Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 124267            January 31, 2003

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF SAUDI ARABIA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

May the unrippled doctrine that a motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing is a useless piece of paper with no legal effect1 be, under the facts of the case, relaxed?

Petitioner National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against respondent Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati on December 4, 1985 to recover "the duplication in the payment of the proceeds of a letter of credit [NCBSA] has issued . . . brought about by the fact that both the head office and the Makati branch of [PBC, the negotiating bank,] collected the proceeds of the letter of credit."2

On August 24, 1993, the RTC of Makati rendered a decision in favor of NCBSA.3 PBC received a copy of the decision on September 3, 19934 and on the 12th day of the period of appeal or on September 15, 1993, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration.5 The motion, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.6

On September 21, 1993, NCBSA filed a Manifestation pointing out that PBC's Motion for Reconsideration did not contain any notice of hearing.7

On September 27, 1993, NCBSA filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the decision of the trial court.8 On even date, PBC filed a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing9 alleging as follows:

xxx           xxx           xxx

2. The Motion for Reconsideration raised both questions of facts and law arising from the erroneous findings made by the Honorable Court in the said Decision;

3. In order that defendant can fully amplify and expound on the issues raised on the said motions, there is a need to set the Motion for Hearing.

xxx           xxx           xxx10

NCBSA opposed this motion vigorously, it praying that it be stricken off the records.11

By Order of February 1, 1994, the trial court struck from the records of the case PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of its decision and granted NCBSA's Motion for Writ of Execution.12

PBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order of February 1, 1994, this time alleging that PBC's failure to comply with the 3-day notice rule "was essentially an honest mistake or oversight of counsel."13 This motion was just as vigorously opposed by NCBSA.14

By Order of March 2, 1994, the trial court denied PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of February 1, 1994, finding that "[t]here are no compelling reasons to warrant a liberal construction of the rules on Motions."15

PBC assailed before the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari the trial court's March 2, 1994 Order.16

By Decision of February 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed PBC's Petition for Certiorari.17 On PBC's Motion for Reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals, by Amended Decision of March 8, 1996, set aside its February 27, 1995 Decision and granted PBC's Petition for Certiorari and directed the trial court to resolve PBC's Motion for Reconsideration (of the trial court's August 24, 1993 Decision).18

Justifying its setting aside of its February 27, 1995 Decision, the Court of Appeals held in its Amended Decision:

. . . [T]o deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground of failure to contain a notice of hearing is too harsh an application of procedural rules especially so when petitioner has filed a motion to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing and had furnished private respondent a copy of the motion, a fact which is not denied by the latter.19

NCBSA thus comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court20 is mandatory. The absence of a notice of hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.21 In the case at bar, it is not disputed that PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the August 24, 1993 decision of the trial court did not contain the requisite notice of hearing.

In an attempt to cure the defect, PBC filed on Motion to Set the "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing on September 27, 1993, or 9 days after the period for filing the Notice of Appeal had expired.

The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of hearing, cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing.22 More so in the case at bar where the Motion to Set the "Motion for Reconsideration" was filed after the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.

NCBSA thus calls for the strict application of our rules of procedure to avoid further delays in the disposition of the case,23 which has remained pending for more than 17 years.

PBC, on the other hand, invokes a just and fair determination of the case.24

PBC's appeal for justice and fairness does not lie, however, there being nothing on record to show that it has been a victim of injustice or unfairness. On the contrary, as found by the Court of Appeals in its original decision, PBC had the opportunity to participate in the trial and present its defense and had actually made full use of the remedies under our rules of procedure.25 More importantly, there was no oppressive exercise of judicial authority that would call for the annulment of the trial court's resolutions.26

The finality of the decision of the trial court cannot be set aside purely on the basis of liberality for while it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random. Only for the most persuasive of reasons should the court allow a relaxation of its procedural rules.27

PBC, however, has not advanced any persuasive or exceptional reason in failing to set its Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision for hearing. In fact, in its Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration" for Hearing, PBC was completely silent on why it did not set the Motion for Reconsideration for hearing. It just alleged that, as earlier quoted, "[i]n order that defendant can fully amplify and expound on the issues raised on said motion, there is a need to set the Motion [for Reconsideration] for Hearing."28 This allegation conveys that, if there was no need for PBC to "fully amplify and expound on the issues raised" in the Motion for Reconsideration, no setting for hearing of said motion was needed. But as earlier stated, the requirement of notice in this kind of motion is mandatory. The Motion for Reconsideration thus remained a mere scrap of paper which deserved no consideration.

