nuclear iran. aglossary of terms-aug.12-winep

7/31/2019 Nuclear Iran. Aglossary of Terms-Aug.12-Winep

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Bonab

MarivanKaraj

Lashkar Abad

Parchin

Natanz

Isfahan ArdakanSaghand

Gchine

Yazd

Bushehr

Fordow

Arak QOM

SHIRAZ

TEHRAN

TABRIZ

MASHAD

BANDAR ABBAS

UAE

Darkhovin

SAUDI ARABIAQATAR

BAHRAIN

KUWAIT

IRAN

OMAN

IRAQ

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTANh

ar o

or

Ka

n

ari

Map: Nuclear installations in Iran.

2012 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Map: Nuclear installations in Iran.


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Nuclear IranA Glossary of Terms

Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen

Policy Focus 121 | August 2012

HARVARD Kennedy School

for Science and International Affairs

BELFERCENTERA C OP UB L IC A T ION W IT H


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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval

system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

by e Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and

International Aairs

Copublished in in the United States of America by e Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

L Street NW, Suite , Washington, DC ; and the Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and

International Aairs, JFK St., Cambridge, MA .

Cover photo: Irans president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. (Ho New/ Reuters)

T

M K H

T W I.


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Contents

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

About this Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Index to Combined Glossaries (interactive). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

| IAEA Reports on Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

| Centrifuge Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

| Initial U.S. Development of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

| Basic Nuclear Physics and Weapons Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

| Pakistans Development of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map: Nuclear installations in Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frontispiece

Fig. : Military organization and timeline of Irans nuclear program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fig. : Uranium enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Fig. : Gas Centrifuge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Fig. : Implosion-type atomic bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Fig. : Gun-type atomic bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Fig. : Alternative routes to a nuclear weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Fig. : Nuclear Fission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Fig. : Excerpts from s British intelligence document about Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


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T W I N E P v

About the Authors

Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at e Washington

Institute. He has lived in both Pakistan and Iran and has written extensively on nuclear proliferation.

Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and International Aairs,served as deputy director-general and head of the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic EnergyAgency in Vienna, inspecting facilities in Iran.

e opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of e WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, its Board of Advisors; nor of the Belfer Center for Science andInternational Aairs.


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T W I N E P vii

About this Publication

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY concerning Irans nuclear program continues to center on the countryscompliance with agreements designed to ensure that peaceful nuclear work is not used as a cover for the develop-ment of nuclear weapons. e challenge of discovering what may be going on in Iran is dicult not only because ofTehrans obstructionism, but also because the same technologies, particularly uranium enrichment and spent fuelreprocessing, can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

is Policy Focus is intended to improve comprehension of the main issues and important technical detailssurrounding the program. e core of the document explains the terms used by the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), the worlds watchdog in ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used for peacefulpurposes only. Separate sections oer explanations of basic nuclear terms and the use of centrifuges for uranium

enrichment. In addition, because some of Irans technology came from nuclear-armed Pakistan, another section isdevoted to explaining the main portions of Islamabads program. And since media coverage oen compares sus-pected Iranian nuclear work to initial U.S. development of atomic weapons in the mid-s, the basic terms oenused in describing this history are dened separately.

In addition, this online report includes an interactive index that provides quick, hyperlinked access to all of theterms discussed in the various glossaries. By clicking on a term in this index, users can instantly jump to the page onwhich it appears, then click another link to return to the index.


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T W I N E P ix

Irans rst work on uranium enrichment dates fromthe s, when it acquired laser equipment from theUnited States and Germany. In the next two decades,Iran conducted laboratory-scale uranium enrichmentand other work, including acquisition of nuclear mate-rials that went unreported to the IAEA. When theseacquisitions were revealed in , Iranseeking toavoid referral to the UN Security Councilagreedwith France, Germany, and Britain (EU-) to suspend

its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities untilnecessary condence on the peaceful nature of the pro-gram had been established. But implementation of thedeal stumbled from the outset, and eventually, in June, the United States, Russia, and China joined thediscussion as part of the P+ (ve permanent mem-bers of the UN Security Council, plus Germany).

Despite UN Security Council resolutions, in Janu-ary Iran resumed uranium enrichment in Natanz,which had been paused. And in September ,Iran disclosed that it had started the secret construc-

tion of an additional underground enrichment plantin Fordow, near the city of Qom. By June , Iranhad installed some , centrifuges in its enrich-ment plants in Natanz and Fordow. Although thecentrifuges have been operating well below capacity,they have produced more than six tons of . percentenriched UF

. Iran has announced plans to build ten

additional enrichment facilities.Since February , Iran has been producing

percent UF

at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant atNatanz, ostensibly for the Tehran Research Reactor,

which was originally supplied by the United States andhas been operating since . Iran had asked, in June, for IAEA assistance in obtaining fuel for thereactor, but the regime could not agree to terms withthe Vienna Group of negotiators in October .Instead, the Iranians also began producing percentenriched material at the Fordow facility and, by June, had produced about kg of UF

there and

at Natanz, of which some portion has been moved toIsfahan for the manufacture of fuel.

Introduction

I R A N S N U C L E A R P R O G R A M dates from the lates. By the s, the United States had suppliedthe Iranians with a small research reactor. Later, theshah had ambitious plans to construct twenty-threenuclear power reactors, and initial orders were placedwith West German and French companies. When Iransigned the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in and ratied it in , all its nuclear activities becamesubject to inspection by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA).e Islamic Revolution halted all nuclear con-struction activities in Iran. In the mid-s, duringits war with Iraq, Tehran decided to revive its nuclearprogram, but sanctions and, in particular, U.S. pres-sure blocked Iranian attempts to acquire power plants,along with fuel-cycle technology from Germany, Bra-zil, Argentina, and Spain. Still, Iran registered a successwhen it built small nuclear research reactors in Isfahanwith Chinese help. Also, work resumed on a powerplant in Bushehr, with the help of Russian companies,

that has been operating since .In seeking nuclear enrichment and reprocess-

ing technologies, Iran rst experienced success in thelate s by acquiring centrifuges from Pakistan,through a nuclear black market, and laser-enrichmentlaboratory equipment from China. A decade later,the Iranians obtained more-advanced laser equipmentfrom Russia.

Given its modest domestic uranium deposits, Iranobtained uranium ore concentrate from South Africa in. Iran is developing a uranium mine in Saghand, a

milling facility at Ardakan, and has a small twenty-ton-per-year uranium mining/milling installation at Gchine.

Iranian cooperation with the Chinese included acontract in the early s to build a uranium conver-sion facility in Isfahan, which the Iranians ultimatelyconstructed themselves. Since , it has produced tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF

), fueled by

material from South Africa as feedstock. The pres-ent levels of UF

are sucient to power Irans planned

enrichment facilities for several years.


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Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen Nuclear Iran

x P F #121

Iran has relied on the P type centrifuge but has

tested several more-advanced types, although reportedprogress so far has been modest. It is not clear whetherthis owes to design and manufacturing problems, lackof access to raw materials such as carbon fiber andmaraging steel because of sanctions, or limited IAEAaccess to Iranian sites.

In Arak, Iran is constructing a heavy-water reactordesigned to produce plutonium that could ultimatelybe used for a nuclear weapon; it is due to becomeoperational in . e construction of the reactor,however, as well as the completion of a fuel fabrication

plant in Isfahan, and the production of heavy water, are

proceeding at slower rates than originally announced.The IAEA reports in June and November raised questions about Irans activities apparentlyrelated to nuclear weapons research and development.ese activities included work beginning in the earlys at the Physics Research Center at Lavisan, theso-called AMAD Plan (believed to be the projectname for the overall nuclear weapons program ), andfrom onward, initiatives at various instituteseventually under the umbrella of the Organisation ofDefensive Innovation and Research.


