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Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex

National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference

May 5, 2016

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003

History of the NRIA

• Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (1996)

• NRIA originally drafted in 2004 as an incident annex to

the National Response Plan (NRP).

• NRIA updated in 2008 as an incident annex to the

National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF was

updated in 2013.

• Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) directed the

creation of national planning frameworks and integrated

operational plans

2


NRIA Scope

3

• This iteration of the NRIA supersedes the 2008 version and will serve as an

operational annex to the Response and Recovery FIOPs.

• Addresses both inadvertent/accidental incidents and deliberate attacks:

- Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

- Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)

- Radiation Exposure Device (RED)

- Fixed nuclear facility incidents (deliberate and inadvertent/accidental)

- Lost/found/orphaned radioactive material sources

- Transportation incidents

- Domestic nuclear weapons accidents

- Foreign incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material (deliberate and

inadvertent/accidental)


Updates Since 2008 NRIA • Expansion of scope to address the Recovery Mission Area.

• Inclusion of new authorities, capabilities, and assets:

- Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Price-Anderson Act, Clean Water Act

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission base and site teams and resident inspectors

- Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise

- Updated NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1

• Clarification of roles and responsibilities of coordinating agencies and

linkages between mission areas.

• Identification of policy/strategic issues that uniquely impact delivery of the

Response and Recovery Core Capabilities.

4



Base Annex

Deliberate Attacks (Branch 1)

Inadvertent Incidents (Branch 2)

International Incidents (Branch 3)

NRIA - Composition


Nuclear/Radiological Incident

Annex

Base Annex


Annex

Base Annex

• Concept of Operations

• Authorities for Interagency Coordination

• Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies

• Support and Coordination Elements

• Cross cutting information requirements

6


Base Annex


Federal Deployment Limitations

7

Information analysis established the following within early in an

operation:

• There is limited Federal capability to operate within the damage zones.

• Multiple interagency missions (e.g., Counterterrorism, Defense, Continuity,

Response, Recovery) will occur simultaneously.

• There is limited Federal capacity (e.g., military air support) to

simultaneously support the deployment requirements of multiple missions.

• Prioritization of capability will be necessary to realize the greatest

good for the greatest number of people.


KEY ISSUES

• How will various incident management roles be integrated/coordinated?

• How will interagency partners access the incident area/crime scene?

• What protocols, equipment, and expertise are needed to monitor responders’

accumulated radiation dose data?

• How can we improve pre-incident preparedness at the Federal level?

• How will large-scale radioactive waste be managed?

• What is the policy for reimbursing host states that provide sheltering and

support services?

• How will resource requests be de-conflicted?

8


Federal Agencies with Primary Authority for Nuclear/Radiological Incident

9

Incident Type, Facilities, or Materials Involved Primary Authority for

Federal Response Nuclear Facilities that are:

a) Owned or operated by the DOD

b) Owned or operated by the DOE

c) Licensed by the NRC or an NRC Agreement State

d) Not licensed, owned, or operated by a federal agency, an NRC Agreement State, or

currently or formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially

viable or is otherwise unable to respond

a) DOD

b) DOE

c) NRC

d) EPA

Nuclear Weapons and Components that are:

e) In the custody of the DOD

f) In the custody of the DOE

e) DOD

f) DOE

Radioactive Materials Being Transported:

g) By or for the DOD

h) By or for the DOE

i) Containing NRC or NRC Agreement State licensed materials

j) Within certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a federal

agency or an NRC Agreement State

k) Outside certain areas of the coastal zone and not licensed or owned by a federal agency

or an NRC Agreement State

g) DOD

h) DOE

i) NRC

j) USCG

k) EPA

Radioactive Materials in Space Vehicles Impacting the United States that are:

l) Managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

m) Managed by the DOD

n) Not managed by the DOD or the NASA and impacting certain areas of the coastal zone

o) Not managed by the DOD or the NASA and not impacting certain areas in the coastal

zone

l) NASA

m) DOD

n) USCG

o) EPA

Foreign, Unknown, or Unlicensed Material Involving:

p) Certain areas of the coastal zone

q) Certain areas outside of the coastal zone

r) Imported contaminated consumer products that are distributed before detection

s) Inadvertently imported radioactive materials

p) USCG

q) EPA

r) EPA

s) U.S. Customs and

Border Protection

(CBP)

International Incidents

t) U.S. Government assistance to foreign government response and recovery efforts t) DOS/USAID

All deliberate attacks involving nuclear/radiological facilities or materials (e.g., RDDs,

INDs) DHS

Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Operations Related to the Incidents in this Table:

It is the policy of the United States that until otherwise determined by the Attorney General, generally acting through the FBI

Director, any weapons of mass destruction incident will be treated as an actual terrorist incident.

