ocket diablo nuclear plant, unit pacific · 2017. 3. 27. · accelerated d1stpjputi0>...

ACCELERATED D1STPjPUTI0> O'Z,MONSTR4+N SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

',ACCESSION NBR:8812060117 DOC.DATE: 88/11/29 NOTARIZED: NO 'OCKETFACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275

50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga 05000323AUTH;NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

SHIFFER,J.D. - Pacific Gas & Electric Co.RECIP.NAME REC1PIENT AFFILIATION gZDocument Control Branch (Document Control Desk) S R

SUBJECT: Forwards info omitted from 881028 submittal re PRA performedas part of LTSP & addi PRA documentation.

DDISTRIBUTION CODE: D031D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ( ENCL J SIZE: 'ZTITLE: Diablo Canyon Long-Term Seismic Program 8

NOTES

RECIPIENTID CODE/NAME

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NOPE TO ALL "RIDS!'ECIPIENZS:

PIZASE HELP US TO REZVCE WASTE.'GPZACZ 'THE DOCUMEÃZ CCÃHKL DESKSBOOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) KO IZZlGXATE YOUR NAME FMH DISTEHEPZIGNLISTS FOR DOCK%HIS YOU DGNiT NEEDf

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Pacific Gas and Etectric'Company 77 Beate Street

San Francisco, CA 94106

415/972.7000TWX 910 372 6587

OJames D. Shiffer

Vice President

Nuclear Power Generation

November 29, 1988

PGtmrE Letter No. DCL-88-285

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

Long Term Seismic Program - Probabi listic Risk Assessment

Gentlemen:

PGhE letter DCL-88-260, dated October 28, 1988, transmitteddocuments related to the Diablo Canyon probabi listi c riskassessment (PRA) performed as part of the Long Term SeismicProgram. Three diagrams related to the high pressure injectionsystem were inadvertently omitted from the enclosure to DCL-88-260.These diagrams are included in Enclosure 1 and should be insertedfollowing page E.4-95 of the >enclosure to DCL-88-260.

In DCL-88-260, PGitE stated that additional PRA documentation wouldbe submitted in November 1988. Enclosure 2 provides the requestedPRA documentation for the low pressure injection system. As agreedupon between PG&E and the Staff on November 28, 1988, the auxiliarysaltwater system documentation will be submitted by December 9, 1988.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy ofthis letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerel

3. D. Shi er

cc w/encls: M. Bohn, SNLN. ChokshiR. Fitzpatrick, BNLV. B. MartinP. P. Narbut

cc wo/encls: M. M. MendoncaB. NortonH. RoodB. H. VoglerCPUCDiablo Distribution

2409S/0065K/GCW/1587

83i2060i17'8ii29PDR ADOCK 05000275P PDC

pos

PGIEE Letter No. DCL-88-285

ENCLOSURE 1

The following three diagrams were omitted from the enclosure to DCL-88-260,dated October 28, 1988. The diagrams should be inserted after page E.4-95 ofthe enclosure to DCL-88-260.

ws~lJJAJ JVL%

Rec'd w/ltr ll/29/88....8812060117

2409S/0065K/

TOP EVENT CH COMPONENTSNOTE: BLOCKS D B E A MODEL CCW VALVES

TO THE PUMP PACKAGE COOLERS»

REGEH HEAT EXCHANGER VOLUHE CONTROL TAHX

RCSLOOP I

RC$LOOP 2

8 004 88104

e oos e 1 s 68014

H4107 H

8108 H

547

H LCV 1125

H LCV 112C

8840

COHTA) HHEIITSI»RAY

ACEI-I

RC$LOOI'

RCSLOOP 4

8900C 681 C

89000 ed 1 00

6 18A

ee2o

6 018

880 4

F

5 8 4 847$ CH I-J84T A 6 '94

8 6 4 84184

e4795

83944

692 ~

660 A

880 B

8 741

H8608A

8 56A

RCSLOOP I

8 19A 822A

860 8

G83948 E

6 698 84788

8 0 A

eoA

ACC1-2

ACC1-4

H4406D

RCSL~ 69 ~ 60 68190 8220

8 180

HRCS

Hol'EGS1,2 860 A 8921A

882 IA

8922A

89194

69204

Sl I-I8 2 A

560 B

92

Hbdobs

8 $ 60 8 185

RCS

8 4be 6 19e ebes 83

H H

69748 974ARWST

8977 976

6 565

ACCI-3

H8604C

RCS

6 46C 6419C d22C

6 16C

8920586218H

RCSHOT LEGS

89198

3,4 680 8 8 21B 6 228 SI 1-29238

H 88045

8956C

PRl'656A

C,S. HEAOER J,4

CCV 365 CCH HDR A

C.S. HEADER 2.4

RCSHOT

8 40A

RCSNOT

d 408

70

8 09A871 ANCV 638

LE TO(WHHEAT

EXCHANGER67168

87J4A

8734BCCV 641A

CCV 364

624

CCHHOR 8

8 28725A

8725B

73oARHR I I 6 0 A H

98 I 960RCS LOOP

NOT LEG8701 70 REC)RC

CONT 5UHP

8 0 8 PRT NCV 63T

66565

CCV 641B

828 828RNR 1-2 408

PRT870

SCREENSbbA

H

888

1160, 130)bdl957»E99 II-28-dd AL DIAGRAM E.4-I

1

N'

1

h'

SN

111

TOP EVENT SL - COMPONENTSNOTE: BLOCKS B 6 C A MODEL CCM VALVES

TO THE PUMP PACKAGE COOLERS.

REGEN HEAT EYCHANGER VOLUHE CONIROL TAHA HVST

RCSLOOP I 8 ooA 8 I A

RC5L~2 800S 6 I S 8 OIA

dl01 H

blob H

47

H LCV II28

H LCV II2C

8840

CON TA INHEN1SPRAY

RCSLOO' 8900C BBIOC

8 OIB

6 664 6415 CH I-3

5479A 924

6 0 A

ACCI-I

H6606A

RC5LOOP 4 89000 db I 00

d IdA

RCS E894bA 65lgA 522A

680 A

5 5 A 5415A8394A

CH I-Ie4798

63948

8 0 8

80A

8 56A

ACCI-4 RCS

LOOP 4 69450 bdlgo 8220

680 85 sge e47ss

CH I 80A

92

ACCl-2

H66088

H88080

8 560RCS

LOOP 2 8 455

66 I 80

68 I 85

SSI95 8228

RCSHOT LEGS ~

I,2 860 A

H 0

83

8922A

592IA bglgA882 I A

8920A

Sl I-I

p

59146 914A

6 2 A860 S

977 976

8 568

ACCI-3 RCS

LOOP 3G

BSI9C d22C

HRCS

HOT LEGSddo 8

882 IS8920B

59 les

8 2IB 8 228 SI I-29238

C

N8805C

8956C

65 I6C

C.S. HEAOER 3. 4

dd048

CoSr HEADER 2.4

RCSNOT

2 8 408

70

RCSHOT H

5 4OA

PRTH

6656A

ddo 487 I A

HCV 636

LETOOVNHEAT

EXCHANGER67 I 68

8134A

81348

SCV 365 CCH HOR A

5 2

FC 64IAPCV 364 D'OR 8

81258

824 13045125A RHR I I SO A

RCS LOOP ~HOT LEG

70I 70 RECIRC

CONT SUHP

6 0 S PRT HCV 631

68568

<CV 64IB

8 2 8 8 2 8 T308RHR l-2 8 0 8

PRT870

SCREEHSSBA

H

8 8 8

I I60e I30366I951eE99 I I-26-bd VHL DIAGRAM E. 4-2

1,

t Ig

1

I 'l f

TOP EVENTS HR, RF PER COMPONENTS

REGEH NEAT ETCRAHGER VOLIP(E CO((TROL TARR

ACCI-I

Neeoel

~ 51A

ACCI 8

ACCI-tII8808D

RCS

8 ol 1(ARCS

~ oe 1(8

RCS

8 OOC 81( C

RCS

8 ooo 88( o

8 (elRCSL~ —

~ ~ el 1 (9A 822A

RCSL~ 8 ~ ibo el(9O 8220

4 Ido

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1 0(A

8 0(b

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eeo l

~ Iof N

8(08 N

880 A

810 8

8922A

8 2(A 19(ll882(A

8920A

839AB8 498 8 F 188

CII I 2

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~ 1

8 1 l eif54(f l

8 91A4 89A 8 ~ 1 ~ l

CRI Ideaf 8 bifeb

N

892A

8 0

804

N J

col

8101 K

II LCV l(2$

II LCV l(tC8810

CO((f~ I NNEHTSPRAT

G

8 0 l

925

I(88048

~ 560RCS

LOOP 2 8 ~ 88

4 Ieb

8 (98 1228 d5

C

118 ~l911 916

~ 544

ACCI-3

II8 dole

~ 56C

RcjLOOP S ill9C 122C

1 IbC

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((Of LEGSS,i ~ 0 4 8 2(b 8 22b

Ce5 ~ HEADER 5 A

89208

89 I 98

Sl I 292 8

N 84044 H

C S READER 2,8

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I 1 ~ ol

RCSNOTt ~ < 4

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845ll

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4TSIB

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NOR b81258

TCV 565 CC(( NOR A

150 lRk 0 A

RCS LOOP 8NOT LEG

10 I 10 REC IRC

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PR'T

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SCREENS8 d A

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f(eoe()ofdd(9$ 1 899 II 24 11 (A(L

884

01AGRAM E.4-3

PG&E Letter No. DCL-88-285

ENCLOSURE 2

Appendix E.5 — Emergency Core Cooling System — Low Pressure Functions

2409S/0065K/

0Jhl

'1 '

E.5 EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEH — LOH PRESSURE FUNCTIONS

E.5.1 ANALYSIS DEFINITION

The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is designed to remove the decay

heat from the reactor core following an accident. To meet this

requirement, the ECCS must function in several modes of operation. Two of

these modes are low pressure in]ection (LPI) and low pressure

recirculation (LPR). For the details of the system features and

operations of the LPI and LPR functions of the ECCS, see the system

summary file ECCLP.SUH, Figure E.5-1. The ECCS is analyzed for its

ability to provide emergency core cooling in response to plant initiating

events and RCS depressurization.

E.5.1.1 Event Definition and Success Criteria~ ~ ~

Top Events LA, LB, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and HU are analyzed as part of

the low pressure function of the ECCS. These top events appear in the

early and late frontline event trees.

Top Events LA and LB model the availability of low pressure RHR pump

trains l-l and 1-2, respectively. These two top events are symmetrical

with respect to the components modeled for each pump train.

Success of Top Event LA or LB requires the respective RHR pump to start

and run for 24 hours. A second start of the RHR pumps is also required

0019D E. 5-1

J.C

k

yl

since these pumps are tripped by the operator a short time after a safety

injection signal to protect the pumps from overheating in the

recirculation mode in those cases for which the RCS pressure remains high.

The miniflow valves must operate until the operators trip the pumps.

Top Event LV models the common RHR pump suction line from the RHST. This

normally open line is required to inject the RHST inventory into the RCS

via the RHR pumps. Success of Top Event LV requires that normally open

MOV 8980 not transfer closed during the period after the previous test and

before the initiating event or close during the 24 hours following the

event and that check valve 8981 opens on demand and remains open for

24 hours.

Top Event RH models the availability of the RHST. Success of Top Event RW

requires that the RHST remain intact and the manual valve on the RHST

discharge line, common to the suction of the charging, safety injection,

and RHR pumps, not transfer closed during the period after the previous

test and before the initiating event or close during the 24 hours

following the event.

Top Events VA and VB model containment .sump valves 8982A and 89828,

respectively. Success of Top Event VA requires that motor-operated

valve 8982A open on demand and remain open for 24 hours. Motor-operated

valves 8982A and 8700A are interlocked in such a way that 8982A cannot be

opened until 8700A has been closed; therefore, success of Top Event VA

requires that MOV 8700A close on demand. The same success criteria apply

to Top Event VB with respect to valves 8982B and 87008.

00190 E.5-2

I p

rtf

Top Event AC models the accumulators and the four RHR cold leg injection

lines. This top event appears only 1n the large LOCA event tree. The

accumulators and injection lines are modeled together because they share

common check valves in the injection lines. Three of three accumulators

injecting to the RCS, when RCS pressure has decreased sufficiently, and

the avai labi lity of one of the three cold leg inject1on 11nes are required

for success. The fourth accumulator and RHR injection line are assumed to

correspond to the broken loop of the RCS and are therefore not taken

credit for in the analysis of this top event.

Top Event LI appears 1n the general transient and the large LOCA event

trees. In the general transient event tree, Top Event LI models the

availability of three RHR injection lines to the RCS cold legs where the

fourth 1njection 11ne is assumed unavailable. In the large LOCA event

tree, Top Event LI is only asked for sequences when Top Event AC has

fa11ed. In this case, the split fraction used for Top Event LI is the

conditional probability that none of the RHR injection lines are

available, given that Top Event AC has failed, assuming that one of the

four injection lines is not available due to the p1pe break.

For the steam generator tube rupture initiat1ng event, Top Event HU is

used to model the avai lab11ity of the suction line from RCS hot leg 4 to

the RHR pumps for closed loop RHR cooling. Success of Top Event HU

requires operator action to open the suction 11ne. Both motor-operated

valves 8701 and 8702 must open on demand and remain open for 24 hours.

0019D E.5-3

'I "

Ay4

For all other initiating events, Top Event HU also models the likelihood

of providing makeup water to the RWST from the spent fuel pool via the

spent fuel pit pump. This function also requires operator action.

E.5. 1.2 System Equipment Boundaries

A complete list of all the equipment included for analysis of Top

Events LA, LB, LV, RW, VA, VB, AC, LI, and HU is presented in

Table E.5-1. A summary of the equipment modeled for each top event

is included here.

The equipment boundaries for Top Event LA include the flow path from RHR

pump l-l suction valve 8700A extending to and including the RHR heat

exchanger for train A. This flow path includes the suction valve, the RHR

pump and discharge check valve, two normally open manual isolation valves,

and the heat exchanger. The pump miniflow valve and the manual valves

that allow component cooling water flow to the RHR pump are also modeled

in Top Event LA.

The equipment boundaries for Top Event LB are the same as those, described

for Top Event LA, except for RHR train B instead of train A.

The equipment modeled in Top Event LV consists of the normally open

motor-operated valve 8980 and check valve 8981. These valves are located

on the common suction line from the RWST to both RHR pump trains.

0019D E.5-4

I

g4

lg

A~ I

; I

The equipment modeled in the analysis of Top Event RH includes the RHST

and the sealed open manual valve on the discharge of the RHST. This

manual valve is common to the suction of all the ECCS pumps.

The equipment modeled in Top Event VA includes the sump suction valve for

RHR train A (8982A) and RHR train A suction valve from the RHST (8700A).

The same valves, corresponding to RHR train B, are modeled in Top

Event VB.

The equipment boundaries for Top Event AC include the accumulator tanks,

the motor-operated valve and check valve on the discharge of each

accumulator to the cold leg injection lines, and the check valves in the

cold leg injection lines common to the accumulator injection flow path and

the RHR cold leg injection flow path. Top Event AC also includes the

remainder of the RHR injection lines to the RCS cold legs, beginning at

the discharge of the RHR heat exchangers. This includes control valve 638

and motor-operated valve 8809A on the discharge line from RHR train A to

cold leg injection lines 1 and 2 and control valve 637 and motor-operated

valve 88098 on the discharge line from RHR train B to cold leg injection

lines 3 and 4. There,is also an additional check valve modeled in each of

the cold leg injection lines from the RHR pumps that is not common to the

accumulator injection paths (i.e., 8818 A, B, C, D).

The equipment boundaries for Top Event LI are the same as those for Top

Event AC except that Top Event LI does not include the accumulators or the

motor-operated valve and check valves on the discharge of each accumulator

to the cold leg injection lines.

0019D E.5-5

l p

~ 4

II

The equipment modeled in the analysis of Top Event HU consists of

motor-operated valves 8701 and 8702. These valves appear in series on the

common RHR pump suction line from RCS hot leg 4. The spent fuel pit pump

is also modeled in Top Event HU under boundary conditions requiring makeup

to the RHST from the spent fuel pool.