But assuming that PBC had presented exceptional reason or excuse for its failure to comply with the notice requirement, the Motion for Reconsideration would be denied on the ground that it is pro forma.

In its Rejoinder29 to NCBSA's Reply to Comment to the petition at bar, PBC alleged that it was, in its Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision, raising "serious questions involving findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court," thus "questioning the decision as being contrary to law and the evidence on record."30 A reading of the records will show, however, that the same three issues raised by PBC during the trial — prescription, laches and lack of double payment — are what are being raised in its Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the trial court.

PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision was thus "in substance . . . a reiteration of reasons and arguments"31 raised before the trial court for the dismissal of NCBSA's complaint, which reasons and arguments had already been considered and resolved against it on the merits by the trial court. The Motion for Reconsideration was thus merely pro forma.

Technicality aside, en passant, on the merits of PBC's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision, the trial court did not err in brushing aside its main defense of prescription — that NCBSA's complaint is "based on the quasi-contract of solutio indebiti,"32 hence, it prescribes in six years and, therefore, when NCBSA filed its complaint nine years after the cause of action arose, it had prescribed.

Solutio indebiti applies where: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause33 In the case at bar, PBC and NCBSA were bound by their contract, the letter of credit, under which NCBSA obliged itself to pay PBC, subject to compliance by the latter with certain

conditions provided therein. As such, the cause of action was based on a contract, and the prescriptive period is ten,34 not six years.

Even PBC's defense of laches is bereft of merit, the cause of action not having yet prescribed at the time NCBSA's complaint was filed.

Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.35

And as to PBC's allegation that the trial court erred in finding the existence of double payment, suffice it to state that PBC, while denying that there was double payment, itself admitted having received a second set of payment for the same amount covered by the letter of credit. Thus, in its petition for certiorari36 filed with the Court of Appeals, it alleged, quoted verbatim:

The second set for the same amount, although it was received and credited to [PBC's] account with Chemical Bank New York, were to be and subsequently transmitted to the account of Labroco (International, Philippines) . . .37 (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1996 is SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Philippine Banking Corporation as pro forma is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173227               January 20, 2009

SEBASTIAN SIGA-AN, Petitioner, vs.ALICIA VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision,2 dated 16 December 2005, and Resolution,3 dated 19 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71814, which affirmed in toto the Decision,4 dated 26 January 2001, of the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, in Civil Case No. LP-98-0068.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

On 30 March 1998, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a complaint5 for sum of money against petitioner Sebastian Siga-an before the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-98-0068. Respondent alleged that she was a businesswoman engaged in supplying office materials and equipments to the Philippine Navy Office (PNO) located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, while petitioner was a military officer and comptroller of the PNO from 1991 to 1996.

Respondent claimed that sometime in 1992, petitioner approached her inside the PNO and offered to loan her the amount of P540,000.00. Since she needed capital for her business transactions with the PNO, she accepted petitioner’s proposal. The loan agreement was not reduced in writing. Also, there was no stipulation as to the payment of interest for the loan.6

On 31 August 1993, respondent issued a check worth P500,000.00 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan. On 31 October 1993, she issued another check in the amount of P200,000.00 to petitioner as payment of the remaining balance of the loan. Petitioner told her that since she paid a total amount of P700,000.00 for theP540,000.00 worth of loan, the excess amount of P160,000.00 would be applied as interest for the loan. Not satisfied with the amount applied as interest, petitioner pestered her to pay additional interest. Petitioner threatened to block or disapprove her transactions with the PNO if she would not comply with his demand. As all her transactions with the PNO were subject to the approval of petitioner as comptroller of the PNO, and fearing that petitioner might block or unduly influence the payment of her vouchers in the PNO, she conceded. Thus, she paid additional amounts in cash and checks as interests for the loan. She asked petitioner for receipt for the payments but petitioner told her that it was not necessary as there was mutual trust and confidence between them. According to her computation, the total amount she paid to petitioner for the loan and interest accumulated toP1,200,000.00.7

Thereafter, respondent consulted a lawyer regarding the propriety of paying interest on the loan despite absence of agreement to that effect. Her lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the loan because there was no agreement between her and petitioner regarding payment of interest. Since she paid petitioner a total amount of P1,200,000.00 for the P540,000.00 worth of loan, and upon being advised by her lawyer that she made overpayment to petitioner, she sent a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of the excess amount of P660,000.00. Petitioner, despite receipt of the demand letter, ignored her claim for reimbursement.8

Respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent (1) P660,000.00 plus legal interest from the time of demand; (2) P300,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) an amount equivalent to 25% of P660,000.00 as attorney’s fees.9

In his answer10 to the complaint, petitioner denied that he offered a loan to respondent. He averred that in 1992, respondent approached and asked him if he could grant her a loan, as she needed money to finance her business venture with the PNO. At first, he was reluctant to deal with respondent, because the latter had a spotty record as a supplier of the PNO. However, since respondent was an acquaintance of his officemate, he agreed to grant her a loan. Respondent paid the loan in full.11

Subsequently, respondent again asked him to give her a loan. As respondent had been able to pay the previous loan in full, he agreed to grant her another loan. Later, respondent requested him to restructure the payment of the loan because she could not give full payment on the due date. He acceded to her request. Thereafter, respondent pleaded for another restructuring of the payment of the loan. This time he rejected her plea. Thus, respondent proposed to execute a promissory note wherein she would acknowledge her obligation to him, inclusive of interest, and that she would issue several postdated checks to guarantee the payment of her obligation. Upon his approval of respondent’s request for restructuring of the loan, respondent executed a promissory note dated 12 September 1994 wherein she admitted having borrowed an amount of P1,240,000.00, inclusive of interest, from petitioner and that she would pay said amount in March 1995. Respondent also issued to him six postdated checks amounting to P1,240,000.00 as guarantee of compliance with her obligation. Subsequently, he presented the six checks for encashment but only one check was honored. He demanded that respondent settle her obligation, but the latter failed to do so. Hence, he filed criminal cases for Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) against respondent. The cases were assigned to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (MeTC).12

Petitioner insisted that there was no overpayment because respondent admitted in the latter’s promissory note that her monetary obligation as of 12 September 1994 amounted to P1,240,000.00 inclusive of interests. He argued that respondent was already estopped from complaining that she should not have paid any interest, because she was given several times to settle her obligation but failed to do so. He maintained that to rule in favor of respondent is tantamount to concluding that the loan was given interest-free. Based on the foregoing averments, he asked the RTC to dismiss respondent’s complaint.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 26 January 2001 holding that respondent made an overpayment of her loan obligation to petitioner and that the latter should refund the excess amount to the former. It ratiocinated that respondent’s obligation was only to pay the loaned amount of P540,000.00, and that the alleged interests due should not be included in the computation of respondent’s total monetary debt because there was no agreement

between them regarding payment of interest. It concluded that since respondent made an excess payment to petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00 through mistake, petitioner should return the said amount to respondent pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti.13

The RTC also ruled that petitioner should pay moral damages for the sleepless nights and wounded feelings experienced by respondent. Further, petitioner should pay exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good, plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing evidence and in the light of the provisions of law and jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

(1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P660,000.00 plus legal interest of 12% per annum computed from 3 March 1998 until the amount is paid in full;

(2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount equivalent to 25% of P660,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(5) Ordering defendant to pay the costs of suit.14

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 16 December 2005, the appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision [is] AFFIRMED in toto.15

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but this was denied.16 Hence, petitioner lodged the instant petition before us assigning the following errors:

I.

THE RTC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NO INTEREST WAS DUE TO PETITIONER;

II.

THE RTC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTIO INDEBITI.17

Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is referred to as monetary interest. Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. This is called compensatory interest.18 The right to interest arises

only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which interest is demanded.19

Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest,20 specifically mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest. Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.21

It appears that petitioner and respondent did not agree on the payment of interest for the loan. Neither was there convincing proof of written agreement between the two regarding the payment of interest. Respondent testified that although she accepted petitioner’s offer of loan amounting to P540,000.00, there was, nonetheless, no verbal or written agreement for her to pay interest on the loan.22

Petitioner presented a handwritten promissory note dated 12 September 199423 wherein respondent purportedly admitted owing petitioner "capital and interest." Respondent, however, explained that it was petitioner who made a promissory note and she was told to copy it in her own handwriting; that all her transactions with the PNO were subject to the approval of petitioner as comptroller of the PNO; that petitioner threatened to disapprove her transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest; that being unaware of the law on interest and fearing that petitioner would make good of his threats if she would not obey his instruction to copy the promissory note, she copied the promissory note in her own handwriting; and that such was the same promissory note presented by petitioner as alleged proof of their written agreement on interest.24 Petitioner did not rebut the foregoing testimony. It is evident that respondent did not really consent to the payment of interest for the loan and that she was merely tricked and coerced by petitioner to pay interest. Hence, it cannot be gainfully said that such promissory note pertains to an express stipulation of interest or written agreement of interest on the loan between petitioner and respondent.

