nuclear weapons - jennifer spindel · nuclear triad –force composition ... is nuclear strategy...
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STRATEGY, PLANNING, AND OPERATIONS
JEN SPINDEL
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
17 FEBRUARY 2016
DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?
Three Uses of Force:
1. DefensiveProtect from attack and minimize damage
2. CoercionExploit an opponent’s wants and fears
3. ConquestSeizure of territory or things of value
DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?
Three Uses of Force:
1. Defensive
2. Coercion
a. Deterrence
b. Compellence
3. Conquest
DETERRENCE: WHAT IS IT?
Three Uses of Force:
1. Defensive
2. Coercion
a. Deterrence
b. Compellence
3. Conquest
A
B
A
A
A
B
Deterrence
Compellence
DETERRENCE: HOW?
Requirements:
- Credibility: believable threats
- Capability: nukes
- Will: fortitude to use them
How do you make threats credible?
DETERRENCE == MAD?
■ Theory aligned with practice?
■ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
1967 speech in San Francisco
DETERRENCE: FORMS
■ General v. Specific
1. General: deter adversaries from challenging in first place
2. Specific: deter once challenge has arisen
■ Immediate v. Extended
1. immediate: deter against one’s own territory or core interests
2. Extended: deter against allies’ territory or core interests
Is one type less credible or more difficult than others?
DETERRENCE IN PRACTICE
■ Nuclear triad – force composition
– How do you build your forces?
■ Importance of second strike
– Incentives to strike at new nuclear states?
■ Is MAD inevitable?
■ Non-“strategic” nuclear weapons
– Is there an actual use for nukes short of apocalypse?
NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY
■ Flexible Response
– Direct Defense
– Deliberate escalation
– General nuclear response
US preferred strategy for NATO defense during Vietnam War-era
Does Flexible Response undermine deterrence?
NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY: WEAPONS
Blue Peacock nuclear “landmine” (UK)Nuclear rifle “Davy Crockett” (US) Atomic Annie nuclear field cannon (US)
W54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition (US)
NON-MAD NUCLEAR STRATEGY
■ Assured retaliation
■ Asymmetric Escalation
■ No first use
■ No-cities (counterforce) doctrine
WAR GAMES: CHICKEN
■ Jervis’ game-theoretic models
– Cost of attack
– Ease of attack
– Timing of moves
– Order of preferences
■ Chicken vs. Prisoner’s Dilemma
– PD: If player 1 defects, so do you
– Chicken: If player 1 defects, you better not
ROLE OF WAR GAMES
■ Are we locked in a game of chicken or prisoner’s dilemma? Is it iterated? Is there an opportunity for cooperation?
WRAP-UP
■ Can deterrence work without second strike capabilities? In theory? In practice?
– North Korea? Iran nuclear development?
■ Can there be nuclear cooperation?
■ Foreshadowing next week: Is nuclear strategy – either in theory or practice – fundamentally different from strategies based around other types of weapons?