of asia policy - the national bureau of asian...

the national bureau of asian research

asia

polic

y

asia policy

seattle, washington 98105

http://asiapolicy.nbr.orghttp://www.nbr.org

1414 ne 42nd street, suite 300


jan

ua

ry 2018

the national bureauof asian research

volume 13 u number 1

131

The CCP’s Use of Homophonous Pen Names David Gitter and Leah Fang

Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?

Derek Grossman

roundtable

The Strategic Implications of Russia-China RelationsAngela Stent, Yu Bin, Alexander Lukin, Tomohiko Uyama,

Hiroshi Yamazoe, and Robert Sutter

Terence Roehrig’s Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella:

Deterrence After the Cold War

book review roundtable

january 2018

China and the Strategic Imperative for the United StatesCharles Boustany and Richard J. Ellings

articles and essays

Muthiah AlagappaInstitute of Strategic and

International Studies Malaysia

Michael ArmacostStanford University

Richard BushBrookings Institution

Steve ChanUniversity of Colorado,

Boulder

Jinwoo ChoiHanyang University

Thomas ChristensenPrinceton University

Eliot CohenJohns Hopkins University

Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise

Institute

Elizabeth EconomyCouncil on Foreign

Relations

Richard Ellings (co-chairman)

The National Bureau of Asian Research

Aaron FriedbergPrinceton University

Paul GodwinNational War College

(ret.)

Michael GreenCenter for Strategic and

International Studies

Stephen HansonCollege of William and

Mary

Harry HardingUniversity of Virginia

Robert HefnerBoston University

David KangUniversity of Southern

California

Mark KatzGeorge Mason University

David LamptonJohns Hopkins University

Nicholas LardyPeterson Institute for

International Economics

Chae-Jin LeeClaremont McKenna

College

Steven LewisRice University

Cheng LiBrookings Institution

Kenneth LieberthalBrookings Institution

Kimberly MartenBarnard College

Barrett McCormickMarquette University

Rory MedcalfNational Security College,

Australian National University

Rajan MenonCity College of New York,

City University of New York

Vali NasrJohns Hopkins University

Marcus NolandPeterson Institute for

International Economics

Margaret PearsonUniversity of Maryland

Minxin Pei Claremont McKenna

College

T.J. PempelUniversity of California,

Berkeley

Dwight PerkinsHarvard University

Kenneth Pyle (co-chairman)

University of Washington (emeritus)

Lawrence ReardonUniversity of

New Hampshire

Robert RossBoston College

Richard SamuelsMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

Andrew ScobellRAND Corporation

David ShambaughGeorge Washington

University

Susan ShirkUniversity of California,

San Diego

Sheldon SimonArizona State University

Robert SutterGeorge Washington

University

Richard SuttmeierUniversity of Oregon

(emeritus)

Michael SwaineCarnegie Endowment for

International Peace

See Seng TanS. Rajaratnam School of


Ashley TellisCarnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Robert WadeLondon School of

Economics and Political Science

Vincent WangIthaca College

editorial board

asia policy• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •

a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific

Brendan TaylorCoral Bell School of International Affairs,

Australian National University

C. Christine FairGeorgetown University

Younkyoo KimCenter for Energy

Governance and Security

Mark FrazierThe New School

Bhubhindar SinghS. Rajaratnam School of


Michael WillsThe National Bureau of

Asian Research

editorial advisory committee

C. Christine Fair and Mark W. Frazier editors

Jessica Keough managing editor

Joshua Ziemkowski copy and style editor

Matthew Newton, Tim White, and Connor Whitney copyeditors

Georgetown University The New School

editors

asia policyvolume 13, number 1 • january 2018

Contents

publisher’s note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Richard J. Ellings

u roundtable u

The Strategic Implications of Russia-China Relations: Regional Perspectives

introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Brian Franchell

the sino-russian partnership and its impact on u .s . policy toward russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Angela Stent

between past and future: implications of sino-russian relations for the united states . . . . . . . . 12Yu Bin

a russian perspective on the sino-russian rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Alexander Lukin

sino-russian coordination in central asia and implications for u .s . and japanese policies . . . . . . 26Tomohiko Uyama

sino-russian cooperation from the perspective of the u .s .-japan alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Hiroshi Yamazoe

america’s bleak view of russia-china relations . . . . . . 39Robert Sutter

u special essay u

china and the strategic imperative for the united states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Charles Boustany and Richard J. Ellings

This essay examines the implications of China’s rise and calls on the United States to reassume a leadership role in Asia by executing a grand strategy that is fully cognizant of political, historical, economic, and strategic realities.

u articles u

the chinese communist party’s use of homophonous pen names: an open-source open secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69David Gitter and Leah Fang

This article examines the evolving commentary system in the People’s Republic of China that utilizes homophonous pen names to transmit official Chinese Communist Party views and assesses the system’s utility as a credible information source for foreign analysts.

can vietnam’s military stand up to china in the south china sea? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Derek Grossman

This article examines Vietnam’s warfighting capabilities for defending its disputed claims with China in the South China Sea.

u book review roundtable u

Terence Roehrig’sJapan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella:


the dangers of decoupling in northeast asia . . . . . . .136Daniel Sneider

are current u .s . extended deterrence approaches sustainable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Zack Cooper

the limited roles of u .s . nuclear deterrence in northeast asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143Se Young Jang

author’s response: the paradox of the u .s . nuclear umbrella—reassurance, credibility, and an unusable military option . . . . . . . 148Terence Roehrig

[ v ]

publisher’s note

T welve years ago, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)established Asia Policy as a new initiative to “bridge the gap” between

academic research and policymaking. Since then, in print and online, the journal has offered policy-relevant content on the Asia-Pacific and U.S.-Asia relations in a variety of formats, including articles, policy essays, roundtables, and book reviews.

This first issue of 2018 marks an exciting transition for the journal: a shift from biannual to quarterly publication. Beginning this year, Asia Policy will be published in January, April, July, and October. The numbering of the journal is also changing to reflect this new publication schedule. The volume number, 13 in this case, represents the number of years we have been in publication, and the issue number corresponds to the quarter of the year. It is our hope that increasing the frequency of publication will allow us to be more responsive to the journal’s audience as well as to important developments in Asia.

Peer review remains now, as then, an important component of vetting article and essay submissions to the journal, ensuring they are judged solely on their scholarly merits and promote the highest-caliber research. Other content in each issue is organized by the journal’s editorial team—special essays are invited contributions and roundtables consist of collections of essays offering an array of arguments on a topic from different perspectives and academic backgrounds.

Over the years the journal has grown in reach and impact. Asia Policy has joined a number of electronic distribution platforms to improve access in libraries and institutions, including Project MUSE, Ebsco, ProQuest, and most recently JSTOR. In 2014, NBR began building a consortium of like-minded policy research institutions from countries in the Asia-Pacific to help support the journal and expand its audience in the region. The Asia Policy Consortium currently includes the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University (ANU), and the Center for Energy Governance and Security (EGS) at Hanyang University in South Korea. These partners play a valuable role in the journal’s development by contributing to roundtable content and promoting Asia Policy in their respective countries.

It has been my privilege to have led the founding of the journal and to have remained involved in its development for the past twelve years.

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Just as it began, Asia Policy remains an important, exciting, and ambitious project to serve as a venue for exchanges between the academic and the policymaking communities. With this shift to quarterly publication, we look forward to facilitating even more research and analysis on the most important region in the world—the Asia-Pacific.

Richard J. EllingsPresidentThe National Bureau of Asian Research

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guidelines for submission

Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific. The journal publishes peer-reviewed research articles and policy essays, special essays, roundtables on policy-relevant topics and recent publications, and book review essays, as well as other occasional formats.

I. General RequirementsAsia Policy welcomes the submission of policy-relevant research on important issues in the Asia-Pacific. The journal will consider two main types of submissions for peer review: research articles that present new information, theoretical frameworks, or arguments and draw clear policy implications; and policy essays that provide original, persuasive, and rigorous analysis. Authors or editors interested in having a book considered for review should submit a copy of the book to the managing editor at NBR, 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300, Seattle, Washington 98105. Submissions may be sent to <[email protected]>.

Asia Policy requires that all submitted manuscripts have not been previously published in any form, either in part or in whole, and are not currently under consideration by any other organization. All prior use of arguments found in the manuscript—whether for publication in English or any other language—must be properly footnoted at the time of submission. The author should also describe the background of the manuscript upon submission of the first draft, including whether the manuscript or any component parts have been presented at conferences or have appeared online.

II. Manuscript Format

• The manuscript should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font with 1.5-line spacing. Research articles should range from 8,000 to 12,000 words, and policy essays should range from 4,000 to 6,000 words.

asia policy• http://asiapolicy .nbr .org •


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asia policy

• In order to be easily accessible to policymakers, each manuscript must include (1) a Title Page, (2) a one-page Executive Summary, and (3) a concise introduction according to the requirements listed below.

1) The Title Page should include only the article title, author’s name, a list of five keywords, and a short biographical statement (under 50 words) that lists the author’s e-mail address.

2) To help bridge the policy and academic communities, each submission must include a one-page Executive Summary of approximately 275 words that contains:• a Topic Statement• the Main Argument• the Policy Implications

A sample Executive Summary is provided in Section III below.

3) The introduction of all NBR publications should not exceed two pages in length and should plainly describe: • the specific question that the paper seeks to answer• the policy importance of the question• the main argument/findings of the paper

• Tables and figures should be placed at the end of the document, with “[Insert Table X here]” inserted in the text at the appropriate locations. Do not include tables and figures in the introduction. All figures and maps should be provided in electronic form.

• Authors are encouraged to consult recent issues of Asia Policy for guidance on style and formatting. For matters of style (including footnotes), NBR largely follows the 16th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

III. Sample Executive Summary

This essay examines the linkages between China’s national economy and foreign policy over the past 30 years, and assesses the claim that Chinese foreign policy has undergone an important shift in which domestic demand for energy and other raw materials heavily influence foreign policy decisions.

main argument

Assessments of Chinese foreign policy intentions and goals often conclude that the need to gain more reliable access to oil and other natural resources is a central aim of Chinese foreign policy and overall strategic considerations. This essay argues that the coherence of China’s economic goals and the coordination needed to achieve them are eroding as multiple competing interests within the Chinese polity emerge to pursue and protect power and resources. This fragmentation of economic policy into multiple competing agendas has to be understood alongside assessments that resource needs drive Chinese foreign policy. The essay first surveys how shifting economic priorities have influenced Chinese foreign policy over the past 30 years. A second section discusses China’s shift from an export-led, resource-dependent growth model to one that is more balanced toward domestic consumption. The essay concludes by noting that China’s search for a rebalanced economy and for a new growth model creates opportunities and constraints on Chinese foreign policy.

policy implications

• While China’s domestic economic goals have always been an importantfactor in foreign policy, Chinese diplomatic initiatives globally and its policies toward oil-producing states are driven by a far more complicated convergence of factors than a simple narrative of “oil diplomacy” would suggest.

• China’spluralizedpoliticaleconomymakessuchrebalancingmuchmoredifficult politically, given the potential winners and losers in this process. Those who now urge China to make a shift away from an export-heavy growth pattern are likely to grow increasingly frustrated unless they understand that the central leaders do not possess the instruments to quickly transform the Chinese economy.

• GiventhatChina,likenoothereconomy,hasbenefittedfromtheinstitutionsof the global economy, China has a strong interest in maintaining these institutions and their liberal principles, even as the Chinese government seeks to play a stronger role in their operation and governance.

Article Topic [preferably no longer than 2–3 lines]

Policy Implications [preferably in the form of bulleted “if … then …” statements that spell out the benefits or problems associated with specific policy options rather than stating that the government “should” take a certain action]

Executive Summary [total length not to exceed 275 words]

Main Argument [preferably no longer than 6–10 lines]

executive summary

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guidelines for submission

IV. Note Format and ExamplesCitations and notes should be placed in footnotes; parenthetical notation is not accepted. For other citation formats, refer to the Chicago Manual of Style.

Part 1: English-Language Sources

• Book (with ISBN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], title (city of publication: publisher, year), page number[s].

H.P. Wilmot, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1982), 146–48.

• Edited volume (with ISBN): Editor[s]’ first and last name[s], ed[s]., title (city of publication: publisher, year), page number[s].

Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 22–42.

• Chapter in an edited volume (with ISBN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of article,” in title of edited volume, ed. editor[s]’ first and last name[s] (city of publication: publisher, year), page number[s].

Graeme Cheeseman, “Facing an Uncertain Future: Defence and Security under the Howard Government,” in The National Interest in the Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 207.

• Journal article (in a journal with ISSN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of article,” title of journal [vol. #], no. [#] (year): page number[s].

Jingdong Yuan, “The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Perspectives and Responses,” Asian Perspective 27, no. 4 (2003): 134–37.

• Reports (no ISBN or ISSN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of report,” publisher, report series, date of publication, page number[s].

Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, no. 47, June 2006.

• Newspaper or magazine article: Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of article,” name of newspaper/magazine, date of publication, page number[s].

Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Seeks Cooperation with China,” New York Times, July 24, 2003, A14.

• Electronic documents and website content: Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title,” URL. Footnote citation should emulate the corresponding print-source category if possible.

“Natural Resources,” Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation of USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/focus_areas/natural_resources.html.

• Public documents: Government department or office, title of document, [other identifying information], date of publication, page number[s].

House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, International Proliferation of Nuclear Technology, report prepared by Warren H. Donnelly and Barbara Rather, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, Committee Print 15, 5–6.

• Personal communication and interview: Author[s]’ [personal communication/email/telephone conversation/interview] with [first and last name], place, date.

Author’s interview with Hamit Zakir, Los Angeles, July 17, 2003.

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Part 2: Foreign-Language Sources When writing the foreign-language title of a language that uses a non-Roman script, please adhere to one of the standard Romanization formats. NBR prefers Pinyin for Chinese, Hepburn for Japanese, and McCune-Reischauer for Korean.

• Book: Author name[s], foreign language title [English translation of title] (city of publication: publisher, year), page number[s].

Sotōka Hidetoshi, Nichi-Bei dōmei hanseiki: Anpo to mitsuyaku [Half-Century of the Japan-U.S. Alliance: Security Treaty and Secret Agreements] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2001), 409–35.

Note: When the work is written in a foreign language, a foreign publisher’s name should not be translated, although the city should be given in its English form.

• Journal article: Author name[s], “foreign language article title” [English translation of article title], foreign language journal title [vol. #], no. [#] (year of publication): page number[s].

Liu Jianfei, “Gouzhu chengshu de Zhongmei guanxi” [Developing a Mature Sino-U.S. Relationship], Zhongguo kexue xuebao 78, no. 2 (June 2003): 73–87.

• Sources translated into English from a foreign language: credit the translator by inserting “trans. [translator’s first and last name]” after the title of the publication.

Harald Fritzsch, An Equation that Changed the World, trans. Karin Heusch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 21.

Part 3: Subsequent Citation Use author[s]’ last name and shortened titles (four words or less) for previously cited sources. “Op. cit.” and “loc. cit.” should not be used. First use: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:

Touchstone, 1996), 136–37.

Subsequent use: Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 136–37.

roundtable

The Strategic Implications of Russia-China Relations: Regional Perspectives

Brian Franchell

Angela Stent

Yu Bin

Alexander Lukin

Tomohiko Uyama

Hiroshi Yamazoe

Robert Sutter

asia policy, volume 13, number 1 (january 2018), 1–45• http://asiapolicy .nbr .org •

© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

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Introduction

Brian Franchell

T he Sino-Russian relationship has progressed considerably since Mikhail Gorbachev called for creating “an atmosphere of

good-neighborliness” with China in 1986.1 The delivery of ten Russian Su-35 fighter jets to China in late December 2017 is a testament to this, especially considering that 30 years ago nearly two million troops were amassed along their shared border.2 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the two countries have gradually improved relations, developing their defense relationship in the 1990s, jointly declaring the establishment of a partnership of strategic coordination in 1996, and resolving the border issue in 2008. Yet the pivotal moment occurred in 2014 with the onset of the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions that pushed Russia toward strategic dependence on China, eliminating any flexibility it previously had. The momentum in the relationship has only continued since then. Although there are clear checks on the depth of the partnership, discussed in the essays in this roundtable, the common interests behind this intensification of cooperation seem to be increasing.

There is considerable agreement among experts about the trajectory of positive Sino-Russian relations, as well as the causes of closer cooperation between the two countries across numerous energy, economic, political, and security issues. There is less agreement, however, about the implications that heightened cooperation might have for the global system and regional relations. This roundtable offers a spectrum of perspectives in response to these questions, including from the key states involved (China, Russia, and the United States), as well as on what closer Sino-Russian cooperation means for neighboring countries in Central and Northeast Asia.

In the first essay, Angela Stent looks at U.S. policy objectives toward Russia on the issues of Syria, North Korea, counterterrorism, cyberthreats, and sanctions and examines the degree to which the trajectory of

1 “Excerpts from Gorbachev’s Speech,” New York Times, originally given June 28, 1986, published in English translation, July 29, 1986 u http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/29/world/excerpts-from-gorbachev-s-speech.html.

2 “Russia Delivers Second Batch of Su-35 Fighter Jets to China,” TASS Russian News Agency, December 22, 2017 u http://tass.com/defense/982446.

brian franchell is a Project Manager with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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roundtable • the strategic implications of russia-china relations

Sino-Russian relations might affect these objectives. She stresses that across these issues there are no significant points of contention that the United States might exploit to drive China and Russia apart. The two countries’ suspicion of the United States and mutual desire to forge a new international order drive the partnership. Closer cooperation will likely hinder the realization of U.S. policy objectives, and the United States must be careful to avoid policies that further bind the two countries together.

Providing a historical context for the relationship, Yu Bin assesses the trajectory of Sino-Russian relations over the past three hundred years. He observes that the two countries have moved from a relationship characterized by volatility to a more pragmatic and institutionalized coexistence. Touching on the Chinese perspective, Yu characterizes the strategic partnership as a dynamic and flexible one that moves beyond the conventional concept of zero-sum geopolitics. For Yu, the direction of the two countries’ relations with the West will be a critical determinant as to whether the partnership moves toward a true alliance.

Alexander Lukin provides a Russian perspective on the relationship, arguing that the Sino-Russian rapprochement is the result of the countries’ shared geopolitical views. China and Russia desire both to counter the West’s dominant influence in the global system and to encourage the development of a multipolar world. Western policies intent on preserving a preeminent position have only served to accelerate the deepening of Sino-Russian cooperation, though the formation of an alliance is unlikely. Any attempt to drive a wedge between them to counter China’s rising influence would fail because of their mutual interests. Lukin asserts that the United States must forfeit its hegemony and join Russia and China to find new principles that suit a multipolar world order.

Turning to Central Asia, Tomohiko Uyama compares Russia’s and China’s activities and influence in the region, noting that each country’s individual engagement is much more significant than their bilateral cooperation. Russia exerts unrivaled influence in the political and security realms, and a de facto division of labor is forming, with China taking an increasingly prominent role in economic engagement. The United States’ engagement with Central Asia has been mostly unsuccessful, in part because of its emphasis on Afghanistan. This contrasts with Japan’s greater success in engaging the broader region with economic assistance, technical aid, and cultural exchanges. To prove themselves as helpful partners to the Central Asian states, the United States and Japan should cooperate with China,

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Russia, and the European Union in promoting security and prosperity, which will help mitigate overreliance on China and Russia.

In Northeast Asia, and from the perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Hiroshi Yamazoe contends that the primary concern is Sino-Russian cooperation in the military sphere, particularly Russia’s transfer of advanced hardware to improve China’s military capabilities. The somewhat limited nature of Sino-Russian joint military actions to date does not require an immediate response from the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, Yamazoe explores three potential scenarios that would significantly challenge the alliance and that it should take care to avoid. One of the core policy implications distilled from these scenarios is that China presents a more serious challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance than Russia and therefore requires more attention and resources in the long term. Although the alliance should adopt some countermeasures in response to growing Sino-Russian cooperation, it must also avoid actions that push Russia and China closer together.

Providing a broad U.S. perspective, Robert Sutter highlights the findings of the National Bureau of Asian Research’s current project on Sino-Russian relations, of which this roundtable is a part. He emphasizes that heightened cooperation between China and Russia is increasingly undermining U.S. interests abroad and argues that this closer relationship is the product of several common objectives. Even though there are clear brakes limiting the extent of cooperation, the drivers carry more weight, to the distinct disadvantage of the United States and the West. No easy policy solutions exist to ameliorate this situation. What is needed is a wide-ranging strengthening of economic, military, and diplomatic power by the United States in support of the U.S.-backed international order.

The essays in this roundtable move beyond an assessment of the implications of stronger ties between China and Russia to examine the strategic triangle and regional dynamics. This diverse grouping of essays demonstrates considerable uncertainty about what the budding Sino-Russian relationship means for the future of the U.S.-supported international system. Within this roundtable, there is a consensus that attempts by Washington to undermine the relationship in the near term by pulling one country away from the other will fail due to their lack of trust in the United States and the common interests driving their cooperation. What is perhaps even clearer is that as Washington and other Western capitals have become increasingly mired in domestic troubles and retreat from global leadership, a strategic window has opened for Beijing and Moscow to advance both their individual and mutual interests.

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The Sino-Russian Partnership and Its Impact on U.S. Policy toward Russia

Angela Stent

D uring the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump suggested that it was important for the United States to improve

relations with Russia because closer ties might induce Moscow to join Washington in pressuring Beijing to change its policies. In 2015, he had said, “I think [Putin’s] dislike of President Obama is so intense, that it really has affected the whole relationship. We’ve driven them into the arms of China, so that now these two are together, which has always been the great sin. Don’t ever let Russia and China get together. We’ve driven them together.”1 The idea that there is a triangular relationship between the United States, Russia, and China and that the United States has both a Russia and a China card to play goes back to the days of the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War. Indeed, the Nixon administration was able to play the China card and pressure the Soviet Union quite effectively in the 1970s. But those days are long gone, and today the United States faces a completely different situation. As a senior Chinese official has stated, “Relations among China, Russia and the United States currently resemble a scalene triangle in which the greatest distance between the three points lies between Moscow and Washington.”2 If any country has a card to play, it is China.

This essay examines the United States’ key policy objectives toward Russia and discusses the extent to which the Sino-Russian relationship can facilitate or hinder these objectives. It starts out from the premise that the key drivers of U.S. policy toward Russia and China differ considerably. The major driver behind U.S.-Russian relations is that the United States and Russia are the world’s two nuclear superpowers with the lion’s share of nuclear weapons. They are also on opposite sides of a number of international conflicts and have a limited economic relationship. A key

1 Julia Limitone, “Donald Trump: Vladimir Putin Can Be Dealt With,” Fox Business, August 20, 2015 u http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/08/20/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-can-be-dealt-with.html.

2 Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016 u https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia.

angela stent is Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She is the author of The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (2014). She can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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driver of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, by contrast, is the fact that the United States and China are the world’s two economic superpowers. Differences over security issues such as Taiwan or the South China Sea have also played an important role, but trade and investment questions loom much larger in this relationship than they do in U.S.-Russian relations. The stakes in the U.S.-Russian relationship are therefore of a very different order of magnitude than those involved in the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

Following a brief assessment of the current state of the Sino-Russian partnership, the essay examines U.S. policy objectives toward Russia on six key issues: Syria, Ukraine, North Korea, counterterrorism, cyberthreats, and sanctions. It then concludes by discussing policy options for the United States.

The Outlook for the Sino-Russian Partnership

Russia and China have over the past decade developed an increasingly robust, pragmatic partnership. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the launch of a war in southeastern Ukraine, the West’s imposition of sanctions against Russia and attempts to isolate it pushed Moscow more closely toward Beijing and increased Russia’s dependence on China. Although the Sino-Russian relationship is asymmetrical and by no means tension-free, the idea that Russia could be persuaded to loosen its links to China today is illusory. The deepening Sino-Russian partnership represents one of the most concrete and durable achievements of President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, and he is not about to jettison it.

Understanding the stakes involved for both sides is important for assessing how this partnership affects U.S. policy. It has played a significant part in elevating Russia’s role as an independent center of international power. The partnership has also enabled Moscow to raise its stature by associating with a rising China as relations with the United States have soured. China’s support for Russia in the UN Security Council and refusal to join the Ukraine-related sanctions—although some Chinese banks do in fact adhere to the financial sanctions out of concern for possible U.S. extraterritorial retaliation—have served to legitimize Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria. In return, the partnership is useful for China because Russia supplies it with hydrocarbons and advanced military hardware and supports it on all major foreign policy issues.

Both countries believe that they were unfairly treated in the past and that the current international political and financial order continues to deny them equal treatment in setting the agenda and determining

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institutional rules. They both advocate the creation of a “post-Western” multilateral international order, one in which the United States no longer determines the rules of the game. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has argued that NATO is obsolete and has advocated “a post-West world order when each country, based on its sovereignty within the rules of international law, will strive to find a balance between its own national interests and the national interests of partners.”3 This new order would highlight the role of multilateral organizations in which Russia and China play important roles but from which the United States is excluded, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), as well as the Eurasian Economic Union. Chinese leaders also stress the need for sovereignty and multilateralism but emphasize the role of economic organizations that do not include the United States such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, both countries pursue a strict policy of noninterference in each other’s domestic affairs and criticize the West for lecturing them on human rights and democracy.

U.S. Policy Objectives toward Russia

Despite ongoing congressional and other investigations into Russian activities during the 2016 presidential campaign and contacts between members of the Trump campaign and Russian individuals, the administration is pursuing a cautious policy of engaging Russia on a series of issues that are national security priorities for Washington. The U.S.-Russian relationship is worse than it has been at any time since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, and the U.S. domestic investigations may make it difficult to develop relations. Currently, the consensus policy in the administration is to pursue a pragmatic, targeted approach to Russia. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has laid out the three pillars of the administration’s policy: push back against Russian aggression when appropriate, engage with Russia on issues of mutual interest that advance U.S. national security interests, and seek to anchor the relationship through strategic stability talks. This is not a “reset” reminiscent of previous U.S. administrations, with expectations of improving ties, but rather an attempt to normalize relations where possible. U.S. policy toward Russia focuses on six major sets of issues, and China is a player in several of them.

3 “Lavrov Calls for ‘Post-West’ World Order; Dismisses NATO as Cold War Relic,” Deutsche Welle, February 18, 2017, http://p.dw.com/p/2Xp91.

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Syria. The United States has ceded much of the initiative in Syria to Russia and has also accepted that Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for the foreseeable future. The most pressing issue is deconflicting U.S. and Russian air operations in Syria to reduce the risk of midair crashes. This necessitates regular contacts between military representatives from both countries. Beyond that is the challenge of maintaining the “safe zones” that Russia agreed to create. The United States is also participating as an observer in Russian-led talks aimed at ending the conflict and seeking reconciliation between the various factions in the civil war. China is not a party to these peace talks but has backed the Russian position, occasionally abstaining in UN Security Council votes on resolutions condemning Syrian chemical weapons attacks that Russia has vetoed. China has thus enabled Russia to pursue its objectives in Syria. Beijing and Moscow clearly have an agreement to support each other’s positions in the United Nations and not to interfere with their respective interests in Syria, Ukraine, or the South China Sea. It is highly unlikely that the United States could persuade China to change its position and back the Western powers’ Syrian policy in the UN Security Council.

Ukraine. China has similarly backed the Russian position on Ukraine. Although abstaining in the UN General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, it has criticized the West’s policies toward Ukraine. When Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over southeastern Ukraine, China refused to endorse Western claims that Ukrainian separatists had shot down the plane with a Russian-made missile. Beijing has thus given Russia cover for its actions in Ukraine and ensured that the West is unable to isolate Russia by strengthening Chinese ties to Moscow after the annexation of Crimea. Current U.S. policy seeks to move forward the stalled Minsk process designed to end the conflict. Ambassador Kurt Volker is negotiating with Vladislav Surkov, Vladimir Putin’s envoy for Ukraine, as well as with his Ukrainian, German, and French counterparts. There is also discussion of deploying UN peacekeeping troops to the region to facilitate an end to hostilities. China backs the Minsk process and has not criticized Russia for the annexation of Crimea. Although China is increasing its own economic ties to Ukraine, it has refrained from political involvement in this dispute. As in the case of Syria, the United States will not be able to secure Chinese support for a tougher policy toward Russia on the war in Ukraine.

North Korea. Although the focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea is to seek Chinese help in reining in Kim Jong-un’s nuclear program, Russia

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is a player in this conflict and has recently stepped up its economic links to the country. It also hosts North Korean laborers, thus boosting Pyongyang’s earnings. Like China, Russia does not want to see regime collapse and seeks to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, fearing a united Korea under Western domination more than a nuclear-armed North Korea. It opposes the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles on the Korean Peninsula. Neither China nor Russia is willing to significantly increase pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and Russia might further strengthen its links with the country if China distances itself more. Russia has so far been content to follow China’s lead in dealing with North Korea and is unlikely to pursue policies that might be supportive of U.S. goals if they were to alienate China. Attempts by the United States to seek Russian assistance in pressuring the Kim regime are unlikely to bear fruit as long as U.S.-Russian relations remain as adversarial as they currently are. Russia and China will continue to support each other on the North Korean issue even though Russia has recently sought to benefit economically from China’s imposition of financial sanctions on North Korea. Both countries are united in advocating that Washington negotiate directly with Pyongyang.

Counterterrorism. In the past the United States and Russia have achieved limited counterterrorism cooperation, which the Trump administration now seeks to improve in order to more effectively counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, such cooperation is challenging because Washington and Moscow often do not agree on who is a terrorist. Russia, for example, has targeted Syrian opposition groups whom the United States and its Middle Eastern allies support. Russia defines as a terrorist someone who threatens Russians either at home—with a focus on groups emanating from the North Caucasus region—or on foreign soil. Nevertheless, attempts to improve joint work countering ISIS will continue. This is an area where China could cooperate with Russia and the United States. While Beijing, like Moscow, remains preoccupied with its own homegrown terrorism emanating from the Uighur-majority areas, it too is committed to combating ISIS. Trilateral cooperation on terrorism is thus theoretically possible but would require a more viable consensus on how to define a terrorist.

Cyberthreats. China and Russia represent the two greatest cyberthreats to the United States. Washington and Beijing signed a cybersecurity agreement in 2015, and even though there are different interpretations about its effectiveness, at least both sides have agreed on some rules of the road. The U.S.-China agreement states that neither government will knowingly

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support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain. While it outlines broader goals for cyber norms, the focus is on commercial espionage. Chinese commercial espionage activities targeting the United States have declined since the 2015 agreement.4 China and Russia also signed a cybersecurity agreement in 2015. It focuses on mutual assurance and nonaggression in cyberspace and builds on an earlier multilateral SCO cyber agreement. Both sides pledged to engage in enhanced interaction and information exchange between their respective law-enforcement agencies on cybercrime and terrorism. It is unclear how well this agreement is working. The United States, however, has no such agreement with Russia. In view of all the issues involved in Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. election, it would make sense to explore whether the two sides could begin talks on a similar agreement. Moscow has expressed interest in talks on cybersecurity, but so far the Trump administration has demurred. If the United States were to engage Russia in negotiations, then China would presumably be supportive.

Sanctions. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the launch of a war in southeastern Ukraine, the Obama administration imposed sanctions by executive order on Russian individuals as well as on financial institutions lending money to Russia and on the transfer of advanced technology in the energy sector. After President Trump’s election, the U.S. Congress became concerned that he might lift these sanctions by executive order in the absence of any progress on Ukraine. It intervened to ensure that the president cannot unilaterally lift sanctions by passing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. This legislation imposes more draconian economic sanctions and also opens the way to sanctions on more Russian individuals. Russia has vigorously objected to these measures. Given the extraterritorial reach of this legislation, its scope could extend well beyond Russia. Although, as noted above, the major Chinese banks have tacitly observed these sanctions, smaller Chinese financial entities have lent money to Russian firms. Moreover, while Sino-Russian energy agreements do not involve the most advanced technology, they nevertheless have enabled Russia to continue to develop its energy sector. China, therefore, provides Russia with the wherewithal to grow economically in the face of tougher U.S. sanctions. Indeed, the latest congressional legislation may well have the effect of making Russia more dependent on China.

4 Yuxu Wei, “China-Russia Cybersecurity Cooperation: Working towards Cyber-Sovereignty,” Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, June 21, 2016, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/china-russia-cybersecurity-cooperation-working-towards-cyber-sovereignty.

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Conclusions

There are no major issues of contention between the United States and Russia where China is likely to support U.S. policies over those of Russia. Whatever the strains in the Sino-Russian relationship, which may well increase as China’s Belt and Road Initiative proceeds, the two countries have a compelling reason to strengthen their developing partnership. Their suspicion of the United States and commitment to forging a new global order will continue to bind them together.

While pursuing its agenda with Moscow, Washington should realize that the Sino-Russian partnership could make the achievement of its goals more difficult. But Washington should also ensure that it does not pursue policies that could drive the two countries closer together. As long as the investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 election and links between Russian individuals and members of the Trump campaign are ongoing, the administration will have to approach Russia with extreme caution. It must continue to build better defenses against a range of Russian cyberactivities, especially those on social media. However, in its attempt to deter future Russian interference, the administration must approach the sanctions question with greater flexibility, so that these newly enacted congressional restrictions do not increase the Kremlin’s dependence on China. The United States should also resume a broader range of bilateral contacts, especially with the Russian military. Moreover, it should engage in discussions about pressing arms control issues to provide the Kremlin with a greater stake in relations with the United States on issues where China is not involved. In devising a balance between deterrence and engagement, the United States should understand that Russia might be willing to re-examine elements of its relationship with China—but only if it believes that the United States is willing to deal with it as an equal and respect what it considers its legitimate interests, as China does.

Ultimately if the United States wants to prevent the Sino-Russian partnership from further challenging U.S. interests, it must remain an active participant on the word stage. Withdrawing from global leadership, questioning alliances, and jettisoning the commitment to the liberal internationalist order could well facilitate the Sino-Russian drive to usher in a post-Western order where the United States has a diminished role—even if there is so far no agreement on what the rules of this order should be.

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Between Past and Future: Implications of Sino-Russian Relations for the United States

Yu Bin

T he “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” between China and Russia is frequently described as making relations between

the two large powers the “best in history” and as serving as a model of a “new type of major power relations.”1 This depiction has generated sharply different assessments in the West regarding the partnership’s scope, strength, sustainability, and likely impact on the regional and global orders. The recently published U.S. National Security Strategy, for example, defines China and Russia as “revisionist powers” because they “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”2 According to the report, Moscow and Beijing are “determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”3 It is not uncommon for U.S. national security strategies to treat Russia and China as U.S. rivals. The 2017 version, however, repeatedly pairs the two with a heightened level of alarm. Moreover, the document discusses the challenge from China and Russia ahead of rogue powers such as North Korea and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

This alarmist view, however, is in contrast to a more cautious assessment that emphasizes the differences between the two large powers. Bilateral ties are perhaps not as solid as officially articulated. More precisely, Russia and China are in a marriage of convenience or a “wary embrace.” 4 Deep within the psyche of the two cultures, there are too many sociological and psychological hurdles to overcome for a

1 “China, Russia Pledge Coordination on Strategic Security,” Xinhua, July 26, 2017 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/26/c_136475098.htm.

2 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 2017), 25 u https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

3 Ibid., 2. 4 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institution Press, 2008); and Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Sydney: Penguin, 2017).

yu bin is Professor of Political Science and East Asian Studies at Wittenberg University in Ohio, Senior Fellow at the Shanghai Association of American Studies, and Senior Fellow at the Russian Studies Center of the East China Normal University in Shanghai. He has also been a regular contributor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ journal Comparative Connections since its debut in 1999. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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normal and genuine strategic partnership.5 Russian and Chinese views and corresponding policies toward the outside world also indicate a more complex interactive mode of convergence and divergence.

These different assessments of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership leave considerable space for further intellectual inquiry. Regardless of whether the current relationship is best for either country or represents a threat to the West, it is entirely different from the preceding three hundred years. During the post–Cold War decades, the two Eurasian powers have transformed a largely asymmetrical and highly ideological relationship into one of pragmatic interaction and coexistence. This essay first reviews the past to understand the development of the bilateral relationship and then assesses the policy implications of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including its potential and limitations.

A Glimpse of History

The long and tortuous process of Sino-Russian intercourse can be understood in three broad phases: imperial “fatal attraction” (the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries), revolution and the curse of ideology (the “short twentieth century”), and pragmatic coexistence (1989 to the present).

Imperial fatal attraction. Until the end of the twentieth century, the Sino-Russian relationship seemed destined to be one of asymmetry, incongruity, and paradox. This was the case even when the two civilizations were briefly “integrated” by the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Mongol rule, however, gave rise in Russia to a nearly permanent fixation on the East as the “Mongol yoke,” a source of fear and a threat to Russia’s national identity. As a result, successive Russian regimes, be they tsarist, Communist, or post-Soviet, all have regarded Asia as alien and difficult to engage, at times viewing it as a threat and at others as an object of contempt or puzzlement.6 This has been the case despite the fact that China too was a victim of Mongol rule.

Russia started its relentless eastward expansion in the sixteenth century. By the mid-seventeenth century, and barely 60 years after crossing the Urals, Russia had acquired a permanent outlet to the Pacific Ocean even before it did to the Baltic or the Black Sea.7 Following the

5 This is the theme of Bobo Lo’s Axis of Convenience. 6 Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 132. 7 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 19–20;

and Robert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942).

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initial contact with China in the seventeenth century and the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, Russia renewed its eastward drive in the eighteenth century and was poised to take advantage of the Western “scramble for China” in the mid-nineteenth century.8 Unlike the infamous Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60) fought by the European powers, however, Russia’s huge territorial gains in China’s lightly populated and thinly governed northern territory went largely unnoticed. A prominent Chinese Russologist nonetheless describes Russia’s eastward pivot from the mid-seventeenth century onward as leading to a “historical encounter” between the two large powers.9

Revolutions and the curse of ideology. At the dawn of the twentieth century, both Russia and China were ripe for social revolutions as a result of internal decay, corruption, and defeat in foreign wars. For much of the “short twentieth century,” Communism largely meant one-sided domination by the Soviet Union, which in China enjoyed unprecedented and unparalleled influence compared with any other Western power.10 In the early twentieth century, for example, the timing of the Bolsheviks’ unilateral declarations (July 25, 1919, and September 27, 1920) to end Russia’s extraterritorial rights in China were perhaps the most powerful catalyst for many young aspiring Chinese intellectuals to switch their beliefs from liberalism to Bolshevism. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party were molded after the Soviet Communist Party, ideologically and organizationally. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Stalin actively manipulated Communist-Nationalist collaboration and conflicts in China’s domestic politics.

The Sino-Soviet “honeymoon” of the 1950s, though brief, turned out to be volatile. Massive Soviet input into China’s domestic organization—such as through economic and military assistance, technology transfers, top-down bureaucracies, and five-year plans—produced both friendship and friction. Despite practicing the same ideology, Moscow and Beijing actually pursued different priorities at home and abroad. Toward the late 1950s, policy

8 See Robert Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832–1914 (New York: Penguin Global, 2011).

9 Zhao Huasheng, “Zhonge guanxi de moshi” [Modes of Sino-Russian Relations], in Zhonge guanxi de lishi yu xianshi [Sino-Russian Relations: History and Reality], vol. 2, ed. Guan Guihai and Luan Jinghe (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2009), 40.