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T W I N E P xi

Casting of uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Center for Research and Development of Explosion and

Shock Technology: Ch. 1, IAEA

Central Islamic Revolution Committee: Ch. 1, IAEA

Centrifuge: Ch. 1, IAEA

Chain reaction: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Chamaran Building: Ch. 1, IAEA

Chemical trap: Ch. 1, IAEA

Code 3.1: Ch. 1, IAEA

Cold test: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsCold trap: Ch. 1, IAEA

Comprehensive Separation Laboratory: Ch. 1, IAEA

Concealment methods: Ch. 1, IAEA

Containment and surveillance measures: Ch. 1, IAEA

Copper vapor laser: Ch. 1, IAEA

Correctness and completeness: Ch. 1, IAEA

Corroboration of information: Ch. 1, IAEA

Corrosion-resistant valves, steels, and filters: Ch. 1, IAEA

Critical mass: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Critical speed: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Criticality: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsCylinders: Ch. 1, IAEA

Darkhovin: Ch. 1, IAEA

Defense Industries Organization: Ch. 1, IAEA

Depleted uranium: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Design information: Ch. 1, IAEA

Design information verification: Ch. 1, IAEA

Designation of inspectors: Ch. 1, IAEA

Destructive analysis: Ch. 1, IAEA

Destructive testing: Ch. 1, IAEA

Detonator: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsDeuterium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Device: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Diffusion: Ch. 1, IAEA

Dished plates: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Diversion of nuclear material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Dump material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Education Research Institute: Ch. 1, IAEA

Effective kilogram (ekg): Ch. 1, IAEA

Index to Combined Glossaries (INTERACTIVE)

Accountancy Reports: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ad hoc inspection: Ch. 1, IAEA

Additional Protocol: Ch. 1, IAEA

Alamogordo: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Alpha decay: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Aluminum alloy: Ch. 1, IAEA

AMAD Plan: Ch. 1, IAEA

Amirkabir University of Technology: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ammonium diuranate (ADU): Ch. 1, IAEA

Ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC): Ch. 1, IAEAAnarak: Ch. 1, IAEA

Applied Physics Institute: Ch. 1, IAEA

Arak: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ardakan Yellowcake Production: Ch. 1, IAEA

Atomic bomb: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Atomic Energy Council: Ch. 1, IAEA

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) :

Ch. 1, IAEA

Atomic number: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Atomic vapor laser isotope separation: seeLaser enrichment

Atomic weight: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsAutoclave: Ch. 1, IAEA

Baffles: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Balancing machine: Ch. 1, IAEA

Bandar Abbas: Ch. 1, IAEA

Bearings: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Bellows: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Bench-scale experiment: Ch. 1, IAEA

Beryllium: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Biological Study Center: Ch. 1, IAEA

Bismuth: Ch. 1, IAEABoard resolutions: Ch. 1, IAEA

Bonab: Ch. 1, IAEA

Boosted nuclear weapon: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Bushehr: Ch. 1, IAEA

Cage: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Carbon fiber: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Cascade: Ch. 1, IAEA

Casing: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment


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xii P F #121

Gun-type nuclear device: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Haft-e-Tir (Seventh of Tir): Ch. 1, IAEA

Hashtgerd: Ch. 1, IAEA

Heavy water: Ch. 1, IAEA

Heavy-water production plant: Ch. 1, IAEA

Heavy-water reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Heavy-water-reactor-related projects: Ch. 1, IAEA

Hemispherical shell: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Hex: Ch. 1, IAEA

High explosives: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

High-enriched uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

High-speed electronic switches: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsHigh-speed streak camera: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

High-strength aluminum: Ch. 1, IAEA

Hiroshima: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Hold-up: Ch. 1, IAEA

Hydrodynamic experiments: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Hydrogen bomb: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Imenista Andish: Ch. 1, IAEA

Implosion device: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Inert gas testing of centrifuges: Ch. 1, IAEA

INFCIRC/153:SeeSafeguards AgreementInitiatorseeNeutron generator

Inspections: Ch. 1, IAEA

Institute of Applied Physics: Ch. 1, IAEA

Inverter: Ch. 5, Pakistan

IR-1 centrifuge: Ch. 1, IAEA






Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center: Ch. 1, IAEAIsotope: Ch. 1, IAEA

Jabd Ibn Hayan Laboratories: Ch. 1, IAEA

Jumbo: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Kahuta: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Kalaye Electric Company: Ch. 1, IAEA

Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center: Ch. 1, IAEA

Khan Research Laboratories: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Electric drive: Ch. 1, IAEA

Electrochemical production of uranium metal:see

Pyroprocessing

Electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS): Ch. 1, IAEA

Elevated pit: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

End caps: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Enrichment: Ch. 1, IAEA

Enrichment factor: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Environmental sampling: Ch. 1, IAEA

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center: SeeIsfahan Nuclear

Technology Center

Exemption from IAEA safeguards: Ch. 1, IAEA

Expanding mandrel: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment, Ch. 5,Pakistan

Exploding-bridgewire detonator: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Explosive control system: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Explosive lenses: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Explosives testing chamber: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fakhrizadeh, Mohsen: Ch. 1, IAEA

Farayand Technique: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fat Man: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal system: Ch. 1,

IAEAFission: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Flash x-ray machine: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Flow forming: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Flying plates: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Fomblin oil: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: Ch. 1, IAEA

Frequency changers: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fuel element chopping machine: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fuel Enrichment Plant: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fuel Fabrication Laboratory: Ch. 1, IAEA

Fuel Manufacturing Plant: Ch. 1, IAEAFusion: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Gadget: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Gchine: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ghauri: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Girdler-sulfide process: Ch. 1, IAEA

Graphite Subcritical Reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Graphite, nuclear grade: Ch. 1, IAEA

Green salt: Ch. 1, IAEA


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A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen

T W I N E P xiii

Neutron generator: Ch. 1, IAEA

Noncompliance: Ch. 1, IAEANondestructive assay: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nondestructive testing: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nuclear device: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Nuclear material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nuclear-powered vessels: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nuclear weapon designs: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Offer in 1987: Ch. 1, IAEA

Offer in early 1990s: Ch. 1, IAEA

Openness:see

TransparencyOpen-source information: Ch. 1, IAEA

Orchid Office: Ch. 1, IAEA

Orchid Scientific Research Center: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ore Processing Center: Ch. 1, IAEA

Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research:

Ch. 1, IAEA

P1 centrifuge: Ch. 5, Pakistan

P2 centrifuge: Ch. 5, Pakistan

P5+1: Ch. 1, IAEA

Parchin: Ch. 1, IAEAPardis Tehran: Ch. 1, IAEA

Pars Trash: Ch. 1, IAEA

Passivation: Ch. 1, IAEA

Passive Defense Organization: Ch. 1, IAEA

Permissive action links: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Physical inventory taking: Ch. 1, IAEA

Physics Research Center: Ch. 1, IAEA

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: Ch. 1, IAEA

Pishgam: Ch. 1, IAEA

Pit: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Plasma physics: Ch. 1, IAEAPlutonium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Polonium-210: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

PUREX reprocessing: Ch. 1, IAEA

Pyroprocessing: Ch. 1, IAEA

Qom: Ch. 1, IAEA

Radioisotope batteries: Ch. 1, IAEA

Reactor: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Khondab: Ch. 1, IAEA

Khushab: Ch. 5, PakistanKiloton: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Kimia Maadan Company: Ch. 1, IAEA

Kolahdouz: Ch. 1, IAEA

Laboratory-scale experiment: seeBench-scale experiment

Laser enrichment: Ch. 1, IAEA

Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory: Ch. 1, IAEA

Lavisan-Shian: Ch. 1, IAEA:

Light-water reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Light-Water Subcritical Reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Limited frequency, unannounced access: Ch. 1, IAEALittle Boy: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Location outside facilities: Ch. 1, IAEA

Low-enriched uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Malek Ashtar University of Technology: Ch. 1, IAEA

Manhattan Project: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Manipulator: Ch. 1, IAEA

Maraging steel: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Marivan: Ch. 1, IAEA

Mass spectrometry: Ch. 1, IAEA

Material unaccounted for (MUF): Ch. 1, IAEAMedical isotopes: Ch. 1, IAEA

Meeting in 1984: Ch. 1, IAEA

Megaton: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Military workshops: Ch. 1, IAEA

Milling of uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Miniature Neutron Source Reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL):

Ch. 1, IAEA

MIX facility: Ch. 1, IAEA

Moallem Kalayeh: Ch. 1, IAEA

Modality: Ch. 1, IAEAModerator: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics

Molecular laser isotope separation: Ch. 1, IAEA

Monte Carlo methodology: Ch. 1, IAEA

Nagasaki: Ch. 3, U.S. Development

Natanz: Ch. 1, IAEA

Natural uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Neutron: Ch. 1, IAEA

Neutron bomb: Ch. 4, Nuclear Physics


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xiv P F #121

Unannounced inspection: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium: Ch. 1, IAEAUranium alloy: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium Chemistry Laboratory: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium Conversion Facility: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium dioxide: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium hexafluoride: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium metal document: Ch. 1, IAEA

Uranium tetrafluoride: Ch. 1, IAEA

Urenco: Ch. 5, Pakistan

Vacuum system: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Vanak Square Laboratory: Ch. 1, IAEAVeracity checking: Ch. 1, IAEA

