nuclear futures iii - bits · ambassador james leonard, for his helpful comments on the report™s...

BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL

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BASIC RESEARCH REPORT 98.5

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NUCLEAR FUTURES:WESTERN EUROPEAN OPTIONS FOR

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION

MARTIN BUTCHER OTFRIED NASSAUER STEPHEN YOUNG

The British American Security Information Council(BASIC) is an independent research organizationthat analyzes international security issues. BASICworks to promote public awareness of defense,disarmament, military strategy, and nuclear poli-cies in order to foster informed debate on theseissues. BASIC facilitates the exchange of informa-tion and analysis on both sides of the Atlantic.

This is the third of a series of BASIC Research Reportslooking at the future of Nuclear Weapons Policy.

BASIC in the UK is a registered charity no. 1001081.

BASIC in the US is a not-for-profit organization constitutedunder section 501(c)(3) of the US Internal Revenue ServiceCode.

BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL..................................................................................................................

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Website: http://www.basicint.org

Nuclear Futures:Western European Options forNuclear Risk Reduction

By Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, andStephen Young

Published by the

British American Security Information Council

December 1998

ISBN: 1 874533 35 0

Price: £7.00 / $10.00

About the authors

Martin Butcher is the Director of the Centre for EuropeanSecurity and Disarmament (CESD), a Brussels-based non-governmental organization. Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow atBASIC�s Washington office.

Otfried Nassauer is the Director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Securtiy (BITS).

Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst as BASIC. Previously, heworked for 20/20 Vision and for ACCESS: A SecurityInformation Service. He has a Masters in International Affairsfrom Columbia University, and a BA from Carleton College.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the many people who pro-vided help of various kinds during the writing of this report.They include: Nicola Butler, for her inestimable assistance;Ambassador James Leonard, for his helpful comments on thereport�s recommendations; Professors Paul Rogers and PatriciaChilton, for their comments on early drafts; Daniel Plesch, forhis comments on the entire report; and Camille Grand, forhis guidance and support in compiling the section on France.Special thanks to Lucy Amis and Tanya Padberg for excellentproofing and copy-editing work, and to Christine Kucia andKate Joseph for advice and assistance on the layout anddesign of the report.

Support

This report was made possible by the generous support ofW. Alton Jones Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, thePloughshares Fund, and the Joseph Rowntree CharitableTrust.

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 4

Exectutive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 5

Chapter One: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy in Western Europe1.1 Outline ....................................................................................................................................................... 81.2 Decision Points .......................................................................................................................................... 81.3 Cracks in the Foundation? ....................................................................................................................... 8

Chapter Two: The United Kingdom2.1 Nuclear Posture ........................................................................................................................................ 102.2 Nuclear Doctrine ...................................................................................................................................... 112.3 Alert Status .............................................................................................................................................. 122.4 Fissile Materials ....................................................................................................................................... 132.5 New Labour in Government ................................................................................................................... 132.6 Labour Party Policies and the Strategic Defence Review........................................................................ 142.8 UK Stance on Disarmament at the UN .................................................................................................. 152.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. .............................. 16

Chapter Three: France3.1 French Nuclear Weapons Doctrine ........................................................................................................ 173.2 Shifting Defence Priorities and Resources ............................................................................................. 193.3 French Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................................................ 193.4 A European Nuclear Deterrent? ............................................................................................................. 213.5 Concerted Deterrence ............................................................................................................................ 223.6 Involving the Germans .......................................................................................................................... 23

Chapter Four: Nuclear Co-operation4.1 US-UK Nuclear Co-operation ................................................................................................................. 244.2 Ongoing US-UK Co-operation ............................................................................................................... 244.3 UK-French Nuclear Co-operation .......................................................................................................... 244.4 Ongoing UK-French Co-operation ........................................................................................................ 254.5 Co-operation Between UK and French Nuclear Weapons Laboratories ............................................. 264.6 US-French Co-operation ........................................................................................................................ 274.7 Current Projects ..................................................................................................................................... 284.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 29

Chapter Five: NATO Europe5.1 US Nuclear Deployments in Europe ...................................................................................................... 305.2 NATO: Nuclear Weapons for Non-Nuclear-Weapon states .................................................................. 315.3 The Effects of NATO Enlargement ......................................................................................................... 335.4 Current NATO Nuclear Doctrine ........................................................................................................... 345.5 NATO�s Future Nuclear Doctrine .......................................................................................................... 355.6 US Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Strategy .......................................................................................... 355.7 European Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................. 365.8 Perspectives on NATO�s Nuclear Posture .............................................................................................. 365.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 37

Chapter Six: Nuclear Risk Reduction in Western Europe6.1 Commit to and Take Programmatic Action Toward the Rapid Elimination of Nuclear Weapons .. 396.2 Reduce the Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons ....................................................................................... 426.3 End the Deployment of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Give Up the Option

of Wartime Nuclear Weapons Use by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States .................................................... 436.4 Halt First-Use Policies by France, the UK, and NATO ......................................................................... 466.5 Include Commitments by France and the UK on the Future of their Nuclear Arsenals

in the START III Context ....................................................................................................................... 486.6 Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme ...................................................... 48

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AB Air BaseAFDRG Anglo-French Defence Research GroupASMP Air-Sol Moyenne PortéeASLP Air-Sol Longue PortéeCD Conference on DisarmamentCEA Commisariat a l�Énergie AtomiqueCFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe TreatyCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban TreatyDGA Delegation Generale de l�ArmementEIVRs Exchanges of Information by Visit and ReportEU European UnionHMS Her Majesty�s ShipIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic MissileICJ International Court of JusticeINF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces TreatyJAIEG Joint Atomic Information Exchange GroupJOWOGs Joint Working GroupsMIRV Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry VehiclesMOA Memorandum of AgreementMoD UK Ministry of DefenceMP Member of Parliament (UK)NAM Non-Aligned MovementNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNTM National Technical MeansNPG Nuclear Planning Group (a NATO body)NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

or the Non-Proliferation TreatyNSAs Negative Security AssurancesNWFZ Nuclear-Weapon-Free ZoneOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropePALEN Préparation a la Limitation des Expérimentations NucléairesPaSEN Programme de Simulation des Essais NucléairesPrepCom Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 NPT Review ConferenceRAF Royal Air Force (UK)SNLE/NG Sous-marins Lanceurs d�Engins de la Nouvelle GénérationSLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic MissileSTART Strategic Arms Reduction TalksSWPP SLBM Warhead Protection ProgramTACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(an EU programme)TMS Thomson Marconi SonarTNN Tête Nucléaire NouvelleTNO Tête Nucléaire OcéaniqueWEU Western European UnionWMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

6

Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

The recent German-US debate over NATO's policyallowing first-use of nuclear weapons highlights agrowing split between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states in the Alliance. Despite this split, thepolitical value attached to nuclear weapons in Euro-pean security remains high. NATO still describesnuclear weapons as the �supreme guarantee� of Alli-ance security. While the number of nuclear weaponsin Europe has declined, the nuclear actors in WesternEurope � France, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates, and NATO � have not yet changed theirdoctrines to reflect the new security environment. Atthe same time, there is no military threat to thecontinent and NATO�s conventional military capa-bilities far outweigh any potential enemy. WesternEurope nations should pursue a risk reduction ap-proach, decreasing the political and military valueattached to nuclear weapons.

