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The defence relationship with

Singapore is the second most active

after Australia with an extensive range

of defence exercises occurring regu-

larly. A benefit of this mutual coopera-

tion, which has seen numerous training

opportunities for Singapore forces in NZ

and the basing of some equipment, is

assistance to the NZDF whenever

required as with the introduction of the

Mistral VLLAD system.

As stated in the 97 Review

Australia is New

Zealands closest and most

important security part-

ner. The alliance with

Australia, born of the

Canberra Pact and for-

malised in ANZUS, remains

central to New Zealands

defence policy. The pub-

lic opinion polls also

showed that a significant

94% consider the security

of Australia to be very or fairly impor-

tant to NZ. Reliance on Australia has

increased ever since NZ implemented a

nuclear free policy that weakened US

defence relations. Since 1991, coopera-

tion has been reinforced by a multitude

of links as part of Closer Defence

Relations (CDR). These CDR have man-

ifested themselves in a multitude of

ways such as the joint ANZAC frigateprogram, joint exercises and training

opportunities and the basing of RNZAF

Skyhawks in Nowra to assist RAN fleet

training.

The 97 Review approved funding

injections of some NZ$663 million over

five years, on top of the baseline bud-

get, for capital programs but this has

been shown to be woefully inadequate,

considering the range of required pro-

grams that currently lack funding. This

is especially true considering the

unfavourable downturn in the value ofthe NZ$ vs. the US$ as this drives up the

cost of most capital acquisitions.

Even more so than Canadian politi-

cians, many in NZ do not seem to under-

stand the benefits of maintaining an

adequately funded general purpose mili-

tary that would give the government a

wider range of options. Defence spend-

ing has been cut by 30% over the past

decade and currently stands at only 1.1

per cent of GDP which is well below

international average. Post-election

defence briefing papers have stated that

the tight defence budgets of the 1980s

and 1990s have resulted in a decline in

current force equipment reliability,

interoperability with friendly forces and

combat viability. The opinion polls

have shown this to be slipping out of

step with public opinion as support for

increasing government expenditure on

defence has risen to over half the

respondents.

The governments previous stance

was that security within the Asia-

Pacific region is of prime importance to

NZ. We are a maritime region sur-

rounded by vast distances that can only

be protected by a strong and well-

equipped naval and air force. a

reform of defence force capabilities that

focuses on land forces and downplays

the need for a blue-water navy and air

strike capability would dramatically

reduce the deployment options avail-

able to a future government to respond

to what is an uncertain future security

environment.

The new Labour government is in

the midst of preparing a new Defence

Assessment, to determine the future

structure of the NZDF to enhance its

ability to support peace support opera-

tions, it bills as the first comprehensive

review of overall defence policy since

the substantive 1991 Review. Thisseems to be mainly based on the con-

clusions of the Review of the lease of

the F-16 report by former MP Derek

Quigley, which is widely regarded as

being based on highly flawed and erro-

neous assumptions, as well as using the

conclusions, again heavily guided by

Quigley, of the Defence Beyond 2000

report as the blueprint for i ts new

humanitarian approach.

This approach basically rests upon

the tenements, as mentioned in the lat-

est issue of NZ Defence Quarterly bycommentator Colin J ames, that only

such fighting is to be done and prepared

for as is necessary to make or maintain

peace and that only such money as is

necessary for that limited capability is

to be spent. This abrupt shift in strate-

gic policy is already as witnessed by the

recent decision to terminate the F-16

lease to free up transport funds and for

re-equipping of the RNZA. Additionally,

it was decided against the purchase of a

third ANZAC frigate in preference of

smaller multi-role patrol vessels.The future roles of the RNZAF and

RNZN would seem to be as glorified

transport forces for the RNZA as borne

out by a recent proposal, as noted in a

recent issue of the Australian Business

Defence Review, to downsize the com-

bat capability of the RNZN and sell the

two ANZAC frigates back to Australia.

