obedience to the laws

8/12/2019 Obedience to the Laws

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De Gruyter

SOCRATES AND OBEDIENCE TO THE LAWAuthor(s): Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. SmithSource: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (June 1984),pp. 10-18Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913520 .Accessed: 22/08/2011 04:32

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SOCRATES AND OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW

IntheCrito, ocrates eems o argue hat ne ought ever odisobey he aw, r nylegal power r body. The strongest uchobligation s suggested t Crito 1B-C,where ocrates aysof the tate:

... if she ordersou

to bescourged

rmprisoned

r f she eadsyou owar o be wounded r lain, erwill s to be done, ndthis sright, nd youmust ot giveway r draw ackor eaveyour ost,but nwar nd ncourt nd everywhere,oumust o whatever hestate, our ountry emands, r youmust howherbypersuasionwhat s really ight . .

It is on such grounds hathe refuses rito's ffer o assisthim n escaping rison(and thus execution). et in the Apology, here s at least one instance whereSocrates eems osay hat e would, nder he ight ircumstances,isobey legallyconstituted uthority. t Apology 9C-30C,Socrates ays hatwere he urors otellhim hathe could go free, n the ondition hathe discontinuehepractice fphilosophy, isreplywouldbe:Men of Athens, respect nd love you, but shall obey hegod

rather han you, nd while live nd am able to continue, shallnever iveup philosophy r stop xhorting ouand pointing utthe ruth oany neofyou may meet . . (29D)

Critics ave been ed,bycomparing uchpassagess these, oargue hat hereis a contradictionnSocrates' iew f the moral cceptibilityf civil isobedience.2Others ave urged hat his hows ocrates' rguments ith rito o be ntendedessas decisive hilosophicallyhan s rhetoricallydequate opersuade ritohimself.3Still others have sought o defend he consistency nd sincerity f Socrates'

arguments y providing varietyf

nterpretationsf the

problematic rgumentsthat ither eaken heir pparent onclusionsr recast heir ocus, ndthus urportto allow consistent ormulationf Socratic hilosophy.4n this rief iscussion,we do not want o evaluate ll of these nterpretationss such,but rather opointout an aspect f Socrates' rguments hathas gonewholly nnoticedn the con-siderableiterature n this ssue. f we are right, iving roper ttention o Socrates'legalsituation n the Apologyremoves he apparent ontradiction, ven f weassume or hese urposes he trongest ossible eading f Socrates' rofessedom-mitment o the aw n the Crito. In thisway,we shall how hat no reading f theCrito onflicts ith ocrates' ow ntheApology.We shall onclude y rguing hatno non-trivial onflict etween odand aw can evenbe imagined.

IThegeneral uestion s whether r not n theApology ocrates s prepared o dothings hatwould efy egal uthority, nd thus is ownproscriptionsntheCrito.Thepassages ited bove Apology 9Cff.) snot he nly ne ntheApologywhereSocrates ppearsdefiant f authority, ut t is the only one that an be arguedplausibly ocause erious oncern or onsistency ith he rguments f the Crito.Forexample, t 32B-C,Socrates ecalls he ime when e alone opposed heplan otry n masse he ight enerals esponsibleor eaving heir ead afer he ea-battleat Arginusae, lthough heother rytanes ere n favor f such n action.This snot problem, owever, ecause uch trialwouldbe illegal, espite ts ppealto

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the populace. Similarly, t 32C-E, Socratesrecalls hetime when the thirty yrantswere n power nd directed im ogo out and bring eon of Salamis for xecutiona man who had apparently one no wrong nd had never been tried for his allegedoffenses. ocrates did not carry ut their order, however, ince neither was theirorder egal according o the aws under which he had grown up,6nor did they have

legal authority nder hose awsto give any such command despite heirmanifestpoliticalpower).The same goesfor ll other asesof apparent rrogance r defiancein theApology, with he ole possible xception f his resistance o the urors t 29Cff.: none commit ocrates to defying aw or legal authority. f there s a contradic-tion to be found between he Apology and Crito, therefore, t can be found only nthis one passage.