Upcoming decision points � updating NATO�sstrategic concept, due to be completed in 1999, andthe 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) � are key in determiningwhat path Western Europe will take. Germany andCanada have called for a renewed discussion on thefuture role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.Germany announced that it will raise the issue inNATO Ministerial meetings.

Under the previous Conservative government,the UK reduced its arsenal to one nuclear system: theTrident missile deployed on Trident nuclear subma-rines. When it came to power, the Labour govern-ment undertook a Strategic Defence Review thatmade substantial but not dramatic changes in Britain�snuclear posture, including reducing the number ofwarheads on Trident missiles. However, Labour hasabandoned its traditional support for unilateraldisarmament, and seems unlikely to implement otherpositions it has recently endorsed, including no-first-use of nuclear weapons. To date, other than anincreased transparency, Labour policies have shownlittle change from their Conservative predecessors.(See Chapter Two, p. 10.)

France is simultaneously reducing its nuclear arse-nal and implementing major upgrades to its remain-

ing systems. Strongly condemned for its 1995-1996series of nuclear tests, France has endeavoured toimprove its international standing. Its support forthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a positive sign;its proposal to create a European nuclear deterrentwas less well received. (See Chapter Three, p. 17.)

Nuclear co-operation between France, the UnitedStates, and the United Kingdom is increasing. Franceand the UK initiated new bilateral working groups onnuclear issues, and France and the US recently signedan agreement increasing their co-operation. Withoutnuclear testing, stockpile stewardship will lead toeven closer co-operation. (See Chapter Four, p. 24.)

NATO has sharply reduced the number of nuclearweapons in Western Europe. However, its doctrine ismoving towards using nuclear weapons to counterthe proliferation of other weapons of mass destruc-tion. The US is pushing NATO to include out-of-areathreats and �nonstate actors�, such as terrorist groups,as targets for nuclear weapons. (See Chapter Five, p.30.)

However, current policies are harmful to Westernsecurity in several ways. First, they are an incentive toproliferators to acquire nuclear, chemical, and bio-logical weapons. As demonstrated by the Gulf War,Western conventional superiority provides the capa-bility to overcome any potential threat. Second,rather than serving as a hedge against a Russianresurgence, reliance on nuclear weapons increases thelikelihood of a renewed threat. Third, the statusconferred to nuclear-weapon states was a majorfactor in the Indian decision to develop its arsenal;Pakistan felt compelled to follow suit. Fourth, therefusal to pursue nuclear disarmament, as agreed inthe nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is leading moreand more nations to question the value of thatregime.

Western European nations should undertake sixsteps to reduce the risks associated with nuclearweapons and to preserve the NPT. These are:

1. Commit to and take programmatic action to-wards the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons;

2. Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons;

7

3. End the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weap-ons and give up the option of wartime nuclearweapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states;

4. Halt first-use policies by France, the UK, andNATO;

5. Include commitments by France and the UK onthe future of their nuclear arsenals in the START IIIcontext;

6. Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduc-tion Programme.

These steps outline a comprehensive nuclear riskreduction strategy for Western Europe. They are alsoimportant to safeguard and strengthen the NPT. Thelist begins with the most important and broadeststeps, and proceeds to less far-reaching initiatives.Most importantly, the last five steps would all followfrom a sincere undertaking of the first. (See ChapterSix, p. 38.)

The six steps closely correspond to many of thecrucial provisions in the New Agenda Coalition�sJune 1998 declaration and 1998 UN First Committeeresolution. That resolution (see Chapter1.3, p. 8, fora description) exposed a growing debate in NATOover the Alliance�s nuclear doctrine. That debate,between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states,may be exposed during the discussions over theAlliance�s Strategic Concept (see Chapters 5.5-5.7,pp. 36-37).

Not included in the list are the traditional, yetimportant, items on the nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament agenda. These include furtherprogress on the bilateral START process, ratificationand entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT), and agreement on a fissile materialproduction cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disar-mament. Russian ratification of START II, which maytake place as this report goes to press, could end thecurrent impasse in bilateral disarmament. For theCTBT and the fissile cut-off, although the vast major-ity of states endorse both goals, each requires sub-stantial progress before it is fully realised. Althougheach of these three steps is significant, none fullyaddress the implications of the end of the Cold War.To strengthen the international non-proliferationregime and to revitalise the disarmament process,new steps must be taken.

The six steps discussed here focus on options forWestern Europe, rather than for all states or all

nuclear-weapon states. Because of the general inter-national focus on US-Russian disarmament, too littleattention is paid to the contribution Western Europecan make. That contribution could be substantial;through direct disarmament and non-proliferationmeasures by European states, through consultationswith and lobbying of the US, and through initiativesto create a more sustainable security policy. The sixsteps described in this report are critical to strength-ening the international non-proliferation regime,advancing disarmament, and creating a new securityenvironment that will allow further progress.

8

Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy

One

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy in Western Europe

However, nuclear doctrine has not changed tomatch the reduced arsenal. NATO, France, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States still rely on a policyallowing first-use of nuclear weapons. As part of itsinterim military doctrine, in 1993 Russia adopted thesame policy. It later conducted the first exercise inwhich Russian forces relied on the first-use of nuclearweapons. Western policy changes have focused onincreasing the flexibility of nuclear arsenals andemployment doctrine. The US plans to use nuclearweapons to counter the perceived threat from chemi-cal or biological weapons, and considers using theatom bomb against �non-state actors�. (See Chapter5.7 on p.36, below). It is also pushing NATO to agreea similar policy. (See Chapter 5.6 on p.35). In thiscontext, NATO is discussing �out of area� nuclear use.

