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Obstacles to effective organizational change:

the underlying reasons

Bruce G. Hoag

Performance Advantage Ltd, Ely, UK

Hans V. Ritschard

RAF Lakenheath, nr Brandon, UK

Cary L. Cooper

Manchester School of Management, University of Manchester Institute of

Science and Technology (UMIST), Manchester, UK

Introduction

Constant change has permeated completely

and indiscriminately every aspect of life and

work. Its pace is ever increasing; and far

from embracing change, many managers

have had enough, and some would like it to

stop (Kanter, 1995; Chia, 1999). On the other

hand, there are those who believe that this

upheaval has benefited them through

improvements in technology (Galbraith,

1967) for example, and they anticipate eagerly

the opportunities that further change will

afford them in developing better products

and services and increasing their markets

(Koopman, 1991). Some will concede only thatthey must change to survive, and still others

pretend that recent changes are just a blip in

an otherwise predictable continuum.

However, most recognize that some kind of

change is necessary in their organizations

and have made various attempts to

accommodate these pressures.

Many see change as a threat because the

outcome is less certain than leaving things as

they are (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Greve,

1998). This dichotomy of attitudes cuts across

hierarchical boundaries in unexpected ways.

One would anticipate that pro-active, open-minded managers would embrace change

willingly, as additional opportunities to

make their organizations grow, to generate

more sales and deliver more value to

customers (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Freiberg

and Freiberg, 1997). Equally, one would

expect employees to do all they could to

preserve the status quo in order to protect

their turf, social position, and livelihood

(Klein, 1970; Maslow, 1970; Watson, 1970;

Zaltman and Duncan, 1977; Kanter, 1995; Cox,

1997), and to change only when they believed

it was in their interest to do so (Manganelliand Klein, 1994).

Perhaps surprisingly, our research has

shown that the opposite is true: staff often

see the need for change and are anxious to

just do it, but their managers seem to be

unwilling or incapable of exercising the

leadership required (Kotter and Schlesinger,

1979; Manganelli and Klein, 1994). This article

will consider some of the popular reasons

managers give for why organizations resist

change and suggest some new underlying

obstacles.

Perspectives on obstacles

The belief is held by some that obstacles to

change are situational and too numerous to

consider (Zaltman and Duncan, 1977; Kotter,

1995); however, this seems to be more myth

than reality. Generally, the literature we

reviewed was divided into two categories:

1 External influences factors which

managers believed were outside of their

control.

2 Who should be blamed when change

initiatives failed.

External factors

There is a category of factors which

comprises a popular mythology. We call this

folklore the rumor mill a collection of

implied beliefs which has no empirical

support. The rumor mill has suggested that

the three main obstacles to change are cost,

workload (Zaltman and Duncan, 1977), and

legislation (Meyer, 1979).

Some managers believe that their

organizations cannot change because too

many resources have been committed

already to ``sunk costs'' monies spent

tooling up to deliver their existing products

or services. Changing direction, in their

opinion, could jeopardize their position,especially if things go wrong (Tichy, 1983).

The research register for this journal is available at

http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregisters

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0143-7739.htm

[ 6 ]

Leadership & OrganizationDevelopment Journal23/1 [2002] 615

# MCB UP Limited[ISSN 0143-7739][DOI 10.1108/01437730210414526]

Keywords

Organizational change,

Resistance, Costs, Work,Legislation, Employees

Abstract

Our world abounds with constant,

relentless change to the extent

that most people no longer have

an open mind about it.

Unequivocally, they want it to

stop. Many organizations have

initiated change programs which

have failed. Often, such failures

are blamed on staff or on external

constraints, such as cost,

workload, and legislation. In this

study, more than 500 responses

were obtained from participants

who completed the statement:

``The three biggest obstacles to

bringing about effective change in

my organization are . . .'' A total of

89 per cent of these responses

pointed to factors within the

organization itself.