But these ther ases provide t least somegrounds ordecidingwhat will ountas a problem for he claim that he two dialoguescontain n inconsistency. or ex-ample, if it can be shown either hat the directive ocrates magines he urors toissue could never be a legal one, or that the urors had no legal authority o issuesuch an order, ocrates' ow to disobeywould be no more nconsistent ith hedoc-trine hat one ought lways obey the aw than his resistance o the mass trial of thegenerals r to the tyrants ad been. Though we concede that there might e otherwaysto resolve he paradox, for xample,by construing isobligation o the aw asonly rima acie, and capable of exceptionwhere here s a conflictwith he dictatesof piety7 r even morality n general,8we shall argue that no such moral hierarchiesneed to be constructed n order to maintain onsistency n Socrates' view.

IIIt is important o recognize hecircumstances nder which ocrates makes his con-troversial ow: He is on trial for mpiety nd corrupting heyouth f Athens. More

immediately, t has been claimed by the prosecution hat either e should not havebeen brought o trial were he innocent), r given that he has, he should surely efound guilty nd sentenced o death 29C). Socrates magines hat he ury s not per-suaded by Anytus, ut s also not utterly onvinced f Socrates' blamelessness ndharmlessness, nd thus offer to let him go on the condition that he give upphilosophy. ocrates responds by saying hat he would never obey.

There re two possibleways n which uch a situation ould occur: Either a) thejury offers o acquit Socratesof all charges,with hisprovision, r b) the ury findsSocratesguilty f the charges, but elects o sentencehim to silencerather han thedeath-penalty roposed by the prosecution. et us consider hese n order.

If the situation ocrates has in mind s of sort a), then what s supposedto oc-cur s that Socrates s found nnocent f any charges, but s nonetheless equired oeschewphilosophy, n pain of death 29D). But there s not the slightest istoricalevidence hat the ury was empowered o provide any such conditional cquittals;nor s there ny sense n supposing hat here hould have been provisions or his.After all, if the man is legally guilty of no crimes, then he surely deserves nopenalties r restrictions. f, on the other hand, he woulddeserve eath for repeatinghis actions, hen urely hoseactions re blameworthy nd should thus merit con-viction, nd not an acquittal. Of course, it might be that one who is charged asSocrateswas, and put forward or rial,9 hould, whatever heoutcome, feelwarnedthat whatever e had done had the potential f getting im n serious rouble. But,again, there s excellent eason to believethat Athenian

uriesn trials of this

type

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did not have the authority o find man innocent, n the one hand, and yet ssue adirective aving heeffect f a penalty, hould the directive e disobeyed.Had theymade such a directive nyway, ocrates' vow to disobey t would commit imto nodisobedience f the aw - for no law allowed the ury to make such a directive.

Now it might e that what he ituation emands s that he ury cquit Socrateswithout

provisionf

any kind,but then

ubsequently assa law

sayingither hat

philosophywas a crime punishable y death, or that Socratespracticing hilosophywas a crime punishable by death. The effect f this would be that while hey oundSocratesguilty f no crime for what he had done was not against he aw), they hadbecomeconvinced hat t ought o be against he aw, and thus had resolved o makeit so. Thus, they ay to Socrates, we will et you go now, for you have broken nolaw, but we will make it so that f you go out and repeat the actions that havebrought oubefore us, you willbe breaking he aw - a law the breaking f whichearns the death-penalty . This would provide a reasonable reading of the ury'sdirective, ithout ommitting hem o the problems onsidered bove, but t wouldstill require hem o take on prerogatives hat they do not have. Juries re not em-

powered opass laws, but rather may only cquit or condemn hose brought eforethem n formal harges, nd, under ertain ircumstances and with ertain estric-tions, bout both of which wewillhave more to say below),select he penalty o bepaid by those that are convicted. Thus, if the ury acquitted Socrates, they wouldhave no further ower over him as a group, nor could they ontrive s a group tomaintain ny uch poweroverhim. Of course, s citizens, ome or for hatmatter llof the members f the ury ould propose egislation f the relevant ort o the coun-cil. But, as jurors, they ould not guarantee ts passage, and so they ould not withany egalauthority, ctual or potential, ssuesuch a directive s Socrates magines,having found him nnocent. Hence, were he ury o find ocrates nnocent, is con-tinued

practicef

philosophywould violate no law or

legallyonstituted

uthority,no matter what the jury had otherwise roposed to him. His vow to continue,therefore, ould n no way violate his avowed commitment lways oobey the aw.

