should not be certified by the Secretary of Labor un-less employers had attempted to recruit domestic workers and had offered them working conditions equiva-lent to those given the braceros, such as housing, transportation, and wages.9

On the controversial issue of interpreting adverse

effect, the committee recommended the use of more specific

criteria. It suggested (a) the failure cf wages in areas

using Mexicans to keep pace with general wage increases,

(b) the relations between Mexican employment trends and

wage trends in areas not using Mexicans, and (c) the dif-

ference in wage and earning levels of workers on farms

using Mexicans compared with non-users.

With the consultants' report indicating the need for

amendments to Public Law 78 and suggesting ways to accomplish

the changes, anti-braeerc members of Congress led by

Representative George McGovern (D., S. D.) introduced a

reform, bill in the i960 Congressional session. The bill

incorporated the consultants' recommendations, and imme-

diately it encountered strong opposition when . . In-

dustrialised agriculture joined with canr.srs and processors

10

to exert pressure for extension . . . " without reform.

McGovern's supporters soon realised they did not control

enough votes to amend Public Law 78, and the pro-bracero Q ' Ibid.. pp. I j-1o.

1 0 Mayer, "(irapes of Wrath," p. 35- Unless cited other-

wise, inforoiation on the i960 Congressional action will be based on the -above article, pp,

89

faction dominated the House Committee on Agriculture. Al-

though the liberals under McGovern threatened to filibuster,

the House of Representatives renewed Public Law 78 for two

more years without amendments.

In the meantime, the Senate Committee on Agriculture

and Forestry extended Public Law 78 for a six-month period

without incorporating any of the reforms suggested in the

consultants' report. The Senate committee .ignored a reform

measure introduced by Senator Eugene McCarthy (D. , Minn.)

and placed the extension bill before the full Senate with-

out conducting hearings on the matter. Again the anti-

bra cero members threatened to filibuster. They felt the

six-month extension could easily be expanded to a two-year

extension in a House-Senate conference committee.

To stop a filibuster which would hinder campaigning-

in a crucial election year and to insure adequate labor for

the harvest season, the two opposing groups agreed on a

compromise. The contract labor program was extended for

six months with thorough hearings to be held in 1961. Even

though the anti-bracero congressmen met defeat in amending

Public Law 78, they still claimed partial victory for

several reasons. They had prevented joint administration

of the braeere program by the Agriculture and Labor De-

partments, shortened the period of extension from two years

to six months, and demonstrated that the growers' lobby in

Washington v:as not invincible.

90

The i960 attack in Congress against Public Law 78 re-

flected a stiffening attitude toward the bracero pact and

was the prelude to heightened opposition. When Public

Law 78 came up for renewal in 1961, the Kennedy Administra-

tion was unwilling for the law to be extended without certain

reforms. The four amendments proposed by the Kennedy

Administration were not new, but were based on the 1959

study of the farm-labor situation. First, the Administration

wanted to prohibit the employment of Mexican workers in jobs

requiring the operation of machinery and in year-round jobs.

Supporters of the amendment contended it was necessary even

though the Secretary of Labor was authorized to determine

domestic labor shortages. They pointed out that the

authorizations were automatic since Mexicans displaced do-

mestic migrants in some areas of the country. Congressmen

who representee1 the growers' interest argued that limitations

on the employment of Mexicans should not be established since

11

domestics would not perform stoop labor.

The Administration also wanted a statutory wage-

standard. The proposed wage amendment required that any

employer who paid less than average wages must raise his,

wage rates to the state or national farm wage average, de-

pending on which wage was lovrer, The wage did not have to

11 "Spradxin. "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Prob-

lem," pp. 101-102. 10 -. Unless cited otherwise, discussion of the Kennedy Administration's proposals in I96I will be based on the above article, pp. 8^-121, 311-327.

91

be raised more than ten cents a year, but any employer who

offered domestics less than he paid Mexicans would be

ineligible to participate in the bracero program. The wage

amendment met with heavy opposition. The pro-bracero

faction argued that such an amendment would lead to wage

escalation, higher customer prices on the retail market,

and inability of the farmers to pay higher wages. The crux

of the opposition, however, was that growers feared the wage

amendment was a step toward extending the minimum wage to

agricultural workers. During the hearings on the amend-

ments, those who agreed with it countered the opposition's

arguments by suggesting that if growers were unable to pay

wages based on the state or national average, they were

certainly too poor to be hiring Mexican nationals.

The third amendment prohibited the recruitment of

Mexican nationals, unless an employer offered domestics

comparable working conditions, such as housing, transporta-

tion, subsistence, and other guarantees. If the amendment

was accepted, the Administration felt domestics would be

more attracted to stoop labor jobs ana the need for

brac-eros would be eliminated. The House Committee on

Agriculture was adamant in its refusal to approve the

amendment and termed the suggestion impracticable. The

committee argued that the amendment would obligate growers

to provide housing and transportation with no guarantee

that the domestic migrant, might not desert his job at the

92

peak of harvest. The growers would have Incurred the extra

expense without receiving any services. The proposal would

allow growers to reimburse themselves from the government

for travel expenses paid in advance if a domestic should

quit his job without notification. When the Senate received

the amendment to Public Law 78, Senator Kenneth Keating

(R., N. Y.) attempted to reinstate the requirement that

comparable terms of employment such as workmen's compensation

be offered the domestic migrant. The Senate rejected his

amendment by a vote of thirty-five yeas to forty-nine noes

with sixteen abstentions.

The final amendment- supported by the Kennedy Administra-

tion, to limit the number of Mexicans that could be employed

on an individual farm, failed to be included in the extension

of Public Law 78 to December jl, 19^3- Even though the

extension of Public Law 78 contained, some points favored by

Washington such as the prohibition against Mexicans operating

farm machinery and their limitations to temporary, seasonal

jobs, the Kennedy Administration remained unsatisfied. For

example, the wage amendment designed to minimize adverse

effect likewise did not pass Congress. The amendment re-

quiring employers to offer comparable working conditions

passed Congress, but with the provision that "working con-

ditions" excluded housing, transportation, subsistence, and

12 work, guarantees.

12 Ibid., p. See also, "Study of Population,"

p. ^ 1.