Waste disposal facility, Qom: Ch. 1, IAEA

Waste handling facility: Ch. 1, IAEA

Waste Storage Facility (Karaj): Ch. 1, IAEA

Whole body counter: Ch. 1, IAEA

Workplan: Ch. 1, IAEA

Yazd: Ch. 1, IAEA

Yellowcake: Ch. 1, IAEA

Zirconium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Recycled uranium: Ch. 1, IAEA

Reflector: Ch. 4, Nuclear PhysicsRemote monitoring: Ch. 1, IAEA

Reprocessing: Ch. 1, IAEA

Resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors: see Board

Resolutions

Resolutions of the UN Security Council: Ch. 1, IAEA

Rotor: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Routine inspections: Ch. 1, IAEA

SADAT Centers: Ch. 1, IAEA

Safeguards Agreement: Ch. 1, IAEA

Saghand: Ch. 1, IAEASatellite imagery: Ch. 1, IAEA

Scoops: Ch. 2, Centrifuge Enrichment

Section for Advanced Development Applications and Tech-

nologies: see SADAT Centers

Separative work unit: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shahab-3: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shahid Beheshti University: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shariaty Building: Ch. 1, IAEA

Sharif University of Technology: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shielded window: Ch. 1, IAEAShielding material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Shockwave software: Ch. 1, IAEA

Significant quantity: Ch. 1, IAEA

Source material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Special fissionable material: Ch. 1, IAEA

Special inspection: Ch. 1, IAEA

Starting point of IAEA safeguards: Ch. 1, IAEA

State Organization for Planning and Management:

Ch. 1, IAEA

Stuxnet: Ch. 1, IAEA

Subsidiary Arrangements: Ch. 1, IAEASupreme National Security Council: Ch. 1, IAEA

Suspension: Ch. 1, IAEA

Tails: Ch. 1, IAEA

Technical cooperation: Ch. 1, IAEA

Tehran Research Reactor: Ch. 1, IAEA

Transparency: Ch. 1, IAEA

Trinity: Ch. 3, U.S. Development


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T W I N E P 1

1 | IAEA Reports on Iran

on all aspects of a countrys nuclear fuel cycle activitiesand granting broader access to all relevant sites, includ-

ing those where nuclear material is not customarily used.

Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December

and implemented it provisionally until February ,

when the IAEA Board of Governors reported Tehrans

noncompliance to the UN Security Council. Since

then, Iran has not heeded IAEA or Security Council

requests to implement and ratify the protocol.

Aluminum alloy: High-strength aluminum alloys are

used for centrifuge rotors and casings. IR- centrifugerotor cylinders are made of -series aluminum

alloy, a very strong metal produced via mixture with

zinc. Outer casings of IR-, IR-m, and other centri-

fuges are made of -series aluminum alloy.

AMAD Plan: In the late s or early s, Iran

consolidated all military-related nuclear activities (g.

) conducted by its Physics Research Center under

the AMAD Plan (full Farsi name: Sazemaneh Tarhe

Amade Vije, or Organization for Planning and Special

Supplies).

Amir Kabir University of Technology: Established in

under the name Tehran Polytechnic, the univer-

sity has close ties with the Atomic Energy Organiza-

tion of Iran.

Ammonium diuranate (ADU): One of the intermedi-

ate chemical forms of uranium resulting from yellow-

cake production. Its chemical formula is (NH)

U

O

.

Accountancy Reports:Under a comprehensive Safe-guards Agreement between the IAEA and any non-

nuclear-weapon state that is party to the Non-Prolif-

eration Treaty, the state must provide the agency with

reports on the status of nuclear material subject to safe-

guards as specied in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

ere are three types of accountancy reports:

r Inventory change report: a report to the IAEA

showing changes in the nuclear material inventory.

r Material balance report: a report to the IAEA

showing the material balance based on a physicalinventory of nuclear material actually present in

the material balance area.

r Physical inventory listing: a report to the IAEA

in connection with a physical inventory-taking by

the operator listing all nuclear material batches at

the facility.

Ad hoc inspection: e IAEA conducts routine

inspections at facilities to verify nuclear material sub-

ject to safeguards. Before a Subsidiary Arrangementincluding a facility-specic attachment has entered

into force, the IAEA may conduct ad hoc inspections.

Additional protocol: Approved by the IAEA Board

of Governors in , the Model Additional Protocol

(known in IAEA parlance as INFCIRC/) provides

additional measures for improving the eectiveness and

eciency of agency safeguards. Specically, it gives the

IAEA an expanded declaration containing information

M O S T O F T H E N A M E S and terms below are taken from International Atomic Energy Agency reports, of whichthere are various types. IAEA public documents are designated INFCIRC (meaning information circular) plusan assigned number, while reports for the regular Board of Governors meetings are designated GOV. Althoughthey are intended to be condential, GOV documentsparticularly on Iran, Syria, and North Koreaare oenobtained by the media or think tanks simultaneous with their release to member states.

Many of Irans nuclear sites, along with organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear program are des-ignated under various United Nations resolutions. A consolidated list of such sites can be found at http://www.un.org/sc/committees//pdf/ConsolidatedList.pdf.

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2 P F #121

Saghand mine (see map). Its design capacity is y tons

of uranium per year, which equals the planned produc-tion of Saghand. e AEOI expects the mill be opera-

tional in .

Atomic Energy Council: Also known as the Supreme

Atomic Energy Council or the Nuclear Energy

Council, this body directs Irans general nuclear pol-

icy. It was created by the same law that estab-

lished the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. e

-member council is composed of the president,

cabinet ministers, the head of the AEOI, and four

nuclear scientists.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI): Estab-

lished in , the AEOI has operational and regula-

tory control over Irans civilian nuclear program and is

responsible for nuclear research and development. It

also controls several companies related to the nuclear

program. e president of the AEOI is one of Irans

ten vice-presidents.

Ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC): An intermedi-

ate product in the process of converting uranium hexa-uoride (UF

) to uranium dioxide (UO

). Its chemical

formula is UOCO

(NH

)

CO

.

Anarak: A site in central Iran, near Yazd, where nuclearwaste has been stored (see map).

Applied Physics Institute: According to Iran, theinstitute was located at the Lavisan-Shian site (seePhysics Research Center.)

Arak: e Arak area has several industrial complexes

with ties to the nuclear program, in particular the reac-tor under construction at Khondab (see Khondab). Inthe late s, one of these complexes may have manu-factured a high-explosive test chamber transferred toParchin, which the IAEA has asked to visit. e Arakarea is also thought to hold factories capable of produc-ing aluminum for IR-m rotors and centrifuge housings.

Ardakan Yellowcake Production: A uranium millunder construction that will process the ore from the

FIG. 1: Military organization and timeline of Irans nuclear program (source: IAEA)

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2002 Aug 2008 201020062004 Feb 20111998-99

Scientific Committee with office at ERI

Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)

Education Research Institute (ERI)Created in 1989/90 to coordinate Defence R&D

AMADPlan

Departments Projects

Section forAdvanced

DevelopmentApplications &Technologies

(SADAT)

Organizationof DefensiveInnovation& Research

(SPND)

Centres Complexes

Pardis TehranMalek Ashtar

University(MUT)

Orchid Office,Orchid ScientificResearch Centre

FIG. 1


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must, without further delay, implement the measures

required by the IAEA Board in and ; reaf-

rmed Irans obligation to cooperate fully with theIAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those

that give rise to concerns about the nuclear programs

possible military dimensions; decided that Iran must,

without delay, comply fully and without qualica-

tion with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including

through application of the modied Code . of the

Subsidiary Arrangements; and called on Iran to ratify

and act strictly in accordance with the provisions of

the Additional Protocol.

Bonab: A research center of the AEOI in northwest-ern Iran (see map) that specializes in nuclear applica-

tions in agriculture and manufactures laser equipment.

Bushehr: Irans only civilian nuclear power reactor

(see map). German companies began construction of

the plant in but stopped in aer the Islamic

Revolution. In , Iran signed a new contract for

nishing the plant with the Russian Ministry for

Atomic Energy. e -megawatt light-water reactor,

known by its Russian acronym VVER-, began

producing electricity for the Iranian national grid in

September .

Casting of uranium: Since the s, vacuum induc-

tion furnaces have been used to cast uranium metal

into appropriate shapes. ese could be either fuel rod

cores for reactors or nuclear weapon components. A

more modern technique is using microwave technol-

ogy to produce weapon components.