10 The phrase “short twentieth century” was coined by the late British historian Eric J. Hobsbawm to highlight an extremely violent part of human history: the two world wars and the Cold War—all within the twentieth century and paralleling the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).

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disagreements between the two Communist giants became open as Moscow and Beijing accused each other of betraying Marxism. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Sino-Soviet ideological polemic assumed a military dimension when millions of forces were deployed along the seven-thousand-kilometer Sino-Soviet border after a border clash in 1969. From “honeymoon” to “divorce,” the ideological factor seemed to exaggerate the friendship during good times and amplify disagreements when things turned sour. Both phases were highly emotional, leading to a state of affairs that prevented pragmatic compromise and conflict management when needed. It is thus not surprising that the process of normalizing relations began with minimizing and neutralizing the ideological factor in bilateral relations.

De-ideologization for pragmatic coexistence. With respect to the ideological factor in bilateral relations, two distinctive stages are discernible: the de-ideologization of the 1980s and the disappearance of ideology in the 1990s. Up to the late 1980s, Beijing and Moscow gradually defused their ideological passions. Since the 1990s, both sides have departed significantly from their respective past legacies. Socialism is no longer an issue between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, managing the transition away from the past with minimum social tension and political instability is perhaps most important for the two nations. Meanwhile, both sides carefully define the outer and inner limits of their cooperative and competitive relations, regardless of the labels applied—“friendly” (1992), “constructive” (1994),” “strategic” (1996), and “comprehensive and strategic” (2012).

Given this historical trajectory, particularly in the post-Soviet period, the two powers have finally moved away from a love-hate oscillation and toward more pragmatic mutual expectations and complex reciprocity. Short of major disruptions in their domestic climates or systemic wars, Moscow and Beijing are set to coexist with one other for the long term.

Policy Implications

The strategic partnership—a league of its own? In the past 25 years the strategic partnership between Russia and China has become a highly institutionalized process providing both countries with more predictable and stable returns and assurances in a rapidly changing international environment and specifically in their important, albeit volatile, relations with

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the United States.11 The partnership is not problem-free, and in October 2017 Vladimir Putin even described some of the issues as “controversial” and “contentious.” But the fact that the problems are deliberated, “resolved with compromised solutions” without “driving the situation into an impasse,” is in itself a marked contrast with the highly politicized experience of the 1950–70s.12 Xi Jinping has described Sino-Russian relations as “mature, solid, and unaffected by outside environments.”13

Given the largely institutionalized strategic partnership and converging ideational constructs regarding the existing international system, Beijing and Moscow may be reluctant to reciprocate any overture by Washington with the purpose of driving a wedge between them unless Washington makes explicitly clear in words and deeds that it will forever renounce its habitual interferences into other countries’ domestic affairs. This is not because China and Russia are anti-West but largely because of their own volatile and costly experiences in the twentieth century. Living with one another without sentimentality, but with sensitivity to the lessons of history and each other’s vital interests, is a tacit consensus in the psychology of many Russian and Chinese political elites.

Reluctant allies? The partnership is not a typical alliance, which requires a clearly defined third party as its target. At this point, neither China nor Russia is ready or willing to take that path. They are therefore “reluctant allies” at best. In essence, the strategic partnership has been an adaptable, dynamic, and open-ended process through which both sides manage important bilateral, regional, and global affairs. That said, it could be highly effective in synchronizing joint actions, particularly on military-security issues of mutual grave concern. One example is the joint naval transportation of Syrian chemical weapons in 2013–14.14 Another case

11 There have been a growing number of intergovernmental functional committees between the two countries at various levels and in various areas, such as head of state, head of government, ministerial, regional, societal, academic, cultural, athletic, public health, and educational. The two countries have also steadily broadened and deepened their consultations and coordination in multilateral forums, either those of their own creation (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS) or global governing bodies such as the United Nations. Military-military relations, too, have gone from the earlier arms transfers and confidence-building mechanisms along the border regions to include joint R&D and regular ground, naval, and aerospace exercises, in either bilateral or multilateral formats.

12 Vladimir Putin, “The World of the Future: Moving through Conflict to Cooperation,” Valdai Discussion Club, Office of the President of Russia, October 19, 2017 u http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882.

13 “Xi’s Moscow Visit Witnesses Stronger China-Russia Ties,” Xinhua, July 5, 2017 u http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017xivisitgermany/2017-07/05/content_30001609.htm.

14 See Yu Bin, “ ‘Western Civil War’ Déjà Vu?” Comparative Connections 16, no. 1 (2014): 92–97 u http://cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/1401qchina_russia.pdf.

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is the two countries’ response to the United States’ deployment of missile defense in South Korea in 2017. Chinese and Russian defense agencies conducted two computerized missile defense simulations in May 2016 and December 2017 and held four joint briefings on missile defense issues in multilateral forums in twelve months.15 The potential for Russia and China to move toward a real alliance, therefore, may not be as strong or weak as it appears, depending on external circumstances, particularly their respective relations with the West.16

In actuality, the current strategic partnership has been significantly facilitated by Western policies since the late 1990s. Putin, for example, was widely expected in his first few months in the Kremlin to correct Boris Yeltsin’s overly pro-China stance.17 His initial pivot to the West and deliberate distancing of Russia from China confused Beijing and delighted the West.18 In the Russian view, it was primarily NATO’s eastward expansion (in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2017), Washington’s unilateral ending of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (2002), and the Iraq War (2003) that gradually and effectively ended Russia’s unrequited love of the West.

A not-so-strategic triangle? The prospect of turning the strategic partnership into an alliance would mean a significant reduction of both sides’ respective freedom of action. Beijing and Moscow seem to be pursuing the twin goals of maximizing their respective interests while retaining adequate flexibility and freedom of action, particularly with regard to their U.S. relations. As a result, Moscow and Beijing have not been overly sensitive to each other’s positive or negative relations with Washington over delicate issues, at least not publicly. From their perspectives, the zero-sum strategic triangle that existed between the three states during the Cold War is no longer the case. Instead, a “not-so-strategic triangle,” or non-zero-sum triangle, may be more desirable.19 Continuous confrontation between any

15 The four joint briefings took place in October 2016 in Beijing on the sidelines of the 7th Xiangshan Forum, March 2017 in Geneva on the sidelines of the Conference on Disarmament, April 2017 on the sidelines of the annual Moscow Conference on International Security, and October 2017 at a session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee.

16 This is borrowed and twisted from the famous remark, sometimes attributed to Otto von Bismarck, that Russia is never as strong or as weak as it appears. Cited from Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 370.

17 Yu Bin, “New Century, New Face, and China’s ‘Putin Puzzle,’ ” Comparative Connections 2, no. 1 (2000) u http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0001qchina_russia.pdf.

18 Yu Bin, “Strategic Distancing...Or Else?” Comparative Connections 2, no. 2 (2000) u http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0002qchina_russia.pdf; and Yu Bin, “Putin’s ‘Ostpolitik’ and Sino-Russian Relations,” Comparative Connections 2, no. 3 (2000) u http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0003qchina_russia.pdf.

19 Yu Bin, “The Three Players,” Harvard International Review 26, no. 2 (2004) u http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=1227.

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two of the trio is not in anyone’s interest. In other words, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is transcending the conventional wisdom of the zero-sum game of geopolitics, or at least has tried to avoid it.

Back to the past and future? In a more historical sense, it can be argued that these two non-Western powers are actually returning to the core of the seventeenth-century Westphalian system of sovereignty that has been largely cast aside in the West by mainstream liberal interventionism since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow are also looking beyond Western realism’s paradigm of the clash of civilizations.20 In the age of WMDs, there is perhaps no choice for major powers other than coexisting peacefully if possible. The alternative could be much worse than the pre-Westphalia Thirty Years’ War, the bloodiest single conflict in Europe until the two world wars, which unleashed the most destructive power in human history. The coexistence of civilizations, therefore, should rightly be the vision for Beijing and Moscow, as well as for the rest of the world, including the United States.

20 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (1993): 22–49.

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A Russian Perspective on the Sino-Russian Rapprochement

Alexander Lukin

A rapprochement between Russia and China is clearly taking place today. Yet as cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has increased

in recent years, significant differences have emerged between how Russian and Chinese pundits view the relationship and its prospects, on the one hand, and how observers outside the two countries perceive it, on the other.

Most U.S. and European experts who come to Moscow to study Russian policy toward China are convinced that Russians should be wary of China as posing an imminent threat. They speak of the risk of economic dependence, the threat of demographic expansion, and even a potential military threat resulting from China’s increased defense spending and modernization of its army. When I point out that what they refer to as “economic domination” in the case of China’s trade with Russia they call “investment and increased trade” in the case of relationships between other countries, that statistics indicate a nearly complete lack of Chinese migration to Russia, and that Canada, for example, does not consider the U.S. Army a threat because the two neighboring countries share very similar approaches to the outside world and have no intention of fighting, my Western colleagues greet me with surprise and even frank incomprehension.

This essay argues that the Sino-Russian rapprochement is a natural result of broader changes taking place in world politics, while the U.S. policy hostile to both countries has had the effect of accelerating that process. It analyzes the causes of this rapprochement, outlines the growing shared interests between Russia and China, and discusses possible changes in U.S. relations with both countries under the Trump administration.

The Causes of Sino-Russian Rapprochement

The dominance of “democratism” has caused the West, at least since the presidency of Bill Clinton, to pursue a course that is anathema to the approach of the traditional “realists”—Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and even Zbigniew Brzezinski—who attempted to exploit tensions between China and the Soviet Union and use one against the other. Today, democratism makes such an approach impossible because it refuses to

alexander lukin is Department Head at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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encourage the authoritarian regime of either country. The adherents of this ideology generally support U.S. and European Union policy aimed at pressuring both China and Russia toward greater democratization and forcing them to abandon measures that hinder the United States and its allies from pushing this agenda. That naturally prompts Moscow and Beijing to resist by teaming up to coordinate their foreign policies. As a result, most advocates of democratization in the West simply try to turn a blind eye to the negative consequences of this policy of simultaneously pressuring Russia and China by claiming that the two countries are not in fact drawing closer or that the rapprochement is only temporary and superficial. Western observers also often exaggerate real and perceived differences between Beijing and Moscow while ignoring the similarity of their approaches.

In fact, the current Russian-Chinese rapprochement is the natural outcome of broader developments in international relations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in the United States and Europe were intent on achieving a system of world unity based on Western principles and values. In response, the major non-Western states began working together to create a counterweight to the preponderant influence of the West and its desire to build a unipolar world.1 Several new non-Western centers of power came to replace what had previously been a single Soviet center of power. Although not unilaterally inimical to the West, as the Soviet Union had been, these weaker centers of power were nevertheless worried about Washington’s use of pressure tactics in pursuing its narrow interests and therefore sought opportunities to coordinate efforts as a counterweight to Western influence in the world. They viewed a world unified on Western terms as a form of hegemony, a sort of restoration of the colonial system that would inevitably fail to give due consideration to their interests.

The Russian-Chinese rapprochement stems from the fact that the leadership and elite of both countries share similar views on the geopolitical situation in the world, the main trends and dangers that exist, and the favorable prospects for the relationship to develop and find expression in the emergence of a multipolar world. Russia and China, along with other such states, want to found a new international order that places them on an equal footing with the United States and its allies and does not relegate them to the status of dependents. What the West refers to as a desire by Russia and

1 The West is understood in this essay in purely political terms as a combination of countries allied with the United States and of which the United States is an informal leader.

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China to establish spheres of influence, Moscow and Beijing consider the minimum expression of their rights and interests as major world powers. In an ideal multipolar world in which everyone recognizes the rights of each center of power, Russia and China would be equidistant, figuratively speaking, not only from each other but also from all other such centers, including the United States. Russian-Chinese rapprochement would lead only to a normalization of relations, without the need for the two countries to support each other in countering the West.

However, the policy of the West aimed at preserving its monopolistic position in the world has had the effect of accelerating the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. Western actions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and the South China Sea—viewed by both Moscow and Beijing as aggressive—have consistently led to a deepening of Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation. This trend gained momentum following the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and U.S. attempts to counter Chinese influence in the South China Sea. The trend of rapid rapprochement might slow if the West were to pursue less aggressive policies. However, it will proceed regardless because, as the weaker centers of power in the emerging multipolar world, Russia and China strategically need each other more than the West needs either of them.

The Outlook for Russian-Chinese Relations

The short-term outlook for Russian-Chinese relations does not depend much on the changes in the international situation (or international events). The partnership between the two countries has developed steadily as a result of their common interests and the underlying global trend away from a bipolar world order toward a multipolar one. In fact, relations have continued to progress for more than 30 years now, despite changes in leadership, national economic models, and even political systems.

One can identify several shared interests between Russia and China. Both countries generally desire to break free of a unipolar system and transition to a multipolar world. As major countries with their own approaches to international problems, they can more freely realize their economic and security interests in a world where there is not one but several leaders, with none able to impose unilateral conditions on others.

In addition, both Russia and China wish to preserve a system of international law based on the principle of the sovereignty of states, with the UN Security Council as the highest authority. Their veto rights in the

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Security Council equalize their influence with that of the West, at a time when within all other parameters they fall far short of a united West. The principle of the absolute sovereignty of states does not allow the leading center of power to impose its will on other states on matters of internal politics. Russia and China, which differ from Western states in their internal political structure, react with great caution to concepts that undermine sovereignty or justify “humanitarian intervention.”

Russia and China also share economic interests. Both countries seek to reform the international financial system—for example, by increasing the role of non-Western states in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and widening the use of regional currencies in international trade. They, moreover, depend on each other as trade and economic partners. Since 2010, China has been Russia’s top trading partner, satisfying the market not only for consumer goods but also increasingly for machines and equipment. It is one of the top ten investors in the Russian economy. Although Russia only accounts for about 2% of China’s foreign trade, China receives goods it cannot obtain from other suppliers due to sanctions from the West, such as weapons.2 Russia also provides items, such as energy resources, that China cannot otherwise obtain in sufficient quantities at acceptable prices and with maximum diversification.

In terms of political interests, the rapidly rising cooperation in border areas plays a significant role in the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East and Northeast China. Russia and China cooperate in Central Asia through the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to achieve common aims: economic development of this region, support for political stability, and maintenance of secular regimes in power. Both countries negatively react to outside advice on their internal political structure, calling this “interference in one’s internal affairs,” and also support each other in the battles against separatism and Western ideology.

Yet despite these shared political, security, and economic interests, the establishment of a formal Russian-Chinese alliance remains unlikely. Russia values its political and economic partnership with China but prefers not to tie its channels of cooperation to one country exclusively. Therefore, it will try to also maintain cooperation with the EU as far as it can. At the same time, as part of its pivot to Asia, Russia will develop multilateral cooperation with other Asian players, including those with which China

2 For trade data, see Fung Business Intelligence, “China’s Trade Performance (2015),” Business Policy and City Clusters in China, February 2017 u https://fbicgroup.com/sites/default/files/IG_06_GDP.pdf.

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has uneasy relations, such as India, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia. China is an important strategic partner, and precisely owing to ties with it (as with other Asian countries), Russian policies are able to be less one-sided. China, for its part, values its relationship with the United States and the EU states, with which it has close economic ties. A stable Russia, which can become an independent center of power, interests Beijing as a counterweight to its complex partner-competitor relations with the United States and Western Europe and as support for its own independent foreign policy. Yet China considers Russia, compared with the Western countries, as a friendlier but less economically significant partner. Moreover, the United States is much more important strategically for China, despite tensions between the two countries, because so much depends on the United States. Therefore, even while developing its strategic partnership with Russia, China will simultaneously strive to build mutually beneficial relations with other states, even if those states are hostile to Russia—China’s close partnership with Ukraine being one example.

Donald Trump’s rise to power and his new approach to relations with Russia and China raise questions about the prospects for a Sino-Russian rapprochement. During the campaign, Trump stated opposing goals with regard to each of the two countries, promising to improve cooperation with Russia, primarily to fight international terrorism, while promising to apply heavy pressure on China to force concessions from it on a number of issues. This approach is very deliberate and stems from the outlook of Trump and the political forces he represents. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, both major U.S. political parties pursued the ideology of “democratization”—the global spread of U.S. values through diplomatic and political programs abroad. Trump and his supporters now hold that the main objective is just the opposite: to improve the standard of living and the economy in the United States and to force the whole world to either serve that purpose or stay out of the way. The Trump administration’s downplaying of democracy promotion could have brought positive changes in U.S. relations with Russia and to a lesser extent with China, but the U.S. Congress has constrained the administration’s ability to implement these ideas.

Originally, the Trump administration considered Islamist terrorism the primary external threat to the United States. It argued that radical Islamists not only threaten U.S. interests abroad but also infiltrate U.S. territory under the guise of refugees and migrants to undermine the country from within. From this perspective, it is logical that Russia, which is not a serious

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economic rival of the United States but possesses considerable military might, could prove a useful ally in the fight against Islamism. Feuding with Russia is pointless: as Trump has said, it makes more sense to mend fences with Moscow.

However, Trump’s campaign promises have been met with resistance from U.S. policymakers and the Washington elite. Trump has had to soften his position on many fronts, including his approach to Russia and China. Not only has cooperation between the United States and Russia not improved, but a serious break between the United States and China is also unlikely. It remains unclear whether Trump can make any fundamental changes to Washington’s relationship with Beijing. China, with its economic might, does present a challenge to the United States. Because the interconnections between the Chinese and U.S. economies run so deep, any drastic moves could prove disadvantageous and injurious to both—something the authorities in Beijing and Washington will have to keep in mind. China, at least, would go to great lengths to avoid a conflict with the United States, with the possible exception of sovereignty disputes in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The numerous articles critical of Trump published by the tabloids controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, such as the Global Times, were probably intended more as a warning, a kind of initial negotiating position, than an indication of possible political moves by the Chinese leadership. (In the same way, Trump’s questioning of the United States’ long-held “one-China” policy was most likely a negotiating position and not an expression of actual policy.)

But even if relations were to improve considerably between Moscow and Washington and the confrontation between China and the United States were to deepen, it would have little influence on Russian-Chinese relations overall. Of course, Moscow would not want to find itself in a position of having to choose between the two countries, but if forced, it would unquestionably choose China.

One thing is certain: anyone in Washington who thinks that the United States can use Russia as a pawn in its confrontation with China is sorely mistaken. Russia’s pivot to Asia, which is the result of its actual interests as well as a reaction to the inimical attitude of the West, is largely irreversible. China extended support to Russia at a difficult time by expanding trade and economic cooperation and expressing understanding of its approach toward the crisis in Ukraine (although not fully approving of Russia’s actions). Moscow realizes that, despite a number of problems, Beijing is a more reliable partner than the West. This is primarily because Beijing, like

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Moscow, long ago abandoned all ideological goals: China is not attempting to impose Communism or Confucianism on Russia. Whatever challenge China might pose for Russia, it is not an existential threat, unlike that posed by the West prior to Trump’s election. For this reason, Russia will never align itself with the United States against China. In fact, Beijing would even look favorably at a certain warming of relations between Moscow and Washington. Both Russia and China believe that the “three countries should work with rather than against each other” and “should pursue win-win rather than zero-sum outcomes.”3 However, Russia’s and China’s understanding of win-win cooperation and their vision of the future world are very different from that of the United States.

From this standpoint, it would make more sense to search for new general principles and rules of world order that would suit all countries than for the United States to continue attempting to use Russia and China against each other. Current U.S. policy takes the contradictory approach of exerting pressure on both countries, surrounding them with military bases, and bolstering inimical military alliances with their neighbors, while at the same time trying to reach separate agreements with each country on specific issues. Such new principles of world order would also serve to restrain emerging powers such as Russia and China that increasingly act at their own discretion in the absence of such rules. However, that would require the United States and its allies to relinquish the monopoly on interpreting international law to which they have become accustomed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Western elites will find this prospect extremely objectionable, the West must inevitably relinquish that dominant role because its influence in world politics is clearly decreasing, while that of other players is growing.

3 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 8, 2017 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml.

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Sino-Russian Coordination in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. and Japanese Policies

Tomohiko Uyama

T he decline of U.S. power, often noted on the global stage in recent years, has been evident in Central Asia for over a decade. U.S.

diplomacy toward this region has not been especially successful, even in earlier years. The United States has not been able to turn Central Asian countries’ multi-vector diplomacy and initial admiration of the West into favorable relationships with these countries, whereas Russia and China have maintained and expanded their influence. The initiation of construction on non-Russian routes for Caspian oil and gas pipelines in the late 1990s and the opening of U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2001 were seen as U.S. successes, but these victories proved illusory and short-lived. The Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments decided to close the bases in 2005 and 2014, respectively. At the same time, China increasingly began to import Central Asian oil and gas, while Russia continues to wield political influence over the region. As Gallup and other opinion polls show, Central Asia is the most pro-Russian and one of the least pro-Western regions in the world.1 It is also moderately pro-Chinese. A large number of Central Asians share many Russians’ view of the West as morally corrupt and conspiring to rule the world,2 and the unilateral actions by the United States and NATO to topple the regimes of some countries in the Middle East made this view even more plausible.

It is evident that the aggressive behavior of Russia and China, including in Crimea, the Donbas, and the South and East China Seas, poses threats to their neighbors in particular and the world order in general. Neighboring Russia and China, Central Asia is a target of their expanding influence, and some people in the region are worried about the potential threat to the

1 “Rating World Leaders: 2016,” Gallup, October 12, 2016 u http://news.gallup.com/reports/196373/rating-world-leaders-2016.aspx.

2 One can often hear such opinions in private conversations with Central Asian peoples. Particularly in Kyrgyzstan, where freedom of speech is most developed and U.S.-funded NGOs are most active, even public media organizations distribute conspiracy theories accusing the United States of orchestrating revolutions and terrorist activities to sow chaos in various parts of the world. See Noah Tucker, “Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Kyrgyzstan,” in Kyrgyzstan: Political Pluralism and Economic Challenges, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2017), 76–82.

tomohiko uyama is a Professor at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center at Hokkaido University. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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sovereignty of the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, in the eyes of countries not aligned with the United States, unilateral U.S. behavior could pose an equal or even heightened threat, as it can target any part of the world. U.S. unilateralism is so unpopular that Russia and China are often considered to be relatively benign great powers.

This essay will examine Russia’s and China’s activities in Central Asia and assess the implications for U.S. and Japanese interests. The first section will assess Russia’s and China’s respective roles in the region. The second section will then discuss U.S. and Japanese relations with the Central Asian states and consider options for dealing with Russian and Chinese influence, even possibly by cooperating with those countries on economic and security initiatives.

Central Asia as a Showcase of Russian and Chinese Soft Power

Russia and Central Asia are connected with each other by the Russian language and the common history of the tsarist and Soviet periods. Russian media is popular in Central Asia and conveys Russia’s worldview to the region. In poorer countries such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, a large number of migrant workers are drawn to Russia, reinforcing economic ties. In short, Russia has tremendous soft power in Central Asia. When the Ukrainian crisis occurred, some Central Asians sympathized with Ukraine, regarding Russian imperialism as a common enemy, but even more people sympathized with Russia, thinking that both Russia and Central Asia are victims of Western dominance of the world.3

China is less familiar to Central Asians and perceptions of the country are more ambivalent, but its economic power is very attractive. Moreover, China has acquired a reputation for extensively engaging in economic cooperation in a quick and flexible manner without meddling in political affairs. Projects related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are seen as opportunities for Central Asian countries to improve infrastructure and expand their external economic activities.

One of the “merits” of Russia and China for Central Asian political leaders is authoritarianism. Not only can organizations such as the Shanghai

3 A number of opinion polls were conducted on Central Asian attitudes toward the Ukrainian crisis. For example, in an April 2014 poll conducted by Strategy, a Kazakhstani center for sociological and political research, 62% supported the Russian position, while only 5% supported Ukraine. “Mneniye Kazakhstantsev ob oslozhnenii Rossiysko-Ukrainskikh otnosheniy izuchili sotsiologi” [The Opinion of Kazakhstanis on the Complication of Russian-Ukrainian Relations Studied by Sociologists], Tengri News, April 22, 2014 u https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/mnenie-kazahstantsev-oslojnenii-rossiysko-ukrainskih-254080.

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Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) function as clubs of authoritarian states,4 but the fact that China and Russia have risen under authoritarian regimes emboldens Central Asian politicians and helps them reject criticism from domestic opposition and the West.

Russia and China typically engage Central Asia separately. Cooperation between the two countries is carried out in the framework of the SCO, but their individual engagement is much more active. Their relations in Central Asia would be better described as a division of labor than an active collaboration.5 Russia is influential in the political and military spheres as well as in organizations promoting regional cooperation, epitomized by the EEU. The common language, political culture, and deep personal connections between the elites enable Russia to exert unrivaled influence on the politics of Central Asian countries. China, for its part, wields influence through trade, investment, and infrastructure building.

Given the differences in ability and interests between the two countries, this division of labor is an effective form of coordination in preventing third countries from gaining serious power in Central Asia. Russia does what China cannot do, and China does what Russia cannot do. In particular, the absence of Russian attempts at hindering China’s economic activities in this former Soviet region is remarkable. Some observers have asserted for several years that Russia is annoyed by China’s increasing role and that confrontation between them is inevitable, but this is not happening. Although more active Russian-Chinese cooperation, such as linking the EEU and BRI, largely still exists only on paper, it does not pose a serious problem to the two countries.

The Central Asian states mostly benefit from their relations with Russia and China, both economically and in terms of security. But their overreliance on these larger neighbors can be dangerous. Kyrgyzstan’s debt to China is around $1.64 billion (August 2017), and Tajikistan’s is around $1.20 billion (December 2016), amounts that will be difficult to repay.6 Likewise, Central Asian countries’ dependence on Russia for security restricts their own diplomatic options, as shown by their awkward reaction

4 Alexander Cooley, “Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (2015): 49–63.

5 Daniyar Kosnazarov, “Sino-Russian ‘Division of Labor’: Keeping Central Asia Stable?” Silk Road Reporters, February 16, 2015.

6 Ministry of Finance (Kyrgyzstan), “Struktura gosdolga KR po sostoyaniyu na 31 Avgusta 2017 g.” [Structure of State Debt of the KR as of August 31, 2017], October 6, 2017 u http://www.minfin.kg/ru/novosti/novosti/struktura-gosdolga-kr-po-sostoyaniyu-na-31-avgusta.html; and Ministry of Finance (Tajikistan), Otchet o sostoyanii gosudarstvennogo dolga na 2016 god [State Debt Report for 2016] (Dushanbe, 2016) u http://minfin.tj/downloads/otchet_2016.pdf.

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to the annexation of Crimea despite their usual sensitivity to issues of sovereignty and territorial integration.

Implications for the United States and Japan

The expanding influence of Russia and China in Central Asia contrasts sharply with the United States’ diminishing role in the region. U.S. policy has miscalculated on several fronts. First, geography still matters. For Central Asians, Russia and China are giant and more or less familiar neighbors who must always be reckoned with, while the United States and other developed countries are far away and less understood. As was shown by the Bush administration’s operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and surrounding regions, including Central Asia, the idea that the United States can exert its power globally irrespective of distance has proved untrue. Instead of devising a more sophisticated strategy, the Obama administration lowered the priority of Central Asia in U.S. foreign policy, further damaging U.S. credibility there. The Trump administration seems even less interested in the region.

Second, the condescending attitude of the West has evoked antipathy. In particular, Central Asians discern in the Western approach to democratization a double standard, dependent on the geopolitical and economic interests of the West. Although the Central Asian populaces do not always enthusiastically support their leaders, Western criticism of their countries’ lack of democracy offends national pride and threatens sovereignty. Even in relatively democratic Kyrgyzstan, people have reacted harshly to Western criticism of human rights conditions and ethnic policies, such as the repression of ethnic Uzbek leaders after the violent clash between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south of the country in 2010.

Third, the United States has put too much emphasis on Afghanistan since 2001, making its Central Asia policy dependent on Afghan issues. This has made unclear what the United States wants to achieve in Central Asia itself, and the protracted, unresolved conflict in Afghanistan has discredited the United States and NATO in the eyes of Central Asians. As U.S. interests in Afghanistan have waned, the United States’ attention to the region has also decreased.

An interesting case that contrasts with the United States is Japan’s policy toward Central Asia. Accentuating economic and technical aid and cultural exchanges, Japan has been engaging Central Asia constantly, with

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modest success.7 Although its presence in this region is far from strong, and Central Asian political leaders often complain that the scale of Japanese investment is too small, especially compared with Chinese investment, Japan has nonetheless succeeded in establishing a positive image for itself and has maintained friendlier relations with regional states than most other developed countries have.

The West and Japan must be united and stand firm against threats posed by Russia and China on territorial and security issues, but at the same time they must stop demonizing these countries on other issues. Russia and China feel marginalized in the Western-dominated world, and more than a few people in Central Asia share this feeling. The United States and Japan must show respect for their potential and encourage their participation in developing the global economy and resolving conflicts in regions where Moscow and Beijing do not pursue narrowly self-interested goals.

Although democratization around the world, including in Russia and China, remains an important goal, directly criticizing the political leaders and systems of specific countries is often counterproductive because it hurts national pride. Emphasis must be placed on helping democratizing countries, such as Ukraine, rather than on criticizing nondemocratic ones. Even more important is restoring the moral authority of the West and developed countries, because distrust in them produces distrust in liberal democracy. It is crucial that the United States and other developed states make their internal democratic systems function well and demonstrate that their foreign policies are just and fair. They must prove that they are not depraved, nor religiously and racially prejudiced, and are more capable than Russia and China of constructing a fair and prosperous world.

With regard to Central Asia, some U.S. observers may dismiss this region’s importance for the United States. But the reasons for Central Asians’ disillusionment are similar to other non-Western (especially Muslim) countries, and the United States’ improvement of relations with Central Asia could be a touchstone for recovering its popularity in the world. Therefore, the United States first should make clear that it wants to develop relationships with Central Asian countries not merely as neighbors to Afghanistan, nor as a field for rivalry with Russia and China, but because it attaches special importance and respect to them.

7 Christopher Len, Tomohiko Uyama, and Hirose Tetsuya, eds., Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2008).

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Second, the United States and Japan need to recognize some of the benefits that Russia and China have brought to Central Asia. Instead of downplaying Russian and Chinese initiatives, U.S. and Japanese leaders should work to make Central Asia an area for cooperation between Russia, China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union on the common goals of prosperity and security. When direct cooperation with Russia and China is difficult, international organizations can help. Japan, for example, has been cooperating with China through the Asian Development Bank on improving transportation infrastructure in Central Asia for a long time.

Third, the United States and Japan can contribute to alleviating the Central Asian countries’ overreliance on Russia and China. Japan should enhance trade and investment. The United States should build an international security regime to stabilize Afghanistan and the surrounding region, thus securing the cooperation of Russia and China in resolving the Afghan problem and at the same time restraining their excessive influence on Central Asian security. One of the urgent tasks for the United States and Japan is either to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or to work out a scheme of collaboration with it. This could enable the United States and Japan to more closely monitor China’s financial activities in Central Asia and beyond. Developed countries’ engagement with BRI could also be useful to make Chinese foreign economic activities comply with international rules and standards. Japanese interest in cooperating with BRI, visible in government and business circles since the summer of 2017, is welcome.

In sum, the United States and Japan need to recognize that Russia and China are prime partners of Central Asian countries, but this reality should not serve as a pretext for abandoning the region. The United States and Japan must prove that they are also useful and indispensable partners, capable of both cooperating with and restraining Russia and China when necessary.

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Sino-Russian Cooperation from the Perspective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Hiroshi Yamazoe

This essay assesses the implications of relations betwen China and Russia for the U.S.-Japan alliance, taking into consideration the

impact of the Sino-Russian partnership as well as the challenges that each country poses. Differences in interests and the nonbinding nature of the strategic partnership currently prevent the relationship from becoming a formal alliance. Still, China and Russia have overlapping interests and their cooperation is growing, a trend that is unlikely to be slowed by the policies of other states.

This essay imagines the impact of the partnership on the U.S.-Japan alliance in three scenarios in order to better understand what situations the United States and Japan want to avoid. The general finding is that, while the United States needs a long-term strategy for countering Russian challenges in limited areas, the U.S.-Japan alliance should develop even longer-term and more comprehensive efforts to counter China’s challenges without expecting a quick victory or exacerbating Sino-Russian collaboration.

The Current Status of the Sino-Russian Relationship: Nonbinding Cooperation

From the viewpoint of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Sino-Russian cooperation in the military sphere is of key concern. Russia’s transfer of military hardware aids China’s military buildup (Su-35 fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missiles are recent examples). Chinese capabilities have been growing on their own, but some dimensions (such as jet engines) still depend on Russia and benefit greatly from Russian transfers. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian naval exercises have been developing in sophistication and political messaging. However, the experience that the two countries gain jointly has only slightly increased the vast experience each has been acquiring individually. The exercises in the Baltic Sea in July 2017 and around Vladivostok and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in September 2017

hiroshi yamazoe is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Japan. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

note u The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the Japanese government, NIDS, or any other organization.

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included new elements such as submarine rescue and passage through the Sea of Okhotsk. Still, Ethan Meick assesses that Sino-Russian military-to-military cooperation, though achieving a higher level, has not yet developed into a comprehensive, alliance-like security relationship.1

What concrete joint actions by China and Russia, then, could realistically undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance? Sino-Russian joint opposition to U.S. initiatives in missile defense has gained significant attention, but this opposition will not deter the United States and its allies. Debates in South Korea or Japan are not changed by Russia aligning itself with China against missile defense programs in Asia. Moreover, other states are not joining the Sino-Russian chorus against the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system. Finally, China never hesitated to criticize THAAD from the outset, even without Russia also objecting, just as Russia does not hesitate to criticize NATO’s missile defense program absent China’s input.

Other differences concerning international norms also distinguish the two countries. Russia is more assertive in attempting to establish international norms on information space. Meanwhile, since 1972, it has continued to observe the maritime safety customs of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, despite tensions with U.S. forces in Europe, and this shared U.S.-Russian custom has implications for China’s behavior in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.2 In 2004, Russia also joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort that China does not support.

In the context of both the advances in Sino-Russian cooperation and these differences in each country’s individual positions, one other important feature of the strategic partnership is its nonbinding nature. This relationship is different from an alliance in which allies commit to each other’s defense in the event of a contingency. Moreover, as one expert points out, unlike balancing or bandwagoning, strategic partnerships do not prevent states from pursuing similar partnerships with others.3 One can even argue that Russia and China cooperate because of mutual mistrust. The 2008 resolution of their border demarcation, for instance, was

1 Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March, 20, 2017.

2 Igor Denisov suggests that China’s stance runs contrary to Russia’s adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). See, for example, Lora Saalman, ed., “China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2017, 54.

3 Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (London: Routledge, 2010), 45.

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far less costly than the kinds of military confrontations they experienced during the Cold War era.4 In today’s maritime domain, Russia could choose to support some of China’s claims, but it does not want to sacrifice flexibility by consistently adhering to China’s position. Russia is unwilling to involve China in talks with Japan over the Kuril Islands (or what Japan calls the Northern Territories), just as China has no intention of revising Mao Zedong’s support for Japan’s claim in that dispute. China, moreover, elects not to support Russia’s position concerning Crimea or other parts of Ukraine and thus provoke European countries.

This status of Sino-Russian relations is not the most favorable for Japan, yet Japan still retains ties with Russia to preserve strategic flexibility and prevent Russian overdependence on China. In fact, Japan has maintained a consistent position on international norms in its engagements with Russia, including during the 2016 talks between Shinzo Abe and Vladimir Putin. The institutions of the U.S.-Japan alliance are strong and are not undermined by Japan’s position toward Russia. Whereas U.S. foreign policy is focused on countering Russian activities in Europe, the United States can maintain a relatively cooperative stance toward Russia in the Arctic and Pacific—essentially identical to Japan’s position.5

There is thus no urgency for the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter Sino-Russian joint actions, nor can Russia be expected to balance against China anytime soon. However, we should always be aware of the possibility for a major change in the nature of diplomatic relations. The next section considers three scenarios that, though low-probability, would produce undesirable outcomes for the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional stability more broadly.

Scenarios for the Sino-Russian Partnership

Scenario 1: Russia offers ad hoc support to China within the current limits of cooperation. This scenario considers the possibility of minor troubles even under current conditions wherein China and Russia avoid coordinated action that binds either country’s position. China’s priority regions are the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the waters beyond them in the Pacific, whereas Russia prioritizes the

4 Hiroshi Yamazoe, “Russia’s Security Relations with China: Less Future Risks, More Practical Benefits,” Russian and East European Studies, no. 40 (2011): 79–90.

5 For the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, see Andrey Kortunov and Olga Oliker, eds., A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), chap. 3.

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former Soviet space, Europe, the Middle East, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Arctic Ocean. Chinese and Russian actions regularly overlap only around islands in the East China Sea. Chinese vessels try to undermine Japan’s effective control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the Japan Coast Guard and Self-Defense Forces are frequently obliged to respond. Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambles from April 2016 to March 2017 in response to Chinese and Russian aircraft numbered 851 and 301, respectively. While the number of scrambles in response to Russian flights has remained fairly consistent since 2012, the number of responses to Chinese activities has increased markedly in this time period by over 500.6

There were two curious cases of Russian actions in the East China Sea in 2016 (but not in 2017): in June, Russian vessels approached the Senkaku Islands with the Chinese navy following, and in November a Russian helicopter appeared near the islands. If Russia wanted to, it could provoke Japan by acting simultaneously with China on a regular basis, thus straining Japan’s capacity to respond to daily and increasing Chinese activities. This would not mean that Russia wishes to assume constant political involvement in Sino-Japanese tensions, nor that China has invited Russia to do so. Instead, Russia may temporarily exploit these tensions and subsequently return to its normal neutrality. Indeed, if Russian relations with Japan were worse and Russia had less incentive to keep Japan interested in economic cooperation, then the likelihood of Russian pressure on Japan and coordination with China for this purpose would be higher.

Scenario 2: Russia switches from a nonbinding partnership to fixed support for China. Russia currently tries to avoid solely collaborating with or committing to China’s positions because it still hopes for a rapprochement with the United States and other players should circumstances eventually permit. If Russia were to give up this hope, it might decide to form a bloc with China to aggressively counter the more dangerous U.S. enemy.

That could occur if U.S.-Russia tensions were to expand from Europe, North America, and the Middle East to affect other aspects of their relationship. For example, a series of skirmishes and retaliations at sea might compel the United States to treat Russia as a violator of maritime security norms. In this scenario, Russia would have less incentive to sustain these norms and more motivation to support China’s position

6 A jump in the number of scrambles in response to Russian flights occurred in 2014 with 473 that year. For data, as well as information on flight routes, see “Statistics on Scrambles through Fiscal Year 2016,” Ministry of Defense (Japan), Press Release, April 13, 2017 u http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2017/press_pdf/p20170413_02.pdf.

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in maritime disputes. Another flashpoint could be the Russian Far East. Currently the Russian military is trying to improve its defense capabilities to protect the Sea of Okhotsk, yet it has not achieved the capacity to repel imminent U.S. offensives. If the United States faced serious obstacles from Russia in its operations concerning North Korea or China, and found it necessary to prepare for an all-front escalation contingency against Russia, then the U.S.-Japan alliance would be deployed to the Russian Far East theater, and Russia would find it difficult to sustain operations against the alliance without support from China.