93

When he signed the law extending the contract system

for an additional two years, President Kennedy stated his

regret that Congress had ignored studies revealing the

detrimental effects which the employment of foreign labor

had on domestic migrants. He added that he signed the law

only because he realized workers were ne.eded for the coming

harvest and because of the impact which the termination of

13

the program might have on Mexico. Even though the initial

efforts of the Kennedy Administration to reform the contract

labor system and thereby protect the domestic migrant were

not completely successful, it was determined to improve

the administration of the program. The President announced

on signing the extension that the Secretary of Labor would

use the power granted to him under the adverse effect clause

(Section 503) to determine whether Mexican laborers were 1

needed in the country. The action of the Secretary of

Labor combined with the l$6l amendments led to a decline in

the use of braceros from 19ol to 196 -.

In the spring of 1962, Secretary of Labor W. Willard

Wirtz exercised the powei given him under Section 5^3 of

Public Law ?8 and issued adverse effect determinations for

twenty-four states. The new wage rates established in

~ "'Public Papers of the Pre si den ts of the United States, Containing the Public "Me¥saa.'es7"Speeches, and Statements of thT'P^esIdentr Jhhii P." Kennedy, 12*61 (Washington, 19511.

14. Ibid.

9^

these states ranged from sixty cents to one dollar an hour.

The Secretary also announced that no Mexican could work on a

piece-rate basis if it did not allow him to earn the t

specified hourly rate. And the hourly earnings of piece-

rate workers in any payroll period must not be less than

the adverse effect'rate for the area in which he was em-

ployed. The effect of the new regulations was to raise the

wage rates for domestics, while the increased expense of

hiring Mexican workers reduced the annual average employment-

of "braceros.

A second factor in the decline of bracero usage was the

1961 provision which limited their -employment to temporary,

seasonal jobs. In compliance with the amendment, only 15

per cent of those admitted during 1962 could stay longer

than nine months. Frior to the amendments, contracts were

extended up to a year with some workers remaining in the

country for eighteen months. With the new restriction,

however, the average length of employment for Mexican workers

was shortened from 3*3 months in 19^1, to 2.9 in 1962, and 1 f\

later to 2.62 months in 3 963.

1 ^U. S., Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign

Workers in 1962," Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963), p. 1.

i Ibid., p. 2. See also, U, S,, Department of Labor,

"Employment of Foreign'Workers in 1963," Farm Labor Market Developme-nts ( k'ash ing 0 on, 19 6-4-) , p. 1,

95

Directly related to the above factor-s which contributed

to the decline in the number of braceros recruited in the

early 1960's was increased mechanization of the 1950's, !

especially in the cotton areas. In 1959. only 4-3 per cent

of the cotton was harvested by machines, compared with more

than 50 per cent a year later. Improved administration of

Public Law 78, and particularly increased wage rates,

stimulated the shift to mechanization. Obviously, the cotton

harvesting machines served to reduce the number of workers 1 7

normally required.

As a result of these factors, approximately 195.000

Mexicans were contracted in 1962. This represented a 33

per cent decline from 1961. In September. 1962, the peak

employment month, there were only 111,000 braceros in the

United States, which represented the lowest number employed

in the history of Public Law 78. The September employment

was per cent lower than the 1961 peak, and 62 per cent

below the all-time high of 292,000 in 1959- The decline

was particularly obvious in states which normally depended

on braceros. In Texas, for example, Mexican employment

during the first six months of 1962 averaged about 9>000

less than in 1961. In July and August, the number employed

1 7 Spradlin, "The Mexican Contract Labor Importation

Program," pp. 92~93« See also, U. S», Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign Workers in 1^62,u Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963). p. 1.

96

was 20,000 to 30,000 less than in 1961, and from September

1 R to November, there were 60,000 less than in 1961.

California and Arizona growers also employed fewer (

Mexicans. In the latter state about 5*000 braceros were

used in 1962, which was 2,000 less than in 1961. Almost

no Mexican labor was used in the Arizona, cotton fields in

1961 compared with 3>200 workers in 1962. Cotton growers

shifted to harvesting by machines when the adverse effect

determination required them to pay piece-rate workers an

average hourly earning of 95 cents. In California, em-

ployment of Mexican labor dropped by about 3>000 in I962 .

The trend away from hiring Mexican workers continued

in 1963. During the year, an average of ^5>900 Mexicans

worked, in the United States, or 2.3 pe~-f cent less than in

1962. At the peak of employment only 90,000 were employed,

a 19 PS-f cent decline from the 111,000 reached in 1962.

The reduced, dependency of foreign labor certainly affected

domestic migrant workers. Growers began to hire them and

also paid them higher wages. In. Texas, the adverse effect

determinations set the hourly rate of seventy cents as the

lowest at which Mexicans could be employed. This relatively

high rate tended to raise wages offered to domestics.

Arizona felt effects similar to Texas in 1963. The employment

1 8 -U. S., Department of Labor, "Employment of Foreign

Workers in 1962,1: Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 1963), pp. 2-4.

9?

of braceros declined 1^ per cent while the use of domestics

increased 8 per cent. Domestic laborers, however, did not

completely fill the vacancies created by fewer braceros.

The Yuma County State Employment Office recorded that some

of the laborers were visa immigrants, many of whom commuted

from Mexico. The report noted that often the commuters

19

were former braceros. '

Encouraged by the higher wage rates and the increased

employment of domestic agricultural workers, the Labor

Department announced that the need for imported labor should

be curtailed even further in 196'4. According to the Labor

Department, domestic seasonal, workers were available in

adequate numbers to fill labor shortages. To buttress its

case, the Department pointed out that 182,000 persons who

performed 25 or more days of farm wage work in 1962 cite.d

unemployment as their "chief activity" during the year.

Workers in this category increased 16,400 per year over the

preceding decade, and thus the Labor Department calculated

that over 200,000 domestic workers were available for 20

additional farm work in 196 -.

Despite the vigorous action of the Labor Department

which had raised the wage rates of contract laborers after 19 yU. S.. Department of labor, "Employment of Foreign

Workers in 1963," Farm Labor Market Developments (Washington, 196^) , pp. 1-3. ' " " ~

20 U. S., Department of Labor, "Review and Outlook,"

Farm Labor Market. Develor'inentq (Washington, 196*0, p. 9.

93

1961 and required better working conditions, many growers

still preferred braceros to domestics. The Mexican workers

were more easily housed since they travelled without their

families; they were usually healthy young adults; they were

normally docile; and they did not complain about their

working conditions. As one grower explained, . .we

used to own our slaves, now we renb them from the govern-

21

ment. "

The time was rapidly approaching, however, when growers

would no longer be able to rely on contract laborers. In

1963, when Public Law 78 came before Congress for con-

sideration, the Labor Department introduced several

amendments. Although the recommendations were not adopted,

opposition to Public. Law r/d> had grown to the point that

its supporters could only force a one-year extension of the

program. The extension to December 31> 196k, marked the

termination of the Mexican contract labor supply program.