Western Europe must address the policy implica-tions of the end of the Cold War and the nuclear testsin South Asia. Changes are needed in NATO policy,in the EU, and in individual governments, particu-larly France and the United Kingdom. Changes indoctrine should reflect or exceed the dramatic reduc-tions in the size of Western Europe�s nuclear arsenal.

The basis of the changes as Western Europe movestowards nuclear disarmament should be a strategy ofrisk reduction. As stated by a growing number offormer military leaders, including General GeorgeLee Butler, USAF (Ret), head of US strategic nuclearforces from 1991-1994, the risks of retaining nuclearweapons are greater than the risks of eliminatingthem.

A vital component of this risk reduction strategymust be a strategy for dealing with obvious dangerscenarios. Iraq provides a classic example. It pursuednuclear weapons in a secret and massive programdespite international inspections. Yet, in the GulfWar, facing the potential nuclear threat from Iraq,US General Colin Powell made clear that the use ofnuclear weapons was rejected because no suitablerole for them could be found.

Even further, scenarios involving the use of nuclearweapons by the West to respond to threats fromweapons of mass destruction (WMD) may exist, but

Western European nations and institutions shouldundertake a comprehensive review of how to reduceand eliminate the risks associated with nuclear weap-ons. Elements of this review have already begun, withthe announcement by German officials that it wouldraise nuclear strategy issues in NATO. The reviewshould both strengthen the non-proliferation regimeand speed the disarmament process.

The May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistanreturned nuclear weapons to the forefront of interna-tional security concerns. The full impact of the testshas not been realised by the international commu-nity. Even before India tested, the changes in Europe�ssecurity structure demanded a new look at nuclearweapons. The Cold War ended. The Warsaw Pact andthe Soviet Union dissolved. Russia now works withNATO in peacekeeping operations in the formerYugoslavia. The Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-rope (CFE) Treaty substantially reduced the level ofheavy armaments spread across the continent, whileNATO�s Partnership for Peace programme initiatedmilitary co-operation and transparency throughoutand beyond Europe. The biggest exceptions to thegenerally improved security atmosphere have beenthe minimal changes in nuclear doctrine, in bothNATO and Russia, and the continued Russian resent-ment over NATO expansion. This paper will focus onthe former issue.

The size of the nuclear arsenal in Europe hasdecreased dramatically. On NATO�s side, the deploy-ment of US tactical nuclear weapons declined fromabout 7,000 to 180 or less. Within the Alliance, the USwithdrew all its nuclear weapons from the army andfrom naval surface forces, leaving only gravity bombsin Europe. Following the dissolution of the WarsawPact and the Soviet Union, Russia withdrew thou-sands of tactical nuclear weapons from Central andEastern Europe back to its own territory. Many of theweapons are now stored centrally and await dis-mantlement. The UK retired its air-based nuclearsystems and relies only on nuclear missile subma-rines. France dismantled its land-based nuclear-armedmissiles. These changes have substantially reducedthe nuclear threat to Europe, making deliberate all-out nuclear war almost inconceivable.

9

they do not constitute �worst cases�. The worst casescenario is one in which, for political, environmen-tal, economic, or humanitarian reasons, nuclearweapons cannot be used to respond to a real threat.The West should consider how its attachment tonuclear weapons hinders the development of othermilitary and especially political mechanisms thatcan effectively limit the proliferation of WMD andreduce these threats.

1.1 Outline

This report has two sections. The first provides anin-depth description of the status of nuclear doctrineand arsenals in France, the United Kingdom, andNATO. A detailed summary of current nuclear co-operation between France, the United Kingdom, andthe United States is also provided. Changes since theend of the Cold War, along with information on newgovernments� future policies and plans, are high-lighted.

The second section focuses on recommendationsfor action. These recommendations outline a com-prehensive strategy of nuclear risk reduction forWestern Europe. Steps include committing to elimi-nation, de-alerting nuclear forces, ending deploy-ment of tactical nuclear weapons, undertaking no-first-use policies, British and French commitmentslinked to START III, and initiating a European Co-operative Threat Reduction programme.

1.2 Decision Points

For Western Europe, NATO and the NPT are thetwo critical forums for discussion and action onnuclear issues. Each arena is at a critical stage.Following a commitment made in the NATO-RussiaFounding Act in 1996 and a decision taken at the1997 Madrid Summit, NATO is in the process ofrevising its Strategic Concept, the guiding politicalvision for the Alliance. NATO is expected to approvethe new version at the Alliance�s April 1999 Summitin Washington. The 1995 decision to make the NPTpermanent was dependent on agreeing a new reviewprocess that is still developing. The 2000 ReviewConference will substantially determine the successof the new process. Within these two processes, thefuture role of nuclear weapons in European securitywill be decided.

1.3 Cracks in the Foundation?

The traditional Western consensus on nuclearissues has held up well, even in the post-Cold Warera. However, there are signs that this consensuscould be evolving or breaking up. The previousAustralian government mandated the prestigiousCanberra Commission's report on the elimination ofnuclear weapons, which recommended immediatesteps towards elimination.1 The US National Acad-emy of Sciences� Committee on International Secu-rity and Arms Control�s report The Future of US NuclearWeapons Policy also called for dramatic reductions innuclear posture.2 On 8 July 1996, the InternationalCourt of Justice released an advisory opinion, whichstated that the use or threat of use of nuclear weaponswas generally illegal.3 Partly because of that opinion,the Canadian parliament is undertaking an in-depthevaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in itssecurity policy.

There are changes in Western Europe as well. Afternearly two decades of Conservative rule, the LabourParty took power in the UK in 1997. Although theLabour Party abandoned its support for unilateraldisarmament, once in government it implemented aStrategic Defence Review that recommended signifi-cant (but far from dramatic) changes in Britishnuclear posture and policy. France eliminated itssmall land-based nuclear arsenal, and together withthe UK, deposited its instruments of ratification tothe CTBT, the first nuclear-weapon states to do so.

Social Democrats and Greens won the Federalelections in Germany in 1998, and Social Democratic-led coalitions now govern the four biggest EuropeanNATO members. The new German government hasstated that it would like to see a discussion of nuclearpolicy in NATO, including the Alliance's doctrineallowing first-use of nuclear weapons. (See Chapter6.4 on p. 46 below.)

The EU recently circulated a memorandum at theUN General Assembly, recommending further nucleardisarmament steps. Within the EU, some states, inparticular Ireland, Sweden, and Austria, have beenmore pro-active in calling for further steps to advancenuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The New Agenda Coalition

In June 1998, Ireland led a group of eight states,comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zeland,

10


Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden, which issued adeclaration calling for immediate progress on nucleardisarmament.