But Socratesmay have had situation b) in mind, where he ury convictshim,but then entences im o giveup philosophy, hreatening eath f he disobeys.Thisnot only makes more conceptual ense than situation a) (for now they would beassigning uch a penalty s a sentence or a convicted riminal), ut coincides wellwith ocrates' discussion t 37E-38A,wherehaving eenconvincted, ereconsidersthe proposal that he quit philosophy, s the appropriate entence.

Now it is clear that the jury is empowered o penalize convicted riminalsthrough he assignment f sentences. And were a sentence ssigned, the convict

would be in violation of the law, or at least disobedient f a legallyconstitutedauthority mpowered o make such assignments, erehe to fail to behave accord-ingly. Were Socrates egally entenced o eschew philosophy, isobediencewouldthen t least prima acie violatehis purported iew hat he ought lways o do as hiscountry ommands.

We do not know all of the imitations n what sentences uries werepermittedto assign, hough we can be fairly ertain hat t least some minimal estrictions erein effect. ut we do know that herewas an important istinction etween ypes ftrial procedures, distinction hat s crucially elevant o this ase. Although herewas apparently ot a clear distinction made between ivil nd criminal roceedings,Athens did have a provision for two different orts of cases: those for crimes he

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penalities or which were set by law, and those for crimes he penalties for whichwerenot set by aw. The trial procedure or he first ort of case was called an &yti)vAtim-titoq; he latter was an ftycov ihtit6


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thus avoided the conflict hat way. In short, he number f suppositions, ll con-trary o fact, hat need to be made, even to get the problematic ase off he ground,renders heproblem prohibitively peculative.

One final point remainswhichmight e used as an objection o our view hat noseriousparadox s to be found n Socrates' vow. After ll, whatever ruth here s in

the above observations, he fact remains hat Socrates does not say that he woulddisobeybecause any such directive o cease philosophywould not be legal; he saysthat he would disobeybecause such a directive would conflict with his duty o thegod. If the fact that the ury could not legallyrequire ocrates to quit philosophyhad anything o do with his vow, surely he would have said so.

Such an objection s based upon a misunderstanding f our argument, owever,and in any case ignores he specificpurpose of Socrates' vow. First, we have notattempted o argue that there ould be no moral principle verriding hat whichobligesSocratesto obey the aw, though we willconsider hispoint n the next ec-tion. Secondly, we have not claimed that the fact that the magined directive romthe ury would not be legal s what motivated ocrates o vow disobedience.We haveonly argued that n vowing o disobey ny such directive, e is not vowingdisobe-dience to the aw or legal authority, nd thus his vow causes no conflict with hearguments f the Crito.

But more mportantly, ocrates does not raise this topic to explain either hisfeelings f obligation o the aw, or any nclination e might aveto violate he aw.Rather, he raises this opicto underscore wopoints of fundamental ignificance nhis defense: He wishes o show how much more deeplyhe fears doing that which sevil and shameful han death, and he wishes o highlight he seriousness with whichhe takes his mission or hegod. In doing so, he uses the deviceof considering hathe would do if the ury et him go unharmed, rovided hat he gave up this mission.

His answer s that o do so would be shameful nd impious. The irony f this s thatit s on the grounds f piety hat he will not promise oceasewhat has led to his be-ing charged with mpiety, nd this rony would not likely have been lost on hisaudience, the ury. The gist of his vow, then, s only this: Even if t meant freedomfor him werehe to giveup his mission , and death werehe to continue t, he wouldcontinue t - so much does he fear disgrace more than death. And even if thecitizens f Athens would never orgive imfor his actions, hewillof the god meansmore to him.

The reason that Socrateswouldmake such claims s that t s vital o his defensethat the actions that have offended is accusers and many others besides)are thewill of the god, and thus cannot provide grounds for the charge of impiety. Andwerehe seen to be saying ll of these hings ut of a fear of death, the urors coulddoubt the sincerity f his repeated professions o the effect hat his work s seriousand vital o the welfare f the tate. Thus, Socratesurged both that he serves he godand that he has no fear of death n the trongest ossible erms so strongly hat tevenoverrides n openly xpressed ove and respect orhis fellow itizens.His vowto disobey he magined irective oes not reflect n arrogant isregard or he uryor their wishes.Rather t stresses he extent o which he is deeplypious, contrary othe claims of the prosecution. ndeed, t s a repeated feature f his defense hat hisactions are designed o better he state and those that compose t - so far are hiscommitments rom efiant isregard or hose hat would have him top behaving she does.