Note: DHS/FEMA may be called upon to lead or provide supplemental operational coordination support for the

primary authority during complex incidents.



Annex

Base Annex


Annex

Base Annex

• Appendix 1 - Federal Response Capability Inventory

• Appendix 2 - Data and Models to Support Nuclear/Radiological

Response and Recovery

• Appendix 3 - Training to Support Nuclear/Radiological Response and

Recovery Incidents

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Base Annex Appendices



Annex

Base Annex


Annex

Base Annex

11

Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Deliberate Nuclear/Radiological Attacks

• Provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the

Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Plan.

• Applies to all federal responses to deliberate nuclear/radiological

incidents, regardless of size or complexity, unless otherwise noted.

• The main focus is on a no-notice surface burst IND detonation with a

yield of 10 kilotons Surface burst.


Zoned Approach

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• The traditional approach of deploying the maximum number of resources

and responders to the incident area as quickly as possible is not realistic or

effective for some types of nuclear/radiological incidents – notably INDs –

due to the scope and complexity of the scenario (e.g., degree of immediate

destruction, high levels of residual radiation in near-term).

• The Zoned Approach Workgroup found that using the Severe, Moderate,

and Light Damage Zones to plan response operations and prioritize actions

(“Zoned Approach”) helps to maximize:

- Life-saving operations

- Safety of Federal responders

- Effectiveness of responder activities


Severe Damage Zone

(to .5 mile)

Moderate Damage Zone (to 1 mile)

Light Damage Zone (to 3 miles)

Outside Damage Zone

Due to exceptionally high dose rates,

Federal operations in the Severe

Damage Zone expected to be limited to

overflight operations such as aerial

monitoring and to law enforcement

investigative operations.

Immediate local and state life-

saving operations in the Light

and Moderate Damage Zones

outside of the fallout zone.

Requests for Federal

assistance in the Moderate

and Light Damage Zones

are expected to focus on

lifesaving operations –

specifically urban search

and rescue operations.

Majority of Federal operations

and staging will occur well

outside of damage and fallout

zones*

Federal Public Information and

Warning Actions/Operations

immediately upon detonation

directing everyone within 50

miles to "Get Inside, Stay Inside

and Stay Tuned" via IPAWS and

all other media means.

FALLOUT ZONE

(inclusive of the DFZ)

*Based on modeling, impacts to critical

infrastructure (e.g. fuel, water, power) may

inhibit operations outside of the damage zones.

Zoned Approach – IND Phase 2a

13

Requests for Federal assistance are

expected for the Light and Moderate

Damage Fallout Zones. While the type

of assistance required will mirror non-

fallout zones, Federal capabilities must

be able to operate in a contaminated

environment.

Capabilities will have a limited ‘stay

time’ to protect federal responders

from unacceptable health

effects/risks.


Response Posture

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The Response Posture Workgroup prioritized Response Core Capability delivery based on

those that have the greatest impact on life-saving operations, while also ensuring the safety of

federal responders. This prioritization is for use adjudicating resource requests within Phase 2a

and some Core Capabilities become pivotal as the incident progresses. Many core capabilities

are not dependent on the same resources, therefore, could be supported simultaneously

without affecting a higher priority core capability.


Resource Prioritization – IND

Severe Damage Zone

• FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team

• EPA National Counterterrorism Evidence

Response Team

• DOE Aerial Measuring System

• EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial

Monitoring

Moderate Damage Zone

• DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g.,

Command and Control CBRN Response

Elements A & B, Defense CBRN

Response Force)

• DOE Radiological Assistance Program

• EPA Environmental Response Team

• EPA CBRN Consequence Management

Advisory Team

• EPA On-Scene Coordinators

• Federal Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Center

Light Damage Zone

• FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task

Forces and Incident Support Teams

Fallout Zone

• All assets, resources, and teams capable

of operating in the SDZ, MDZ, and LDZ.