The views expressed in this

article are those of theauthors and do notnecessarily reflect theofficial policy or position ofthe Air Force, theDepartment of Defense orthe US Government.


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Other costs may take the form of ``managerial

time'' (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979).

Some see change programs as one more

thing to do in a day, week, or month whenthere is already an insufficient number of

hours to do what is deemed to be important

(Kanter, 1995). This belief is understandable

given the complexity associated with

meaningful and effective change, but every

day, managers choose to change some things,

but not others. The issue, therefore, is not

lack of time, but lack of will.

Others believe that the scope for change in

their organizations is limited by government

legislation (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979;

Jackson, 1999), but these constraints have

been around since the beginning of politicsitself. While some might argue that this has

hindered organizational change, there is

little evidence to support this.

Some believe that other external factors

obstruct organizational change. For example,

managers who experienced ``institutional

change,'' such as that which occurred during

and after the collapse of the former

communist regimes of eastern Europe,

reportedly found it difficult to identify

and embrace the new value systems

(Newman, 2000).

Market conditions have been cited as abarrier to change (Sachwald, 1998), but it is

more likely that they have forced

organizations to change rather than actually

preventing it.

Some organizations might resist change

because of an in-born desire to control

events, reduce uncertainty and preserve the

status quo (Watson, 1970; Katz and Kahn,

1978; Tichy, 1983; Carr et al., 1996). Closely

associated with this are ``ideologies'' which

``represent solutions to past problems''

(Newman, 2000).

Staff

A second category of obstacles discussed in

the literature is staff. The collective message

seems to be that if factors outside of the

organization cannot be blamed for the failure

of change initiatives, then it must be the fault

of the employees (Piderit, 2000). This

conclusion is remarkable considering the

great lengths to which most organizations

have gone to publicize the mantra that people

are its greatest resource (Meyer, 1979).

Koopman (1991) implies that all

organizations have ``resistors'' people ``who

will resist any change at all costs.'' Larsson

and Finkelstein (1999) report that staff

exercised active and passive resistance in

response to merger and acquisition activity

by speaking out or resigning, through

``sabotage, absenteeism, disobedience, and

shirking.'' However, none of these studies

attempts to explain why staff had resorted to

such measures; only that they were to blamefor doing so.

In spite of the challenges just mentioned,

all organizations change or adapt to some

degree, often positively, during their

lifetimes. For example, staff turnover alone

changes an organization: it changes when

one person is hired or another leaves (Fayol,

1987). In addition, changes occur as the result

of the introduction of new products or

services, and the deletion of old ones.

This is not to say that external factors do

not have an impact; they do. Equally, some

staff do resist change; but the blame forunsuccessful organizational change must lie

with those who are responsible for

implementing it, not with other things or

other people. Indeed, if factors such as

institutional change, government

regulations, market conditions, and

disgruntled employees are responsible for

preventing positive change, then it means

that managers are nothing more than

hostages to fortune. If, however, it is accepted

that change can afford opportunities through

which the adept manager can take advantage,

then it will be recognized that, while thesefactors have influence, fundamentally they

are not obstacles.

In this article, an obstacle is a factor which

prevents the implementation of positive

change in organizations. In view of this

definition, it is easy to understand why the

examples discussed above really are not

obstacles.

The primary purpose of our study was to

determine what obstacles impeded positive

change in organizations. In it, we took the

view of human resources professionals

those people who often are tasked with thechange program implementation, but who

receive much of the criticism when things go

wrong.

Methodology

The study primarily was exploratory and no

a priori hypotheses were identified.

However, there was a general suspicion that

the rumor mill had identified incorrectly the

underlying obstacles. Over a period of

several months, 146 human resources

professionals in the UK ranging in

responsibility from students to human

resources directors, to a few pensioners, were

surveyed. Each participant was asked to use

a worksheet to record the three biggest

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Bruce G. Hoag,Hans V. Ritschard andCary L. CooperObstacles to effectiveorganizational change:the underlying reasons



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obstacles to effective change in his or her

organization, and the reasons for those

obstacles if the respondent knew them. The

questions were entirely open, and nosuggestions were offered.