Center for Research and Development of Explosion

and Shock Technology: Also known as METFAZ,this Iranian agency conducts studies with conventional

military applications (e.g., developing armor-piercing

projectiles) that can also be used to develop computer

codes for model nuclear explosives.

Central Islamic Revolution Committee: In the s,

this Iranian organization coordinated wartime strategic

material acquisition and manufacturing. It also appears

to have links to some nuclear-related procurement.

Autoclave: An industrial oven in which uranium feedcylinders are heated, converting solid uranium hexa-

uoride into gas so that it can be fed into centrifuges.

Balancing machine: As a centrifuge rotor spins at high

speeds, it experiences vibrations that, if not contained,can cause failure of the bearing and suspension system

and, eventually, a crash. erefore, the rotors are bal-

anced horizontally and vertically to minimize vibra-tions. Considered dual-use items, balancing machines

are subject to export controls.

Bandar Abbas: Port city in southeast Iran near the

Gchine uranium mine (see map).

Bench-scale experiment: Testing of materials, meth-ods, or chemical processes on a small scale, such as on a

laboratory worktable or room.

Biological Study Center: Iran explained in that

the activities of the Physics Research Center at Lavisan-

Shian were reorganized in . e Biological StudyCenter, which was involved in biological research and

development and radioprotection activities, stayed

in Lavisan.

Bismuth: When natural bismuth (bismuth- iso-tope) is bombarded with neutrons, bismuth- is

created, which then decays to Po- via beta decay.

Po- can be used for neutron initiators (seeNeutrongenerator).

Board resolutions: Since , the IAEA Board of

Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection

with the implementation of safeguards in Iran. Byvirtue of its Relationship Agreement with the UN,

the agency is required to cooperate with the SecurityCouncil in the exercise of the latters responsibilityfor maintenance or restoration of international peace

and security. All UN member states agree to accept

and carry out the Security Councils decisions and, inthis respect, to take actions consistent with their obli-

gations under the UN Charter. Since , the coun-

cil has adopted six resolutions on the implementationof safeguards in Iran. In Resolution (), the

council took the following steps: armed that Iran

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Centrifuge: Machine used to enrich uranium by sepa-rating the isotope U- (which occurs naturally as

only . percent of the metal) from U- (most of theother . percent). Separation is achieved by spinningat high speed. For a fuller explanation of the termsassociated with this process, see chap. , CentrifugeEnrichment.

Chamaran Building: Between and , Irancarried out experiments on the purication of pluto-nium solution in this building, located at the TehranNuclear Research Center.

Chemical trap: Traps containing sodium uoride(NaF) are used to capture uranium hexauoride gas-eous euents at enrichment plants.

Code 3.1: Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements, thiscode species when an IAEA member state mustreport a new facility to the agency. According to theoriginal version of Irans Code ., agreed in , Teh-ran is obligated to report a new facility no later than days before the introduction of nuclear material.In , Iran agreed to implement the modied Code., which requires the submission of design informa-tion to the IAEA as soon as a new facility is planned.Iran unilaterally revoked its implementation of themodied code in February . Iran is the only coun-try with a substantial nuclear program that does notadhere to the modied code.

Cold trap: Also known as a desublimer, this deviceconverts uranium hexauoride gas to a solid so that itcan be removed from centrifuge cascades.

Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (CSL):

In , Iran concluded a contract with a Chinesecompany for the establishment of this facility, whereuranium enrichment was carried out on a milligramscale. e contract also supplied Iran with kg ofnatural uranium metal in , which Iran failedto report to the IAEA. e CSL was located at theTehran Nuclear Research Center until October, when the laboratory and nuclear material weremoved to Lashkar Abad. e laboratory was eventu-ally dismantled.

Concealment methods: An expression describingactions taken to reduce the probability of the IAEA

detecting a countrys nuclear activities or material. Suchactions may include tampering with IAEA containmentand surveillance measures through improper nuclear

material accounting activities; falsifying records, reports,

and other documents; presenting false facility opera-tional data; and impeding IAEA inspectors so as to

reduce their chances of detecting the diversion or pres-

ence of nuclear material.

Containment and surveillance measures: C/S mea-sures such as cameras and seals are used by the IAEA

to maintain continuity of knowledge on movement ofnuclear material, equipment, or samples. ese meth-ods are oen used to cover periods when inspectors are

not present at the facility.

Copper vapor laser (CVL): Used in some machining

and laser cutting applications, this technology can also

be used in in atomic vapor isotope separation systems(AVLIS) a potential way of enriching uranium. Iran

manufactured the CVLs used at the pilot enrichment

plant at Lashkar Abad.

Correctness and completeness: Each IAEA memberstates comprehensive Safeguards Agreement stipulates

that all nuclear material in the states territory must be

declared correctly and completely to the agency.

Corroboration of information: When conductingsafeguards evaluation, the IAEA corroborates its nd-

ings with other information to ensure the credibility of

its conclusions.

Corrosion-resistant valves, steels, and filters:

Uranium hexauoride gas is very corrosive, so en-richment components are manufactured from materi-

als resistant to such damage. ese materials includecopper, stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys,

nickel (or alloys containing percent or more

nickel), and UF-resistant fully uorinated hydro-

carbon polymers.

Cylinders: Uranium hexauoride gas is stored in cylin-

ders made of nickel (including the series of alloys called

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monel) or stainless steel. e cylinders are standard-ized and use type classications such as A, A, B,

or A, where the number refers to cylinder diameter.Typically, A cylinders are used for high-enriched ura-nium, while the others are for low-enriched, natural, ordepleted uranium.

Darkhovin: Site of a future Iranian-designed light-water power reactor, which Tehran has described ashaving an output of megawatts (see map). econstruction was scheduled to begin in , withcommissioning to take place in . e Darkhovinsite is located in Ahvaz in southwestern Iran, where a

French power reactor had been slated until construc-tion was cancelled aer the Islamic Revolution.

Defense Industries Organization: e DIO (inPersian: Sasadjah Sazemane Sanaye Defa) is a con-glomerate of Iranian companies whose function isto provide the military with its own manufacturingcapacity and boost its technical abilities. e DIOis controlled by Irans Ministry of Defense ArmedForces Logistics (MODAFL), and in recent years,the DIO has also sought export markets. Some of its

workshops have been involved in production of cen-trifuge components.

Depleted uranium: Uranium containing less than .percent of the isotope U- (i.e., less than the amountthat occurs in natural uranium). Found in spent fuelrods from natural uranium reactors and in tails fromuranium enrichment processes.

Design information: Under an IAEA SafeguardsAgreement, a member state must provide the agencywith design information for each nuclear site: speci-

cally, a facility description (including layout and con-tainment features) as well as information on the form,quantity, location, and ow of nuclear material beingused.Kala e agency uses this information to designappropriate safeguards arrangements (seeCode .).

Design information verification (DIV): Process car-ried out by the IAEA at a given facility to verify the cor-rectness and completeness of the design information

provided by the member state. An initial DIV is per-formed on a newly built facility to conrm that it is as

originally declared. is is followed by periodic DIVsto conrm the continued validity of the design infor-mation and the safeguards approach.

Designation of inspectors: All Safeguards Agree-ments stipulate that the IAEA must secure a memberstates consent to the assignment of individual agencyinspectors. e state can object to the designation atany time without giving specic reasons.

Destructive analysis: e means of determining the

nuclear content and isotopic composition of a sample .Destructive testing: Conducting prolonged testsunder the most severe operating conditions until agiven component or piece of equipment fails (e.g., acentrifuge crashes), with the purpose of determiningservice life and detecting design weaknesses.

Deuterium: An isotope of hydrogen that occurs natu-rally in water, but only in trace amounts of about ppm. e highly concentrated solution known asheavy water, which contains more than percent

deuterium oxide (DO), is used as a moderator in somenuclear reactors .

Diffusion: e gaseous diusion method of enrichinguranium is based on the principle that two isotopeswith the same energy (i.e., in thermal equilibrium) willhave slightly dierent average velocities. e lighteratoms (or the molecules containing them) will travelmore quickly and be more likely to diuse through amembrane. is method is expensive due to the workneeded to push uranium hexauoride gas through

a membrane, as well as the many stages required toobtain high purity given the small amount of separa-tion achieved at each stage. In , the techniquerequired around , stages, forcing the United Statesto use huge amounts of electricity and house the cas-cades in the largest building ever constructed. By con-trast, todays cascades require about stages and canbe assembled in a building the size of a supermarket,with comparatively minimal electricity requirements.