E.5. 1.3 Initial Conditions and Analysis Boundary Conditions

The normal operating conditions of the systems involved in the modeling of

Top Events LA, LB, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and HU are discussed in this

section. The support systems that impact the availability of these top

events are also discussed. For a complete list of the boundary conditions

and split fractions quantified for these top events, refer to fileECCLP.CRT presented as Figure E.5-2. The boundary conditions define the

operability of support systems that impact the equipment unavailability

analyzed in the top events.

E.5.1.3.1 Top Events LA and LB

During normal plant operation, the RHR pumps are in standby mode. The RHR

system is aligned to take suction from the,RHST and discharge to the RCS

cold legs.

The support systems considered in the boundary conditions for Top

Events LA and LB are the vital 4,160V AC buses, the vital 480V AC buses,

the vital 125V DC buses, the instrument channels, and the component

0019D E. 5-6

cooling water supply. The boundary conditions for Top Event LB are similar to

that for top event LA but are also dependent on the status of Top Event LA.

E.5.1.3.2 Top Event LV

During normal operation, the RHR system is aligned to take suction from

the RHST. The motor-operated valve (8980) modeled in Top Event LV is open

during normal operation. The availability of Top Event LV is not

dependent on the status of any support systems.

E.5.1.3.3 Top Event RW

Top Event RH is a passive top event, meaning that no component modeled in

Top Event RH needs to change state for the success of Top Event RH. The

status of the support systems does not impact the availability of Top

Event RH.

E.5.1.3.4 Top Events VA and VB

The containment sump suction valves (8982A and 8982B) are closed during

normal plant operation. The opening of these valves and success of Top

Events VA and VB depends on the availability of 480V buses 1G and lH,

respectively.

0019D E.5-7

E.5.1.3.5 Top Event AC~ ~ ~ ~

The analysis of Top Event AC does not depend on the status of the support

systems. The accumulators are normally aligned to inject into the RCS

when RCS pressure has decreased, and the RHR pumps are also normally

aligned to inject to'he RCS.

E.5.1.3.6 Top Event LI

All motor-operated valves modeled in Top Event LI are open during normal

plant operation. The only active components modeled in Top Event LI are

the check valves. Therefore, the analysis of Top Event LI does not depend

on the status of the support systems.

E.5.1.3.7 Top Event HU~ ~ ~

During normal plant operation, motor-operated valves 8701 and 8702 are

closed. Valves 8701 and 8702 require power from 480V buses 1G and 1H,

respectively, to open. Failure of either of these power sources

constitutes failure of Top Event HU. Spent fuel pit pump ll requires

power from 480V bus 1G.

E.5. 2 HODEL DESCRIPTION

0019D E.5-8

1 1 ' 4

l

E.5.2.1 Logic Model~ ~ ~

A schematic model of the ECCS system is shown in Diagram E.5-1. This diagram

identifies the supercomponents for each top event used in the development of

the reliability models. A discussion of each top event follows.

The reliability block diagram for Top Event LA is shown in Figure E.5-3.

A detailed list of components in each block and the associated failure

modes are presented in Table E.5-1. Components are grouped into blocks so

that the fai lure of any component in the block constitutes fai lure of the

'lock.The support systems required for each block are shown in the

ovals, with arrows pointing to the respective blocks. The components

modeled for Top Event LA were grouped into three blocks.

Based on the reliability block diagram, a block-level fault tree was

developed. The block-level fault tree for Top Event LA is shown in

Figure E.5-4. This fault tree defines failure of the top event in terms

of failure of the blocks. The block-level fault tree can be expanded to

show the dependent failures of the blocks, as well as the independent

failures. The expanded block-level fault tree for Top Event LA is

presented in Figure E.5-5. Dependent failures are modeled for the

RHR pump start and run failure modes, failure of the miniflow valves, and

failure of the RHR pump discharge check valves to open. These

dependent failures fail Top Events LA and LB. The dependency across top

events is handled in the quantification of Top Event LB.

0019D E.5-9

The reliability block diagram, block-level fault tree, and the expanded

block-level fault tree for Top Event LB are presented in Figures E.5-6,

E.5-7, and E.5-8, respectively.

The reliability block diagram for Top Event LV presented in Figure E.5-9

consists of a single block. Top Event LV is asked in the event trees only

when the RHR pumps must in)ect the RHST inventory into the RCS. The

block-level fault tree for Top Event LV is shown in Figure E.5-10. No

dependent failure modes are modeled for the components included in Top

Event LV; therefore, no expanded block level fault tree is presented.

The reliability block diagram for Top Event RH is presented in

Figure E.5-11. Top Event RW questions the availability of the RWST as a

sdction source for the ECCS pumps. The block-level fault tree for Top

Event RH is shown in Figure E.5-12. No dependent failure modes are

modeled for the components included in Top Event RW; therefore, no

expanded block-level fault tree is presented.

The reliability block diagram for Top Event VA is shown in Figure E.5-13.

Block A contains the motor-operated suction valve for RHR pump l-l, and

block B contains the RHR pump 1-1 containment sump suction valve. These

two valves are interlocked in such a way that the RHST suction valve must

close before the containment sump suction valve can be opened. The

block-level fault tree for Top Event VA is shown in Figure E.5-14. The

expanded block-level fault tree for Top Event VA is presented in

Figure E.5-15. Dependent failures are modeled for the failure to close of

0019D E.5-10

,~ '

t

the RHST suction valves (8700A and 8700B) and the failure to open of the

containment sump suction valves (8982A and 8982B). Valves 8700B and 89828

are modeled in Top Event VB. The dependent failures of valves 8700A and

8700B or 8982A and 89828 fail both trains of containment sump suction, Top

Events VA and VB. This dependency across top events is handled in the

quantification of Top Event VB. The reliability block diagram, block-level

fault tree, and the expanded block-level fault tree for Top Event VB are

presented in Figures E.5-16, E.5-17, and E.5-18, respectively.

The reliability block diagram for Top Event AC is presented in

Figure E.5-19. Success of Top Event AC requires three of three

accumulators to in)ect to the RCS and one of three cold leg injection

lines from the RHR pumps to the RCS to be available. The fourth

accumulator and the fourth in)ection line from the RHR pumps are assumed

to in)ect into the ruptured RCS cold leg. This assumption is slightly

conservative for non-LOCA initiating events but simplifies the analysis of

Top Event AC by reducing the number of split fractions that need to be

quantified. The block-level fault tree for Top Event AC is shown in

Figure E.5-20. The block-level fault tree illustrates that the top event

will fail if any of the accumulators or related valves fail or if all

three of the cold leg in)ection lines from the RHR pumps fail. Dependent

failures were included for the second-off check valves (8818A, 8818B,

8818C, and 8818D) on the RHR cold leg in]ection lines. Dependent failures

for check valves 8948A through 8948D were included in the independent

failure rate for the check valves since failure of any one of these valves

is sufficient to fail the system. The expanded block-level fault tree for

Top Event AC is shown in Figure E.5-21.

0019D E.5-11

f

P

I

N, dp

The reliability block diagram for Top Event LI is presented in

Figure E.5-22. Success of Top Event LI requires one of three cold leg

injection lines from the RHR pumps to the RCS to be available. As was

the case in Top Event AC, the fourth injection line from the RHR pumps is

assumed to inject into a ruptured RCS cold leg. This assumption

simplifies the analysis of Top Event LI by reducing the number of splitfractions that need to be quantified and is only slightly conservative for

non-LOCA initiating events. The block-level fault tree for Top Event LI

is shown in Figure E.5-23. The expanded block-level fault tree for Top

Event LI is shown in Figure E.5-24. Dependent failures were modeled for

two groups of check valves. These two groups consist of the first and

second-off RCS check valves on the RHR cold leg injection lines, 8948A

through 8948D and 8818A through 8818D, respectively.k

The reliability block diagram for Top Event HU is presented in

Figure E.5-25. This diagram contains a single block of components. This

block consists of the two normally closed motor valves 8701 and 8702.

Both of these valves must open to establish closed loop RHR cooling. The

block-level fault tree for Top Event HU is shown in Figure E.5-26. The

dependent failures are included with the total failure rates for the

motor-operated valves since the failure of either valve is sufficient to

fail the the top event. For initiating events in which HU models the

likelihood of providing makeup to the RHST in addition to RHR closed loop

cooling, the block also includes spent fuel pit pump 11. The expanded

block-level fault tree for Top Event HU is identical to the block-level

fault tree presented in Figure E.5-26.

0019D E.5-12

E.5.2.2 Algebraic Model~ ~ ~

Algebraic models are used to quantify the unavailability of Top Events LA,

LB, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and MU for the boundary conditions presented

in Section E.5.1.3. These algebraic models are developed directly from

the expanded block-level fault trees presented in Section E.5.2.1. For

each boundary condition, a set of unavailability equations is developed

for the corresponding split fraction. The algebraic equations for each

split fraction are presented in the ECCLP equation file, ECCLP.EQS,

presented in Figure E.5-27.

The following component data base variables were used in the quantification of

the ECCS low pressure top events:

ZTHXRB — Heat exchanger — excessive leak, plugging

ZTPRHR

ZTPRHS

ZTTK1B

ZTVAOT

ZTVCOD

ZTVCOP

ZTVHOT

ZTVMOD

ZTVMOT

S2VMOC

S2VMOO

RHR pump fail to run

RHR pump fail to start

Storage tank, rupture during operation

Air operated valve transfer open/closed

Check valve (other than stop) — fail to operate on demand.

Check valve (other than stop) — transfers closed/plugged

Manual valve transfers closed/open

Motor operated valve - fail to operated on demand

Motor operated valve — transfer open/closed

1 of 2 motor operated valves fail to close on demand

1 of 2 motor operated valves fail to open on demand

0019D E. 5-13

D2VMOO - 2 of 2 motor operated valves fail to open on demand

S4VCOD — 1 of 4 check valves fail to open on demand

D4VCOD - 2 of 4 check valves fail to open on demand

T4VCOD — 3 of 4 check valves fail to open on demand

64VCOD — 4 of 4 check valves fail to open on demand

D2VCOD — 2 of 2 check valves fail to open on demand

D2PRHR — 2 of 2 RHR pumps fail to run

D2PRHS — 2 of 2 RHR pumps fail to start on demand

ZMGN9D — RHR heat exchanger maintenance duration (72 hr. tech. spec.)

ZMHXRF — RHR heat exchanger maintenance frequency

ZMPRHD — RHR pump maintenance duration

ZMPRHF — RHR pump maintenance frequency

ZMVBOD — ECCS system valves maintenance'duration

ZMVBOF — ECCS system valves maintenance frequency

ZHELAl - Operator action to stop RHR in the short term if RCS pressure is

high (during bleed and feed scenario)

ZHELA2 — Same as ZHELA1 except for small LOCA scenario

ZHEMUl - Operator action to initiate closed loop cooling and depressurize

RCS

ZHEMU2 — Operator action to reduce in)ection flow to RCS and provide makeup

to the RHST as an alternative to switching over to closed loop RHR

cooling or to recirculation from the containment sump.

0019D E.5-14

4t

J

» ~

The following seismic fai lures were modeled with Top Event RH:

ZRHSTK - Seismic failure of the refueling water storage tank

ZRHRPP — Seismic failure of the RHR pumps

ZCSPMP — Seismic failure of the containment spray pumps

ZBOPPS - Seismic failure of piping and supports (17 pipe segments with a

0.25 chance of pipe rupture given failure).

Seismic failures are included in the algebraic equation file for

quantification purpose. As already mentioned, of Top Events LA, LB, LV, RH,

VA, VB, AC, LI, and MU, only RH has a seismic contribution to unavailability

modeled explicitly in the equations presented in Figure E.5-27. The impact of

draining the RHST content caused by seismic failures of the RHST, RHR pumps,

containment spray pumps, or certain pipe segments in the RHR, containment

spray, and safety injection systems is modeled as failure of the RHST.

Failure of the RHR heat exchangers is modeled in the component cooling water

,, system.

E.5.2.2.1 Block Level Equations

This section presents the block-level top event failure equations for Top

Events LA,'B, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and MU.

E.5.2.2. 1.'1 Top Events LA and LB. The unavailability equations for Top

Events LA and LB are written in terms of the following variables:

P[LA3 single RHR train unavailability (train A).

HI[LAI + HD[LAB] + M[LA1 + HE[LAB]

0019D E.5-15

II

Vj"

C

P[LB3 single RHR train unavailability (train B).HI[LB] + HD[LAB] + M[LB3 + HE[LAB]

P[LAB] - probability of failing RHR trains A and B.

HI[LA3*(HI[LB]+ M[LB]) + HI[LB]*M[LA]+ HD[LAB] + HE[LAB]

where

HI[LA]M[LA]

HI [LB]

M[LB]

HO[LAB]

HE[LAB]

independent hardware failures, train A BKA + IBKB + BKC.

contributions due to maintenance, train A.

ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF + ZMGN9D*ZMHXRF + 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF

independent hardware failures, train B BKD + IBKE + BKF.

contributions due to maintenance, train B.

ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF + ZMGN9D*ZMHXRF + 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF

dependent hardware failures (fails trains A and B).D2PRHS*2 + D2PRHR*TM + D2VCOD + D2VMOO

operator fails to trip the RHR pumps fails RHR trains A

and B.

ZHELA2 (small LOCA case)

If common cause failures are modeled for a given block, such as blocks B

and E above, the block name is prefixed by an "I" indicating that thisblock represents only the unavailability due to independent failures ofcomponents in the block. The dependent failures for these blocks are

modeled explicitly in separate basi c events. This convention is used inthe algebraic representation of all the top events in this section. Allof the dependent failures listed in the unavailability equation for Top

Event LA involve failures of components in block B. Variable 02PRHS

represents the common cause failure of both RHR pumps to start on demand.

02PRHS is multiplied by a factor of 2 in the equation because success ofTop Events LA and LB require RHR pumps l-l and 1-2 to start twice.

The equation for the unavailability of Top Event LA, given all supportavailable, is

TOTAL P [LA]

0019D E. 5-16

Due to common cause failures that fail both Top Events LA and LB, the

quantification of Top Event LB split fractions is dependent on the status

of Top Event LA.

The unavailability equation for the all support available boundary

condition for Top Event LB with Top Event LA successful is

TOTAL (P[LB] — P[LAB])/(1 - P[LA])

The block-level equation for the all support available boundary condition

for Top Event LB with Top Event LA failed is

TOTAL P [LAB]/P [LA]

The unavailability equation for Top Event LB, given Top Event LA was not

asked (Top Event LA failed due to support system failure), is

TOTAL P [LB]

E.5.2.2.1.2 Top Event LV. The block-level equation for Top Event LV is

TOTAL BKA

The quantification of Top Event LV is not dependent on the status of

support systems. Therefore, this equation is applicable to all boundary

conditions.

00190 E. 5-17

\

t 4

1"

E.5.2.2.1.3 Top Event RW. The block-level equation for Top Event RW is~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

TOTAL BKA + BKB

Since the components modeled in Top Event RW are not dependent on any .

support systems, this equation applies to all boundary conditions.

E.5.2.2.1.4 Top Events VA and VB. The unavailability equations for Top

Events VA and VB are written in terms of the variables listed below:

P[VA] single train unavailability (train A).HI[VA] + HD[VAB] + M[VA]

P[VB] single train unavailability (train B).HI[VB] + HD[VAB] + M[VB]

P[VAB] - probability of failing trains A and B.HI[VA]*(HI[VB]+ M[VB]) + HI[VB]*M[VA]+ HD[VAB]

where

HI[VA] independent hardware failures, train A IBKA + IBKB.M[VA] contributions due to maintenance, train A 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF.HI[VB] independent hardware failures, train B IBKC + IBKD.M[VB] - contributions due to maintenance, train B 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF.HD[VAB] dependent hardware failures (fails trains A and B).

D2VMOO + D2VMOC.

The equation for the unavailability of Top Event VA, given all support

available, is

TOTAL M P[VA]

Due to common cause failures that fail both Top Events VA and VB, the

quantification of Top Event VB split fractions is dependent on the status

of Top Event VA.