The worksheets were handed out by the

primary author prior to a presentation he

gave as a guest speaker to various groups of

Chartered Institute of Personnel and

Development and Institute of Management

members. None of the respondents knew in

advance that the worksheets would be

distributed, and all worksheets were

collected before the presentations began. The

surveys were administered in an entirely

anonymous fashion, and no minimum

number was sought. Respondents wereoffered copies of the research findings in

exchange for their participation.

No attempt was made to qualify

participants in any way, so no figures are

available regarding, for example, their

ages or gender.

There were a number of anomalies in the

collection of the data. Three participants

changed the wording of the question,

disqualifying their responses from the

survey. One admitted to being self-employed,

and since the question was about ``my

organization,'' those data also were omitted.A fifth respondent simply indicated that his/

her work was as a part-time careers advisor,

and commented, `Ì don't think I can provide

any useful answers.'' Although a few

participants were retired, it was not clear

who they were, and so their responses were

included in our sample.

Some participants listed only one or two

obstacles; others provided several. On a

number of occasions, obstacles for some were

reasons for others. Consequently, each

obstacle and each reason had to be evaluated

on its own merits to determine whether an

obstacle or a reason was being reported.

Where reasons did not clarify the obstacle, but

suggested a new one, the reason was counted

as an obstacle. A few responses were illegible.

As a result, 503 statements were collected.

A pilot test was conducted on 20 of the

statements to determine whether interrater

reliability could be established in rating the

responses. The primary author trained the

secondary author, and both then performed a

pilot evaluation. The evaluations were based

on a seven-point Likert scale according to the

following categories:. cost;. workload;. legislation;. leadership;. management;

. culture; and

. other.

The following guidelines were used:1 Cost referred to insufficient financial

resources.

2 Workload concerned the volume of

work.

3 Legislation referred to laws, legal

mandates, or regulations.

4 Leadership included vision, planning,

strategy, direction, purpose, or decision

making.

5 Management referred to senior

managers, and the organization's

structures or systems.

6 Culture referred to middle or junior

managers', or employee perceptions and

training or development deficiencies.

7 Other any statements that did not fit in

the above six categories.

A score of seven was given when the

responses matched exactly or included the

category word; a score of six was assigned to

responses which made the rater think

immediately of the category, but did not

include the category word; a score of five was

assigned when the rater felt that the response

could have been placed into more than one

category. In these cases, the best categorywas chosen for the rating. The remaining

responses were rated one to four depending

upon the strength of feeling of the rater that

an item should be included in a particular

category. Only one category was permitted

for each response. On those occasions when

none of the six categories seemed

appropriate, the `òther'' column was ticked,

and the rater was instructed to use one or two

words to describe a suitable category.

Each category was weighted equally as a

nominal variable (n = 7). A low interrater

reliability was obtained using the method

described above, and low reliabilities

followed two further pilot evaluations with

training. These low interrater reliabilities

seemed to derive from the apparently

overlapping categories that initially were

chosen. As a result, we had to admit that our

initial expectations may have been too

ambitious. The data were then re-rated again

by both the primary and secondary authors

using only four categories defined as cost,

workload, and legislation. The remaining

category, defined as `òther,'' was made to

include all other responses which could not

be placed confidently into the first three

categories. By using these four categories,

a high interrater reliability coefficient of

0.81 on all 503 statements was obtained

(Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).

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Discussion

The manner in which the sample was collected

was one of convenience (Fink, 1998).

Consequently, some might argue that since

participants were not selected randomly, this

study contains bias and therefore threatens

internal validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

This charge, however, is unwarranted since no

selection took place at all. Those in attendance

simply were given the opportunity to take part.

To our knowledge, no one refused, and no

suggestion was made implicitly or explicitly

that non-participation was unacceptable.

