occult science and the fall of the khwārazm-shāh jalāl al-dīn

British Institute of Persian Studies

Occult Science and the Fall of the Khwārazm-Shāh Jalāl al-DīnAuthor(s): Isabel MillerSource: Iran, Vol. 39 (2001), pp. 249-256Published by: British Institute of Persian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4300607 .

Accessed: 17/06/2014 14:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

British Institute of Persian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Iran.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.55 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 14:51:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bips

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4300607?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


OCCULT SCIENCE AND THE FALL OF THE KHWARAZM-SHAH JALAL AL-DIN

By Isabel Miller London

In Nasawl's Sirat al-Sul.tdn Jalfl al-Din Mingburnu there is a tantalisingly brief and curious story of a magic statue or image (timthV), which Jalal al-Din's father, 'AlI' al-Din Khwdrazm-Shdh, had used in his war against the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Nasir.1 The maker of the

timthdl was a certain Siraj al-Din AbN Yasuf al-SakWki who, NasawlI says, was known for his great learning and mastery of the arts. Magical powers were attributed to him, and it was believed he had bewitched certain stars and could reverse the course of rivers with his breath. He was also, according to Nasawl, author of a range of works on various other topics (wa-lahafi sd'ir al-funan tas~n1).2

The timthM, imbued with magic which would grant all one's wishes, had to be taken to Baghdad and buried there. By the time of Jaldl al-Din's rule in western Iran, the timthgl had again become important. A messenger arrived from Khwarazm to tell Jalal al-Din that Siraj al- Din was convinced that its magic had gone wrong and was at the root of all the calamities experienced by his father. As a result, it was imperative to retrieve the timthal since all its powers were directed against the Khwarazm-Sh~hs and in favour of the Caliph. So Jaldl al-Din dispatched the Qadi Shaykh Mujir al-Din, who had originally buried the timthgl in Baghdad and who therefore had to retrieve it, ostensibly on a mission to the Caliph (perhaps connected with Jaldl al-Din's attempts to obtain a diploma of recognition from the Caliph) but with the real object of digging up the timthX1. Unfortunately, the palace or house (dr) in which he had stayed on his earlier visit and in which he had buried the timthNl, was not as easily accessible as it had been in the time of the late Khwarazm-Shah (though Nasawi does not say why) and despite all his best endeavours, the Shaykh was unable to get into it, let alone dig up the timthg1.3

This episode is another reminder of the confusion, desperation and the sheer terror that the Mongol invasions had inspired in the inhabitants of eastern Islam. It also demonstrates the varied responses to these

events; for instance, Nasawi himself is critical of the behaviour of Jaldl al-Din Khwarazm-Shah in this

particular instance. He points out that people should rely on God alone and that only He knows the tablets of destiny.4 Nonetheless, various forms of magic, and perhaps most particularly astrology, were of considerable importance at this time and learned men regarded them as a valid part of their intellectual apparatus. Interestingly 'Atd-Malik Juwayni, who wrote some thirty to forty years after Nasawi, gave an account of the astrologers in Bukhara allegedly advising 'AId' al-Din against attacking the Mongols:5

The astrologers, too, said that the beneficent stars were cadent from the angles of the Ascendant and the Tenth House and that the maleficent stars were in attendance; until the transmission (of power) to the Dark Houses had passed, it would be prudent to undertake no course which would involve an encounter with the enemy. This circumstance added to the confusion of his case, and he determined to turn back and hasten elsewhere. Most of his armies he left in Transoxiana and Turkestan,

Juwayni further comments:

Nor was it concealed from the Sultan's discernment that to struggle with the contentious Heavens and to persevere against fickle Fate is (vain) toil and trouble; the course of all events is predestined.6

Whilst this is not contemporary, it may be a reliable account of the manner in which the Khwdrazm-Shdh reached his decision not to fight the Mongols. For if Nasawi's account of the timth&i, which is contemporary, is true, then 'AId' al-Din might also have allowed his decisions to be governed by astrological prediction. 'AId' al-Din would not have been unique in consulting astrologers. After all, astrology was a respectable scientific activity in the mediaeval age amongst peoples

249



250 JOURNAL OF PERSIAN STUDIES

of all religious beliefs (and indeed for some time after). It was a part of the Sasanian court practices which were adopted by the 'Abbasid Caliphs and then spread among Islamic princes. The corpus of writings from the mediaeval period is considerable, with attendant complex attributions, borrowings, translations and compilations, indicating a widespread and active field of learning.7 Perhaps, therefore, magic should be included in the reasons presented for 'AlI' al-Din's panic-stricken flight in the face of the Mongol invasion. There has been, naturally, considerable interest in this topic over the years and much discussion of the various possible causes of 'Ala' al-Din's actions.