Meanwhile the RNZAF is unlikely to be

able to replace its Skyhawks once they

17VANG UARD Issue 3, 2000

Basic Facts: NEW ZEALAND

Total Area 268,680 sq km.[two-island nation,slightlylarger than UK]Also: Antipodes; Auckland;Bounty; Campbell; Chathamand Kermadec Islands

Government Democratic monarchy

Capital Wellington

Terrain Predominantly mountainouswith some large coastalplains. Lies across the

Tasman Sea SEof Australia.

Population 3.8 million (April 2000)

EthnicGr oups 74.5%NZ European,9.7%Maori,4.6%European,3.8%Pacific Islander,7.4%Asian and other

Religion 24%Anglican,18%Presbyterian,15%Roman Catholic,10%Other,33%unspecified or none

Languages English (official), Maori

Flag

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must be retired by 2007 as it is unlikely

that funds, much greater than the gen-

erous NZ$124.8 million for two five-year

leases, NZ$238.2 million for support

equipment and start-up costs for the F-

16 deal plus NZ$287 million for outright

purchase, would be approved. This is

unfortunate considering the 1999 Annual

Report stated that NZ would contribute

effectively to the common security of

the Australia-NZ strategic area by

maintaining defence capabilities that are

interoperable with those of Australia

and that can look after New Zealands

fair share of the defence burden.

This approach is at odds with the

fundamental tenants of NZ defence pol-

icy and is likely to alienate both

regional allies, and the US, as both naval

and air combat capabilities are funda-

mental in demonstrating that NZ is seri-

ous about its own defence and

committed to regional security. This

ignores the prevailing environment,

such as instability in Indonesia, the rise

of nationalism and expanding military

capabilities of key regional states, as

even Australia has the perception that

the post-Cold war strategic environ-

ment has deteriorated and is publishing

a new White Paper this year to reflect

this updated strategic assessment of

the region.

Royal NZ Army (RNZA)

The RNZA is structured around two reg-

ular land force groups based on the two

main i slands and would provide the

capacity for one to command the field

brigade while the other oversees sus-

tainment arrangements. There are plans

in place to expand the size of the Army

to 4,900 by 2005/6 as well as adding a

fourth rifle company to each regularforce battalion (Bn), commencing in

2001 and completing by 2005. It is the

main beneficiary of a NZ$500 million re-

equipment program that aims to

upgrade the RNZAs: mobility; commu-

nications; surveillance and fire-support

capabilities. This is because, as noted

by the NZ PM, Dr Helen Clark, we feel if

there is one thing that has let us down

in our overseas deployments, it is the

antiquated nature of the NZ Armys

equipment, and that is right at the top

of our priority list for significant expen-diture.

At the top of the list is the program

to provide new wheeled armoured vehi-

cles, based on the Diesel Division

General Motors of Canada LAV-III /

Bison APC family and their Australian

ASLAV variants to replace the current

tracked fleet which is pr oving very

expensive to keep operating. This is

expected to comprise 24 fire-support

vehicles (FSV) and some 80 infantry

mobility vehicles (IMV) configured for

various roles. The FSV/IMV project will

provide the RNZA with enough vehicles

to motorise one RF Bn group and a com-

pany of the second Bn with approval to

purchase to be presented to the govern-

ment mid-year for an in service date of

mid-2002. There is presently a program

in place to refurbish 150 Unimog

medium trucks to double their opera-

tional life to thirty years and allow the

medium vehicle replacement program

to be postponed until at least 2010.

The MOD already purchased 30 (out

of total of 115) Holden Rodeo 4WD vehi-

cles for the East Timor deployment out

of a total of 423 new Light Operational

Vehicles (LOV) being purchased to

replace the Armys 567 obsolete

Landrovers with the total purchase

including some 115 non-military vehi-

cles and the balance as standard mili-

tary vehicles. A program to acquire

Sincgars tactical radios under a FMS

from the US is underway to improve

interoperability with likely allies. New

FN heavy machine guns have been

acquired for Point Direct Fire Support

Weapon (DFSW) role although tenders

have been deferred for the Area DFSW

and the Medium Range Anti-Armour

Weapon as have targeting systems for

the Point DFSW and the VLLAD detach-

ment.