Others might argue that since no specific

statistics were noted regarding the sex, age,

levels of responsibility of the participants, orsize of the organizations represented that our

results were skewed in some way. However,

it must be noted that despite the absence of

this information, the words used by the

respondents to describe obstacles to

organizational change were remarkably

similar, suggesting that these factors were

observable by staff irrespective of those

delimiters.

External validity pertains to

generalizability. Since the literature seems to

have avoided staff perceptions in large

measure, and our study is based on datacollected from staff employed by a broad

spectrum of organizations, we assert that our

findings are generalizable.

A key word analysis was used to identify

obstacles to effective organizational change.

The rumor mill, which asserted that cost,

workload and legislation were significant,

was wrong, predicting only 11 per cent of the

empirical variance (Table I). However,

management and organizational culture,

which accounted for nearly 89 per cent of the

variance, emerged as the two most

significant obstacles to organizationalchange (Table II). Communication was seen

as the channel through which the

management influenced the organization's

culture, whether positively or negatively.

Leaders or managers?There is no doubt that organizational

leadership is conceived and executed by

senior managers. Although it is possible that,

in the past, the roles of leader and manager

were performed by different people,

clearly this artificial distinction is

counterproductive in modern organizations.

One person can and often does fulfill both

roles. In fact, for organizational change to be

effective, these roles must be seamless, a

theme which was supported by our study.

While senior managers are expected to be

effective both as leaders and managers, it is,perhaps, easier to understand these roles if

we discuss them separately.

In this study, respondents described five

characteristics of poor leaders and four

characteristics of weak managers which they

felt were obstacles to effective organizational

change. For clarity, we have used italics

within quotation marks to identify actual

quotes from our data.

Leadership

No visionLeadership was seen to be poor when there

was no vision for the future. Many

statements referred to the ``lack of goals,

plans or strategies.'' Closely related to this

was the apparent focus on short-term

challenges. Other statements conveyed the

sense that senior executives were unable to

agree or to prioritize issues for change,

suffering from the proverbial analysis

paralysis. Uncertainty precluded action, and

no one seemed to be willing to take

ownership for any decisions regarding

change, possibly because no one wanted to be

responsible for failure.

It was implied that staff wanted to knowwhere their organization was headed, and

what to expect along the way. Managers who

could not or would not provide those

signposts were seen to be weak, failing to

exercise leadership. Staff expected executives

to decide where they wanted the organization

to go, to create a vision of the future, to

communicate it to the staff, and to work

towards it, recognizing from the beginning

that the outcome could not be known fully in

advance.

No supportLeadership was seen to be poor when

managers were unable to garner the support

of those concerned. Many responses

conveyed the idea that the staff were left to

interpret executive missives because

Table I

Examined H1

Management/culture/

Rumor mill communication/miscellaneous

n (%) n (%)

56 11.1 447 88.9

Table II

Summary of underlying obstacles

Management Culture Rumor

Communication/

miscellaneous Total

209 179 56 59 503

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managers could not articulate the need for or

the methods of change effectively. In

addition, there seemed to be a less than

wholehearted commitment to change bysenior managers. This may have hindered

their ability to communicate clearly the

benefits they expected.

Obstructive senior teamPoor leadership was cited as an obstacle

when the senior executives themselves

obstructed change (Cunniff, 1993). Several

references were made to the ``board,

partners,'' or ``key individuals.'' The sense

was that managers were more interested in

themselves than in the organization. In

addition, executives were seen to disagree

about what to do or what was important.

Responses such as ``fragmented views between

directors as to the priorities'' and lack of

àgreement of senior managers as to the best

solution/way forward' illustrate this.

Not yetSome respondents implied that senior

managers had recognized the necessity of

change, but had adopted a not yet policy.

Several statements referred to the `àmount''

or ``pace'' of change. One respondent said that

his organization needed to ``secure the present

situation'' before embarking on any newchange initiatives. This perspective reflected

the view that any existing pressures to

change were temporary aberrations, and that

soon everything would get back to normal. In

fact, it appeared that many managers had not

understood why the current changes were so

intense or so radical, or what they would do if

normality failed to materialize.