The three major proposals recommended by the Labor

Department in 19^3 were (1) employers of Mexican nationals

had to provide workmen's compensation insurance for the

domestic workers employed, (2) employers had to provide

domestics with the same housing arid transportation provided

91 Mayer, '-'Grapes of Wrath," p. 35.

99

Mexicans, or (3) employers had. to give supplemental payments

Op

to domestics in lieu of housing and transportation.

On August 6, 1963» ^he Senate Committee on Agriculture

and Forestry reported favorably on S. 1703 which called for

a simple extension of the bracero program without amendments.

But the minority on the committee composed of Senators

William Proxmire (R. , Wise.), Maurine Neuberger (D., Ore.),

George McGovern (D. , S. D.) and. Eugene McCarthy (D. , Minn.)

submitted a strong protest. The minority opinion contended -

that all interested parties had not been given the opportunity

to present their views because the Senate did not conduct

hearings, and they felt the Senate committee failed to con-

sider the plight of domestic migrants by recommending extension

without amendments. Senator Spessard L. Holland (D,» Fla.),

representing the majority viewpoint, refuted the minority's

objections. He stated that all interested groups had been

given ample opportunity since the House held hearings on

the topic for three days in March, and the hearings in July

of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare

provided, another chance for testimony and investigation.

Holland denied that the domestic laborer was overlooked by

the extension. He quoted the Secretary of Labor's remark

before the Senate subcommittee hearings that the administration

22 U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture,

One Year Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program, H. Rept. 72.2 to Accompany H. R. 8195. 88t-h Congress, 1st Session, 1963. p. 15. Hereafter cited as "House Report No, 722."

100

of Public Law 78 since the 1961 amendments had been "rea-

sonably successful" in minimizing adverse effect.

Holland further justified the Senate committee's refusal

to approve the amendments of the Department of Labor. The

authority needed by the Secretary of Labor to implement the

proposals was considered "vague, extensive, and unnecessary"

as well as "impractical and unreasonable." To amplify his

argument, Holland attacked the amendment which required em-

ployers to provide transportation for domestics. The

amendment allowed growers to collect from the national

government if a migrant left the place of employment before

the end of harvest. According to the Senator, the entire

?'3

amendment was "unreasonable.

Holland's explanations and justifications naturally

did not quiet the opposition, which was becoming more

vociferous. Senator Proxmire argued that the bracero

program was in violation of the American system of free

enterprise since it interrupted the balance between supply 24

and demand, thus preventing farm wages from rising.

Another member of the minority, 'Senator McCarthy, offered

an amendment, in line with the Labor Department's recom-

mendation, to provide workmen's compensation and other

benefits to domestics, The amendment was rejected by a c C ongr e s s i onal Record , 88 th Congress, 1st Session,

II, 15185-15180.

2ifIbid., II, 1518?.

101

k$ to 45 tie vote. -McCarthy then offered' essentially the

same amendment, but he struck out the provision which re-

quired the Secretary of Labor, prior to December 31, 196^,

to take action to assure the availability of domestic

agricultural workers. The amendment passed by a one-vote

majority of kk to ^3.^

By a vote of 62 to 25» the Senate passed S. I703 which

gave a one-year extension to the bracero program, but with

the important McCarthy amendment. The clause of Section 5°3

of Public Law 78 which provided working conditions to

domestics comparable to those offered to foreign workers

was struck out. It was amended to include specifically

". . . workmen's compensation, or occupational insurance

coverage, housing, transportation, and work period guarantees

comparable to those provided foreign workers.

In the House of Representatives, the Labor Department's

proposals also encountered opposition. Majority opinion

and justification in the Hous-e Committee on Agriculture

paralleled that of its sister committee in the Senate. The

Committee members fully agreed with the Senate that the

Secretary of Labor should not be given such "broad discre-

tionary power," and that paid transportation for domestics

was unreasonable. They argued that historically state

2^Ibid., II, 15201-15202.

26 Ibid., II, 15219.

102

governments passed laws concerning workmen's compensation,

and that they did not want to set a precedent by its "casual

27

inclusion" in a national statute.

Though the House minority declared that Public Law 78

was a . . bad law, a wretched law that should be buried 1128

* * *' the majority would not approve the proposed

recommendations.- After House-Senate conference committee

consideration, the Senate accepted the House amendments to

S. I703 which extended the bracero program for one additional

year. The House version did not contain the McCarthy

amendment, nor did it incorporate the Labor Department's 2Q

recommendations. "

Realization that the bracero program would be terminated

on December 31 > 196^» stimulated much activity in the Labor

Department and among the country's growers. In California

citrus fruit growers reflected an attitude that was wide-

spread. They considered the abandonment of the bracero

program as a "fact of life," and therefore took action to

prevent crop losses. At a conference in Sacramento, growers

initiated studies to determine labor needs on a "county-by-30

county, crop-by-crop, month-by-month basis.

^"House Report No. 722," pp. 15-16.

28Ibid., p. 21.

^ C ongresslonal Record, 88th Congress, 1st Session, XVIII, 23223."

3°The New York Times, February 25. 196 -, p. 55 •

103

Secretary of Labor VJirtz assured growers across the

country that his department would make every effort to fill

labor needs with domestic migrants. If labor shortages

still existed, Wirtz agreed that foreign labor could be

imported under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

(Public Law 4l4) . And in late December, 1964, the Labor

Department conducted a series of meetings in Washington,

Miami, Dallas, and San Francisco to establish criteria for

the employment of foreign agricultural labor under the 1952

law, There was an immediate negative outburst from the

anti-bracero forces, which argued that Importation of

workers under Public Law 4l4 was a subversion of the will

of Congress. Reverend Samuel A. Snyder, spokesman for the

National Council of Churches, urged the Labor Department

to concentrate Its efforts on improving the conditions of

domestics rather than seeking ways to continue contracting

31

foreign labor.

Even though the Department of Labor held the criteria

hearing, Wirtz acted to reduce the need for foreign workers

and also to make their employment impracticable. On

December 13, 1964, he announced plans for a massive nation-

wide recruitment of domestics to replace bracero labor. A

week later new wage levels set by the Labor Department

-^ibld., November 15. 1964, p. 65; December 1, 1964, p. 25.