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Enrichment: e process of increasing the amountof the ssile isotope U- within nuclear material.

Natural uranium contains only . percent U-, butenrichment can increase it to percent (the level

used for nuclear reactors) or over percent (used

in atomic bombs). Enriching is a progressively easierprocessfor example, if the aim is to produce per-

cent enriched uranium, reaching the . percent level

requires some percent of the work. And by the time percent enrichment is reacheda level Iran cur-

rently achieves percent of the work has been com-pleted (g. ).

Environmental sampling: e IAEA collects samples,oen with cotton swipes, from certain areas in orderto analyze them for traces of materials that can reveal

information about a member states nuclear activities.

e sample could include traces of nuclear materialfrom various surfaces (e.g., of equipment or buildings).

An important part of this process is particle analysis, inwhich micrometer-size particles are removed from the

samples for mass spectrometric isotope analysis (i.e.,

measurement of their size, morphology, and elementalcomposition).

Exemption from IAEA safeguards: Under the provi-

sions of a Safeguards Agreement, a member state mayrequest exemption for nuclear material up to speci-

ed limits and under certain conditions. is includes

exemptions related to intended use (e.g., using nuclearmaterial in gram quantities as a sensing component in

instruments; or using it in nonnuclear activities if thematerial is recoverable). If exempted nuclear material

is to be processed or stored together with safeguarded

material, reapplication of safeguards on the exempted

material is required.

Explosives testing chamber: Heavy steel vessel de-

signed to contain the blasts and fragments produced byexplosion tests. e conguration oen includes equip-

ment such as ash x-ray and streak cameras. In January

, the IAEA asked Iran for permission to visit such achamber at the Parchin complex in Taleghan, which has

reportedly been used to test a nuclear warhead initiator.

Diversion of nuclear material: A case of noncompli-ance that involves one or more of the following: the

undeclared removal of declared nuclear material froma safeguarded facility; the use of a safeguarded facil-ity for the introduction, production, or processing ofundeclared nuclear material (e.g., the undeclared pro-duction of high-enriched uranium in an enrichmentplant); or the undeclared production of plutonium in areactor through irradiation and subsequent removal ofundeclared uranium targets.

Dump material: When the centrifuges are started up,or during the malfunctioning of centrifuges or cas-

cades, the operator dumps uranium hexauoride intocylinders. Such material is generally considered tobe waste.

Education Research Institute: Established to coordi-nate defense research and development for Irans Min-istry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.

Effective kilogram (ekg): A special unit of nuclearmaterial used in the context of safeguards, as denedby IAEA document INFCIRC/ (Corr.). For plu-tonium, it corresponds directly to samples weight inkilograms. For uranium with an enrichment of % orhigher, the ekg is the samples weight in kilograms mul-tiplied by the square of its enrichment level; for ura-nium with an enrichment below % and above .%,the weight in kilograms multiplied by .; and fordepleted uranium with an enrichment of .% or lower(or for thorium), the weight in kilograms multipliedby ..

Electric drive: e stationary part of the motor thatdrives a centrifuge.

Electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS): Adevice called a calutron enables the separation and col-lection of U- and isotopes as they pass througha magnetic eld. Iran has a single calutron in Karaj,which is being used to produce stable isotopes formedical and industrial purposes. Calutrons were alsoused in the initial U.S. nuclear weapons program andby Saddam Husseins program in s Iraq.


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Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal system:

Process systems such as feed autoclaves (or stations)

used for passing uranium hexauoride to centrifugesor desublimers/cold traps, which in turn are used to

remove UF

from cascades. From the desublimers/cold

traps, UF

is moved into cylinders. Autoclaves are also

used at UF

production plants.

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP): Facility con-

structed under a mountain near the city of Qom (see

map). Iran originally stated that its purpose was the pro-

duction of percent enriched uranium using cascades

and approximately , centrifuges. Since then, the

facilitys purpose has been changed several times. Infor-mation from June indicates that it is being used for

the production of up to percent enriched uranium,

as well as centrifuge research and development. Built in

secrecy until , the plant is probably capable of with-

standing most aerial bombing or missile attacks.

Frequency changers: Also known as inverters; typi-

cally used to maintain motors (e.g., for centrifuges) at

a constant speed.

Fakhrizadeh, Mohsen: e apparent leader of Iranssuspected nuclear weapons program (also known as

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi). He has served as headof the Physics Research Center and executive ocer ofthe AMAD Plan, the executive aairs of which wereconducted by the Orchid Oce. Aer , someAMAD activities continued under his leadership at theSection for Advanced Development Applications andTechnologies (SADAT), which reported to the Ministryof Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

By mid-, he was also serving as head of the MalekAshtar University of Technology (MUT) in Tehran. Henow leads the Organization of Defensive Innovationand Research. Fakhrizadeh is named in UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions and , which banned himfrom international travel and froze his assets.

Farayand Technique: An Isfahan-based subsidiaryof the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran that was

originally intended to be a centrifuge assembly site butis now believed to be associated with centrifuge com-ponent manufacturing. e rm has since changed itsname to Technology of Centrifuge of Iran.

0.7%

3.5%

20% 60%

90%

Fig. : Uranium enrichment

To enrich uranium so that the percent-

age of fissile isotope U-235 increases

from 0.7% to 90%, UF6 gas is passedthrough four processes: (1) through

two groups of 12 cascades of cen-

trifuges, each having 164 machines,taking the enrichment level to 3.5%;

(2) through eight cascades each of

another 164 machines to increase thelevel from 3.5% to 20%; (3) through

four cascades of 114 machines

increase from 20% to 60%; (4)through two cascades of 64 machines

each, to increase from 60% to 90%.

At each stage, gas depleted of U-235

is passed back to the previous stageor out of the system completely. As

the schematic suggests, the process

becomes relatively easier.

Each 1,000 atoms of natural uranium contains 993 atoms of U-238 and seven of U-235. At 3.5% enrichment, the ratio

becomes 193:7; i.e., 800 atoms of U-238 have been removed. Removal of just another 158 U-238 atoms effects a ratio

of 35:7, or 20% enrichment the level Iran currently achieves. Comparatively little effort, or as it is known in the jargon,work, is needed to remove another 34 U-238 atoms to reach 90% enrichment, suitable for an atomic bomb, and a ratio

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Graphite Subcritical Reactor: A zero-power light-water reactor (with graphite reector) in Isfahan, oper-

ating on uranium metal fuel. China constructed thetraining reactor in .

Green salt: e name given, due to its color, to ura-nium tetrauoride, an intermediate step in the con-version of uranium hexauoride to either uraniumoxides (U

O

or UO

) or uranium metal. e so-called

Green Salt Project is part of an alleged secret Iranianprogram, which includes studies related to uraniumprocessing, high explosives and design of a missile war-head with a nuclear payload.

Haft-e-Tir (Seventh of Tir): A workshop in Isfahanbelonging to Irans Defense Industries Organization. Itis currently manufacturing centrifuge components.

Hashtgerd: An area near the city of Karaj to the westof Tehran (see map), where the Atomic Energy Organi-zation of Iran has installations (specically, in LashkarAbad and Ramandeh).

Heavy water: Water containing more than percentof the hydrogen isotope deuterium (D

O). It is used as

a moderator in reactors fueled by natural uranium.

Heavy-water production plant (HWPP): Iran com-missioned the HWPP at Arak in . It can producesixteen metric tons of heavy water per year for use inthe IR- heavy-water reactor, which is currentlyunder construction.

Heavy-water reactor: A reactor using heavy water(deuterium) as the moderator. A prominent exampleis the Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reac-tor, which is moderated and cooled by heavy water and

fueled with natural uranium. Spent fuel rods from suchfacilities contain signicant quantities of plutonium,a nuclear explosive. Iran decided in the mid-s tobuild its IR- heavy-water reactor, the denotingits power output in megawatts. Located at Khondab incentral Iran, the plant is intended for use in researchand development as well as radioisotope production,at least according to Iran. It is expected to becomeoperational sometime in . Such a reactor produces

Fuel element chopping machine: Remotely oper-ated equipment at a reprocessing plant that cuts,

chops, or shears irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies,bundles, or rods so that nuclear material (e.g., pluto-nium) can be separated.

Fuel Enrichment Plant: e ocial name of theenrichment plant at Natanz, which is protected by acover of cement, rocks, and earth many feet deep toprotect it from airstrikes. Its large halls are designed tohold as many as , centrifuges.

Fuel Fabrication Laboratory: A facility in Isfahan

where research and development into nuclear fuel wasconducted.