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IllWe have not argued that there s no need to consider he commitments f Socraticphilosophy n the ssue of conflicting uties o god and law. Rather, ur claim thusfar is only that no such conflict rises from Socrates' vow in the Apology. Thegrounds for saying his, however, o not entail that no such conflict ould occur.

Thoughsuch

speculation, ccordingo the

argument bove,is not

required bythe

juxtaposition f the Apology and the Crito, t is worthwhile sking whether uch asituation ould arise and, if t did, what Socrates' response would be.

The options eemto be three: i) Socrates' principleswouldrequire him to obeythe aw even f t entailed efying hegod's command; ii) Socrates' principles ouldrequire him to obey the god's command ven f t entailed defying he aw; and (iii)there s no conceivable ituation, nce properly nderstood, n which obedience tothe aw and to the god conflict.15

Establishingwhich f these would be the Socraticposition s made at least pro-blematic y the fact hat the text ffers othing xplicitly ddressed o this ssue -for ccording o our argument bove the statements f the Apology and Crito thathave caused such controversy n this point are not, once properly een in context,sufficient eally o raise the questiondirectly. ather, hey eaveonly hefeeling hatsuch a conflict ould occur. But (i) on its face appears to conflict with t least thesense of Socrates' defense n the Apology; a defense hat s founded upon repeatedassertions o the effect hat he has given up all else in favor f pursuing isduty othe god. Moreover, even if our argument bove is correct, ocrates ignores theillegality f the ury's imagined directive, iting nly the god's will in his vow todisobey. These features f the Apology at least suggest hat ocrates ook his duty othe god as foremost. And just as such observations would seem to render i) anunlikely andidate for Socratic commitment, heywould also seem to lend supportto

(ii),the

option unanimouslyhosen

bythose scholars nclined to attribute

hierarchy f commitments o Socrates. But there s an homologous difficulty ith(ii). In the Crito, Socrates' arguments ever explicitly llow exceptions; hey ayonly hat one must bey the aw, at least where hose responsible annot be persuad-ed that he aw in question ought o be changed. Of course, t might e argued thatthe uggested xception s not provided n the Crito onlybecause such religious ues-tions re not at issue at that point.16 he unqualified haracter f Socrates' conclu-sions, however, strongly uggest that the arguments re not intended to beapplicable solely to those specific uestions raised by Crito.

On these grounds, hen, iii) appears to be the most attractive ption, thoughfor t to work, grounds must be given for ruling ut possibleconflict etween ivic

and religiousduties. Let us consider, hen, what evidencemight e cited for this.First, t was generally upposed that he foundations or he egalcode were divine norigin.17 ut more mportantly, thenian aw directly roscribed mpiety, withoutproscribing articular cts or beliefs.18 he conflict etween he aws and the godsuch speculations uppose, therefore, would be, to Socrates, conflicts within helaws themselves, ince any law that required Socrates to disobey the god woulddirect him n a way exactly ontradictory o the egaldirective rohibiting mpiety.Socrates' categorical duty to obey the law could not in principle onflict with hiscategorical uty o the god under these conditions, orthe atter was built nto theformer.

Let us consider, for example, what would be the effect f this account on

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Socrates' position were he to face a duly enacted aw prohibiting he practice ofphilosophy.19 ertainly ewoulddisobey uch a law, yet n the Crito Socratesplain-ly asserts hat ach of the tate's awsmust be obeyed 51C-D). But n this ituation,the magined awrequireswhat s to Socrates manifest mpiety; hus t contradictsa prior aw prohibiting mpiety. When aws contradict ne another, ven the moststeadfast dherent to civil

authorityannot find a

wayto

complywith both.

Necessarily, ocomplywith ne is to disobey heother. That Socrates ould not defya law of logic is no evidence hat he would defy law of Athens, yet t seems theformer s what wouldbe required n this ase, in order o achieve he atter n a non-trivialway. Thus, Socrates ould argue that both duties to the awand to the god- are such as to allow for no exceptions.Given that Socratesmakes no exceptionsto such duties, and that Athenian aw provides for their ompatibility, e see noreason not to assume the iterality f Socrates' claims, t least so far s they pply othese problems.