104

required farmers who desired to import foreign workers to

pay wages which varied from $1.15 to $1.40 per hour.-^

Quite naturally the termination of the contract labor

system received much attention in Mexico. As in the United

States, there were divergent reactions to the effect the

ending of the program would have in Mexico, During the 19&3

Congressional debates on the extension of the program,

Secretary of State Dean Rusk received a note from the

Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Antonio Carillo

Flores. The Ambassador urged that the termination of the

contract system be carried out gradually so that the Mexican

economy could adjust and absorb the workers who would be

unemployed. If the demand for workers was decreased

slowly, Carillo Flores felt such action would " . . . stave

off the sudden crisis that would come from an increase in

33

national unemployment."-^

For popular consumption in Mexico, the position of the

Mexican government was that the termination of the bracero

program would not greatly affect the economy. The Mexican

Department of the Interior announced that industry could 3I4.

absorb the unemployed agricultural workers. Other reports

32ibid., December 13, 1964, p. 83; December 20, 1964, P. 39. "

^^Hispanic American Reuort, XVI, No. 8 (October, 1963), 754. The note was dated June 21, 19o3> aud was not reported in the American or Mexican press.

34 Congressional Record, 88th Congress, 1st Session, X,

12945-129467 Article by Emil Zubryn, "Failure to Extend Program for Braceros Brings Divergent Reaction in Mexico," Cotton Trade Journal (June 7? 1963)-

105

announced, that tourism would make up the anticipated, loss

in foreign exchange caused by the ending of the program.

The Associacio'n Mexicana de Turismo said, that 73»190 foreign

tourists spent $75 million in January, 1963* which was an

increase of $7 million over the preceding year. The

problem, however, was that while tourist spending compen-

sated for the loss in foreign exchange, this money did not

reach the people who normally depended on bracero money.

One influential newspaper, La Prensa. editorialized that

some 300,000 Mexican families would suffer directly from

the ending of the bracero program.- J

While La Prensa's position seemed to indicate the

desirability of continuing the program, many segments of

the Mexican press and society did not concur. Leftist

opinion represented by Politica condemned the program as,

an imperialist plot to keep Mexico dependent on the United

States and urged a national solution to agrarian problems.

Excelsior, a conservative daily, also hailed the termination

of the program and. called on the government to create new

36

employs'en t opportunities for ex-braceros.

The administration of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,

which took office in l$6k, announced, that the problem of the

braceros was receiving intensive study under the direction

-^Hispanic American Report, XVI, No. 6 (August, 1963), 5^8.

36-Ibid.

106

of Antonio Carillo Flores. Besides the unemployment created

in Mexico, one of the major fears expressed by Diaz Ordaz

was that the ending of the bracero program would increase

wetback migration to the United States. He and Carillo

Flores urged the United States to take every effort to

37 prevent an upsurge in the illegal migration.

37 The New York Times, December 16, 196^, p. 16.

CHAPTER V

THE POST-BRACERO ERA, 1964-1966:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

When Public Law 78 lapsed without renewal on December 31,

196^, the contract labor systems with Mexico which had been

in effect for over a twenty-year period ended. Many persons

who had consistently supported the practice of importing

foreign labor predicted dire consequences for the American

agriculturax system. Having relied on braceros for several

years, they did not believe domestic migrants would perforin,

stoop labor. And they believed the lack of workers would

result m crops perishing in the fields, creating higher

retail prices for many farm products. On the other hand,

some groups hailed the termination of the bracero pact as a

progressive step toward improving the conditions of do-

mestic migrant workers. Secretary of Labor Wirtz hailed

the oeginning of a ". . . new era in a major segment of

American agriculture . . . " and stated that the time of the

government-sponsored, "guaranteed and assured" farm labor

3

supply had ended. Although no one familiar with the

seasonal farm labor prob]em would agree that the new era

nad fully arrived, the year 1965 represented the transition

1 The New York Times, March 29, 1965, p, 1.

10?

108

from reliance on foreign labor to dependency on domestics.

The transition occurred without major difficulties, but it

produced interesting results. In a lengthy and detailed

study submitted to the public in early 19 6 6 , the Secretary

reported the significant events of the preceding year.

During 19^5 there was an 83 per cent reduction in the

use of all foreign farm laborers, with the major change

occurring in the use of Mexican nationals. There were only

20,300 Mexican workers employed in the United States in

1965. compared with 1 7 8 , 0 0 0 at different times in 196^,

Whereas braceros worked in seven states in 196^, California

was the only state using Mexican nationals in 1965. And

the 20,300 in that state naturally were not admitted under

Public Law 78, but under the Immigration and Nationality

Act of 1952 (Public Law ^lk).2

• According to the previsions of Public Law klk, if the

Secretary of Labor certifies a labor shortage, foreign

workers can be imported. With the termination of Public

Law 78, many growers wanted to continue contracting under

the Immigration and Nationality Act, but Wirtz destroyed

their hopes. Although he never flatly refused to authorize

foreign laborers In proven emergencies, Wirtz stated in

2 'U. S., Department of Labor, "Year of Transition:

Seasonal Farm Labor, 1965" (Washington, i960), pp. 5~S. Hereafter cited as "Year of Transition, 1965."

109

March, 1965, that large-scale admission o'f workers would not

3

be revived under Public Law '4lk,'

The Department of Labor, prior to Wirtz's statement,

established certain criteria regulating the importation of

workers under Public Law klk. The new regulations established

a minimum wage that had to be offered to domestics before

the need for foreign labor could be certified. Prom January

through March, 19^5 > the wage ranged from 90 cents to $1-25

per hour, but effective in April, the rates were $1,15 to

$1.^0 per hour. In addition, any employer desiring foreign

labor first had to provide housing and transportation, and

meet all the terms end conditions of employment extended, to

Mexicans under the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 > including

its subsequent amendments. One important provision was

that no worker contracted under Public law hlk could remain k

in the United States more thai: 120 days. The stipulation

was included on the grounds that the only justification for

importing foreign workers was to harvest crops which easily

spoiled if not harvested quickly.

Several complications have arisen in the administration

of Public Law As previously noted, before the Secretary

of labor certifies the need of foreign laborers, prospective

employers must prove that 8 labor shortage definitely exists - The Mew York Times. March 29* 19o5> p. 1* h "I'ear of Transition; 1965," Appendix II, pp. 7-8.

110

and that failure to fill it could result in crop losses.