At the 1998 UN General Assembly�s First Commit-tee on disarmament, Ireland, Sweden, and 32 otherstates, introduced a resolution following on from theJune 1998 eight-nation declaration. The resolutioncalled on the nuclear-weapon states

to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to thespeedy and total elimination of their respectivenuclear weapons and without delay to pursue ingood faith and bring to a conclusion negotiationsleading to the elimination of these weapons,thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VIof the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT).4

It also called for the integration of all five nuclear-weapon states into the nuclear disarmament process,for �de-alerting� nuclear forces and for a forum at theConference on Disarmament (CD) to �deal withnuclear disarmament�. (See Chapter 6.2 on p.42below on de-alerting, and Chapter 6.1 on p.39 on theCD.) Significantly, the June declaration�s call for anend to nuclear first-use policies was replaced by a callfor �measures to enhance strategic stability�, includ-ing a review of strategic doctrines. This last point wasa clear reference to NATO�s review of its StrategicConcept. Dropping the no-first-use call was an effortto draw support from Alliance countries, as NATOpolicy still retains the option of first-use. (See Chap-ter 4 on p.24 below.)

That effort was successful. The three Westernnuclear-weapon states lobbied heavily against theresolution, pushing NATO members in particular tovote �no�. Despite this pressure, every non-nuclear-weapon state in NATO except Turkey abstained.Most of the 19 states that voted against the resolutionwere either nuclear-weapon states (except China,which abstained), new NATO members, or statesapplying to become NATO members. This vote clearlyindicates a growing divide between the nuclear- andnon-nuclear-weapon states within NATO on nucleardisarmament.

These developments, however, only begin toaddress the full implications of the end of the ColdWar. This report outlines a variety of steps thatWestern European countries and institutions should

take to reduce the risks associated with nuclearweapons. As the world approaches the newmillennium, it is time to develop an internationalsecurity regime that does not rely on weapons thatcan end the new era before it begins.

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy

11

Two

The United Kingdom

In the Defence Review, the Government estimatedthe total lifetime costs of the Trident programme at£12.52 billion (approximately US$20.03 billion). Itestimated the annual running cost of the submarineprogramme at around £280 million (US$448 million)during its thirty-year life, with another £400 million(US$640 million) annually for the warhead and fissilematerial program. However, other recent statementsfrom the Government indicate that spending onnuclear weapons is substantially higher than thosefigures.7

2.1 Nuclear Posture

Since the end of the Cold War, the previousGovernment made a number of reductions in Britishnuclear forces. Some of these steps inevitably resultedfrom or were linked to the 1991 US unilateral decisionto reduce substantially both the types and numbersof nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. These reduc-tions were highlighted in the Defence Review:

Since 1992, the United Kingdom has given up:

� the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roleswe undertook previously with US nuclearweapons held under dual-key arrangements;

� our maritime tactical nuclear capability, sothat Royal Navy surface ships no longer haveany capability to carry or deploy nuclearweapons;

� all of our air-launched nuclear weapons.8

The last point refers to the withdrawal of the WE-177 gravity bomb from active service, which wascompleted on 31 March 1998. With that withdrawal,the UK now deploys the Trident as its sole nuclearcapability. Three Trident submarines, HMS Vanguard,HMS Victorious, and HMS Vigilant are already inservice.9 The fourth and final submarine, HMS Ven-geance, was launched in September 1998 and is sched-uled for active deployment around the turn of thecentury.10

In the Defence Review, the Government announcedthat it would �maintain fewer than 200 operationallyavailable nuclear warheads, a reduction of one third

The nuclear arsenal of the United Kingdom is thesmallest of the five declared nuclear-weapon states.1

Since the inception of the British nuclear programmein the 1940s, the UK has seen nuclear weapons as away of maintaining its international standing. In the1990s, British perceptions continue to link nuclearweapons with retaining the UK�s status as a perma-nent member of the United Nations Security Counciland as a major player in NATO and Europe.

However, since the end of the Cold War, publicsupport has grown steadily in the UK for the elimina-tion of nuclear weapons. The UK Government evencited a recent opinion poll on the subject. Parliamen-tary Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign andCommonwealth Office, Baroness Symons of VernhamDean, told the House of Lords: �In the Gallup Pollwhich was conducted in October this year [1997],87% of those questioned supported negotiations toprohibit nuclear weapons. We pay close attention tothat�.2 The same poll found that 59% of thosequestioned thought it was best for the security oftheir community if Britain did not have nuclearweapons, and 54% supported immediate steps towithdraw Trident nuclear warheads from deploy-ment at sea and place them in storage.3

The new UK Government, however, has been clearthat it intends to retain Trident. In July 1998, theGovernment released the results of its 13-month longStrategic Defence Review.4 The Defence Review in-cluded a series of decisions affecting the size andstructure of the British nuclear forces, includingreductions in the arsenal. Yet the new Governmentmade clear the terms of the Defence Review before itstarted: the UK would retain the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile system. The Defence Reviewstated the reasons for keeping Trident:

[I]n present conditions nuclear deterrence still hasan important contribution to make in insuringagainst the re-emergence of major strategic militarythreats, in preventing nuclear coercion, and inpreserving peace and stability in Europe.5

It also noted that the Government needed �toensure that [Trident] can remain an effective deter-rent for up to 30 years�.6

12

Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction The United Kingdom

from the previous government�s plans�.11 Each Tri-dent submarine will carry 48 warheads. This is areduction from the previous government�s policy ofa ceiling of 96. In parliamentary questioning, theGovernment also announced that under the previousgovernment the normal load of warheads on eachsubmarine was 60. It added that,

12 warheads are to be removed from each of thethree Trident submarines currently in service duringtheir next programmed docking in the warheadfitting facility at Coulport. This process will becompleted before the end of the year.12

The 200 warheads will exclude �missile warheadsheld as a necessary processing margin or for technicalsurveillance purposes�.13

Each UK Trident submarine can carry up to 16Trident II D5 missiles, which are manufactured andserviced in the United States. The UK�s atomic weap-ons establishment produces the warheads for Tri-dent. They are closely based on the design of the USTrident warhead, W76, with a yield of approximately100 kilotons.14

The number of Trident II D5 missiles that the UKwill purchase from the US was also reduced in theDefence Review to 58. The UK�s earlier planningassumption, inherited from the previous govern-ment, was that in addition to the 51 missiles alreadypurchased, it would buy a further seven missiles inFY1998 and seven in FY1999, bringing the total to 65.The Government proceeded with the first order ofseven missiles for FY1998, but announced that the 58missiles thus purchased �are sufficient to maintain acredible deterrent�.15 Of those, six have already beentest-fired, there are plans for eight more tests, andfour are set aside for a processing margin, leavingonly 40 missiles for deployment.16

As part of the Defence Review, the Governmentstated that it would maintain the capacity to pro-duce a follow-on to the Trident nuclear programme,noting �it would be premature to abandon a mini-mum capability to design and produce a successor toTrident should this prove necessary�.17 This allowsfor producing a new nuclear warhead, one thatwould have to be produced without nuclear testing.The UK would probably need to increase co-opera-tion with the French and US stockpile stewardship

programmes to achieve this goal. (See Chapter Fouron nuclear co-ooperation on p. 24 below.)