If Russia were to face such a threat from the alliance, it could propose a simultaneous military maneuver with China to undermine U.S.-Japan positions—such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea—in return for Chinese military support or pressure against states sanctioning Russia. China would gain more know-how and military experience from such cooperation with Russia, while Russia would surrender its advantage and limit its ability to prepare for a future clash with China. In these circumstances, both China and Russia would take assertive actions to jointly disturb the operations of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Scenario 3: The United States retreats, Russia grows, and China assumes prominence over the long term. This more hypothetical scenario assumes that the United States’ commitment to alliances decreases and imagines a very different international order from the current U.S.-led one. In this scenario, Russia would exercise greater influence in Europe at the expense of Western institutions. Although a great-power clash in Europe would remain unlikely, Ukraine would be more dependent on Moscow, and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) would formally switch from being full members of NATO to special partners under a fragile NATO-Russia guarantee of their neutrality. NATO’s shrunken membership would reduce it to a collective defense body whose security is guaranteed by Germany and France rather than the United States. Russia would feel existentially more comfortable, enjoying increased influence in global affairs and a decreased sense of encirclement. Europe would live under a fragile peace, but one less dangerous than in any year before 1990 because Russia’s drive for revisionism would have been weakened and made more complicated by NATO and the neutral states.

In East Asia the situation would be more serious. North Korea would command the capability to strike U.S. facilities and population centers, yet it would not cease its provocations against South Korea. China would possess even greater economic and military power. Benefiting from

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favorable conditions for trade, China would not have suffered a major direct military clash with other states. To the contrary, an increasing number of states would now be heavily dependent on its goodwill and subject to its arbitrary decisions in the case of disputes. Russia would begin to suffer from Chinese economic dominance in its eastern territory and would no longer need a formidable China to resist retreating U.S. power. South Korea, due to dependence on China, would be forced to develop a more delicate and complicated foreign policy. In this era, the U.S.-Japan alliance might appear more vulnerable than it really is. Yet still unable to accept China’s dominance, Japan would pursue alternative diplomatic initiatives, such as stronger ties with India and potentially Russia, in an effort to supplement the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Peace in East Asia may endure in this scenario, but the characteristics of China and the United States would make numerous situations quite dangerous. The United States would retreat from its commitments in Europe and the Middle East but remain engaged in the Pacific. Dominance in maritime trade and navigation would be highly important. Nevertheless, based on the U.S. retreat elsewhere, it might appear that the United States is also retreating from Japan. The Chinese leadership, now possessing greater capabilities, might then prioritize grand ideas for the rejuvenation of its civilization and unknowingly misread U.S. resolve in the maritime domain, heightening the risk of escalation. To avoid misperceptions and misjudgments, the U.S.-Japan alliance would need to send clear messages of resolve through proportionate military development and activities sufficient to prove, beyond doubt, that both the United States and Japan would be willing to assume the costs and risks of protecting their mutual interests.

Implications

These three undesirable scenarios have implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, countermeasures against Russia should take care not to conflate the U.S.-Russia rivalry in Eastern Europe with the challenges posed by China. Even if Russia were to attain a change in the status quo there, China still poses more serious problems as a rising power and requires more resources from the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States and Japan should not make the situation worse by motivating China and Russia to join forces—even though their existing behavior continues to necessitate U.S. countermeasures. Given current conditions and the nature of the Sino-Russian partnership, the United States and Japan cannot expect to put

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an end to the two powers’ cooperation, let alone reverse their alignment. Nevertheless, the alliance can adopt countermeasures that do not drive them closer together.

While the challenges posed by Russia in Europe can be countered by the powers there, Japan can also contribute to a stable future along with the existing norms. For example, the United States and Japan should support Ukraine to establish a successful society, but not in a manner that advocates permanent detachment from Russia.7 Russian participation in positive dialogues, such as military-to-military contacts and nonproliferation, should be continued and encouraged. Negative effects by Russian actions in the Asia-Pacific are still limited, and the U.S.-Japan alliance should not take an offensive posture into the Russian Far East or the Arctic region unless Russia becomes involved in military complications over China or North Korea. As far as problems with Russia are concerned, the West is more than capable of playing this protracted and somewhat familiar game.

The game of managing challenges associated with China’s rise is much less familiar, and much more demanding. Playing it well will require the allocation of immense resources and sophisticated long-term planning. Of course, China’s positive commitment to trade within the existing norms supported by the United States should be encouraged. At the same time, however, the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to counter China’s actions in the long term if the country intensifies dangerous attempts to challenge freedom of navigation not only in the South China Sea but in the wider Indo-Pacific as well. With Xi Jinping’s increasingly ambitious “dream,” China will seek to extract gains from its international position whenever possible. Insufficient messaging by the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter these ambitions might result in Chinese miscalculation, leading to severely unfortunate consequences for China, the United States, Japan, and the entire region.

7 In this direction, Japan has been implementing an assistance program in Ukraine providing $1.86 billion. Embassy of Japan in Ukraine, “Japan’s Assistance to Ukraine,” November 14, 2017 u http://www.ua.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/en_oda.html.

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America’s Bleak View of Russia-China Relations

Robert Sutter

T he partnership between Russia and China has matured and broadened since the Cold War, and it has strengthened significantly in the last

decade. The dispositions of President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping support forecasts of closer relations over the next five years and probably beyond. The momentum is based on (1) common objectives, (2) perceived Russian and Chinese vulnerabilities in the face of U.S. and Western pressures, and (3) perceived opportunities for the two powers to expand their influence at the expense of U.S. and allied leaders, who are seen as cautious, distracted, and in decline.

One hundred leading U.S. specialists on Russia and China participating in the NBR project “Strategic Implications of Russia-China Relations” are in broad agreement on the causes of the challenges that Russia and China pose to the United States.1 They agree that Sino-Russian relations increasingly undermine U.S. interests and that past views of the relationship as an “axis of convenience” with little significance for the United States no longer hold. While some see a de facto alliance, others discern a more contingent relationship. All favor broadly strengthening U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military might to change the prevailing international balance of power in ways that improve the U.S. position in the face of opposition by Russia and China. In terms of tactics, the specialists vary in the mix of incentives and disincentives—so-called carrots and sticks—that they suggest employing to deal with this challenge. Notably, some seek advantage in improving U.S.

1 Now entering its second year, the project has involved 30 commissioned papers, formal presentations at three workshops, and one public panel discussion by leading specialists in the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and Europe. Additionally, 20 in-depth private interviews and consultations with 40 specialists inside and outside the U.S. government were conducted by the principal investigator, some project participants, and staff from the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). The specialists participating in the workshops from Japan, South Korea, and Europe generally agreed with the negative findings for U.S. interests and the need for strengthening the United States. Russian and Chinese specialists disagreed. The project’s publications thus far include Michael S. Chase, Evan S. Medeiros, J. Stapleton Roy, Eugene Rumer, Robert Sutter, and Richard Weitz, “Russia-China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines,” NBR, Special Report, no. 66, July 2017 u http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=349; and Shoichi Itoh, Ken Jimbo, Michito Tsuruoka, and Michael Yahuda, “Japan and the Sino-Russian Entente,” NBR, Special Report, no. 64 u http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=34.

robert sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University and the principal investigator of the project “Strategic Implications of Russia-China Relations” at the National Bureau of Asian Research. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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relations with Russia to counter the much more powerful China, while others see major disadvantages in overtures to Moscow.

This essay begins with an examination of the causes and drivers of the closer Russia-China relations that have emerged in the last decade. It then analyzes the roadblocks, or “brakes,” that will slow the developing relationship, in particular identifying how the two countries diverge on many of their most important foreign relationships. The next section studies the strategic consequences of tighter Sino-Russian cooperation for U.S. interests. The final section identifies policy options and provides an outlook for 2018.

The Causes and Drivers of the Sino-Russian Relationship

Counterbalancing U.S. global influence and revising the international order. Russian and Chinese interests converge most prominently on their mutual desire to serve as a counterweight to perceived U.S. preponderant influence. China sees Russia as a useful counterbalance to constrain and weaken U.S. power, and Russia values Sino-Russian cooperation for the same reason. Both seek greater dominance in their respective regions, and the United States stands in the way.

Countering perceived U.S. promotion of democracy. The governments in Moscow and Beijing feel vulnerable and sometimes threatened in the face of U.S. promotion of human rights and democracy, motivating closer cooperation in response. Both states in theory support a doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.

Opposing U.S. military advances in areas important to Russia and China. Both countries perceive the United States as encroaching on areas of strategic interest. Targets here include opposition to U.S. missile defense systems, U.S. military reconnaissance along the Russian and Chinese borders, and U.S. long-range strike capabilities.

Opposing U.S. policies on space and cyberspace security. China and Russia work together to influence rules and norms for outer space and cyberspace to their advantage at the United States’ expense.

Sharing a strongly engrained common identity and strategic culture. Moscow and Beijing (and Presidents Putin and Xi) share a negative view of the intentions of the United States and its allies that reinforces cooperation against perceived outside threats. This view colors how both leaders perceive global affairs and the international order.

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Selling and developing advanced weapons and military technology, and cooperating on other defense activities. Sino-Russian national security collaboration includes arms sales, defense dialogues, and joint exercises. These influence third countries and seek to change the balance of power to the disadvantage of the United States.

Linking trade and investment. Russia has mitigated Western sanctions with Chinese purchases of Russian oil and gas, while China also supplies capital. China has likewise looked to Russia to diversify and secure its energy supplies.

The Brakes on Closer Sino-Russian Relations

Economic asymmetry and longer-term military and political implications. Russia increasingly plays the role of a dependent junior partner. Moscow accommodates China’s economic dominance and greater overall influence in key areas along Russia’s periphery in Mongolia and Central Asia. These trends jeopardize Russian influence and belie Russia’s continued strong drive for status as an international great power.

Asymmetrical tools of power for advancing national interests. Russia has a limited tool kit for exerting international influence. Though the country possesses nuclear weapons, military power, and the means for cyber operations, covert operations, and intelligence in nearby areas, these tools are juxtaposed with large economic and demographic weaknesses and the absence of compelling soft power. China features the full range of international security, economic, and diplomatic tools, which are growing rapidly. Unlike Russia, China has an enormous stake in and is much more integrated with the world economy. It favors global stability that supports development. Beijing seeks a gradual erosion of the U.S.-led international order while continuing to benefit greatly from various aspects of that order.

Limits on arms sales and defense cooperation. As China’s military modernization has taken shape, Russia has less to offer the country as a source of advanced military hardware. Moscow also restricts sales of some advanced weapons that Beijing might use to threaten Russia.

History, distrust, and divergence regarding the Russia-China-U.S. triangle. Both Moscow and Beijing are familiar with and influenced by the history of duplicity and distrust that characterized their often confrontational relationship in the past and their respective dealings with the United States aimed against one another.

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Divergence on foreign relations. Russia and China diverge in their policy approaches to many important countries in the region. China supports Russia in its periodic dramatic shows of force to advance its interests at U.S. expense, but it also seeks a stable working relationship with the United States. Beijing does not want to be seen as an adversarial revisionist power and formally eschews an alliance with Moscow. Possible moves by the Trump administration to ease tension with Putin’s government could prompt Chinese concerns about whether Putin might shift Russian policy closer to the United States, negatively affecting Chinese interests.

In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continues his strong efforts to improve relations with Russia. This raises the possibility that Moscow may be persuaded to improve relations with Tokyo, countering China’s hard line against Japan. Elsewhere in East Asia, North Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea are more important for China than for Russia. Russia’s involvement in North Korea may complicate China’s policy. On the other hand, Russian demonstrations of support for Chinese interests regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan through rhetoric and military exercises mirror Chinese posturing in support of Russian actions in Syria. Such posturing, however, underlines the two countries’ continued ambivalence about supporting each other with binding commitments. Russia also has close relations with India and Vietnam, including the large-scale provision of military equipment to help secure them against China’s rise.

In Central Asia, both sides have failed to effectively coordinate their economic strategies. China has much more to offer the region and has gained political influence through its Belt and Road Initiative. A looming question, and a potential source of tension, is whether China’s growing economic role will inevitably lead to a more significant security role, and if so, how Russia will respond. Farther west and southwest in Europe and the Middle East, China’s ever-growing interest in the economic penetration of Europe and the Middle East requires stability that is challenged by Russian assertiveness, potentially heightening frictions between the two sides going forward.

The Strategic Consequences of Sino-Russian Cooperation

The drivers of Russia-China cooperation are accelerating the bilateral relationship beyond the capacity of the brakes at the United States’ expense. The influence of U.S. policy on key areas of cooperation—notably sales of advanced weapons, energy-related trade and investment, and cooperation

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in the United Nations and elsewhere against various Western initiatives—is low. Preoccupied with troubles at home and abroad, U.S. and allied leaders are creating a balance of international power that favors further advances and challenges from a rising China and resurgent Russia, both of which are averse to the U.S.-backed international order.

Today, Russia and China pose increasingly serious challenges to the U.S.-supported order in their respective priority spheres of concern—Russia in Europe and the Middle East, and China in Asia along the country’s rim. Russia’s challenges involve not only military maneuvers and incursions but also cyber and political warfare that has threatened to undermine elections in the United States and Europe, European unity, and NATO solidarity. China’s cyberattacks, by contrast, have focused more on massive theft of information and intellectual property aimed at accelerating Chinese economic competitiveness and thereby dominating world markets in key advanced technologies at the expense of leading U.S. and other international companies.

The two countries thus work separately and together to complicate and curb U.S. power and influence in the political, economic, and security domains. In terms of global diplomacy, Beijing and Moscow support one another in their respective challenges to the United States and its allies and partners around the world. These joint efforts involve political, security, and economic measures both in multilateral forums and in bilateral relations with U.S. adversaries such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria, in addition to other steps to challenge regional and global norms and institutions backed by the United States.

As indicated above, the U.S. position in the triangular relationship among the United States, Russia, and China has deteriorated. Russia’s tension with the West and ever-deepening dependence on China, alongside active U.S. constructive engagement with China, have given Beijing the advantageous top “hinge” position in the triangle that Washington used to occupy.

U.S. Policy Options

Up to this point, it has been hard to find instances when Russia took substantial risks in support of China’s challenges to the United States that did not involve overlapping Russian interests, and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the Russian-Chinese relationship has become closer, U.S. government and other specialists are carefully examining the behavior of both sides for

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signs of closer collaboration that could bring negative implications for the United States.

No quick fixes. The absence of easy options to remedy the increasingly adverse situation reinforces the bleak American view of Sino-Russian relations. The circumstances today are very different from those that enabled Richard Nixon’s Cold War breakthrough in playing the China card against the Soviet Union in a period of intense Sino-Soviet confrontation. In the contemporary relationship between the two countries, any U.S. overture to accommodate either state in seeking leverage over the other risks being interpreted as another sign of U.S. weakness.

Major recommendations in the NBR project call for wide-ranging measures to strengthen U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic power and influence. This strengthening would enable a more favorable balance of power supporting the U.S.-backed international order that is now challenged by Russian and Chinese actions. Building national power at home and abroad requires greater domestic cohesion and less partisan discord and government gridlock. Strategies employed need to be realistic and effectively implemented. It is worth emphasizing that these are long-term policy choices requiring prolonged whole-of-government approaches that are difficult to carry out amid high-profile distractions. These recommendations are in line with those of earlier authoritative studies by policy-oriented research organizations dealing with Russia and China.2 However, unlike those studies, the NBR project sees the United States not as a constant among variables—that is, not as an actor that is necessarily assumed as able and willing to employ the demanding recommendations offered by the project. Rather, U.S. policy and behavior are viewed as major uncertain variables that have impacts on the Russia-China relationship.

Playing the long game. Whereas the Russian and Chinese specialists in the NBR project tend to support U.S. accommodation of Russian and Chinese

2 Major studies include Julianne Smith, “A Transatlantic Strategy for Russia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Task Force White Paper, August 29, 2016; Angela Stent, “Russia, China and the West after Crimea,” Transatlantic Academy, 2015–16 series, no. 8, 2016; Kathleen Hicks and Lisa Sawyer Samp, Recalibrating U.S. Strategy toward Russia: A New Time for Choosing (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017); Eugene Rumer, Henry Sokolsky, and Andrew S. Weiss, “Guiding Principles of a Sustainable U.S. Policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia: Key Judgments from a Joint Task Force,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook, February 9, 2017; Julianne Smith and Adam Twardowski, “The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations,” Center for New American Security, January 11, 2017; Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy toward China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015); Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk, chairs, “U.S. Policy toward China: Recommendations for a New Administration,” Asia Society and University of California–San Diego, Task Force Report, February 2017; and Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Sydney: Penguin, 2017).

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ambitions, the American specialists argue that any such accommodation should be backed by a strengthening of the United States and should avoid undermining the resolve of either Washington or its allies and partners. The American specialists agree that the influence of U.S. policy on key areas of Russia-China cooperation, notably weapon sales, energy-related trade and investment, and cooperation in the United Nations and elsewhere against various Western initiatives, remains low. More promising targets for increasing U.S. influence involve exploiting differences between China and Russia. Such differences include China’s rise in power at a time when Russia remains hobbled by demographic and economic weaknesses and Russia’s alienation from the U.S.-led international order at a time when China continues to rely on it. Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese ambitions for dominance in their respective regions make regional governments that are negatively affected more inclined to work closely with the United States in seeking strategic counterweight.

Outlook for 2018. Given the uncertainty regarding U.S. policy toward Russia and China, the NBR project offers alternative policy choices rather than specific recommendations to U.S. government decision-makers. It shows the pros and cons of long- and short-term U.S. policy choices to enable policymakers with different views on Russia and China to choose an appropriate path forward.3 Longer-term choices range from accommodating Russia and/or China to supporting U.S. international primacy; in between these extremes are choices that mix U.S. strengthening and accommodation. Shorter-term policy choices involve the United States, without significant strengthening, seeking to gain an advantage by tilting for or against Russia, China, or both. The path that Washington decides to follow will likely be the most important determinant of the impact of Russia-China relations on the United States over the next year.

3 It should be noted that the U.S. administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy also sees grave dangers from Russia and China and argues for U.S. strengthening in response. This signals the government’s intention to pursue a more clearly defined direction in dealing with Russia and China. See White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 2017).

China and the Strategic Imperative for the United States

Charles Boustany and Richard J. Ellings

asia policy vol . 13, no . 1 (january 2018), 47–67

• http://asiapolicy .nbr .org •

keywords: united states; china; u.s. trade policy; balance of power


special essay

charles boustany is a Counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the inaugural chair holder of NBR’s Center for Innovation, Trade, and Strategy. Congressman Boustany served in the U.S. Congress from 2005 to 2017 for Louisiana’s 3rd Congressional District and held leadership positions on the House Ways and Means Committee. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

richard j. ellings is President and Co-founder of the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and Affiliate Professor of International Studies in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. He is the author and editor of half a dozen books on Asia and foreign policy and serves as executive director of NBR’s Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

executive summary

asia policy

This essay examines the implications of China’s rise and calls on the U.S. to address the domestic bases for national power and to reassume a leadership role in Asia by executing a grand strategy that is fully cognizant of political, historical, economic, and strategic realities.

main argument

The U.S. has deep and long-standing interests in the strategically complex Indo-Pacific region. Now, however, Beijing’s multi-decade strategy is bearing fruit as Chinese power and interests are beginning to predominate there. U.S. regional interests and leadership are challenged, and U.S. economic and security policies relevant to Asia are incoherent. Washington must craft effective policies that coordinate economic and diplomatic instruments of power with military instruments of power, and these policies must be executed in a manner consistent with historical yet achievable strategic imperatives.

policy implications• Xi Jinping is committed to consolidating his and the Chinese Communist

Party’s grip on Chinese society, basing much of his and the party’s legitimacy on nationalism. China appears determined to replace the U.S. as the dominant regional force and compete for global hegemony.

• The U.S. must address the threats to its economy and at the same time remain engaged in crafting the rules of the international economic order. It should improve as needed and consider rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership to accelerate economic growth and coordination among coalition members. The U.S. should seek opportunities to strengthen liberal economic behavior in the region.

• The U.S. must develop an appropriate, well-resourced military strategy for the Indo-Pacific and deploy the required weapons and related systems to execute it.

• The U.S. must build coalitions to keep a stable balance of power, as well as reform and lead the institutions that play critical roles in the post–World War II economic and political order.

• The relationship between China and the U.S., together with the actions and strategies of each power, will be the most important determinants of the 21st-century world order. The U.S. has the capacity to rise to the challenge, but it must make serious assessments of what is needed and act accordingly and expeditiously.

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boustany and ellings • china and the strategic imperative

C hina’s accession on December 11, 2001, to membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) was hailed by many in the United States

as a breakthrough that could lead to political liberalization in China, peace and security in Asia, and greater prosperity for the American people.1 This optimism has faded away, replaced by rising pessimism. The first two goals have not been achieved, nor are the prospects for achieving them bright, and the third is a major continuing political issue and increasingly questioned by economists.2

Fueling the pessimism are years of muddled, uncoordinated U.S. policies toward China. These policies have been a Procrustean mix of robust yet distorted economic engagement, ad hoc strategic and diplomatic responses to events, and constrained defense planning due to budgetary paralysis. Neglect of the influence that China is deriving from its enormous economic success and the growing challenges in the U.S.-China relationship, coupled with a failure to properly consider this relationship in the context of a U.S. grand strategy, have constituted a profound policy failure. The situation has been made worse by a succession of Chinese leaders who, in contrast, have carried out a consistent grand strategy in the face of U.S. policy incoherence.

To address this failure, the Trump administration issued in December 2017 the new National Security Strategy, which seeks to clarify the challenges presented by China, especially to the U.S. economy. The Trump administration is also conducting major investigations of Chinese industrial and trade practices.3 In December, with China the clear target, the administration agreed with Japan and the European Union to work together “to enhance trilateral cooperation in the WTO and in other forums, as appropriate, to eliminate…unfair market distorting and protectionist practices by third countries.” The joint statement focused on “government-financed and supported capacity expansion, unfair competitive conditions caused by large market-distorting subsidies and state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and local content requirements and preferences.”4 These are positive

1 See, for example, William J. Clinton, “Remarks Given at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,” University of California–Santa Barbara, American Presidency Project, March 8, 2000 u http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714.

2 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, “The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016): 205–40. See also Dani Rodrik, Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

3 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 2017). 4 “Joint Statement by the United States, European Union, and Japan,” Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative, Press Release, December 2017 u https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/december/joint-statement-united-states.

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first steps, possibly heralding a decisive change in the United States’ approach to economic relations with China. At the outset of 2018, such steps and more need to be implemented and placed in a broad policy framework.

Pervading the complexities of the Indo-Pacific region, including continental Asia, is the emerging salience of Chinese power and interests. A number of questions arise. What are the crucial dynamics driving nations’ policies in the region today? Which Chinese capabilities and interests conflict with those of the United States and others in the region? What characteristics of China and the United States affect this strategic environment? How can these powers shape their competition, which Aaron Friedberg calls “a struggle for mastery in Asia”? 5 Can a stable balance of power be maintained to avoid war? Can a liberalized trade system with agreed-upon rules and effective enforcement be sustained, or will a cycle of competing nationalist policies undermine this system as the United States and China, with a shallow basis for trust, jockey with different values, historical legacies, cultures, and political systems? What are the central components of an American grand strategy that is informed by strategic realities and optimizes the chances of success? The relationship between the United States and China, together with the actions and strategies of each power, will be the most important determinants of world order in the 21st century.

the strategic context for understanding u.s.-china relations

The United States is a Pacific nation with deep and long-standing interests in Asia and throughout the Indo-Pacific. In his review of U.S. grand strategy in Asia, Michael Green observes that “for over two centuries, Americans have been tied to the Pacific by commerce, faith, geography, and self-defense.” He adds, “If there is one central theme in American strategic culture as it applied to the Far East over time, it is that the United States will not tolerate any other power establishing exclusive hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific.”6 In the post–World War II era, the United States has aimed to prevent any one power from dominating the Eurasian landmass, to maintain open sea lanes and freedom of navigation, to promote open trade, and to define a line of

5 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

6 Michael J. Green, By More than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific since 1783 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 1, 5.

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defense that safeguards the United States.7 It has been supremely successful until recently.

Compared with the United States and Europe in the decade following the war, Asia was an economic backwater. Only in the 1960s and 1970s, with the success of Japan and then the Asian “tigers,” did its economic prominence rise. Still, U.S. economic, military, and political preponderance in Asia remained through the 1990s and early 2000s as the nation drew additional legitimacy from its victory in the Cold War. It continued to lead the stabilizing hub-and-spoke security structure based on mutual defense treaties with five nations; its success also derived from an expanding number of countries in the region sharing its values and developing rule of law and democratic institutions and habits. Finally, the United States derived influence from its leadership in trade liberalization and of multilateral regimes.

Much of this architecture of Pax Americana is in question today, and this is due most fundamentally to core changes in the balance of power. Asia has become far more important in international relations than it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, the importance of the Indo-Pacific region can hardly be understated.8 Including the United States and Canada, the region contains 37 nations and features the world’s two major powers, the United States and China.9 It hosts the four most populous nations in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim nation. Six declared nuclear powers and eight of the ten largest militaries in the world are located in the region.

The importance of the Indo-Pacific to the global economy is equally significant. The region includes the world’s three largest economies, nine of the ten largest sea ports, and many of the busiest sea lanes. Maritime security is essential in support of $5.3 trillion in global trade transiting the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea each year, $1.2 trillion of which is destined for the United States.10 In recent years, 25% of global oil and 50% of global

7 The major failure of this strategy transpired in the interwar period of Wilsonian idealism, which was followed by a period of isolationism.

8 U.S. Pacific Command, briefing to the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Board of Directors, March 2017.

9 In this essay, we treat “Asia” as the entire eastern half of the Eurasian land mass and the arc of offshore islands in the western Pacific. This vast expanse can be pictured as an area centered on China and consisting of four distinct subregions arrayed clockwise around it: Northeast Asia (including Russia, the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia, Japan, and Taiwan), Southeast Asia (including the ten ASEAN states, East Timor, Australia, and New Zealand), South Asia (including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

10 Sara Schonhardt and Saurabh Chaturvedi, “South China Sea Ruling Increases Uncertainty for Shipping, Trade,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2016.

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gas shipments have traversed the Strait of Malacca each day.11 At the center of all this activity is China, which is now by far the world’s largest industrial producer, with this sector more vertically and horizontally integrated than in any other economy. China has replaced the United States in other ways as well—for instance, as the major trading partner of Asian countries—and has become the world’s largest trading power and entrepôt. The Indo-Pacific, with China at its epicenter, is thus now the engine of the world economy.

What else do these numbers and rankings suggest? From the perspective of the balance of power and its implications for international relations, there are two salient features. The first is the rise of China to superpower status with no peer competitor other than the United States. By a tremendous margin, it is now Asia’s largest economic and military power. The second feature is the rapidity of China’s rise, especially in relation to Japan’s relative stagnation and to slower growth and mercurial politics in the United States. China has possessed the world’s fastest-growing major economy and military for three decades. Thus, the balance of power in Asia has undergone a complete transformation, with strategic ambiguity as an unavoidable consequence. Dizzying leaps by China are driving peripheral countries to frequently reassess its growing capabilities, motivations, and objectives. Nearby nations are pursuing an uncomfortable combination of policies: strengthening coalitions to counter economic challenges from China and to balance Chinese power, revising their economic strategies to better compete, engaging and seeking accommodation with China, and building up their militaries. Recently Europeans have become anxious as well. As Robert Gilpin underscored in his book War and Change, the most dangerous times in history are those with a fast-rising power.12

Add to this combustible mix the historical animosities and distrust in the region. Chinese dwell on their country’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of the Japanese, Europeans, and Americans. Chinese leaders’ emphasis on Japanese transgressions boosts their popularity at home and serves to justify their stern Japan policy. Many Koreans harbor similar sentiments stemming from their colonial and World War II experiences. Moreover, extreme nationalism frequently grows in societies undergoing industrialization; China appears to be the principal nation of concern in this regard. Plus, political values and systems vary widely in the region. Contrast the democratic values

11 U.S. Energy Information Agency, “The South China Sea Is an Important World Energy Trade Route,” Today in Energy, April 4, 2013 u https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671.

12 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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of institutions in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and India, for example, with the autocratic ones in Russia, China, and North Korea. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the most likely site of major-power conflict.13

Consequently and inescapably, the United States retains vital security interests in the region. Indeed, the core dynamics of international relations today are driven by developments involving the United States and China: their successes or failures in their separate domestic matters; their bilateral interactions, including in multilateral contexts; and their policies across economic, diplomatic, and military affairs. Henry Kissinger posed the dilemma in the following terms:

The question ultimately comes down to what the U.S. and China can realistically ask of each other. An explicit American project to organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade is unlikely to succeed—in part because China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power.14

Graham Allison, Ted Galen Carpenter, Christopher Coker, Howard French, Aaron Friedberg, and others are writing thoughtfully about the incredible difficulty ahead of sustaining a peace that is acceptable to both China and the United States.15 Both countries presumably have interests in avoiding conflict, but, at a minimum, only as long as each sees the other as able and prepared to defend its current and claimed interests effectively. Therefore, it is imperative for U.S. policymakers to understand China’s changing capacities, interests, goals, will, and actions in relation to their own country’s. This is an ongoing project second to none in significance to the United States.

13 Given the challenge posed by Russia, Europe constitutes the next most likely site. 14 Henry Kissinger, “The China Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2011 u https://www.wsj.

com/articles/SB10001424052748703864204576315223305697158. 15 See, for example, Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s

Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2015); Christopher Coker, The Improbable War: China, The United States and Logic of Great Power Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017); Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Debate over U.S. China Strategy,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 89–110; and Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy.

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china: a new economic and military locus of power

The strategically critical fact in Asia is the return of China to economic and military preeminence, reflective of its position for centuries prior to the industrialization of Europe and North America. China’s economically based influence exerts a “gravitational pull” on every nation around it, as well as across the Pacific to the United States. Many American, Asian, and European companies are highly integrated into the Chinese economy through supply chains, joint ventures, consulting contracts, and product research and development. Americans buy about four times as much from China as they sell to it.16 China runs an impressive current account surplus with the world, providing the country with vast funds to invest abroad and at home in its military. Likewise, as China rapidly modernizes its military, U.S. forces in the western Pacific find themselves increasingly vulnerable.

Since 1949, the primary imperative for the Chinese Communist Party has been to maintain its monopoly on domestic political power—by all means necessary. These means range from seeking legitimacy through economic success and the achievement of national aspirations to suppressing any threats to the party and its leadership hierarchy; they include control over the People’s Liberation Army, all other organizations of any significance, and the policy tools guiding the economy.

A second imperative, commenced under Deng Xiaoping 30 years later, has been to build China into a great and powerful nation. Under his leadership, China began an intensive period of industrial, technological, agricultural, and military development.17 Deng opened the country to carefully controlled investment and international aid, encouraged entrepreneurship, and allowed some loosening of state control, but the economy continued to be dominated by state-owned enterprises. In the realm of foreign relations, China’s strategy during this period is best described by Deng’s notion that the country would “hide its power and bide its time.” For a quarter century, China thus focused mostly on internal economic development and modernizing its military.

16 U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with China” u https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.

17 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013).

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The Consolidation of Power under Xi Jinping

The time of hiding and biding has been ending for half a decade. The hallmarks of Xi Jinping’s tenure as chairman of the party and head of state are his consolidation of power, strengthening the party, and his more aggressive policies abroad. The latter seem aimed not only at weakening the postures of the United States and its allies in the region but at extending Chinese influence globally. China’s authoritarian and suzerain past appears to be a model for its future.

Xi proved his ascension last fall at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee and the wider Politburo, he has no identifiable successors.18 He has concentrated decision-making authority more than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong and has surrounded himself with capable managers. After assuming power in 2012, Xi launched a far-reaching anticorruption program as the first step in imposing more uniform party discipline. He has expanded repression of dissidents and human rights and placed further restrictions on NGOs, the press, and the use of the internet. These measures have extended into the academic arena, which previously allowed limited freedom to research sensitive subjects. Xi has made explicit and bolstered what was always the case: that every organization and business operating in China, whether Chinese or foreign, will have party members in key positions and ultimately will be controlled by the party.19

Harnessing technologies that even George Orwell could not foresee, the party-state has embarked on a massive effort to track the activities of all of its citizens and reward or punish them according to the “social credit” system. People are tracked from their mobile phone usage and payment data, increasingly by facial recognition software and cameras deployed throughout the country, from internet traffic, through the use of big data analytics, and by a massive secret police force.20 Citizens who obey the law and avoid suspicious

18 “The World’s Most Powerful Man,” Economist, October 14–20, 2017; and William C. McCahill Jr., “The Chinese Communists’ New Politburo Standing Committee: More Claque Than Collective Leadership,” NBR, Commentary, October 26, 2017 u http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=813/.

19 Michael Martina, “Exclusive: In China, the Party’s Push for Influence Inside Foreign Firms Stirs Fears,” Reuters, August 24, 2017 u https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies/exclusive-in-china-the-partys-push-for-influence-inside-foreign-firms-stirs-fears-idUSKCN1B40JU.

20 See, for example, Simon Denyer, “China’s Watchful Eye: Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big Drive for Total Surveillance,” Washington Post, January 7, 2018 u https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for- total-surveillance/.

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political behavior are rewarded; those who transgress are punished. In short, the Chinese government is conducting an extraordinary experiment to achieve unprecedented control of its large national population.21

As reported widely in the Western press, China’s quest to put together dossiers and track people extends well beyond its borders. The successful cyberattack in 2015 against the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) nabbed the personal information of more than 21 million Americans, including their fingerprints. In addition, China is the chief suspect in the Anthem medical data attack that compromised close to 80 million records.22 Although the Chinese government has vehemently denied involvement in these data breaches, experts believe that the “attacks were carried out by the Chinese government hackers in order to collect information to help identify Chinese dissidents in the U.S., as well as to track people who may frequently visit China.”23 In August 2017, a Chinese national was arrested for supplying and using the malware Sakula, the same malicious software tool used in the OPM and Anthem attacks.24

The Four Elements of Chinese International Strategy

The strengthened party leadership is charting the path for Chinese international strategy. Four basic elements of this strategy are coming into focus.

Retaining control of the economy. The first element is to retain ultimate control of the economy through a fusion of central planning and market forces under the watchful eye of the party-state. As in the past, the strategy incorporates mercantilist trade practices and a range of protectionist measures, with the explicit goals of developing the Chinese economy and building domestic wealth by capturing emerging industries and achieving world-leading indigenous innovation. The government continues to make the transfer of technology and intellectual property (IP) a precondition for

21 In December 2017, Xi ordered officials to accelerate implementation of the party-state’s big data strategy, entailing the completion of the national digital infrastructure, data collection, analysis, cybersecurity, and sharing among official organizations. See Denyer, “China’s Watchful Eye”; and “China Must Accelerate Implementation of Big Data Strategy: Xi,” China Daily, December 9, 2017.

22 Drew Harwell and Ellen Nakashima, “China Suspected in Major Hacking of Health Insurer,” Washington Post, February 5, 2015.

23 Robert Abel, “Hacked American Businesses Are Using China as a Scapegoat,” Outline, February 13, 2017 u https://theoutline.com/post/1071/when-big-companies-get-hacked-it-s-tempting-to-blame-china. See also Joseph Menn, “Chinese National Arrested in Los Angeles on U.S. Hacking Charge,” Reuters, August 24, 2017; and Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says Breached OPM Database,” Washington Post, December 2, 2015.

24 “Chinese National Arrested for Supplying Malware Connected to OPM Breach,” Meritalk, August 25, 2017.

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market entry and has acquired IP at a prodigious rate using these measures. In addition, it has acquired IP illicitly through a variety of traditional and cyber means, accounting for up to 80% of IP theft internationally. The cost to the United States alone is hundreds of billions of dollars per year.25

To further bridge the innovation gap, China is directing ever more resources into R&D in strategic industries, seeking to create national champions that play a dominant role in the global market. There is also a concerted effort to recruit the best and brightest around the world to enhance these initiatives. On the international stage, China continues to promote its status as a developing country in order to broadly seek an advantage in the global market and international forums. At the WTO, however, it now is disputing treatment as a non-market economy by the European Union, a status that allows the EU to level higher tariffs. This is but one example of China’s continued attempt to bend global trade rules to its advantage.

Building hard power. The second element of China’s new international strategy is the buildup of hard power. China has traditionally been a continental power. In recognition of this historical vulnerability, the country has taken steps to enhance its air force and to build a true blue water navy. In addition, China deploys its coast guard fleet and numerous allegedly private craft, such as fishing boats, that work in strategic coordination with official vessels to probe and challenge Japan’s and other nations’ maritime areas. Copying current Russian behavior, and reminiscent of Soviet tactics during the Cold War, Chinese air force fighters and bombers regularly conduct threatening operations toward Japanese airspace, causing Japan to scramble its fighters to intercept them hundreds of times per year. China’s space, cyber, and nuclear forces are also world-class.

In the South China Sea, China issued a map with a nine-dash line claiming most of the sea as Chinese territory and followed this announcement with land-reclamation projects and the construction of airstrips and military infrastructure on these former islets and reefs. Brought to the international tribunal in The Hague by the Philippines in 2013, China simply rejected the court’s jurisdiction and later the court’s ruling against it in 2016. China is also expanding its sea port access along the Indian Ocean, most notably in Gwadar, Pakistan, for strategic and energy security purposes. Moreover, to further increase power projection, it has built its first remote military base in Djibouti. Added up, China continues to develop its already powerful,

25 See Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (Seattle: NBR, 2013), 3 u http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf.

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multidimensional military, and it is finding more ways to use this tool kit in day-to-day policy.

Leading regional integration with Chinese characteristics. The third element of Xi’s strategy is the launch of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, in which China seeks to lead broad integration in Eurasia by combining infrastructure, development, aid, and expanded trade and investment.26 This is a long-term strategy designed to further build Chinese economic power and put China at the center of developing institutions and rules throughout Eurasia and along the sea routes connecting Asia and Europe. The initiative elevates Xi’s reputation on the global stage by giving him convening authority among world leaders, and by doing so, it enhances his legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. Though implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative will be challenging, other countries in the region will have difficulty gaining leverage because of the absence of significant alternative sources of capital. In fact, the pull of the initiative is even extending into Western Europe.27

In 2016, China also opened the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to further enhance its influence while leveraging additional investment opportunities globally. This bank is arguably the first step by China to create a specific alternative to one of the Bretton Woods institutions developed under U.S. leadership. Chinese leaders are also taking carefully orchestrated steps to internationalize the renminbi with the goal of competing with the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. In particular, the Belt and Road Initiative creates a platform for international transactions in renminbi. China has managed fluctuation in its currency within a narrow band and is the largest foreign holder of U.S. sovereign debt. If successful, these new policies will give the country more monetary tools to manage its currency as it diversifies away from holdings of U.S. Treasuries. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is that China is building an alternative economic order to compete with the one constructed by the United States after World War II. U.S. policymakers have yet to fully respond to this challenge.

Deploying sharp power. The fourth element of Xi’s strategy involves what has been called the deployment of “sharp power,” along with the traditional use

26 See Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: NBR, 2017).

27 In addition, China has begun trade discussions with Canada and Mexico, following its investments in Africa and South America, and is demonstrating leadership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which aims to expand multilateral trade in Asia.