Petitioner, nevertheless, claims that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that he and respondent agreed on the payment of 7% rate of interest on the loan; that the agreed 7% rate of interest was duly admitted by respondent in her testimony in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases he filed against respondent; that despite such judicial admission by respondent, the RTC and the Court of Appeals, citing Article 1956 of the Civil Code, still held that no interest was due him since the agreement on interest was not reduced in writing; that the application of Article 1956 of the Civil Code should not be absolute, and an exception to the application of such provision should be made when the borrower admits that a specific rate of interest was agreed upon as in the present case; and that it would be unfair to allow respondent to pay only the loan when the latter very well knew and even admitted in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that there was an agreed 7% rate of interest on the loan.25

We have carefully examined the RTC Decision and found that the RTC did not make a ruling therein that petitioner and respondent agreed on the payment of interest at the rate of 7% for the loan. The RTC clearly stated that although petitioner and respondent entered into a valid oral contract of loan amounting to P540,000.00, they, nonetheless, never intended the payment of interest thereon.26 While the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision that it concurred in the RTC’s ruling that petitioner and respondent agreed on a certain rate of interest as regards the loan, we consider this as merely an inadvertence because, as earlier elucidated, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is not entitled to the

payment of interest on the loan. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court deserve great weight and respect especially when affirmed by the appellate court.27 We found no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of both courts.

Petitioner’s reliance on respondent’s alleged admission in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that they had agreed on the payment of interest at the rate of 7% deserves scant consideration. In the said case, respondent merely testified that after paying the total amount of loan, petitioner ordered her to pay interest.28 Respondent did not categorically declare in the same case that she and respondent made an express stipulation in writing as regards payment of interest at the rate of 7%. As earlier discussed, monetary interest is due only if there was anexpress stipulation in writing for the payment of interest.

There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or written, regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the Civil Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent on this point.

All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of contractual obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In other words, the two instances apply only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.29 The case at bar involves petitioner’s claim for monetary interest.

Further, said compensatory interest is not chargeable in the instant case because it was not duly proven that respondent defaulted in paying the loan. Also, as earlier found, no interest was due on the loan because there was no written agreement as regards payment of interest.

Apropos the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the principle of solutio indebiti does not apply to the instant case. Thus, he cannot be compelled to return the alleged excess amount paid by respondent as interest.30

Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti shall be applied. Article 2154 of the Civil Code explains the principle of solutio indebiti. Said provision provides that if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In such a case, a creditor-debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who then has the right to demand the return of payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive such payment becomes obligated to return the same. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.31 The principle of solutio indebitiapplies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.32 We have held that the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest.33

It was duly established that respondent paid interest to petitioner. Respondent was under no duty to make such payment because there was no express stipulation in writing to that effect.

There was no binding relation between petitioner and respondent as regards the payment of interest. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since petitioner received something when there was no right to demand it, he has an obligation to return it.

We shall now determine the propriety of the monetary award and damages imposed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Records show that respondent received a loan amounting to P540,000.00 from petitioner.34 Respondent issued two checks with a total worth of P700,000.00 in favor of petitioner as payment of the loan.35 These checks were subsequently encashed by petitioner.36 Obviously, there was an excess of P160,000.00 in the payment for the loan. Petitioner claims that the excess of P160,000.00 serves as interest on the loan to which he was entitled. Aside from issuing the said two checks, respondent also paid cash in the total amount of P175,000.00 to petitioner as interest.37 Although no receipts reflecting the same were presented because petitioner refused to issue such to respondent, petitioner, nonetheless, admitted in his Reply-Affidavit38 in the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases that respondent paid him a total amount of P175,000.00 cash in addition to the two checks. Section 26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that the declaration of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Aside from the amounts of P160,000.00 and P175,000.00 paid as interest, no other proof of additional payment as interest was presented by respondent. Since we have previously found that petitioner is not entitled to payment of interest and that the principle of solutio indebiti applies to the instant case, petitioner should return to respondent the excess amount of P160,000.00 and P175,000.00 or the total amount of P335,000.00. Accordingly, the reimbursable amount to respondent fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be reduced fromP660,000.00 to P335,000.00.