0019D E. 5-18

CC

I'l\

'l~

The unavailability equation for the all support available boundary

condition for Top Event VB with Top Event VA successful is

TOTAL (P [VB] — P [VAB]) /(1 — P [VA])

The block-level equation for the all support available boundary condition

for Top Event VB with Top Event VA failed is

TOTAL P [VAB]/P [VA]

The unavailability equation for Top Event VB, given Top Event VA was not

asked (Top Event VA failed due to support system failure), is

TOTAL P [VB]

E.5.2.2.1.5 Top Event AC. The block-level equation applicable to all

boundary conditions for Top Event AC is

TOTAL [(IBKG*IBKH)+ BKB + BKD]*(BKA+ BKC + IBKF) + BKJ + BKK

+ BKL + BKN + BKO + BKP

The cutsets involving the dependent failures of blocks F, G, and H are

listed in Figure E.5-27, the ECCLP.EQS file. The components modeled in

Top Event AC are not dependent on the availability of support systems.

Therefore, only one split fraction needs to be quantified for Top

Event AC.

0019D E.5-19

E.5.2.2.1.6 Top Event LI. The block-level equation for the all support~ ~ ~ ~ ~

available boundary condition for Top Event LI is

TOTAL ~ (BKB + BKD)*(BKA+ BKC + IBKF + IBK3) + ((IBKG + IBKK)+ (IBKH + IBKL))*(BKA+ BKC + IBKF + IBKQ)

The cutsets involving the dependent failures of blocks F, G, and H and

blocks 3, K, and L are listed in Figure E.5-27, the ECCLP.EQS file.

E.5.2.2.1.7 Top Event MU. The block-level equation for the all support

available boundary condition for Top Event HU is

TOTAL HUBKA (split fraction HUl)

TOTAL - MUBKB (split fraction HU2)

Block A represents the failure to open or failure to remain open of

motor-operated valves 8701 and 8702. If the support for either of these

valves is not available, Top Event MU is a guaranteed failure. Successful

operator action is also required for success of Top Event MU. Human

actions are discussed in Section E.5.2.2.3. For boundary conditions that

require makeup to the RHST, block B models the failure of the spent fuel pit

pump to start and run, failure of a check valve to open, manual valves

transferring from open to closed or closed to open, and strainer plugging.

E.5.2.2.2 Test and Maintenance Contributions to ECCS Failure

The test and maintenance contributions to the unavailability of Top

Events LA, LB, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and HU are discussed in this

0019D E.5-20

1

,I ~

section. The impact on the availability of these top events due to tests

performed on ECCS systems was considered insignificant and was not

modeled in the quantification of these top events for the following reasons:

The RHR pumps are tested quarterly in the pump recirculation miniflow mode.

The alignment of the RHR system during the test is the same as during power

operation; therefore, this test does not contribute to the unavailability of

the RHR system.

Stroke testing of motor-operated valves in the ECCS subsystems is

performed periodically but is assumed insignificant to system

unavailability due to the short duration of these tests. Other tests that

alter the ECCS system alignment include functional testing of ECCS check

valves, check valve leak tests, and ECCS flow balancing, but these tests

are performed during refueling outages or at cold shutdown and have an

insignificant chance to impact the ECCS during power operation.

The unscheduled valve maintenance data collected at the plant from

Hay 1985 through June 1986 show maintenance is done without isolating the

valve. Therefore, unscheduled valve maintenance in the ECCS was modeled

under the assumption that the valve under consideration is positioned open

or closed, depending on the technical specification requirements for the

system, but was not isolated from the rest of the system. Valves are

assumed to be in the worst possible position allowed by the technical

specifications. In the case of all the valves listed below, the valve is

assumed to be closed when maintenance on the valve is being performed.

The following list shows the valves that were modeled under maintenance

configurations for each top event.

00190 E.5-21

I

d'*

v n

LALALBLBVAVBACACACACACACACLILILILIHU

HU

HOV 8700AFCV 641AHOV 8700BFCV 6418MOV 8982AMOV 8982BMOV 8809AHOV 8809BHCV 638HCV 637HOV 8808BHOV 8808CHOV 8808DHOV 8809AHOV 8809BHCV 638HCV 637HOV 8701HOV 8702

RHR pump and RHR heat exchanger maintenance are also included as part of

the quantification of Top Events LA and LB. Top Events LA and LB were

analyzed for unavailability under maintenance configurations for the

following components: RHR pumps l-l and 1-2, the heat exchangers on

trains A and B, and motor-operated valves 8700A and 8700B and 641A

and 641B.

The maintenance contribution to the unavailability of Top Event LV and RH was

considered to be insignificant. Any maintenance performed on HOV 8980 or the

RHST outlet valve that lasted more than 1 hour would be a technical

specification violation since it would disable both RHR trains. Haintenance

on this valve would require the plant to be shut down.

0019D E.5-22

I

,I,I tg4

I 1

tl

It

Top Events VA and VB were analyzed for unavailability due to maintenance

performed on motor-operated valves 8982A and 8982B.

The quantifications of both Top Events AC and LI included unavailability

contributions due to maintenance on valves 8809A, 8809B, 637, and 638.

Top Event AC also includes contributions due to maintenance on the

accumulator isolation valves 8808A, 8808B, 8808C, and 8808D.-

Maintenance on motor-operated valves 8701 and 8702 was included in the

unavailability analysis of Top Event MU.

E.5.2.2.3 Human Error Contributions

Success of Top Events LA, LB, and MU require successful operator actions.

For success of Top Events LA and LB, the operator must trip the RHR pumps

to prevent the pumps from overheating when the RCS is at high pressure.

This operator action is not required for large and medium LOCA initiatingevents since the RCS would depressurize rapidly. The quantification of

Top Event MU includes an operator action to align the RHR pump suction to

RCS hot leg 4 to establish RHR closed-loop cooling and an operator action

to transfer water from the spent fuel pool to the RHST.

E.5.3 QUANTIFICATIONS, RESULTS, AND CONCLUSIONS

The results of the quantification of the split fractions for ECCS Top

Events LA, LB, LV, RH, VA, VB, AC, LI, and MU can be found in the cause~ I

0019D E.5-23

.jt

f

l

'h

1

I

table (file ECCHP.CTS) presented as Table E.5-2. For each split fraction,

the total unavailability is listed, as well as a breakdown of the total in

terms of the contributions from independent and dependent hardware

failures, human errors, and unavailability due to maintenance events.

The top contributors to the unavailability of a single RHR train (Top

Event LA or LB) are independent hardware failures, dominated by RHR pump

failures, and RHR pump maintenan'ce, followed by the failure of the

operator to trip the RHR pumps when the RCS is at high pressure. The

failure of both RHR trains is dominated by failure of the operator to tripthe RHR pumps, followed by dependent hardware failures that contribute

less than 10K to the RHR system unavailability. For large or medium LOCA

initiating events, there is no contribution from human errors; therefore,

the failure of two trains is dominated by the dependent failures of the

RHR pumps to start and run for 24 hours.

The model for Top Event LV consists of motor-operated valve 8980 and check

valve 8981. The leading contributor to the unavailability of Top

Event LV, at about 7(C of the total, is the failure of check valve 8981 to

open on demand. MOV 8980 or check valve 8981 transferring closed

constitutes the rest of the unavailability for Top Event LV.

The dominant contributor to the unavailability of the RWST (Top Event RW)

is the failure of the manual valve on the outlet of the RWST to remain

open. This failure mode contributes over 90K of the total unavailabilityof Top Event RW. The remaining contribution comes from the failure of the

RWST integrity.

00190 E.5-24

'J

*

,%»

I'

The top contributors to the unavailability of a single containment sump

suction train (Top Event VA or VB) are independent motor-operated valve

failures and valve maintenance. The independent failures account for

about 85'X of the total, and the valve maintenance events contribute

about 14K. The failure of both containment sump suction trains is

dominated by common cause events involving the failure to open by

HOVs 8982A and 8982B or the fai lure of valves 8700A and 8700B to close.

The unavailability of Top Event AC is dominated by independent hardware

failures. Due to the three out of three accumulator success criteria for

Top Event AC, there are numerous single-event cutsets involving the

independent failure of accumulators, failure of check valves to open and

remain open, and failure of manual valves to remain open.

The leading contributors to the unavailability of Top Event LI are

unscheduled valve maintenance events and independent hardware failures.

Most of the hardware failures are due to the check valves on the cold leg

in)ection lines.

The unavailability of Top Event MU is contributed by the failures ofHOVs 8701 and 8702 to open, the operator action to establish closed-loopRHR cooling, and unscheduled maintenance of HOV. For boundary conditionsrequiring makeup to the RHST, the operator action to transfer water from

the spent fuel pool to the RHST and the failure of the spent fuel pit pump tostart and run contribute about 70'L and 30'L, respectively, to theunavailability of Top Event HU.

The results of the seismic quantification are presented in Appendix J, Tables

3-37, J-38, J-39, J-40, J-41, and 3-42. Only the values for the splitfraction totals are presented.

0019D E.5-25

TABLE E.5-1. ECCLP. TABLE

LIST OF COMPONENTS IN BLOCK DIAGRAMS - ECCS SYSTEM(LP)Sheet 1 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR CCHPONENTS

(NAME AND ID NO.) FAILURE )g)DE

FUNCTIONAL ANDENVIRONMENTAL

'UPPORTSYSTEMSACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOHPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOMER

POSITION

TOP EVENT Lh(RHR PUMP TRAIN h STARTS AND RUNS FOR 24 HOURS)

Hotor OperatedValve 8700ARHR Pump11Suction fzom the RMST

Transfer closed2TVHOT

480V AC Bus 1G Open NormallyOpen

hs is

Residual HeatRemoval Pump 11

Fail to startZTPRES

Fail to zunZTPRHR

4160V Bus G

SSPS Train BCCM Header h125V DC Bus 12

Runnin8 Standby Off

Check Valve 8730hRHR Pump 11 Discharge

Fail to openZTVCODTransfer closedZTVCOP

None Open Closed Nh

Hanual Valve 8728ARHR Pump 11 Discharge

Transfer closedZTVHOT

None Open SealedOpen

Nh

Hotor OperatedFCV 641ARHR Pump 11 Recirc.Line Control Valve

Fail to openZTVHODTzansfer closedZTV)%T

480V AC Bus 1G OpenInstr. Channel II

Closed hs Is

Manual Valve 1-460CCM Valve for SealMater Cooler


None Open Open Nh

Manual Valve 1-462CCM Valve for SealMater Cooler

Tzansfer closedZTVHOT

None Open SealedOpen

Nh

Manual Valve 8724hRHR Pump 11 Discharge


None Open LockedOpen

Nh

RHR Pump 11 HeatExchanger Fice Path

Plugged/Gross leakage NoneZTHXRB

Available Intact NA

E.5-26

TABLE E.5-1. (continued)

Sheet 2 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR CCMPONENTS

(NAME AND ID NO.) FAILURE t%>DE

FUNCTIONAL ANDENVIRONMENTALSUPPORT SYSTEMS

INITIAL LOSS OFACTUATED CQGQNENT POWER

POSITION STATE POSITION

TOP EVENT LB(RHR PUMP TRAIN B STARTS AND RUNS FOR 24 BOURS)

Motor OperatedValve 8700BRHR Pump12Suction from the RWST

Transfer closedZTVMOT

480V AC Bus 1H Open NormallyOpen

hs is

Residual HeatRemoval Pump 12

Check Valve 8730BRHR Pump 12 Discharge

Fail to startZTPRHSFail to zunZTPRHR


4160V Bus HSSPS Train hCCW Header B125V DC Bus 13

None

Running

Open

Standby

Closed

Off

Nh

Manual Valve 8728BRHR Pump 12 Discharge

Motor OperatedFCV 641BRHR Pump 12 Recirc.Line Control Valve

Manual Valve 1-153CCW Valve for SealWater Cooler


Fail to openZTVM3DTransfer closedZTVM3T


None Open

None

480V AC Bus 1H OpenInstr. Channel III

SealedOpen

Closed

Open

Nh

hs is

Nh

Manual Valve 1-154CCW Valve for SealWater Cooler


None SealedOpen

NA

F Manual Valve 872kBRHR Pump 12 Dischazge



Nh

RHR Pump 12 HeatExchanger Flow Path

Plugged/Gross leakage NoneZTHXRB

Available Intact Nh

TOP EVENT LV((XRIRN SUCTION FROM THE RWST TO BOTH RBR PUMPS)

A Motor OperatedValve 8980

Transfer closed2TVM3T

480V AC Bus 1F Open Normally As isOpen(Po~er

E.5-27


Sheet 3 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR COMPONENTS

(NAME AND ID NO.) FAILURE HODE

FUNCTIONAL ANDENVIRONMENTALSUPPORT SYSTEHS

ACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOMPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOWER

POSITION

RHR Pumpll & 12Suction from the RWST

Removed)

Check Valve 8981RHR Pump 11 & 12Suction from RWST


None Open Closed Nh

TOP EVENT RW(REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK INTEGRITY AND ECCS OUTLET VALVE)

h RWST 1-1 Rupture durin8operationZTTK1B

None Intact Intact Nh

B Hanual Valve 1-1Coczson ECCS RWST Outlet



Open

TOP EVENT Vh(RHR PUHP 1 CONTAINMENT SUHP SUCTION VALVE OPENS AND REHAINS OPEN FOR 24 HOURS)

Hotoz'peratedValve 8700ARHR PumpllSuction from the RWST

Fail to closeZTVHOD

480V AC Bus 1G Closed NozmallyOpen

hs is

Hotor OperatedValve 8982ARHR Pump 11Containmant SumpSuction ValveInterlocked with 8700A

Fail to openZTVHODTzansfer closedZTVHOT

480V AC Bus 1G Open Closed(Power hs isRemoved)

TOP EVENT VB(RHR PUMP 2 CONTAINMENT SUMP SUCTION VALVE OPENS AND REMAINS OPEN FOR 24 HOURS)

Hotor OperatedValve 8700BRHR Pump 2Suction from the RWST

Fail to closeZTV)%D

4SOV AC Bus 1H Closed NozmallyOpen

hs is

Hotor OperatedValve 8982BRHR Pump 2Containment Sump

Fail to openZTVHODTransfer closedZTVHOT

4SOV AC Bus 1H Open Closed(Power hs isRemoved)

EBS-28


Sheet 4 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR COMPONENTS

(NAME AND ID NO.) PAILURE MODE


ACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOMPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOWER

POSITION

Suction ValveInterlocked with 8700B

TOP EVENT AC(INJECTION VIA THE ACCUMULATORS AND COLD LEG INJECTION PATH FROM RHR PUMP DISCHAGE)

hir OperatedValve HCV 638RHR HX No. 1Flow Control

Transfer closedZTVAOT

Instrument hir Open NormallyOpen

Open

i B hir OperatedValve HCV 637RHR HX No. 1Flow Control


Instrument hir Open NormallyOpen

Open

Motor OperatedValve 8809hRHR Train 11Discharge Valve

Motor OperatedValve 8809BRHR Train 12Discharge Valve

Check Valve 8818hDischarge toCold Leg 1



Fail to openZTVCOD

Transfer closedZTVCOP

480V AC Bus 1G

480V AC Bus 1H

None

Open

Open

Open

Normally OpenOpen(PowerRemoved)

Normally OpenOpen(PowerRemoved)

Normally NhClosed

F Check Valve 8818BDischarge toCold Leg 1

G Check Valve 8818CDischarge toCold Leg 1



None

None Open

Normally NhClosed

Normally NAClosed

H Check Valve 8818DDischarge to

Fail to openZTVCOD

None Open Normally NhClosed

E.S-29

TABLE E. 5-1. (continued)

Sheet 5 of 9

BLOCK MAJOR CCMPONENTSNO. (NAME AND ID NO.) FAILURE MODE


ACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOMPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOWER

POSITION

Cold Leg 1 Transfer closedZIVCOP

I Check Valve 8948ARHR To Cold Leg 1I+ection Path

Fail to openZTVCOD



Check Valve 8948BRHR to Cold Leg, 2In5ection Path

Fail to openZTVCODTzansfer closedZTVCOP


K Check Valve 8948CRHR to Cold Leg 3In)ection Path

Check Valve 8948DRHR to Cold Leg 4In)ection Path

Fail to openZTVCOD

Tzansfer closedZTVCOP


None

None

Open

Open

Normally NhClosed

Normally NhClosed

Accumulator Tank 1-1 Rupture duringoperationZTTK1B


Motor OperatedValve 8808hAccumulator Isolation

Check Valve 8956hAccumulator 1-1 toCold Leg 1

N Accumulator Tank 1-2

Transfer closedZTVMDT


Rupture duringoperationZTTK1B

480V AC Bus 1F

None

None

Open

Open

Intact

NormallyOpen(PcwerRemoved)