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of soft power.28 Sharp power is more intrusive and coercive, yet diffuse, so as to be difficult to trace directly to the state. In the case of China, the Economist describes sharp power as seeking “to penetrate and subvert politics, media, and academia, surreptitiously promoting a positive image of the country, and misrepresenting and distorting information to suppress dissent and debate.” It adds that “China’s sharp power has three striking characteristics—it is pervasive, it breeds self-censorship, and it is hard to nail down proof that it is the work of the Chinese state.” 29 Sharp power is used to soften and mold opposition to meet Chinese interests. Examples include influence-peddling through foundations connected to the Chinese Communist Party that fund think tanks in Washington, D.C.;30 large investments in Hollywood and theater chains;31 distribution of the China Daily and news-like inserts in major newspapers; Confucius Centers in academic institutions across the United States; and claimed enforcement of embargoes against North Korea even as trade continues (maybe coordinated with Russia), despite official statements.32 China also informally sanctions its neighbors when it is displeased: for example, cutting off exports of rare earths to Japan when Japan arrested a fishing boat captain; blocking Chinese tourism in Taiwan when Tsai Ing-wen was elected; and imposing unofficial sanctions against South Korea when it decided to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.33

In sum, Xi is committed to the consolidation of both his position as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and the party’s grip on Chinese society. Xi and his colleagues thereby intend to avoid the fate of the Soviet Communist Party domestically and the Soviet Union internationally. In essence, China appears determined to replace the United States as the preeminent military, economic, and political force throughout the Indo-Pacific and to establish itself as the world’s dominant power.

28 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “From ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Sharp Power’: Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World,” in “Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,” National Endowment for Democracy, December 2017, 13.

29 “How China’s ‘Sharp Power’ Is Muting Criticism Abroad and Stealthily Trying to Shape Public Opinion in Its Favour,” Economist, December 14, 2017.

30 See, for example, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “This Beijing-Linked Billionaire Is Funding Policy Research at Washington’s Most Influential Institutions,” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2017; and Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks,” New York Times, September 6, 2014.

31 Matthew Garrahan and Henny Sender, “Chinese Investors Flood into Hollywood,” Financial Times, June 7, 2016.

32 Nicola Smith, “Chinese Ships Spotted by Satellites ‘Selling Oil to North Korea’ 30 Times since October, Despite Sanctions,” Telegraph (UK), December 28, 2017.

33 Kristian McGuire, “Dealing with Chinese Sanctions: South Korea and Taiwan,” Diplomat, May 12, 2017.

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the united states: responding with incoherence

In the face of the economic and security challenges posed by China, the response of the United States has been strategic incoherence—a failure to properly assess these challenges, define goals, and apply the instruments of national power to achieve explicit goals in a coordinated and integrated fashion.

Abdicating Leadership in the Global Economy

The decision in early 2017 to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) fulfilled a presidential campaign promise and was supported by a majority of Americans.34 It was made, however, without a formal review of the consequences or the presentation of an alternative that might have better achieved U.S. economic and strategic goals. This constituted a significant departure from the United States’ traditional position of regional leadership and was perceived as such by key allies and friends in the region. By backing out of the TPP, the United States was seen to be retreating. The decision thus raised serious questions about U.S. leadership and credibility at a time when China was seeking to step into any power vacuum. In just a few months, there was evidence that some Americans were modifying their views on trade agreements, giving them more support.35

Japan has also sought to fill the economic leadership role, in its case to implement the TPP in hopes that the United States will recognize its mistake and rejoin. Australia and New Zealand have expressed similar hopes.

34 In January 2017, a Rasmussen survey found that most voters “applauded the end of TPP” and “want changes in NAFTA,” noting that “just 33% of voters think most free trade deals with other countries have been good for America. Forty-two percent (42%) believe they have been bad for the country instead. Only eight percent (8%) say those deals have had no impact. Sixteen percent (16%) are not sure.” “Most Applaud End of TPP, Want Changes in NAFTA,” Rasmussen Reports, January 26, 2017 u http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/trump_administration/january_2017/most_applaud_end_of_tpp_want_changes_in_nafta.

35 In April 2017, the Pew Research Center found that “support for free trade agreements rebound[ed] modestly,” reporting that “currently 52% say free trade agreements between the United States and other countries are a good thing for the U.S., while 40% view them as a bad thing.” Specifically regarding the U.S.-China trade relationship, however, an April 2017 Rasmussen survey found that “52% of likely U.S. voters say the current trade situation between the U.S. and China is better for China,” although Pew found that “U.S. attitudes toward China [are] soften[ing].” A Pew Research Center study in 2016 on economic power found that 55% of Americans had an unfavorable view of China. By July 2017, 47% of Americans expressed a negative attitude toward China, while 44% had a positive attitude. See Bradley Jones, “Support for Free Trade Agreements Rebounds Modestly, but Wide Partisan Differences Remain,” Pew Research Center, April 25, 2017; “Most Voters Not Happy with Current U.S.-China Trade Situation,” Rasmussen Reports, April 6, 2017; and Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, and Caldwell Bishop, “Globally, More Name U.S. Than China as World’s Leading Economic Power,” Pew Research Center, July 13, 2017.

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In late 2017, the EU completed a trade agreement with Japan, and it has also shown interest in filling the void left by the United States. A recent white paper by the EU Commission described in some detail a strategy for setting European standards for trade in the Asia-Pacific region, clearly recognizing the opportunity presented by the United States’ seeming retreat.36

Without a clear strategy, the United States is abdicating its position as the most credible partner for keeping the peace and sustaining rules-based, liberalized trade and innovation. A major concern is that new rules will be written by others. To put this in perspective, there are around 350 trade agreements in effect today worldwide and another 250 that are proposed. Beyond membership in the WTO and regional trade regimes, the United States is party to only 14 trade agreements, which include twenty countries.37 The United States is not party to a free trade agreement with any of the other ten leading economies, with the exception of Canada. In that case, however, Washington is currently renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which badly needs updating, and the Trump administration has threatened to withdraw from it. Those negotiations are being watched around the world for signs of either an American retreat into isolation or a recommitment to leadership.

As a tactical matter, it would be wise for those advocating a new or revised TPP to insist that such a trade group be intended for any country (including China) that truly meets the highest trade standards, including on new 21st-century issues such as digital trade, cross-border data flows, IP protections, privacy standards, state-owned enterprises, and other non-tariff measures. Meeting these standards is in China’s long-term interest as well as that of the United States, and China would have the choice to join or not. By taking this approach, the United States would be in a stronger leadership position in the region. This approach might also enhance the position of reformers in China and certainly would test the intentions of the Chinese leadership. The Truman administration used this approach to test the intentions of Soviet leadership when the Marshall Plan was proposed after World War II. It put the United States on the high ground as the plan was implemented, while Stalin’s refusal to participate revealed much. This knowledge was important as the Truman administration crafted a postwar strategy that positioned the United States to shape the events to come.

36 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the EU, 2014).

37 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Free Trade Agreements” u https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.

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Still Asia’s Security Guarantor?

Over the decades, U.S. security policy in the Pacific theater has been relatively consistent, albeit with occasional, incremental adjustments. Efforts have been made to strengthen the alliances and adjust to developments in allies’ domestic circumstances. Modest rebalancing of the global distribution of U.S. military assets is underway in an attempt to respond to China’s rise. But in the past ten years these dimly lit tweaks have been lost in the shadow of the dramatic changes in Asia’s strategic environment. Not surprisingly, therefore, little if any progress has been achieved in settling security problems. In some cases, there have been serious setbacks from the U.S. perspective—notably the advances in the North Korean nuclear and missile programs and China’s base building in the South China Sea. Moreover, there has been scant policy appreciation of the direct linkage of foreign economic and trade policy with security policy. Washington has yet to respond effectively to the persistent U.S. trade and balance-of-payments deficits with China. Manufacturers continue to be incentivized by China’s low labor rates and subsidies to move businesses there, and defense contractors—and most manufacturers—remain vulnerable to Chinese industrial espionage and rampant IP theft.

elements of u.s. strategy: recommendations for u.s. policy

As China continues to test U.S. intentions where the United States’ response is weak or nonexistent, Beijing is emboldened. The United States must craft coherent and effective policies that coordinate economic and diplomatic instruments of power with military instruments of power, and these policies must be executed in a manner consistent with historical yet achievable strategic imperatives. While the United States possesses superior military capability, it must maintain its edge wherever practicable.

Economics and Diplomacy

Without effective alternatives, unilateral steps are underway and will represent improvements over past policies. These steps include strengthening the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and both clarifying and broadening its mission. They entail penalizing violators of IP protections and enhancing protection from predatory practices overseas. The ongoing Section 301 investigation of Chinese IP theft and forced transfers, together with pending U.S. Commerce Department actions on dumping

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charges regarding steel, aluminum, and other products, will undoubtedly lead to national policy responses such as targeted tariffs and other penalties. Concluded in December was the important step of lowering tax rates to make U.S. producers competitive with their counterparts overseas.

More is needed, however, and on the international stage, building on the December agreement by the United States, Japan, and Europe to collaborate on stopping China’s predatory trade and industrial policies. The United States should seek to strengthen the existing Bretton Woods and derivative institutions that are the foundation of the international economic order. Doing so will invigorate U.S. legitimacy. Working together with its partners, the United States should use these institutions to challenge China calmly, firmly, and consistently to achieve standards consonant with the rule of law and national interests. U.S. policymakers must also put forth reforms in these institutions to address deficiencies as well as make a robust diplomatic effort to build the necessary international support for those reforms. In doing so, U.S. diplomats should apply lessons learned about China’s strategic culture and negotiating behavior.38

Reform of the WTO must be a priority, as the organization is ill-equipped to deal with the problems posed by non-market economies and state-directed mercantilist practices. Overcoming Chinese resistance to these reforms will require measures to create leverage or bypass China. Building on unilateral U.S. actions, a multinational approach with the EU, Japan, and other like-minded countries would assist in dealing with predatory Chinese trade practices. By sharing export control and CFIUS information and coordinating policy on IP theft and forced transfers, U.S. cooperation with allies and friends would not only better secure the U.S. economy but apply further pressure on China to change and build a basis for needed reforms at the WTO.

With our interests understood and draft revisions in hand, re-engagement with the TPP process would also make sense to restore lost U.S. credibility while pursuing national strategic and economic goals. Re-engagement would bolster confidence in the United States, reaffirm the country’s commitment to maintaining a strong economic footprint in the region, and build leverage for other useful trade negotiations. U.S. leadership in negotiating this high-standard, rules-based multilateral agreement would give these countries an alternative to dealing with China

38 See Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2016–17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific (Seattle: NBR, 2016); and Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests through Old Friends (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999).

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from weaker positions. The emphasis on high standards would be a template for WTO reform and create leverage in future engagement with China. The price for dealing only bilaterally with countries in the region would be the loss of the influence that is inherent in a coalition. Furthermore, bilateral agreements add enormous complexity and inefficiencies to the conduct of trade and would be a cumbersome approach to keep apace of changes in economic activity. It would likely be more difficult to grapple with barriers by pursuing bilateral agreements alone. Re-engagement in the TPP need not lead to protracted negotiations and would create momentum for a second round of countries to negotiate accession. This strategic coalition, in other words, could grow.39

The United States also should consider how it might participate in the AIIB. The decision several years ago to dismiss the initiative summarily was counter-strategic; any opportunity to shape the structure and governance of this new institution at the outset was missed. The United States should seek ways to ensure that the AIIB operates transparently using accepted banking practices or limit its reach if it does not. U.S. involvement in the bank would offer an additional opportunity to test China’s intentions and rules of engagement as it attempts to implement the Belt and Road Initiative. In doing so, the United States and other countries could better push the AIIB to collaborate with other financial institutions to bring much-needed reform, particularly in Central Asia. The alternative is leaving recipient nations to cope with unchallenged Chinese influence.

The Nexus between Economics and Defense at Home

The economic bases for American power are competitive industrial, agricultural, energy, scientific, and service sectors and the country’s large market. Day to day, it is the more narrowly conceived defense industrial base—far more than just industry—that enables the United States to produce and deploy the weapons and equipment that sustain the world’s leading military power. Here the strategic issues are vital. One of the main issues is the vulnerability of supply chains that are now international. Another challenge is that supply interruptions and illicit substitutions are a constant headache for

39 As mentioned earlier, the Trump administration has chosen to renegotiate NAFTA. The implications of reaching an optimal outcome are important beyond the regional economic benefit to North America. Successful renegotiation would further enhance North America as a manufacturing and export platform to global markets, would potentially improve relations with South America, and could further provide leverage in dealing with China and WTO reforms.

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planners,40 in addition to cyberattacks and other espionage aimed at stealing technologies for incorporation into enemy weaponry. Since the 1970s, China has stolen large amounts of our nation’s top military technology. The first major breaches were in the nuclear field; more recently, it has stolen the plans for the most modern U.S. fighter aircraft.41 Today, the competitiveness, self-sufficiency, and capacity of the United States’ defense industrial base is a major issue.

Another critical issue we have identified is the future of U.S. innovation. Beyond IP protection, an environment that encourages innovation includes effective rule of law more broadly, an educated and entrepreneurial workforce (including targeted immigration), a reasonable and predictable tax structure, robust university research, and government support for science, all of which should be considerations in a new comprehensive strategy.42

Defense and Diplomacy at a Historical Turning Point

In order to develop an appropriate strategy in view of China’s efforts to re-establish its preeminence in Asia, the United States needs to integrate a new military strategy and develop and field the weapons and related systems appropriate to execute it. Distracted by wars in the Middle East and Central Asia, and hampered at home with budget sequestration, the United States is guilty of neglecting military considerations as much as economic and diplomatic ones. We simply have not been operating from assessments of our core, defendable interests in Asia and of the directions in which key players are moving. We have failed again and again to understand and anticipate Russian intentions and policy, North Korean intentions and policy, and most importantly Chinese intentions and policy. We have not undertaken a serious assessment of the kinds of coalitions that we may face should international tensions rise further and polarization take place in different areas of the region. There is no peacetime U.S. strategy built on a tough-minded global assessment. If pursued, this strategy might reduce the

40 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense Supply Chain, 112th Cong., 2d session, Report 112-167 (Washington, D.C., May 21, 2012).

41 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 105th Cong., 2d session, Report 105-851 (Washington, D.C., 1999), vol. 1, chap 2; Jeremy Bender, “Espionage Is Fueling China’s Development of High-End Weapons Systems,” Business Insider, November 2, 2015; and “China’s Military Built with Cloned Weapons,” U.S. Naval Institute Staff (USNI), USNI News, October 27, 2015.

42 Although beyond the scope of this essay, education reform in the United States is another area ripe for attention.

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chances of the United States facing such coalitions and thereby prevent war, or if war breaks out, contain it to the commons.

In fact, the United States does not have a clear military strategy for the Indo-Pacific. We have not decided how to respond to China’s “gray-zone aggressions”—its island building in the South China Sea or harassment of the Senkaku Islands. We have not decided what is essential to advance U.S. interests or what winning would be in various contingencies. Have we adequately prepared, should war be thrust upon us, for a conventional arms victory fought over the commons? What are the red lines for responding militarily in the commons? Is a military strategy of attacking the Chinese mainland in the event of a war with China a viable one? Once a military strategy is decided, what weapons systems are needed to accomplish its goals?

Moreover, do we appreciate the difficult situations that our allies are in? South Korea is the poster child in this regard. It sits on the edge of Asia—a short flight from China, its major trading partner, and adjacent to North Korea, an immediate and dire nuclear power enemy that is backed by China and supported to a lesser degree by Russia. The delicate balance on the Korean Peninsula is simultaneously sustained by the United States’ military presence, joint military exercises and planning with South Korean forces, nuclear deterrent, and formal alliance obligations. That same United States, however, is not keeping up with China’s economic growth and yet is not supporting the formation of a true free trade area among the more liberal states of Asia that should accelerate economic growth among its prospective members. The United States is also not keeping up with the rate of increase in China’s defense investments. Adding new missile defense capabilities in South Korea is necessary but inadequate; defenses are rarely 100% effective, and in this case just one failed intercept could mean disaster. Deterrence is the bedrock of peace. If there are to be effective negotiations to de-nuclearize the North, with China having a clear incentive to help, they will have to be based on the United States and its allies having stronger strategic leverage. This can derive from enhancing the United States’ regional position by deploying more advanced conventional and nuclear second-strike forces there. Without a change in economic and military trends soon, there will not be successful negotiations to rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons, South Korea will have good reason to doubt alliance promises, and China will increasingly set the rules for international relations in much of East Asia.

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conclusion

At several junctures since its founding, the United States has confronted extraordinary challenges to its vital interests. And it has answered. For each challenge, whether the secession of the Confederacy or Soviet ambitions immediately following World War II, Washington responded strategically. In the case of the Cold War, it committed to a strategy lasting a half century.

The United States was successful in grappling with major challenges because its leaders came to understand them, faced them, defined the nation’s purposes, and explained confidently to the American people and peoples overseas the fundamental values at stake. These leaders harnessed the instruments of power and stayed the course through mercurial events. Implementation in peacetime as well as wartime was not easy, but success was achieved when our elected leaders set understandable goals, crafted supportive economic policies, and made the necessary military investments and deployments. In addition, success came when our leaders reached out to nations that shared our interests, nurturing close relationships in the Americas, Europe, and Asia, and used diplomacy wisely.

There is nothing inevitable about the path of history. Nonetheless, as we have argued, China has pursued a consistent strategy whose elements were first assembled by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The results are that the balance of power and patterns of interdependence in the Asia-Pacific and globally have been transformed, causing the calculations of all affected countries to change. At the same time, the goals of U.S. engagement with China have largely gone unfulfilled. Political liberalization in China and peace and security in Asia are nowhere in sight, while the outlook for greater prosperity for the American people due to economic engagement with China is unclear. Moreover, U.S. international leadership and the post–World War II international institutions appear weaker. These are the stark realities. Nonstrategic engagement and hopes have not been rewarded.

The peaceful integration of China into a world in which the United States and its allies thrive and preserve their values remains, arguably, the greatest challenge to humanity. Serious assessments and strategy are needed now.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Use of Homophonous Pen Names:

An Open-Source Open Secret

David Gitter and Leah Fang


keywords: china; chinese communist party; media commentary


david gitter is Director of the Party Watch Initiative, a new program of the Project 2049 Institute that analyzes the writings and activities of the Chinese Communist Party. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

leah fang is a Researcher at the Party Watch Initiative at the Project 2049 Institute and a China specialist at Kroll Associates. She can be reached at <[email protected]>.

executive summary

asia policy

This article examines the evolving commentary system in the People’s Republic of China that utilizes homophonous pen names to transmit official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views and assesses the system’s utility as a credible information source for foreign analysts.

main argument

The CCP uses an evolving system of homophonous pen names to write authoritative commentary that accurately propagates its views. Since the mid-1990s, this system has been repurposed to circumvent growing resistance to CCP propaganda by both the Chinese public and the ranks of the CCP itself. Its commentary covers policy-relevant topics pertaining to China’s most important domestic and foreign affairs, and at times has been used to issue ominous warning statements to foreign countries over sensitive areas of dispute. The article concludes that the pen names investigated within verily represent the views of their superior regime organ. While the system’s effectiveness to achieve its intended purpose seems uncertain, these commentaries provide a readily exploitable resource for foreign analysts that can supplement the long-monitored and more authoritative premium commentary vehicles of the party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily.

policy implications• If foreign analysts systematically monitor and analyze the messages

transmitted by the CCP’s homophonous pen name system, then the policymaking community can take advantage of more complete information to devise more effective China-oriented policies.

• Analysts can accurately identify new homophonous pen names by understanding the history of established pen names and the commonalities found in their linguistic components.

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gitter and fang • the ccp’s use of homophonous pen names

A n indispensable form of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been

authoritative regime commentary. Written for the regime’s official publications, such commentary conveys the collective views of party bodies and is meant to be recognized for its weight. Until the 1980s, the CCP’s traditional commentary system enjoyed a full monopoly over shaping the Chinese public’s views. Editorial content from CCP Central Committee mouthpiece the People’s Daily (PD) was reprinted in local party newspapers nationwide and broadcast over state radio and television to a captive audience.1 Although many Chinese citizens became numb to this constant barrage of dogma, they had no other opinion source to tune in to.

Unfortunately for party spin doctors, the commercialization of China’s media that began with the reform and opening up (gaige kaifang) period—when most newspapers were made to operate by market principles in order to reduce the state’s burden—introduced many new voices to the commentary landscape. The unintended result was that the country’s media grew to have two masters: the party and the public. Before long, most Chinese found that commercial media sources better catered to their interests and, in critical ways, were more trustworthy than dogmatic party papers. Additionally, new information technologies such as the internet and social media platforms enabled a plethora of different opinions to spread nearly instantaneously. This relative diversity of views threatened the long-held monopoly on opinion-setting that the CCP considers vital to its resilience and power. As an important part of its solution, the party resurrected an old tool: homophonous pen names. This commentary system employs pseudonyms that at first glance look like an individual author’s name but in actuality are homophones for specific CCP regime organs. By repurposing this system, propagandists hope to reassert dominance over China’s opinion environment, which they perceive as chaotic and replete with messages that stray from the party line. Teams working under these pen names write prolifically on China’s major domestic and foreign affairs in party papers and professional journals, as well as on official government websites.

Foreign analysts of China stand to benefit from this system if its commentary truly represents the views of the CCP center. To our knowledge, the only other publicly available English-language study addressing this system’s authoritativeness was written by Wen-Hsuan Tsai

1 Wu Guoguang, “Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People’s Daily,” China Quarterly, no. 137 (1994): 194–211.

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and Peng-Hsiang Kao in 2013. Titled “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams,” this article for China Quarterly insightfully concluded that the pen names of this system are utilized by professional writing teams to authoritatively represent their parent regime organ.2 However, some observers have understandably questioned whether these pseudonyms represent the views of a CCP regime body or merely those of the authoring propagandists. This difference is important: a misreading of what can be construed as an acceptable stance versus an official party view might misguide policymakers, leading to ineffective or even deleterious policies related to China. In contrast, if these pen names are demonstrably authoritative and properly understood, policymakers can enhance their comprehension of the ruling party’s positions through the regular analysis of such commentary, thereby improving policies.

This article seeks to definitively assess the authoritativeness of the homophonous pen name system. Through an open-source investigation into official internet-based Chinese-language materials that discuss ten currently used homophonous pen names, the article finds that within the realm of each sponsoring regime organ’s purview, its pen name authoritatively propagates the regime’s views and directives.3 We ultimately conclude that while PD editorials and commentator articles will remain the preferred channels for the CCP’s most pressing messages, the homophonous pen name system offers foreign analysts an expanded inventory of sources for official party positions on nearly all of China’s most important affairs that can be readily exploited through open-source research.

This article is divided into the following seven sections:

u pp. 73–74 briefly review the authority and hierarchy of PD’s traditional commentary system.

u pp. 74–80 examine China’s increasingly complex and diverse commentary environment.

u pp. 80–102 analyze the authority and utility of ten prominent homophonous pen names.

u pp. 103–5 examine the future resilience of the homophonous pen name system and relevant patterns for identifying new pen names.

2 Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Peng-Hsiang Kao, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams,” China Quarterly, no. 214 (2013): 394–410.

3 The authors relied nearly exclusively on Chinese-language materials found on CCP-controlled or Chinese government–controlled websites to investigate the authority and scope of each pen name. Records of all internet-based sources are maintained by the authors and are available upon request.

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u p. 106 concludes that the systematic analysis of homophonous pen names can help observers better understand the official positions of the CCP.

u Appendix 1 shows the particulars of the ten pen names discussed in this article.

u Appendix 2 shows the original Chinese characters, English translations, and relevant context of all Chinese pinyin romanizations found in this article.

the traditional commentary system

A basic understanding of the traditional PD commentary system is essential to fully grasp the CCP’s utilization of pseudonyms. PD commentary is not authoritative because it possesses superior analysis, writing, or wisdom. Rather, the sole source of its authority comes from its utility as a command vehicle for the CCP Central Committee, the 376-member decision-making body comprising China’s most powerful elite.4

Today, PD editorials (she lun) are the most authoritative commentary vehicle in use. Editorials directly represent the paper’s editorial department, and by extension the CCP Central Committee. The process of writing and publishing an editorial is a strict operation. If the topic was not preselected by the Central Propaganda Department or other “higher ups,”5 the PD Editorial Department selects the topic and creates an outline, which is sent for review by central leaders.6 Writing the editorial is the duty of the PD Commentary Department, and drafts are transferred to relevant specialists for edits before finalization by the chief editor.7 If deemed necessary, it is once again sent for central approval before publication. This careful process is meant to eliminate all content deviating from the party line and put forth the “collective wisdom” (jiti de zhihui) of the paper. The publication frequency of such editorials has shifted throughout the years, but today they are relatively few and far between.8

4 Wu, “Command Communication,” 194–211. 5 Ibid., 199–201. 6 “Baozhi pinglun wenti de tedian ji xiezuo yaoling” [Newspaper Commentary Style’s Characteristics

and Writing Essentials],” in Xinwen Pinglun Xiezuo 2016 Ban [News Commentary Writing 2016 Edition], ed. Quanguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu Zixue Kaoshi Zhidao Weiyuanhui and Zeng Jianxiong (Beijing: Waiyu Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu Chubanshe, 2016), 206–77.

7 “Renmin ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi” [People’s Daily Reporter Reveals the Story behind “Ren Zhongping”], People’s Daily, December 22, 2008 u http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/54155/57487/8560342.html.

8 “Baozhi pinglun wenti de tedian ji xiezuo yaoling.”

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The second most authoritative form of PD commentary is the commentator article (benbao pinglunyuan wenzhang), which is also drafted by the Commentary Department.9 Although they lack the full weight of editorials, commentator articles represent the party center’s views on major affairs and events of similar levels of importance. One benefit offered by these articles is that they are published more frequently than editorials, and a series of commentator articles can address one issue from several angles.10 The release of a series has historically signaled that a new concept has gained importance and warrants study.11 Until recent years, PD editorials and commentator articles had no near-equivalents in terms of significance.

Below this level are various bylines that are quasi-authoritative, nonauthoritative, or of inconclusive authority. A core assertion of this article is that the homophonous pseudonyms discussed below possess (in correspondence with that of their sponsoring organ) “full authoritativeness” and do not belong to these categories.

the era of everyone having a microphone

China’s transformation from a land of one microphone to a land of many started in the 1980s, when the commercialization of the country’s media began to offer new information sources for citizens. The unprecedented Tiananmen Square protests and subsequent military crackdown in June 1989 strengthened the perception among propagandists that the party needed to both rejuvenate the country’s economy and strengthen political thought if it was to stay in power.12 Despite this consensus, the commercial media sector was eventually allowed to continue its expansion, ultimately outcompeting party outlets in attracting an audience. From 1993 to 2003, party newspaper circulation visibly declined as more commercial papers entered the market. For example, during that period the Beijing Party Committee’s Beijing Daily saw a 27% drop in daily circulation from 523,000 to 380,000, the Guangdong Party Committee’s Nanfang Daily saw a 14% decline in circulation from 876,000 to 750,000, and the CCP Central Committee’s very own PD saw a 35% circulation

9 “Renmin ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi.” 10 “Baozhi pinglun wenti de tedian ji xiezuo yaoling.” 11 Timothy R. Heath, China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of

National Rejuvenation (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 55. 12 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China

(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

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decline from 2.78 million to 1.8 million.13 The reality was that most Chinese grew to prefer the variety and more sensational stories of outlets that relied on their patronage. Commercial sources also increasingly gave readers more accurate reporting on sensitive stories than official outlets. This credibility gap became especially apparent in media coverage of developments related to law-enforcement abuses, public-health emergencies such as the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), high-profile corruption cases, and other serious crises.14 By 2006, Tsinghua University professor Li Xiguang warned in the annual Report on Development of China’s Media Industry that a failure to reform “mainstream” (party) newspapers would result in “a serious disjoint between the party and government agenda and the public agenda.”15

As part of the broader reforms enacted to address these deficiencies, the CCP launched an overhaul of its commentary system. Most Chinese had become at best indifferent to the fanatical messages of CCP commentary. They generally continue to find it to be hollow and arrogant, proffering theories removed from their lives. While expounding on the superior qualities of the PD commentary pseudonym “Ren Zhongping,” former PD deputy chief editor Mi Bohua soberly assessed the public’s disinterest in his paper’s commentary work in 2009:

Improving party papers’ political commentary has been a problem strenuously considered by commentary workers for a long time now. Readers have largely reflected that the party’s political commentary has a lot of empty talk, boastful talk, meaningless talk, and bureaucratic talk; they wish that viewpoints were a bit more original, the writing style a bit more fresh, and the form a bit more lively.16

A common lamentation for propagandists has been the crowded commentary environment they now work in, in which various media platforms transmit a flood of messages that often contradict their efforts. The diversification of opinion sources has posed a challenge to the Central Propaganda Department, even with its legions of media minders. This is especially true on the Chinese internet. To be sure, just as the party

13 These official figures were not verifiable through an independent circulation audit but nevertheless help confirm a serious decline in party paper subscribers. See Qian Gang and David Bandurski, “China’s Emerging Public Sphere: The Impact of Media Commercialization, Professionalism, and the Internet in an Era of Transition,” in Changing Media, Changing China, ed. Susan L. Shirk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 38–76.

14 Gang and Bandurski, “China’s Emerging Public Sphere,” 38–76. 15 Ibid., 55. 16 Mi Bohua, “Ren Zhongping de tezhi he pinge” [Ren Zhongping’s Nature and Character], People’s

Daily, March 2009 u http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2009-03/01/content_387299.htm.

http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2009-03/01/content_387299.htm

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has measures to deter newspaper journalists from printing forbidden information, it too maintains tools for limiting information online. These include the “great firewall” of China, which imposes stifling restrictions on the websites that Chinese can visit; the outlawing of popular global internet platforms such as Facebook and Instagram; reprisals against social media personalities that cross ill-defined limits on discussion topics; and the “50 cent party,” a veritable militia of party-sponsored internet commenters that cheerlead for the regime in online forums. But these efforts only offer the regime incomplete control of the online agenda, and often risk alienating netizens who are otherwise apolitical.17

The relative freedom of expression provided by the internet is most apparent in China’s spirited social media domain. At a time when Chinese increasingly socialize online,18 propagandists criticize the current period as the era of “everyone having a microphone” (renren douyou maikefeng) and have linked social media and the spread of online rumors with the popular but “hidden” expectation for accurate mainstream narratives.19 While detailing the importance of PLA Daily commentary pen name “Xie Xinping” in 2016, veteran PLA Daily journalist Huang Kunlun intimated his paper’s frustrations with the perceived chaos of a space with more than one opinion and projected the PLA Daily’s own mandate to guide public opinion as the desire of the people:

In today’s information age of fierce competitive media and cacophony of noise, every type of viewpoint fiercely collides and different tides of thought move unrestrained; the demands of interests are multiple, observations are multidimensional, and thinking methods are diverse; at the same time that people use “we-media” platforms like Weibo and Weixin to issue their voice, they also long for an authoritative “opinion leader” to appear.20

17 For an in-depth discussion on the ongoing struggle between online users seeking greater freedom of expression and the Chinese government forces opposed to them, see Bruce J. Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 64–73.

18 As of August 2017, the number of users communicating with the Chinese messaging app WeChat alone approached one billion. See Steven Millward, “WeChat Is Close to a Billion Users,” Tech in Asia, August 16, 2017 u https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-near-billion-users.

19 “ ‘Renren dou you maikefeng’ geng xuyao zhuliu shengyin” [“Everyone Having a Microphone” Needs Mainstream Voice Even More], China Civilization Net, November 10, 2016 u http://hz.wenming.cn/ycpl/201611/t20161110_2929960.htm.

20 Huang Kunlun, “Cong zhengzhi huayu dao xinwen huayu—You ‘Xie Xinping’ xilie wenzhang kan junshi zhenglunwen zhuanxing” [From Political Talk to News Talk—Observing the Transition of Military Commentary from the “Xie Xinping” Series], China Military Online, February 19, 2016 u http://www.81.cn/jsjz/2016-02/19/content_6919233.htm.

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The difficulties to which Huang alludes stem in large part from the fact that social media influencers churn out opinions faster than traditional commentary vehicles can, enabling the flow of ideas that can weaken public trust in the state. One prominent example of this reality came in July 2011, when a high-speed train crash killed dozens and left hundreds injured near the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province. Netizens on China’s microblog Sina Weibo exploded with indignation at their government’s reticent reporting of developments, and the propaganda apparatus struggled to address accusations of corruption and conspiracy.21 Even before this tragedy, propaganda apparatchiks had been aware of the growing need to craft national narratives on major events early on if they were to protect their own credibility. While discussing the backstory of PD’s development of new commentary brands in 2008, then deputy director of the Commentary Department Lu Xinning explained the paper’s reasoning for addressing volatile topics instead of avoiding them:

Previously, PD did not have a column for issuing commentary regarding news events. When met with societal hot topic events, the general practice was to “not partake in hyping [the issue],” but in recent years, paper leaders feel, that if the party’s paper is speechless at the key moment, it is the same as a dereliction of duty. When confronted with hot topic events of deep concern to the masses and problems of direct relation to the masses’ interest, as the party’s paper, if [we] do not utter a single word and offer no comment, in actuality this is a form of neglect and shortsightedness; if things continue this way, societal trust will be lost as a result, [and we will] resign ourselves to the periphery. [We] must meet public opinion hot topics head on, and partake in societal discussions; only then can [we] talk about influencing societal public opinion.22

As difficulties with managing the public opinion environment multiplied, there was another growing problem that troubled propagandists: grassroots party cadres were increasingly exhibiting adverse reactions toward their own party’s propaganda. According to interviews carried out by Tsai and Kao as part of their study on CCP pseudonyms, negative emotional responses were particularly apparent when cadres were issued propaganda tasks under the name of the ordering party body.23 This response may correlate to the findings of a 2014 national survey of party members that asked why they joined the CCP. The survey found that those who joined the party after 1992 listed

21 Josh Chin, “Weibo Watershed? Train Collision Anger Explodes Online,” Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report, July 26, 2011 u https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/26/weibo-watershed-train-collision-anger-explodes-online.

22 “Renmin ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi.” 23 Tsai and Kao, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda,” 394–410.

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“helpful to career” as their most common response, beating out more altruistic options such as “serve the people,” “work for communism,” and “only the CCP can lead China to prosperity and power.”24 Put simply, cadre attention seems chiefly focused on career advancement and not propaganda edicts.

Such significant challenges required CCP commentators to think outside the Leninist box they had worked in since the days of Mao Zedong. Although the old commentary system still successfully served its purpose of transmitting unambiguous party messages to those who heeded them, new innovations were necessary to catch the attention of those who had tuned out. Across the bureaucracy, propaganda chiefs strived to develop their own opinion leaders to dominate this new environment of “commentary overload.” The perceived solution was to make party commentary vehicles as diverse and multidimensional as the competition.

To wage this propaganda war against competing voices in a complex commentary space, regime commentators took up an old tool that had served Chinese propagandists well before: the homophonous pen name system. The first homophonous pen names were used by Chinese Communists before their takeover of China to disseminate ideology while protecting their identity. Examples include Mao’s employment of the name “Er Shi Ba Hua Sheng” (a reference to the 28 traditional character strokes that made up his name) and Liu Shaoqi’s use of the names “Tao Shangxing” and “Mo Wenhua.”25 During the Cultural Revolution, the pseudonym “Liang Xiao” was used by a group originally named the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Group to push Maoist policies at the behest of Mao and Jiang Qing. The pen name is homophonous with liang xiao, or “two schools.”26 Following the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang and his reform-minded supporters briefly took up the pen name “Yue Ping,” which stood for “special commentator,” to advocate policies that were contrary to those of leader Hua Guofeng and his “two whatevers” faction, which supported a continuation of Mao’s policies.27

24 Dickson, Dictator’s Dilemma, 214–61. 25 “Lingdaoren biming shang de shidai fengyun” [Era Trends in Leader Pen Names], Dang Zheng

Luntan, March 2014, 50–51. 26 Tsai and Kao, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda,” 396. 27 Shen Baoxiang, “Jiemi Renmin Ribao ‘teyue pinglunyuan’ ” [Uncovering People’s Daily’s

“Special Commentator”], CCP News Net, March 11, 2009 u http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/85039/8941769.html. The byline “Yue Ping” was eventually shed for its true meaning (special commentator). In addition to offering anonymity, the byline special commentator also allowed PD to circumvent censorship regulations that called for editorials and important commentator articles to be reviewed prior to publication. These articles eventually helped steer elite opinion in favor of Deng Xiaoping’s proposed reform-oriented policies. See, for example, Ye Yonglie, “Jingxin xuanze tupokou” [Carefully Selecting a Breakthrough Point], in Deng Xiaoping gaibian Zhongguo [Deng Xiaoping Changed China] (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), 257–61.

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The usage of homophonous pen names by commentator teams found a more permanent place of influence in Chinese propaganda after its revival in 1991. That year, as China’s overall economic reform stalled and Deng Xiaoping’s influence over the media waned following the resurgence of leftists after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Deng sought to breathe new life into his policies. Around Chinese New Year in 1991, his daughter Deng Lin quietly approached Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao), the official mouthpiece of the Shanghai Party Committee, to enlist the paper’s editorial support for her father’s cause.28 In response, party secretary of the newspaper Zhou Ruijin teamed up with Ling He of the paper’s commentary department and Shi Zhihong of the Shanghai Party Committee Policy Research Office to author pro-reform commentary under the pen name “Huangfu Ping.”29 The Huangfu Ping series made big waves in the otherwise conservative commentary environment of the time and was initially met with harsh rebuke from PD and Guangming Daily. Seeing that his supporters were under threat of investigation, Deng used his momentous 1992 “southern tour”—his unorthodox but ultimately successful trip to southern municipalities to promote the accomplishments of his reform policies—as a chance to voice his support for the articles: “These articles are well written and the points they made are all correct. I heard that some people wanted to investigate the background of these articles. If they continue to do this, just tell them that I requested these articles and I made the points. Let them investigate me.”30

Deng’s overt defense of the writing team helped embolden regional papers to take up his cause. Local media in Shanghai and Shenzhen reported on his tour before PD and other national outlets reported on the event, finally turning the tide in elite CCP politics in favor of economic reform. Years later, Zhou confirmed the exact meaning of Huangfu Ping, explaining that “huang” sounds very similar to “feng” in his native Southern Min dialect, which in context has the meaning of “receiving orders” (feng ming); “fu” (甫) is homophonous with “fu” (辅), which has the meaning of assist or help; and “ping” is the same character as that in Deng Xiaoping’s name.

28 Zhao Suisheng, “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China,” Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (1993): 748.

29 Li Xiyan, “Cong Huangfu Ping dao Ren Zhongping dangbao zhuming zuozhe bushi yigeren zai zhandou” [From Huangfu Ping to Ren Zhongping, Not a One-Man Battle for Renowned Party Newspaper Author], Liberation Daily, November 3, 2015 u http://msn.huanqiu.com/china/article/2015-11/7897480.html.

30 Zhao, “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour,” 749.

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The resultant meaning is “receive the people’s order to assist Deng Xiaoping” (feng renmin zhi ming fuzuo Deng Xiaoping).31

ten prominent homophonous pen names of the ccp: authority, content, and utility

Huangfu Ping would pave the way for an entire array of homophonous pen names that propagate the CCP’s messages and defend the party’s interests. Beginning with Ren Zhongping, subsequent pseudonyms would be utilized not to fight subversive ideological battles against competing party factions but instead to circumvent growing resistance to traditional forms of commentary. They rely on speed, less formulaic language, and the internet to extend their reach. The obliqueness of the pseudonym system aims to bypass readers’ hostile reactions to known regime sources and increase the success rate of thought penetration.32 However, it is equally important that readers are able to eventually decipher each pen name’s source of authority, so that it may be perceived as an “opinion leader.” In this sense, this system is less a secret code than an open secret meant to be discovered.