This does, however, uggest ne possible et of circumstances n which ocrateswould encounter he conflictwe have so far ruled out: We can generate ucha case if

we imagine Athens to repeal her proscription f impiety nd subsequently utlawphilosophy. We have shown that no such conflict an be generated rom properunderstanding f the Apology, evenwhen onjoinedwith he trongest endering fthe arguments f the Crito. We have further rgued that given he Athenian egalsystem s we know t, and as it was when Socrates argued the views for which wehave come to knowhim, no such conflict an be generated. hough we concede thatinterestmight e found n speculations s to how Socrates might avehad to modifyhis views were Athens to undergo one or more drastic hanges or, for these pur-poses equivalently, f the god were to demand that Socratesattempt o destroy helaws), such speculations lie considerably beyond the scope of philosophical

exegesis.20nd

thought

maybe desirable on other

groundso interpret ocratic

claims in such a way as to weaken the commitments e have taken here to becategorical,we have shown hat n context, ocrates' arguments an be taken t facevalue, with no violence o sense or logic.

Thomas C. Brickhouse, NicholasD. Smith,Lynchburg ollege Virginia olytechnicVirginia. Institute nd StateUniversity.

NotesWe are ndebted oTerence

rwin, Henry Teloh,and Gene James or omments n earlier rafts f

this paper, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for funding hat helped to make thisresearch ossible.All errors re, of course, ours alone.1 This and the next uote are the Loeb ClassicalLibrary ranslation y H.N. Fowler Harvard, 1971).2. Cf for epresentative xamples f this view, RexMartin, Socrates and Disobedience oLaw , The

Reviewof Metaphysics XXIV, 1970, pp.22 ff.; Gene James, Socrates on Civil Disobedience ndRebellion , Southern Journal of Philosophy XI, 1973, pp.119-127; and Howard Zinn, Dis-obedience nd Democracy NowYork, 1968, p.28).

3. Cf. for representative xamplesof this view, Gary Young, Socrates and Obedience , PhronesisXIX, 1974,pp.1-29; Ann Congleton, Two Kinds of Lawlessness:Plato's Crito , Political TheoryII, 1974, pp.432-466; Frederick Rosen, Obligation and Friendship n Plato's Crito , PoliticalTheory, , 1973, pp.307-308.John Grote, nPlato and the Other Companions f Socrates London,1888,Vol. I, Chapter 10)holds that hepositions egarding bedience olaw found nApology andCrito re inconsistent. ut Grote ttempts oexplain he nconsistency y arguing hat he Apology

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is a faithful ccount of the speech Socrates actually gave at his trial, while the Crito representsPlato's attempt oportray is master n a far more favorable ight y writing n imaginary iscus-sion between ocrates nd Crito n which ocrates defends heprerogatives f the tate. A positionsimilar o that of Grote s found n J. Dybikowski, Was Socrates as Reasonable as ProfessorVlastos? , The Yale Review LXIV, 1974, pp.293-296.

4. Cf. for representative xamplesof such nterpretations, regory Vlastos, Socrates on Obedienceand

Disobedience ,The Yale Review

LXII, 1974,pp.517-534;FrancesC.

Wade, S.J., In Defenseof Socrates , The Reviewof Metaphysics XXV, 1971, pp.311-325; Gerasimos Santas, Socrates(London, Boston, and Henley, 1979,pp.54-56); R.E. Allen, Law and Justice n Plato's Crito ,Journal of Philosophy LXIX, 1972, pp.557-567; A.D. Woozley, Socrates on Disobeying theLaw , in ThePhilosophy f Socrates, d. by Gregory lastos Garden City, NewYork, 299-318).A somewhat different ersion s taken by Woozley in his recent book, Law and Obedience: TheArguments f Plato's Crito Chapel Hill, 1979,Chapter II, esp. pp.44-46).