2.2 Nuclear Doctrine

The UK�s Trident submarines are assigned toNATO to be used for the defence of the Alliance�except where the UK government may decide thatsupreme national interests are at stake�.18 Tridentwas originally intended to provide the UK with anindependent strategic nuclear capability to deter theSoviet Union. After the Cold War, the previousGovernment adapted Trident�s rationale to deterringa �potential aggressor� from threatening British �vi-tal interests�.

With the withdrawal of the UK�s WE-177 free-fallbombs, Trident was also assigned a �sub-strategic�nuclear role, defined as the capability to carry out a�more limited nuclear strike�.19 According to theDefence Review, this limited strike �would not lead toa full-scale nuclear exchange�.20

The new Labour Government affirmed that it fullysupports �NATO policy on the continuing require-ment for a sub-strategic capability as a crucial ele-ment of credible deterrence. In extreme circumstancesof self-defence, such a capability would allow thelimited use of nuclear weapons to send an aggressora political message of the Alliance�s resolve to defenditself�.21 Such an aggressor could be Russia or ahostile state with access to WMD.

Perceived Threats from WMD

Like the US and NATO, in recent years the UK hasplaced greater emphasis on deterring potentialproliferators of WMD as a rationale for retainingnuclear weapons.22 In 1993, Secretary of State forDefence Malcolm Rifkind posed the question: �Would. . . the possible use of chemical or biological weaponsagainst us be seen as justifying the threat of ournuclear weapons?�. Rifkind�s answer was to emphasisethat the UK provided its negative security assurances(NSAs) in a context in which �we attach ever increas-ing importance to the Biological and Chemical Weap-ons Conventions�.23

British policy on the use of nuclear weapons todeter proliferators of WMD remains ambiguous.Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Dr John Reid,

13

described the new Government�s approach to thethreat of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation:

The role of deterrence... must not be overlooked.Even if a potential aggressor has developed missileswith the range to strike at the United Kingdom,and nuclear, biological or chemical warheads to bedelivered by those means, he would have to consider� he would do well to consider � the possibleconsequences of such an attack... It seems unlikelythat a dictator who was willing to strike anothercountry with weapons of mass destruction wouldbe so trusting as to feel entirely sure that thatcountry would not respond with the power at itsdisposal.24

Even more recently, when asked in the House ofLords about nuclear retaliation �in the case of aggres-sor states contemplating the use of chemical andbiological weapons�, Lord Hoyle responded for theGovernment:

The use of chemical or biological weapons by anystate would be a grave breach of international law.A state which chose to use chemical or biologicalweapons against the United Kingdom shouldexpect us to exercise our right of self defence and tomake a proportionate response.25

These statements move UK policy towards USdoctrine, although it appears that the UK is creatinga distinction that the US does not, between the use ofchemical or biological weapons and their posses-sion.26

This policy appears to contradict the negativesecurity assurances (NSAs) stated in the DefenceReview, that the UK,

will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state not in material breach of itsnuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless itattacks us, our Allies or a state to which we havea security commitment, in association or alliancewith a nuclear weapon state.27

The UK issued a similar assurance in 1995, duringthe run-up to the NPT Conference. France, Russia,and the United States issued almost identical decla-rations, whereas China reiterated its pledge never touse nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weaponstates. The assurance was part of the West's successfuleffort to make the NPT permanent.

2.3 Alert status

The Defence Review announced some changes inthe operational posture of the Trident submarineforce:

The new strategic environment also enables us tomaintain our nuclear forces at reduced readiness:

� only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol atany time;

� the submarines are routinely at a �notice to fire�measured in days rather than the few minutes�quick reaction alert sustained throughout the ColdWar. Their missiles are de-targeted;

� submarines on patrol will carry out a variety ofsecondary tasks, without compromising their secu-rity, including hydrographic data collection, equip-ment trials and exercises with other vessels;

� over time we plan to reduce from double to singlecrews for each submarine, reflecting reduced opera-tional tempo.28

The first point is not a change from previousoperating procedure. In fact, until recently only twoTridents were available. With necessary maintenancetime, it was impossible to maintain more than oneon patrol. The four-boat Trident fleet is intended toensure that the UK �can maintain continuous patrolsand a continuously-available sub-strategic capabil-ity throughout the life of the Trident force�.29 Withfour submarines, the UK can retain three submarinesin the operational patrol cycle even when one is inrefit or out of service. This capability could allow theUK to maintain two boats on patrol much of the timeif it so chose (although it rarely if ever has done so inthe past). In this sense, the UK is intentionallyrestricting its capability by limiting patrols to one. Atthe same time, this policy does not preclude the UKfrom deploying another Trident for something otherthan deterrent patrol.

The second point could have important implica-tions for all nuclear forces globally, but the lack ofdetails about the �notice to fire� status leaves openimportant questions. Most importantly, UK officialshave stated that this status will not be verifiable. It isalso unclear if this is an entirely new policy. Before therelease of the Defence Review, the Government saidthat there has not been �any change in the UK�spolicy of maintaining continuous deterrent patrols�since the election. It added that submarines on patrol

14


are �at a reduced alert state reflecting improvedstrategic conditions�.30

Keeping one crew for each submarine will reducethe operating costs of Trident. It reflects the decreasedneed for maintaining the high levels of alert typicalin the post-Cold War era.