The nonexhaustive list of pen names discussed in this article are used by professional propagandists that disseminate the collective wisdom of their department and act as the voice of their superior party organ within their area of specialization. Just like party paper editorials, those speaking on behalf of a regime publication represent the views of that publication’s superior party body. Furthermore, carefully managed writing and editing procedures ensure that views are in line with those of the party center. Each pseudonym has been selected because its authority and active status are demonstrable.33 By analyzing each pen name’s particulars, such as parent organ, home publication, and content, analysts can identify its relative authority and area of expertise. These names can then be integrated into a regular monitoring routine to enhance understanding of CCP concerns. The first four pseudonyms discussed belong to PD, and the final six belong to other regime organs.

31 Li, “Cong Huangfu Ping dao Ren Zhongping dangbao zhuming zuozhe bushi yigeren zai zhandou.” 32 Tsai and Kao, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda,” 395. 33 This study limits pen names to those that represent party organs, rather than merely authoritative

individuals, and that have been active since the start of the 18th Party Congress.

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Ren Zhongping: The “Gold Medal Author” of People’s Daily

As Lu Xinning states, Ren Zhongping is PD’s official “spokesperson.”34 The origins of this pen name are closely tied to that of Huangfu Ping. After Deng and his reformers won back the support of the propaganda apparatus in 1992, it was not long before the party’s mouthpiece wanted its own pseudonym byline. In 1993, Zhou Ruijin was transferred to PD and put in charge of commentary work, where he was asked to write some articles “like Huangfu Ping.” Zhou promptly created the name Ren Zhongping, which stands for “important PD commentary” (Renmin Ribao de zhongyao pinglun). As Zhou explains, the Ren Zhongping writing team was specifically made to take up Huangfu Ping’s mantle as an advocate for continued reform and opening.35 Even so, as the inadequacies of PD’s traditional commentary became apparent, its importance as an innovative propaganda vehicle grew.

Ren Zhongping first appeared in December 1993 with the commentary “From the 11th Central Committee Third Plenum to the 14th Central Committee Third Plenum,” which expounded on the essentials of reform and advocated for developing Deng’s path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.36 Today, Ren Zhongping’s articles are widely reposted with great fanfare across the Chinese internet, and former PD director Zhang Yannong went as far as calling the brand the “focused embodiment of the PD political commentary advantage.” As director, Zhang played an important role in editing the brand’s articles.37 Senior party leaders have also praised Ren Zhongping. In May 2003, then CCP general secretary Hu Jintao called Ren Zhongping articles clear-cut, penetrating, and fresh and asked that the brand be utilized to a greater degree.38

A main reason that senior officials find Ren Zhongping to be a veracious commentator is because they guide its commentary topics. An illustrative article posted on PD Online and originally published in the Press (Xinwen Zhanxian), the monthly magazine run by PD, explains that the byline’s topics

34 “Renmin ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi.” 35 Li, “Cong Huangfu Ping dao Ren Zhongping dangbao zhuming zuozhe bushi yigeren zai zhandou.” 36 Ren Zhongping, “Cong Shiyijie Sanzhongquanhui dao Shisijie Sanzhongquanhui” [From the 11th

Central Committee Third Plenum to the 14th Central Committee Third Plenum], People’s Daily Online, December 22, 1993 u http://media.people.com.cn/GB/192301/192351/201921/201922/12605741.html.

37 All-China Journalists Association, “Gaibian lishi de ‘Beijing Shijian’: Zhongguo xinwen jiang canping zuopin tuijian biao” [The “Beijing Time” That Changed History: China News Award Evaluating Work Recommendation Form], Xinhua, September 27, 2009.

38 Zhang Yannong, “Ren Zhongping zai lushang” [Ren Zhongping on the Road], People’s Daily, Fall 2009 u http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2009-03/01/content_387298.htm.

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are regularly selected by the heads of PD and even “central leading comrades” (zhongyang lingdao tongzhi), a term that usually refers to leaders of the CCP Central Committee Politburo or Secretariat rank.39 Joseph Fewsmith has posited that this comrade may be the Central Propaganda Department head or the member of the Central Secretariat managing ideological work.40 At the time of writing, Propaganda Department head Liu Qibao seems to meet this profile, as he sits on both the Politburo and the Central Secretariat, where he manages the ideological work and media portfolio.41

Under the direction of the PD Commentary Department, the Ren Zhongping writing team’s methodology is guided by the motto, “seven to eight guns, seven submissions and eight revisions, seven mouths and eight tongues” (qiba tiao qiang, qishang baxia, qizui bashe).42 According to Zhang, “seven to eight guns” signifies that the team’s members frequently number around eight individuals from several PD departments and include department directors, seasoned journalists, and young employees; “seven submissions and eight revisions” represents that the team’s works pass back and forth for revisions more than eight times, with some enduring as many as fourteen drafts; and “seven mouths and eight tongues” represents the democratic atmosphere that the group allegedly enjoys, in which every member is encouraged to voice opinions regardless of rank. Zhang states that debates frequently take place over article structure and even punctuation, and are sometimes resolved in the end by a vote.43 When consensus has been reached, the draft is sent to the paper’s director and chief editor for finalization before publication.44 If its own understanding of an issue is inadequate, the team consults PD specialists and outside experts. For example, Tian Junrong, a journalist in the economics department and a former Ren Zhongping collaborator, recalled that for a July 2004 article titled “Another 20 Years—On Our Country’s Key

39 Cao Huanrong, “Zoule jin liangnian de qi” [A Chess Move Spanning Almost Two Years], Xinwen Zhanxian, Fall 2009 u http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2009-03/01/content_387301.htm. For example, the CCP Central Organization Department’s website, Communist Party Member Net, has a page titled “Central Leading Comrades Activities Page” (zhongyang lingdao tongzhi huodong zhuanye) covering the activities of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. See CCP Central Organization Department, “Zhongyang lingdao tongzhi huodong zhuanye” [Central Leading Comrades Activities Page], Communist Party Member Net u http://news.12371.cn/leaders.

40 Authors’ telephone conversation with Joseph Fewsmith, April 26, 2017. 41 For Liu’s full biographical profile, see “Liu Qibao,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

China Vitae u http://chinavitae.com/biography/Liu_Qibao%7C1294. 42 Lu Xinning confirms that Ren Zhongping is written under Commentary Department auspices. See

“Renmin ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi.” 43 Zhang, “Ren Zhongping zai lushang.” 44 Li, “Cong Huangfu Ping dao Ren Zhongping dangbao zhuming zuozhe bushi yigeren zai zhandou”;

and All-China Journalists Association, “Gaibian lishi de ‘Beijing Shijian.’ ”

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Period of Reform and Development,” drafters from the economics and theory departments hosted a panel of eight experts to partake in a discussion forum.45

With regard to content, Mi Bohua explains that although Ren Zhongping covers all affairs of national importance, its angle is always political, and its articles are often meant to bring “proper” understanding to a given issue. Mi cites a July 2000 article series that promoted Marxist views as relevant to the average citizen’s life as an example of relating theoretical concepts in a down-to-earth manner.46 Although he admits that Ren Zhongping cannot stray from sanctioned theories nor abandon the party’s solemn language, he does not view this as limiting commentary to the mundane. His optimism is based on Ren Zhongping’s attempt to utilize emotion-laden and concise language that readers can easily absorb. Although a review of recent commentaries by this pen name shows this to be a challenge, careful wording aims to relate with each reader’s own experiences, thereby transmitting lessons that guide them down the “correct” path.47

All things considered, how does Ren Zhongping’s importance stack up against that of PD editorials and commentator articles? One indicator comes from a 2016 university-level textbook on news commentary writing released by education publishing house Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press. Seemingly in reference to quality, the book calls Ren Zhongping’s works “Editorial Department commentary articles” with standards that are “higher than ordinary commentator articles, even surpassing editorials.”48 Indeed, the fact that each finished Ren Zhongping article involves a multitude of writers and many successive drafts explains why in recent years only five to six pieces have been published annually. By comparison, PD published three times as many editorials in 2016.49 There are other signs that this pen name should be held in high regard. In a political culture where the order of precedence matters greatly, it is worth noting that at some point between November 2007 and May 2008, Ren Zhongping displaced PD commentator articles as the second-listed commentary type on the PD Important Opinions Library webpage, just after

45 Tian Junrong, “Tian ‘zhuan’ yu qiu ‘bo’ ” [Adding “Specialty” and Seeking “Variety”], Xinwen Zhanxian, Fall 2009 u http://paper.people.com.cn/xwzx/html/2009-03/01/content_387304.htm.

46 Ren Zhongping, “Nuli peiyu shiying shehuizhuyi xiandaihua yaoqiu de ‘siyou’ gongmin—Lun shijieguan, renshengguan, jiazhiguan” [Strive to Cultivate “Four Haves” Citizens of Socialist Modernization Requirements—On World Views, Life Views, and Material Values], People’s Daily, July 2000 u http://www.360doc.com/content/15/1110/08/1433596_512061408.shtml; and Mi, “Ren Zhongping de tezhi he pinge.”

47 Mi, “Ren Zhongping de tezhi he pinge.” 48 “Baozhi pinglun wenti de tedian ji xiezuo yaoling,” 213. 49 “Renmin Ribao zhongyao yanlunku” [People’s Daily Important Opinions Library], People’s Daily

Online, June 11, 2017 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/8213/49160/index.html.

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PD editorials. It had previously been placed third after PD commentator articles.50 These indicators help signify Ren Zhongping’s status as a premier commentator for PD as an institution. One could argue that its articles have become second only to PD editorials as a significant representative of the paper, even if PD commentator articles maintain their traditionally superior status as an unambiguous command vehicle for the CCP Central Committee.

In review, observers can consider the Ren Zhongping brand to be a highly polished, secondary form of PD editorial that receives frequent input from senior party members and accurately represents the Central Committee’s views on major topics. Although the very nature of the CCP’s message deters many would-be readers, the Ren Zhongping team sugarcoats the message to make it more palatable, paving the way for other commentary units to do the same under their own pseudonyms.

He Zhenhua: The “Sensitive Hot Issue Brand”

To counter foreign influencers that are deemed hostile to the CCP’s interests, PD created the pen name “He Zhenhua.” This pseudonym was officially confirmed in a 2008 Commentary Department interview to stand for “how to invigorate China” (ruhe zhenxing Zhonghua), and as a pseudonym originally used by the Commentary Department, it seems likely to remain under the department’s management today.51 Following the March 2008 unrest in Tibet, which ended in violence and a government-sanctioned “people’s war” against the “Dalai clique,” PD was ordered to launch a propaganda blitz to gain control of the narrative on unfolding events.52 Lu Xinning, deputy director of the Commentary Department at the time, led two junior commentators to establish the He Zhenhua writing team. Once established, it wasted no time in pumping out dozens of articles by the end of the year to battle against the perceived separatist forces that were supposedly behind the unrest.53 Successive articles accused the Dalai Lama of orchestrating a violent uprising in Tibet.54

50 This comparison was made by accessing archived versions of the “People’s Daily Important Opinions Library” from November 24, 2007 and May 12, 2008. See “Renmin Ribao zhongyao yanlunku,” People’s Daily Online u http://opinion.people.com.cn.

51 “Renmin Ribao jizhe jiemi ‘Ren Zhongping’ beihou de gushi.”52 “Renmin Ribao zongbianji: Jianchi zhengque daoxiang, tigao chuangxin nengli” [People’s Daily

Chief Editor: Maintain the Right Direction and Improve Creativity], Xinhua, June 19, 2009 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2009-06/19/content_11566630.htm.

53 “Dangbao pinglun nv zhubi” [The Chief Female Hand of People’s Daily Commentary], People’s Daily Online, September 5, 2012 u http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/0905/c348664-18925302.html.

54 He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: Qipian yu liyong” [People’s Daily Public Forum: Deception and Manipulation], People’s Daily Online, April 2, 2008 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/40604/7072875.html.

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One three-part series argued that Tibet was not an issue of religious or human rights but rather one of Chinese sovereignty.55 Other pieces took aim at Tibet activists who interfered with the 2008 Olympic torch relay by emphasizing that such efforts were contrary to the spirit of the games.56 He Zhenhua’s use of persuasive reasoning to defend China’s sovereignty and prestige earned it praise from then Politburo Standing Committee member and propaganda boss Li Changchun, who stated that the pen name’s effectiveness had made it an important “sensitive hot issue brand.”57

Content analysis shows that He Zhenhua is not one-dimensional and has written about other topics that “invigorate China.” For example, this pen name took a break from battling the Dalai Lama in order to guide public opinion following the tragic May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which left more than 87,000 people dead or missing.58 The writing team has maintained a low profile in more recent years, but a three-part series published in January 2016 attacked billionaire investor George Soros. Referencing his statement at the World Economic Forum in Davos that a hard landing for China’s economy was “practically unavoidable,” He Zhenhua retorted that Soros, by “shorting China, is only shorting himself ” and offered various counterarguments that the world’s second-largest economy would not be rocked by “a few speculators.”59

55 He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: ‘Xizang wenti’ bushi zongjiao wenti” [People’s Daily Public Forum: The “Tibet Issue” Is Not a Religious Issue], People’s Daily Online, April 29, 2008 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/7177623.html; and He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: ‘Xizang wenti’ bushi renquan wenti” [People’s Daily Public Forum: The “Tibet Issue” Is Not a Human Rights Issue], People’s Daily Online, April 30, 2008 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/7182793.html.

56 He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: Tingzhi ganrao fangde renxin” [People’s Daily Public Forum: Only by Halting Your Interference Can You Win Hearts], People’s Daily Online, May 12, 2008 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/7224490.html.

57 “Renmin Ribao zongbianji: Jianchi zhengque daoxiang, tigao chuangxin nengli.” 58 “Sichuan 2008: A Disaster on an Immense Scale,” BBC News, May 9, 2013 u http://www.bbc.com/

news/science-environment-22398684. This hiatus ended about a month later when He Zhenhua accused the British parliament of hurting the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese people by inviting the Dalai Lama to attend a May 22 hearing on Tibet’s situation. See, for example, He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: ‘Renquan weishi’ men de qingxiangxing shiming” [People’s Daily Public Forum: “Human Rights Warriors” Selective Blindness], People’s Daily Online, June 4, 2008 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/7337654.html.

59 Katherine Burton, “Soros Says China Hard Landing Will Deepen the Rout in Stocks,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2016 u https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-21/george-soros-says-he-expects-hard-landing-for-chinese-economy; He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: ‘Kankong’ Zhongguo haowu yiju” [People’s Daily People’s Forum: “Underestimating” China with No Evidence], People’s Daily Online, January 28, 2016 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0128/c1003-28090613.html; He Zhenhua, “Renmin Ribao renmin luntan: ‘Zuokong’ Zhongguo zhihui zuokong ziji” [People’s Daily Public Forum: “Shorting” China Means Shorting Yourself], People’s Daily Online, January 29, 2016 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0129/c1003-28094046.html; and He Zhenhua, “ ‘Changshuai’ Zhongguo zhishi ziqiqiren” [To Disparage China Is to Deceive Yourself], People’s Daily Online, January 30, 2016 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0130/c1003-28097517.html.

http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0129/c1003-28094046.html




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In summary, He Zhenhua seems to have evolved into a combative tool for PD when the paper needs to counter foreign influencers who could disrupt stability, whether regarding Tibet or the national economy. The employment of the pseudonym signals to analysts that a sensitive narrative has become threatening, requiring rebuke. Its apparent evolution away from Tibet issues suggests that this pen name will likely be used against a widening range of challengers in the future.

Guo Jiping and Zhong Sheng: China’s Voice and Alarm Bell on International Affairs

PD maintains two writing teams that officially voice PD’s commentary stance on foreign affairs: “Guo Jiping” and “Zhong Sheng.” The brands are complementary, addressing slightly different purposes but never straying from the same sanctioned views. Their articles are occasionally translated or summarized in English, appearing on PD Online and other official outlets in order to reach Western audiences.

According to an article posted on PD Online and originally published in the China Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television Journal, a newspaper managed by the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, the pseudonym Guo Jiping stands for “relevant international important commentary” (youguan guoji de zhongyao pinglun) and was created in 2005 under the auspices of the PD International Department.60 The mastermind behind the brand’s creation was the department’s then director Wu Changsheng, who sought to strengthen the paper’s ability to respond authoritatively to international events.61 PD states that Guo Jiping’s writing team is staffed by professionals of its International Department, and that each article represents the department’s collective wisdom.62 From what is known about the Zhong Sheng writing team’s production process (described below), it can be surmised that the International Department director also plays an important role in finalizing Guo Jiping articles before publication. With the occasional exception of Ren Zhongping, Guo Jiping remains PD’s most important pseudonym commentator on international affairs and is used to express the paper’s position on consequential international situations.63

60 Fan Zhanying, “ ‘Huangjin shidai’ de meili huying” [A Beautiful Echo to the “Golden Age”], People’s Daily Online, October 27, 2015 u http://media.people.com.cn/n/2015/1027/c192374-27745693.html.

61 “Wu Changsheng tongzhi gongzuo jianli ji zhongyao shiji he yewu chengji” [Comrade Wu Changsheng’s Work Experience, Important Accomplishments and Achievements], Xinhua, June 5, 2007.

62 “Guo Jiping / Zhong Sheng” [Guo Jiping / Zhong Sheng: Recommended Columns], People’s Daily Online u http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/145010/index.html.

63 Fan, “ ‘Huangjin shidai’ de meili huying.”

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Guo Jiping articles are long, generally ranging between 4,000 and 5,000 Chinese characters.64 This length naturally extends the writing and editing process and means that articles are not intended to quickly shape public opinion but instead aim to offer deeper analysis for more inquisitive readers.

Guo Jiping’s earliest articles focused on a wide range of topics. During Hu Jintao’s tenure as general secretary, the writing team helped proclaim his major strategic concept of building a “harmonious world,” which embodies the CCP’s push for greater Chinese international influence, accommodation of its core interests, and the rejection of universally accepted political systems and values.65 In the month following Hu’s September 2005 speech at the UN summit calling for the building of a harmonious world, Guo Jiping repeated his call for the abandonment of a “Cold War mentality,” respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect for each country’s chosen societal system.66 Other articles focused on promoting the “new security concept,” which centers on advancing a multipolar global order, deepening globalization, and upholding the United Nation’s authority. As the Iraq War raged on with climbing costs to the United States, Guo Jiping argued in December 2007 that unilateralism and hegemony did not match the period’s international security situation and promoted the new security concept as China’s contribution to international peace.67 More recently, it has pushed for a more equitable financial system in the wake of the international financial crisis, heralded the beginning of a “new golden age” in relations with the United Kingdom following Xi Jinping’s state visit there in October 2015, and welcomed the beginning of a “new era” in China–Latin American relations before Xi’s regional tour in November 2016.68

64 This figure comes from a People’s Daily Online study published in April 2014: Liang Kun, “ ‘Zhongsheng’ qiaoxiangle shenme?” [What Kind of Bell Did “Zhong Sheng” Ring?], People’s Daily Online, April 22, 2014 u http://media.people.com.cn/n/2014/0422/c382352-24928717.html.

65 For more on Hu’s “harmonious world” concept, see Heath, China’s New Governing Party Paradigm. 66 “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity: Statement by Hu

Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations Summit,” United Nations, September 15, 2005 u http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf; and Guo Jiping, “Lianheguo Chengli 60 zhounian: Jianshe hexie shijie de liangda mingti” [United Nations 60th Anniversary: Two Key Questions for Constructing a Harmonious World], People’s Daily Online, October 24, 2005 u http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/3793989.html.

67 Guo Jiping, “Gongtong weihu shijie heping wending” [Mutually Maintaining World Peace and Stability], People’s Daily Online, December 6, 2007 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/6618818.html.

68 Guo Jiping, “Huhuan gongping heli de guoji jinrong xinzhixu” [Calling for a Fair System for International Financial Markets], People’s Daily Online, November 6, 2008 u http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1030/8291119.html; Fan, “ ‘Huangjin shidai’ de meili huying”; and Guo Jiping, “Yingjie Zhongla mingyun yugong de lishi xinshiqi” [Welcoming a New Era of China–Latin American Relations under a Common Destiny], People’s Daily Online, November 16, 2016 u http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n1/2016/1116/c78779-28870818.html.

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Guo Jiping’s partner Zhong Sheng first became active in November 2008 and is also managed by PD’s International Department. The homophone has been confirmed in PD publications and other reputable sources to have the meaning of “voice of China” (Zhongguo zhi sheng), but one PD Online study has posited a more covert translation of “sounding the alarm bell” (jingshi zhongsheng).69 This second meaning fits well with many of the pen name’s alarmist messages. Zhong Sheng can be thought of as a sidekick to Guo Jiping; its writing team also comprises journalists and editors of the International Department, and each article is a collective departmental work.70 Two official commentary evaluations of Zhong Sheng articles from 2012 and 2013 show the responsible editor of the works to be then department director Lv Yansong, which strongly suggests that all articles under this pen name are reviewed and finalized by the department head. Under the “societal effect” section, these evaluations also observe which international news outlets discussed and shared these articles, signaling a keen awareness of Zhong Sheng’s foreign influence.71 Its articles are noticeably shorter than Guo Jiping’s, with most coming in under 1,500 Chinese characters. This has allowed Zhong Sheng to publish at a much more frequent rate than Guo Jiping.72 Such brevity also suggests that this pseudonym is meant to respond to events more quickly than its senior commentary partner.

In terms of content, Zhong Sheng has a clear focus on international relations, with considerable coverage of economics, trade, and security affairs. Its articles have especially focused on Sino-U.S. relations. For example, a May 2012 piece called on both nations to jointly defend world peace and promote sustainable development.73 But true to the alternative translation of its name, Zhong Sheng has also admonished targeted countries. Examples include its

69 Liang, “ ‘Zhongsheng’ qiaoxiangle shenme?”; and Jing Dong Group, Daguo zhisheng [The Voice of a Great Power], June 11, 2017 u http://item.jd.com/10402049014.html.

70 “Guo Jiping / Zhong Sheng.” 71 All-China Journalists Association, “GJ Pinglun: Buneng renyou waibu ganshe shixian zhengquan

gengdie: Zhongguo xinwen jiang canping zuopin tuijian biao” [GJ Commentary: We Cannot Let Foreign Interference Beget Regime Change: China News Award Evaluating Work Recommendation Form], Xinhua, June 24, 2013 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2013-06/24/c_132481545.htm; All-China Journalists Association, “Xuliya Wenti, dangxin ‘moshi’ beihou de sihuo: Zhongguo xinwen jiang canping zuopin tuijian biao” [The Syria Problem: Beware of Hidden Information behind the Obvious: China News Award Evaluating Work Recommendation Form], Xinhua, June 15, 2014 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2014-06/15/c_133409121.htm. Lv is now a deputy chief editor at PD: “Lv Yansong jianli” [Lv Yansong’s Curriculum Vitae], People’s Daily Online u http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/208383.

72 This figure comes from a People’s Daily Online study published in April 2014: Liang, “ ‘Zhongsheng’ qiaoxiangle shenme?”

73 Zhong Sheng, “Zouchu Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi zhilu” [Walking the Road of a New Type of Major Power Relations between the U.S. and China], People’s Daily Online, May 6, 2012 u http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/17817455.html.

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November 2008 inaugural article, “Whoever Hung the Bell on the Tiger’s Neck Must Untie It,” which blamed French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to meet the Dalai Lama for China’s postponement of the 11th EU-China Summit.74 “Be Vigilant of the Wishful Thinking in Japan’s Delay Tactics,” a September 2012 article widely shared on Chinese Foreign Ministry websites, warned that China “[has] the confidence to fight an ‘encountered engagement,’ and [has] the preparation to fight a ‘prolonged war’ with Japan” (you he Riben da “zaoyu zhan” de xinxin, yeyou da “chijiu zhan” de zhunbei) in response to the Japanese government’s nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.75 “America, Stop Using ‘National Security’ as a Pretense,” published in May 2013, protested Washington’s alleged obstruction of Chinese business activities in the United States on national security grounds.76 It is worth noting that a key target in recent years has been the Philippines’ South China Sea arbitration case at The Hague, which threatened to delegitimize Beijing’s claims over the area. In 2016 an eight-part series aggressively attacked the Philippines, the West, Japan, and the entire tribunal process.77 Zhong Sheng struck a more conciliatory tone in a January 2017 article explaining the themes of China’s first white paper on Asia-Pacific security cooperation, emphasizing the country’s desire to meet global challenges together with regional nations in the face of various “black swan” events and “anti-globalization” thoughts.78

In summary, the Guo Jiping and Zhong Sheng writing teams work together to guide public opinion on foreign affairs through both long analytical commentaries and concise opinion pieces supporting China’s most important strategic initiatives on the world stage. Of note, Guo Jiping articles have often been published to provide supporting commentary surrounding trips abroad by the Chinese president. Similarly, the posting of shrill Zhong Sheng articles threatening preparedness for war on official Foreign Ministry websites suggests that this commentary brand may play a low-level role in the

74 Zhong Sheng, “Jieling haixu xilingren” [Whoever Hung the Bell on the Tiger’s Neck Must Untie It], People’s Daily Online, November 29, 2008 u http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-11/29/content_148024.htm.

75 See “Jingti Riben yituodaibian de jiaoxing xinli” [Be Vigilant of the Wishful Thinking in Japan’s Delay Tactics], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), September 17, 2012 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/xwdt/t975491.htm.

76 Zhong Sheng, “Meiguo, shaona ‘guojia anquan’ dang huangzi” [America, Stop Using National Security as a Pretense], People’s Daily Online, May 3, 2013 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2013/0503/c1003-21348757.html.

77 Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, no. 51, August 4, 2016, 6 u http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM51MS.pdf.

78 Zhong Sheng, “Yi hezuo cu heping de daguo dandang” [Fostering Peace through Cooperation Is the Virtue of a Superpower], People’s Daily Online, January 13, 2017 u http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0113/c409499-29020812.html.

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PRC’s hierarchy of warning statements for international crises. Both brands offer analysts authoritative views on international affairs that collectively represent the position of the CCP’s mouthpiece.

Qiu Shi: Flagship Ideologue of the Central Committee’s Journal

The “Qiu Shi” commentary brand is published exclusively in Qiushi Journal (qiushi), the theoretical periodical under the direction of the CCP Central Committee. Like the journal itself, these articles are used to communicate the theoretical underpinnings of CCP authority and related Central Committee policy directives. Qiu Shi’s articles are frequently posted on Qiushi Journal’s affiliate website. Even rudimentary Chinese-language skills are unnecessary for one to recognize that the pen name is a homophone for the journal itself. Qiushi Journal has specifically reported on its special employment of the pseudonym to support top CCP gatherings, such as the 18th Party Congress, further corroborating the pen name’s status as a heavyweight representative of the journal.79

Little information can be found on the composition of the Qiu Shi writing team, but the makeup of the Ren Zhongping writing team—the Central Committee’s other mouthpiece—suggests that it may consist of editors, journalists, and theorists from different departments of the journal. Like the journal’s editorials, Qiu Shi articles undergo an exhaustive approval process prior to publication. According to debriefing materials provided to a December 2004 experience-sharing conference and a meeting of chief editors and station directors, commentaries are initially reviewed by an appointed editor before undergoing a review and approval process by the relevant departmental director or deputy director, an editorial board member, a second on-duty editorial board member, and the chief editor.80 Although this process may have been adjusted since 2004, these materials nonetheless confirm that Qiu Shi commentary is Qiushi Journal’s highly polished flagship product.

79 “Shi ba da zhongda zhuti xuanchuan: ‘Qiushi’ fabiao qiu shi xilie wenzhang” [Propaganda on the Important Theme of the 18th Party Congress: Qiushi Journal Publishes Qiu Shi Article Series], Qiushi, 2012 u http://www.qstheory.cn/special/2012/qswzsbd/.

80 Qiushi Journal, “2004 nian 12 yue jingyan jiaoliu hui (shang): Shenru chijiu kaizhan ‘san xiang xuexi jiaoyu huodong’ jingyan jiaoliu hui ji zong bian, tai zhang huiyi cailiao: Qiushi Zazhi she kaizhan ‘san xiang xuexi jiaoyu huodong’ qingkuang huibao” [December 2004 Experience Sharing Conference (Part 1): Deeply and Persistently Launch “Three-Points Study and Education Campaign” Experience Sharing Conference and Chief Editors, Station Directors Meeting Materials: Qiushi Journal Opens “Three-Points Study and Education Campaign” Situation Debriefing], Xinhua, December 24, 2004 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2007-01/05/content_5567791_4.htm.

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The writing team has been disseminating theoretical commentary for a relatively long time, with articles dating back to the Jiang Zemin era. Its commentaries were an important part of the well-coordinated media campaign to propagate Jiang’s main theoretical contribution, “the important thinking of the Three Represents.” The Three Represents was a radical departure from 80 years of the party’s emphasis on recruiting from traditional sectors of society, such as workers and farmers, and opened recruitment to newer “advanced productive forces” of society: professionals from the private sector. This controversial about-face thus required all the commentary support it could get.81 In the run-up to the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and the 10th National People’s Congress in March 2003, Qiu Shi articles declared that the Three Represents concept embodies “the modernization of socialism’s overall layout” and named it as part of the CCP’s guiding ideology alongside Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.82 Subsequent articles have covered a variety of topics, ranging from provincial modernization to the issue of borrowing from the “excellent civilizational achievements” of other countries. They have also connected economic development to the CCP’s “socialist core value system” (shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi), contending that it provides the very foundation on which China’s economic growth can be realized.83

Qui Shi articles often take a hard line on competing ideologies and party discipline. Examples include a May 2009 article that dismissed capitalism as the ideology of Western aggressors and a more recent December 2016 piece that expounded on the importance of strict party governance with Xi Jinping at the helm.84 Qiu Shi has also appealed to the nationalistic tendencies of the Chinese public to support CCP theories. As one September 2009 article straightforwardly states, “only socialism is capable of saving China, and only

81 For more on the Three Represents, see David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 111.

82 Qiu Shi, “Qiushi: ‘Lun dang de zuidi gangling yu zuigao gangling de tongyi’ ” [Qiushi Journal: “Discussing the Integration of the Party’s Lowest Program and Highest Program”], Xinhua, May 27, 2002 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-05/27/content_410648.htm; and Qiu Xuan, “Qiu shi zazhi fabiao qiu shi wenzhang: Lishi xing de juece he gongxian” [Qiushi Journal Publishes Qiu Shi Article: Historic Strategic Decision and Contribution], People’s Daily, January 11, 2003 u http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/29/98/20030111/905655.html.

83 Qiu Shi, “Jiandingbuyi de jianchi shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi” [Unswervingly Adhere to the Socialist Core Values System], Qiushi, June 1, 2009 u http://www.qstheory.cn/qszq/qskt/200906/t20090622_1948.htm.

84 Qiu Shi, “Weishenme bixu jianchi Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi daolu er buneng zou bie de daolu” [Why [We] Must Persist on the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Must Not Walk Another Road], Qiushi, May 1, 2009 u http://www.qstheory.cn/qszq/qskt/200906/t20090609_1845.htm; and Qiu Shi, “Puxie quanmian cong yan zhi dang xin pianzhang” [Composing a New Chapter in Strictly Governing the Party Comprehensively], Qiushi, December 16, 2016 u http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-12/16/c_1120107682.htm.

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socialism with Chinese characteristics is capable of developing China; this is the scientific conclusion developed from Chinese patriotism since modern times.”85

As demonstrated, the Qiu Shi pen name speaks authoritatively on behalf of its parent publication, offering observers an accurate source for the CCP Central Committee’s latest theoretical views. It is utilized to promote updates to the party’s ideology, bolster the initiatives of China’s top leaders, and portray CCP theory as the only viable foundation for China’s economic success. This last task is critical, since the CCP is uniquely qualified to implement the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics that it upholds as the only correct theory for China’s advancement.

Xie Xinping and Xie Zhengping: The “Opinion Leaders” of the Chinese Military

The pen names “Xie Xinping” and “Xie Zhengping” serve as two prominent commentary brands representing the mouthpiece of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), PLA Daily. The CMC has supreme command over the Chinese armed forces, which are currently led by CMC chairman Xi Jinping. Since their inception, both pen names have been utilized by the paper for the purpose of guiding opinion on China’s most important military affairs, especially the current anticorruption and military modernization efforts by the People’s Liberation Army. Persuasively addressing corruption is a particularly critical task for military propagandists if the public’s faith in the military is to be restored.

Xie Xinping was masterminded in 2013 by the former chief propagandist of the PLA General Political Department, Yu Guang, during his tenure as director of PLA Daily.86 Xie Xinping has been confirmed by PLA Daily’s Huang Kunlun to have the homophonous meaning of “PLA Daily news commentary” (Jiefangjun Bao xinwen pinglun). Like its peer civilian writing

85 Qiu Shi, “Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi qizhi shi shehui zhuyi yu aiguo zhuyi xiang tongyi de qizhi” [The Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Is the United Banner of Socialism and Patriotism], Qiushi, September 16, 2009 u http://www.qstheory.cn/qszq/qskt/200909/t20090911_11308.htm. Another similar example is found in the previous issue. See Qiu Shi, “Cong aiguo zhuyi dao Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi” [From Patriotism to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi, September 1, 2009 u http://www.qstheory.cn/qszq/qskt/200908/t20090831_10485.htm.

86 Yue Huaijiang, “Yuan zong zhengzhi bu xuanchuan bu buzhang Yu Guang shaojiang churen junwei zhengzhi gongzuo bu zhuren zhuli” [Former General Political Department Propaganda Department Head Rear Admiral Yu Guang Becomes CMC Political Work Department Assistant Director], Paper, January 19, 2016 u http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1422469; and Liu Liu, “Miji tiaozheng hou junwei hexin bumen fasheng xin bianhua” [After Intensive Adjustments, New Changes Occur at CMC Core Departments], Jiyuan City Zhicheng Town Public Information Net, February 17, 2017 u http://www.zhicheng.gov.cn/guonaxinwen/20170217/32161.html.

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team Ren Zhongping, the Xie Xinping writing team jointly produces articles through a collaborative process and comprises senior paper leaders, department directors, experienced editors, and promising new talent. Overall planning is reportedly spearheaded by the “Xie Xinping studio.”87 An official commentary assessment of Xie Xinping’s inaugural article shows that the team consisted of three main writers and was edited by Commentary Department director He Minghong and paper director Yu Guang. It also stated that the pen name was created as “the military’s Ren Zhongping.”88 This suggests a review process mirroring that of Ren Zhongping, where drafts are submitted to the paper’s leadership for final approval before publication. Xie Xinping’s commentaries are regularly posted on PLA Daily’s affiliated website, China Military Online, as well as the official websites of party organs, including PD, China Daily, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Xie Xinping works have been compiled into a book released by PLA Daily’s publishing house in December 2014.89

According to Huang, the Xie Xinping brand represents nothing less than an innovation of the military’s political commentary to meet the challenging requirements of the “new situation,” a concept that encompasses a broad set of “contradictions” challenging China in the period from 2000 to 2020. The new situation’s competitive commentary environment is replete with opinion sources that often undermine sanctioned narratives. As mentioned previously, Huang’s writings portray a crowded environment where “everyone has a microphone” and social media platforms allow for a low commentary threshold, necessitating the creation of an authoritative “opinion leader.” As the key opinion leader in PLA Daily, Xie Xinping represents the CMC’s voice at important times and on crucial topics.90

The first article by this pseudonym appeared on PLA Daily’s front page in September 2013 and discussed the importance of CCP and PLA members maintaining party loyalty in an increasingly materialistic society.91 Since that piece, Xie Xinping has published many articles in support of Xi’s bold anticorruption drive and military modernization.

87 Wu Tianmin, “ ‘Xie Xinping’ shi shei?” [Who Is “Xie Xinping”?] Ministry of National Defense (PRC), July 25, 2014 u http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2014-07/25/content_4524360.htm.

88 All-China Journalists Association, “Lun xinyang yu zuofeng: Zhongguo xinwen jiang canping zuopin tuijian biao” [Discussing Faith and Work Style: China News Award Evaluating Work Recommendation Form], Xinhua.

89 Jiefangjun bao Xie Xinping jilu [PLA Daily Xie Xinping Compilation] (Beijing: Long March Press, 2014) u http://book.kongfz.com/235283/673550828/.

90 Huang, “Cong zhengzhi huayu.” 91 Ibid.; and Xie Xinping, “Lun xinyang yu zuofeng” [Discussing Faith and Work Style], PLA Daily,

September 25, 2013 u http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xcjy/qfwy/201309/t20130924_43754.html.

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A February 2014 article, for example, highlighted the urgency of realizing the martial counterpart of the “China dream”—the “strong military dream” (qiang jun meng)—by unifying the mindset and actions of the PLA.92 On the eve of the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War, PLA Daily published another Xie Xinping article that similarly advocated reform as the catalyst of military modernization.93 This piece, along with a December 2015 article, strongly condemned the pandemic of rule-breaking, opportunism, and bribery for eroding soldiers’ morale; the latter article characterized vested interests as the “umbilical cord” that impedes military reform.94 The PLA’s incomplete military transformation and ongoing discipline issues strongly suggest that Xie Xinping will have much to write about for some time to come.

Xie Xinping’s sidekick at PLA Daily is Xie Zhengping, whose name has been confirmed to stand for “PLA Daily Political Department and Commentary Department” (Jiefangjun Bao zhengzhi bu yu pinglun bu).95 The origins of this pseudonym are linked closely to Xie Xinping, which was created by the same person, Yu Guang.96 Sources suggest that in addition to the two departments referenced in the name, the Xie Zhengping team was also founded by the PLA Daily chief editor’s office, the Theory Department, and other main divisions of the paper.97 Articles under this pen name are published directly on the China Military Online website. In fact, the Xie Zhengping program was reportedly pioneered by the General Political Department to spearhead internet public

92 Xie Xinping, “Shenru xuexi guanche xi zhuxi guanyu guofang he jundui jianshe de zhongyao lunshu” [Deeply Study and Implement Chairman Xi’s Important Expositions on National Defense and Military Building], PLA Daily, February 17, 2014 u http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0217/c83083-24376791.html.

93 Xie Xinping, “Dao zhongliu jishui: You feng ‘jiawu’ lun gaige” [Hitting the Water Midstream: Coming Along “Jiawu” to Discuss Reform], PLA Daily, July 25, 2014 u http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014-07/25/content_6064377.htm.

94 Xie Xinping, “Sheng zhan zhi lu—Shenhua guofang he jundui gaige zankai shishi zhiji lun shizhanhua xunlian” [The Road to Victory—Deepening Defense and Military Reform Opening Implementation during Discussion of Improving the Realism of Combat Training], PLA Daily, December 14, 2015 u http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/gd/2015-12/14/content_6813977.htm.