As earlier stated, petitioner filed five (5) criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent. In the said cases, the MeTC found respondent guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing five dishonored checks to petitioner. Nonetheless, respondent’s conviction therein does not affect our ruling in the instant case. The two checks, subject matter of this case, totaling P700,000.00 which respondent claimed as payment of the P540,000.00 worth of loan, were not among the five checks found to be dishonored or bounced in the five criminal cases. Further, the MeTC found that respondent made an overpayment of the loan by reason of the interest which the latter paid to petitioner.39

Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered if the party underwent physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Respondent testified that she experienced sleepless nights and wounded feelings when petitioner refused to return the amount paid as interest despite her repeated demands. Hence, the award of moral damages is justified. However, its corresponding amount of P300,000.00, as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, is exorbitant and should be equitably reduced. Article 2216 of the Civil Code instructs that assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably excessive as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.40 To our mind, the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages is fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the injury suffered by respondent.

Article 2232 of the Civil Code states that in a quasi-contract, such as solutio indebiti, exemplary damages may be imposed if the defendant acted in an oppressive manner. Petitioner acted oppressively when he pestered respondent to pay interest and threatened to block her transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest. This forced respondent to pay interest despite lack of agreement thereto. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is appropriate. The amount of P50,000.00 imposed as exemplary damages by the RTC and the Court is fitting so as to deter petitioner and other lenders from committing similar and other serious wrongdoings.41

Jurisprudence instructs that in awarding attorney’s fees, the trial court must state the factual, legal or equitable justification for awarding the same.42 In the case under consideration, the RTC stated in its Decision that the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the amount paid as interest by respondent to petitioner is reasonable and moderate considering the extent of work rendered by respondent’s lawyer in the instant case and the fact that it dragged on for several years.43 Further, respondent testified that she agreed to compensate her lawyer handling the instant case such amount.44 The award, therefore, of attorney’s fees and its amount equivalent to 25% of the amount paid as interest by respondent to petitioner is proper.

Finally, the RTC and the Court of Appeals imposed a 12% rate of legal interest on the amount refundable to respondent computed from 3 March 1998 until its full payment. This is erroneous.

We held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45 that when an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the rate of 6% per annum. We further declared that when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether it is a loan/forbearance of money or not, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

In the present case, petitioner’s obligation arose from a quasi-contract of solutio indebiti and not from a loan or forbearance of money. Thus, an interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded as well as on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees, to be computed from the time of the extra-judicial demand on 3 March 1998,46 up to the finality of this Decision. In addition, the interest shall become 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71814, dated 16 December 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the amount of P660,000.00 as refundable amount of interest is reduced to THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P335,000.00); (2) the amount ofP300,000.00 imposed as moral damages is reduced to ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00); (3) an interest of 6% per annum is imposed on the P335,000.00, on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees to be computed from the time of the extra-judicial demand on 3 March 1998 up to the finality of this Decision; and (4) an interest of 12% per annum is also imposed from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177960               January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, vs.PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.

x x x x

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.

x x x x

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latter’s inner

fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

x x x x

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence

resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a

dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35

A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated

that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165496             February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner, vs.EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 20041 and September 28, 20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.4

By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.6

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest.8

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the

case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for the following reasons:

1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully comply with Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records.

2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10

In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing his petition.

The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified, such as a petition for review before the CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.12(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.

On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.

A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either one’s own personal knowledge or on authentic

records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.15

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleader’s liking, but is dependent on thesurrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.

As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.

Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath18to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.19

This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and certification and enunciating that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 While the requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule can only be justified by the attending circumstances of the case.21

To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.

On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition – that the petition was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) – petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial to his appeal.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer.

Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated documents, save for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.

The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22

A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.

While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different order, however. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondent’s Comment.

This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.

Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them in the required form.23

In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible thereunder and is well settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)

As to the third reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition – failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action.The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.28

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.30

If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any.31

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.33

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.36

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.

Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.

Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.

Petitioner’s position is tenuous.

Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. 1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve.