The previous government took other steps onalert status. Following a bilateral agreement betweenthe UK and Russia in 1994, UK nuclear weapons areno longer targeted at any country.31 However it ispossible �quickly to restore operational targets to themissiles should the need arise�.32

As part of Defence Review, the UK rejected otherde-alerting steps, such as removing warheads frommissiles. Baroness Symons informed the House ofLords of the UK position on this issue:

We believe that to detach warheads from missileswould be impractical...because of the nature of ourdeterrent. As Trident is a single submarine-basedsystem, there would be significant difficulties indetaching our warheads from missiles whilemaintaining the credible deterrent to which HerMajesty�s Government are committed...33

2.4 Fissile Materials

As part of the Defence Review, the UK Govern-ment increased the level of information it providesabout stocks of fissile materials and, for the first time,placed materials under international safeguards.Claiming to be the first nuclear-weapon state to doso, the Defence Review reported that the total fissilestocks for the UK included:

� 7.6 tonnes of plutonium;

� 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium; and

� 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium.

Much of this stock is no longer required for defencepurposes, and 4.4 tonnes of plutonium, including0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, and over9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium willnow be placed under European Atomic EnergyCommunity (EURATOM) safeguards, and madeliable to inspection by the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA).34

Russia and the United States have already madesome of their fissile stocks liable to IAEA inspection.

2.5 New Labour in Government

Since the overwhelming election victory of TonyBlair�s New Labour Party on 1 May 1997, a number oftrends in Labour�s thinking on defence have becomeapparent. Most importantly, the Blair governmenthas been keen to align itself with the Clinton Admin-istration. The UK has always regarded its �specialrelationship� with the US as providing increasedstatus for the UK in international affairs.

The Blair government has already shown itself tobe one of the Clinton Administration�s strongestsupporters on defence matters. In the run up toNATO�s Madrid summit in July 1997, the UK was themost enthusiastic supporter of the US position onadmitting only the Czech Republic, Poland, andHungary in the first round of NATO enlargement.Likewise, the UK has been the strongest supporter ofthe Clinton Administration�s stance on the use offorce against Iraq.

The New Government and Nuclear Weapons

The Labour Government came to power on aplatform committed to retaining Trident, but also topressing for �multilateral negotiations towards mu-tual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclearweapons�. The Labour Party Manifesto continues,�when satisfied with verified progress towards ourgoal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons,we will ensure that British nuclear weapons areincluded in multilateral negotiations�.35 This state-ment is repeated in the Defence Review and elsewhere.

The Government has yet to publish any morespecific plans for its implementation. In fact, theDefence Review makes clear the UK Governmentbelief that it has done all it can or should:

Our own arsenal, following the further reductionsdescribed above, is the minimum necessary toprovide for our security for the foreseeable futureand very much smaller than those of the majornuclear powers. Considerable further reductions inthe latter would be needed before further Britishreductions could become feasible.36

15

2.6 Labour Party Policies and theStrategic Defence Review

Before the 1996 election, the Labour Party pub-lished its policies on defence and security in A FreshStart for Britain: Labour�s Strategy for Britain in the ModernWorld. The document stated:

We...want to see a new commitment to transparencyby the nuclear weapon states. As a starting pointthe nuclear weapon states should declare theirexisting inventories of plutonium and highlyenriched uranium to the IAEA, and open to inspectiontheir nuclear production facilities.

Labour in government will work for:

� a freeze on nuclear warhead numbers. As a firststep we will ensure that Trident carries no morewarheads than Polaris.

� an internationally verifiable ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty and a negotiated Fissile MaterialCut-Off Convention.

� a negotiated, multilateral no first use agreementamongst the nuclear weapons states andstrengthened security assurances to non-nuclearweapon states in the form of an internationallegally-binding treaty.

� further international measures to assist thecountries of the former Soviet Union with thedismantling of their nuclear weapons and toimprove safety standards at their nuclear basesand civil nuclear power stations.37

A Fresh Start for Britain followed an earlier state-ment by Robin Cook, when he was Shadow ForeignSecretary, which included a ten-point programme�that a Labour Government would have taken toNew York� for the NPT Conference of 1995. In addi-tion to the points contained in A Fresh Start for Britain,the ten-point programme advocated:

� A nuclear weapons register. The nuclear weaponsstates should declare their holdings on a verifiableNuclear Weapons Register under the auspices ofthe United Nations...

� Respect for nuclear weapons-free zones. Regionalnuclear weapons-free zones established byinternational agreement should be respected bythe nuclear weapons states in peacetime... Oursecurity interests are served by encouraging theirdevelopment, not flouting them.

� Regular disarmament reports to the UnitedNations. In order to sustain the momentum fordisarmament, each of the nuclear weaponsstates should be obliged to lodge regular reportswith the UN Secretary-General outlining whatsteps they have taken to fulfil their obligationsunder Article VI.38

The Defence Review addressed many of theseissues, but largely ignored others. Although theDefence Review was intended to be �foreign policyled�, the process was similar to previous Britishdefence reviews, with first drafts being prepared byMinistry of Defence (MoD) civil servants. Initially,the Defence Review sought to establish a �policybaseline�, looking first at the UK�s commitments andinterests as a country, in Europe, and then morewidely, in order to reassess essential security interestsand defence needs.39 The Defence Review then exam-ined possible missions for British forces, militarytasks, future force structures and capabilities, pro-curement, and a wide range of efficiency-relatedissues.40

The Defence Review did increase British transpar-ency about its nuclear stocks. However, while repro-cessing of spent fuel from defence reactors atChapelcross will be under safeguards and liable tointernational inspection, other defence nuclear facili-ties �will remain outside international supervision�.41

Furthermore, the Government reserved the right toconduct future reprocessing outside safeguards untilagreement is reached on a fissile material cut-off.42 Italso pointed out that maintaining �a degree ofuncertainty about our precise capabilities is a neces-sary element of credible deterrence�.43

To meet its pledge to �ensure that Trident carriesno more warheads than Polaris�, the Government cutthe number of warheads on Trident to 48 per subma-rine. While Polaris was originally deployed with 48warheads, a later version, Chevaline, carried only32.44 More importantly, this cut does not take intoaccount the fact that the two or three warheads oneach Polaris missile could only hit one target. Inaddition to far greater range and substantially in-creased accuracy, each warhead on Trident is inde-pendently targetable. Rather than hitting just 16targets with 16 missiles, as Polaris could do, Tridentcan hit 48.

16


Since the election, the UK moved quickly to ratifythe CTBT, and together with France deposited itsinstruments of ratification on 6 April 1998. There hasbeen no progress on the Fissile Material Cut-OffConvention.