Fuel Manufacturing Plant: Iran is currently construct-ing this facility in Isfahan to produce fuel rods for theTehran Research Reactor, for the IR- heavy-waterreactor in Arak, and for planned light-water reactors.Parts of it are already operational.

Gchine: e Atomic Energy Organization of Iranowns the Gchine mine near Bandar Abbas (see map),as well as the Gchine uranium ore concentration plant.

Currently, the mine has estimated reserves of fortymetric tons of uranium, and IAEA reports indicatethat its annual output is around metric tons. e oreconcentration plant has been operating since .

Girdler-sulfide (GS) process: Heavy water can be pro-duced by two commercially viable processes: the water-hydrogen sulde exchange (GS process) and the ammo-nia-hydrogen exchange. e GS process, which is usedat Khondab, is based on the exchange of hydrogen anddeuterium between water and hydrogen sulde within

a series of towers that are operated with the top sectioncold and the bottom section hot. e product of the laststagewater enriched up to percent in deuteriumis sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor-gradeheavy water (i.e., . percent deuterium oxide).

Graphite, nuclear-grade: Graphite capable of beingused as a moderator in a nuclear reactor. Must have apurity level better than ppm boron equivalent and adensity greater than . g/cm.


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weapons-grade plutonium sucient for at least one

nuclear device annually. IAEA reports indicate that

Iran also tried unsuccessfully to acquire a -megawattheavy-water reactor from China.

Heavy-water-reactor-related projects: UN Secu-rity Council resolutions have called on Iran to suspend

all of its heavy-water-reactor-related projects, includ-

ing heavy-water production, construction of the IR-

reactor, and the manufacture and testing of fuel for that

reactor.

Hex: Slang for uranium hexauoride gas (UF

).

High-enriched uranium (HEU): Uranium contain-

ing percent or more of the ssile isotope U-.

Weapons-grade uranium is usually enriched to per-

cent or higher levels of U-.

High-strength aluminum: e series of high-

strength aluminum is oen used for centrifuge

rotors. Centrifuge casings are typically made of

series aluminum.

Hold-up: Nuclear material deposits remaining in pro-

cess equipment, interconnecting pipes, lters, and adja-cent work areas. For plants in operation, the hold-up is

the amount of nuclear material contained in the process.

Imenista Andish: A private rm that had a con-

tract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iranto develop a rotor for a P centrifuge. e company

concluded that carbon ber was the best material to

use given the countrys industrial infrastructure. e

AEOI canceled the contract in , by which point

the company had only built cylinder rotors and run

some basic mechanical tests.

Inert gas testing of centrifuges: Xenon and sulfur

hexauoride can be used as surrogates to test the per-

formance of centrifuges at early stages of research and

development. ey do not substitute, however, for

testing with uranium hexauoride gas.

Inspections: Most IAEA onsite inspections are carried

out according to a dened schedule, though some areunannounced or short-notice. Inspections are limited to

locations within a declared nuclear facility or other loca-tions containing nuclear material. During onsite visits,

inspectors audit the facilitys accounting and operat-ing records, verify the nuclear material inventory, takeenvironmental samples, and apply containment andsurveillance measures such as seals and cameras. efrequency of inspections depends on the type of facil-ity and its inventory of nuclear material. A light-waterreactor (e.g., Bushehr) is typically inspected quarterly,while an enrichment plant (e.g., Natanz) has monthlyannounced inspections as well as additional unan-nounced visits at least once a month. e IAEAs annualinspection eort in Iran totals about person-days.

Institute of Applied Physics (IAP): Part of Irans Phys-ics Research Center.

Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center: Irans largestnuclear research center, established in with Frenchassistance (see map). Although France eventually ceasedcooperation, work continued, particularly with Chi-nese assistance. e site is home to research reactors,numerous laboratories, the Uranium Conversion Facil-ity, and Zirconium Production Facility.

IR-1 centrifuge: is Iranian model is based on theearly Dutch SNOR design acquired by Pakistani sci-entist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who developed it furtherand called it P. e design was subsequently givento Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

IR-2 centrifuge: Irans original IR- was made of car-bon ber, without bellows. A more advanced model, theIR-m, uses two carbon ber rotors and a maraging steelbellows. Both models are based on the Pakistani P cen-trifuge, a German design acquired by A.Q. Khan, which

uses a maraging steel rotor.

IR-3 centrifuge: One of the prototype centrifugestested at Irans Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant.

IR-4 centrifuge: An Iranian design based on PakistansP centrifuge, but believed to use carbon ber for boththe rotor and bellows.



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Laser enrichment: Separating uranium isotopes byusing a laser of a particular wavelength, which excites

U- atoms to the point that they can be segregatedfrom U-. Such systems use one of two types ofprocess medium: atomic uranium vapor or the vapor

of a uranium compound. e rst category includesatomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS), forwhich Iran has built a pilot plant in Lashkar Abad (see

map). Tehran never completed equipment for the sec-ond category, however (molecular laser isotope separa-

tion, known as MLIS or MOLIS). AVLIS technologywas obtained from Russia and China, and some of theMLIS equipment from the United States.

Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory (LSL): In , theAtomic Energy Organization of Iran concluded a

contract with a Chinese supplier for establishing thisfacility to study the spectroscopy of uranium metal

on a milligram scale. e LSL was used until Octo-ber , when the laboratories and nuclear materialwere moved to Lashkar Abad. None of these activi-

ties were reported to the IAEA. e equipment waseventually dismantled.

Lavisan-Shian: A site in Tehran where the PhysicsResearch Center was once located. Iran razed the site

aer November ; the IAEA visited it in June .

Light-water reactor (LWR): A power reactor that is

both moderated and cooled by ordinary (light) water.LWR fuel assemblies usually consist of Zircaloy-clad fuelrods containing uranium oxide pellets of low enrich-

ment (generally less than percent). ere are two typesof LWR: boiling water reactors and pressurized water

reactors. e LWR at Bushehr is the second type.

Light-Water Subcritical Reactor: A Chinese-made

zero-power reactor in Isfahan, used for train-ing purposes.

Limited frequency, unannounced access (LFUA):An IAEA safeguards measure developed for gas cen-trifuge plants whose stated output is uranium enriched

to percent or less. LFUA inspections of cascade areasare designed to help detect diversion of one signicant

quantity (SQ) of uranium (including the production


Isotope: Any of two or more species of atoms of achemical element with the same atomic number andnearly identical chemical behavior but with dieringatomic mass or mass number and dierent physicalproperties. See alsoAtomic weight.

Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories: Part of the Teh-ran Nuclear Research Center, this facility has beeninvolved in laser uranium enrichment, uranium con-version, and metallurgy research and development.

e facility was named aer Jabr Ibn al-Hayan, aninth-century Shiite Muslim chemist.

Kalaye Electric Company: A subsidiary of the AtomicEnergy Organization of Iran that has been involved inresearch and development as well as construction ofuranium gas centrifuge enrichment facilities in Tehranand Natanz.

Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center: An AtomicEnergy Organization of Iran research center west ofTehran (see map) that has been storing waste from

the nuclear program and equipment dismantled fromatomic vapor laser isotope separation experiments innearby Lashkar Abad.

Khondab: Site, near Arak (see map), where IransIR- heavy-water research reactor is still under con-struction. e spent fuel rods from this type of reactorcontain signicant amounts of plutonium, a potentialnuclear explosive. Khondab is a also the location of aheavy-water production plant.

Kimia Maadan Company: A cover company for chem-ical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan.e Atomic Energy Organization of Iran also usedthe rm to help with procurement. Kimia Maadanwas heavily involved in the construction of facilities atGchine mine.

Kolahdouz: An industrial site in western Tehranbelonging to the military industries. In , theIAEA visited three locations on this site to clarify alle-gations related to uranium enrichment activities.


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wherePB is the beginning physical inventory

X is the sum of increases in inventoryY is the sum of decreases in inventoryPE is the physical ending inventory

MUF is generally not zero due to measurement uncer-tainties, but these have internationally accepted tar-get values. Using these values, statistical tests are con-ducted to conrm whether the MUF declared by theoperator is acceptable and that nuclear material hasnot been diverted.

Medical isotopes: Iran produces several radioisotopes

for medical and industrial purposes at the TehranNuclear Research Center. e most common such iso-tope is molybdenum-. See alsoMIX facility.

Meeting in 1984: e IAEA has asked Iran for infor-mation about a high-level meeting held in to dis-

cuss reviving the countrys pre-revolution nuclear pro-

gram. Iran denied that any such meeting took place.