Royal NZ Navy (RNZN)

Of the three services the RNZN [Maori

Te Taua Moana O Aotearoa] is

presently in the best shape as it

recently completed the acquisition of

two ANZAC frigates for NZ$927.3 million

as part of a joint Australian-NZ pur-

chase and an ANZAC Combat System

Tactical Training and System Support

Facility in Auckland, while a Bridge

Simulator has been ordered for installa-tion at Devonport naval base to be oper-

ational by September 2000. Allowances

have been made to fit Harpoon SSMs at

a future date and are fitted for, but not

with, a Phalanx CIWS. Also planned is

the acquisition of a towed array sonar

system for the ANZACs plus the pro-

curement of the Evolved Seasparrow

Missile (ESSM) which will allow the

eight-cell Mk 41 VLS which currently

carries 8 RIM-7P Seasparrow to accom-

modate 32 quad-packed ESSM.

Approval has finally been received

to proceed with the phase three conver-

sion of the former Ro-Ro ferry Charles

Upham, acquired in December 1994 but

under commercial charter for the last

three years, into an operational military

Sealift ship as the 1991 Review noted

the RNZN had insufficient transport to

deploy and sustain a reinforced battal-

ion group away from NZ. The delay in

implementing the modifications has

18VANG UARD Issue 3, 2000

CURRENTDEFENCEBUDGETNZ$1.6 billion (US$__?)

Current Force Levels:

Army 4,500 personnel(plus 5,000 Territorial Force)

26 Recce (Scorpion: 18 in storage)78 Tracked APC(M-113)43 Towed 105mmartillery (incl. 24 Hamel)

Army Unit Formations

(RF =Regular Force, TF =Territorial Force)

1 Bde (2 RF plus 1 composite TF Inf Bn)8 Infantry Bns (2RF +6TF)1 Armoured Regt (Joint RF/TF) plus TF Recce Sqn1 SASGroup (2 RF Squadrons)1 Artillery Regt (Joint RF/TF) plus TF Bty1 Engineer Regt (RF) plus 1 TF Sqn3 Logistics Regt

Navy: 1,861 personnel(plus 381 Volunteer Reserves)

3 Frigates (2 ANZAC, 1 Leander)7 IPC/MCM, inshore survey (2 laid up)

1 Replenishment ship1 Ro-Ro (future Military Sealift) ship

Air Force: 3,065 personnel19 Strike aircraft (A-4K Skyhawk)7 Transports (5 C-130H, 2 B727)6 Maritime Patrol (P-3K Orion)

4/5 Light Maritime helicopters (SH-2F/GSeasprite)14 Light Tactical Transport helicopters

(UH-1H Iroquois)

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been sorely felt as HMNZS Upham was

unavailable for the East Timor deploy-

ment.

The remaining 5 operational Inshore

Patrol Craft (IPC) of the indigenously

designed and produced MOA class are

operated by the RNZNVR and provide a

limited MCM capability for NZ har-

bours, similar to that provided by the

better armed Canadian Kingston class

MCDVs, although it is planned to add a

remote minehunting system.

The decision to walk away from the

purchase of a third ANZAC frigate is ill

considered as the former Chief of Naval

Staff (CNS) Rear Adm. Fred Wilson

noted that based on our analysis, four

ANZAC frigates are required to meet

current output requirements and fully

meet the defence policy objectives. As

noted by the current CNS Rear Adm.

Peter McHaffie the ANZAC scores in

terms of endurance, interoperability,supportability, and the logistics avail-

ability that comes by being part of a 10-

ship program with the Royal Australian

Navy (RAN). A previous CNS Rear Adm.

J ack Welch notes that an analysis of

smaller Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV)

being procured as an ANZAC alternative

reveals that they are not as cheap

overall as their capital cost would sug-

gest. The Navy would have to purchase

the infrastructure to support yet

another class of ship and would need

to train for additional special skills toman them. In a small navy such as ours,

the effect would be quite profound and

costly.