95 Jiang Xi, “Da Peng you tongchi jun zhong ‘da laohu’ Xu Caihou de ‘Xie Zhengping’ shi shei?” [Answering Peng Pai Readers: Who Is the “Xie Zhengping” Denouncing the Military’s “Tiger” Xu Caihou?], Paper, October 29, 2014 u http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1274081; and “Xin jin da qu fu jiangling yishou dazao tong pi Xu Caihou Gu Junshan xiongwen” [Newly Appointed Deputy Leader of Theater Personally Writes Powerful Article Lambasting Xu Caihou and Gu Junshan], CCP Suzhou City Wujiang District Party School, February 15, 2017 u http://www.wjdx.gov.cn/UpFile/template/contentpage/wjgf_mb1/item.aspx?id=27835&p=0.

96 Yue, “Yuan zong zhengzhi bu xuanchuan bu buzhang yu guang”; and Liu, “Miji tiaozheng hou junwei.” 97 Guo Yuandan, “Xie Zhengping huo xi zong zheng yulun gongzuo bumen siwei huoyue geng tie di

qi” [Xie Zhengping May Be Connected with General Political Public Opinion Work Department; Characterized for Having an Active Mind and Being Down to Earth], People’s Daily Online, August 5, 2015 u http://sn.people.com.cn/n/2015/0805/c358036-25856742.html; and Jiang, “Da Peng you tongchi jun zhong ‘da laohu’ Xu Caihou de ‘Xie Zhengping’ shi shei?”

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opinion and is meant to be well-versed in online language.98 This pseudonym is also distinguished from Xie Xinping by its more concentrated focus on championing Xi Jinping’s anticorruption operations in the Chinese military.

Xie Zhengping made its debut in March 2014 in the PD Online column Netizens Discussion (wangyou lailun).99 The article, which contrasted the corruption scandal of Lieutenant General Gu Junshan with morally upright PLA soldiers, appeared just one hour after the scandal broke.100 As was reportedly divulged to the Paper by a veteran PLA Daily journalist, this first article appeared in the PD Online forum to train the writing team in the use of the proper style.101 The Paper further personified the author as clearly being a “hot-blooded” man of around 30 years in age, whose expression evokes the masculinity and passion that Xie Zhengping exudes.102 From these facts, it stands to reason that the writing team aspires to a stout, patriotic writing style that it hopes will earn rapport with China’s young nationalistic netizens.

Xie Zhengping’s timely writing continued to target military corruption, including the most sensitive cases of malfeasance. An article published in June 2014 offered a historical analysis of military corruption in the Ming and Qing dynasties, concluding that “the most dangerous type of corruption is military corruption; for the military to condone corruption is to condone failure.”103 This motif was further expounded on in October 2014 articles that lamented the downfall of former CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou and endorsed the creation of a military with “zero tolerance” for corruption. That month, on the same day that Xinhua announced Xu was stripped of his military rank and CCP membership for accepting massive bribes, the Xie Zhengping team published a prominent commentary that both recognized the seriousness of Xu’s offense and sought to offset its damage to military morale and

98 Guo, “Xie Zhengping huo xi zong zheng yulun gongzuo bumen siwei huoyue geng tie di qi.” 99 Jiang, “Da Peng you tongchi jun zhong ‘da laohu’ Xu Caihou de ‘Xie Zhengping’ shi shei?” 100 Xie Zhengping, “Wei gua ‘Gu’ liao du de jiefangjun dian zan” [Liking the PLA’s Scraping

Treatment of the ‘Gu’ Disease], People’s Daily Online, Netizens Discussion forum, March 31, 2014 u http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0331/c1036-24786046.html; and Jiang, “Da Peng you tongchi jun zhong ‘da laohu’ Xu Caihou de ‘Xie Zhengping’ shi shei?”

101 Wu Yaoqian and Jiang Xi, “ ‘Xie Zhengping’ tongchi junzhong ‘da laohu’, ‘Xie Xinping’ you shuole shenme?” [“Xie Zhengping” Denounces the Military’s “Tigers,” What Has “Xie Xinping” Said?], Paper, November 2, 2014 u http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1274982.

102 Jiang, “Da Peng you tongchi jun zhong ‘da laohu’ Xu Caihou de ‘Xie Zhengping’ shi shei?” 103 Xie Zhengping, “Jundui juebu yunxu you fubai fenzi cangshen zhidi” [The Military Will Never

Permit Hideouts for Corrupt Elements], Ministry of National Defense (PRC), June 18, 2014 u http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2014-06/18/content_4517091.htm.

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public trust.104 Later articles seem to have characterized the corruption issue as a side effect of the PLA’s rapid development.105

The Xie Zhengping team also produces works other than written commentary. In 2015 a series of slick political cartoons about the PLA were released by the “Xie Zhengping studio” (Xie Zhengping gongzuoshi), a unit controlled by the same team behind the Xie Zhengping commentaries.106 Using lively cartoon characters, internet language, and even profanity, one video released for China’s Army Day celebrated Chinese military victories over foreign aggressors such as “little Japan” and applauded “Big Daddy Xi’s” anticorruption drive against military “tigers” and “flies.” It further described China’s military upgrades with the popular internet slang gao da shang, meaning high-end, impressive, and high-class. The video had over 90 million viewers shortly after its release.107 A similar video artfully framed current military reform policies in the long historical context of an ever-evolving Chinese military.108 Of final note, the studio has also produced colorful graphics explaining the new structure of the military following reforms.109 These works seem to represent an additional push to connect with a younger generation that is jaded by both PLA corruption and traditional propaganda through leveraging “new media” formats.

In summary, analysts can monitor Xie Xinping and Xie Zhengping for authoritative and timely opinions on the PLA’s most pressing issues, specifically related to ongoing military reforms and the evolving narrative on PLA corruption. Tracking Xie Zhengping commentary is particularly useful

104 “China to Put Decorated General on Trial over Corruption,” Guardian, October 28, 2014 u https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/china-general-xu-caihou-bribery-corruption; and Xie Zhengping, “Xie Zhengping: Tan fu qiongtu lu qiang jun zheng dangshi” [Tie Zhengping: Corruption’s Dead End Road the Right Time for a Strong Military], China Military Online, October 28, 2014 u http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-10/28/content_6202290.htm.

105 Xie Zhengping, “Fanfu fengbao zhong de jundui, ni zenme kan?” [The Military at the Center of an Anticorruption Storm, What Do You Think?], China Military Online, April 26, 2015 u http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-04/26/content_6461078.htm.

106 Guo, “Xie Zhengping huo xi zong zheng yulun gongzuo bumen siwei huoyue geng tie di qi.” 107 Xie Zhengping Studio, “Dongman: Wu fenzhong du dong jiefangjun hua feng hao ‘renxing’ ”

[Cartoon: Understand the PLA in Five Minutes the Style Is Really “Headstrong”], China Military Online video, 4:33, July 31, 2015 u http://tv.81.cn/sytj-tupian/2015-07/31/content_6609934.htm; and Guo Yuandan, “Xie Zhengping huoxi zongzheng yulun gongzuo bumen, siwei huoyue geng jiediqi” [Xie Zhengping Could Be a General Political Public Opinion Department, Nimble Thinking Makes It Down to Earth], Global Times, August 5, 2015 u http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2015-08/7193978.html.

108 Xie Zhengping Studio, “[Meng Dongman] wu fenzhong liaojie jundui gaige de qianshi jinsheng” [[Cute Cartoon] Understand Military Reform’s Past and Present in Five Minutes], China Military Online video, 4:25, December 1, 2015 u http://tv.81.cn/sytj-tupian/2015-12/01/content_6794074.htm.

109 Xie Zhengping Studio, “Yi zhang tu du dong junwei jiguan jigou shezhi tiaozheng gaige” [Understand CMC Organs Structural Set Up and Adjustment Reforms in One Picture], China Military Online, January 11, 2016 u http://www.81.cn/syjdt/2016-01/11/content_6852763.htm.

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for discerning the very latest opinions on anticorruption news before other military commentators can chime in.

Zhong Zuwen and Zhong Zuxuan: Party Whips on Cadre Management

The CCP Central Organization Department (COD) maintains two writing teams to act as its official commentary voice under the pseudonyms “Zhong Zuwen” and “Zhong Zuxuan,” standing for “COD article” (zhongyang zuzhibu wenzhang) and “COD declaration” (zhongyang zuzhibu xuanbu), respectively.110 Their rhetoric centers on the processes of party-building and thought-building among CCP cadres, which they seek to inculcate with ideological zeal and a strict sense of discipline. Articles under these pseudonyms are written in a cheerless form, though party cadres are expected to respond receptively based on their source of authority. The COD is one of the most powerful systems of CCP control through its management of appointments to thousands of top posts in the CCP, government, military, large businesses, banks, universities, and other bodies.111

Ever since its appearance in PD in September 2001, Zhong Zuwen has been hailed as a “weather vane for cadre management and appointment.”112 A 2012 book compilation of Zhong Zuwen works edited by the COD Research Office’s Policy and Regulation Bureau expressly states that Zhong Zuwen articles are authored by the department to “strengthen thought propaganda, implement policy guidance, point out problems of contradiction, promote healthy trends, and play an important role in propagating the Central Committee’s voice, educating CCP cadres, and consolidating consensus.”113 Zhong Zuwen publishes exclusively in PD.

The Zhong Zuwen writing team maintains a problem-oriented tone, emblematic of the serious issues the department must address throughout the CCP’s ranks. For example, a January 2008 article titled “Don’t Let the

110 “Ni renshi ‘Guo Ping’ me? ‘Guo Ping Lun Tianxia’ yi shu chu xin ban” [Do You Know “Guo Ping”? “Guo Ping Discusses All Under Heaven” Releases a New Edition], Xinhua, September 18, 2016 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-09/18/c_129286355.htm; and Liu Dongshu, “Zhongguo guanfang ‘xiezuozu’ shuming you shenme jiangjiu?” [What Particular Selections of China’s Official “Writing Teams” Signatures Are There?], Elite Reference, June 25, 2014 u http://qnck.cyol.com/html/2014-06/25/nw.D110000qnck_20140625_2-02.htm.

111 For more on the CCP’s departments and organs, see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 41–76.

112 “Jiemi guanfang biming: ‘Guo Ping’ ‘Zhong Zuwen’ dou shi shei?” [Unmasking Official Pen Names: Who Are “Guo Ping” “Zhong Zuwen”?], Sina, October 30, 2014 u http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-10-30/151431070044.shtml.

113 COD Research Office Policy and Regulation Bureau, Shiqi da yilai Zhong Zuwen huibian [Honest Righteousness: Zhong Zuwen Compilation since the 17th Party Congress] (Beijing: Dangjian Duwu Chubanshe, 2012), 2.

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-10-30/151431070044.shtml

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-10-30/151431070044.shtml

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Honest Person Suffer” pointed out that many party members have schemed to advance their own interests at the expense of the CCP’s image. An April 2008 article titled “Cadre Selection Must Stress Morality and Ability, Morality Comes First” recognized that a minority of cadres have “introduced market rules into inner-party political life” and engaged in the buying and selling of government posts. As a final example, a January 2011 article titled “Responsibility from Start to Finish Is Necessary When Working” highlighted the frequent problem of unclear division of labor as hampering organization work at the outset of the 12th Five-Year Plan.114 Zhong Zuwen’s attention to these issues—particularly “the buying and selling of government positions” (maiguan maiguan)—reflects a candid assessment of the personnel management system’s failures, a dire reality that in October 2014 spurred Xi Jinping to admit that the CCP’s cadre management system is “for show only.”115

The writing team’s style is formulaic and bureaucratic, and articles typically name a litany of tasks that must be done. Zhong Zuwen offers commentary support for Xi’s anticorruption campaign by revealing problems lurking just underneath the personnel system’s surface. Decrying “the promotion of sick cadres” (daibing tiba)—cadres engaged in corruption and other dubious acts—is a central theme in several pieces. A series posted on PD Online from August 30 to September 1, 2016, seized the opportunity to comment on the CCP Central Committee General Office’s “Opinion on Preventing the Promotion of ‘Sick’ Cadres,” cautioning against the dangers of such practices, but also offering remedies for catching unfit cadres.116

Departing from Zhong Zuwen’s stern warnings, Zhong Zuxuan has typically featured a more action-oriented and positive tone. Its articles are initially published in China Organization Personnel Newspaper, which is sponsored by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Following publication, they are featured primarily on the PD Online–hosted website CCP News Net and the COD-managed Communist Party Member Net. Zhong Zuxuan’s works date back to at least 2007, evidenced by a commentary

114 COD Research Office Policy and Regulation Bureau, Shiqi da yilai Zhong Zuwen huibian 3, 47, 193. 115 Minxin Pei, China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2016), 78. 116 For a discussion of dangers, see Zhong Zuwen, “Fangzhi ganbu ‘dai bing tiba’ de youli wuqi” [The

Powerful Weapon to Guard against Cadre “Sick Promotion”], People’s Daily, August 30, 2016, 2 u http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2016-08/30/nw.D110000renmrb_20160830_2-02.htm. For a discussion of remedies, see Zhong Zuwen, “Fangzhi ‘daibing tiba’ bixu ya shi zeren” [To Guard against “Promoting Sick Cadres” [We] Must Take Real Responsibility], People’s Daily, August 31, 2016, 6 u http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2016-08/31/nw.D110000renmrb_20160831_2-06.htm.

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2016-08/31/nw.D110000renmrb_20160831_2-06.htm

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2016-08/31/nw.D110000renmrb_20160831_2-06.htm

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in China Organization Personnel Newspaper that encouraged party members to improve party-building research.117

Zhong Zuxuan has often sought to rally party members to a specific cause, lauding COD initiatives and focusing on implementing them more efficiency. For example, a February 2016 article praised the meticulous inspections of party secretaries nationwide and local governments’ commitment to those inspections.118 Likewise, an October 2016 piece emphasized that party-building and disciplined executives are essential to bolster state-owned enterprises (SOE).119 Such commentaries point to a continuation in the CCP’s approach to SOE reform, which aims to enhance party leadership of SOEs while simultaneously reducing the state’s overbearing interference.120

In sum, both COD pen names offer observers a forthright window into personnel issues within the CCP, many of which directly threaten the party’s political legitimacy. Zhong Zuwen appears to be the more senior of the two; it targets the most serious problems and levies heavy demands upon its readers. In contrast, Zhong Zuxuan often seeks to bolster party morale as the CCP tackles chronic deficiencies, while also directing cadres to take bold action.

Guo Ping: The Party’s Crack Cyber Commentary Team

If Ren Zhongping marked the modern institutionalization of the pseudonym writing team system, then Guo Ping marks its continued adaptation to the internet era. The pen name can be translated as “Cyberspace Administration of China Commentary” (guojia wangxinban pinglun),

117 Zhong Zuxuan, “Shenru xuexi guanche dang de shiqi da jingshen qieshi jiaqiang dang de jianshe ji dangjian yanjiu” [Deeply Study and Implement the Spirit of the 17th Party Congress, Earnestly Strengthen Party Building and Party Building Research], Guangzhou Personnel Information Network, November 22, 2007 u http://www.gzpi.gov.cn/rsxx/200711/T20071122_57188.htm.

118 Zhong Zuxuan, “Zhong Zuxuan: Tuijin jiceng dang zuzhi jianshe quanmian jinbu quanmian guoying” [Zhong Zuxuan: Advance Grassroots Level Party Organization Building’s Comprehensive Improvement and Comprehensive Excellence], CCP News Net, February 1, 2016 u http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0201/c117092-28101349.html.

119 Zhong Zuxuan, “Zhong Zuxuan: Jiang quanmian cong yan zhi dang yaoqiu luo dao shichu kaichuang guoyou qiye dang de jianshe xin jumian” [Zhong Zuxuan: Practically Implement Comprehensive Strict Party Governance, Initiate a New Phase in SOE Party Building], CCP News Net, October 19, 2016 u http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1019/c117092-28791415.html. See also Zhong Zuxuan, “Zhong Zuxuan: Dui biao yaoqiu zhao chaju miaozhun wenti zhua zhenggai” [Zhong Zuxuan: Find Deficiencies toward Target Requirements, Take Aim at Problems, and Grasp Rectification], CCP News Net, January 22, 2017 u http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0122/c117092-29040940.html.

120 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, H.R. Rep. No. 114, 2nd Session (November 2016) u https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.

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or simply “National Commentary” (guojia pinglun).121 Since Guo Ping’s inaugural article in April 2014, its works have quickly circulated on the Chinese internet following initial publication in official outlets such as PD Online and Xinhua Net. The writing team has been credited with “opening up the era of traditional media reprinting commentary from the internet” and “realizing the milestone transfer of roles between internet and print media.”122 Its commentary focuses on both domestic and foreign events, and its analysis on Xi’s activities has won it recognition by the CCP’s propaganda apparatus.123

After a year of official hype that included media promotions and intimations of its authority from “relevant persons,” a compilation of Guo Ping’s works published in July 2015 by the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau confirmed the pen name’s authors to be a writing team of the CCP Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group (CISILG) Office, more commonly known by its State Council title, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC).124 CISILG is in charge of policing China’s internet and is headed by Xi himself.125 The Guo Ping brand was created under the CAC’s orders to “organize a commentary team; voice opinions without delay on major events, important matters, and sensitive matters; and effectively guide internet public opinion.”126 Official media outlets strived to quickly increase the public’s knowledge of the pseudonym’s importance. In February 2015, Guo Ping even became the only collective group to win the prize of China Internet Person of the Year, which was sponsored by PD Online (other winners were actual persons).127

121 Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), “Guo Ping shi shei? Ni renshi ‘Guo Ping’ ma?” [Who Is Guo Ping? Do You Know “Guo Ping”?], in Guo Ping lun tianxia [Guo Ping Discusses All Under Heaven] (Beijing: Zhongyan Bianyi Chubanshe, 2015), 4; and “Ni renshi ‘Guo Ping’ me?”

122 CAC, “Bianhou” [Afterword], Guo Ping lun tianxia, 1045. 123 “ ‘Guo Ping’ ronghuo ‘2014 Zhongguo hulianwang niandu renwu’ ” [“Guo Ping” Honored as “2014

China Internet Person of the Year”], Ta Kung Pao, February 12, 2015 u http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2015-02/2921281.html.

124 Li Tianrui, “Jiemi guanfang biming: Juzhong ruoqing de ‘Zhong Zuwen’ men dou shi shei?” [Unmasking Official Pen Names: Who Are the “Zhong Zuwens” That Make Lifting Heavy Weights Look Easy?], National Party Building Website Alliance, November 11, 2014, 2 u http://www.12371.gov.cn/html/djbl/dnck/2014/11/11/063950364816.html; and CAC, Guo Ping lun tianxia.

125 “Zhongyang wangluo anquan he xinxihua lingdao xiaozu diyici huiyi zhaokai Xi Jinping fabiao zhongyao jianghua” [Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group Convenes First Meeting, Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech], Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, February 27, 2014 u http://www.cac.gov.cn/2014-02/27/c_133148354.htm.

126 “Niandu hulianwang renwu pinglunyuan ‘Guo Ping’ shi shei?” [Who Is the Annual Internet Person Commentator “Guo Ping”?], Xinhua, July 10, 2015 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2015-07/10/c_134400020.htm.

127 “Niandu hulianwang renwu pinglunyuan ‘Guo Ping’ shi shei?”; and “ ‘Guo Ping’ ronghuo ‘2014 Zhongguo hulianwang niandu renwu.’ ”

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An official list of prize-winning news articles and several unofficial sources suggest that the CAC Internet News Information Dissemination Office is in charge of the Guo Ping commentary program.128 Guo Ping differs from other writing teams in that it is not an internal unit of its official sponsor. Instead, the team is composed of members from across China’s official media, state organs, and academic institutions. A core group of around five to six individuals is responsible for selecting topics and overall planning and drafting, and the team is organized to achieve a balance of age and specialty.129

In fulfillment of its CAC mandate, the Guo Ping commentary team works faster than any other team currently operating and is reportedly able to publish within two to three hours after a major story breaks. Its speed is in part enabled by its source of authority. Unlike other teams, Guo Ping apparently has a direct and open line to senior officials. According to Guo Ping’s book and reconfirmed by an article posted on the CAC website, the team’s writers are close to the “core information source” (hexin xinyuan). To some, this may suggest that they have access to Xi, the “core leader” and CISILG head, but a more conservative conjecture is that the writing team is in direct contact with CAC management or other members of the CISILG itself. In the interest of speed, these officials reportedly edit and review articles on their mobile devices when time is of the essence.130 This unorthodox working arrangement represents a serious innovation that cuts past the usual bureaucratic process that commentary entails, sacrificing layers of review to rapidly seize the public opinion high ground. Guo Ping’s ability to quickly comment on behalf of the CCP leadership was exhibited in December 2014, when a commentary regarding the discipline violations of Ling Jihua, ally of Hu Jintao and former director of the CCP Central Committee General Office,

128 All-China Journalists Association, “Di 25 jie Zhongguo xinwen jiang huojiang zuopin mulu” [The 25th China News Award Winning Works Table of Contents], Xinhua, October 30, 2015 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2015-11/02/c_134771803.htm; and “Zong dingzhe zong shuji dongxiang xie gao de ‘Guo Ping’ shi shei?” [Who Is “Guo Ping” of the Writings Always Watching the General Secretary’s Movements?], Hexun, September 21, 2016 u http://news.hexun.com/2016-09-21/186118623.html.

129 “Guo Ping lun tianxia: Si juan ben chuban: Gaosu ni ‘Guo Ping’ weihe shou huanying” [Guo Ping Discusses All Under Heaven: Four Published Volumes Tell You Why “Guo Ping” Is Popular], Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, September 20, 2016 u http://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-09/20/c_1119590710.htm.

130 CAC, “Bianhou,” 1046; “Niandu hulianwang renwu pinglunyuan ‘Guo Ping’: Dashi yaoshi minganshi jishi fasheng” [Voice Opinions without Delay on Major Events, Important Matters, and Sensitive Matters], Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, July 10, 2015 u http://www.cac.gov.cn/2015-07/10/c_1115885153.htm; and China Civilization Net, “Zhongyang bianyi chuban she: Guo Ping lun tianxia” [Central Compilation and Translation Press: Guo Ping Discusses All Under Heaven], Wenming Online, August 11, 2015.

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appeared on Chinanews.com only 73 minutes after Xinhua broke the story.131 This is proof enough that Guo Ping is worth following.132

In terms of coverage, the team writes on a broad range of affairs from international relations to party discipline. Pieces frequently revolve around the successes of Xi’s latest diplomatic trips. For example, “The European Lion Greatly Admires the China Dragon,” published in April 2014, juxtaposed the admiration Europe showed China on Xi’s first visit to the continent with its humiliation of China more than a century earlier. “ ‘Being Four Kinds of People’ Is the New Values Benchmark for Party Cadres,” published in July 2015, explained the values expected of local cadres in order to strengthen the party’s governing capacity.133 More recently, a January 2017 piece celebrated Xi’s prescription of the “China remedy” to treat the backlash against globalization around the world.134 An August 2017 article celebrated China’s Army Day by touting the country’s troops as a manifestation of strong CCP leadership, but also reiterated the PLA’s need to strengthen its “political consciousness” and “core consciousness.”135 This article exhibits how the pseudonym is used to advance political priorities on national holidays just as traditional commentary vehicles have long done.

In sum, Guo Ping will likely continue to be a prolific source of official views on China’s important affairs. Its emphasis on internet publication and speed makes the pen name unique, allowing it to frame events before alternative (and potentially threatening) narratives can take hold. Astute observers can read Guo Ping articles for authoritative insight into the party’s initial position before other commentary vehicles weigh in.

131 Xinhua, “Niandu hulianwang renwu pinglunyuan ‘Guo Ping’ shi shei?”; and Guo Ping, “Guo Ping: Laohu cangying yiqi da, fan fubai shen de dangxin minxin” [Guo Ping: Strike Tigers and Flies Together, Opposing Corruption Won Over the Party and the People], Chinanews.com, December 22, 2014 u http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/12-22/6900892.shtml.

132 Pei, China’s Crony Capitalism, 4. 133 Guo Ping, “Guo Ping: ‘Zuo si zhong ren’ shi dangyuan ganbu de jiazhi xin biaogan” [Guo Ping:

“Being Four Kinds of People” Is the New Values Benchmark for Party Cadres], CNTV, July 1, 2015 u http://opinion.cntv.cn/2015/07/01/ARTI1435719120900688.shtml.

134 Guo Ping, “Guo Ping: Xinnian shou fang shixian Zhongguo waijiao jingcai kaiju” [Guo Ping: The First Visit of the New Year Realizes the Opening of China’s Brilliant Foreign Diplomacy], China.org.cn, January 19, 2017 u http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2017-01/19/content_40137485.htm.

135 Guo Ping, “Guo Ping: Xiang renmin zidibing zhijing” [Guo Ping: Saluting the Soldiers of the People], China.org.cn, August 1, 2017 u http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2017-08/01/content_41329262.htm.

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future trajectory

The Resilience of the System

As this article shows, the homophonous pen name system is an elaborate operation that propagates party positions in order to bolster CCP legitimacy and power. Ongoing efforts to expand and improve its commentary over the past two decades show that the CCP is serious about updating its Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination in the so-called new situation.

In a larger sense, these changes to the propaganda apparatus point to its rising importance in the lead-up to 2020, the year the party has promised to achieve a “moderately prosperous society,” which is a key benchmark toward the “China dream.” Some may doubt this conclusion, arguing instead that China’s impressive economic growth over the past three decades has led to the waning significance of propaganda in the eyes of the party leadership. To be sure, the country’s rapid development has undeniably improved the lives of the vast majority of Chinese citizens (however unevenly), constituting a key source of performance legitimacy for the regime. However, this factor alone can never be enough to uphold one-party rule. As Timothy Heath has noted, there is nothing unique about good governance in China that inherently mandates CCP rule, a truth that the party can never allow to take root among its citizens. It is thus imperative that the CCP effectively emphasize the connection—however tenuous—between its supposedly superior methodology and its own theories, which are said to uniquely qualify CCP governance.136 Chinese citizens must be made to have exclusive confidence in China’s CCP-led political system (what Xi Jinping calls zhidu zixin) based on this link.

The propaganda apparatus’s growing importance derives from its ability to advance the CCP as the only party capable of underwriting the material benefits, public goods, political values, and international prestige required for a moderately prosperous society and the realization of the “China dream.” Any foreseeable decline in the importance of propaganda seems implausible unless a different kind of political legitimacy—one that derives from liberalizing political reforms—becomes available to the regime. Barring an unexpected leadership consensus to once again manage incremental political reforms from above, this prospect seems dim. The result is that the homophonous pen name system seems likely to continue

136 Heath, China’s New Governing Party Paradigm.

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its evolution, given its perceived utility in transmitting the CCP’s messages in a complex media environment. Xi’s recent order for propaganda outlets to leverage new media formats and promote innovative content suggests that the system has a secure place in party commentary at least through Xi’s leadership tenure, and probably beyond.137

Spotting New Pen Names

Given the system’s projected resilience, it is useful to note several patterns that our research discovered among authoritative pen names (including those not investigated in this article) that may help analysts tune in to new emerging bylines. First is a common circumstance under which several pseudonyms, including three that are homophonous, appear to have been taken up: an urgency to counter others in the party at pivotal moments while taking care to mask public splits. Examples include Hu Yaobang’s use of Yue Ping to counter Hua Guofeng’s brand of Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping’s use of Huangfu Ping to push market-oriented reform against resistance from Chen Yun’s conservative camp. At the time, both Hu and Deng lacked control of the traditional propaganda apparatus to support their mission. More recent pseudonyms appear to share similar circumstances, although their source of authority is not proven beyond all doubt. In 2010 the pseudonym “Zheng Qingyuan,” which almost certainly stands for the idiom “solve a problem from its root/strike at the root of the evil” (zhengben qingyuan), wrote several prominent commentaries that forcefully opposed any movement toward Western-style democracy. Credible sources strongly indicate the byline was used by the Hu Jintao–led Politburo to oppose Wen Jiabao’s proposals for such political reform.138 Similarly, in 2016, the somewhat unimaginative byline “Authoritative Person” (quanwei renshi) appears to have been used by a Xi Jinping confidant to criticize those who were distorting economic policies during China’s “critical stage” of racing toward a moderately prosperous society. Some posited that this byline was used to chastise Premier Li Keqiang for his perceived stalling on economic reforms, but Alice Miller offers a convincing argument that the

137 “China Focus: One Year On, Xi’s Speech Injects Vitality into Media,” Xinhua, February 19, 2017 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/19/c_136068476.htm.

138 Tsai and Kao, “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda.” Chinese official sources suggest that Zheng Qingyuan articles were CCP Politburo-level “public opinion guidance” regarding the sensitive topic of political reform: “Zai renmin ribao lianxu fabiao shuming wenzhang shei shi ‘Zheng Qingyuan’ ?” [Who Is “Zheng Qingyuan” of PD’s Consecutive Signed Articles?], WCC Daily, November 5, 2010 u http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/13140170.html; and CAC, “Guo Ping shi shei? Ni renshi ‘Guo Ping’ ma?”

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target was in fact lower-level officials who had strayed from the consensus policy line.139

A second pattern for detecting new authoritative pen names relates to the linguistic components of each name. These can be broken into three general indicators:

• The pseudonym’s first character is homophonous for the first character (at least through one of its pronunciations) of the name of the publication in which the pseudonym’s commentaries are published. Examples include Ren Zhongping, Qiu Shi, and Xie Zhengping. Xie Xinping roughly falls in this category, although in this case the first character of the pseudonym and the publication name are identical, with each using two alternative pronunciations.

• The pseudonym’s first and sometimes second characters are homophonous for the characters of the CCP organ’s name that they represent, with commentary matching the areas of responsibility of that organ. Examples include Zhong Zuwen, Zhong Zuxuan, and Guo Ping.

• The pseudonym’s final character is homophonous for (or the same as) “ping” of the word for commentary (pinglun), “wen” of the word for article (wenzhang), or “xuan” of the word for declaration (xuanbu). Examples include Ren Zhongping, Guo Jiping, Zhong Zuwen, and Zhong Zuxuan.

A final pattern is the concerted effort by propagandists to spread awareness of a significant pseudonym, often through the republishing of its commentaries and conspicuous allusions to its authority before the source of the pen name is made public. Recent examples include the promotion of Zheng Qingyuan by Xinhua Net in 2010, which “guessed” in a prominent homepage article that the pseudonym represented Politburo-level “public opinion guidance” on the sensitive topic of political reform.140 Another example is the promotion of Guo Ping in 2014, which saw party websites repost an Honest Outlook article asserting that Guo Ping “very possibly is not a real person’s name” and that a “relevant person” revealed that the pen name “probably has the meaning of ‘commentary article organized by a relevant subordinate organization of the Cyberspace Administration of China.’ ”141

139 Alice Miller, “ ‘Core’ Leaders, ‘Authoritative Persons,’ and Reform Pushback,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, no. 50, summer 2016.

140 “Zai renmin ribao lianxu fabiao shuming wenzhang shei shi ‘Zheng Qingyuan’ ”; and CAC, “Guo Ping shi shei? Ni renshi ‘Guo Ping’ ma?”

141 Li, “Jiemi guanfang biming.”

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conclusion

While the homophonous pen names discussed in this article have significantly augmented the traditional commentary system with their oblique tactics, provocative language, and extended reach, their utility in convincing an increasingly sophisticated target audience to heed regime messages remains to be seen. If a key reason that party commentary lacks appeal is that the theories at the core of its messages are alienating, then these new commentary vehicles only treat the symptoms of the ailment. Even so, one area where this system may prove competent is in the timely framing of events that are potentially threatening to the CCP. In particular, pen names that focus on speed, such as Guo Ping, may successfully propagate the party’s preferred agenda on sensitive situations as they unfold. So long as China’s army of censors can scrub away alternative narratives, Chinese once again will be left with only one opinion source.

Setting aside the question of efficacy, these accessible commentary vehicles speak authoritatively for their party sponsors on China’s most important domestic and international affairs, and foreign analysts can readily monitor their messages. Their opinions are collectively crafted, polished to a fine sheen, and published under the name of their sponsoring regime organ. This ensures that such commentary is in step with official views and not merely the opinion of small groups of authors. Some pen names, like Ren Zhongping and Guo Ping, even have direct input from senior party officials. Of special note, the posting of a Zhong Sheng commentary boasting China’s readiness for war over a territorial dispute to multiple Chinese embassy websites suggests that foreign analysts should monitor this and other bylines for low-level warning statements emanating from the Chinese leadership.

PD editorials and commentator articles will almost certainly remain the Chinese leadership’s first choice when unambiguous transmission of its views are needed. Notwithstanding, foreign analysts can treat commentary pseudonyms with roughly the same level of authority as that held by their regime sponsor within that sponsor’s purview. Coupled with analysis of leadership statements, the systematic analysis of all forms of open-source authoritative commentary can help observers better understand the official positions of the CCP. The result will be a fuller comprehension of what matters most to China’s enigmatic political regime, which in turn enables the implementation of more effective policies.

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Name Homophonous meaning Topics covered Publication

Ren Zhongping / 任仲平

Important People’s Daily Commentary / 人民日报的重要评论

Nationally important issues

People’s Daily

He Zhenhua / 何振华

How to Invigorate China / 如何振兴中华

Tibet, countering the Dalai Lama, countering foreign influence

People’s Daily

Guo Jiping / 国纪平

Relevant International Important Commentary / 有关国际的重要评论

International affairs People’s Daily

Zhong Sheng / 钟声

Voice of China, Sounding the Alarm Bell / 中国之声, 警世钟声

International affairs, issuing warnings

People’s Daily

Qiu Shi / 秋石 Qiushi Journal / 求是CCP ideology, party-building

Qiushi Journal

Xie Xinping / 解辛平

PLA Daily News Commentary / 解放军报新闻评论

Military reform, military discipline

PLA Daily

Xie Zhengping / 谢正平

PLA Daily Political Department and Commentary Department / 解放军报政治部与评论部

Military anticorruption, military reform

China Military Online

Zhong Zuwen / 仲祖文

Central Organization Department Article / 中央组织部文章

Personnel issues, party discipline

People’s Daily

Zhong Zuxuan / 仲组轩

Central Organization Department Declaration / 中央组织部宣布

Personnel issues, party-building

China Organization Personnel Newspaper

Guo Ping / 国平

Cyberspace Administration of China Commentary / 国家网信办评论

Nationally important issues

People’s Daily Online, Xinhua Net, and other official internet sources

APPENDIX 1

Ten Homophonous Commentary Pen Names and Their Particulars

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Article page

number

Name in Chinese characters

Name in pinyin

English translation

Context (if applicable)

71 改革开放 gaige kaifang reform and opening up –

73 社论 she lun editorialsIn reference to People’s Daily editorials

73 集体的智慧 jiti de zhihui collective wisdom –

74 本报评论员文章benbao pinglunyuan wenzhang

commentator articles

In reference to People’s Daily commentator articles

76 人人都有麦克风renren douyou maikefeng

everyone having a microphone

Fostered by the internet age; refers to the ease with which individuals can spread their own ideas online

79 解放日报 Jiefang Ribao Liberation Daily –

79 奉命 feng ming receiving orders –

80奉⼈民之命辅佐邓⼩平

feng renmin zhi ming fuzuo Deng Xiaoping

receive the people’s order to assist Deng Xiaoping

The homophonous meaning of Huangfu Ping a pseudonym once used by the Liberation Daily to support and spread Deng Xiaoping's ideas on reform

81 人民日报的重要评论Renmin Ribao de zhongyao pinglun

important People's Daily commentary

The homophonous meaning of Ren Zhongping, a pseudonym created by the People's Daily to publish authoritative political commentary

81 新闻战线Xinwen Zhanxian the Press –

82 中央领导同志zhongyang lingdao tongzhi

central leading comrades

–

APPENDIX 2

Glossary of Chinese Terms

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Appendix 2 continued

Article page

number


Name in pinyin

English translation


82中央领导同志活动专页

zhongyang lingdao tongzhi huodong zhuanye

central leading comrades activities page

–

82七八条枪，七上八下，七嘴八舌

qiba tiao qiang, qishang baxia, qizui bashe

seven to eight guns, seven submissions and eight revisions, seven mouths and eight tongues

A motto used to characterize the Ren Zhongping writing team's methodology

84 如何振兴中华ruhe zhenxing Zhonghua

how to invigorate China

The homophonous meaning of He Zhenhua, a pseudonym created by the People's Daily Commentary Department to counter foreign influencers hostile to CCP interests

86 有关国际的重要评论youguan guoji de zhongyao pinglun

relevant international important commentary

The homophonous meaning of Guo Jiping, a pseudonym created by the People's Daily International Department to strengthen its coverage of international events

88 中国之声Zhongguo zhi sheng voice of China

The homophonous meaning of Zhong Sheng, a pseudonym created by the People's Daily International Department to supplement Guo Jiping commentary

88 警世钟声jingshi zhongsheng

sounding the alarm bell

A secondary homophonous meaning of Zhong Sheng, which characterizes the alarmist messages spread by this pseudonym

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Article page

number


Name in pinyin

English translation


89

有和日本打"遭遇战"的信心，也有打 "持久战"的准备

you he Riben da “zaoyu zhan” de xinxin, yeyou da “chijiu zhan” de zhunbei

the confidence to fight an “encountered engagement,” and the preparation to fight a “prolonged war” with Japan

A statement from a 2012 Zhong Sheng commentary on China's territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea

90 求是 qiushi Qiushi Journal –

91社会主义核心价值体系

shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi

socialist core value system –

92 解放军报新闻评论Jiefangjun Bao xinwen pinglun

PLA Daily news commentary

The homophonous meaning of Xie Xinping, a pseudonym created by the PLA Daily that focuses on military reform and discipline

94 强军梦 qiang jun meng the strong military dream –

94解放军报政治部与

评论部

Jiefangjun Bao zhengzhi bu yu pinglun bu

PLA Daily Political Department and Commentary Department

The homophonous meaning of Xie Zhengping, a pseudonym created by the PLA Daily that focuses on military anticorruption efforts and reform

95 网友来论 wangyou lailun Netizens Discussion

A People's Daily Online column

96 谢正平工作室Xie Zhengping gongzuoshi

Xie Zhengping studio

A unit controlled by the Xie Zhengping writing team that produces cartoons and graphics propaganda

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Article page

number

Name in Chinese

characters

Name in pinyin

English translation


97 中央组织部文章zhongyang zuzhibu wenzhang

CCP Central Organization Department article

The homophonous meaning of Zhong Zuwen, a pseudonym created by the CCP Central Organization Department that focuses on personnel issues

97 中央组织部宣布zhongyang zuzhibu xuanbu

CCP Central Organization Department declaration

The homophonous meaning of Zhong Zuxuan, a pseudonym created by the CCP Central Organization Department that focuses on personnel issues

98 买官卖官maiguan maiguan

the buying and selling of government positions

–

98 带病提拔 daibing tiba the promotion of sick cadres

A term used to describe the promotion of cadres engaged in corruption and other dubious acts

99–100国家网信办评论 / 国家评论

guojia wangxinban pinglun / guojia pinglun

Cyberspace Administration of China commentary / national commentary

The homophonous meaning of Guo Ping, a pseudonym created by the Cyberspace Administration of China that focuses on important national issues

101 核心信源 hexin xinyuancore information source

Refers to the high-ranking official(s) that is/are the source of authority and information for the Guo Ping writing team

103 制度自信 zhidu zixin system confidence

Confidence in China’s CCP-led political system

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Article page

number

Name in Chinese

characters

Name in pinyin

English translation


104 正本清源zhengben qingyuan

solve a problem from its root/strike at the root of the evil

The probable homophonous meaning of Zheng Qingyuan, a pseudonym that was thought to be managed by the Hu Jintao–led Poliburo

104 权威人士quanwei renshi

authoritative person

A pseudonym that seems to have been used by a Xi Jinping confidant to criticize those who were distorting economic policies during China’s “critical stage” of racing toward a moderately prosperous society

105 评论 pinglun commentary –

105 文章 wenzhang article –

105 宣布 xuanbu declaration –



Derek Grossman

asia policy vol . 13, no . 1 (january 2018), 113–34

• http://asiapolicy .nbr .org •

keywords: vietnam; vietnamese military; south china sea


derek grossman is a Senior Defense Analyst at RAND, where he focuses on Indo-Pacific defense and security issues. He formerly served in the Intelligence Community for over a decade and was the daily intelligence briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the Pentagon. Mr. Grossman can be reached at <[email protected]>.

note u The author is indebted to many contributors and reviewers of this research over the last two years. He would like to thank RAND colleagues Edmund J. Burke, David Wooddell, and Huynh Trung Dung, who were instrumental in researching and developing the analysis contained here. The author is especially grateful for the Herculean efforts of Nguyen Nhat Anh, who meticulously culled insights from a range of primary source documents in Vietnamese that often revealed information never before published in English. His findings have single-handedly made this article a genuine contribution to the literature. The author would also like to highlight the invaluable contributions of Carlyle A. Thayer and express deep appreciation to the following reviewers: Zachary Abuza, Richard Bitzinger, Colonel Darren Kerr of the Australian Army, Swee Lean Collin Koh, Le Hong Hiep, and Lieutenant General Dan “Fig” Leaf of the U.S. Air Force (retired). Although the author benefited from many individual contributions, he retains sole ownership of any errors.

executive summary

asia policy

This article examines Vietnam’s warfighting capabilities for defending its disputed claims with China in the South China Sea.

main argument

Vietnam’s military modernization is increasingly focused on deterring China from seizing disputed territory in the South China Sea. By developing and fielding select capabilities—including Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2 maritime strike fighters, a network of anti-access missiles, and other weapon systems—Hanoi has likely achieved its core objective of convincing Beijing of the hardships it would face in a military conflict against Vietnam in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, if deterrence fails because Beijing believes it can mitigate the substantial but reasonable risks, then Vietnam is probably incapable of sustaining an extended, large-scale, or high-intensity conventional conflict in the region. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of its evolving warfighting doctrine in the air and sea domains, lack of jointness and unrealistic training activities, and shortcomings in the Vietnamese military’s maritime domain awareness capabilities and weapon systems interoperability.

policy implications• U.S. policymakers should seek specific areas of cooperation and

collaboration with Vietnam in the defense and military spheres that would enhance Hanoi’s warfighting capabilities. For example, the U.S. could pursue closer collaboration on coastal radar, satellite and other communications systems, maritime surveillance aircraft (including unarmed drones), and naval patrol craft.