One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.39

As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the nature of the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it.41

This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

Virata vs. Ochoa

81 SCRA 472

Facts: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Ave., Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victorio Ochoa. Borilla was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence. At the hearing of the criminal case the private prosecutor made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver. Later the private prosecutor withdrew the reservation and actively took part in the prosecution of the criminal case. Still later the heirs of Virata reserved their right to institute a separate civil action. On July 19, 1976 the heirs of Virata commenced a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for damages based oa(sic) on quasi-delict against the driver Borilla and the owner of the jeepney Ochoa. On Sept. 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City rendered a decision acquitting Borilla on the ground that he caused the injury by mere accident. On Jan. 31, 1977 the Court of First Instance of Cavite, dismissed the civil action for damages upon motion of the defendants.

Held: “it is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

x x x x x

“The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 isquasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act, or omission, punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.”

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141986.  July 11, 2002]

NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended party?  Our short answer is: from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 133) in Criminal Case No. 96-246.  The Order reads in full as follows:

“Opposition to Notice of Appeal being well-taken, as prayed for, the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal are denied due course.”[3]

The foregoing Order effectively prevented petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of the criminal proceedings in which the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The factual antecedents, as narrated by petitioner in its Memorandum, [4] are as follows:

“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation.

‘2.01.1 The private prosecutor represented the interests of the petitioner who was the private offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-246.’

“2.02 On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment.

“2.03 On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment.

‘2.03.1 Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday.’

“2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

“2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment.  On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.

“2.06 On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal x x x.”[5]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal [6] and Amended Notice of Appeal.[7] It accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period.  The 15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.

Hence, this Petition.[8]

The Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

“Whether the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or move for a reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action should be reckoned from the date of promulgation or from the date of such party’s actual receipt of a copy of such judgment considering that any party appealing or challenging such judgment would necessarily need a copy thereof, which is in writing and which clearly express the factual and legal bases thereof to be able to file an intelligent appeal or other challenge.”[9]

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

Preliminary Matter:Mode of Review

Petitioner brought this case to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  The Petition seeks to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order of the RTC which, in effect, disallowed petitioner’s appeal of its Judgment.

An ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) is “taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.”[10] Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.

A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court.  However, the questioned Order is not a “decision or final order” from which an appeal may be taken.   The Rules of Court states explicitly:

“No appeal may be taken from:

x x x  x x x     x x x

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;”[11]

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy that petitioner should have used, in view of the last paragraph of the same provision which states:

“In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”[12]

In turn, Rule 65, Section 1, provides:

“SEC. 1.  Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”[13] (Italics supplied)

By availing itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the Petition merits an outright dismissal. [14] Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 [15] (hereinafter “Circular”) is unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an inappropriate mode of appeal thus:

“4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.”[16]

The same Circular provides that petitioner’s counsel has the duty of using the proper mode of review.

“e) Duty of counsel – It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client’s cause.” [17]

This Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which rule a petition should fall.   It has likewise

warned lawyers to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.[18]

On this score alone, the Petition could have been given short shrift and outrightly dismissed.  Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching effects, the Court will deal with the arguments raised by petitioner and lay down the rule on this matter.  As an exception to Circular 2-90, it will treat the present proceedings as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Main Issue:Timeliness of Appeal

Petitioner contends that an appeal by the private offended party under the Rules of Criminal Procedure must be made within 15 days from the time the appealing party receives a copy of the relevant judgment.  It cites Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.  This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel.” (Italics supplied)

The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.

It is petitioner’s assertion that “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider the judgment from which an appeal will be taken.” [19] Thus, it concludes that the 15-day period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted from the time the losing party actually receives a copy of the decision or order.  Petitioner ratiocinates that it “could not be expected to capture or memorize all the material details of the judgment during the promulgation thereof.” [20] It likewise poses the question: “why require all proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be allowed the benefit of utilizing these written [documents]?”[21]

We clarify.  Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment.  In People v. Tamani,[22] the Court was confronted with the question of when to count the period within which the accused must appeal the criminal conviction.  Answered the Court:

“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant’s counsel by registered mail is not well-taken. The word ‘promulgation’ in section 6 should be construed as referring to ‘judgment’, while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as referring to ‘order’.”[23]

The interpretation in that case was very clear.  The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers [24] are in agreement with this interpretation.

In an earlier case,[25] this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:

“It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the date the decision is announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done by the court either by announcing the judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by promulgating the judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.”[26]

Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect only.  Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party.  We answer in the negative.