California growers were the only group who adequately

demonstrated a need for labor. When Wirtz allowed foreign

labor to enter California, he received criticism from

states which had previously used braceros, but'had been

denied similar authorization. Senator John Tower (R., Tex.)

claimed that his state had the same farm problems as did

California, and he urged the Secretary to !!. . . readmit

Texas to his special union of states and to apply his

5

Bracero remedy nationwide without discrimination."

One of the major difficulties in administering Public

Law is the overlapping authority between the Secretary

of Labor and the Attorney General. The former may certify

the need for foreign labor, but the Attorney General makes

the final determination of whether it will be admitted.

In May, 19o5» Wirtz denied Florida laborers from the British

West Indies, but his decision was overruled by Attorney

General Nicholas Katzenbach.^ Fearing the renexml of

massive foreign recruitment, pressure groups in the country

voiced their disapproval of the Attorney General's decision.

Andrew J. Biemiller, director of the legislation department

of the AFL-CIO, urged that the Secretary of Labor be given

more responsibility in determining whether laborers could

- The Dallas Times Herald, April 29, 1965. P> 6

6The New York Times, May 23, 1965. P. 59.

Ill

enter the country. He pointed out that the conflict between

the Justice and Labor Departments indicated the need for a

7

clearer division of authority with regard to the matter.

Others who thought the Secretary of Labor possessed

too much authority and who disliked his strict enforcement

of Public Law klk wanted the Secretary of Agriculture to

determine the need for foreign laborers. They felt that

the Secretary of Agriculture would be more considerate of

the growers' needs. Long-time supporter of the bracero

program Senator Spessard L. Holland (D., Fla.) introduced

a bill which would have transferred this authority to the

Department of Agriculture. The Senate Committee on Agri-

culture and Forestry reported the bill favorably, but

during debates Senator Ross Bass (D., Tenri.) introduced an

amendment which allowed the Secretary of Labor to continue

to determine the need for workers. When the bill came

before the Senate, it was deadlocked in a 4 5 to 45 tie;

however, Vice-President Hubert Humpnrey cast the deciding 8

vote for the Bass amendment.

The termination of Public Law 78 and the curtailed

influx of workers under Public Law klk have noticeably

affected the situation of the domestic farm worker. In 19&5

there was an average monthly increase of about 200,000 native

^The Dallas Morning News, June 9, 19 6 S, p. 3A-

^£h", HSJS I?rk Times, September 3> 1965*. P* 1^5 September 12," 19&5. P» 53; September 1^, 19»5> P- 18,

112

workers in fields previously harvested by foreign labor.

As a result, over 100,000 American workers who otherwise

9

might have Deen unemployed had jobs. At the same time,

hourly wage rates for agricultural work rose from $1.08 in

196^ to $1.1^ in 1965» The raise of six cents was the 1 0

largest increase recorded in any year since the mid-1950' s . 7

The effect of the transition from foreign to domestic

/ workers has been less damaging and less catastrophic to

\

crops than the growers' prediction. The only crop losses ;

in 1965 which were directly attributable to the unavaila """*

bility of labor were the asparagus crops near Stockton,

California, strawberries in the area of Salinas, California,

and pickling cucumbers in Michigan. In the latter situation,

if growers had accepted the termination of Public Law 78 as

fact and had taken steps to recruit domestics, some 'of the

11

loss could have been avoided. According to statistics

compiled by the Labor Department, " . . . the total of even

the claimed losses due to labor shortage in 196.5 i-s

estimated at less than | of 1 per cent of the value this 12

year of crops which foreign labor worked on in 196^."

Commenting on the fact that domestics filled most vacancies,

^"Year of Transition, 1965," p. 10.

I 0 "Ibid., p. 19.

II Ibid., p. 17•

^Ibid. , p. 15.

113

Wirtz said that 1965 dispelled the ". . . false notion that

'Americans won't do stoop labor' /which/ was carefully

nurtured from the truer fact that they won't work for stoop

wages."

From the other point of view, however, not all growers

felt that their labor needs were satisfied. The Tri-Valley

Growers' Association in California complained that the lack

of skilled domestics caused a high crop loss. The Association

announced that it would set up a plant in Mexico to process

and can tomatoes and asparagus. Spokesmen for the Association

said that the action was necessary because labor shortages

in the United States caused a decline in tomato production.

This move on the part of the Association possibly indicated

that United States farm investments in Mexico would increase

lf

sharply as a result of the bracero ban.

The adjustment of California, a state which regularly

employed large numbers of braceros, demonstrates specifically

the problems and the results of the 19'$5 transition period. """-.

The initial reaction of many growers was to refuse to hire

domestics because they objected to the quality of the workers. /

This attitude was reflected when growers in the Imperial

Valley cancelled an order to the State Department of Em-

ployment for 1,800 domestic workers. They complained that '^Ibid. , p. 1.

1 /l The Dallas Morning News, September 6, 19&5< P- 9A.

13>

the " . . . calibre of workers being referred to us these

past few days will make our harvest problem even greater

than the impending labor shortages.""^

Representatives of the growers continued to exert

pressure on Wirtz to certify a labor shortage in California.

Finally the Secretary appointed a three-man panel to evaluate

the actual need for labor. The panel was composed of

Benjamin Aaron, professor of law at the University of

California and director of the Institute of Industrial and

Labor Relations; Daniel Aldrich, chancellor of the University

of California at Irvine and formerly dean of agriculture; and

Arthur Ross, professor of business .administration at . .-\

Berkeley. In its first report, the-, panel recommended that

some Mexicans be allowed to enter for a short time to help

harvest asparagus and strawberries. Following the report,

wo

16

Wirt?: certified workers for the San Joaquin Valley and the

Monterrey areas.

At the end of 1965. the panel submitted a comprehensive

report and analysis of California's farm situation. They

considered the shift from foreign laborers to domestics to

be successful for both growers and workers. There was a

noticeable rise in the employment of domestics, 20,000 more

finding jobs in 1965 than in 196^. Domestics accounted for

^The New York-Times, January 1, 19^5> P- 12.

"^Ibid. , April 16 April 25. 1965. P- 31-

^Ibid., April 16, 1965. P. 26; April 26, 1965, p. 3^;

115 '

97.3 per cent of the man-years of seasonal hired labor, and

foreign laborers provided only 2.7 per cent. These figures

contrasted sharply with the 1959 to 1964 averages, which

indicated that American laborers provided 73*7 per cent of

the total man-years compared with 26.3 per cent worked by

17

foreign laborers.