No reason to changeMany respondents reported that their

managers saw no reason to change, taking

the view that what worked in the past would

continue to work in the future. These

managers seemed to assume that the context

in which the status quo was successful had

not and would not change. The question,

` why change?'' was echoed by several

respondents. This was seen as an absence of

leadership by subordinates who believed that

far from preserving the organization,

maintaining the ``status quo'' actually

threatened it. One respondent said: `Òld

school, dislike[s] new ideas from staff. They

know best.'' This was not a novel lament

among the responses. In fact, Taylor (1919)

said as much 90 years ago.

Management

The were four characteristics of weak

managers which were seen by many in our

sample to be significant obstacles to effective

organizational change (Kotter, 1995).

1 Pot-pourri. There was the sense that

managers dealt with a pot-pourri ofseemingly unrelated challenges. This was

reflected by statements such as

` seasonality of demand, lack of technology,

recruitment and space,'' and the tactic used

to cope with these challenges was

described as ``firefighting.''

2 Internal systems. The organization's

internal systems were reported to prevent

change initiatives from succeeding.

Historically, organizations have sought to

preserve themselves by controlling

everything: risk (Isenson, 1968), markets

(Goetz, 1968), subordinate activities(Sayles, 1977), time (Mintzberg, 1973),

performance management, and budgeting

(Carroll et al., 1977) to name a few. The

hierarchy in traditional organizations

was structured deliberately so that

supervisors could control human

behavior at every level (Gulick, 1937).

The principle of organizational control

was designed to ensure that everything

remained the same, an ideal diametrically

opposed to change. When change

programs were introduced, the internal

organizational systems often were leftintact, creating a context within which

lasting change was untenable.

Metaphorically, this resembled bungee-

jumping, in which the organization was

propelled in one direction until the cord

was extended fully, whereupon it lurched

back from the brink, finishing its journey

within its own predetermined boundaries.

Respondents blamed failed attempts to

change their organizations on internal

systems such as ``functional (technical)

departments, reward systems [that]

promote the short term, administration,bureaucracy, hierarchy and red tape.'' In

the face of such control, some remarked,

``why bother?'' Others implied that a ``lack

of sustainability'' and a tendency to drift

back to `òld ways'' made change programs

a waste of time. Another respondent

expressed his cynicism by saying that

` changes haven't worked before.''

3 Victim mindset. Managers claimed they

could not do anything differently because

of external factors. The irrationality of

this view was discussed earlier. One

respondent admitted that his organizationfailed to ``work with external influences.''

Another blamed the ``competitive nature''

of the environment as an obstacle, and a

third respondent said that staff believed

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that they would `àlways be victims of

change.''

4 Status quo. A common theme was that

managers wanted the benefits ofimplementing change programs, but they

wanted to keep doing things the ``way they

had always done them.'' One respondent

said, ``We've done the downsizing and the

right sizing, and we're trying to do all the

work we used to do when everybody else

was there.''

Culture

There is no agreement on the precise

definition of culture (Wilkins, 1983; Ashforth,

1985; Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Some

understand it as ``shared beliefs andassumptions'' (Ashforth, 1985; Nahavandi

and Malekzadeh, 1988). Schein (1987) says

that these beliefs and assumptions are

learned `ùnconsciously'' through ``group

experience'' and ``define in a basic

`taken-for-granted' fashion an organization's

view of itself and its environment.''

Pfeffer (1981) says that:[i]nstitutionalization . . . bind[s] participants

together with a common set of

understandings about the organizational way

of doing things [and] provides each person

with common beliefs . . .

Hofstede et al. (1990) says that culture is:the collective mental programming of the

people in an environment . . . conditioned by

the same education and life experiences

(Hofstede, 1995).