It has been argued that 'Ala' al-Din was unable to match the exceptional size of the Mongol armies, but it has also been argued, notably by David Morgan, that the numbers cited by contemporary historians should not be relied upon.8 It is true that the Mongols were an extremely effective military force, but their tactics were fundamentally no different from those of other Central Asian nomads, based as they all were on the practice of the hunt, skilled horsemanship and the mobility of nomadic life.9

Another contemporary of Chingiz Khn's invasion, Jizjani, maintained that 'Ala' al-Din's one encounter with the Mongol army had terrified him, with their superior military skills, since he took care never to fight them again.10 Yet 'Ala' al-Din's army included a considerable number of similar Central Asian nomads, from his mother's people, the KanglY or Yemek tribes who were part of the Kipchak and possibly derived from the Pecheneg."l Most of the amirs came from the Kipchak. The KiYpchak warriors that he used went on in due course to become a part of the Mongol army itself and, later, the troops of the Golden Horde, as well as forming the cavalry of the Mamltk Sultanate in Egypt and Syria. Nor had they been softened by contact with settled peoples, pursuing what might be described as the Ibn Khaldin model of the rise and fall of empires based on nomadic armies. There had hardly been time. Judging from Nasawi, and he was after all on the same side, they were thoroughly "uncooked", regarding the settled lands in which they campaigned as alien, a view held by other contemporary commentators.'2 As a result these nomadic fighters could act with freedom from any sort of social restriction and with a behaviour similar to that shown by the Mongols towards settled peoples.13 The Kipchaks acquired a terrible reputation for violence and savagery, and they were pagan and remained so,

despite being in the service of a Muslim ruler. In fact, their paganism and their savagery provoked NasawlI to criticise 'Ald' al-Din: how could a Sultan of Islam make use of these godless nomads to protect the lands of Islam?14 A similar accusation is made by Juwayni, possibly deriving from Nasawi. This, incidentally, must surely have been an advantage for the Caliph in the propaganda war that the two rulers waged against each other.

The Khwarazm-Shahs made use of Central Asian traditions when governing the settled Muslim lands. Turning again to NasawI, when dividing his empire among his sons 'Ala' al-Din was as attuned to nomadic tradition as Chingiz Khan was.15 'AId' al-Din's eldest son, Jalal al-Din, got the lands furthest from the traditional homeland, an area which roughly comprised the former Ghurid territories, Ghiir, Ghazna, Bdmiydn and the Indus valley, though his control of this last was largely nominal, just as the ulus of JWchi, Chingiz Khan's eldest son, consisted of those lands most distant from the Mongol homeland. The youngest son got the homelands, as it were, of Khwarazm, just as Chingiz Khan's youngest son also received the Mongol homelands.

After 'AId' al-Din's death, Jalal al-Din had to act swiftly to prevent the sultanate being given to his youngest brother, who was the ruler of Khwarazm and who also had the support of the Kipchak amirs, possibly, so Nasawi tells us, because his mother was of

KiYpchak origin. NasawI portrays this incident as a wicked plot against the rightful claims of Jalkl al-Din - who had been given the throne by 'Ala' al-DIn on his death bed - asserting that it was he, as the eldest son, who had the right to the sultanate; but surely the earlier method of division was just standard Central Asian practice.16

A major source of nomadic influence in the Khwarazmian state was 'AId' al-Din's mother, Terken Khatin, who was a Kipchak princess and who brought these warrior nomads with her, or at least retained access to them, when she married his father.17 She was a woman of considerable energy and power, in the Central Asian tradition, and Nasawi states that, because

'Al' al-Din's amirs came from the Kipchak, they were

loyal to her, and so he was compelled to obey her, even

appointing a vizier whom he disliked and distrusted because she wished to have him.18 Nasawi also blames one of her relatives, Ynal, or Inalchuq, Khan, for the execution of Chingiz Khan's ambassadors at Utrar



OCCULT SCIENCE AND THE FALL OF THE KHWARAZM-SHAH JALAL AL-DIN 251

which provoked, or gave the excuse for, the Mongol invasion.19 Inal Khan, who was the governor of Utrar, arrested the merchants sent by Chingiz Khan and wrote to the Sultan claiming that they were spies and should be executed. The Sultan concurred and Inal Khan, who, so Nasawi says, was only interested in seizing their merchandise, promptly killed them. Unfortunately, 'AId' al-Din could not punish him as Chingiz Khan required, for Inal Khan was his cousin, the son of his mother's brother, and presumably the Klpchak amirs would not have supported action against him. In this regard, it would seem that 'AIa' al-Din was not so much a Muslim ruler of settled lands unable to resist the Mongol nomadic hordes as a leader of an unruly nomadic army. His fundamental military weakness may well have earlier encouraged him to seek alternative and supplementary means to confront his enemies.