A possible decision to dispose of

the ANZACs for $500 million and pur-

chase a new class of patrol vessel

would be a mistake because of the con-

siderable investment outlay for both

the frigates and their shore based infra-

structure. Besides, as Welch noted in

terms of force structure, the OPV does

not sit well in the NZ situation. This is a

small island nation which is assessed asunlikely to be territorially threatened in

the foreseeable future. It follows that

the Navy does not need to develop a

force specifically for territorial defence

The OPV is, by its size, limited in its

ability to contribute to operations with

a coalition force at long distances from

NZ, in all weathers and for long periods.

The frigate does not have these limita-

tions.

The pur chase of a thi rd ANZAC

frigate would make fiscal sense as it

would allow for the operational rotation

of one deployed on MIF type missions

and as noted in the 97 Review the

Southern Ocean includes some of the

roughest seas. The farthest part of the

Cook Islands, for which we have

defence responsibilities, is 4,000 km

from NZ. To overcome the operational

limitation of a small navy the RNZN

could sign an Admiral Benelux type

agreement with the RAN similar to that

signed by the Belgian and Dutch navies.

Operation as an integrated fleet would

strengthen capability in peacekeeping,

SAR and humanitarian operations and

financial benefits would accrue through

joint logistics procurement and training

while fully utilising common infrastruc-

tures.

Royal NZ Air Force(RNZAF)

The RNZAF [Maori Te Hokowhitu o

Kahurangi] operates i ts Iroquois fleet,

which are currently receiving a life-

extension upgrade, in support of RNZA

operations and the Maritime assets in

support of the RNZN. The ageing

Skyhawks will require some NZ$35 mil-

lion to extend their lives to 2007. The

present Hercules are nearing the end of

the expected service as they were some

of the first H models off the productionline and an option, in conjunction with

the Australian buy, has been taken that

is open til l late 2002 on 5 C-130J models

for purchase between 2005-2008.

In conjunction with the ANZAC pro-

gram 5 SH-2G Seasprite shipborne mar-

itime helicopters have been purchased

with deliveries having commenced this

March and ending early in 2003, them-

selves complemented by a planned

lightweight torpedo upgrade, and an

interim capability being provided by 4

SH-2F which have already undertaken

deployments in a full operational role.

The Orions are being extensively

upgraded under projects Kestrel and

Sirius, having had their surveillance

equipment partially upgraded in the

early 1980s under project Rigel, in addi-

tion to having their obsolete autopilots

replaced by early 2001. Kestrel seeks to

extend airframe life by at least 20 years

and should be complete by J uly 2001

while Sirius will comprehensively mod-

ernise the Orions tactical systems, and

is similar to the Canadian planned

Aurora Lift Extension project.

It is suggested that it is stil l not too

late for the NZ government to reverse

its decision, influenced by the Quigley

report that was highly biased towards

cancellation, and continue with the

lease of the 28 F-16s as this would pro-

vide new combat aircraft that would be

operational until at least 2030, as sup-

ported by the 1998 Air Combat Future

Options study that underpinned the

original acquisition decision, and

recoup the NZ$58 costs already

incurred, the suggested exit cost of

NZ$11 million plus save the Skyhawk

upgrade costs.

Additionally, if the Skyhawks are

sold to the Philippines for a nominal

cost, just enough to cover the cost of

the required ECM pods, this wouldshow NZ commitment to regional stabil-

ity. As noted in the 99 Report the

rebuilding of the NZDF is seen as a

litmus test of NZs resolve and commit-

ment to meet its fair share of the bur-

den in maintaining peace, especially in

the Asia-Pacific region. A reduction of

air bases to Ohakea only, and the sale of

the Macchi jet training fleet, plus partic-

ipation in a multinational training

scheme such as the NFTC should effect

significant additional savings.

Prepared by Mark Romanow

19VANG UARD Issue 3, 2000