In this article, culture is defined as the

emotional environment shared by members

of the organization. It reflects how staff feel

about themselves, about the people for whom

and with whom they work, and about their

jobs. These feelings are acquired through:shared perceptions of daily practices [which]

are the core of an organization's culture[,]

shape[d by] the values of founders and keyleaders[, and] learned through socialization at

the workplace (Hofstede et al., 1990).

Therefore, managerial behaviors exemplify

acceptable and unacceptable staff behaviors.

Some researchers (see Ashforth, 1985;

Rousseau, 1988) have described differences

between climate and culture. However, since

our respondents made no such distinction,

neither do we.

As an underlying obstacle, culture was

described from four perspectives:

1 Uncertainty. Staff felt threatened by the

prospect of change itself. All change,

whether ``positive'' or ` rational'' creates

`èmotional turmoil'' for those concerned

(Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979).

Uncertainty regarding the outcomes of

change left respondents feeling anxious

about their position in the organization

and, therefore, raised concerns about

their livelihood. For some this may havemeant that future plans had to be

suspended, either temporarily or

permanently. Others may have felt

stymied, unsure of what to do next

(Kanter, 1995).

Although managers may acknowledge

readily that better communication would

reduce uncertainty, some have argued

that confidentiality prevents them from

providing as much information as they

would like. Some people can ``tolerate''

greater `àmbiguity and uncertainty'' than

others (Duncan, 1972); but, in our sample,managers who could not or would not

provide answers to questions such as,

``What does it mean to me?'' had to face

employees who felt that change was

``done'' to them without any

` consultation.''

When change programs impact on staff

personally, confidentiality can be seen as

a convenient excuse rather than a bona

fide reason for not ``keeping them in the

picture.'' It is imperative that managers

involve and communicate regularly with

the staff who are expected to implementthe change initiatives, since the

managers, and not the staff, will be held

accountable for its success (Koopman,

1991; Manganelli and Klein, 1994). Full and

open communication engenders trust and

cooperation; providing limited

information by hiding behind

confidentiality issues breeds fear, anxiety,

and mistrust. There is no middle ground.

Managers often are confronted by

uncooperative staff whose `ùnderlying

beliefs values, and norms'' are embodied

in their organizational culture (Tichy,

1983). Change programs may ask

employees to change what is important to

them. For example, in recent years, the

protestant work ethic (Weber, 1958) has

given way to the so-called now generation.

Delayed reward has been replaced by

instant gratification. Change programs

which impose criteria dependent upon

delayed reward are bound to be resisted

by those for whom instant gratification

has become the norm.

Managers who failed to address

concerns such as `Ì may not have a job in

the new set up'' encountered staff who had

become suspicious of all organizational

motives, and who had lost faith in the

management as a whole.

Although it may be difficult to

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communicate strategies for change in a

climate where there is a dearth of effective

and ``relevant'' change models, the failure

to do so will contribute to the perceptionthat, despite all the hoopla surrounding

such programs, everything eventually

will get back to normal (Newman, 2000).

2 Turf protection. Some respondents

reported that there was a tendency for

staff to ``cling to the status quo.''

Statements such as ``tradition'' and ``turf

protection'' were typical. Some

respondents indicated that staff often

resisted change, but this seemed to have

more to do with living with a known devil

(Watson, 1970), than risking an

experiment with a new one, especiallywhere information regarding the impact

on them was sparse.

Closely related to this was the notion

that admitting that change was needed

was tantamount to saying that the old

ways were wrong, and that someone was

to blame for taking the organization down

that road. Responses such as

``unwillingness to make and learn from

mistakes'' were indicative of this

perception.

3 Can't cope. There was a perception that

the staff were unable in some way to copewith a change initiative. ``Lack of

knowledge, skill'' or ``training,'' or some

deficiency in their abilities were cited as

obstacles. This view is shared by Zaltman

and Duncan (1977), who found that:the more personnel perceive that there is a

need for their department to change to meet

the increased demands of society, and so on,

the less do they perceive that their

department is really able to deal with

change.