The report conceded that some crop losses had occurred

in the asparagus and strawberry fields because of the labor

shortages. But these crops paid the lowest wages in the

state. Even with the losses, growers did not suffer extreme

financial reversals. In fact, strawberry growers grossed 5

per cent more than in the period 1959 to 1964. Asparagus

growers grossed $1 million more than in 1964, a figure only 1 R

slightly lower than the increases from 1959 to 1964.

Even though the situation of domestic agricultural-

workers improved in California with regard to wages and

available jobs, the panel members agreed that much improve-

ment was still necessary. They echoed Wirtz's remark that

transition did not equal fulfillment of objectives, and they

stated that agricultural wage rates for domestic labor were

still not competitive with many other industries. Also many

improvements were needed in the area of providing trans-

portation and adequate housing for^domestic migrant workers."^ ^'Ye,

Ikii

Ibid., p. 31.

'Year of Transition, 1965," Appendix I, pp. 1, 9.

l^lbid,, p. 2.

19

1 1 6 •

The termination of Public Law ?8 has, of course, had

its effect on Mexico. The thought in Mexico initially was

that the ban on bracercs was only temporary and that the

contracting system would be revived. Therefore, much

attention was focused on the actions of cotton', fruit, and

vegetable growers of California and Texas in hope that

pressure from these groups would cause a renewal of the

20

program.

When no action had been taken in that direction by

February, 19^5> the subject of renewal was naturally dis- /•

cussed by the Fifth Interparliamentary Reunion between the

United States and Mexico, held at La Paz, capital of Baja ;

California. Heading the American delegation was Senator

John J. Sparkman (D., Ala.). Other members were Senate

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), George Aiken

(R,, Vt.), and Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), chairman of the

Latin American subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee. Aside from agreeing that the bracero problem

could not be settled immediately, no other action was taken.

The Mexican delegation put forth i cs traditional requirement that fair treatment be given to all workers should the

21 program be renewed.

20,

21

The New York Tines, -January 3> 1965. P- 5^«

Ibid-. February 21, 1965. p. 31 •

11?

Since one of the phenomena of twentieth-century Mexico

has "been its advancement in the area of economic progress,

it would appear unusual that the Mexican government would

still be amenable to a program which permitted a yearly

exodus of thousands of agricultural workers to the United

States. Such a migration definitely hurts national pride

for it indicates that severe unsolved problems coexisted <

with the rapid steps taken toward economic progress. But i

in the midst of the economic advancements, agriculture re-

mains as one of the inherent problems of Mexico.

Basically, there are two systems of agriculture in

Mexico, one centered around subsistence farming and the

other on high-volume production. The crux of the problem

is the highly fragmented, subsistence farms prevalent

throughout the country. These small plots of land are

unsuitable for mechanization or for effective cultivation.

Even if the land were large enough to employ power-driven

machinery, farmers are usually tradition-bound; and they

fear to take the necessary risks involved in accepting and

implementing new techniques. As a result of the primitive

22

farming methods, the soil becomes increasingly eroded.

The second system of farming involves the production

of non-cereal crops such as cotton, coffee, and sugar cane,

9 9 Henry G. Aubrey, "Structure and Balance in Rapid

Economic Growth: The Example of Mexico," The Political Science Quarterly, LXIX (December, 195'+). 538.'

118

and it is within this system that most of the progress in

agriculture has occurred. In 1955 non-cereal production

accounted for only 27 per cent of the total tilled acreage

and comprised 68 per cent of the total value of production.2^

Cereal production, or the traditional highly fragmented

farms, in the same year accounted for 73 Per cent of the

total tilled acreage but only 30 cent of the total value

2k

of production. It is evident that efforts to improve the

agricultural situation in Mexico should have been directed

toward the small farms which maintain the largest number of

families but which account for the smallest output; yet

available resources have not been channeled into the area.

Most of the "crash" programs to aid agriculture have been

aimed at the large commercial farms in northern and Pacific

northwest Mexico which maintain only 26 per cent of the 2^

total rural population. ^ Central Mexico, plagued by the

largest number of subsistence farms and supplying the

majority of braceros, maintained ^3 pe*' cent of the total

rural population, yet did not receive attention in the aid

program.2^ "-'Richard C. Hancock, 'The Role of the Bracero in the

Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: A Case Study of Chihuahua ("Stanford, 1959T7 P. 33- Hereafter cited as Hancock, "Role of the Bracero."

2l|Ibid.

2%bid.

2bIbid.

119

Rural Mexico suffers from underemployment, which

accounts not only for the "bracero's exodus but also for the

internal rural-to-urban migration." A 1959 study by the

Mexican Department of Agrarian Affairs revealed that over

one-half of Mexico's labor force, or approximately 5>000.000

workers who were engaged in agricultural activities were

28

employed for only lk$ days a year or less. Rapid in-

dustrialization and urbanization have produced some

redistribution of the labor force, but the change has not

alleviated the widespread underemployment in the rural

areas. The agricultural work force has seen some reduction,

but since 1930 it has continued to .increase in absolute

terms.^ In 19^0 agriculture employed 3.830,971 persons

and accounted for 65.^ per cent of the labor force. By

1950 the number of persons engaged in agriculture was

'1,828,901 or 58.3 Per cent of the total laboring force.

One can see the decline in relative terms but the increase

in absolute figures. In 196^, the year the bracero program

was terminated, it was estimated that more than 2,000,000

peasants could leave agriculture without causing a drop in 30

the volume of production or the output rate. 09 Arthur Neef, Labor in Mexico, U. S. Department of

Labor Report No. 251 (Washington, 1963), p. 39-28Ibid., P- ^0-

29Adolf Sturmthal, "Economic Development. Income Distribution and Capital Formation in Mexico," The Journal of Political Economy, LXI1I (June, 1955)> 185.

J Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 0 (August, l963-l9#rrT"595." " '

120

Since Mexico was faced with seemingly overwhelming

obstacles, statements by Mexican governmental officials

continued to reflect two objectives throughout 1965= to

provide workers to the United States and to obtain guarantees

for the workers. This position was clearly outlined by the

Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Hugo Margain, in

an address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. He

stated, "We have farm workers ready and are willing to

cooperate . . . but the creditation must be settled legally

after the need is established and the working conditions and

31

rates are agreed upon,"-^

The farm workers were indeed ready and eager to work

in the United States, and few of them could recognize the

difference between recruitment procedures under the expired

Public Law ?8 and those under Public Law klk. They con-

tinued to congregate in the Ciudadela Plaza in Mexico City,

the recruitment center under Public Law ?8. Although

Mexican officials repeatedly told the men that the United

States was not importing laborers, often as many as 3,000

men crowded into the plaza. On 'one occasion, police used

tear gas and billy clubs to disperse them when residents 32

near the plaza, complained that the men were a menace.