Outside of the Damage and Fallout Zones

• The majority of Federal assets, resources,

and teams will deploy to and stage outside

of the damage and fallout zones.

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Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the Resource Prioritization Workgroup identified

Federal resources that could conduct operations within the damage and/or fallout zone

in Phase 2a:



Annex

Base Annex


Annex

Base Annex

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Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Inadvertent Nuclear/Radiological Incidents

• Provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the Nuclear/Radiological

Incident Annex Base Plan.

• While focused on an incident at a nuclear power plant, the branch plan applies to all

federal response and recovery efforts as they pertain to the unique circumstances of

inadvertent nuclear/radiological incident types and locations.


Zoned Approach – Fixed Nuclear Facility

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Plume Exposure Pathway

360° for 10 miles

Ingestion Exposure Pathway 360°

for 50 miles

Immediate local and state evacuation

operations in Plume Exposure

Pathway

Federal response within the Plume

Exposure Pathway and the Plume itself

limited to agency authorities and

radiation monitoring

Majority of Federal operations and

staging will occur outside of the Plume

Exposure Pathway and upwind of the

plume

Zoned Approach – Fixed Nuclear Facility

☢ Early Evacuation Zone 360°

for 2 miles

Expanded Evacuation Zone

within the Plume out to 5 miles

Reactor Site


Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the following Federal resources that could conduct

operations within the Plume, Plume Exposure Pathway, and Ingestion Exposure Pathway

in Phase 2a:

Plume

• DOE Aerial Measuring System

• DOE Radiological Assistance Program

• EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial Monitoring

• Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

• DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g., Command and Control CBRN Response Elements

A & B, Defense CBRN Response Force)

Plume Exposure Pathway – 10 miles

• EPA Environmental Response Team

• EPA CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team

• EPA On-Scene Coordinators

Ingestion Exposure Pathway outside of the Plume – 50 miles

• The majority of Federal assets, resources, and teams will deploy and stage outside of the

affected area.

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Resource Prioritization – Fixed

Nuclear Facility



Annex

Base Annex


Annex

Base Annex

19

Branch 3: Federal Response to International Nuclear/Radiological Incidents

• Provides supplemental information regarding overseas events to the

Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Plan.

• Applies to all federal response and recovery efforts as they pertain to the unique

circumstances of international nuclear/radiological incident types.


A series of time-phased decision points are outlined for executive

leadership with guidance on decision criteria, responsible entities,

and other information.

Examples include:

Public Information and Warning

Crisis Standards Of Care

Emergency and Permanent Work Involving Contaminated Structures

Management and Removal of Debris

Long Term Waste Management

Decontamination Standards / Clearance Goals

Funding and Applicability of the Price Anderson Act

Relocation, Alternative Housing, and Reoccupancy

Remediation and Cleanup

Executive Decision Points


Nuclear/Radiological Incident Task Force

(NRITF)

Interagency group that convenes within the NRCC to provide

nuclear/radiological incident specific subject matter expertise in

support of national level incident planning and whole community

core capability delivery.

Addresses specific tasks, objectives or issues, related to a

nuclear or radiological incident, and makes recommendations

for executive decision points.

The Task Force does not take the place of any Emergency

Support Function (ESF), Recovery Support Function (RSF),

program area, or agency.

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Mission Area Integration - Prevention

If the incident involves suspected federal crimes of terrorism,

the FBI will lead and coordinate the law enforcement response

and investigation.

The Response and Prevention Mission Areas should enhance

information-sharing pathways and coordinate interdependent

decisions and operational activities.

The FBI has mechanisms to share sensitive information and

coordinate interdependencies of activities and decisions at both

the national and local level with its partners, as appropriate.

The FBI-led WMDSG at the FBI SIOC utilizes its FEMA-led

Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU) to

ensure information sharing and coordination across the PPD 8

mission areas.

22


Where are we today????

• The annex has been sent to the White House for final

concurrence.

• The NRIA will be used in the next 2 weeks during the Capstone

2016 series of exercises.

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