5. There re a variety f interpretations f the pecific onclusions or rguments f the Crito re sup-posed to reach, and we shall not attempt o take sides on this ssue. Rather, we shall take at facevalue what Socratesproclaims f his view n numerous laces n the Crito, namely, hathe is moral-ly obliged to obey the aws and legal structures f his country. t is worth noting, however, hatmany of the arguments f the Crito seem to derive hisobligation from higher nes, and so ourargument hould not be taken s an attempt orefute ny of the more detailed nterpretations f theCrito that ake this nto ccount. Rather, weseekonly oshowthat uchmoderating nterpretationsare not required orconsistency ith heproblematic ow in the Apology.

6. That one aspectof Socrates' feeling f duty o the aw is that he had grown p under ts protection sevident n his argument t Crito 51C ff. The degree o which his n particular s vital to his duty ssomewhat nclear, houghwecan be certain hat ocrates' commitment o this aw would entail c-quiescenceto the established process by which any new laws were to be made. Thus, it wouldreasonably e hypothesized hat ny new aw or legaldecisionwould, by this ame argument, ro-hibit ocrates' disobedience.Cf. pp.11-12 for the imits f this, however.

7. Cf. Vlastos and Santas, for xamples.Though not explicit n arguing hat ocrates holds a hierar-chical view of moral obligation, uch an attribution o Socrates eemsto be implied y both posi-tions taken by Woozley. Unfortunately, hatever hilosophical merits uch a view might have,nowhere n the Crito does Socrates llow that his obligation o the tate ould be overridden y anyother obligation, hough f. note 5, above.

8. Cf. Wade, for xample.Again similar onsiderations pply to this view as any other hierarchicalview . (Cf. notes 5 and 7 above).9. Not all plaints were ctually brought efore he court for rial. The kingarchon, hose function twas to hear preliminary vidence gainst a defendent n impiety ctions, could for a variety freasons refuse o forward case to the court. Cf., A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, Vol. I,

Oxford, 1971, p.90).10. Cf., John Burnet, lato's Euthyphro, pology of Socrates nd Crito, Oxford, 1963,p.152, note on36B3.

11. The penalty roposed by the prosecution s called the tihtiok;; hat by the defendant, hedvirrlu-iloiQ.It is not entirely lear whether hiswas a legal requirement or the defendant, r merely noption that he had.

12. Cf., for xamples,Burnet, p. cit., p. 149;Harrison, p. cit., pp.80-82; J.H. Lipsius,Das AttischeRecht und Rechtsverfahren 1905, pp.248-253); Louis Gernet, Droit et Societe dans la greceAn-cienne 1955, pp.61-81, esp. 78-79); Otto Schulthess, RE cols. 1251-1255;Harpokration, .v.,&t(htito


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15. Though he is not necessarily ommitted o the viewthat follows,Terence rwin's helpful ommentshad a great ffect n the way we have structured t.

16. This s the move made by Santas to explainwhy ocrates does not mention n the Crito what Santastakes obe the overriding ature f his obligation othe god. Though we should not be taken here srefuting hisviewby flat, ee notes 5 and 7, above.

17. Cf. K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality n the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Berkeley nd LosAngeles, 1974,pp.255-56.

18. Cf. D.M. MacDowell,TheLaw in Classical Athens, thaca, N.Y., 1978,pp.199-200.

19. Initially, ocrates might ot consider t a law at all. In cases where ne believed hat lawwaspass-ed that contradicted prior aw, one could endeavor to have it cancelledby proposing ypacpfi7capav6iiG)v, legalprocedure n which he nitiator f the ater aw is charged with having reatedsuch a contradiction, nd during which hat ater aw is suspended.At least at the outset, ocratesmight wellhave initiated uch a procedure. However, t s conceivable hat even f he did this, heoffending aw would be upheld, eaving ocrates o face a duly enacted and now upheld lawforbidding imto philosophize.The fact hat he ury rying he magined ase did not seethe on-tradiction oes not entail hat here sno contradiction, owever, nd this s crucial o the ituationSocrateswouldnow face. For a more detaileddiscussion f how such legalprocedurewouldwork,cf. MacDowell,pp.50-52.

20 Even on the most superficial eading of the Crito, however, ome provision s made for this:Socrates ould always hoose to leave Athens, hough t s not clear that hiswouldnot compromisehis religiousmission n Athens. Cf. Crito 51D, but cp. Apology 30D-E, and 37C-E.)

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obedience to the laws

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