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Nuclear

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: Hr. Ronald c. Haynes, Director Region I US Nt•clear Regulatory Col!llllssion 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Denr Sir:

June 18, 1982 4400-82-L-0104

GPU ......_ P.O. Box480 Middletown. Pennsylvania 17057 717 ·944-7621 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

Three Hile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (THI-2) Operatin& License No. DPR-73

Docket No. 50-320 Licensee Event Report 82-016/0JL-0

,\ttached please find Licensee Event Report 82-010/0JL-0 concerning the inoperable deluge sprinkler heads in the H2 Purge and the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinets on Hay 19, 1982.

This event concerns Section 3.7.10,2 and ts considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9(b} of the Interim Recovery Technical Specifications.

JJB/SDC/jep

Attachments

CC: L. II. Barrett, Deputy Program Director, THI Program Office Dr. B. J. Snyder, Program Director, THI Program Office V. Stcllo, Deputy Executive Director

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GPU Nuclear •s a part of the General Pubhc Uhht•es Sys!ern

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U. a. NUCLEAR IUGULATORV C:O.WISSION

Attachment 1 4400-82-L-0 104

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[[]]] J(Fire System Deluge/Sprinkler System flow Test), it was determined that the three (3) []]!] 1112 J>urgc nod 18 of 90 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinet Deluge Sprinkler

[[I!) Jhcnds were lnopernble. Tills condition plnced the Unit in the nction statement of

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'HONE: (717) 948-8461 � ..

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE REPORT

THI-II LER 82-016/03L-O

EVENT DATE - Hay 19, 1982

I. F.XPLANATION OF OCCURRF.NCE

Attachment 2 4400-82-L-Ql04

At 1100 hours on Hay 19, 1982, while performing surveillance procedure 4333-3Y1 (Fire System Deluge/SprinklPr System Flow Test), it was determined thnt the three (3) H2 Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet (AH-F-34) deluge sprinkler heads and eighteen (18) o f the ninety (90) deluge sprinkler heads in the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Filter Cabinet (AH-F-lOB) were inoperable.

This condition placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.2 and is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9. 1.9(b).

11. CAUSE OF TilE OCCURRENCE

The deluge heads were declared inoperable as a result o f reduced or no flow conditions observed during compressed gas flow testing. Investigation has shown that the loss of flow in the H2 Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet was the result of installation of a blank flange in the supply line, upstream of the deluge heads. It has not been determined when the blank flange was installed. However, it should be noted that the deluge system is installed for the prott>ction of the charconl adsorber bank in the 112 Purge Exhaust Filter Cabinet. TI1e charcoal adsorbers were removed from the Filter Cabinet in September. 1980. Therefore, the inoperability o f the three (3) deluge heads has been of no safety significance since that time.

Investigation has shown the loss of or low flow conditions ln the 18 Auxiliary Bullding Exhaust Filter Cabinet deluge heads was the result of very fine sediment and/or debris blocking the nozzles.

lll. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING TilE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutd�� state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no efCect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

The deluge sprinklers were checked and cleaned as necessary. In addition, the blind flange in the supply line to AII-F-34 was removed. At 0935 hours on Hay 28, 1982, the deluge sprinkler heads in both AH-F-34 and �l-F-lOB were declared operable.

-2- Attachment 2 440D-82-L-0104

The sediment found 1n the MI-F-lOB sprinkler heads hns been sent for analysis in order to determine its origin.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A