The Khwirazm-Shahs' westward expansion had brought them into conflict with the 'Abbasid caliphate and the Ism'ilis. Al-NMsir had laboured for some forty years to restore the authority of the caliphate, making use of the fragmentation of power in western Iran following the break-up of the Seljuq empire there.20 The authority of the 'Abbasids increased within the framework of alliances and counter-alliances which ensued. Each local ruler sought validation of his power from the Caliph, expressed in seeking after diplomas of investiture and robes of honour, and as a result, he was able to manipulate their rivalries. He established a secret service with a reputation for efficiency, which, deserved or imaginary, was clearly designed to have a palpable effect on anyone who might think of challenging his power.21 He achieved a reputation for omniscience, not only through this spy system but also by claiming the authority of a Shl'I Imrm.22 His alliance with the Ismd'ilis, who had a popular reputation for concealment of their real motives and violence, though doubtless exaggerated, must have further enhanced his reputation for omnipotent knowledge. The Ismailis, after all, had put forward a rival claim to the caliphate-Imamate, and during the Seljuq period there had been a series of sporadic but inconclusive campaigns against them conducted by the Seljuq sultans.23 The Isma'ili strongholds in Daylam and Quhistan seemed

impregnable, and at one point the Isma'ilis had threatened Seljuq control of Isfahan and its surrounding region from the fortress of Shahdiz.24 It should be noted, however, that, with the exception of the campaign involving the siege and capture of Shahdiz, suppressing

the Ismd'ilis was not a priority for the Seljuqs.25 Nevertheless, it seems that, possibly in the popular imagination and certainly in the sources reflecting orthodox Sunni beliefs, the Isma'ilis were perceived as a serious threat to that orthodoxy. What is more, it seems to have been convenient to accuse enemies, political or otherwise, of being Ism'ili or more

precisely b.tini.26 The term

btini, "esoteric, hidden or concealed", although in this context referring specifically to the Isma~'Ilis, is sufficiently vague and inclusive to be able on occasion to encompass all sorts of behaviour. When considered in conjunction with the

Isma~'ili (and general Shi'I) doctrine of dissimulation, taqiyya, it can be seen as having been a sort of magnet for ill-defined but widespread fears, further enhancing the Isma'ili reputation for terror, stealth and access to esoteric knowledge of all sorts. In 559/1164 the Ismd'ili Imaimn, Hasan II, declared a state of qiyima, which Farhad Daftary has described as withdrawal from the world into the constant presence of the revealed Imam, and this remained in effect for almost fifty years.27 But in 607/1210, probably in part as a reaction to this long period of virtual isolation, IjHasan III campaigned for

recognition as a Sunni ruler and embarked on a

programme of building mosques and bath houses and of re-educating the Ismra'illis in Sunni practices.28 He

adopted the Sunni shar!hA, and Nasawl says that initially he had the khutMb recited in the name of the Khwarazm- Shah, though he changed it to the name of the 'Abbasid

Caliph and was therefore officially recognised by al- Nasir.29

The adoption of Sunni Islam by HIasan II brought for him a more active and more open involvement in the

political complexities of western Iran. Hasan III joined forces with Ozbeg, the ruler of Azerbaijan, to conquer Jibal. The Caliph backed this enterprise which

challenged the authority of the Khwarazm-Shah in western Iran. After Hasan's victory, these lands were then divided between the Isma'ilis, the Caliph and Ozbeg. However, Ozbeg's representative in the province, Oghlamifsh, transferred his allegiance to 'Ala' al-Din. The Caliph had also incited the Ghurids against 'AIl' al-Din's father, a policy the result of which had been a long series of campaigns extending over two reigns.30

Matters came to a head when, at the Caliph's request, Isma'Ili fidd'is murdered Oghlamish.31 The Khwarazm-Shah decided to proclaim himself an adherent of the Shi'a, remove al-Nasir's name from the

khu~tba and march on Baghdad. This probably




demonstrates 'AIl' al-Din's rather muddled, opportunistic attitude towards religion; but then the 'Abbasid was in alliance with the Shi'I IsmR'ilis, now purporting to be Sunni it was true, though it is legitimate to wonder how many of their contemporaries really believed them. Daftary has argued that most Ism'Illis themselves regarded the adoption of Sunni Islam as a reimposition of the policy of taqiyya which had been lifted when the state of qiyvma was declared.32 It was therefore no wonder 'Ala~' al-Din turned to the occult for assistance. Presumably it was at this point that the timthdl was buried in Baghdad. With the combined forces of the Isma'ilis and the caliphate ranged against him - which meant that, apart from anything else the Caliph now had access to the skills of Isma~'ili assassins - 'Al' al-Din may well have felt that he needed help from preterhuman sources.