NormallyClosed

Intact

As is

Nh

Nh

Motor OperatedValve 8808B

Transfer closedZTV)K)T

480V AC Bus 1G Open Normally hs isOpen(Prier

E.5-30

TABLE E,5-1. (continued)

Sheet 6 of 9

BLOCi MAJOR CCMPONENTS

NO., (NAME AND ID NO.) FAILURE MODE

FUNCTIONAL ANDEliVIRONMENTAISUPPORT SYSTEMS

ACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOMPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOHER

POSITION

Accumulator'Isolation

Check Valve 8956BAccumulator 1-2 toCold Leg 2


None Open

Removed)

Normally NhClosed



Motor OperatedValve 8808CAccumulator Isolation


480V AC Bus 1H Open Normally hs isOpen(PowerRemoved)

Check Valve 8956CAccumulator 1-3 toCold Leg 3

Fail to openZTVCOD

Transfer closed

None Open NormallyClosed

Nh

ZTVCOP

1



Motor OperatedValve 8808DAccumulator Isolation

Transfer closed 480V AC Bus 1GZTVMOT

NormallyOpen(PowerRemoved)

hs is

Check Valve 8956Dhccumulatoz 1-4 toCold Leg 4


~ None Open NormallyClosed

Nh

TOP EVENT LI(COLD LEG INJECTION PATH FROM RBR PUMP DISCHAGE)

hir OperatedValve BCV 638RHR HX No. 1Flow Contzol


Plant hir Open NormallyOpen

Open

hir OperatedValve HCV 637

Tzansfer closedZTVAOT

Plant hir Open NormallyOpen

Open

E.5-31


Sheet 7 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR COMPONENTS

(NAME hND ID NO.) FhILURE MODE

FUNCTIONAL hNDENVIRONMENTALSUPPORT SYSTEMS

ACTUhTEDPOSITION

INITIhLCCMPONENT

SThTE

LOSS OFPOHER

POSITION

RHR HX No. 1Flow Control

Motor OperatedValve 8809hRHR Train 11Dischar8e Valve

Motor OperatedValve 8809BRHR Train 12Dischar8e Valve

Check Valve 8818hDischar8e toCold Le8 1


Transfer closedZTV)%T

Pail to openZTVCOD


480V hC Bus 1G

480V hC Bus 1H

None Open

Normakly OpenOpen(PowerRemoved)

Normally OpenOpen(powerRemoved)

Normally NhClosed

Check Valve 8818BDischar8e toCold Le8 1

G Check Valve 8818CDischar8e toCold Les 1


Fail to openZTVCOD


None

None

Open

Open

Normally NhClosed

Normally NhClosed

H Check Valve 8818DDischarse toCold Les 1



I Check Valve 8948hRHR To Cold Le8 1In)ection Path

Fail to openZTVCOD



J Check Valve 8948BRHR to Cold Le8 2I+ection Path



E.5-32

lr)p'L

TABLE E.S-1. (continued)

Sheet 8 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MAJOR COMPONENTS(NAHE AND ID NO.) PAILURE MODE

FUNCTIONAL ANDENVIRONHENTALSUPPORT SYSTEMS

ACTUATEDPOSITION

INITIALCOMPONENT

STATE

LOSS OFPOWER

POSITION

K Check Valve 8948CRHR to Cold Leg 3I+ection Path



L Check Valve 8948DRHR to Cold Leg 4

Infection Path

Fail to openZTVCOD


None Open Normally NAClosed

TOP EVENT HU (SUCTION VALVES FROM RCS HOT LEG 4 TO THE RHR PUMPS OPEN AND REHAIN OPEN FOR 24 HOURS OR HAKEUP TO RWST)

h Hctor OperatedValve 8701RHR Pump Suction fromRCS Hot Leg 4

Hotor OperatedValve 8702RHR Pump Suction fromRCS Hot Leg 4

B SFP Strainer STR-43

Fail to openZTVHOOTransfer closed2TVHOT

Fail to openZTVHOO

Transfer closedZTVN)T

PluggingZTSC1P

480V AC Bus 1G

480V AC Bus 1H

None

Open

Open

Clear

NormallyClosed(PcwerRemoved)

NormaklyClosed(PollerRemoved)

Unplugged

hs is

hs is

NA

Manual Valve 1-8756SFP Pump Suction Valve

SFP Pump 1-1


Fail to startZTFRHSFail to runZTPRHR

None

4160V Bus G12SV DC Bus 12

Open

Running

NormallyOpen

Off

hs is

Off

E.5-33-1

ThBLE E.5-1. (continued)

Sheet 9 of 9

BLOCKNO.

MhJOR CCMPONENTS(NhME hND ID NO.) FhILURE MODE

FUNCTIONhL hNDENVIRONMENThLSUPPORT SYSTEMS

hCTUATEDPOSITION

INITIhLCCMPONENT

SThTE

LOSS OFPOHER

POSITION

Check Valve 1-60SFP Pump 1-1 Dischar6e


None Open Closed Nh

Manual Valve 1-8754SFP Heat ExchangerDischar6e Valve

Manual Valve 1-14SFP Dischar6e to Filterand Demineraliser

Transfer openZTVHOT

Tzansfer closedZTVHOT

None

None

Closed NormallyOpen

NormallyOpen

hs is

hs is

Check Valve 1-53 Fail to openSFP Pump 1-1 Dischar6e to ZTVCODFilter and Demineraliser Tzansfer closed

ZTVCOP

None Open Closed Nh

Manual Valve 1-8774SFP DemineralirerBypass Valve

Manual Valve 1-8771hSFP Filter Input

Manual Valve 1-8775SFP Dominoralisor ResinTrap Outlet to SFP Filter

Manual Valve 1-87898SFP Resin Trap Outlet

Check Valve 1-8766SFP Fl~ Path to RHST


Tzans for open2TVHOT


Transfer openZTVHOT


None

None

None

None

None

Open

Closed

Open

Closed

Open

NormallyClosed

NormallyOpen

NormallyOpen

NormallyOpen

Closed

hs is

hs is

hs is

hs is

Nh

Manual Valve 1-8973Refuolin8 RaterPurification PumpDischar6e to RHSTIsolation Valve

Tzansfor closedZTVHOT

None NormallyClosed

hs is

E.5-33-2

4

I

'I

TABLE E.5-2 ECCLP.CTS

LA1LA1LA1LhlLA1LAlLhlLhlLA1LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LAFLB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB3

1234567891234

56789

~1234

5678911

234

56789

101234

56789

101

2.041K-029.422E-039.048K-033.738K-046.402E-034.926E-033.950E-041.083K-034.582E-032.037E-029.422K-039.048K-033.738E-046.402E-034.926K-033.950E-041.083K-034.542K-031.583E-029.422E-039.048K-033.738E-046.402K-034.926K-033.950E-041.083K-030.000K+001.000K+001.558E-022.041E-029.422E-039.048K-033.738K-046.402K-034.926E-033.950K-041.083K-034.582E-032. 324E-015.183E-034.861K-041.123E-043.738E-041.159K-048.902K-057. 187E-061.965E-054.582K-032.041K-02

Sheet 1 of 4TOTAL - hll suppozt available (SLOCA Case)

HARDHARE- Independent failures- Dependent failures

MAINTENANCEUnscheduled RHR pump maintenanceUnscheduled RHR heat exchanger maintenanceUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

HUMAN ERRORTOTAL - hll support available (Bleed h Feed Case)

HARDHARE- Independent failures- Dependent failuzes


HUMAN ERRORTOTAL - hll support available (LLOCA/MLOCA Case)

HARDHARE- Independent failuzes- Dependent failures


HUMAN ERRORTOTAL - Guaranteed failureLB1 - hll support available, Given LA SuccessfulSTOTAL - Tzain B Failed (SLOCA Case) 6

HARDWARE S- Independent failures S- Dependent failuzes SMAINTENANCE S

Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance SUnscheduled RHR heat exchangez maintenance SUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance S

HUMAN ERROR SLB2 - hll support available; Top event LA failedSTOTAL - Tzains A and B Failed (SLOCA Case) S

HARDWARE S- Independent failures S- Dependent failures SMAINTENANCE S

Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance SUnscheduled RHR heat exchanger maintenance SUnscheduled motor opezated valve maintenance S

HUMAN ERROR STOTAL - Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure(SLOCA Case)S

E.5-34

LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB4

LB4

LB4

LB4

LB4

LB4

LB4LB4LB4LB4LB5LB5LB5LB5LBSLB5LBSLBSLB5LB5LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB8LB8

234567891

234

56789

101234

"56789

101

234

56789123

56789

1012

9. 422K-039.048K-033.738K-046.402E-034.926E-033.950K-041.083E-034.582E-031.558E-022.037K-029.422E-039.048E-033.738E-046.402K-034.926E-033.950E-041.083E-034.542E-032.298K-015.143K-034. 861K-041.123K-043.738K-041.159K-048.902E-057. 187K-061.965E-054.S42E-032.037E-029.422E-039.048K-033.738K-046.402K-034.926K-033.950K-041.083K-034.542E"031. 551K-021.583K-029.422E-039.048K-033.738K-046.402K-034.926E-033.950K-041.083E-03O.OOOE+003.753E-026. 019K-04

TABLE E.5-2 (continued)Sheet 2 of 4

HARDRARE S- Independent failures S- Dependent failures SHAINTENANCE S

Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance SUnscheduled RHR heat exchanher maintenance SUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance S

HUHAN ERROR SLB1 - hll support available, Given LA SuccessfulSTOTAL - Train B Palled (B h F Case)

HARDRARE- Independent failures- Dependent failures

HAINTENANCEUnscheduled RHR pump maintenanceUnscheduled RHR heat exchanger maintenanceUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

HUHAN ERRORLB2 - hll support available; Top event Lh failedSTOTAL - Trains h and B Failed (B h F Case)

HARDMARE- Independent failuzes- Dependent failures

MAINTENANCEUnscheduled RHR pump maintenanceUnscheduled RHR heat exchanher maintenanceUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

HUHAN ERRORTOTAL -Top Event LA Guaranteed Pailure(B h F Case)S

HAKNARE- Independent failures- Dependent failures

MAINTENANCEUnscheduled RHR pump maintenanceUnscheduled RHR heat exchanher maintenanceUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

HUMAN ERRORLB1 - hll support available, Given LA SuccessfulSTOTAL - Train B Failed (LLOCA/MLOCA Case) S

HARDMARE S- Independent failures S- Dependent failures SHAIN TENANCE S

Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance SUnscheduled RHR heat exchanger maintenance SUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance S

HUMAN ERROR SLB2 - hll support available; Top event Lh failedSTOTAL - Tzains h and B Failed (LLOCA/HLOCA Case)S

E.5-35

TABLE E.5-2 (continued)

4.861E-041.123E-043.738E-04

LB8LB8LB8LB8LB8LB8LB8

6 1.159E-047 8.902E-058 7.187K-06

1.965K-05LB8 10 O.OOOEt00LBQLB9LB9LBQLB9LBQLB9LB9LBQLBFLvlLV1LV1LvlRW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

VA1VA1VA1VA1VA1VA1VAFVB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB3

1.583E-029.422E-039.048K-033.738E-046.402K-034.926K-033.950K-041.083E-03O.OOOE+001.000K+004.590E-044.590K-044.590E-04O.OOOE+003.941E-053. 941K-053.941K-OS0 ~ OOOE+00O.OOOE+003.836K-033.294K-033.099K-031.947E-045. 412E-045.412K-041.000K+003.642E"03

2. 3.836K-033 3.294E-034 3.099E-03

1.947K-045.412K-045. 412E-045.679K-022.085E-042.052E-041.046K-051.947K-043.347E"063.347E-063.836K-03

Sheet 3 of 4HARDWARE

- Independent failures- Dependent failures


HUMAN ERRORTOTAL - Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure

HARDWARE (LLCCA/MLOCA Case)S" Independent failures- Dependent failuresMAINTENANCE

Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceUnscheduled RHR heat exchanger maintenanceUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

HUMAN ERRORTOTAL - Guaranteed failureTOTAL -hll conditions(No support required)

HARDWARE- Independent failures- Dependent failures

TOTAL -hll conditions(No support required)Hh)U)WA)K

- Independent failures- Dependent failures

SEISMICTOTAL - hll support available


MAINTENANCEUnscheduled motor operated valve maintenance

TOTAL - Guaranteed failureVB1 - hll support available, Given Vh SuccessfulSTOTAL - Train B Failed



VB2 « hll support available; Top event Vh failedgTOTAL - Tzains h and B Failed

HARDWARE- Independent failures- Dependent failures,


TOTAL - Top Event Vh Guaranteed Failure

E.5-36

TABLE E.5-2 (continued)Sheet 4 of 4

VB3VB3VB3VB3VB3VBFAC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1LI1LI1LI1

, LI1LI1LI1LI2HU1HU1HU1HU1HU1HU1HU2HU2HU2HU2MUF

2 3.294K-033 3.099K-034 1.947K-045 5.412K-046 5. 412E-041 1.000K+001 6.271K-032 6.137E-033 6.136K-034 1.270K-075 1.344K-046 1.931E-067 1.325K-041 4.028E-062 1. 913E-063 1.659K-064 2.546E-075 2. 114E-066 2. 114K-061 8.293K-041 7.977K-032 3.289E-033 3.289E-034 1.086K-035 1.086E-036 3.621K-031 1.173K-022 3.719K-033 3.719K-03

8.040E-031 1.000E+00

HARDWARE 6- Independent failures 6- Dependent failures 6HAINTENANCE 6

Unscheduled motor operated valve maintenance 6TOTAL - Guaranteed failure $TOTAL -hll conditions(No support required) 6

HARDWARE S- Independent failures 6- Dependent failures SMAINTENANCE 6

Unscheduled motor operated valve maintenance SAccumulator Dischar8e Isolation Valve maintenanceS

TOTAL -hll boundary conditions(No support required)SHARDWARE $- Independent failures S- Dependent failures SHAINTENANCE 6

Unscheduled motor operated valve maintenance STOTAL - LLOCA: Given failure of top event AC STOTAL -Pcnrer Available to 480V Buses 1G and 18 S

HARDWARE 6- Independent failures SMAINTENANCE S

Unscheduled motor operated valve maintenance SHUMAN ERROR S

TOTAL - Hake-up to the RWST via the SFP pump SHARDWARE S- Independent failures SHUMAN ERROR S

TOTAL - Guaranteed failure S

E.5-37

4'I

kl

FNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFNFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SYSTEH FUNCTION

FSAR SUCCESS CRITERIA

The LPI success criterion ior a large LOCA is at leastone RHR pump delivering makeup water to at least twocold legs for 1 hour. Three of the accumulators arerequired for 1 hour for accumulator system success.The other accumulator is assumed to discharge into thezuptured leg and is therefore unavailable.

The LPR success criterion for a large LOCA is at leastone RHR pump delivering makeup water to at least twocold legs for 23 hours.

The RHR shutdown cooling success criterion for a trans-ient or small LOCA is at least one RHR pump deliveringcooling water to at least one cold legs for 24 hours.

SUPPORT SYSTEMS

1) 4160V Bus G

2) 4160V Bus H3) 480V AC Bus 1G

4) 480V AC Bus 1H

5) Diesel Generator6) Diesel Generator

: RHR Pump 11 (Hotive power): RHR Pump 12 (Hotive power): FCV 641A, )g)V 8809A, HOV 8716A, l%V

Spent Fuel Pit(SFP) Pump 11: FCV 641B, HOV 8809B, HOV 8716B, )%V

SFP Pump 1212: RHR Pump 1111: RHR Pump 12

The ECCS is designed to remove the decay heat from the zeactorcore, following an accident. To meet this requirement the ECCSmust function in several modes of operation. One of these modesis low pzessuze inlection(LPI). LPI provides a source ofmakeup water and shutdown capability to thecore for events where the RCS pressuze decreases belowthe shutoff pzessuze oi the RHR pumps.The low pzessure recirculation (LPR) function of the ECCSfollows the in)ection phase. After the iNST levelreaches the low setpoint and RCS pressure dropsbelow the RHR pump shutoff pressure, longtezm core cooling is initiated by circulatingcontainment sump water through the core using the RHRpumps. Normally, recirculation flow will be directedto the RCS cold legs. If a vezy large break occurs inthe cold legs, hot leg recirculation is required in thelong term.