Military workshops: According to information Iran

gave the IAEA in , most of its centrifuge com-ponents are manufactured in workshops belonging to

defense industries organizations.

Milling of uranium: A process in which uranium isextracted from crushed ne ore by leaching. e ura-nium is then precipitated and removed from the solu-tion. Aer drying and, usually, heating, a concentratereferred to as yellowcake undergoes a conversionprocess. Iran has uranium mills at Ardakan near Yazdand in Gchine and near Bandar Abbas (see map).

Miniature Neutron Source Reactor: A small research

reactor in Isfahan of Chinese origin.Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics:Established in , MODAFL encompasses the regu-lar military (Artesh) and the Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran). MODAFL alsocontrols Irans Defense Industries Organization andits subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization,both of which are involved in the nuclear program.

MIX facility: Acronym for the Molybdenum, Iodine,

of material at an enrichment level higher than thatdeclared) while protecting sensitive technical informa-

tion related to the enrichment process.

Location outside facilities (LOF): Any location thatis not a designated nuclear facility, but where nuclearmaterial is customarily used in amounts of one eec-tive kilogram or less. All of Irans LOFs are hospitals,which use uranium in radiation shielding.

Low-enriched uranium (LEU): Denotes uranium con-taining more than the . percent of the isotope U-found in the natural metal but less than percent.

At percent the material becomes known as high-enriched uranium.

Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT):A Iranian public university dedicated to engineer-ing, science, and the military. Opened in , it hascampuses in Tehran and Isfahan, with funding pro-vided by the Ministry of Defense. In , the Ger-man government identied MUT as a mainly civil-ian institution that also conducts military researchand development. e university is also linked withkey Iranian nuclear gure Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who

merged the SADAT Center into MUT, where it isknown as Pardis Tehran.

Manipulator: ese remotely controlled devices(sometimes known as master slaves) are used for han-dling highly radioactive materials inside specially con-structed thick-walled containers known as hot cells.

Marivan: Area of Iran close to the Iraqi border (seemap) where the IAEA has reported large-scale high-explosive experiments.

Mass spectrometry: An isotope analysis technique inwhich small quantities of a sample are ionized, formedinto a beam, and passed through a strong magneticeld. e ions are deected dierently depending ontheir masses.

Material unaccounted for (MUF): e dierencebetween the material balance at the end of an account-ing period compared to what it was at the beginning,given by the equation MUF=(PB+X+Y)-PE,


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sources, but it has been unable to conclude whetherthe experiments were peaceful or not. Pakistan is

thought to have used a uranium deuteride initiatorknown as a D-D for its nuclear weapons, a type devel-oped in China.

Noncompliance: When a state is found to be in viola-tion of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, suchas by diverting nuclear material from declared nuclearactivities, failing to declare nuclear material that mustbe placed under safeguards, violating agreed recordingand reporting systems, obstructing IAEA inspectors,interfering with safeguards equipment, or otherwise

preventing the agency from carrying out its vericationactivities. In the event of noncompliance, the IAEAdirector-general must report the matter to the agencysBoard of Governors, which then calls upon the mem-ber state to remedy the problem. e board must alsoinform other IAEA member states, the UN SecurityCouncil, and the General Assembly. e SecurityCouncil may take additional actions, including sanc-tions, to reinforce the compliance.

Nondestructive assay (NDA): Measuring the nuclear

material content or elemental/isotopic concentrationof an item without producing signicant physical orchemical changes in the item.

Nondestructive testing (NDT): A wide group of anal-ysis techniques used in science and industry to charac-terize the properties of a material, component, or sys-tem without damaging it.

Nuclear material: Uranium, plutonium, or thorium (apossible nuclear fuel). Oen subdivided into sourcematerial and special ssionable material.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): A globaltreaty designed to halt the spread of nuclear weap-ons, promote the spread of peaceful nuclear technol-ogy, and further the goal of disarmament. e NPT,which went into force in , divides its signatoriesinto two categories: nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. e ve ocial nuclear weap-ons states are the United States, Russia, Britain, France,and China. e non-nuclear weapons stateswhich

and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility at theTehran Nuclear Research Center.

Modality: An understanding on specic measures or con-ditions agreed between the IAEA and a member state toaccomplish the objectives of a given site visit or inspection.

Molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS):A type of laser enrichment that Iran has considered butnot pursued.

Monte Carlo methodology: Computer algorithmsnow widely used in science and business but origi-nating in work on the design of the rst U.S. nuclear

weapons. is methodolog y is used to simulate physi-cal and mathematical systems.

Moallem Kalayeh: A site northwest of Tehran thatIAEA ocials visited in . e Atomic EnergyOrganization of Iran has a training and recreationfacility there, but it was originally considered as a pos-sible nuclear research center.

Natanz: e site of Irans main uranium enrichmentplant in the central part of the country, north of Isfa-

han (see map).

Natural uranium: Uranium as it occurs in nature con-tains about . percent U- and . percent U-,as well as minute quantities of U- .

Neutron: An atomic particle that is present in everymaterial except the element hydrogen. In ssile mate-rials, neutrons can cause the nucleus of an atom tosplit, which releases more neutrons and creates achain reaction.

Neutron generator: Also known as an initiator orneutron source, this device is capable of producinga burst of neutrons upon activation. It is a crucialcomponent of any implosion device aimed at kick-starting a chain reaction when a nuclear device goescritical. e initiator is typically placed in the centerof the device and is activated by the impact of theconverging shockwave. IAEA reports indicate thatIran worked on a polonium-beryllium neutron sourcearound , and more recently with deuterium


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and that the Atomic Energy Organization of Irannever actually received any such items.

Offer in early 1990s: Sometime in , asso-ciates of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan made anew oer to Iran concerning the transfer of centrifugetechnology. Iran has maintained that no documenta-tion exists on the oer apart from shipping documentsconrming the delivery of P centrifuge componentsin . e deal included provision of the Pcentrifuge design, but Iran claims that it did not pur-sue any work on that design between and .Some reports indicate that documentation related to

nuclear weapons design may also have been passed toIran as part of the deal. e genesis of the deal itselfis unclearTehran claims that it was oered on theinitiative of Khan and his associates, but it might alsohave involved an agreement between the governmentsof Pakistan and Iran.

Open-source information: Information generallyavailable to the public from sources such as scienticliterature, government releases, commercial satelliteimages, and releases issued by public organizations,

commercial companies, and the media.

Orchid Office: Executive oce of the AMAD Plan,located on Orchid Street in Tehran.

Orchid Scientific Research Center: Part of IransPhysics Research Center.

Ore Processing Center: An installation at the TehranNuclear Research Center that performs bench-scaletests to recover uranium from ore.

Organization of Defensive Innovation and

Research: An entity headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh,who is suspected of being associated with Irans mili-tary nuclear research.

P5+1: e group currently leading international nuc-lear negotiations with Iran. Led by European UnionHigh Representative Catherine Ashton of Britain, itincludes the ve permanent members of the UN Secu-rity Council (the United States, Britain, China, France,and Russia) plus Germany. It is also known as the E+.

include Iranagree not to pursue nuclear weapons inexchange for access to peaceful nuclear technologies.

e nuclear weapons states are obligated to assist inthe development of nuclear energy while also workingin good faith toward nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear-powered vessels: In June , the Iraniannavy announced that it was considering construction

of nuclear-powered submarines. Shortly aerward,Tehran stated that it was also considering nuclear-powered oil tankers. Although naval reactors typi-

cally use high-enriched uranium (HEU) as a fuel inorder to reduce reactor size (e.g., U.S. Navy subma-

rines use percent HEU, and Russian icebreak-ers up to percent), there have been exceptions.e French navy uses low-enriched uranium (LEU)caramel fuel (around . percent) in its submarines,

enabling it to enrich and manufacture fuel rods at itscivilian plants. Brazils planned nuclear submarineis also expected to use LEU fuel. Experimental mer-

chant ships such as the Savannah (U.S.), Otto Hahn(Germany), and Mutsu (Japan) used LEU fuel, but

they no longer exist. In terms of international nuclearsafeguards, the issue is complicated. Non-nuclear

weapon states with a Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement are allowed to remove certain materialfrom IAEA safeguardsin this case, nuclear mate-rial intended for nonproscribed military use such as

submarine fuel can be exempted under arrangementsreached with the agency.