Furthermore, not only were the Ismd'ilis popularly known as assassins they were also receptive to philosophers, however advanced or unusual in their ideas. The most famous case of their intellectual patronage is that of Nasir al-Din Tiisi, who survived Hilegui's campaign against the Isma'ilis some forty years later, became astrologer to the Il-Khans and built the observatory at Maragha as the centre for a group of astronomers and mathematicians who have become known as the Maragha School. H. Dabashi has argued that Ndsir al-Din TGsi was operating in the Iranian tradition of the philosopher-vizier, first for the Isma'ilI ruler of Quhistan with whom he sought refuge around 624/1227 in the confusion following Chingiz Khan's invasion, then later at Alamtt, and finally for the Il- Khans.33 Although he was not involved in the affair of the timthal, his career illustrates the potent nature of the union in the mediaeval world between encyclopaedic learning, including subjects such as philosophy, astrology, astronomy, geomancy and mathematics, and politics. Moreover, Tiisi's major works were written when he was living amongst the Isma'ilis, taking advantage of the security that they were able to offer and making full use of the resources of Isma'ili libraries.34 His extraordinary corpus includes recensions of works by Greek and early Islamic mathematicians including the Bang Miss and Thibit b. Qurra.35 Hans Daiber has emphasised TGsi's role as a reviver of earlier scientific traditions as well as stressing his philosophical studies influenced by the writings of Ibn Sina and by Neoplatonic ideas.36 Examination of Ttisi's works can therefore give some idea of the contents of the great

library at Alamit and the intellectual concerns of the

Isma('ili leadership at this late period. At all events, patronage of scholars such as Tuisi enhanced the intellectual reputation of the Isma'ili leadership. Perhaps it also influenced 'AI' al-Din, who may have feared that the Isma'ilis had access to some particularly powerful form of 'ilm, some hermetic science, which they could also place at the service of the Caliph (who, it may be recalled, had also cultivated a reputation for omniscience) and that it would be well to guard against any exercise of this powerful alliance. W. Ivanow in his article "A forgotten branch of the Isma~'ilis" illustrated the sort of powers which could be attributed to spiritual leaders such as the Ism'ili Im•ms.37 In a treatise intended for instruction, and dealing with the IsmW'ili Imamate, there is a report of a letter foretelling the rise of the Mongols which, it was claimed, was sent to 'AI' al-Din Muhammad by the Isma'ilis. Whilst it is true that the historical record of these pronouncements is very much after the event, it may well be that similar predictions had become known to 'AlI' al-Din and his court. Ivanow also pointed out that similar prophecies are alluded to in Nasir al-Din TGlsi's Rawdat al-tasl~m.38 It would certainly fit the general atmosphere of the moment, characterised by complex alliances, shifting, uncertain loyalties, propaganda and intrigue, of which the timthi] forms so potent a part. Perhaps it is in this context that the question of whether or not the Isma'ilis and the Caliph played any part in inciting Chingiz Khan against the Khwarazm-Shah should be considered. As Marshall Hodgson noted, Juwayni rejected the notion, but Rashid al-Din Tabib, admittedly writing somewhat later but with access to a wide range of authentic materials, claimed it was true.39 Whilst it may never be possible to prove either way, it is an accusation which accords with the neuroses of the age and the reputations of both the Isma~'ili leadership and the Caliph. In such conditions, the use of astrology may well have been deemed both necessary and efficacious.

Hence, if the Khwdrazm-Shah was influenced by Central Asian nomadic traditions of inheritance for the division of his empire and possessed an army dominated by Kipchak amirs, he may perhaps have been also attracted to those aspects of religion and those ideas in the Muslim world that accorded more with Central Asian shamanism than with the Islamic orthodoxy of the ulema, and herein may lie the reason for the impact of the astrologers' predictions recounted by Juwayni and of the episode of the timthill in Nasawi.