8701,

8702,

SSS

SSSS

SS

SSSSSSSS

8SSSSS

SSSS

SSSSSSSSSS

SS

SSS

FIGURE E.S-1. ECCLP.SUM(Sheet 1 of 9)

E.5-38

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSPSPSPSPOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

: RHR Pump 11 and SFP Pump 11(Control: RHR Pump 12 and SFP Pump 12(Control: RHR Pump 12: RHR Pump ll: RHR Pump 11 (Seal cooling): RHR Pump 12 (Seal cooling)

II : Provides the S18nal to Open RHR

Pump 11 Recirculation Valve(FCV 641A) on Low Flow Condition.

III: Pzovides the S16nal to Open RHRPump 12 Recirculation Valve(FCV 641B) on Low Plow Condition.

: RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation: Valves FCV 365 and FCV 364(Normally: Closed, Fail Open)

7) 125V DC Bus 128) 125V DC Bus 139) SSPS Train h

10) SSPS Train B11) CCW Train h12) CCH Train B13) Instrument Channel

14) Instrument Channel

15) Instrument hir

SYSTEHS SUPPORTED

Reactor coolant system

OPERATING FEATURES

ValveNumber

8700h RHR Trainh Suction fromRMST

8700B RHR TrainB Suction fzomRWST

2) LPI/LPR Valve Interlocks

Conditions or Interlocks Requiredto Open the Valve

8804h, 8982h and 9003h must be closed

8804B, 8982B and 9003B must be closed

8702 RHR Suction RCS pressure must be less than 425 psi6from RCS hot le8

8982A RHR Trainh Suction fromthe Sump

8700h must be closed

1) The RHST serves as an emer8ency water source for RCSmakeup, coze refloodin6, core cooling, and additionalshutdown capacity. hfter LPI, valve reali8nment isperformed and the containment zecirculation sumps (CRS)aze used as the water source durin8 the recizculationphase.

power )S

power)S8SS

SS

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSS

SS

SSSSSSSSSS

SS

SSSS

FIGURE E.5-1 (Sheet 2 of 9)

E.5-39

OP

OPOFOFOFOFOFOPOP

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

8700B must be closed

Refueling Mater Storage Tank(RMST)

8982B RHR TrainB Suction izcmthe Sump

3) Mhile at power operation or hot shutdown condition,the RHR system is aligned to function duzing theinjection phase of a LOCh event. During the injectionphase, the RHR pumps take suction on the RMST anddischarge to the RCS cold legs when the primarysystem pressure has decreased to less then 170 psig.

5) Design pazametera for LPI/LPR components

4) The injection mode continues until tho low level isreached in the RMST(105,000 gallons left). ht this pointthe operator manually changes tho system alignment torecirculation mode. This includes shutting down anyrunning RHR pumps, closing the two valves(8716h/B)in the crossover line between the two low-headheaders, closing the RHR pump 2 suction valve(8700B),restore power to and open the containment sump valve(8982B) to tho number 2 RHR pump, open the CCM outletvalve(FCV-364) to the RHR heat exchanger,start the number 2 RHR pump, restore power to and closethe SI zecirculation flow valves(8974h/B), open thevalve frcxn the number 2 RHR pump discharge to the saietyinjection suction(8804B),open the valves in the cross connect line from thesuction of the charging pumps and the suction oi SI pumpnumber 1 (8807h/B), close the numbez 1 RHR pump suctionvalve(8700h), zestoze power to and open the containmentsump valve(8982h) to the number 1 RHR pump, open the CCMoutlet valve(FCV-365) to the RHR heat exchanger and stazt thenumber 1 RHR pump, open the valve from the number 1RHR pump discharge to the centrifugal charging pumpsuction line(8804h), close the valves in the suctionline between the centzifugal charging pumps and theRMST(8805h/B), and zoatore power to and closevalve between the RMST and the SI pump suction(8976) and thevalve in the cocunon RMST line to the RHR pump suction(8980).The total time rec(uized to change over to recirculationis approximately 10 minutos.hppzoximately 19 hours after switchover to recircu-lation, hot leg zecizculation will be initiated toensure termination of boiling and to prevent boric acidcrystalisation. For success of the hot leg zocirculationmode, the safety injection discharge valves 8802h/Bmust open.

SSSSSSS

SS

SS

SSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSS

SS

SSS8SSSSSSSSSSSS68S

PIGVRE E.5-1 (Sheet 3 of 9)

E.5-40

0

'P

leg

4>

I i"

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOFOF

Hinimum hllowable Volume(gal)Design Pzessuze

Residual Heat Resoval PumpsNumber (per unit)Design Pressure(psig)Desi6n Flowrate(gpm)Design Head(ft)Net Positive Suction Head Required(ft)Design Temperature(Degrees F)

Spent Fuel Pit PumpsNumber (per unit)Design Pressure(psig)Design Flowrate(gps)Design Head(ft)Net Positive Suction Head Required(ft)Design Temperature(Degrees F)

400,000atmospheric

26003960(per pump)35011400

21502300(per pump)12515200

6) hlazms/Indications include:a) The fluid temperature at the outlet oi each RHR heat

exchanger is recozded in the control zoom.b) Duplicate pressure channels are installed on each

accumulator. Pzessure indication in the control roomand high and low pressure alarms are provided by eachchannel.

c) RHR pump discharge pressure for each pump is indicatedin the control room. h high pressure alarm is actuatedby each channel.

d) Flow through each RHR injection and recirculationheader to the reactor cold or hot legs is indicated inthe control room.

e) Three water level instrumentation channels are providedfor the RWST. Each provides independent indication onthe main control board. T«o out of three logic isprovided foz RHR pump trip and low-level alarminitiation. One channel provides low-low water levelalarm initiation.

f) Two zedundant wide-zan6e reactor cavity water levelchannels are provided to measure level from the bottomof the reactor cavity. Mide-zan6e recorders are locatedon the postaccident monitoring panel.

6) Red indicating lights are provided by the RHR pumpcontrol switches in the control room, and the switchgearcubicle to indicate closuze of the breaker, with greenlights to indicate openin6 the breaker.

h) The following valves have position indicators in thecontrol zoom:

)%)V 8716h, HOV 8716B,HOV 8703

SSSS88SSSSSSSSS8SSSSSSS

S8SSSSSSSS

SS

SSS8SSSSSS

8SSSS

FIGURE E.5-1 (Sheet 4 oi 9)

E.5-41

OFOFOFOFOFOFOFOPOFOFOFOFOP

OFOF

OFOFOFOFOFOFOP

OP

OFOFOFOFOFOP

OFOF

EIEIEZEIEIEIEIEZEIEIEIEIEIEIEITSTSTSTS

MV 8809A, )8)V 8809BKlV 8808A, )g)V 8808B, )80V 8808C, )QV 8808DFCV 365, FCV 364HCV 638, HCV 637MV 8980)g)V 8982A, S)V 8982BK)V 8700A, H)V 8700BFCV 641A, FCV, 641BMV 8701, HOV 8702KR 8976

ts include:Routine shift checks. Includes verifying thatECCS related valves are in the correct position.Stzoke testing of RHR heat exchanger outletvalves HCV 637 8 638.Stroke testing of RHR pump suction valves )K&s8700A/B.Functional test of ECCS check valves. Every18 months duzing refueling.ECCS check valve flow test, every cold shutdown.no more often than every 92 days.Operability test of RHR pumps every 3 months.'llmodes. This test is performed with the RHRsystem aligned for normal operation. The pumpis run on recirculation and the flow rate ismonitored on FIC-641A(or B). When operating inmodes 4,5 or 6, the RHR pump being tested isisolated by closing the RHR to RCS cold leg valve8809A(or B) and the RHR to hot leg valve8716A(or B).

7) Tesa)

b)

c)

d)

e)

POTENTZAL FOR EVENT INITZATION

TECHN ICAL SPECIFICATIONS

LCOs:

FIGURE ED 5-1 (Sheet 5 of 9)

1) A piping failuze anywhere between the RCS cold legs andthe last check valves in the accumulator infection linesor the last check valves in the charging pump infectionlines could cause a LOCA. A LOCA could also be caused bya piping failure upstream oi the motor operated isolationvalves in the RHR suction line from the RCS hotleg.A LOCA would also occur given a pipe break downstream ofthe last check valves in the RHR/SIS infection lines tothe RCS hot legs. An interfacing systems LOCA could occurif two series check valves in the infection lines ortwo series motor operated valves in the RHR hot legdropline fail.

S88S6S6S66S

SS

SSSSSSSS

SSSS8SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

SSSSS

E.5-42

TSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTSTS

1) 3.4.6.1: The containment recirculation sump and thereactor cavity sump level and flow monitoring systemshall be operable.

2) 3.5.1: Each RCS accumulator shall be operable.Mith one accumulator inoperable, except as a result ofa closed isolation valve, restore the accumulator withinone hour or be in hot standby within 6 hours.

3) 3.5.2 : Requires two ECCS subsystems be operable.Hitb one inoperable, it must be zestored within 72 hoursor go to hot standby within the next 6.

4) 3.5.5 : The ERST must be operable at temperaturegreater than 35 degrees F, bozon concentration from 2000to 2200 pps and 400,000 gal volume. Restore to operablestatus within one hour or be in hot standby within thenext six.

5) 3.7.11: The temperature of the RHR, SI and chazgingpump rooms must not exceed 103 degzees F for more than8 houzs or by moze than 30 degrees F at anytime.No shutdown requirements.

Surveillance Tests:1) 4.4.6.1: Reactor cavity sump level monitoring system

performance of channel calibration at least once per 18months.

2) 4.5.2 : Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstratedoperable;a) At least once evezy 12 hours by verifying that thefollowing valves are in the indicated positions withpower to the valve operators removed:Valve Number Position8703 Closed8809A/B Open8980 Open8982A/B Closed8992 Open8701 Closed8702 Closedb) At least once every 31 days by:Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water.Verifying that all valves in the flow path that are notlocked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, arein the correct position.c) Visual inspection of the containment sump at least onceevery 18 months.d) At least once evezy 18 months by verifying that allautmatic valves in the flow path actuate to the correctposition and the centrifugal charging, safety infection and


E.5-43

TSTSTSTSTSTSTS

TS'S

TSRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRF

RHR pumps start on a S.I. test signal~ ) Verifying the differential pressure on zecirculationflow for the ECCS pumps quarterly.

3) 4.5.5 : The RMST shall be demonstrated opezable byverifying the the contained water volume and the boronconcentration oi the water at least once every 7 days.

4) 4.7.11 : The temperature in each of the affected areasshall be determined to be within its limits at leastonce per 12 houzs.

REFERENCES

FShR Section: 5.5, 6.3

Technical Specification Section:3.4.6.1, 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.5, 3.7.114.4.6.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.5, 4.7.11

Operating Procedure Number(s):

Surveillance Test Procedure Number:

STP I-lh Routine shift checks.STP I-1D Routine monthly checksSTP V-2 Exercising and position verification of power

operated valves.STP V-2D RHR pump recirculation valves.STP V-2H Miscellaneous auxiliary building valves.STP V-3L4 Exercising valves 8808h,B,C and D, accumulator

discharge isolation valves.STP V-4h Functional test of ECCS check valves.STP V-4B Functional test of ECCS check valves at cold

shutdown.STP V-7B Valve interlocks and RHR pump trip from RWST

level channels.STP V-7C Leak test of RHR suction valves 8701 and 8702.STP P-3B Routine surveillance test, of the SI pumps.


OP B-2:I RHR System - hlignment Verification for PlantStaztup

OP B-2:IV RHR System - Remove from Sezvice During PlantHeatup

OP B-2:V RHR System - Place in Service During PlantCooldown

OP B-3B hccumulatorsOP B-3B:II Accumulators - hlignment Verification for Plant

StartupOP B-3C ECCS Valve Leakage Test System hlignment for

Plant StartupOP K-10G Sealed Valve Checklist for ECCS Systems

E.5-44

Every three months.

Other Drawings

Emergency Plan and Procedures Number(s)

EP OP-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg RecirculationEP OP-1.4 Transfer to Hot Leg RecizculationEP ECA-1.1 Loss oi Emergency Coolant Recizculation

102009102009102010

FSAR Figure 6.3-4 ECCS Alignment During InJection HodeFSAR Figure 6.3-5 ECCS Alignment During Recizculation Hode

ASSUMPTIONS

1. A combined mission time of 24 hours including therecirculation and infection phases is assumed fozthe operation of the RHR pumps. The use of the 24 hourmission time simplifies the analysis becausethe RHR pump trains can then be questioned gust one time inthe event tree logic and if successful, can beassumed opezable foz the recirculation phase as wellas the inJection phase.

2. Successful low pressure in)ection or recirculationrequires a flow path to one of the RCS cold legs.In the case of a medium or large LOCA, it isassumed that the LOCA is caused by a break in one of thecold legs. In)ection into the ruptured cold leg is notsufficient for success, therefore the analysis of thecold leg injection paths assumes that 1 injection path isunavailable. Based on the report "Safety Evaluation ofthe RHR Crosstie Line Isolation" prepared by Westinghouse(dated July 10, 1987) and received by PLG from PGAE onJuly 27, 1987 (Chzon F502246), a success cziteria oi 1 outof 4 inJection paths can be Justified for the large LOCAevent for the first fuel cycle of Unit 2 if it isrecognised that this analysis is not entirely applicableto Unit 1 or the subsequent fuel cycles of Unit 2.However, the conditions are considered sufficiently closeand the consezvatisms in the Westinghouse evaluation azequite significant. The same success criteria is Judged tobe adequate for both Units 1 and 2 in the PRA model.Therefore, the ECCS success is defined in this analysis tozequize infection through one of the remaining three intactcold leg inJection paths. For the analysis of the ECCS top

S6SS6SS

SS

SS

6S

6S

SSSSSSSS6SSSSSSSSS68SS

6SSSSS

SSSSSSS

PIGURE E.5-1 (Sheet 8 of 9)

E.S-45

events it is assumed that the rupture occurred in cold leg 1.The 1 of 3 success criteria is conservatively used for allother initiating events also. This zeduces the number ofboundazy conditions that need to be quantified and is justslightly conservative.

3. In the quantification of Top Event NJ under boundazy conditionsrequiring makeup to the RHST, no credit is taken'for SFPpump 12. This is slightly conservative in cases where 480Vbuses 1G and 1H are available.


E.5-46

LALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALALBLBLBLBLBLBLB

LBLBLB

SFSFSFSFASASASASASASASASAS

ASSCSC

, SCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSC

SSSSSSSS

SSSSSSSSS

SSSS

SSSS6SSSSSSS

SUCCESS CRITERIA

Post accident i+ection phase:

RHR pump train A must start and zun for1 hour taking suction from the RWST.

Post accident recirculation phase:

RHR pump train A must start and run for23 hours taking suction from the containment sump.

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

1. (LA1) All support available. (SLOCA Case)2. (LA2) All support available. (Bleed A Feed Case)3. (LA3) All support available. (LLOCA/MLOCA Case)4. (LAF) Guaranteed failure.

SPLIT FRACTION IDs

LA1 All support available. (SLOCA Case)LA2 All support available. (Bleed A Feed case)LA3 All support available. (LLOCA/HLOCA Case)LAF Guaranteed failure

ASSUMPTIONS

time in Stzain Sas well S

SUCCESS CRITERIA

Post accident infection phase:

RHR pump train B must start and run for1 hour takin6 suction from the RWST.

Post accident recirculation phase:

RHR pump train B must start and run for23 hours takinS suction from the containment sump.

FIGURE E.5-2. ECCLP.CRT(Sheet 1 of 6)

1. A combined mission time of 24 hours includins thezecirculation and i+ection phases is assumed fortop event LA. The use oi the 24 hourmission time simplifies the analysis becausethe RHR pump trains can then be questioned gust onethe event tree logic. Ii LA is successful, the pumpcan be assumed operable for the recirculation phaseas the in)ection phase.