It is possible that staff concerns such as

``fear of going wrong'' or ``anxiety about

their position in the structure'' were

interpreted as veiled indicators of this

perception. Staff who doubt their ``future

competence'' might resist change if they

believed that they could not learn thenew skills required to perform in the

new organization (Tichy, 1983; Kanter,

1995).

4 Internal politics. Statements such as

` elitism, and inter-departmental rivalry''

suggested that internal politics was an

obstacle to change. People who needed

power or believed that their status would

be diminished (Cox, 1997; Zaltman and

Duncan, 1977) or who depended on others

for emotional or political security often

resisted change as well (Tichy, 1983). This

is an important consideration because itdemonstrates that ``[m]ajor structural

Table III

Summary of the literature

Obstacles Related literature

Management Kotter and Schlesinger (1979), Cunniff (1993), Greenwood et al. (1994),

Kotter (1995), Newman (2000)

Lack of leadership Manganelli and Klein (1994), Beer et al. (1995), Kanter (1995), Freiberg and

Freiberg (1997)

Hierarchy, bureaucracy and

red tape Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994), Jackson (1999)

Systems, procedures and

administration; always done

it this way

Zaltman and Duncan (1977), Shepard (1995), Cox (1997), Johnson (1998),

Labianca et al. (2000)

Culture Zaltman and Duncan (1977), Tichy (1983), Wilkins (1983), Hofstede et al.

(1990), Greenwood et al. (1994), Cox (1995), Hofstede (1995),

Langan-Fox and Tan (1997)

People doubts about future

competence or place in new

set up; internal politics;

cannot cope

Pettigrew (1975), Koopman (1991), Carr et al. (1996), Begley (1998),

Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), Pideret (2000), Wanberg and Banas (2000)

Fear and uncertainty Maslow (1970), Kotter and Schlesinger (1979), Tichy (1983), Fox-Wolfgramm

et al. (1998), Greve (1998), Johnson (1998)

Reluctance or resistance, Watson (1970; 1982), Kanter (1995), Dean et al. (1998)

change done to them

Tradition, status quo Klein (1970), Katz and Kahn (1978), Pfeffer (1981), Cox (1997)Poor communication Zaltman and Duncan (1977), Koopman (1991), Manganelli and Klein (1994),

Kanter (1995), Wanberg and Banas (2000)

Rumor mill Zaltman and Duncan (1977), Kotter and Schlesinger (1979), Tichy (1983),

Kanter (1995), Jackson (1999)

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changes have political consequences''

(Pettigrew, 1975).

FindingsThis study overturns the mythology that

cost, workload and legislation are the

primary obstacles to effective organizational

change. Indeed, we have shown that it is

cultural entrenchment created by a

dysfunctional management which prevents

organizations from experiencing positive

change.

Future studies will enable us to describe

more precisely how management inhibits

change and how a culture which supports

change initiatives can be created. The clues

are there, but, at present, we can not statethis in a generalizable way.

A key word analysis found that the 503

unique statements were accounted for by 155

distinct statements. We believe that this

reduced group of statements will explain the

variance and will enable us to explain the

failure of change programs. The dependent

variable is change itself, and we will evaluate

management and culture as the independent

variables using factor analysis to discern the

subtleties between them.

Thus far, our study has accounted for most

of the factors proffered by other theorists onorganizational change (Table III) and

accounts for some which are not. In addition,

this study makes significant advances on the

elemental ideas articulated by Johnson (1998)

and others.

Future research

The next step will be to create a conceptual

model which explains how the 13 factors

identified in this paper are related. In a

subsequent study, we will discuss the

development of a new diagnostic which

reflects our findings. This work has begunalready.

Summary

Rumor has suggested that the primary

obstacles to effective organizational change

are cost, workload, and legislation. We found,

however, that when the executive level fails

to lead and manage the organization up to the

expectations of the staff this can create a

culture which is resistant to change. This

means that any obstacles managers

encounter in effecting organizational change

are largely of their own making.

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