Indeed, the two practices are linked, fabrication and use of magical figurines and amulets being an offshoot of astrology, an applied pseudo-science, as it were. Religious amulets, were almost universally worn as prophylactics, and included charms and holy relics such as tablets made of earth from the tomb of the Shi'i Im5mn

H.usayn.40 However, Nasawi's account of the timth] is of a different order. It matches recipes in Latin translations of the treatise De Imaginibus, attributed to the mathematician Thabit b. Qurra (d. 288/901) and of which a number of copies have survived in European libraries, indicating a considerable degree of interest in the text among scholars in mediaeval Europe.41 According to Lyn Thorndike's monumental study, A History of Magic and the Experimental Sciences, it was translated by both Adelard of Bath and John of Spain (or Seville). As a result, Thabit was quoted as an authority on the science of images by a range of authors, such as Roger Bacon. F.J. Carmody discussed the treatise in his study of the astronomical works of Thdbit b. Qurra, and more recently R6gis Morelon has assessed his contribution to astronomy, discussing the eight or so works out of some thirty attributed to him which have survived.42 Carmody also discussed the hermetic work, Liber Prestigiorum, attributed to Thabit when not attributed to Hermes Trismegistus himself, which was translated by Adelard of Bath; but Carmody dismisses this fairly swiftly from the corpus of Thabit's works.43 Studies focussed more particularly on mediaeval magic by both Charles Burnett and Donald Pingree have set Thabit in the contemporary intellectual context of hermeticism and magic. Possibly the earliest extant work on this sort of magic, that of talismans, is the Liber Imaginum attributed to Ptolemy. Other hermetic works followed which dealt with images and talismans in a variety of ways, including Abi Ma'shar's KitTb al- UlOff44 The GhIdy?t al-hakimn, or Picatrix, written in Madrid in the late fourth or early fifth/early eleventh century (see below), includes a discussion of the making of amulets with exceptional power over human beings and the natural world, including neutralising the action of arms wielded by the enemy and calming the desires of soldiers who risk bringing about the victory of the enemy.45 The making of such an amulet (nirandj), was very skilled, with necessary precautions against the noxious materials employed. It is clear that there were many variants on the theme of magic images, talismans and statues. It is therefore possible that Nasawi's story

presents not only an example of the practical application of the magic of images but also another variant of it.

Astrology and, as Thorndike expresses it, "astrological conditions" played an important part in the preparation and burying of images. The name of the person to be injured could be engraved on the back of the image along with various curses. The image should be buried in the house of the person concerned. Perhaps this gives a clue as to where 'Ala' al-Din's agent had buried his anti-caliphal timthgl. Extraordinary as this seems, it surely had to be buried within the grounds of the Caliph's palace. If so, no wonder the unfortunate Shaykh was unable to recover it. The wonder is that anyone was able to bury it in the first place, particularly if the burial was a magical rite performed according to planetary or lunar influence.

Since Nasawl described the vehicle for magic as a

timthid, an image or a statue, which might even be considered a likeness, it may have been or have included some sort of representation of the Caliph, recognisable maybe, not so much by resemblance to an individual, as by the writing of his name, and/or titles, or by the portrayal of insignia, although it might also have been a symbol not unlike Abti Ma'shar's allegorical figures described by Carmody.46 In any case, it may be said that in some way or another it could be identified as relating to the Caliph, if only to a person who could read the enigmatic signs.

The magic activated by such an image could, it was maintained, procure amongst other things the destruction of a given region and the conquest of a city, but not, specifically, the death of a king. It is not clear from Nasawli's text what precisely the timthil was meant to procure for 'Ala' al-Din Khwirazm-Shah, but it may be that the timth] was thought to be working against the Khwarazm-Shahs because it had been loaded with a power that it was neither capable of harnessing nor of using. Employing magic in his attempt to conquer Baghdad or to overthrow the 'Abbasid Caliph had been over-adventurous. It had brought disaster on the Khwarazm-Shahs, and could do so again. This was experimental science with a vengeance, and one can readily see why it should be so

fraught with danger and why, therefore, it was so

imperative to retrieve the buried timthl. It may never be possible to confirm positively the

authorship of De Imaginibus, although many mediaeval

scholars, in Europe and the Middle East, perhaps most

importantly the author of Picatrix, Abo Maslama




Muhammad al-Majriti known as the Pseudo-Majriti (c. 398/1007), believed the treatise to be genuine.47 But the information available on Thabit b. Qurra and on his home town of Harrfn in northern Syria, its pagan inhabitants and their traditions, is just sufficient to allow for considerable further speculation. For instance, Michel Tardieu's densely argued article on the Sabians concludes that Harrin was the site of a Platonic Academy which preserved the traditions of pagan philosophy and science.48 T. Fahd has argued that the Harranians practised astrolatry, the worship of the stars.49 There was certainly a temple to the Mesopotamian Moon God Sin in