Offer in 1987: A handwritten one-page documentgiven to Iranian ocials in Switzerland by a foreignintermediary believed to be a business associate of Pak-

istani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. e oer included:

a disassembled centrifuge; drawings, descriptions, andspecications for centrifuge production; drawings andspecications for a complete plant; materials for themanufacture of , centrifuge machines; auxiliary

vacuum and electric drive equipment; and uraniumreconversion and casting equipment. e latter itemprovides some details on how to make uranium com-

ponents for a nuclear weapon. Iran has repeatedlystated that the intermediaries oered the reconversionunit with casting equipment on their own initiative,


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, but between the late s and early s, thePHRCs eorts were consolidated under the AMAD

Plan. In late and early , Iran completelycleared the PHRC site in Lavisan-Shian outside Tehran.

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: An enrichment researchand development facility in Natanz. Unlike the sitesmain enrichment plant, it is located above ground.Currently, it is being used for tests involving singlecentrifuges as well as small and full cascades, includingIrans next-generation centrifuges. Some of these testsinvolve nuclear material.

Pishgam: An Iranian engineering rm known byseveral names, including Pishgam Energy IndustriesDevelopment Co. and Pioneer Energy IndustriesDevelopment Company (PEI). It has been providingengineering and technical support for various AtomicEnergy Organization of Iran projects, including theZirconium Production Plant, the Uranium Conver-sion Facility, and the Fuel Manufacturing Plantalllocated in the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centeraswell as the Yellowcake Production Plant at Ardakan.e company is listed in UN Security Council Resolu-

tion ().

Plasma Physics: A department at the Tehran NuclearResearch Center that housed the uranium enrichmentprogram during the early s.

Plutonium (Pu): A radioactive element that occursin only trace amounts in nature. When produced byirradiating uranium fuels, plutonium contains varyingpercentages of the isotopes Pu-, , , , and. Plutonium containing any Pu- is considered aspecial ssionable material. e International Atomic

Energy Agency has dened kg of plutonium as a sig-nicant quantity, that is, the amount sucient for anuclear bomb.

PUREX reprocessing: Around the year , thePishgam company was involved in the design of aPUREX-based reprocessing method for the AtomicEnergy Organization of Iran. e PUREX is an indus-trial process used to separate uranium and plutoniumfrom spent nuclear fuel.

Parchin: A large military-industrial site near Tehranthat is believed to have conducted nuclear experiments,

particularly high-explosives testing allegedly related towarhead design.

Pardis Tehran: Organization created by MohsenFakhrizadeh through the merger of the SADAT Cen-

ters and Malek Ashtar University of Technology.

Pars Trash: One of the subsidiary companies of the

Kalaye Electric Company, focusing on centrifugecomponent manufacturing. e workshop is located

in east Tehran.

Passivation: e process of ushing newly installed

uranium enrichment equipment (e.g., piping or centri-fuges) with depleted uranium hexauoride to coat the

surfaces, which must be done before the equipment

can be used.

Passive Defense Organization: Created in responseto perceived threats of military attack against Iran,

the Passive Defense Organization designed and estab-

lished contingency centers for various organizations

and activities. e Atomic Energy Organization

of Iran requested that one of these centers be desig-nated as a contingency enrichment plant, so that the

countrys enrichment activities do not need to be sus-pended in the case of an attack. According to Iran,

this was the basis for establishing the enrichment

plant at Fordow.

Physical inventory taking: A given nuclear facilitysphysical inventory is determined by the facility opera-

tor and reported to the IAEA in the physical inventory

listing. e agency then veries the report during a

physical inventory verication inspection.

Physics Research Center (PHRC): e Tehran-based

organization believed to have been at the center of

Irans military nuclear research. It was created with thepurpose of ensuring preparedness for combat and neu-

tralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and acci-

dents (nuclear defense), as well as providing supportand scientic advice and services to the Ministry of

Defense. Iran has stated that those activities ended in


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remote-monitoring equipment. Iran has not agreed to

allowing remote monitoring at its facilities.

Reprocessing: Chemical separation of nuclear mate-rial from ssion products. Usually refers to obtaining

plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel rods. e

most common reprocessing process is PUREX.

Resolutions of the UN Security Council: e rel-

evant Security Council resolutions on Iranadopted

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, making them

mandatoryare (), (),

(), (), (), and ().

SeealsoBoard resolutions.

Routine inspections: e most frequent type ofIAEA inspection. ey may be carried out according

to a dened schedule or with little or no notice.

SADAT Centers: Some of the military nuclear activities

that Iran had previously carried out under the AMAD

Plan were resumed aer under a new organiza-

tion known as the Section for Advanced Development

Applications and Technologies (SADAT), which con-tinued to report to the Ministry of Defense and Armed

Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

Safeguards Agreement: Each non-nuclear-weapons

state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty must conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards

Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. e model Safe-

guards Agreement, laid out in IAEA document

INFCIRC/ (Corr.), serves as the basis for negotia-tion of each states CSA. e details of how these safe-

guards will be applied are contained in the agreements

Subsidiary Arrangements. Under a CSA, a member

state must accept IAEA safeguards on all source or spe-cial ssionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities

within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carriedout under its control. e IAEA has a correspond-

ing right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are

applied on all such material, for the exclusive purpose

of verifying that it is not diverted to nuclear weapons.

Irans agreement with the IAEA entered into force onMay , (see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/

Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc.pdf).

Pyroprocessing: In , the IAEA noted that theJabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory

(JHL) in Tehran had initiated pyroprocessing researchand development activities to study the electrochemi-cal production of uranium. Iran stated that the experi-ments were aimed at studying the electrochemicalbehavior of uranyl ion in ionic liquid. Pyroprocessingis an alternative to PUREX reprocessing and can alsobe used to produce high-purity uranium metal. Pyro-processing, however, has only been used on an experi-mental scale.

Qom: A holy city in central Iran, south of Tehran (see

map), near the Fordow uranium centrifuge enrichmentplant built deep inside a mountain.

Radioisotope batteries: Radioisotope thermoelectricgenerators (RTGs or RITEGs) are electrical genera-tors in which the heat released by the decay of a suit-able radioactive material is converted into electricity.ey have been used as power sources in satellites,space probes, and unmanned remote facilities such aslighthouses. Most applications have used Pu-, butIran has stated that it studied Po- for that purpose.

Po- can also be used as part of an initiator in anatomic bomb.

Recycled uranium: When low-enriched uranium hasbeen irradiated in a reactor and removed for reprocess-ing, it still contains more than percent U-, alongwith an additional isotope (U-) not present innatural uranium. High U- content has been foundin samples taken from Iranian centrifuge equipmentthat originated in Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan likelyreceived such uranium from China.

Remote monitoring: A technique whereby safeguardsdata collected by unattended monitoring and mea-surement systems (e.g., camera images) is transmittedto IAEA headquarters or a regional oce via com-munication networks, where it is then evaluated. eIAEA currently has around such systems deployedworldwide. e benets are that evaluation and equip-ment checks can be performed without visiting a site.is approach includes oen-unannounced inspec-tions to ensure that the state is not tampering with the


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Saghand: A uranium mine under construction inYazd in central Iran (see map). It has an annual esti-

mated production capacity of metric tons.

Satellite imagery: e IAEA uses commercially avail-able satellite imagery to support its work. Available fromvarious vendors, such high-resolution imagery is useful infollowing construction of nuclear sites over long periodsof time.

Separative work unit: A way of measuring the e-ciency of dierent centrifuge designs, relating to boththe amount of material processed and the degree of

enrichment achieved.Shahab-3: Persian for meteor, the Shahab is amedium-range ( miles) ballistic missile developedby Iran and based on the North Korean Nodong mis-sile. As indicated in documentation and other informa-tion obtained by the IAEA, the Shahab- nose-conereentry vehicle is designed to accommodate a nuclearpayload.

Shahid Beheshti University: A senior SADATocial solicited assistance from this university on

a matter related to nuclear weaponsspecically,complex calculations related to the state of critical-ity of a solid sphere of uranium being compressedby high explosives.

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group: A subordinateof Irans Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO),which is responsible for the countrys liquid-fueled bal-listic missile programs.

Shariaty Building: Between and , Iranconducted plutonium separation experiments in a

laboratory in this building, located at the TehranNuclear Research Center. In , plutonium solu-tions produced from these activities were transferredto the centers Chamaran Building, where experi-ments continued.

Sharif University of Technology: One of the larg-est engineering schools in Iran, SUT was establishedin under the name Aryarmehr University ofTechnology, then renamed aer the Islamic

Revolution. Since , the IAEA has asked Iran to

explain nuclear-related equipment procured by the

former head of the Physics Research Center, who wasalso a professor at SUT. e equipmentonly so