E.5-47

~ a

I!4 Ji

LBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLBLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLVLV

SCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBCBC

SFSFSFSFSFSFSFSFSFSFASASASAS

SCSC

SCSCSCSC

SCSC

BCBCBCBC

SFASASASAS

SBOUNDARY CONDITIONS S

6l. (LB1) hll support available. Top event LA successful.(SLOCA)S2. (LB2) hll support available. Top event LA failed. (SLOCA)S3. (LB3) Top Event LA Guaranteed Failure (SLOCA)S4. (LB4) hll support available. Top event LA successful.(B & F)S5. (LB5) hll support available. Top event LA failed. (B A F)S6. (LB6) Top Event LA Guaranteed Failure (B A F)S7. (LB7) hll support available. Top event LA successful.(LLOCA)S8. (LB8) hll support available. Top event LA failed. (LLOCA)S9. (LBQ) Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure (LLOCA)S

10. (LBF) Guazanteed failure. S

SSPLIT FRACTION IDs S

SLB1 hll support available. Top event LA successful. (SLOCA)SLB2 hll support available. Top event Lh failed. (SLOCA)SLB3 Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure (SLOCA)SLB4 hll suppozt available. Top event Lh successful. (B A F)SLBS hll support available. Top event LA failed. (B A F)SLB6 Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure (B A F)SLB7 hll support available. Top event LA successful.(LLOCA) SLB8 hll support available. Top event LA failed. (LLOCA) SLBO Top Event Lh Guaranteed Failure (LLOCA) SLBF Guaranteed failure S

SASSUMPTIONS S

SSimilar to those for top event Lh. 6

SSUCCESS CRITERIA S

SPost accident infection phase: S

SSuccess of top event LV requires that the RHR Ssuction valves, cocmon to RHR trains h and B, takin8 Ssuction fzom the RWST remain open for 24 bours. S

SBOUNDARY CONDITIONS S

S1. (LV1) hll conditions(No support zequired) S

SSPLIT FRACTION IDs 6

SLV1 hll conditions(No suppozt required) S

SASSUMPTIONS S

SNone S


E.5-48

RW

RW

RW

RW

RW

RW

RHRW

RW

RHRHRHRW

RHRW

RW

RW

RW

RW

RW

VAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVAVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVB

SC SUCCESS CRITERIASCSC Post accident infection phase:SC

SCSC

SCSCBC BOUNDARY CONDITIONSBCBC 1. (RW1) hll conditions(No support required)BC

SPLIT PRACTION IDs

SF RH1 hll conditions(No support zequired)ASAS ASSUHPTIONSASAS NoneSCSC SUCCESS CRITERIASC

SC Post accident zecirculation phase:SCSCSCSCBC BOBCBC 1. (BC 2. (BC

SPLI

SF VA1SF VAFASAS ASSASAS 1. SAS hSCSC SUCC

SCSCSCSCSCSC

Success of top went RW requires that the RWSTand the manual valve discbar8in8 from the RWST tothe ECCS pumps remain available foz 24 hours.

Sump valves on RHR train h opens and remains open for S24 hours.

UNDARY CONDITIONS

Vhl) hll suppozt available.VAF) Guaranteed failure.

T FRACTION IDs

hll suppozt available.Guaranteed failure

IMPTIONS

ump suction valve 8982A willnot open until valve 8700has closed.

ESS CRITERIA

Post accident zecizculation phase:

Sump valve on RBR train B opens and remains open for24 hours.

FIGURE E.5"2 (Sheet 3 of 6)

E.5-49

VBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBVBACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACACLILILI

BCBCBCBCBCBCBC

SFSFSFSFASASASASASSCSCSCSCSC

SCSCBCBCBCBCBC

SFASASASASASASASASASASASASASASSCSCSC

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

r24 Ss fullyS

SSSSSSSSSSSS

hbe Scold S

RCS. 8ak bas S

Scient S

Sand S

8 S

ge SSSSS

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

l. (VB1) hll support available. Top event Vh successful.2. (VB2) hll support available. Top event Vh failed.3. (VB3) Top Event Vh Guaranteed Failure4. (VBF) Guaranteed failure.

SPLIT FRACTION IDs

hll support available. Top event Vh successful.hll support available. Top event Vh failed.Top Event Vh Guaranteed FailureGuazanteed failure

ASSUMPTIONS

SUCCESS CRITERIA

One oi the four cocmon infection paths to thecold legs from the RHR pumps must zemain open fobouzs and three of four accumulators must succesin3ect into the cold legs.

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

1. (AC1) Large LOCA initiating event(No support required)

SPLIT FRACTION IDs

AC1 hll conditions(No support required)

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Success oi top event AC requires that an inJection patavailable from the RHR pumps to RCS through one of thelegs and that 3 of 4 accumulators discharge into theIn the case of a large LOCh, it is assumed that a breoccurred in one of the cold legs. Availability oi aninfection path into the ruptured cold leg is not suffifor success of top event AC. Therefore this analysisassumes that cold leg 1 infection path is unavailablesuccess of AC is infection through one of the remaininthroe cold leg in)ection paths and accumulator discharto 3 of 3 cold legs.

SUCCESS CRITERIA

VB1VB2VB3VBF

PIGURE E.5-2 (Sbeet 4 of 6)

1. Sump suction valve 8982B willnot open until valve 8700Bhas closed.

E.5-50

LILILZLILILILILILZLZLILILILILILILILILILILILILILILILILILILILIHUHUHUMU

HVWHUHUHUHUHUHUHU

WHUHUMU

HUHU

WWMU

SC

SCSCSCBCBCBCBCBCBC

SFSFASASASASASASASASASASASASASASASASSC

SCSC

SC

SCSC

SCSCBCBCBCBC

BCBC

SFSFSFASAS

One of the four cocnen in)ection paths to thecold legs fzom the RHR pumps must remain open for 24bours.

UNDARY CONDITIONS

1. (LI1) hll conditions except large LOCA initiating event

BO

SU

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

I+ection into the rupturod cold leg is not sufficientfor success oi top event LI. Therefore this analysisassumes that cold leg 1 in)ection path is unavailable andsuccess of LI is in)ection through one of the zemainingthree cold leg i+ection paths. This 1 of 3 successcriteria is conservatively used for all otherinitiating events also. This zoducos the number of boundary Sconditions that need to bo quantified and is Just slightly Sconservative.

CCESS CRITERIA

Suction path from RCS hot leg 4 to an operable RHRpump train. Zncludos operator action to open thesuction valves(for boundary condition HU1).Flow path from the spent fuel pit to the RMST viathe spent fuel pit pump(for boundary condition HU2).

1. (HU1) Power available at AC buses G and H2. (W2) Power avail at AC bus G (Hake-up to RNST via SFP Pump)S3. (WF) Guazanteed failure S

SSPLIT FRACTION IDs S

SPower available at AC buses G and H SPower avail at AC bus G (Hake-up to RWST via SFP Pump) SGuaranteed failure S

SS

HU1W2WF

ASSUMPTIONS

FIGVRE E.S-2 (Sheet 5 of 6)

(No support required) S2. (LI2) LLOCA initiating evont: Given failure of top event AC S

SSPLIT FRLITION IDs S

SLI1 hll conditions except large LOCA;(No support required) SLI2 LLOCA initiating event: Given failure oi top went AC S

SASSUMPTIONS S

S1. Success of top event LI roquizes that an injection path be S

available from tho RHR pumps to RCS through one of the cold Slogs. In the case of a large LOCA, it is assumed that a Sbreak has occurred in ono of tho cold legs. S

E.5-51

HU ASHU AS NoneHU AS

FIGURE E.S-2 (Sheet 6 of 6)

E.5-52

TRAINASUCTIONMOV 8700A

A

RHR PUMPTRAINA

TRAINA HEAT-EXCHANGERANDFLOWPATH C

4.kV BUS G

ANDINSTRUMENTCHANNELII

SSPS B4SOV BUS

1G

HEADER A125V DCBUS 12

FIGURE E.5-3. BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR TOP EVENT LA'

FAILURE OFRHR PUMPTRAIN 1

RHR TRAIN 1

SUCTIONMOV 8700A

PUMP ANDFLOW PATH

RHR HEATEXCHANGERAND FLOW PATH

BKB BKC

FIGURE E.5-4. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LA

E.5-54

FAILUREOFRHR PUMPTRAIN 11

TRAIN 11

SUCTION VALVEMOV8700A (TC)

PUMP 11,RECIRC VALVEAND FLOW PA IH


BKC

INDEPENDENTFAILURES

COMMONCAUSEFAILURESPUMP, MOY, CV

BKB D2LAB

F)GURE E.5-5. EXPANDED BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LA

E-5-55

TRAIN 8SUCTIONMOV 87008

RHR PUMPTRAIN8

TRAIN8 HEATEXCHANGERANDFLOWPATH F

4.kV BUS H

ANDINSTRUMENTCHANNEL III

SSPS A480V BUS

1H

CCWHEADER 8

125V DCBUS 13

FIGURE E.5-6. BLOCK DIAGRN FOR TOP EVENT LB

FAlLUREOFRHR PUMPTRAN2

RHR TRAN 2SUCTlONMOV8700B

PUMP ANDFLOW PATH


BKD BKE

FIGURE E.5-7. BI OCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LB

E.5-57

FAILUREOFRHR PUMPTRAIN 12

TRAIN 12SUCTION VALVEMOV8700A PC)

PUMP 12RECIRC VALVEANDFLOW PATH


BKD BKF

INDEPENDENTFAILURES

COMMONCAUSEFAILURESPUMP, MOV, CV

BKE D2LDE

FIGURE E.5-8. EXPANDED BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LB

E.5-58

COMMON RHRPUMP SUCTIONFROM 1HE RWST

FIGURE E.5-9. BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR TOP EVENT LV

E.5-59

LOSS OF COMMONRHR SUCTlONFROM THE RWST

FIGURE E.5-10. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LV

E.5-60

RWSTNTEGRITY

A

RWST OUTLETVALVE

FIGURE E.5-11. BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR TOP EVENT RW

(SUCTION FROM RWST TO THE CHARGING, RHR,AND SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS)

E.5-61

RWSTUNAVAILABLE

RWSTINTEGRlTY

RWST OUTLETVALVE

BKB

FIGURE E.5-12- BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT RW

E.5-62

TRAIN ARWST SUCTIONVALVE(CLOSE)

TRAINASUMP SUCTIONVALVE(OPEN)

480V ACBUS >G

480V AC8US 1G

FIGURE E.5-13. BLOCK DIAGRAMS FOR TOP EVENT VA(SUCTION TO RHR SYSTEM FROM CONTAINMENT

SUMP TRAIN A)

E.5-63

LOSS OFCONTAINMENTSUMP A

SUCTIONFROMRWST FTC

SUMPSUCTlONVALVEFTO

BKA BKB

FIGURE E.5-14. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT VA

E.5-64

II

(1<

'fag(f

LOSS OFCONTAINMENTSUMP A

FAILTO CLOSESUCTION PATHFROM RWSTMOV8700A

FAILUREOFSUMP SUCTIONMOV8982A

INDEPENDENTFAILURE

GLOBALCCFMOVs 8700AANDB

INDEPENDENTFAILURE

GLOBALCCFMOVs 8982AANDB

BKA D2V1 BKB D2V2

FIGURE E.5-15. EXPANDEO BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT VA

E.5-65

TRAIN BRWST SUCTIONVALVE(CLOSE)

TRAIN BSUMPSUCTIONVALVE(OPEN)

480V ACBUS 1H

480V ACBUS 1H

FIGURE E.5-16. BLOCK DIAGRAMS FOR TOP EVENT VB(SUCTION TO RHR SYSTEM FROM

CONTAINMENT SUMP TRAIN B)

E.5-66

LOSS OFCONTAINMENTSUMP B

SUCTIONFROMRWST FTC

SUMPSUCTIONVALVEFTO

BKC BKD

FIGURE E.5-17. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT VA

E.5-67

$ ~

pit

LOSS OFCONTAINMENTSUMP B

FAILTO CLOSESUCTION PATHFROM RWSTMOV8700B

FAILUREOFSUMP SUCTIONMOV 8982B

INDEPENDENTFAILURE

GLOBALCCFMOVs 8700AAND B

INDEPENDENTFAILURE

GI.OBAI CCFMOVs 8982AANDB

BKC D2V1 BKD D2V2

FIGURE E.5-18. EXPANDED BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT VB

E.5-68

cv ee ISA cve048A

JIVIAHxILXSCHAWEHCV4%

A

AIVITAAIHALX CHARGEe000A

C

cveele8 cv 80I68

In

AtelHXgOISCHAAOEHCV601

8

AHATAAW8

DISCHARGE

eSYIO

cv ee leo

mVII

Ch

L

ACOVLAAAIOATAIN IMov ee0IACV e006A M

ACCLAAAATORTAIAItMovee088cv ees68

ACCIIM|AATORTANKS

LQveexccveesec o

ASSUME COLO LEO I IS HOTAVAEA8LE

ACCIIIAAATOATANK~

Mov 00000cv 80N0 p

cv e04lo

FIGURE E.5-19. BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR TOP EVENT AC

FAILUREOFACCUMULATORSOR COLD LEGINJECTION PATHS

FAILUREOFACCUMULATORINJECTION

FAILURE OFCOLD LEGINJECTION PATHFROM RHR

FAILURE OFACCUMULATOR

2

FAILUREOFACCUMULATOR

3


4

ACCUMULATORTANKANDFLOW PATH

CHECK VALVE8948B

ACCUMLMTORTANKANDFLOW PATH

CHECK VALVE8948C


CHECK VALVE8948D

BKO BKK BKP BKL

FIGURE E.5-20. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT AC

(Sheet I of 2)

E.5-70

IAIUIIIOfChho«n~ IP C IIVII'AIIII I ~ AJ I ~ AI

fAAUIILOIcao«nsHIIC IIOIII'AIII

fAh UIIE OfCOI 0 IfGS 5Ate h

IhnlrAfEICIIAHGEIII IOUIlEf

IIVI IK'4IAIK'fIOCa OLlGS I Her

lAhIKKOfHIICIKHL PIL 5 S AIO~

fhnlKArEXCIWIGEhf 5OUII f.f

nnD5OIAnGE roCaOLEGSSAte ~

CIIECKVALVE CIKCKVALVECIKCKVALVE

SSI SO ~5400 COIOIEOS

CIKCKVALVEfALUOEHCa olio ~

CIIfCK VALVESh IOC

CIKCK VALVESSIAC

CIKCK VALVE CI IECK VALVESh Iro SSUO

LSO I


e

gl,

I/

FAILUREOFACCUMULATORSOR GOLD LEGINJECTION PATHS

FAILUREOFACCUMULATORINJECTION

FAILURE OFCOLD LEGINJECTION PATHFROM RHR

FAILURE OFACCUMULATOR

2


3


4


CHECK VALVE8948B


CHECK VALVE8948C


CHECK VALVE89480

BKJ BKO BKK BKP BKL

FIGURE E.5-21. EXPANDED BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT AC

(5heet 1 of 3)

E.5-72

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGINJECTIONVIARHR

FAILUREOFCOLD LEG 2INJECTIONPATH

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGS 3AND4FLOW PATH

RHR RABAT

EXCHANGER 1-1

OUTLET

RHR DISCHARGETO COLDLEGS I AND 2

RHR HEATEXCHANGER 1.2OlfllET

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGS 3AND4INJECTION

RHR DISCHARGETO COLD LEGS 3AND 4

BKA BKC BKB BKD

COLD LEG 2INJECTIONPATH COLD LEG 3

INJECTIONPATH

COLD LEG 4INJECTIONPATH


E.5-73

FGH

T 5

233414

241324

122334

234134124

123 124234 123134 234

COLD LEG TINJECTIONPATH

DOUBLE CCFCV8818r ORCV 8948 r

INDEPENDENTFAILURECV 8818 r

GLOBALCCF COLDLEGS 1234

TRIPLE CCFCV 8818 r ORCV 8948 r

NDEPENDENTFAILURECV 8948 r

BXP BXX

DOUBLE CCFCOLO LEGS 8

DVUBLECCFCOLD LEGS c

DOUBLE CCFCOLD LEGS (

TRIPLE CCFCOLO LEGS n

TRIPLE CCFCOLD LEGS a

TRIPLE CCFCOLO LEGS i

T4q T4t


E.5-74

CV 8818A CV 8948A

tw

L ' JRHR HX1DISCHARGEHCV638

AHR TRAINADISCHARGE8809A

CV 88188 CV 89488

CV8818C CV8948C

RHA HX2OISCHAAGEHCV 637

RHA TRAIN8DISCHARGE88098

0CV8818D CV8948D

(I) ASSUME COLO LEG 1 IS RUPTURED, THEREFORE ONE OF THE REMAININGTHREE COLO LEGS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS OF L I