H.arran up until the

fifth/eleventh century, when it was destroyed. Nasawi's comments on the manufacturer of the

timthl shed some light on contemporary views on learning, experimental or other, most interestingly in his report of the claim that Siraj al-Din had the ability to bewitch the stars, which may be regarded as a sort of application of astrology, if not the worship of stars, or perhaps a garbled version of the theory of trepidation which was attributed to Thdbit by mediaeval and Renaissance scholars in Europe.So0 However, his ability to change the course of a river with his breath is a purely supernatural skill, comparable to those claimed for

S.ifi masters and saints. Tamara M. Green has pointed out that what we

know of the ideas and beliefs of both mediaeval Harrdnians and Thabit b. Qurra derives from accounts by Muslim contemporaries, many of whom were interested in hermetic philosophy and the esoteric arts.51 Their testimony perhaps tells more about their own concerns than gives reliable information about the Harramnians. Thus it would seem that, when he relates his story, Nasawl is not only rejecting magic but is also criticising the influence of Neoplatonists and other philosophers. If this last is correct, then Nasawi's criticism runs deep indeed.

Islam had a rather complex relationship with philosophy, which was suspect, as being pursued by the more heterodox elements within the learned community. For instance, Ahmad b. al-Tayyib b. Marwan al-SarakhsI, who knew Thabit and was regarded as the most important student of al-Kindi, was executed in 286/899, possibly because of his association with the Mu'tazilites.52 Al-Ghazali divided the fields of

learning into the praiseworthy and the blameworthy, and he ultimately rejected Neoplatonism and attacked the philosophical writings of Ibn Sina.53 The Caliph al-

Ndsir actively suppressed the pursuit of Greek philosophy. Most notable, perhaps, was the persecution of Rukn al-Din b. 'Abd al-Wahhab b. 'Abd al-Qadir al- Jill.54 Rukn al-Din was a faqih who possessed a large private library of works on philosophy and the natural sciences. His library was publicly burnt in Baghdad on Friday, 12 Safar 588/28 February 1192. It included not only the Encyclopaedia of the lIhwdn al-Safa' and works by Ibn Sina but, of most interest for the episode of the buried timthl, writings on subjects such as astrology, talismans and praying to the stars.55 Whatever other issues may have been involved in this event, the persecution of Rukn al-Din and other students of Greek philosophy can also be seen as an aspect of the Caliph's quest for omniscience; he did not want his own claims challenged by any other rival source of knowledge and power. Hartmann points out that Rukn al-Din's career, which ultimately ended in some sort of respectability and rehabilitation, was dominated by the complex and changing policies which al-Nasir followed in his re- establishment of the caliphate.56

It may be that in Nasawi's comments we see a similar rejection, possibly even a sense that a preference in the Muslim world for the learning of the philosophers, for hermeticism and the experimental sciences was, if not the only cause, then partly the cause of the Mongol victory.57 We cannot say for certain what were Nasawi's attitudes to astrology or the hermetic sciences. It seems probable that, like so many of his contemporaries, he thought astrology worked; but whether he thought it praiseworthy is another matter. However, it seems clear that he did not believe in the power of the timthgl: "I do not know", Nasawl writes, "what is more astonishing, the faith the savant had in his image or the credulity of people who let themselves be tricked by his magic."58

Nevertheless, it is clear at the very least that, if not

Nasawi himself, others at the time sincerely believed that the timthgl and its magic were the cause of the Mongol invasions. It is also of importance to note that the disaster was still seen in the context of caliphal politics and the intrigues of al-Na•sir; at that time it cannot to have occurred to anyone that the Mongol invasions were only partly generated by the internal

politics of the Muslim world. It would seem, therefore, that NasawI rejected the

context of those powers, namely the experimental sciences, which had produced the timth&. He was, in short, rejecting ideas influenced by Neoplatonic




philosophy and hermeticism. One might say that if he believed that the timthl was responsible for the Mongol invasions, it was because the Khwarazm-Shah favoured these dubious practices rather than faith in God and the pious pursuit of the precepts of Islam, the sunna of the Prophet, which, as appropriately interpreted by the jurists, should remain the true guide.

NasawI's story serves as a reminder of the sometimes troubled relationship between the political history of his age and its intellectual developments. In a few lines he brings together the scientific and philosophical inheritance of the Middle East, the conflicting societies of nomads and settled peoples, as well as Muslim and non-Muslim tradition. It thus seems as if the Mongol invasions distilled and focussed the intellectual issues of the Muslim world which endured those invasions.

Notes

1 Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Nasawi, Sirat al-Sultin Jal9l al- Din Mankubirni, ed. Z.M. Buniiatova (Moscow, 1996), pp.175-76; ed. and French trans. Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti Prince du Kharezm, texte arabe

publie et traduit de l'arabe par O. Houdas, 2 vols (Paris, 1891-95), Arabic pp.150-51, trans. pp. 249-51.