Perhaps the biggest failure in the Defence Reviewwas the lack of mention of no-first-use. While existingnegative security assurances provided by the UK aredescribed, no-first-use is not discussed. UK officialshave confirmed that a no-first-use policy was consid-ered during the Review, but set aside, at least for thepresent. The probable explanation is two-fold. First,there may have been internal opposition, particu-larly within the Ministry of Defence. Second, the UKwould face strong resistance from some NATO allies,in particular the US and France. As British nuclearweapons are committed to NATO, it is difficult forthe government to endorse publicly a policy that theAlliance currently rejects.

Little if any mention is made of efforts to assistRussia and countries of the former Soviet Union indismantling their nuclear arsenals, although men-tion is made of considering whether the UK �canassist Russia in dismantling the vast stocks of chemi-cal weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union�.45

There is no discussion of a nuclear weaponsregister in the Defence Review, or of reports to the UNon steps to fulfil the commitments under Article VI ofthe NPT on nuclear disarmament. While support fornuclear-weapon-free zones is included, no changesare made to previous policy.46

2.8 UK Stance on Disarmament at the UN

The new Government has only made marginalchanges on its stance on disarmament at the UN. Atthe UN First Committee in November 1997 and againin 1998, the UK voted against a resolution fromMalaysia endorsing the �Advisory Opinion of theInternational Court of Justice on the Legality of theThreat or Use of Nuclear weapons�. However, unlikeits predecessor, the new Government both timesabstained on (rather than opposed) Operative Para-graph 1 of the resolution, which underlined,

the unanimous conclusion of the InternationalCourt of Justice that there exists an obligation topursue in good faith and bring to a conclusionnegotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in

all its aspects under strict and effective internationalcontrol.47

Following the vote in 1997, UK Ambassador IanSoutar explained the UK position:

We welcome the recognition of the importance ofobligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty,including the nuclear weapons states� obligationson nuclear disarmament, by the InternationalCourt of Justice�s Advisory Opinion on the Legalityof the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. But giventhat the draft resolution contains highly selectivequotations from the Court�s Advisory Opinion, theUnited Kingdom will abstain from operativeparagraph 1 of draft resolution L.37.48

The US and France, along with Russia, Israel, andMonaco, voted against the paragraph. Turkey ab-stained, while the remaining NATO countries votedin favour.

The new UK Government has distinguished itselffrom its predecessor by welcoming the InternationalCourt of Justice�s (ICJ�s) ruling on the nuclear-weaponstates obligations on nuclear disarmament. How-ever, the Government also states that,

the ICJ opinion does not require a change in theUnited Kingdom�s entirely defensive deterrencepolicy. We would only ever consider the use ofnuclear weapons in the extreme circumstance ofself-defence which includes the defence of ourNATO allies. The court was unable to concludedefinitively whether the threat or use of nuclearweapons would be lawful or unlawful in anextreme circumstance of self-defence in which thevery survival of the state would be at stake.49

Operative Paragraph 2 of the 1997 resolutioncalled on all states to fulfil the obligation to nucleardisarmament by,

commencing multilateral negotiations in 1998leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear-weaponsconvention prohibiting the development,production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons andproviding for their elimination.50

The UK voted against this paragraph and theresolution as a whole because of the �selective�quotations from the Court�s Advisory Opinion and�on account of the unrealistic call, in operative

17

paragraph 2, for multilateral negotiations in 1998leading to an early conclusion of a Nuclear WeaponsConvention�.51 In this case, NATO countries andRussia were firmly opposed, although EU membersIreland, Sweden, and Finland abstained. Like itspredecessor, the new UK Government seems likely tosupport the nuclear-weapon states� line against mul-tilateral negotiations, despite its own policy state-ments indicating support for the multilateral nucleardisarmament process.

The UK also voted against a resolution from Egyptthat called for the principle of transparency (as in theUN Register of conventional arms) to be applied toweapons of mass destruction. The resolution re-quested,

the Secretary-General to seek the views of MemberStates on ways and means of enhancingtransparency in the fields of weapons of massdestruction and transfers of equipment andtechnologies directly related to the developmentand manufacture of such weapons...52

This vote indicates that although the UK hasstated that it is considering greater transparency onnuclear warhead numbers in its Strategic DefenceReview, the prospects for UK support for a nuclearweapons register are not good.

Finally, as described in Chapter 1.3 above, in1998, the UK not only voted against the Irish-led NewAgenda Coalition resolution at the First Committeeon nuclear disarmament, but it lobbied other statesto vote �no� as well.

2.9 Conclusion

Although the election of a Labour Government inthe UK suggested the possibility of progress on arange of nuclear disarmament issues, the newGovernment�s approach has been similar in practiceto that of the previous government. The StrategicDefence Review made important but not astonishingchanges in British nuclear posture and doctrine. TheDefence Reviews steps on transparency and safe-guarding fissile materials deserve praise, and thereductions in arsenal are a significant step in the rightdirection. Yet the UK�s stance on disarmament issuesin the UN First Committee and the CD has notchanged as much as the Labour Party�s pre-electionstatements suggested they would. Nor does the De-

fence Review even begin to deal with the implicationsof India and Pakistan�s nuclear tests.

The current Government wishes to be seen as�strong on defence� and is still concerned to distanceitself from Labour�s earlier �unilateralist� policies.The reduction to only one nuclear system is animportant step, but one decided by the previousgovernment. Labour policy on retaining Trident hastaken precedence over its historical support for nucleardisarmament. The UK is also keen to position itself asa key US ally and supporter of NATO, reiterating itssupport for NATO nuclear policies.

The UK can make significant contributions to thenuclear arms control process. Measures to reduce thealert status of Trident missiles are worthy of merit, yetneed verifiability to make them truly appreciable.Officials have said the UK will not push the no-first-use issue, but it is unclear if that decision will changein light of the new German position. (See Chapter 6.4on p. 46.) Any significant progress in disarmamentwill depend on the willingness of Labour Ministers topursue these policies despite opposition from civilservants and pressure from the Defence Ministries ofother NATO members, in particular the United States.

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Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction France

Three

France

French nuclear weapons policy and doctrine haveremained remarkably stable and consistent through-out the past 30 years, through periods of governmentunder right wing, centrist and socialist parties. Theend of the Cold War has seen no great change inpolicy or doctrine. However, the position has notbeen completely static during the 1990s. Franceended its international isolation on nuclear weaponsquestions: joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty; re-cently ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;reducing its deployed nuclear forces and greatlyscaling down plans for future forces. France has alsobegun to co-operate on a more formal level on bothtechnical and doctrinal nuclear issues, particularlywith the UK, but with the United States as well. Therehave also been French initiatives for theEuropeanisation of French and British nuclear forces� most notably in the concept of �concerted deter-rence�.