FIGURE E. 5-22. BLOCK 0 IAGRAH FOR TOP EVENT L I

1

t

1

IAAIII«OIII«VI OI h<« I~IIIC IeONPAVIS

fALVIILOfcaoILnsHJI C ION PAII I

fALVIIE OfcaolfnssANO ~

rl«IICAIE Scl LANCED I.IOVILEf

If«LOS Wr<Loca oLLos IAIIOf

rALLAW Of~VlCIONLAII$ 1JWO ~

IffllrArEACIWIOEll'ISOVIILI

nflasowloE foCOLOLEOSSANO ~

mLflI

Cfl

abc«VALVE Clifc«VALVE~S ISO es«o caollns

CI « C«VAIVEIALLAILHcaolfni

CIIIC«VAIVE CICCII VALVE CIILC«VALVE CIILC«VALVE~LIOC ~IVC ÃIlo

h«n

FIGURE E.5-23. BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LI

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGINJECTIONViARHR

FAILUREOFCOLD LEG 2INJECTIONPATH

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGS 3AND4(FLOW PATH)

RMR HEATEXCHANGER 1-1

OLITLET

RHR DISCHARGETO COLD LEGS 1

AND2

RMR MEATEXCHANGER 1-2OUTLET

FAILUREOFCOLD LEGS 3AND4INJECTION

RHR DISCHARGETO COLD LEGS 3AND4

BKA BKC BKB

COLD LEG 2INJ ECTIONPATH



FIGURE E.5-24. EXPANDED BLOCK LEVEL FAULT TREE FOR TOP EVENT LI(Sheet I of 2)

E.5-77

.I>

~ '

FGH

233414

241324

12

2334

234134124

123 124234 123134 234

COLD LEG Y

INJECTION PATH

mEJlI

CO

DOUBLE CCFCV 8818 r ORCV 8948 r


GLOBALCCFCOLD LEGS 1234

TRIPLE CCFCV8818 r ORCV 8948 r


BKP G4

DOUBLE CCFCOLD LEGS 5

DOUBLE CCFCOLD LEGS c

DOUBLE CCFCOLD LEGS (

TRIPLE CCFCOLD LEGS q

TRIPLE CCFCOLD LEGS c

TRIPLE CCFCOLD LEGS i

74q 74o 741


PUP SXl'IN ffQINI IEC 4 (LNs 8701m sm)

FIQK E&25. MXDAMRB TIP EYENI'kl

E.5-79

CMN RR PNPSXTIN FRN NTLEG 4 (SW S70> te8702 FAIL TO 5KN)

FIQK E&26. 8 KK LEVEL FNLT TREE FN TlP EVEM IN

E.5-80

LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA1LA2LA2LA2

A2

LA2LA2LA2LA2LA2LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3LA3

B

LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB1LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2LB2

1 LA1TOTAL

2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN17 MN28 MN39 HE1 LA2

TOTAL2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN17 Mh28 MN39 HE1 LA3

TOTAL2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN17 MN28 MN39 HE

1 TOT1 LB12 TOTAL3 HW

4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN7 MN18 MN29 MN3

10 HE1 LB22 TOTAL3 HW

4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN

7 MN1

8 MN2

~ P[LA2)~ P[LA2)~ HWI + HWD~ HI[[.B)~ HD[LB)~ MN1 + MN2 t MN3~ ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF~ Z%N9D*ZMHXRF~ 2"ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF~ ZHELA2~ P[LA1)~ P[LA1)~ HWI + HWD~ HI[LB)~ HD[LB)~ MN1 + MN2 + MN3~ ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF~ ZMGN9D*ZMHXRF~ 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF~ ZHELA1

P[LA)~ P[LA)~ HWI + HWD~ HI[LB)~ HD[LB)~ MN1 + MN2 + MN3~ ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF

LCN9D*ZMHXRF~ 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF~ 0.0~ 1.0

(P[LB2) - PLAB2))/(1"P[LA2))~ P[LB2)~ HWI + HWD~ HI[LB)~ HD[LB)~ MN1 + MN2 + MN3~ ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF~ ZMGNQD*ZMHXRF~ 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF~ ZHELA2~ PLAB2)/P[LA2)> PLAB2]~ HWI + HWD~ HI[LB) * HI[LB)~ HD[LB)~ 2 * HI[LB) * M[LB)~ ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF*HI[LB)*2~ ZMGN9D*ZMHXRF*HI [LB)*2

FIGURE E.5-27. ECCLP.EQS(Sheet 1 of 8)

S CSF for LA given 4KV Bus G andS Instrument Channel II available(SLOCA Case)S8SSS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MOV 8700A, FCV 641A)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; SLOCA Case)S CSF for LA given 4KV Bus G andS Instrument Channel II available(Bleed & Feed)SSSSS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MOV 8700A, FCV 641A)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; Bleed & Feed Case)S CSF for LA given 4KV Bus G and8 Instrument Channel II available(LLOCA/MLOCA Case)SSSS

8 Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MDV 8700A, FCV 641A)SS Guaranteed failureS CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H available and LA succeisfulS (SLOCA Case)SS8SS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenance,S Valve maintenance(MOV 8700B, FCV 641B)8S CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H and Instrument Channel IIIS available and LA failed (SLOCA Case)SSSS I

S Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance6 RHR heat exchanger maintenance

E.5-81

LB2LB2LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB3LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB4LB5LB5LB5LB5LB5LB5

B5

LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB6LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7LB7

9 MN3

10 HE1 LB3

TOTAL2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN17 MN28 MN3


4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN

7 MN1

8 MN29 MN3


4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN

7 MN1

8 MN29 MN3

10 HE1 LB6

TOTAL2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN17 MN28 MN39 HE1 LB72 TOTAL3 HW

4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN

7 MN18 MN2

«2eZMVBODeZMVBOFeHI[LB)*2«ZHELA2«P[LB2)«P[LB2)«HWI + HWD

«HI[LB)« HD[LB)«MNl + MN2 + MN3«ZMFRHD*ZMPRHF«ZKNQD*ZMHXRF«2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF«ZHELA2

(P[LB1) - PLABl))/(1-P[LA1) )«P[LBl)«HWZ + HWD« HI[LB)« HD[LB]« MN1 + MN2 + MN3« ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF« Z%NQD*ZMHXRF« 2"ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF« ZHELA1«PLAB1) /P[LA1)«PLAB1)«HWI + HWD« HI[LB) e HI[LB]« ED[LB)« 2 * HI[LB) * M[LB]«ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF*HI[LB]«2«2KNQD*ZMHXRF*HI[LB)*2«2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF*HI[LB)*2«ZHELA1«P[LBl)«P[LBl)«HWI + HWD« HI[LB)« HD[LB]«MN1 + MN2 + MN3«ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF«ZMGNQD*ZMHXRF«2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF«ZHELA1

(P[LB) - P[LAB])/(1-P[LA))« P[LB)«HWI t HWD« HI[LB)« ED[LB)«MN1 + MN2 + MN3«ZMPRHD*ZMPRHF«MQD*ZMHXRF

PIGURE E.5-27 (Sheet 2 of 8)

S Valve maintenance(KV 8700B, FCV 641B)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; SLOCA Case)S CSF for LB given 4KV Bus G orS Instrument Channel II Failed (SLOCA Case)SS8SS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MDV 8700A, FCV 641A)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; SLOCA Case)S CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H available and LA successfulS (Bleed b. Feed Case)SSSSS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RBR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MOV 8700B, FCV 641B)SS CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H and Instrument Channel IIIS available and LA failed (Bleed 6 Feed Case)SS8SS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MDV 8700B, FCV 641B)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; Bleed A Feed Case)S CSF for LB 6iven 4KV Bus G orS Instrument Channel II Failed(Bleed A Feed Case)S

SSS8 Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenanceS Valve maintenance(MOV 8700A, FCV 641A)S Operator fails to trip RHR pumps; Bleed b. Feed Case)S CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H available and LA successfulS (LLOCA/MLOCA Case)S

SS

SS Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenance

E.5-82

~1 Q

*h I

II ~ t

LB7LB7LB8LB8LB8LB8LBQLB8LB8LB8LB8LB8LB9LB9LBQLB9LBQLB9LB9LB9LB9LB9LBFLV1LV1LV1LvlLV1

'Wl

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

RW1

VA1VA1VA1VA1VA1

10 HE1 LBQ2 TOTAL»3 HW

4 HWI5 HWD

6 MN

7 MN1

8 MN29 MN3

10 HE1 LBQ

TOTAL»2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 MN

6 MN1

7 MN28 MN3

9 HE1 TOT1 TOTAL»2 HW

3 HWIBKA

4 HWD

1 TOTAL»TTL

2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

5 SEISBKABKBSEIST »RWSM1»RWSM2»SEIS17»SEIS16»SEIS8 »SEIS4 »SEIS2 »SEIS1 »

1 VhlTOTAL »

2 HW

3 HWI4 HWD

2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF0.0P[LAB)/P[LA)P[LAB)HWI + HWD

HI[LB) * HI[LB)HD[LB)2 * HI[LB) * M[LB)IMPRHD*ZMPRHF*HI[LB)*22tSNQD*ZMHXRF*HI[LB)*22*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOPeHI[LB)*20.0P[LB)P[LB)HWI + HWD

HI[LB)HD[LB)MN1 + MN2 + MN3ZMPRHD"ZMPRHFQKNQD"ZMHXRF2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF0.01.0HW

HWI + HWD

BKAZTVMOT * (Tl + TM) + ZTVCOD + ZTVCOP * TM0.0TTL + SEIS - TTL * SKISHW

HWI + HWD

BKA + BKB0.0SEISTZTTK1B * (IM + 7*24/2)ZTVHOT * (TM + Tl)ZRWSTK + RWSM1 - ZRWSTK * RWSM1ZRHRPP + RWSM2 - ZRHRPP * RWSM2ZCSPMP + SE1S17 - ZCSPMP * SEIS17SEIS16 + SEIS1 - SEIS16 * SEIS1SEIS8 » 2 - SEIS8 * SEIS8SEIS4 * 2 - SEIS4 * SEIS4SEIS2 * 2 - SEIS2 * SEIS2SEIS1 * 2 - SEIS1 * SEIS1ZBOPPS * 0.25P[VA)P[VA)HWI + HWD

HI [VB)HD [VB)

8 Valve maintenance(MOV 8700B, FCV 641B)8S CSF for LB given 4KV Bus H and Instrument Channel III8 available and Lh failed (LLOCA/MLOCA Case)6868S Unscheduled RHR pump maintenanceS RHR heat exchanger maintenance6 Valve maintenance()g)V 8700B, FCV 641B)88 CSF ior LB given 4KV Bus G orS Instrument Channel II Failed (LLOCA/MLOCA Case)8S888 Unscheduled RHR pump maintenance8 RHR heat exchanger maintenance8 Valve maintenance(MOV 8700h, FCV 641A)88 Guaranteed failureS CSF for LV for all cases888 Failure of WV 8980 or CV 89818 Failure of MOV 8980 or CV 8981S CSF for RW

8S6S8 Seismic Initiated Failures8 RWST integrity(RWST level checked weekly)8 RWST outlet valve(MV 1-1)S Seismic failure (RWST, RHR PP, CS PP, RHR HX & PIPING)8 Seismic failure (RHR PP, CS PP, RHR HX & PIPING)8 Seismic failure (CS PP, RHR HX & PIPING)8 Seismic Failure Contribution (17 Piping segs.)8 Seismic Failure Contribution (16 Piping segs.)8 Seismic Failure Contribution (8 Piping segs.)S Seismic Failure Contribution (4 Piping segs.)8 Seismic Failure Contribution (2 Piping segs.)8 Seismic Pailure Contribution (1 Piping seg.)S CSF for Vh given 4KV Bus G available8888


E.5-83

VA1VA1VAFVB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB1VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB2VB3VB3VB3VB3VB3VB3VB3VBFAC1AC1AC1

vlAC1AC1AC 1

AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1AC1

5 HN6 HN11 TOT1 VB12 TOTAL ~

3 HW

4 HWI5 HWD

6 HN

7 MN1

1 VB22 TOTAL ~

3 HW

4 HWI5 HMD

6 )(N7 )(Nl1 VB3

TOTAL ~

2 HW

3 HWI4 HMD

5 HN

6 HN1

1 TOTAL ~

2 HW

3 HMIHWI1HWI2HWI3HWI4

HWI54 HWD

HWDX1

HWDX2 ~HWD1

HMD2HWD3

HMD4

HWD5

HWD6HWD7

HWD8

HMD9

HWD10 ~HWD11 ~HMD12 ~HMD13 ~

](NlZHVBODeZHVBOF1.0(P[VB) - P[VAB)P [VB)HWI + HWD

HI[VB)HD[VB)](NlZHVBOD*ZHVBOFP[VAB]/P[VA)P[VAB]HWI + HWD

HI[VB] * HI[VB]HD[VB)H[VB)*HI[VB]*2.Z](VBOD*ZNBOFe2P[VB)P[VB)HWI + HWD

HI[VB]HD[VB)]([VB)ZHVBOD*ZHVBOF1.0HM+ HNHWI + HMD

HMI1 t HWI2ACLFGH * AC]FGHACLFGH * AC[FGHAC]FGH * (LIBKB(LIBKB + LIBKD)ACBKN + ACBKO +HWD1 + HWD2HWD6 + HWD7

HWD11 + HMD126 * D4VCOD ~

1 e D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *1 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *2 * D4VCOD *9 e D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *1 * D4VCOD *3 * AC]FGH *1 e T4VCOD3 * T4VCOD *2 e T4VCOD *

)/(1-P[VA])

0.0*HI[VB)

+ HWI3 + HWI4* AC[FGH* (LIBKA + LIBKC)+ LIBKD)* (LIBKA + LIBKC)ACBKP + ACBKJ + AC+ HWD3 + HWD4+ HWD8 + HWDQ

+ HWD13 + HWD14D4VCODD4VCOD * D4VCODD4VCOD * AC]FGHD4VCOD * (LIBKA +ACLFGHAC]FGH * AC>FGHACLFGH * (LIBKA +T4VCOD(LIBKB + LIBKD)(LIBKA + LIBKC)T4VCOD

+ HWI5

BKK + ACBKL+ HWD5 + HWDX1+ HWD10 + HWDX2+ HWD15 + HWD16

LIBKC)

LIBKC)

T4VCOD(LIBKB + LIBKD)


SS Hotor operator valve maintenance(HDV 8982A)S Guaranteed failureS CSF for VB given 4KV Bus H available and Vh successfulSSS

6S

S Hotor operator valve maintenance(HOV 8982B)S CSF for VB given 4KV Bus H availableS and top event Vh failedSSS

SS Hotor operator valve maintenance(HOV 8982B)6 CSF for VB given 4KV Bus G FailedSS66SS Hotor operator valve maintenance(HOV 8982A)S Guaranteed failure6, hll boundary cond[,tions(No support required)S

SSSS

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS6S

E.5-84

AC1AC1AC1AC1AclAC1AclAc1AC1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1

LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI1LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2

HWD15HWD16

5 MN

6 MN1MNAAZlZ2MNAB

7 MN21 LI12 HW

3 HWIHWI1HWI2HWI3HWI4

4 HWD

HWDX1HWDX2

HWD1HWD2

HWD3

HWD4

HWD5

HWD6

HWD7

HWD8

HWD9

HWD10HWD11HWD12HWD13HWD14

HWD15HWD16

5 MN

6 MN1

MNLAYlY2MNLB

1 LI2AC1ACHWIACI1ACI2ACI3ACI4ACI5ACHWD

1 * T4VCOD * (LIBKA + LIBKC)1 * G4VCOD

~ MN1 + MN2~ 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF*(MNAA+ MNAB)~ ACLFGH * AC)FGH + D4VCOD + 4*D4VCOD*D4VCOD + Zl~ T4VCOD*T4VCOD + 4*D4VCOD*T4VCOD + 2*T4VCODtG4VC(XHZ2 6~ LIBKB + LIBKD 8~ ACiFGH + 3eD4VCOD + 3*T4VCOD + G4VCOD +LIBKA + LIBKC 8~ 3 e ZMVBOF * 1.0 6~ HW + MN 6~ HWI + HWD 8~ HWII + HW12 + HWI3 + HWI4 6