-^The Dallas Morning News, May 7> 196.5, Sec. 2, p. 9«

-^"Ibid. , June 6, 1965. p. 12. See also, The New York Times, May 1?, 1965, p. 18.

121

Many prospective braceros who were unwilling to wait

for recruitment under Public Lav; klk resorted to the familiar

tactic of illegally entering the United States. According ;

to a recent survey by the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS), it was estimated that approximately 1,000

illegal immigrants were working in southeastern Colorado.

A spokesman for the INS stated that all wetbacks apprehended

were stripped of their wages before being returned to

Mexico. By this action, the INS hoped to deter the Mexicans .

33

from attempting to re-enter the United States. ^

Probably wetback migration will not reach the intensity

of the 1950's, but quite possibly the punitive action of the

INS will not bo completely successful in curbing the entry

of illegal aliens. Despite the rapid industrialization

occurring in Mexico, the United States still holds forth the

promise of higher wages. To some workers, the prospect of

gaining these wages may outweigh the possibility of arrest

by the INS. Meanwhile the unemployed peasant farmers con-

stitute a restive and potentially disruptive element beneath 34

the fa cede of social peace in Mexico, ^

One can only speculate whether a contract labor system

similar to the one conducted under Public. Law 78 will ever

be renewed. Undoubtedly some farm groups within the country

- 'The Dallas Times Herald, August 11, 1966, p. 35-

34, The New York Times, June 9> 1966, p. 14; June 11, 1966, p. 10.

122

would support legislation designed to revive the system,

and the Mexican government might also be receptive. But

there are certain factors which seem to militate against

any future renewal of a contract labor system.

Among the factors is the effective nationwide re-

cruitment of domestic workers accomplished by the Department

of Labor in the 19^5 harvest period. Through pre-season 1

planning which located potential reserves of domestic .

workers, catastrophic crop losses resulting from labor

shortages were avoided. Since the 19^5 experience indicated

that sufficient laborers could be provided by massive

nationwide programs, growers in coming harvest seasons will \

J

have little basis for arguing that laborers are not avail-able./' i

A striking example of the long-range recruitment procedure ~-J

occurred in the sugarbeet fields.

Pre-season planning by agents of the Department of

Labor in ccnjunction with area growers began in early fall

of 196^. On May ?, 19^5» &• few days before harvest

operations were to begin, growers presented a request for

^,230 Mexican nationals. But the Department of Labor

denied the requests on the grounds that domestics were

available. Within a week, the orders for foreign laborers

3 had been filled with domestic migrants.

3 S •^E. C. iiancock, "Domestic Workers for Sugarbeets,"

Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 17.

123

Similar activities took place in Texas and Arkansas.

In the latter state a three-man recruitment team publicized

the need for workers in newspapers and over local radio

stations. There were no reported crop losses because of

labor shortages.Texas' successful harvesting of crops

with domestic laborers in part resulted from the expanded

activities of the Texas Employment Commission. The agency

enlarged its recruiting staffs and employed mobile teams

37

for special labor drives.

Perhaps one of the most decisive factors hindering

renewal of the contract system is the increased mechaniza-

tion taking place on modern farms. The change to machine,

harvesting will curtail the need not only for foreign

workers but also for domestic laborers. The cotton har-

vesting machine reduced the demand for workers in the late j

1950's and early 1960's. Since that time, other machines

have been developed. For example, experimentation is being

conducted with a machine which will harvest asparagus.

Although not expected to be in operation for several years,

the machine, if perfected, can harvest a forty-acre field OO

in one day. Already being used are machines which greatly

36 JULloyd E. Curtis, "Using Seasonal Farm Recruiters in

Arkansas," Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 23.

37 ^ William J. Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros," Em-

ployment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 39-^0. Hereafter cited as Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros."

O Q Gerald ¥. Rowland, "Asparagus Harvest Mechanization,"

Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 16.

12b

automate the harvesting process of cantaloupes and cucumbers.

In the case of cantaloupes, the melons are loaded onto a

conveyor, thereby eliminating the need for each worker to

carry a heavy load, and allowing women and children to work

in the melon fields.

Many growers based their hope for renewal of the bracero

program on the anticipated rise in retail food prices which

they felt would result from increased labor costs. Although

there were some increases in consumer prices, a study of the

California fresh fruit and vegetable market revealed that

the price of only asparagus and strawberries rose sharply

in 1965.^ Asparagus was 7 cents a pound above the 196^

prices, and strawberry prices rose 3-8 cents per pound in

1965. The study noted only moderate increases in other

crops. The price of lemons rose only 2.k cents per pound;

tomatoes rose a cent or less; and lettuce rose 0.9 cent

over the previous year. The retail price- for celery actually

dropped during 19^5« Since no sharp increase in retail

prices resulted from higher labor costs, efforts to improve

the plight of domestic farmworkers will undoubtedly continue.

Meanwhile the supporters of the contract labor system

will have to seek other ways of demonstrating the necessity

of importing foreign labor. Their task is becoming more

39 Hood, "Texas Replaces the Braceros," pp. 55> ^0.

4 0 Irving Cohen, "Farm Labor Costs and Food Prices

196^-1965," Employment Servj ce Review, III, No. 3 (March, 1966), 62.

125

difficult since the attention of Congress is currently-

focused on providing improved social and economic opportunities

for Americans. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that the ad-

vocates of the bracero program will be successful in their

4- 1

efforts to revive the labor system.

In May, 1966, the House of Representatives voted to ex-

tend minimum wage coverage to certain types of domestic farm-

workers;^ and at present (September 1, 1966) Senate

approval of the minimum wage bill indicates that steps are

being taken to provide better working conditions for farm-

workers. Renewal of the contract labor system, a program

which depressed farm wages for several years, is not con-

sistent with the present liberal trends in Congress.

Considering the events since the termination of the

bracero program in 196^, the proponents of the program would

meet major roadblocks in attempting to renew the contract

system. The importation of Mexican laborers aided the United

States in time of national emergency, such as World War II,

when actual labor shortages existed. However, when domestic

laborers were available, the contract system perpetuated- it-

self through habit rather than through need.

U1

' xFor additional information on this aspect of the struggle for renewal see- the following article: Ellis W. Hawlev, "The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-1965?" Agricultural History, XL, No. 3 (July, 1966), 157-176.