No Need to ReserveIndependent Civil Action

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones.  Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[27] 33,[28] 34[29] and 2176[30] of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.  Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

1.  The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2.  The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3.  The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.

Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.  In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil interest therein.[31] By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.

And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.

Period for Perfecting an Appeal

Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure declares:

“Section 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.”

This provision is similar, though not identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules invoked by petitioner.  The difference is that the former makes clear that promulgation refers to “judgment,” and notice refers to “final order appealed from.”

Taken on its face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal, whether by the accused or by the private offended party, must be counted from and understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation of the judgment.  This provision mentions the presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in certain instances, and/or the counsel or representative of the accused.  Petitioner is correct in observing that the private offended party is not required to be present during the promulgation; in fact, the said party is not even mentioned in the provision.

For clarity, the 2000 Rule on the promulgation of judgment is quoted in full hereunder: 

“Section 6. Promulgation of judgment – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

“If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

“The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

“In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”[32]

Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the Offended Party

Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the proceedings.  Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party.  It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused.  It is only through notice to the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is only from that date that the complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case.  Till then, the remedy of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.

We clarify also that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited to appeals of judgments rendered by regional trial and inferior courts.  In higher courts, there is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6 Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.  In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a decision is promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk of court, who then causes copies to be served upon the parties or their counsels.[33] Hence, the presence of either party during promulgation is not required.

The period to appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, cannot be applied equally to both accused-appellant and private offended party.  Further bolstering this argument is the second sentence of this provision which mandates as follows:

“x x x. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.”[34] (Italics supplied)

The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the reglementary period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence.  However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in relation to the accused.  This conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the period to appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the accused is given notice of the order overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new trial.  Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was taken by the accused, not by the private offended party.

Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments.  If these rules are not completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter.  As correctly pointed out by petitioner, “[t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal cannot affect the criminal aspect

thereof.”[35] Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.

In People v. Santiago,[36] the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom.  If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general.  As a rule, only the solicitor general may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.  The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.  As such, the present appeal undertaken by the private offended party relating to the civil aspect of the criminal judgment can no longer be considered a criminal action per se, wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.  Instead, it becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.

Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction.  Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal.[37] An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. [38] For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to appeal from the “promulgation” of the judgment to the accused.

In sum, we hold that an offended party’s appeal of the civil liability  ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from.  To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors.  This step will enable them to appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances.

General Rule Not Applicable to the Present Case

Having laid down the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now determine its application to the present controversy.  In short, was petitioner’s appeal timely filed?

If we were to follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January 31, 2000 was on time, considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its counsel only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed on November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.

However, a peculiar circumstance in this case militates against this conclusion.  Here, the private prosecutor himself was present during the promulgation of the Judgment.  This fact is undeniable, as petitioner itself admits his presence in its Memorandum as follows:

“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial Court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation.”[39] (Italics supplied)

Further, private prosecutor[40] even signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29, 1999, a signature which in unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he represents -- herein petitioner.

Having been present during the promulgation and having been furnished a copy of the judgment at the time, private offended party was in effect actually notified of the Judgment, and from that time already had knowledge of the need to appeal it.  Thus, the very raison d'être of this Decision is already satisfied: the filing of an appeal by the said party, only after being notified of the Judgment.  As argued by respondent, “did not the public and private prosecutors acquire notice of Judgment at its promulgation because of their presence?  Notice of the judgment may not be defined in any other way x x x.”[41]

Petitioner stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party.  It harps on the fact that -- based on constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential edicts -- judgments must be in writing and with the factual and legal bases thereof clearly expressed.

Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the Judgment, for “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof which] they can review or refer to from time to time.” [42] To rule otherwise would supposedly deny them due process.

We clarify.  If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the period for appeal would never have run.  True, no law requires the offended party to attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date.  But fiction must yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed.

Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief statement of its intention to elevate the trial court’s Decision to the CA.  There was no reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse Judgment during the promulgation. [43] Parties and

their counsels are presumed to be vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to technicalities.

Appeal Not Part of Due Process

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.  It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.[44] Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with. [45] The failure of petitioner to file a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus rendering the Judgment final and executory, is not a denial of due process.  It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.

It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[46] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. [47] “The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate.  These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.  In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity.  Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.”[48]

Neither has petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.  Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation. [49]

A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed, for they are indispensable interdictions against needless delay and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. [50] After judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party.  Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[51] This principle becomes even more essential in view of the fact that the criminal aspect has already been adjudicated.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.