Oct. 26, 2006 1

Crisis CommunicationsCrisis Communications

Lessons Learned from TMI (and Katrina)

Presentation to Oak Ridge Regional Emergency Management Forum

Harold R. Denton

Oct. 26, 2006 2

Crisis Crisis CommunicationsCommunications

Purpose: Immediate protection of public health and safety

How: Provide accurate, complete and timely information to decision makers, media and public

Oct. 26, 2006 3

Unique Aspects Unique Aspects of TMI Accidentof TMI Accident

Small utility unable to handle managerial, technical, and public relations challenges

Magnitude of potential public health effects

Protracted time of crisis development

Media inexperience with nuclear energy

Oct. 26, 2006 4

Magnitude of Potential Magnitude of Potential Health EffectsHealth Effects Large-scale public

evacuation a real possibility

Considerable departure of general population

Continuing community stress and demoralization

Economic future of area threatened

Oct. 26, 2006 5

Protracted Time of Protracted Time of Crisis DevelopmentCrisis Development

Constantly changing story

Wide variety of sources sought

Conflicting messages led some to conclude media was problem

Oct. 26, 2006 6

Media Inexperience Media Inexperience in Nuclear Mattersin Nuclear Matters

300/400 reporters on scene Overall complexity of event Skepticism Demand for immediate news “What if” questions and

“maybe” answers Growing understanding was

often mistaken for cover-up

Oct. 26, 2006 7

Multiple Sources of Multiple Sources of InformationInformation

Utility Federal agencies State Individuals and interest

groups Best source of information

is at source/site

Oct. 26, 2006 8

Technical IssuesTechnical IssuesFrom Today’s PerspectiveFrom Today’s Perspective

Extensive core melting in the first few hours

Importance of a containment in mitigating accident consequences

Unnecessary hydrogen bubble scare

Significantly reduced risks of a future accident

Oct. 26, 2006 9

Likelihood of Hydrogen Likelihood of Hydrogen Bubble ExplosionBubble Explosion

Hydrogen produced by metal water reaction

Burned in Containment Large RCS bubble at

1000 psi / 280F Removed by steam

stripping and venting into containment

Little or no oxygen ever present

No explosive risk

Oct. 26, 2006 10

Actual Radiological Consequences

Noble gases released 2.5 MCi Radioiodines released 15 Ci

Max probable off site Dose 100 mrem Downtown Harrisburg dose rate 15 mrem/hr Airborne level over stack- 1200 mrem/hr Collective 50 mile dose – 2400 manrem Max Occupational Dose – 4 Rem

Oct. 26, 2006 11

What you need to What you need to learn from TMIlearn from TMI

Don’t become a complacent organization

Assure accurate, complete and timely information available

Elected Officials have ultimate responsibility

Put credible technical source on the firing line

Prepare systematic Public Information program

Oct. 26, 2006 12

SpokespersonGuidelines:

Be Candid

Admit uncertainties exist

Act on best estimate of situation

Be Non-Judgmental

Refrain from making “value judgments”

Don’t point fingers

Maintain Credibility

Don’t speculate

Be accurate, honest and reasonable

Oct. 26, 2006 13

Aegis of PresidentUnexpected but invaluable

President’s micro-management style bypassed hierarchy

Presidential involvement resulted in unparalleled Federal cooperation

Oct. 26, 2006 14

Obstacles to Obstacles to SuccessSuccess Decision making

may be more bureaucratic

Sheer numbers of reporters today

Media no better informed

Public more risk adverse

Less Presidential Involvement

Oct. 26, 2006 15

Contrasts in Federal Contrasts in Federal Response to TMI and Response to TMI and KatrinaKatrina

Massive communication failures

Presidential leadership lacking

No principal official No Federal

spokesperson Bureaucracy

overwhelmed

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