2 Op. cit., ed. Buniiatova, p. 175, ed. Houdas, Arabic, p. 151, trans. pp. 249-50.

3 Loc. cit. 4 Op. cit., ed. Buniiatova, p. 176, ed. Houdas, Arabic, p.

151, trans. p. 250. 5 T?rikh-i Jah5n-Gusha, trans. J.A. Boyle, History of the

World Conqueror, 2 vols (Manchester, 1958), vol. II, pp. 374-75.

6 Op. cit., vol. II, p. 400. 7 T. Fahd, EI2, arts. "Munadidjim" and "al-Nudium". 8 J. Masson Smith, "Mongol Manpower and the Persian

population", JESHO, XVII (1975), pp. 271-99, putting the case for large Mongol armies; D. Sinor, "The Inner Asian warrior", JAOS, CI (1981), esp. pp. 135, 142-44, but also the article as a whole for an overall view of Central Asian nomadic armies; D.O. Morgan, "The

Mongol Armies in Persia", Der Islam, LVI (1979), pp. 84-88, discusses the problems with the figures given in the sources for the size of Mongol forces.

9 Sinor, "The Inner Asian warrior", pp. 135, 137, 139. See also Morgan, The Mongols, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 84-85.

10 'Uthman b. Siraj al-Din Jilzj•ni, TabaqAt-i N~siri, ed. 'A.H. Habibi (Kabul, 1963), p. 310; English trans. H.G.

Raverty, Tabaq&t-i Nsiri. A General History of the

Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, 2 vols (London,

1881-99), vol. I, p. 270. 11 S.G. Agajanov, Ch. 3, "The states of the Oghuz, the

Kimek and the Kipchak" in M. Asimov and C.E. Bosworth (eds.), History of civilizations of Central Asia, vol. IV, pt. 1, (UNESCO, Paris, 1998), p. 74.

12 SIrat, ed. Buniiatova, pp. 35-36, 43, 45, 86-87, 101, ed.

Houdas, Arabic, pp. 28, 35, 36-37, 136-37, trans. pp. 50, 60, 63, 136-37. An example of the hostility towards the

Kipchaks may be found in C.L. Cahen, "'Abdallatif al-

Baghdadi et les Khwtrizmiens"

in Iran and Islam, in

Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C.E.

Bosworth (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 158-59, (though the source refers to "the Khwarazmians" it is reasonable, given Nasawi's testimony, to argue that it is in fact talking about the Kipchak element in the army); Bosworth, Ch. 1, "The political and dynastic history of the Iranian world

(A.D. 1000-1217)", in CHIr, vol. V, pp. 182-83, 191. 13 For a general account of the Mongol invasions and their

rule, see Morgan, The Mongols, (Oxford, 1986), and in more specific detail for Iran the relevant chapters in the

CHIr, vol V; for the Kipchaks see Asimov and Bosworth

(eds.), op. cit., esp. Agajanov, Ch. 3 and A. Sevim and

Bosworth, Ch. 7, "The Seljuqs and the Khwarazm

Shahs", pp. 169, 175. 14 Ed. Buniiatova, p. 101, ed. Houdas, Arabic, p. 83, trans.

pp. 136-37. 15 Ed. Buniiatova, pp. 31-33, ed. Houdas, Arabic, pp. 25-26,

trans. pp. 44--46; P. Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, his life and

legacy, trans. and ed. T.N. Haining (Oxford, 1991), p. 207. 16 Ed. Buniiatova, pp. 32, 141-42, ed. Houdas, Arabic, pp.

25, 55-57, trans. pp. 44, 93-96. 17 Ed. Buniiatova, pp. 51-52, ed. Houdas, Arabic, p. 42,

trans. pp. 72-73; Sevim and Bosworth, "The Seljuqs and the Khwarazm Shahs", pp. 175-77.

18 Ed. Buniiatova, pp. 32, 51-52, ed. Houdas, Arabic, pp. 25, 42, trans. pp. 44, 72-73.

19 Ed. Buniiatova, pp. 35-36, 42-43, 51-52, ed. Houdas, Arabic, pp. 33-35, 42, 60-61, trans. pp. 55, 59-60, 72-73, 79-80; Boyle, Ch. 4, " Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans", in CHIr, vol. V, p. 305.

20 Angelika Hartmann, an-Ngsir li-DIn Allah (1180-1225).

Politik, Religion, Kultur in der spliten 'Abbisidenzeit, (Berlin, New York, 1975), pp. 72-78.

21 Ibid, pp. 132-33. 22 Ibid., pp. 133-35. 23 Carole Hillenbrand, "The power struggle between the

Saljuqs and the IsmR'Ilis of Alamit, 487-518/1094-1124.