• A dramatically reduced role for Washington in the Asia-Pacific would greatly increase the prospects of China employing bullying tactics against Vietnam. Hanoi could respond by accelerating and expanding its own military modernization efforts. Yet it is equally plausible that Hanoi would instead simply seek ways to accommodate Chinese demands, calculating that an arms race would be destabilizing and unwinnable. Neither scenario is in the strategic interests of the U.S. or Vietnam.

• Through sustained U.S. leadership in the region, the U.S. and Vietnam should deepen their burgeoning defense partnership to ensure that Hanoi stands a better chance in a significant military confrontation with China.

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grossman • can vietnam’s military stand up to china?

Ahead of his participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, in November, China’s

paramount leader, Xi Jinping, issued a statement entitled “For a New Vista in China-Vietnam Friendship.”1 In this statement, Xi lauded the “camaraderie and brotherhood” forged by China and Vietnam’s shared Communist revolutionary activities, and he praised their history of “good neighborliness.” These factors, he argued, should enable Beijing and Hanoi to find a “fundamental and durable solution” to the most pressing bilateral dispute—their substantial overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. By the end of his visit, Xi and the Vietnamese general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, agreed to manage tensions in the region.2

Despite Xi’s optimistic message and the positive outcome, Vietnamese leaders are increasingly concerned that China’s actions in the region are destabilizing and meant to alter the status quo. Beijing, for instance, could eventually leverage its expanding military footprint in the South China Sea—which now includes naval and air patrols as well as upgraded military facilities with runways sitting atop reclaimed land features under de facto Chinese control—to seize additional features that are currently under Vietnam’s control. Additionally, China has been attempting to administer substantial portions of the South China Sea with the China Coast Guard frequently patrolling these waters, making them off-limits to Vietnamese fishermen even when they fall within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Vietnam has approximately one million fishermen and 120,000 fishing boats throughout the country’s EEZ, and its leaders have emphasized linkages between coastal economic development and the ability to access and exploit resources in the South China Sea. In other words, the South China Sea is Vietnam’s economic lifeline, with significant implications for the country’s sovereignty, security, and domestic and political stability.

In the event that China and Vietnam are unable to peacefully resolve their differences in the region, what are the prospects that the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) can stand up to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in a confrontation in the South China Sea? 3 This article attempts to make such an assessment based on an evaluation of several key factors, including

1 Xi Jinping, “For a New Vista in China-Vietnam Friendship,” Xinhua, November 10, 2017. 2 Kristin Huang, “China, Vietnam Sign Cooperation Pacts in Bid to Play Down South China Sea

Tensions,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2017. 3 In this article, “VPA” refers to Vietnam’s ground, navy, air, and border forces as well as maritime

police. All of these forces are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defence. To avoid confusion, the term “army” is used to specifically denote Vietnam’s ground forces.

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the VPA’s changing military doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and capabilities. It notes substantial improvements to the VPA in recent years, but also highlights remaining weaknesses that the military needs to address to make itself a more credible fighting force. The article is divided into the following seven sections:

u pp. 116–18 describe the recent history of Vietnamese-Chinese relations over the South China Sea.

u pp. 118–19 examine the VPA’s capabilities and efforts to modernize the Vietnamese military and discuss the reprioritization of air, maritime, and missile system assets.

u pp. 119–22 analyze the VPA’s doctrine and attempt to transplant its land-centric concept of “all-people’s war” into its emerging operational doctrines for air and maritime combat.

u pp. 123–24 assess the organizational structure of the VPA, in particular the weaknesses posed by the parochialism of the army.

u pp. 124–27 outline the human resources and training of the VPA, arguing that the lack of quality training opportunities is preventing the forces from achieving greater effectiveness.

u pp. 127–30 address maritime domain awareness and intelligence gathering and highlight deficiencies in these systems’ interoperability and capabilities.

u pp. 130–34 examine the implications for regional stability and identify areas where the United States could usefully support Vietnam.

vietnamese concerns growing in the south china sea

Vietnamese concerns about Chinese designs on the South China Sea are nothing new. In January 1974, for example, a brief naval skirmish between South Vietnamese and Chinese warships resulted in Vietnam’s total loss of its holdings in the Paracel Islands. Another brief encounter in the Spratly Islands in March 1988 resulted in the deaths of dozens of Vietnamese sailors at Johnson South Reef and the loss of the reef itself. Despite these violent incidents, bilateral tensions remained relatively contained until May 2014 when China moved an oil rig into disputed waters. This decision sparked a months-long maritime standoff, with China sending overwhelming force to the region, including not only coast guard ships and fishing trawlers but also naval and air assets. Although Beijing did not employ these military assets in the standoff, its coast guard aggressively rammed Vietnamese vessels until the incident ended when China withdrew from its position.

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The seriousness of this incident prompted the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) to reconsider Vietnam’s relationship with China. For instance, during Vietnam’s 12th Party Congress in January 2016, a permanent member of the party’s secretariat, Le Hong Anh, gave an authoritative speech that highlighted the South China Sea as being the most challenging area for Vietnam in recent years.4 Then, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, Senior Lieutenant General and Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh for the first time publicly used the term đấu tranh—defined as “political struggle” or “political agitation”—to describe Vietnam’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with China.5 He noted that while Vietnam seeks to strengthen cooperation with China “to find common points in strategic interests,” it simultaneously must “struggle openly with a constructive spirit.” He went on to state that China was responsible for “changes to the status quo along with the threat of militarization.”6 Indeed, since the May 2014 incident involving the Chinese oil rig, Hanoi has been referring to a “new situation” with Beijing, suggesting the advent of a more adversarial dynamic.7

The VCP leadership’s growing concerns over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea are only reinforcing the wisdom of their plan to modernize the VPA. As early as January 2007, the VCP adopted a resolution entitled “Maritime Strategy toward the Year 2020,” which prioritizes modernizing the country’s air and maritime assets. This resolution is supported by another program—officially titled “Adjustments to the VPA’s Organization

4 Van Hieu, “Báo cáo kiểm điểm sự lãnh đạo của BCH Trung ương khoá XI” [Report on Criticism of XI Central Committee’s Leadership], Voice of Vietnam, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, January 21, 2016.

5 The Vietnamese concept of “cooperation and struggle” (vừa hợp tác vừa đấu tranh), perhaps first introduced by the VCP in 2014, applies to defending Hanoi’s “national interest” (lợi ích dân tộc) against external states. For more information, see X. Linh et al., “Thủ tướng: Vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh với TQ” [Prime Minister: Cooperation and Struggle with China], VietNamNet, November 19, 2014. This concept has since been consistently reaffirmed by the VCP. Senior Lieutenant General Chi added the concept of đấu tranh, however, to describe the nature of Vietnam’s new relationship with China. Vietnamese officials commonly use “new situation” as a code term to describe the growing possibility of an armed conflict with China in the South China Sea. For the full statement, see Nguyen Chi Vinh, “The Challenges of Conflict Resolution: Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh” (presentation at the Shangri-La Dialogue, fourth plenary session, Singapore, June 5, 2016). For more on “cooperation and struggle” generally, see Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-U.S. Competition and Increasing Domestic Political Influence,” Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 183–99. For more information on the use of the term “new situation,” see “Vietnam Builds Military Muscle to Face China,” Reuters, December 19, 2015.

6 Nguyen, “The Challenges of Conflict Resolution.” It is worth highlighting that Vietnam’s public blaming and shaming of China’s activities in the South China Sea represents a dramatic departure from past official statements. A good example is Vietnam’s last defense white paper, issued in 2009, which only discusses relations with China in a cooperative context. See Ministry of National Defence (Vietnam), Vietnam National Defence (Hanoi, 2009).

7 See, for example, “Một số nội dung cơ bản của chiến lược bảo vệ tổ quốc trong tình hình mới” [Core Contents of the Strategy to Protect the Country under New Situations], Tạp chí Quốc phòng toàn dân, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, June 10, 2014.

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until 2020”—that is aimed at converting the military into a more “compact, powerful, mobile, and flexible” fighting force. According to a recent analysis of the program, it focuses specifically on upgrading the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN), Vietnam Air Defence–Air Force (VAD-AF), and Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) “in the areas of communications, electronic combat, and technical reconnaissance.”8 This will require the VPA to transform itself from a traditionally ground-centric military force into one that is capable of projecting limited power in the air and sea domains.

To accommodate the high cost of these military modernization efforts, Vietnam is spending more on defense. Strong economic growth—consistently hovering around 6.0% over the last decade and approximately 6.2% in 2016—has been predictable enough that it has inspired confidence in the VCP leadership to increase military spending each year while keeping the percentage of GDP spent on defense steady at 2.3%.9 Although Vietnam’s defense budget is a closely guarded state secret, Western sources generally estimate that the VPA’s budget is currently between $4.2 and $4.9 billion and will rise to $6.2 billion by 2020.10 Hanoi’s quiet network of military-run businesses, however, likely raises this figure significantly.11

make china think twice

Realizing that it cannot hope to outmatch the numerical and technological superiority of the PLA in the air and sea domains, Vietnam instead seeks to develop a more modest array of offsetting and retaliatory military capabilities to deter Beijing from seizing disputed territory in the South China Sea.

8 Phuong Nguyen, “High Ambitions, Tall Orders for Vietnam’s Military,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 2, 2016.

9 World Bank, “Vietnam” u http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview. As a source of comparison, Vietnam’s official defense budget is dwarfed by other countries also worried about China. For example, Taiwan is slated to spend approximately $11.6 billion on defense in 2018, while Japan could spend as much as $48.1 billion in 2018—up from around only $6 billion just the year before.

10 “Defense Budget Overview,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia, July 25, 2016. 11 According to an unprecedented statement in January 2015, Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence

disclosed combined annual earnings for its military businesses of $13.7 billion, which, if true, represented nearly 7% of Vietnam’s GDP for the year. Notably, 67% of this amount came from the fast-growing military telecommunication corporation Viettel. Indeed, military-run businesses probably maintain substantial budgets outside the scope of officially reported defense budget data, meaning that Vietnam’s true defense budget is likely significantly larger than estimated by Western sources. See, for example, Jon Grevatt, “Vietnam Reveals the Significant Financial Scope of Military-Run Businesses,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 1, 2015; Tuyet Minh, “Báo Nga: Lần đầu Việt Nam lộ doanh thu DN quốc phòng” [Russian News: Vietnam’s Revenues of Defense Enterprises First Disclosed], Bao Dat Viet, January 30, 2015; and Thuy Dieu, “Lợi nhuận của Viettel vượt 2 tỷ USD” [Viettel Profit Exceeds $2 Billion], VnEconomy, December 30, 2015.

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In this regard, the VPA has acquired advanced weapon systems, such as six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and 36 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole aircraft, which have the range to strike targets throughout the South China Sea as well as on the Chinese mainland. Additionally, Hanoi is actively building a complementary network of anti-access missiles—including the Bastion-P shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries—to guarantee that Chinese military operations within Vietnam’s EEZ would encounter lethal and heavy resistance in the event of an attack. Vietnam has also improved its ability to retaliate in close naval engagement scenarios using ASCMs fired from new Russian Gepard-class frigates and Tarantul V (Molniya) class corvettes. Finally, Vietnam has greatly expanded its coast guard presence, fielding a force larger than those of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia combined—all archipelagic and peninsular nations. These paramilitary maritime vessels are lightly armed to conduct maritime law-enforcement activities as well as tactical reconnaissance and maritime surveillance in the South China Sea.12

By fielding these capabilities, Vietnam has probably achieved its core objective, which is to demonstrate the ability to inflict great harm against PLA forces in order to deter China from initiating a confrontation in the first place. If Beijing does so anyway, then Hanoi likely plans to carry out a spectacular attack—for example, sinking a PLA Navy surface ship with a torpedo launched from one of its submarines—to convince Beijing to back down and return to the status quo ante as quickly as possible. It is less certain, however, that Vietnam is sufficiently prepared to confront China in a broader, high-intensity conflict lasting months. I examine why this is the case below.

new guerilla warfare

The VPA is contemplating new ways to conduct military operations in the air and sea domains against China as it has never fought such a war. Although the VPA appears to still be in the early stages of developing a doctrine to encapsulate how it plans to fight this new sort of conflict, one concept that continues to loom large is “all-people’s war,” or the mobilization of the entire population to protect the nation. One important component of all-people’s war is the ability to conduct asymmetric warfare against an enemy. This approach calls for leveraging the strengths of weaker military forces to exploit

12 For more information, see Lyle J. Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty: The Rise of Coast Guards in East and Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 2 (2017): 78.

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the weaknesses of stronger military forces. The idea harkens back to at least the thirteenth century when the legendary Vietnamese war hero Tran Hung Dao successfully employed asymmetric warfare tactics to defeat Mongol invaders led by Kublai Khan in spite of their greater numbers and superior weaponry. Today, Vietnamese leaders expect to use guerrilla tactics in what they call the “people’s war in the new situation,” code for their growing concerns over Chinese activities in the South China Sea. In at least one private but official discussion, a Vietnamese officer informed his Western counterpart that the VPA hoped to bring guerrilla warfare to sea.13

The VPN can probably leverage the quietness of its six Kilo-class submarines to sneak up on the enemy, strike, and then vanish. Indeed, as of March 2016, the VPN had approved an internal research project at the vice-admiral level to assess the most effective employment of submarines.14 Additionally, according to well-known Vietnamese military commentator Le Ngoc Thong, submarines are best suited to guerrilla-style combat because they are quiet, quick, and small.15 Le also notes that Vietnam’s geography, specifically its long coastline with many islands, offers multiple locations for submarine ambush.16 Separately, the VPN’s purchase of ground mobile “fire and forget” ASCMs, such as the Bastion-P, could afford it the opportunity to attack Chinese surface vessels without exposing itself to substantial risk of retaliatory fire.17

In 1964, the Viet Cong sunk the USNS Card by deploying commandos to secretly swim up to the ship and attach explosives to it.18 Drawing on this proud history of effectively using frogmen in the Vietnam War, the VPN’s

13 Personal communication with Western government official, August 2016. In several citations throughout this article, the author uses “personal communication” to describe sensitive discussions he had with subject-matter experts. During the course of this research, the author spoke with experts spanning all walks of life, including academics, think tank experts, journalists, defense contractors, and current and retired government officials of multiple nationalities. These discussions influenced the course of the research, even if only some of them are cited here.

14 “Effective Use of Submarine Force Discussed,” People’s Army Newspaper Online, March 9, 2015. 15 Le Ngoc Thong, “Vì sao giới quân sự Việt Nam chưa quan tâm đến ‘tàu ngầm Trường Sa’?” [Why

Are Vietnamese Military Experts Not Interested in the “Truong Sa Submarine?”], Angle of Soldiers (web log), trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, February 10, 2014.

16 Le Ngoc Thong, “Vũ khí và lối đánh Việt Nam: Một góc nhìn gần” [Vietnamese Weapons and Combat Tactics: A Close-Up], Angle of Soldiers (web log), trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, August 12, 2013; and Le Ngoc Thong, “Cớ sao lại phải lo sợ khi Việt Nam có tàu ngầm?” [Why Is Someone Afraid of Vietnam’s Submarines], Angle of Soldiers (web blog), trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, February 1, 2015.

17 Greg Torode, “Vietnam Creating Submarine Deterrent to Chinese Expansionist Efforts in South China Sea,” Japan Times, September 11, 2014; and Terrence K. Kelly, Anthony Atler, Todd Nichols, and Lloyd Thrall, Employing Land-Based Anti-ship Missiles in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013).

18 Paul Huard, “Viet Cong Commandos Sank an American Air Craft Carrier,” War Is Boring (web log), April 26, 2016.

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Naval Special Operations is once again prioritizing elite swimming and diving training for the purposes of conducting sabotage operations against enemy vessels. During the May 2014 incident, China claimed to have spotted Vietnamese frogmen in the vicinity of its oil rig.19 Additionally, the VPN now uses hyperbaric chambers accessed from its dive ships, enabling faster recovery times from deep-dive operations.20

Vietnam is also investing in paramilitary maritime law-enforcement forces, including the VCG and a civilian force known as the Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance Force. While primarily serving in a constabulary role, these forces can also quickly and inexpensively “flood the zone” of a potential maritime standoff. In the tradition of guerrilla military doctrine, they are only lightly armed. VCG vessels, for example, possess deck-mounted gun turrets and firearms for crew members.21 The Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance Force is reportedly armed with machine guns and explosives.22 These forces would be employed to establish defensive positions without escalating the conflict further. Indeed, maritime strategy articles in Communist Review, a publication of the VCP, recommend that Vietnam “focus on building defensive fighting positions coordinated with the all-people’s security fighting position at sea.”23

Vietnamese leaders rarely discuss their evolving concepts for air operations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that they are relatively confident in air defense over the homeland but lack similar confidence in overwater capabilities. On homeland defense, the VAD-AF needs to look no further than the Vietnam War for lessons that it could apply in a potential conflict with China. During the Vietnam War, Hanoi, with assistance from

19 “The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 8, 2014.

20 Personal communication with Western government official, August 2016. 21 “Ảnh hỏa lực đáng gờm trên tàu Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam” [Images of Fearsome Weapons on

Vietnam Coast Guard Ships], Kien Thuc News, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, April 27, 2016. 22 “Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance Force Vessels to Be Equipped with Weapons: New Decree,” Tuoi

Tre News, August 1, 2014; and Directorate of Fisheries, “Thông tư liên tịch số 01/2015/TTLT-BCA-BNNPTNT: Quy định về trang bị, quản lý, sử dụng vũ khí quân dụng, công cụ hỗ trợ và thiết bị chuyên dùng của lực lượng kiểm ngư” [Joint Circular No. 01/2015/TTLT-BCA-BNNPTNT, January 13, 2015, on Regulation on Equipping, Managing and Using Military-Grade Weapons, Supporting Equipment and Specialized Apparatus by the VFSF], trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, January 13, 2015; and Lam Son, “Lực lượng kiểm ngư được trang bị vũ khí quân dụng” [Vietnam Fishery Resource Surveillance Is Equipped with Military-Grade Weapons], Lao Dong, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, February 26, 2015.

23 Nguyen Duc Thang, “Đẩy mạnh thực hiện Nghị quyết 09-NQ/TW, ‘Về chiến lược biển Việt Nam đến năm 2020’” [Accelerate the Implementation of Resolution 09-NQ/TW on “Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy by 2020”], Tạp chí Cộng sản, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, September 10, 2014; and Nguyen Chu Hoi, “Đẩy mạnh công tác dân số vùng biển, đảo và ven biển trong tầm nhìn đến năm 2020” [Implementation of the Population Tasks at Sea, Islands, and Coast with Vision 2020], Tạp chí Cộng sản, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, September 18, 2012.

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the Soviet Union, quickly ramped up its anti-aircraft artillery to complicate U.S. plans to fly at low altitudes. In addition, the VAD-AF creatively found vulnerabilities in U.S. operations—for example, by effectively fusing the collection of U.S. radio messages with Vietnamese radar mapping to identify and intercept U.S. fighters that were low on fuel or damaged.24 To be sure, overwater air operations will be significantly more difficult for the VAD-AF given that it has never conducted a maritime strike. Its only known offensive air operations came against ground targets in Cambodia during Vietnam’s war with Cambodia in 1978.25 Moreover, in an air war versus China, the VAD-AF would face a highly contested environment if it attempted to operate over water in the South China Sea. To stand a credible chance in air combat, Vietnam would first need to disable China’s use of three runways in the South China Sea and get past its improving air defenses positioned across disputed features in the region.

Although it is possible for Vietnam to transplant its land-centric concept of “people’s war” into the air and sea in certain respects, the VPA will nevertheless face significant challenges operating in these new domains. Most notably, long distances, highly variable weather conditions, and the absence of natural features to conceal air and surface assets in the South China Sea present challenges not normally encountered on land. It is not clear that current doctrinal conceptualizations of warfare have adequately incorporated these factors. Moreover, one of the key enablers of a successful guerrilla campaign is access to third-party state or nonstate actors for arms and financial support. During the Vietnam War, for example, Hanoi received assistance from both the Soviet Union and China. In the case of a potential conflict in the South China Sea, the VPN and VAD-AF would almost certainly not have access to a third party—whether regional or extraregional—that would offer such assistance. Vietnam, however, is working to mitigate this risk by engaging in technology transfer and coproduction activities with a range of states, including Russia, India, and increasingly Japan. The VPA is also stockpiling weapons produced by the Vietnamese national defense industry to avoid the need to rely on others to sustain a war effort.

24 Marshall L. Michel III, Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam: 1965–1972 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

25 Merle L. Pribbenow II, “A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia,” Journal of Military History 70, no. 2 (2006): 464.

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army parochialism

Having seen how legacy ideas such as “people’s war” constrain Vietnam’s ability to confront China, this section looks at a separate but equally important problem: the organizational structure of the VPA. The most prominent feature in this regard is that the army dominates the VPA. This is not too surprising given that many countries’ armed forces are army-centric. However, in the case of Vietnam, the army maintains a particularly exalted position among the population. Considered the pride of Vietnam for its instrumental role in defeating external powers—including not only France and the United States but also China in the 1979 border war—the army is a service without parallel in the country’s military system. The military’s presence is felt almost everywhere throughout Vietnam. The VPA builds on goodwill with the people by offering medical treatment, education, and relief services following natural disasters. The government leverages all active and reserve troops, as well as militia and paramilitary forces and more than 1.5 million members of the veterans’ association, to carry out domestic objectives.26 Because of this deep and ongoing interaction with the public, the role of the military in Vietnam is virtually unassailable, even if recent stories of corruption are becoming increasingly prevalent in society.

Organizationally, the general staff of Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence, which oversees all aspects of VPA modernization, is also the army’s general staff. Army parochialism is so pervasive that, according to one former Western government official, the other services—including the VPN and VAD-AF—are not even recognized as independent organizations; they merely serve as augmenting support to the ground forces. Indeed, according to this official, it would be more accurate to describe the VPN and VAD-AF as “the army’s ships and the army’s planes.”27 The government itself has supported this conceptualization of the VPN, with state-run media noting in 2009 that Vietnam required “strategic boats and ships for the army.”28 Further illustrative of army dominance of the military is the fact that of the 22 uniformed members of the Central Committee, the VPN and VAD-AF have only 1 representative each, with the other 20 hailing from the army.

26 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Military Politics in Contemporary Vietnam: Military Engagement, Corporate Interests, and Professionalism,” in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Meitzner (New York: Routledge, 2011), 63–84.

27 Personal communication with a Western government official, July 2016. 28 “New Boats Equipped for Transport Units,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan, February 18, 2009.

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Army parochialism has resulted in three major problems for the VPA. First, the VPN and VAD-AF have struggled to establish their own service identities, cultures, and mission sets and to obtain status and respect on par with their army brethren. For example, when assigned to Ministry of National Defence headquarters, VPN and VAD-AF officers must take off their service uniforms and wear army uniforms instead.29 Second, the VPA lacks information exchanges and rotational opportunities across the services, creating a jointness deficit within the military. Although the VPA has acknowledged the importance of jointness in military operations, it has yet to establish a joint staff headquarters to advocate for and oversee the transition to a more joint force.30 Finally, despite China’s growing military footprint in the South China Sea, the army still appears to be fixated on the land dimensions of warfare and may not be capable of effectively preparing for conflict in the air and sea domains. It appears to perceive the South China Sea as “sea territory” or “blue soil” that, while worthy of protection, is infeasible to defend. Therefore, the VPA prioritizes the coast, manned outposts, and oil rigs for protection.31

the human side of warfare

VPN and VAD-AF training appears to have intensified recently, with a growing focus on the South China Sea. For instance, following the international arbitration ruling against China’s claims vis-à-vis the Philippines in July 2016, the VPN conducted an “island recapturing” exercise (diễn tập tái chiếm đảo), and the VPN carried out two more such exercises this past summer.32 It appears that these operations are synonymous with amphibious assault operations, with the literal translation of “island recapture” (tái chiếm đảo) in Vietnamese being “attacks on occupied islands.” Although this exercise appears to have involved substantial coordination between the VPN

29 Personal communication with Western officials, August 2016. 30 Personal communication with a Western official, September 2016. 31 Personal communication with a U.S. think tank expert, August 2016. 32 Dan Nguyen, “Tàu pháo hộ tống hải quân Việt Nam tập bắn đạn thật” [Vietnam Escort Gunboat

Practiced Live-Fire Exercise], Baodatviet, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, July 11, 2017. There are also several video clips on the internet of these training events. See, for example, “Lữ đoàn Hải quân đánh bộ 147 diễn tập thực binh bắn đạn thật” [147th Naval Infantry Brigade Held Live-Fire Exercise], Vietnam Defense TV, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, July 9, 2017; and “Lữ đoàn Hải quân đánh bộ 101 diễn tập bắn đạn thật” [101st Naval Infantry Brigade Held Live-Fire Exercise], Vietnam Defense TV, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, August 19, 2017.

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and VAD-AF, in general it is difficult to find VPA exercises that can be defined as truly joint and that do not center on support to ground-force operations.

VPA training also remains so highly scripted that these events might be more accurately described as drills. Rather than testing dynamic and improvisational skills, they simply reinforce the mastery of static, repetitive skill sets. It would appear that Vietnam’s network of 21 defense academies only reinforces the VPA’s emphasis on drills, based on an official description.33 Moreover, a greater focus on training efforts in recent years has not resulted in observable greater proficiency in the air and sea domains. The VPN, for example, still has limited proficiency and confidence in close-in maneuvers as virtually all exercises continue to be held at long distances, demonstrated by a video clip of the VPN firing at a target from a far distance.34 Similarly, although the VPN conducts patrols with its Kilo-class submarines, the extent to which it engages in subsurface training is unclear.

In the air domain, according to Nguyen Thanh Trung, a fighter pilot and national war hero, “for a military pilot, accumulating 1,000 flight hours is very difficult and time-consuming, maybe [taking] 10 to 15 years, or even much longer.”35 This means that a Vietnamese pilot only receives 65–100 flight hours each year, or even less. The lack of both training hours and realistic training scenarios has likely contributed to a series of recent high-profile accidents. In June 2016, for example, the VAD-AF lost a Su-30MK2 while training over the South China Sea—an accident that was later blamed on engine failure.36 In response, the VCG attempted to launch a search and rescue operation that resulted in the crash of a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft as well.37

Lack of expertise in operating high-tech weapon systems has convinced VPA leaders of the need to reach out for assistance to foreign militaries beyond Russia, which supplies the vast majority of Vietnam’s defense systems. Improved English-language skills within the VPA have been critical to this effort because they have opened the door to dealing with not

33 For more information, see Ministry of National Defence (Vietnam), Vietnam National Defence, 79. 34 “Lữ đoàn 171 Hải quân diễn tập bắn đạn thật trên biển” [Naval 171th Flotilla Held Live-

Fire Exercise at Sea], VietNamNet, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, June 27, 2016; and personal communication with a Western official, September 2016. In addition, see the following video clip from VietNamNet u http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/quan-su/lu-doan-171-hai-quan-dien-tap-ban-dan-that-tren-bien-312346.html.

35 Hoang Dan, “Phi công quân sự tích lũy được 1.000 giờ bay là rất khó” [Military Pilots Accumulating 1,000 Flight Hours Is Very Difficult], Soha News, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, June 21, 2016.

36 “Sukhoi Su-30MK2 of Vietnamese Air Force Crashed into Sea,” Defence Blog, June 14, 2016 u http://defence-blog.com/news/sukhoi-su-30mk2-of-vietnamese-air-force-crashed-into-sea.html.

37 Van Thanh Vo and Mac Thai, “Vietnamese Search Team Finds Body at CASA 212 Plane Crash Site,” VN Express International, June 23, 2016.

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only English-speaking countries in the West but other nations as well. For instance, India is a particularly valuable defense partner because its military inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era weapon systems. Indian officials are also willing to assist Vietnam with training because of shared concerns over China’s rise. New Delhi has offered submarine training using Vietnam’s Kilo-class submarines and in late 2016 agreed to train Vietnam’s Su-30 pilots.38 It has even apparently offered ground-forces training, including tank training—underscoring the special and intimate nature of their cooperation, given Vietnam’s sensitivity to interactions with its army.39 Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Hanoi in September 2016 and offered Vietnam two lines of defense credit totaling $600 million, further emphasizing the closeness of bilateral defense relations.40

Japan is another increasingly important defense partner. In late August 2017, Japanese vice minister of defense Ro Manabe and his Vietnamese counterpart, deputy defense minister Nguyen Chi Vinh, concluded the fifth Vietnam-Japan defense policy dialogue. The two sides agreed to continue their cooperation in maritime security, defense industry endeavors, technology transfer, and military medicine, among other areas.41 In January 2017, Japan pledged to send six used coast guard patrol boats to Vietnam, and in June of the same year the two countries conducted their first-ever joint exercise aimed at combating illegal fishing in the South China Sea.42 Japan has also pledged to give Vietnam funding to build six new coast guard patrol boats.43

Whereas every year Hanoi enjoys a plentiful supply of eligible recruits that generally possess high regard for the VPA’s history and missions, neither the VPN nor the VAD-AF have increased their personnel numbers to complement military modernization geared toward combat in the maritime and air domains. The VPN’s naval personnel, consisting of both sailors and

38 Dinakar Peri, “India to Train Vietnam’s Sukhoi Fighter Pilots,” Hindu, December 6, 2016. 39 On ground forces training, see, for example, Vishnu Som, “As China Arms Pakistan, India Trains

Vietnamese Soldiers in Jungle Warfare,” NDTV, March 16, 2016. On tank training, see Binh Nguyen, “Tướng Ấn Độ khen ngợi sĩ quan Việt Nam huấn luyện trên xe tăng hiện đại” [Indian General Praises Vietnamese Officers Being Trained on Modern Tanks], Soha News, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, March 15, 2017.

40 Ho Binh Minh, “India Offers $500 Million Defense Credit as Vietnam Seeks Arms Boost,” Reuters, September 2, 2016; and Thayer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Sino-U.S. Competition,” 183–99.

41 “Vietnam, Japan Hold 5th Defense Policy Dialogue,” VietNamNet Bridge, August 30, 2017. 42 Mai Nguyen and My Pham, “Japan Pledges Boats to Vietnam as China Dispute Simmers,” Reuters,

January 16, 2017; and Ankit Panda, “Vietnam, Japan Coast Guards Hold First-Ever South China Sea Drill on Illegal Fishing,” Diplomat, June 19, 2017.

43 Prashanth Parameswaran, “What Did the Vietnam Premier’s Japan Voyage Accomplish?” Diplomat, June 9, 2017; and “Tăng cường hợp tác quốc phòng Việt Nam–Nhật Bản” [Strengthening of Vietnam-Japan Defense Cooperation], People’s Army Online, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, June 5, 2017.

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naval infantry, has held steady at 40,000, while the VAD-AF has remained at around 30,000 personnel since 2009.44 By contrast, the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force maintain forces of approximately 235,000 and 398,000 respectively.45 Complicating matters further, army dominance of the VPA keeps most personnel in army-focused positions. The VPA consists of approximately 482,000 total active troops. Of this total, 412,000 are ground forces; the remainder of the VPA’s active force is in the VPN or VAD-AF. While the VPA does maintain a reserve force of approximately 5 million troops, the vast majority of these are focused on land-centric mission sets and could contribute little in the event of an air- or maritime-based contingency in the South China Sea.46

maritime domain awareness and system interoperability

Although the VPA has successfully procured from abroad or indigenously developed important military capabilities that can be used in the South China Sea, it continues to suffer from an inability to “see” what is about to happen or is happening in the region, otherwise known as maritime domain awareness (MDA). To be sure, the leadership is aware of the problem. One article published in a Vietnamese defense journal in 2014 noted that the VPA’s modernization must incorporate capabilities “to defend from afar and from high up” as well as the “ability to monitor the air space, the seas, and islands far from the mainland.”47

As part of then president Barack Obama’s meeting in July 2015 with Vietnamese general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong at the White House, the United States and Vietnam adopted a joint vision statement that called for increased collaboration to improve MDA capabilities.48 Nearly one year later,

44 These findings result from a comparison of data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on VPA personnel for the years 2009 to 2015. Please see IISS, The Military Balance 2009 (London: Routledge, 2009), chap. 8; IISS, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2012 (London: Routledge, 2012), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2013 (London: Routledge, 2013), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2014 (London: Routledge, 2014), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge, 2015), chap. 6; IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge, 2016), chap. 6; and IISS, The Military Balance 2017 (London: Routledge, 2017), chap. 6.

45 IISS, The Military Balance 2017, chap. 6. 46 IISS, The Military Balance 2016, 297; and “Public Briefing on Active Troops and Reserve Force of

Vietnam,” Bao Dat Viet, October 4, 2013. 47 “Core Contents of the Strategy to Protect the Country under New Situations.” 48 “United States–Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 7, 2015.

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following Obama’s May 2016 visit to Vietnam, the United States lifted its decades-long embargo on arms sales to Vietnam, reportedly prompting the VPA to consider purchasing additional MDA assets, such as the P-3C Orion.49 The VPA has purchased six Canadian-built DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 amphibious aircraft to provide additional MDA capability. These aircraft offer medium-range maritime surveillance.

Vietnamese leaders are exploring other, at times low-tech, ways to improve the VPA’s MDA. For instance, Vietnam plans to leverage its sizable fisherman population to conduct intelligence collection in the South China Sea. In 2013, it also acquired the French-built Coast Watcher 100 long- range coastal surveillance radar. Dubbed the “peephole into the Spratlys,” this system should allow the detection of ships up to 170 kilometers away, giving the VPA its first over-the-horizon capability.50 Vietnam is separately seeking the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as space-based satellites. The VPA has partnered with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to convert civilian-use UAVs into platforms that can be leveraged for national defense. The intent is to develop at least 35 “observation platforms” by 2020.51 Vietnam has also partnered with Israel in recent years to learn more about and acquire new UAV technologies.52 One particularly important UAV is the fixed-wing HS-6L, revealed in December 2015.53 Produced by the military-run Vietnamese company Viettel, the HS-6L is reportedly a high-altitude, long-endurance UAV with an operational time of 35 hours and a range of 4,000 kilometers. Although very few details are available, Vietnam took its first foray into space-based MDA in September 2016 with its purchase of the Japanese-constructed ASNARO-2 satellite. ASNARO-2 is an earth observation satellite that takes pictures in all weather conditions and at any time.54 Vietnamese media claim the satellite offers the highest quality of resolution available, and as of June 2017, Tokyo had signed a

49 Andria Shalal, “Vietnam, South Korea May Buy Lockheed Planes amid Chinese Buildup,” Reuters, June 5, 2016. The VPA, however, might select used Japanese P-3s as a less expensive alternative. See Atsushi Tomiyama, “Vietnam Eyes Secondhand Japanese Defense Gear,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 26, 2016.

50 “Power of the Vietnamese ‘Peephole’ CW-100 in the South China Sea,” Kien Thuc Online, June 8, 2013, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh; and “God’s Eye View into the Spratly Islands,” Bao Moi Online, trans. Nguyen Nhat Anh, February 2, 2015.

51 Collin Koh Swee Lean, “Vietnam Boosts Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Capabilities in the South China Sea,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Broader Horizons, January 2016.

52 “Vietnam Wants More Israeli Made UAVs,” Israeli Homeland Security, March 2015 u https://i-hls.com/archives/59443?utm_source=iHLS&utm_medium=Guy&utm_campaign=RSS.

53 Richard D. Fisher Jr., “New Vietnamese HS-6L HALE UAV Likely Aided by Belarus,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 23, 2015.

54 “Japan to Export Earth Observation Satellite to Vietnam,” Vietnam News Agency, September 20, 2016.

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memorandum of understanding with Hanoi on funding to support Vietnam’s long-term satellite plan.55 Vietnam also allowed India to set up a satellite imaging and tracking center on its soil. In exchange, it will have access to images covering the region taken by Indian satellites.56 This will give Vietnam a much-needed capability to observe China’s activities at locations of interest in the South China Sea.

Yet despite the VPA’s intent to build up its MDA capabilities, Vietnam has struggled to collect basic intelligence about the region. For example, even after receiving four days of prior notification that the PLA planned to land aircraft on one of its runways at Fiery Cross Reef, the VPN scrambled to collect radar but could only catch a few minutes of footage, according to an Asian government official.57 Vietnam also could not detect that a U.S. aircraft carrier was steaming through the South China Sea, nor reportedly could it differentiate between Japanese and Chinese naval ships operating within its EEZ.58 This lack of MDA capabilities, together with a limited capacity to integrate, fuse, analyze, and distribute such intelligence to commanders and warfighters across diverse command, control, and communications networks, will likely prove particularly disruptive to the VPA’s military operations in the South China Sea unless properly addressed.