1 * LI'LFGH * LI)FGH e LliFGH 61 * LI)FGH * LliFGH * (LIBKA+ LIBKC)1 * LI)FGH * (LIBKB + LIBKD)1 * (LIBKB + LIBKD) * (LIBKA + LIBKC)

~ HWD1 + HWD2 + HWD3 + HWD4 + HWDS + HWDX1~ HWD6 + HWD7 + HWD8 + HWD9 + HWD10 + HWDX2~ HWDll + HWD12 + HWD13 + HWD14 + HWD15 + HWD16

6 * D4CVX2 * D4CVX2* D4CVX2 * D4CVX2 * D4CVX2

3 e D4CVX2 * D4CVX2 * LILFGH1 * D4CVX2 * D4CVX2 * (LIBKA + LIBKC)3 e D4CVX2 * LILFGH3 * D4CVX2 * LI)FGH * LI'LFGH2 * D4CVX2 * LI)FGH * (LIBQ + LIBKC)9 * D4CVX2 * T4CVX23 * D4CVX2 * (LIBKB + LIBKD)1 * D4CVX2 * (LIBQ + LIBKC)3 * LILFGH * T4CVX21 * T4CVX23 * T4CVX2 * T4CVX22 * T4CVX2 * (LIBKB + LIBKD)1 * T4CVX2 " (LIBKA + LIBKC) 81 * G4CVX2 S

~ MN1 S~ 2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF*(MNLA+ MNLB) 6

LILFGH * LILFGH + D4CVX2 + 4*D4CVX2*D4CVX2 + Yl 6~ T4CVX2*T4CVX2 + 4*D4CVX2*T4CVX2 + 2*T4CVX2tG4CVX2+Y2 6~ LIBKB + LIBKD~ LI'LFGH + 3*D4CVX2 + 3*T4CVX2 + G4CVX2 + LIBKA + LIBKCS~ Lll/AC1~ ACHWD + ACHWI + ACMN~ ACI1 + ACI2 + ACI3 + ACI4 + ACI5~ AC'LFGH * AC'iFGH * ACLFGH~ AC'LFGH e AC)FGH * (LIBQ + LIBKC)~ AC(FGH e (LIBKB + LIBKD)~ (LIBKB + LIBKD) * (LIBKA + LIBKC)~ ACBKN + ACBKO + ACBKP + ACBKJ + ACBKK + ACBKL~ ACDl + ACD2 + ACD3 + ACD4 + ACD5 + ACDX1

Valve maintenance(M3Vs 8809h h B, and HCV 638 8 637)Unavailability due to MOV8809h or HCV638 in maintenance

Unavailability due to H3V8809B or HCV637 in maintenanceValve maintenance(MOVs 8806B,C h D)One hour tech. spec.hll boundary conditions(No support required)

Valve maintenance(MOVs 8809h h B, and HCV 638 6 637)Unavailability due to )K)V8809h or HCV638 in maintenance

Unavailability due to )K)V8809B or HCV637 in maintenanceLLOCA initiatin8 event: Given failure of top event ACSplit fraction AC1


E.5-85

LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2I2

,LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2

ACDX1 ~

ACDX2 ~

ACD1ACD2ACD3ACD4ACD5ACD6ACD7ACD8ACD9ACD10 ~ACD11 ~ACD12 ~ACD13 ~ACD14 ~ACD15 ~ACD16 ~AMAM1 ~HNAAZlZ2HNABACM ~LI1LIHWI ~

LII1LII2LII3LII4LIHWD ~

LIDX1 ~

LIDX2 ~

LID1LID2LID3LID4LID5LID6LID7LID8LIDQLID10 ~LIDll ~

LID12 ~

LID13 ~

LID14 ~

LID15 ~

LID16 ~

SS6S6S

SSS6S6S6SSSSSSS

+ ACDX2+ ACD16

+ Zl

+ ACD8+ ACD13D4VCODD4VCOD *D4VCOD *D4VCOD *AC)FGHAC)FGH *ACLFGH *T4VCOD(LIBKB +(LIBKA +T4VCOD

+ ACDQ + ACD10+ ACD14 + ACD15

ACD6 + ACD7ACD11 + ACD12

6 e D4VCOD *1 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *1 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *2 * D4VCOD *9 * D4VCOD *3 * D4VCOD *1 * D4VCOD e3 * AC)FGH *1 * T4VCOD3 * T4VCOD *2 * T4VCOD *1 * T4VCOD *1 * G4VCOD

ACHN1 + ACHN22e ZHVBOD*Z)(VBOFAC'LFGH e AC(FGHT4VCOD*T4VCOD +LIBKB + LIBKDAC(FGH + 3*D43 * ZHVBOF * 1.LIHWD + LIHHI +LII1 + LII2

1 * LliFGH *1 * LI)FGH *1 * LI)FGH *1 * (LIBKB +

LID1 + LID2LID6 + LID7LID11 + LID12

6 * D4CVX2 *1 * D4CVX2 *3 * D4CVX2 *1 * D4CVX2 *3 * D4CVX2 *3 * D4CVX2 e

2 e D4CVX2 *9 * D4CVX2 *3 * D4CVX2 *1 e D4CVX2 e

3 e LI'LFGH *1 * T4CVX23 * T4CVX2 *2 * T4CVX2 *1 * T4CVX2 *1 * G4CVX2

D4VCODAC LFGH

(LIBKA + LIBKC)

ACLFGH(LIBKA + LIBKC)

LIBKD)LIBKC)

T4VCOD(LIBKB + LIBKD)(LIBKA + LIBKC)

*()(Nhh + MNAB)+ D4VCOD + 4*D4VCOD*D4VCOD4*D4VCOD*T4VCOD + 2*T4VCOD +G4VCOD+228

SIBKA + LIBKCS

+ LIDX1+ LIDX2+ LID16

T4CVX2(LIBKB + LIBKD)(LIBKA + LIBKC)

VCOD + 3*T4VCOD + G4VCOD + L0

LIHN+ LII3 + LII4LI)FGH * LI(FGHLILFGH * (LIBKA + LIBKC)(LIBKB + LIBKD)LIBKD) * (LIBKA + LIBKC)+ LID3 + LID4 + LIDS+ LID8 + LID9 + LID10+ LID13 + LID14 + LID15D4CVX2D4CVX2 * D4CVX2D4CVX2 * LI>FGHD4CVX2 * (LIBKA + LIBKC)LI'LFGHLILFGH * LILFGHLI1FGH * (LIBKA + LIBKC)T4CVX2(LIBKB + LIBKD)(LIBKA + LIBKC)T4CVX2

Valve maintenance()K)Vs 8809h 6 B, and HCV 638 & 637)Unavailability due to HOV8809h or HCV638 in maintenance

Unavailability due to HOV8809B or HCV637 in maintenanceValve maintenance(ÃlVs 8808B, C 6 D)hll boundary conditions(No support required)

FIGURE E.5-27 (Sbeet 6 of 8)

E.5-86

qtP

> ~

}PS

$ 4)

,

t'>

it

LI2LI2LI2LI2LI2MU1MU1

MU1MU1MU1MU1MU1MU2

MU2MU2MU2MU2MU2MUF

LIMNMNLAYlY2MNLBTOTAL»HW

HWIMN

MN1»

MUBKA»TOTAL»HW

HWI»

MUBKB»CON2TOTP [LAZ)»P[LB2)»PLAB2)»P[LA1)P [LB1)»PLAB1)»P[LA)»P[LB) »P[LAB)»HI[LB)»HD[LB)»M[LB) »LBBKD »LBBKE »CON1LBBKF »

P[VA) »P[VB) »P[VAB)»HI[VS)»HD[VB)»M[VB) »LIBKA »LIBKB »LIBKC»LIBKD »ACBKJ »ACBKK »ACBKL »ACBKN »

SS

CVXZWY2 SS

LIBKCS

N2

SS

iTMS

2*ZMVBOD*ZMVBOF* (MNLA + MNLB )LI[FGH * LI)FGH + D4CVX2 + 4*D4CVX2*D4CVX2 + YlT4CVX2*T4CVX2 + 4eD4CVXZ*T4CVXZ + 2*T4CVX24G4LIBKB + LIBKDLI[FGH + 3eD4CVX2 + 3*T4CVX2 + G4CVX2 + LIBKA +HW + MN + HE " (HW + MN) * HEHWI

MUBKAMN1

2 * ZMVBOD * ZMVBOF * 1.0ZHEMU1ZTVMOD * 2 + ZTVMOT * TM * 2HW + HE - HW * HEHWIMUBKB

ZHEMU2ZTPRHS + 3*ZTVCOD + TM * (ZTPRHR + 3*ZTVCOP) + COTM * (5*ZTVHOT + 3*ZTVHOT + ZTSC1P)1.0P [LB2)P[LB) + ZHELA2P[LAB) + ZHELA2P [LB1)P[LB) + ZHELA1P[LAB) + ZHELhlP [LB)HI[LB) + HD[LB) + M[LB)HI[LB) * (HI[LB) + 2*M[LB]) + HD[LB)LBBKD + LBBKE + LBBKFD2PRHS * 2 + D2PRHR * TM + D2VCOD + D2VMQOZMFRHD"ZMPRHF + ZMGN9D*ZMHXRF + 2»ZMVBODiZMVBOFZTVM3T * (IM + Tl)S2PRHS * 2 + S2PRHR * IM + S2VCOD + CON1ZTVCOP * TM +3*ZTVHOT*(T)MT1)+ 62VM3O + ZTV)K)T(ZTVHOT + ZTHXRB)*(TM+ Tl)P[VB)HI[VB) + HD[VB) + M[VB)HI[VB) " (HI[VB) + 2*M[VB)) + HD[VB)SZVMOO + S2VMQC + 2 * ZTVMOT * TMD2VMDO + D2VM3CZMVBOD*ZMVBOFLIBKBZTVAOT * (TM + T3)LIBKDZTVMOT * (TM + T3)ACBKLACBKL

'TVCOD + ZTVCOP * TMACBKP

Valve maintenance(M3Vs 8809A & B, and HCV 638 & 637)Unavailability due to MUV8809h or HCV638 in maintenance

Unavailability due to MUV8809B or HCV637 in maintenanceCSF for MU with buses G and H availablefor all cases

Failure oi MOV 8701 or WV 8702 to open

Unavailability due to maint. on )%V 8701 & 8702Operator action to open suction from hot leg 4 to RHRFailure of MOV 8701 or MUV 8702 to openCSF for MU with bus G available(Make-up to RWST)

Operator action (Make-up to the RWST via the SFP pump)Note; RHR pump failuze rates used for SFP pump)

Guaranteed failureRHR failure(Single train)SLOCA CaseRHR failure(Single train)SLOCA CaseRHR system failure(Tzains h and B)SLOCA CaseRHR failuze(Single train)Bleed & Feed CaseRHR failure(Single train)Bleed & Feed CaseRHR system failure(Trains h and B)Bleed & Feed CaseRHR failure(Single train)LLOCA/MLOCA CaseRHR failure(Single train)LLOCA/MLOCA CaseRHR system failure(Tzains h and B)LLOCA/MLOCA CaseIndependent hardware failures for a single RHR trainDependant hardware failures for RHR tzains A and BMaint. contributions to RHR tzain h(Same for train B)MOV 8700 transfers closedFailure of RHR pump to start twice, fail to run, failureof discharge check, manual valves(CCW), or pump miniflcwFailure of the RHR HX integrity or MV 8724hSingle train total unavailability for top event VASingle train total unavailability foz top event VBTwo train total unavailability for top event VA/VBIndep. hardware failures for a single train(VA or VB)Dependant hardware failures for both trains h and BMaint.contributions to RHR train h (MOVs 8982A)RHR discharge to cold legs tznsfzs closed(HCV638)Tr. ARHR discharge to cold legs trnsfrs clo'sed(HCV 637)Tr. BRHR train h dichazge valve(8809h) transfers closedRHR train B dichazge valve(8809B) transfers closedFirst off check valve, RHR/ACCUM. cold leg in)ecFirst oii check valve, RHR/ACCUM. cold leg in)ecFizst off chock valve, RHR/ACCUM. cold leg infection 4Accumulator discharge(CV8956 and MOV8808) to cold leg 2


E.5-87

hCBKO»hCBKP»LILFGH»hC)FGH»S4CVX2»D4CVX2»T4CVX2»G4CVX2»THTlT2T3TCSNCSNRFTMD

hCBKPZTVCOD+(ZTVCOP * TH)+ZTTK1B»(THtTHD)+ZTVHOT»(IHtT2)(S4VCOD + ZTVCOP * TH) * 2S4VCOD + ZTVCOP * THS4VCOD + S4VCODD4VCOD + D4VCODT4VCOD + T4VCODG4VCOD + G4VCOD24.0(8760 * 0.25)/2.0(8760.0 » 1.5)/2.0TCS/2(8760 » 1.5)/(NCS*1.5 + NRF)216.0


S hccumulator dlschar6e(CV8956 and HOV8808) to cold le8 3S hccumulator dlschar8e(CV8956 and HOV8808) to cold le8 4

S LI: Blocks F 6 J; or G 6 K; or H 8 L(lst h 2nd off CVs)S hC: Block F,G or H. (Second off'V only)S Indep.failure of 1st or 2nd off CV to open on demandS Double CCF of 1st or 2nd off CV to open on demandS Triple CCF of 1st or 2nd off CV to open on demandS Global CCF of 1st or 2nd off CV to open on demand8 Mission timeS Hean exp. time prior to I.E. foz quarterly tested equip.8 Hean exp. time prior to I.E. for equip. tested at RFS Mean exp. time prior to I.E. for equip. tested at CSS Hean time between cold shutdownsS Number of cold shutdowns per yearS Number of refuelin8 outa6es per year and a halfS TS limit for operatin6 with inoperable accumulator

E.5-88

~ *,t

0rt'I

TOP EVENT LA LB ER COMPONENTSNOTE: BLOCKS C AND CONTAIN CCW I4ANUAL

VALVES TO RHR P PACKAGECOOLERS (NOT SHOWN HERE).

REGEN HEAT EXCHANGER

YOLUNE CONTROL TA10(

H LCV 1128

RNST

ACCI-I

RCSLOO 8900l 681 l

RCSL~2 8 008 8$ 1 S

RCS

8 00C 8$ 1 C

RCSLOOP 4 8900D 881 D

SS ISA

820

8 80 1l

88018

Soi

8107 N

8108 H

8 bel 847S CN I 3

84 A 8479A

~ 7

8394 l8 89l $ 478l

CH I-I

H LCV 112C

6840

8 0 A

924

808

CONTJIIIHENTSPRAY

741

Hbeebi

8 Sbl

RCSLOOP I 8948l 8 19l ebbl

808

84795

8 9488 898 84768

CH -260A

60A

ACC1-4

N$ 80BD

R(S

89480 4 190 6220

4 1$ 0

HRCS

HOT LEOS1,2 880 A 8921A 8919l

H8922A

Sl I-I8 2l 880 8

892

ACC1-2

e seo4 Ibe

882ll 8920lN N

H88058

59988ACC1-3

R($LOOP 2 89488

LOOP 3 8948CRCS

8 198 8228

4 19C d22C

83

e920888218H

RCS $ 9198MOT LEOS

3, ~ 880 8 89218 89228

897 8RNST

974A

Sl 1-292 8

977 976

N6808C

8 56C

6 IBC

C.S. IEAOER 3.4

88048

Cobe HElDER 2e4

RCSHOT

I 4 40l

RCSHOT

4 408

870

CONT SUE

S(BE(MS

860 A

608

898 lH

87168 87348

PRT HCv 637

ebsee

PRI'856A

STISAHCV 638

8734A

LETDOVII MEAT XCMCRB

SO I4lMPR 8

IDII>CV

Cl

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ocket diablo nuclear plant, unit pacific · 2017. 3. 27. · accelerated d1stpjputi0>...

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