The Saljuq perspective" in F. Daftary (ed.), Mediaeval

Ism9'ili History and Thought (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 205-20.

24 Ibid, pp. 206, 209. 25 Jbid, pp. 216-18. 26 Ibid, pp. 207-8, 210. 27 Daftary, The Ism~'lis, their history and doctrines

(Cambridge, 1990), pp. 392-96; M.G.S. Hodgson, The Order of the Assassins. The struggle of the Early Nizalrf

Isma'fls against the Islamic World (The Hague, 1955), pp. 148-57, 160-67.

28 Nasawl, Sirdt, ed. Buniiatova, p. 239, ed. Houdas, Arabic, pp. 212-13, trans. p. 355; Daftary, op. cit., pp. 405-6 ; Hodgson, op. cit., pp. 216-20.

29 Daftary, op. cit., pp. 406-7; Hodgson, op. cit., p. 224. 30 Bosworth, in CHIr, vol. V, p. 184; Hartmann, an-Nisir,

pp. 78-80. 31 Daftary, op. cit., p. 407; Hodgson, op. cit., p. 224. 32 Daftary, op. cit., p. 406. 33 "The philosopher/vizier: Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tisi and

the Ismd'Ilis" in Daftary (ed.), Mediaeval lsmi'li1History and Thought, pp. 231-46.

34 H. Daiber, E-2 art. "al-Tisi, Nasir al-Din. 1. Life." 35 Idem, E2 art. "al-Tisi, Nasir al-Din. 2. As theologian and

philosopher". 36 Ibid 37 JRAS (1938), pp. 64, 67. 38 "An Ismailitic work by Nasiru'd-din Tusi", JRAS (1931),

pp. 560-61. 39 The Order of the Assassins, p. 223. 40 J. Ruska, B. Carra de Vaux, [C.E. Bosworth], E2 art.

"Tilsam"; Bosworth, The Mediaeval Islamic Underworld. The Band

Sssdn in Arabic Society and Literature, 2 vols.

(Leiden, 1976), vol. I, pp. 87-88, vol. II, pp. 198-99. 41 Lyn Thomrndike, A History of Magic and Experimental

Science during the first Thirteen centuries of our era, 3 vols. (London, 1923), vol. I, pp. 661-66; R. Rashed and R. Morelon, EP art. 'Thtbit b. Kurra".

42 Carmody, The Astronomical Works of Thabit b. Qurra (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 168-97; Morelon,

"Thabit b. Qurra and Arab Astronomy in the 9th Century", Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, IV/ 1 (March

1994), pp. 111-40. 43 Carmody, op. cit., pp. 177-78. 44 Ibid, pp. 169-71; C. Bumrnett, "Talismans: magic as

science? Necromancy among the Seven Liberal Arts" in

Magic and Divination in the Middle Ages. Texts and

Techniques in the Islamic and Christian worlds

(Variorum, Aldershot, 1996), pp. 1-15. See also other articles in the same collection by Burnett and also D.

Pingree, The Thousands of Aba Ma'shar, (London,

1968). 45 Fahd, E2 art. "Nirandf". 46 The Astronomical works, p.170. 47 Thomrndike, A History ofMagic, vol. I, p. 665. 48 "Sdbiens coraniqes et 'Sdbiens' de Harrn", JA, CCXXIV

(1986), pp. 1-44, gives especial significance to the

geographical position of Harrtn on the borders between the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires, arguing that it was a

refuge for Neoplatonists from both the Academy in Athens and from Alexandria, who established an

Academy in Harrin (see, in particular, the evidence from al-Mas'ldi regarding the inscription above the door of the

Harrdn Academy). 49 E2 art. "Sabi'a. 2. The Sabl'at Harrin". 50 E. Grant, Planets, Stars and Orbs.: the Medieval Cosmos,

1200-1687 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 315. 51 The City of the Moon God Religious Traditions of

Harrdn, (Leiden, New York, Cologne, 1992), pp. 163-64, 169-74, 188-89.

52 Ibid, p. 164; F. Rosenthal, E2 art. "al-Sarakhsi". 53 E2 art '"'lIm", See also W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim

Intellectual (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 25-71. 54 Hartmann, op. cit., pp. 256-60. 55 Ibid, p. 257. 56

Ibid., p. 260.

57 H.A.R. Gibb, E12 art. '"Arabiyya. B. Arabic literature.

(III) Third to fifth centuries, (i) Prose". 58 Sirat, ed. Buniiatova, pp.175-76, ed. Houdas, Arabic, p.

151, trans. pp.150-51.



occult science and the fall of the khwārazm-shāh jalāl al-dīn

Documents