Ensuring interoperability among VPA radars is another acute challenge. Vietnam typically prefers to shop around for the most cost-effective systems, resulting in a patchwork array of MDA capabilities built by multiple countries, including Russia, France, Ukraine, and Israel, that are at times incapable of communicating with each other. As a consequence, Vietnam has been forced to spend extra money on training personnel on multiple systems and housing an array of spare parts. After the 2014 crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, for instance, Vietnamese leaders privately worried that the crash may have occurred off the coast of southern Vietnam unbeknownst to the Vietnamese defense establishment because air traffic control towers, as well as coastal and air defense units, were unable to communicate with each other.59

It is possible that Hanoi would face similar challenges were it to purchase more non-Russian/Soviet weapon systems in the future. Interestingly, Vietnam’s

55 “Japan to Export Earth Observation Satellite to Vietnam”; and Nguyen Cuong, “Japan’s Research on Vietnam’s Long-Term Satellite Development and Utilization Plan,” Vietnam National Space Center, June 28, 2017.

56 Sanjeev Miglani and Greg Torode, “India to Build Satellite Tracking Station in Vietnam That Offers Eye on China,” Reuters, January 25, 2016.

57 Personal communication with an Asian government official, August 2016. 58 Ibid. 59 Personal communication with a Western official, August 2016.

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quiet but growing relationship with Israel could help mitigate potential interoperability problems. Given its experience capturing Soviet military equipment from Arab adversaries, Israel maintains a high level of expertise in retrofitting this equipment for further use, potentially making it an ideal partner for Vietnam.60

conclusion

Implications for Regional Stability

Although Vietnam has already achieved impressive results in a short period, particularly in the acquisition and production of new weapon systems, it will likely continue to face acute challenges in integrating and learning how to effectively employ these systems in air and sea combat. This will have the effect of impairing VPA military operations in virtually any protracted, large-scale, or high-intensity conflict in the South China Sea. Therefore, the Vietnamese leadership’s primary intent—indeed, its hope—is to prevent war with China in the first place. Vietnamese leaders regularly express the view that armed conflict in the South China Sea should be avoided at all costs.61 Instead, the core of Vietnam’s national defense strategy is to expand and develop its defense relationships in Southeast Asia, as well as with like-minded partners such as the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, to hedge against China’s position in the South China Sea.

Conflict prevention efforts also include regular engagement with Beijing itself to convince the Chinese leadership not to engage in destabilizing and provocative behavior, and Vietnam tries to serve as a model in this regard. Indeed, Hanoi’s military modernization has clearly prioritized weapon systems that offer only a counterbalancing check on PLA offensive power. Vietnam does not currently possess, nor has it ever sought, a weapon system that could be considered an attempt to unilaterally raise the stakes vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea. However, if in the coming years Beijing decides to take a more assertive stance toward the territorial dispute—for example, by stepping up sovereignty patrols, declaring an air defense identification zone over the South China Sea (as it did over the East China Sea in 2013),

60 See, for example, “T-72 Upgrade Program,” IMI Systems. 61 Nguyen Tan Dung, “Building Strategic Trust for Peace, Cooperation and Prosperity in the Asia-

Pacific Region” (remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2013); and H.E. Tran Dai Quang, “Strengthening Partnership for Regional Sustainable Development” (38th Singapore Lecture, Singapore, August 30, 2016).

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or continuing its land reclamation and construction activities to expand its military presence—then it could prompt Hanoi to care less about the risks of provoking China. Vietnamese leaders might even begin to contemplate the acquisition of medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking deeper into the Chinese homeland.

Regardless of Beijing’s decision on how to behave in the South China Sea, bilateral trust is low enough that Vietnam is seeking further upgrades to its anti-access capabilities. Most notably, it has been attempting to acquire the BrahMos supersonic ASCM from India since 2011.62 BrahMos would give Hanoi the ability to launch ASCMs with similar characteristics to the Bastion-P from air- and sea-based platforms, in effect posing a multidirectional threat to any PLA naval assets. Rumors have persisted that Vietnam may have secretly secured a deal with India for BrahMos. Even though New Delhi officially denied the sale in August 2017, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that such a sale would be “consistent with the policy of peace and self-defense and is the normal practice in the national defense.”63

Additionally, Vietnamese leaders may be negotiating with Russia to procure the S-400 air defense system, which is capable of identifying and destroying dozens of targets simultaneously out to and beyond Vietnam’s EEZ.64 Hanoi is also quietly upgrading its South China Sea outposts. For example, in August 2016, Vietnam had apparently deployed Israeli-built Extended Range Artillery (EXTRA) guided rocket artillery launchers on several of the disputed features it controls.65 These systems have sufficient range to destroy Chinese military infrastructure throughout the Spratly Islands and Beijing’s forward-operating bases on Hainan Island. By November 2016, Vietnam had also extended its sole runway in the Spratly Islands—on Spratly Island itself—and built a new aircraft hangar there.66 Chinese leaders

62 Bharat Lather, “Is China Driving Vietnam’s Military Modernization?” Indian Defence Review, August 8, 2016.

63 For rumors that Vietnam has already purchased and acquired BrahMos, see Helen Clark, “India-Vietnam Point Potent Projectile at China,” Asia Times, August 30, 2017. For comments from Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Khanh Lynh, “Vietnam Hails Burgeoning Defense Ties with India,” VN Express International, August 18, 2017 u https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-hails-burgeoning-defense-ties-with-india-3629191.html.

64 “Vietnam Is Negotiating to Buy S-400 Triumph Anti-aircraft Missiles,” Defence Blog, July 4, 2016 u http://defence-blog.com/news/vietnam-received-new-batch-of-surface-to-air-spyder-sr-air-defence-system.html.

65 Greg Torode, “Exclusive: Vietnam Moves New Rocket Launchers into Disputed South China Sea—Sources,” Reuters, August 10, 2016.

66 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Vietnam Responds with Spratly Air Upgrades,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 15, 2016.

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have been noticeably circumspect in their response, probably because the PLA continues to hold an overwhelming advantage over the VPA.

The Role of the United States

As part of his five-country, twelve-day whirlwind trip through Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump stopped for two days in Vietnam, spending one day in Da Nang to address APEC and the second to meet with top Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi. Trump’s visit reassured Vietnam of the U.S. position in the South China Sea, following up on Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to the White House in May 2017. The meeting was significant because it reiterated the need for Washington to cooperate with Hanoi on issues of “maritime security”—code for primarily dealing with China in the South China Sea. Most importantly, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to freedom of navigation and the settlement of all disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, without coercion, and in accordance with international law. Washington and Hanoi also affirmed their intent to enact the three-year plan of action (2018–20) on U.S.-Vietnam defense cooperation called for under the 2011 U.S.-Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation as well as the 2015 Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations. Additionally, Secretary of Defense James Mattis will visit Vietnam in 2018 to reciprocate Minister of National Defence Ngo Xuan Lich’s visit to the Pentagon in August 2017, and the United States will also send an aircraft carrier to the strategic Vietnamese port of Cam Ranh Bay in 2018.

While top leadership meetings and the joint statement are important, U.S. policymakers and military commanders should seek to capitalize on this positive momentum to target specific areas of deeper bilateral defense cooperation. This analysis demonstrates that the VPA is likely unprepared for a sustained maritime standoff with China in the South China Sea for a variety of reasons, ranging from a lack of operational concepts and training in the air and sea domains to shortcomings in MDA capabilities and the interoperability of its weapon systems. But even if Washington wants to help in these areas, such cooperation will almost certainly be difficult due to Vietnam’s long-standing mistrust over U.S. intentions and traditional reluctance to give the appearance of acting in a provocative way against China. To be sure, the United States can continue the collaborative activities laid out by the 2011 U.S.-Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding. These include information sharing in the conduct of nontraditional military operations

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such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, and other types of military operations other than war that are typically considered less sensitive in Vietnam. Indeed, many training skills can be learned or honed in less sensitive contexts.

It will be far more difficult, however, to engage Vietnam on developing a doctrine for air and sea warfare, modifying its army-centric organizational structure, and improving training and the interoperability of weapon systems. One area that could offer a significant return on investment for Washington, and where, more importantly, there is already some activity, is MDA. The joint statement noted the need to cooperate further with Vietnam to enhance its MDA capabilities but did not provide any specifics. The United States could pursue closer collaboration on coastal radar, satellite and other communications systems, maritime surveillance aircraft (including unarmed drones), and naval patrol craft. Better MDA would greatly improve the VPA’s warfighting capabilities in a long-duration, high-intensity conflict against China in the South China Sea.

Regardless, a broader and more consequential question for Vietnam is perhaps whether the Trump administration seeks to continue Washington’s decades-long policy of maintaining a robust and active economic and security presence in the Asia-Pacific. Trump’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, which the president cited several times in his APEC speech at Da Nang, has unclear geostrategic implications.67 Although Vietnamese leaders should be heartened by their meetings with the Trump administration thus far, the verdict is still out on overall policy toward the region. Trump’s recently released national security strategy provides few additional details on Vietnam, only including it on a list of “growing security and economic partners” along with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.68 Trump’s warming relationship with Chinese president Xi, coupled with his earlier decisions to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (of which Vietnam was a critical part) and to declare that the Obama administration’s policy of strategic rebalancing to Asia is over, suggests a stark departure from the past.

A dramatically reduced role for the United States in the Asia-Pacific greatly increases the prospects of China employing bullying tactics against Vietnam and other claimants in the South China Sea. Hanoi could respond by accelerating and expanding its own military modernization efforts, and

67 “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 10, 2017.

68 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., December 2017), 46 u https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

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even consider the procurement of strategic weapon systems to deter China, as detailed above. It is equally plausible that Vietnam would instead simply seek to find ways to accommodate China, calculating that an arms race would be destabilizing and essentially unwinnable. Vietnam’s apparent capitulation in July 2017 to Chinese demands to withdraw the Spanish company Repsol from drilling in a disputed oil block site suggests that Hanoi might settle on the latter.69 Neither of these scenarios is in the strategic interests of the United States or Vietnam.

On the other hand, a more muscular U.S. approach might worry Hanoi as well. During his visit, and perhaps wandering a bit off script, Trump offered missiles to Vietnam and expressed interest in helping mediate disputes in the South China Sea, to which Vietnam did not respond, probably to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing China.70 Instead, merely a sustained U.S. leadership role in the Asia-Pacific would probably cause just enough healthy concern in Beijing about the potential for U.S. military intervention in a South China Sea conflict. Although the continuation of the United States’ presence in the region would certainly not embolden Vietnam, given its history of self-reliance and lingering suspicions of the West, Hanoi might nevertheless feel more comfortable standing up to Beijing the next time it faces Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

69 Mike Ives, “Vietnam, Yielding to Beijing, Backs Off South China Sea Drilling,” New York Times, August 4, 2017.

70 For Trump’s remark on missiles, see “Remarks by President Trump before Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Phuc of Vietnam,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 12, 2017. For his comment on South China Sea mediation, see “Remarks by President Trump before Bilateral Meeting with President Quang of Vietnam,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 12, 2017.

Daniel Sneider

Zack Cooper

Se Young Jang

Terence Roehrig




Terence Roehrig’sJapan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella:

Deterrence After the Cold WarNew York: Columbia University Press, 2017

ISBN: 978-0-2311-5799-5 (paperback)

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The Dangers of Decoupling in Northeast Asia

Daniel Sneider

T he U.S. security alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) remain two of the most enduring legacies of the postwar global

system. Despite dramatic changes in the global security environment, those alliances have continued to offer stability and peace in Northeast Asia and allowed the region to prosper, to the benefit of the United States as well as its allies.

The success of those security alliances was hardly assured. The alliances have been, from their inception, inherently unbalanced. The United States provides a security guarantee that is effectively one-sided, not only when it comes to Japan, with its constitutional restrictions on the use of force, but also with respect to the ROK, which necessarily is largely focused on the Korean Peninsula itself. Of course, our allies have at times contributed to the global security interests of the United States, and the U.S. base structure, particularly in Japan, has a broader regional, if not global, purpose.

But fundamentally, the alliances are seen as a defense of our allies against external threats. And in that regard, the U.S. resolve to provide security has been questioned almost from the inception of the treaties that bind us. There is a persistent fear of abandonment, of a “decoupling” of the United States’ security from that of its allies and a U.S. retreat from responsibility. Such fears arose in Europe during the Cold War and were manifest in Japan in the mid-1960s when China began to test nuclear weapons.

Fear of abandonment increased dramatically in both Japan and the ROK amid the disaster and defeat of the Vietnam War, the Guam Doctrine and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, and the shocking opening to China without notice to our allies. In Japan, there was talk of going nuclear, while the ROK undertook a clandestine program to build a nuclear bomb. The end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, followed by the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed onshore in the ROK and onboard vessels in the Pacific, again revived those concerns.

This fear of decoupling is most powerfully triggered by the threat from nuclear-armed states. The security guarantee rests on the extension of the so-called nuclear umbrella—a public, and private, pledge to use nuclear weapons to deter and, if needed, respond to an attack on U.S. allies.

daniel sneider is a Lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and a former foreign correspondent. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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book review roundtable • deterrence after the cold war

For extended deterrence to be credible, both our allies and our foes must believe that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of our allies even if it puts U.S. territory at risk. In popular parlance, the United States must be willing to trade Los Angeles to defend Tokyo or Seoul.

Terence Roehrig’s new book, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War, is far and away the most complete, authoritative, and analytically provocative account of the complex history of these issues written to date. Roehrig, who directs the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College, begins with an incisive discussion of the doctrines of extended deterrence, explaining that the extension of a nuclear umbrella is a subset of that broader goal and that deterrence can also be provided by conventional means (chap. 1). It is a distinction essential to the policy conclusions he reaches later in the book. Deterrence, as Roehrig explains, rests on two essential assumptions—that the actors are rational decision-makers and that the threats to use force, including nuclear weapons, are credible.

The book goes on to provide a concise account of the history of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence during the Cold War in chapter 2, beginning as it should with an account of the legacy of the first use of those weapons against Japan. It moves on in chapter 3 to examine the threats that have reinvigorated the need for extended deterrence, namely China and North Korea. Here, Roehrig makes an essential distinction between the long-term threat posed by China and the near-term threat posed by North Korea. Although China seeks to match the strength of the United States in the region and has a major nuclear weapons capability, the likelihood of military conflict in the short term is minimal. Importantly, Roehrig notes that China is a far more compelling threat for Japan than for the ROK. North Korea’s rapidly growing nuclear program, by contrast, is unsettling for both countries.

The two chapters that delve into the detailed history of the nuclear umbrella in relation to Japan and the ROK are the most authoritative accounts that I have read on this subject. Roehrig’s command of the archival history and of the development of weapons systems and doctrine is impressive. He explains the importance of the formal dialogues with both countries on extended deterrence, launched in 2009 with Japan along the lines of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO and then with the ROK the following year. Roehrig provides invaluable insights into the concerns that both countries have raised about the decisions made to reduce, or even end, the use of weapons systems, such as cruise missiles, which are viewed as

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providing credibility to U.S. commitments. He also illuminates the role of tactical nuclear weapons, discussing the impact of the decision to remove them from the theater and the demand in certain quarters to reintroduce them. He argues that such weapons, which have lower yields and can be used with much greater targeting precision, might encourage the use of nuclear weapons to attack targets in North Korea.

This sets the stage for what will be, for many, the most controversial aspects of this book—the discussion of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and policy in chapter 6 and the policy implications offered in chapter 7. Roehrig contends that though the United States retains a sufficient arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including a diminished number of tactical weapons that can be mounted on bombers or cruise missiles, Washington is highly unlikely to use them to respond to an attack on its allies. The opprobrium that would accompany their use is so great that an American president would be under immense pressure not to employ them. The use of nuclear weapons “is unlikely and unwise for a number of strategic, operational/military, and moral reasons,” Roehrig writes (p. 9). Instead, he argues that extended deterrence can be maintained through the ability to use precision conventional weapons to carry out a massive and highly destructive attack on potential foes, both China and North Korea.

At the same time, Roehrig agrees that retaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons is still necessary to create some calculated ambiguity about their possible use. The problem with this approach, which he anticipates, is that neither the enemy nor U.S. allies may find it credible. Already there is a growing perception of the United States decoupling its security from that of its allies. President Donald Trump and prominent Republican politicians have clearly separated the threat posed to the continental United States from a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile from that of an attack on our allies. This suggests that the United States would be more likely to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack on the homeland than on allies, even one targeted at U.S. bases or forces in the region.

The result of such decoupling would be to send both Japan and the ROK in several possible directions. One is toward development of their own nuclear weapons capability, which they have both contemplated in the past and for which both have a latent technical capacity. Another is to bandwagon with China, in the hopes of gaining security from that emergent hegemonic power. And the last is to provoke conflict in an attempt to force U.S. engagement.

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Finally, there is the issue of North Korea’s goals. North Korea may be encouraged by U.S. decoupling and by its own nuclear capability to be even more provocative about carrying out lower-level attacks, confident that it will not trigger an escalatory response. Roehrig shares the consensual view that the North Korean leadership is a rational actor, motivated almost entirely by the goal of self-preservation and perceiving the use of nuclear weapons as a means of guaranteeing regime survival. But, as he acknowledges, there is a danger of escalation that would cause the North Korean leadership to conclude that it faces an existential threat, sufficient to warrant use of its nuclear weapons.

Regime survival is certainly the dominant motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. But the North Korean regime also has never abandoned its long-term goal of undermining the ROK and achieving unification on its own terms. That requires effectively ousting U.S. forces from the peninsula and driving a wedge between the United States and its allies. The constant demands for the United States and ROK to end joint exercises, the refusal to discuss security issues with the ROK, and the use of nuclear weapons to put U.S. forces and bases in the western Pacific that are essential to the defense of South Korea at risk—all these actions suggest that the Kim regime’s long-term goal of unification remains in force. In that context, any diminishing of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as an essential component of extended deterrence, could serve North Korean ends.

Despite the downplaying of a more aggressive goal on the part of North Korea, Roehrig’s book is the starting point for any intelligent discussion of an issue that is now at the forefront of U.S. policy concerns in Northeast Asia.

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Are Current U.S. Extended Deterrence Approaches Sustainable?

Zack Cooper

T erence Roehrig’s Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War is a timely addition to

the literature on extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. This book is particularly relevant today given that rapidly advancing Chinese and North Korean military capabilities are raising concerns about the viability of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella provides a valuable historical and theoretical primer for scholars and policymakers reassessing U.S. extended deterrence commitments.

Roehrig begins by examining the basics of deterrence theory and discussing the challenges of extending deterrence—nuclear or otherwise—to one’s allies. This summary is clear and concise, differentiating primary deterrence from extended deterrence, immediate deterrence from general deterrence, and symmetric deterrence from asymmetric deterrence. Roehrig also unpacks some of the foundational assumptions of deterrence theory, including rationality and credibility. He then explains how the United States attempted to apply extended deterrence in East Asia during the Cold War. After reviewing the historical record, Roehrig pivots to the modern day and assesses evolving Chinese and North Korean military capabilities, which represent the primary deterrence concerns for the United States and its allies in East Asia. He effectively highlights the fact that the two U.S. allies in Northeast Asia prioritize these threats differently, with Japanese leaders tending to focus primarily on China and South Korean leaders emphasizing North Korea.

Perhaps Roehrig’s most valuable contributions are the book’s fourth and fifth chapters, which concisely summarize the extended deterrence relationships between the United States and Japan and South Korea, respectively. With mounting threats from China and North Korea, extended deterrence dilemmas are drawing greater attention from leaders in all three countries. These chapters provide tidy histories of the evolution of these extended deterrence relationships from the perspectives of Washington,

zack cooper is the Senior Fellow for Asian Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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Tokyo, and Seoul and should be required reading for policymakers considering changes to extended deterrence arrangements.

The final two chapters evaluate U.S. extended deterrence and then draw implications for today. These chapters make several core arguments. First, “the nuclear umbrella likely does little to deter anything other than nuclear war” (p. 187). Roehrig does not believe that U.S. extended deterrence threats to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks are credible. As a result, he favors the use of “precise, lethal conventional options” rather than nuclear weapons to “achieve similar strategic effects against North Korea as well as China” (p. 189). Nevertheless, “given the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons, an uncertain umbrella retains value as a deterrent” (p. 193). As a result, Roehrig concludes that “despite these concerns, the nuclear umbrella will be ‘good enough’ when it is part of a strong, credible alliance” (p. 197). Supporters of current U.S. extended deterrence policies will find themselves reassured by this conclusion.

There is much to commend in Roehrig’s appraisal of the choices facing leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. Yet three limitations remain. First, the book would benefit from an original theoretical construct that could weave together its various elements. Second, Roehrig may be overly optimistic about the sustainability of current U.S. extended deterrence arrangements. Third, as a result of the first two limitations, the book may leave readers searching for tangible suggestions about how to enhance extended deterrence. Each of these issues is addressed in turn below.

First, although Roehrig’s synthesis of theory and history is detailed and insightful, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella lacks a central puzzle or novel theoretical argument, which limits its contribution to the existing literature. Not all books require a new puzzle or theoretical construct, but treatments without these elements risk restating conventional views. At the outset, Roehrig notes that “the central argument of this book is that the United States does indeed possess a nuclear umbrella that has the capability to protect its allies with nuclear weapons should deterrence fail” (p. 9). This assertion is largely in line with conventional views. Thus, the book may be more appealing as a theoretical and historical primer than for more novel contributions.

Second, Roehrig may be overconfident about the sustainability of U.S. conventional deterrence. The United States does retain a substantial military edge over North Korea and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Yet China is another story. Roehrig asserts that “even with increasing Chinese conventional capabilities, the United States would not need to

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escalate to nuclear weapons but would have credible conventional options to respond to Chinese aggression” (p. 191). This may be true today, but the conventional military balance is shifting rapidly against the United States, particularly in contingencies involving Taiwan. A cross-strait scenario would be challenging given China’s rapid military modernization and Taiwan’s relatively limited defense spending. Such a scenario could easily escalate to include U.S. bases in Japan, which would force Washington to consider nuclear deterrence options. Yet Roehrig does not address potential contingencies involving Taiwan in detail, leading to overconfidence about U.S. conventional deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China.

Third, this confidence in existing U.S. capabilities reinforces the book’s embrace of prevailing views on the viability of U.S. extended deterrence and avoids the need for new policy proposals. It is not clear, however, that existing U.S. commitments are sufficient from the perspectives of Japan and South Korea. Leading scholars and policymakers have openly questioned whether Japanese and South Korean reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella is realistic in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. For example, Henry Kissinger has argued that if North Korean leaders “continue to have nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons must spread in the rest of Asia.”1 It may therefore be necessary to consider some fundamental changes to long-standing U.S. deterrence approaches to reassure Japan and South Korea that they need not develop their own nuclear weapons.

What changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella might convince Japan and South Korea that the United States will continue to be a reliable provider of extended deterrence? Potential options include forward deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or development of nuclear-sharing arrangements. Yet Roehrig argues that “the return of tactical nuclear weapons would do little to improve strategic deterrence while actually making crisis stability more fragile” (p. 190). This stance also eliminates the most likely options for nuclear sharing. What then is to be done if U.S. allies in Asia continue to openly discuss acquiring nuclear weapons to guard against rising threats from China and North Korea, as well as the U.S. president’s embrace of an “America first” strategy?

In the final assessment, Roehrig has written a valuable review of the theory and history of extended deterrence in East Asia. Yet, in so doing, he also highlights the fact that new thinking may be required to maintain U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the 21st century.

1 David E. Sanger, Choe Sang-hun, and Motoko Rich, “North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, October 28, 2017 u https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-japan-south-korea.html.

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The Limited Roles of U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia

Se Young Jang

I n the era of North Korea’s incessant, and almost successful, attempts to become a nuclear weapons state and the rise of China’s power, Terence

Roehrig’s book Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War is a very timely and interesting academic work. Bridging theory, history, and contemporary debates, Roehrig delves into the effectiveness of the United States’ security commitment to its two main allies in Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), particularly in the form of nuclear deterrence. The Cold War came to an end almost three decades ago at a global level, but military tensions still remain in Northeast Asia. North Korea’s decision to arm with nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) further destabilizes the region’s geopolitical situation, continuously requiring the deep involvement of U.S. leadership in managing and resolving this new nuclear crisis after the Cold War. Against this backdrop, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella offers readers detailed explanations and invaluable insights on how to view the U.S. role in dealing with the current and future nuclear confrontations in Northeast Asia.

Roehrig provides a well-structured analysis of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan and South Korea by introducing theory, overviewing history, moving to threat analysis and case studies, and then assessing overall U.S. nuclear capability and resolve. Yet missing from the book is a chapter on the comparative analysis of these two alliances in terms of nuclear deterrence. Despite a number of similarities shared by the alliances in dealing with U.S. extended deterrence, there are some clear discrepancies that make Tokyo and Seoul respond differently to Pyongyang’s increasing threats and U.S. reassurances. Roehrig mentions these comparative aspects here and there in various chapters. For instance, he observes that “the U.S. nuclear umbrella had to remain quiet for many years” in Japan and “provided reassurance only for its leaders,” mainly due to “domestic political sensitivities” and the “nuclear allergy” in Japanese society (p. 63). In comparison, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea “were viewed more as an actual warfighting tool than a deterrent”

se young jang is a Nonresident Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She can be reached at <[email protected]>.

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in the early years (p. 63). The withdrawal of those tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991 and the end of the Cold War do not appear to have significantly changed South Korea’s views on nuclear weapons, though. Roehrig notes that “a majority of South Koreans believe developing their own nuclear weapons is a necessary response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons” (p. 152). A single independent chapter or section that more systematically compares the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK nuclear umbrellas and thoroughly reflects on the implications suggested by the similar or different aspects would have been useful.

One of the sticking points in debates about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which is also the main question of this book, is the issue of credibility: “Would the United States truly be willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of an ally?” (p. 2). Roehrig concludes that the United States is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies because this is “not in the [U.S.] strategic interest and should be avoided at all costs” (p. 189). Rather, “the nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis North Korea is more important as a message of reassurance for U.S. allies than a tool that adds further to an already stable strategic situation” (p. 186) and has a significant “function for U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons” both regionally and globally (p. 196). As Roehrig states a number of times in the book, the U.S. nuclear umbrella offered to South Korea and Japan has been successful in persuading these two allies to remain non-nuclear thus far, which means that U.S. extended deterrence is still regarded as credible by Tokyo and Seoul. However, it is also true that the rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia, which was further exacerbated by North Korea’s November 2017 test of an ICBM with the possible capability to reach the U.S. mainland, complicates any scholarly conjecture about the future of extended nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia.

The Trump administration’s undecided and unpredictable position on a nuclear North Korea has been making its own policy less credible as well. One of Roehrig’s major conclusions is that “the United States would respond to an attack on Japan or South Korea with conventional weapons in the context of a credible alliance” (p. 190), while “an uncertain umbrella retains value as a deterrent” (p. 193). The overwhelming conventional capability of the United States no doubt poses a grave threat to North Korea, but it is still questionable how much longer conventional military assets can effectively deter Pyongyang. The more advanced North Korea’s nuclear program becomes, the harder it will be to deter the country through the traditional means of deterrence policy unless other tools, such as diplomacy, are

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simultaneously applied. Furthermore, any small sparks, either intentionally or inadvertently lit, could escalate into a nuclear war in the worst-case scenario, no matter how effectively the United States’ conventional or nuclear capability is supposed to deter a nuclear North Korea. Indeed, in an age of uncertainty led by Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, it is increasingly hard to expect that the status quo in this region will be maintained only through traditional deterrence policy.

Some minor points in the book could be further discussed or updated. First, Roehrig notes that “U.S. nuclear restraint during the Korean War appeared to add little more to the worry ROK leaders were already feeling” (p. 56), arguing that “in the early days of the alliance, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was superseded by larger concerns for the overall alliance” (p. 55). According to Il-kwon Chung, chief of staff of the ROK Army during the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee wanted the U.S. government to expand the war by keeping a nuclear option open when Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River (the Amnok River in Korean) on the Sino-Korean border in October and November 1950. As Rhee regarded a clash with China as an inevitable course of action leading to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, he welcomed the U.S. government’s consideration of using nuclear weapons to defeat China.1

At that time, China’s massive offensives led U.S.-ROK forces to promptly retreat southward, shocking both U.S. leaders in Washington and U.S. field officers and opening up a full-scale review of using nuclear weapons. However, President Harry Truman decided not to use nuclear weapons, despite the commander of the UN forces General Douglas MacArthur’s strong urge to do so. This episode was obviously not the only reason for Rhee’s worsening relationship with the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the later stages of the Korean War, but it possibly contributed to his growing suspicion about the credibility of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea. At the very least, Rhee would have realized at this early point of the war that Washington’s principal objective was significantly different from and less ambitious than his own—reunifying the peninsula under his control. In this sense, U.S. nuclear restraint in the Korean War, underscored by Truman’s dismissal of General MacArthur, could have partly shaped South Korea’s larger concerns about its alliance relationship with the United States.

1 Il-kwon Chung, Chung Il-kwon hoegorok [Chung Il-kwon’s Memoirs] (Seoul: Koryo Sojok, 1999), 323.

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Next, Roehrig reasonably argues that “returning U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula would be a bad idea” for four reasons: first, “forward deployed nuclear weapons” could create “possible North Korean preemption or a dangerous ‘use or lose’ situation”; second, the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons “would do little to improve strategic stability” and instead would “stir a contentious debate in South Korea”; third, “the cost and political fallout” of returning them would exceed the benefits; and last, it would not be in the United States’ interest to signal to others a policy “encouraging the spread of tactical nuclear weapons” (p. 147). These reasons are important and should not be disregarded. Yet Roehrig appears to only focus on the potential aftermath of a decision by the United States to redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, while paying little attention to Washington’s actual capability for the redeployment. Notably, some analysts are skeptical of U.S. capability in this regard, arguing that “there is no ready U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons that could be redeployed in South Korea.”2

Last, Roehrig notes that U.S. pressure truly resulted in South Korea’s decision to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and accordingly abandon its nuclear ambitions (p. 148). As I have argued elsewhere, however, extensive archival research in South Korea, Canada, and the United States suggests that Canada, not the United States, played the decisive role in pressing the ROK leadership to ratify the NPT.3 The influence of the United States over South Korea’s foreign or security policy often tends to be overemphasized. Although “the U.S. nuclear umbrella is essential in keeping South Korea from pursuing its own nuclear weapons” (p. 153), U.S. extended nuclear deterrence historically has been a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for South Korea to remain non-nuclear. Despite U.S. tactical nuclear weapons continuously being deployed on the Korean Peninsula, other aspects of the alliance relationship made South Korea less secure and more willing to go nuclear in the 1970s. Moreover, non-U.S. factors such as nuclear reactor deals with Canada would sometimes exert a stronger influence on South Korea’s decision to take a step forward to support nuclear nonproliferation.

Despite such minor reservations, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella is an extremely timely and useful scholarly work

2 See Jon Wolfsthal and Toby Dalton, “Seven Reasons Why Putting U.S. Nukes Back in South Korea Is a Terrible Idea,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2017 u http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/11/putting-u-s-nukes-back-in-south-korea-is-a-terrible-idea.

3 Se Young Jang, “Bringing Seoul into the Non-proliferation Regime: The Effect of ROK-Canada Reactor Deals on Korea’s Ratification of the NPT,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Working Paper, no. 10, September 2017.

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that deepens our understanding of the U.S. security commitment to Japan and South Korea amid North Korea’s growing nuclear threat to the United States and its allies. It is one of the few book-length studies that cover both Japan and South Korea in U.S. deterrence policy and thus marks a major contribution to the field. As a valuable resource bridging academic and policy-relevant research, Roehrig’s book will benefit not only scholars and advanced students but also general readers interested in this issue.

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Author’s Response: The Paradox of the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella—

Reassurance, Credibility, and an Unusable Military Option

Terence Roehrig

O ver the last year the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula has risen to new heights, making a discussion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella

even more critical. Though the rhetoric from the Trump administration has raised some potential challenges for my argument that the United States is highly unlikely to ever use nuclear weapons to defend Japan and South Korea, I believe this argument will hold. I am grateful that the reviewers have found my book Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War to be useful in understanding the role of the nuclear umbrella in Northeast Asian security. Nonetheless, they have raised some important questions regarding nuclear weapons and extended deterrence.

Daniel Sneider asks two very important questions about North Korean goals concerning the possession of nuclear weapons. First, are nuclear weapons likely to make North Korea more willing to undertake provocative actions in the belief that it has a nuclear shield to protect against retaliation? Many analysts have resurrected the Cold War concept of a stability-instability paradox whereby Moscow and Washington conducted lower-level actions believing that neither side would escalate to a broader conflict, given that nuclear weapons could be involved. Will nuclear weapons make North Korea more tolerant of risk and likely to pursue increasingly provocative behavior? Though a definitive answer remains uncertain, I would argue that North Korea has been relatively cautious and has not undertaken the kinds of actions predicted by the paradox to alter the political or territorial status quo. Its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests are necessary to build these capabilities and ensure they work. Moreover, although North Korean rhetoric reached new heights in 2017, official statements, including Kim Jong-un’s 2018 New Year’s speech,

terence roehrig is Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

note u The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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should be read largely through the lens of deterrence.1 Indeed, North Korean bluster is largely a signal of weakness. While analysis often focuses on how the United States will be more cautious in confronting a nuclear North Korea, including the possibility of decoupling from its East Asian allies, North Korea also faces great risks as a nuclear weapon state should a conflict begin and escalate.

Sneider’s second question raises the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons to pursue the goal of reunification, an objective that would fit a classic case of the stability-instability paradox. North Korean leaders continue to tout reunification, and the goal is embedded in the country’s ideology and constitution. Though North Korean leaders maintain this façade, the reality of reunification under Pyongyang’s leadership would be a fool’s errand and likely lead to the downfall of the Kim regime. Let me outline one example among many to show the foolhardiness of such ambitions. For many years, North Korean officials have been trying to revive their decrepit economy and at times have implemented small reforms and restructuring efforts to jump-start it. In addition, they have turned a blind eye to the “marketization from below” that resulted from the collapse of the public distribution system in the wake of the famine years of the mid-1990s. However, large-scale economic reform has been viewed with trepidation for fear of unleashing forces within society that the regime could no longer control. Rather than emulating China’s success, the leaders fear that the result could lead to a collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union. If North Korea is reluctant to implement even minimal reforms to its own economy, how would it go about integrating South Korea, a country with twice its population and the twelfth-largest economy in the world? Reunification would be a disaster for the ruling elites in North Korea and would surely start a process they would be unable to control. Despite the continued rhetorical goal of reunification, North Korean leaders must realize that it is not realistic and will not use nuclear weapons to coerce this outcome.

One of the central arguments of the book is that conventional strikes from the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK), particularly precision-guided munitions, can impose similar strategic effects on North Korea as nuclear weapons. In fact, because conventional power does not involve the same usage problems, it can be a far more credible option to deter Pyongyang. Related to the two questions raised by Sneider,

1 See Kim Jong-un, “New Year’s Address,” available in English translation at NK Leadership Watch u http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2018/01/01/new-years-address/.

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Se Young Jang asks how much longer conventional military assets will be able to deter North Korea. Pyongyang’s conventional capabilities are large and dangerous, but they are also aging and increasingly unable to sustain combat operations for any length of time. The U.S. ability to punish North Korea with advanced conventional weapons will endure. Moreover, South Korean military capabilities are also growing so that the combined conventional strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance will be more than sufficient to deter North Korea for many years to come.

An important distinction in security relations in Northeast Asia outlined in the book is the differing threat perceptions of Japan and South Korea. While North Korea is a serious and immediate concern for both allies, they have differing assessments of China. Japan views China as an ominous, long-term strategic challenge, whereas South Korea, though wary of Beijing’s power and intentions, has extensive economic ties with China and a more benign appraisal of its rise. The book attempts to determine some of the likely conflict scenarios that could lead to a nuclear war in the region. For North Korea, particularly given the current climate, it is possible to see how a nuclear exchange might occur, but these scenarios are more difficult to envision for China. What would it take for a conflict to escalate to the point where the United States would consider using nuclear weapons against China? Some potential flashpoints exist, particularly the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But would the United States be willing to start a nuclear war over these disputes? I am highly doubtful.

Zack Cooper raises an important question in this context about U.S. conventional forces in a China contingency over Taiwan. When Chinese conventional forces surpass those of the United States, as they almost certainly will sometime in the future, will U.S. conventional options no longer be sufficient for Washington to respond should war break out over Taiwan? Deterrence is certainly easier if the United States has conventional superiority than if it does not. Yet the U.S. military need not be able to defeat the People’s Liberation Army with conventional weapons to be able to deter Beijing. The United States need only have the capability to raise the costs sufficiently high with conventional strikes, and it will continue to have this option for many years. Moreover, though I argue that the United States is highly unlikely to ever use nuclear weapons to defend its allies, as long as these weapons and the nuclear umbrella remain, an adversary will never be able to completely dismiss possible nuclear use, which generates some degree of deterrence effect. Finally, using nuclear weapons in a Taiwan

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contingency carries the same problems and risks as it does in a defense of Japan or South Korea scenario and is not in any state’s interest. As Cooper notes, these extended deterrence commitments require careful attention and adjustment to a changing security environment, and both alliances have made considerable progress in revitalizing their defense arrangements.

Though the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are separate, bilateral relationships, they have always been linked. Thus, the U.S. nuclear umbrella was never two separate commitments but is part of a regional security architecture. Se Young Jang suggests that a separate chapter comparing the nuclear umbrella for Japan and for South Korea would have been useful. This suggestion points to the importance of examining the nuclear umbrella together for these two allies; these commitments cannot be considered in isolation. Because of the linkages between these two alliances, I chose to integrate many of these assessments throughout the book where appropriate rather than address them in a separate chapter. Jang also notes some important points about the role played by Canada in South Korea’s signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the difficulties the United States would have in redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

Finally, Jang points to the link between deterrence and diplomacy, arguing that a nuclear North Korea will be increasingly more difficult to deter and will require other tools such as diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy is not typically thought of as a tool of deterrence other than in communicating red lines, issuing retaliation threats, and providing statements of resolve. However, her comment raises a crucial issue: Deterrence is a strategy that seeks to prevent an action and, in many ways, locks in the status quo. Deterrence is not very good at solving problems between states; for that, we are going to need diplomacy. While strengthening deterrence has been an important objective for both alliances, diplomacy will remain central for managing and possibly solving regional problems in the future.

For years, the United States has maintained an extended deterrence commitment to defend Japan and South Korea. The nuclear umbrella is only one part of that commitment. There is a paradox here. The United States is highly unlikely to ever use nuclear weapons to defend its allies, and yet despite these doubts, allied leaders continue to place high value on the nuclear commitment. The answer is that the nuclear umbrella is far more important as a sign of political assurance than a usable military option. The use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia is not in anyone’s interests. As I note in the last line of the book, “No one knows what would happen once a nuclear exchange began, and we must never find out.”

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volume 13 u number 1

131

The CCP’s Use of Homophonous Pen Names David Gitter and Leah Fang


Derek Grossman

roundtable

The Strategic Implications of Russia-China RelationsAngela Stent, Yu Bin, Alexander Lukin, Tomohiko Uyama,

Hiroshi Yamazoe, and Robert Sutter

Terence Roehrig’s Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella:



january 2018

China and the Strategic Imperative for the United StatesCharles Boustany and Richard J. Ellings

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