^ T h e Mew York Times, May 27, 1966, p. 1. According to the provisions of T h e House bill, laborers on farms employ;ng seven or more workers and members of migratory labor crews will be covered by a minimum wage. By 1969> the wage will reach a top of $1.30 per hour..

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Cline, Howard F. , The United. States and Mexico, New York, Atheneum, 19^3 •

Fisher, Lloyd H., The Harvest Labor Market in California, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953•

Gamio, Manuel, Mexican Iranjuration to the United States: A Study of Human Migration and Adjustment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930•

Hancock, Richard C., The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: A Case Study of Ch ihuahua, Stanford, Hispanic American Society, 1959.

Jones, Robert C., Mexican War Workers in the United States; The Mexico-United States Manpower Recruiting Progrsin and Its Operation, Washington, Pan-Aneilean Union, 19^5 •

McBride, John G., Vanishing Bracero: Valley Revolution, San Antonio, The Naylor Company, 19^3.

Rasmussen, Wayne D., A Hi story of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 19^3-19^-7. Monograph No. 33» Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•

Schwartz, Harry, Seasonal Farm Labor In the United States, New York, Columbia University Press,-19^5•

Whetten, Nathan, Rural Mexico, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 19S.

Articles

"Agriculture Labor Relations—The Other Farm Problem," Stanford Law Review, XIV (December, 19ol), 120-1-+9.

Aubrey, Henry G., "Structure and Balance in Rapid Economic Growth: The Example of Mexico," The Political Science Quarterly, LXIX (December, 195^),"517-Wo* '

127

Coalson, George 0., "Mexican Contract Labor in American Agriculture," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIII (December, 1932") 7 228-238.

Cohen, Irving, "Farm Labor Costs and Food Prices 196^-1965,11

Employment Service Review, III, No. 3 (March, 1 9 6 6 ) , 58-62.

Curtis, Lloyd E., "Using Seasonal Farm Recruiters in Arkansas," Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, i960) ," 23.

Eckels, R. P., "Hungry Workers, Ripe Crops, and the Non-Existent Mexican Border," The Reporter, X (April 13, 195*0, 2 8 - 3 2 . ~ ~

Gilmore, N. Ray and Gladys W. Gilmore, "The Bracero in California," The Paoific Historical Review, XXII (August, 196377 235-282. —

Hancock, E. C., "Domestic Workers for Sugarbeets," Employment Service Review, III, No. 1 (J'anaary, 1966) , 1?-19» 31-

Hawley, Ellis ¥., "The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 19 50-1965." Agr 1 cul tural Hi s toj",y, XL, No, 3 (July, 1966), 157-176: " ~ ~ "

Hayes, Edward, "'Operation Wetback'---Impact on the Border States," Employment Security Heview, XXII (March, 1.9 35). 1 6 - 2 1 .

Hispanic American Report, 1963-196^.

Hood, William J., "Texas Replaces the Braceros," Employment Service Review," III, No. 1 (January, 1966), 39-^0, 50-

Kayer, Arnold, "The Grapes of Wrath, Vintage 1961," The Reporter, XXIV (January-June, 1961), 3^-36.

Rowland, Gerald W., "Asparagus Harvest Mechanization," Emnloynent Service Review, III, No. 1 (January, 1966), lB. ~ "

Scruggs, Otey M., "The Bracero Program under the Farm Security Administration, 19^2.-19^3»" Labor History. Ill (Spring, 1 9 6 2 ) , 14-9-168, " " " " '

, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 19^2," Agricultural History, XXXIV (July, i 9 6 0 ) , 1 ^ 0 - 1 ^ 9 .

12t

"Texas and the Bracero Program, 19^2-19^7." The Pacific Historical Review, XXXII (August, 1962), 251-2^K — ""

, "The United States, Mexico, and the Wet-back, 19^2-19^7»" The Pad fic Historical Review, IV (May, 1961), 316-329.

Spradlin, T. Richard, "The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program—Review and' Reform," The George Washington Law Review, XXX (October, 1961, and. December, 19<d1) , 8 --121, 311-327.

Sturmthai, Adolf, "Economic Development, Income Distribution and Capital Formation in Mexico," The Journal of Political Economy, LXIII (June, 19551, 183-201.

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Public Documents

Congre s 3 iona'l Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session; 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951. 196^,

U. S., Department of Labor, Arthur Neef, Labor in Mexico Report, No. 2^1, Washington, Government Printing Office, I9T3: \

, "Employment of Foreign Workers ~ in 1962," Farm Labor Clarket Developments (February, I963)., 1-20.""

, "Employment of Foreign Workers Tn 1963." Fara Labor Market Developments (January, 196*0 , 1-^0

, Mexican Farm Labor Program: Consultants Report, Washington, Government Printing Of flceT 19.59

_ , "Review and Outlook," Farm Labor Market Developments (January, 1964-), 1-bO.

, Year of Transition: Seasonal Labor, 1 9 ? Washington, Government Printing

Officej" T966,

129

U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The American Republics, Vols. VI (1952), VI (19^3) » Washington, Government. Printing Office, 1962-1965'

U. S., House of Representatives, Conference Report, Im-portation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, Report No. 668, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953•

' , House Document No. 192, 82.nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951. -

, Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, Report No. ^26 to Accompany H. R. 3283, Parts I and II, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951 •

, One Year Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program, Report No. 722. to Accompany H. R. 81*95, Parts I and II, 88 th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963.

, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•

U. S., President, Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951•

, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Containing the PubIIc Messages, Speeches. and Statements of the President, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952.

U. S., Senate, Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers, Report No. 2.14, to A'ccompany S. 984, Parts I arid II, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951*

U, S.t Statutes at Large, Vols. LVI, LVII, LVIII, LXI, LXII, LXV.

United States Treat!es and Other Internatlonal Agreements, Vol, I, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951»

130

Unpublished Materials

Pfeiffer, David G., "The Mexican Farm Labor Supply Program--Its Friends and Foes," unpublished, master's thesis, Department of History, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1963*

Sabghir, Irving H., "Mexican Contract Labor in the United States, 19^-8-19531" unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953-

Tomasek, Robert D., "The Political and Economic Implications of Mexican Labor in the United Stages under the Non-Quota System, Labor Program, and Wetback Movement," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1957-

Newspapers

The Dallas Morning News, 19^5•

The Dallas Times Herald, 19 65-

The New York Times, 1951-195^; 1959"19°6-