3.1 French Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

Since the 1970s, French nuclear doctrine has re-mained almost immutable. Even now, under a GaullistPresident with a Socialist-led coalition governmentthat includes Greens and Communists, nuclear weap-ons continue to play a central role in French defencepolicy. French strategists and analysts have contin-ued to support the consensus on French nucleardoctrine even following the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War doctrine talked of deterrence �dufaible au fort�, from the weak to the strong. Thisconsisted essentially of being able to inflict enoughdamage on any potential aggressor � for all practicalpurposes the Soviet Union � to mean that an attackon France would not be worthwhile.

In the early 1990s, the Gulf War highlighted theneed to deter potential nuclear threats from ThirdWorld proliferators. This led to an active debate onthe concept of deterrence �du faible au fou� � from theweak to the mad. Disguised behind this amusing playon words was a serious debate which followed closelythe US debate on counter-proliferation and the use ofnuclear weapons in the Third World. Many politicalfigures, military, and academic experts advocated

this major shift in policy. However, President FrançoisMitterrand refused to accept their arguments and inthe publication of the 1994 White Paper on Defence (thefirst such paper since 1972) the more traditionaldoctrine was reconfirmed.

It is interesting to note that the 1994 White Paperconfirms the traditional doctrine while acknowledg-ing that the international situation has changedfundamentally:

For the first time in its history, France does not facea direct military threat near its borders. Howevernew risks can affect its security and its defence...No one denies that the main and global threat �direct, concrete and measurable � that threatenedour vital interest, has vanished today and probablyfor a long time.1

Thus admitting that a strategic reassessment isneeded, the White Paper delivers the following threatassessment:

1) The global Soviet threat has disappeared.Nevertheless, in Europe, Russia will remain astrong military power, which must be taken assuch in our strategic evaluation. Moreover, local orregional crises, which might degenerate intoconventional wars, may challenge the shift of thecontinent toward a new equilibrium.

More broadly, the main risk on security lies now inregional conflicts which could challenge the researchof international stability.

2) The level of military equipment of a number ofregional powers should rise not only in the field ofconventional weapons, but also, given proliferation,in the field of weapons of mass destruction,including nuclear weapons, by the beginning of thenext century.2

Chapter Four of the White Paper discusses thedeveloping role of nuclear deterrence in French secu-rity policy. The introduction makes it clear that the�future of deterrence� is at the heart of the rethinkingof French strategy after the Cold War. The WhitePaper states later that the French choice to become anuclear power had two motivations: �the wish to

19

response with nuclear forces and a third mentionsdeterrence. They include:

Scenario No. 2

This scenario looks at the possibility of a regionalcrisis threatening Europe at some point over thetwenty years from 1994 and involving a nuclearpower that could draw in France through a threat tovital interests. Such a situation could arise in Europeor �in a longer time-frame, in the Mediterranean, theNear and Middle East.�

The White Paper states, �A deterrent manoeuvre,adapted to this particular context, might be neces-sary to accompany our decision to intervene�. How-ever, it rejects any idea of fighting a nuclear battle,stating that the threat of use of nuclear weaponswould be used purely to deter such threats as poten-tial ballistic missile attacks, nuclear blackmail, airattacks, and others.

Scenario No. 3

Scenario 3 covers the possibility of attack onFrance�s overseas territories. It states that these terri-tories are covered by nuclear deterrence withoutgiving any details.

It is clear from this description of French nucleardoctrine that nuclear weapons remain at the heart ofFrench defence policy. While nuclear doctrine wasmodified to reflect changing strategic circumstances,it remains a defensive concept. For France, nuclearweapons are not a tool for power projection, but forthe defence of the nation and of vital interests.

Scenario No. 6

Again over a twenty-year timescale, this scenariolooks at the risk of the re-emergence of a major threatin Europe. While admitting that this scenario looksvery unlikely, the White Paper states that such a riskcannot be completely dismissed. The likelihood ofthe resurgence of such a threat is said to be linked todevelopments in European security structures.

Such resurgence would mean the use of France�snuclear deterrent to prevent the use of nuclear forces.If that failed, then France would have to be preparedto use nuclear forces � potentially even far fromFrench soil � alongside its allies.

preserve our vital interests against threats from thestrongest countries; the desire to assure in all circum-stances our independence and freedom of politicalaction.�3

The first of these reasons is then stated to havebecome much less important, while the second hasincreased in importance. Independence of action iscentrally linked to the possession of nuclear weap-ons:

The possession of independent nuclear weapons,adapted as necessary to the strategic risks that mayappear in the years to come, will remain anessential means for France to provide the margin offreedom of action which she needs to defend herinterests. National independence, in future Europeanindependence, will without doubt be attached tothe possession of such arms.4

The White Paper acknowledges that the role ofconventional forces will be much more important inthe future, and that there needs to be a new balancein French strategic thinking between nuclear andconventional forces. However, the introduction tothe section on nuclear deterrence states the role ofnuclear weapons in traditional terms:

Nuclear deterrence rests on the perception by anyadversary of the unacceptable risks they run in anaggression against our country, out of all proportionto what might be gained by conflict.5

Nuclear weapons are �reserved for the protectionof our vital interests, whatever the origin or form ofthe threat to them.�6 The final warning � France�ssub-strategic nuclear forces � can be used to �mark, atthe appropriate time, in diverse situations, the limitsof our vital interests and to recall without ambiguityour determination�.7

Finally, to achieve these objectives the White Paperstates that French nuclear forces have to be able to�strike, inflicting unacceptable damage� and make alimited strike against military objectives as a finalwarning.8 Furthermore, to be credible these forcesmust be mixed and flexible, and technically mustkeep pace with any potential adversary.

The White Paper then goes on to list scenarios forthese threats to France. Two of these involve a

20


3.2 Shifting defence priorities andresources

While France did not undergo any major shift innuclear doctrine, there has been a substantial reallo-cation of procurement resources during the 1990s.Accompanying the downsizing in nuclear forces, thedelays in procurement programmes, and weaponscancellations, there has been a conscious effort toboost capabilities in other areas, most particularly inspace based intelligence gathering. The aim of thiseffort is to provide full independence of action, inEurope or further afield. This is to be achieved at threelevels: the strategic, or the national defence level; theoperational, or at the theatre level; and the tactical,or the level of troops on the ground.

While dating from earlier in the decade, the WhitePaper laid out perspectives for this development incapability. In a section entitled �Priorities in NewCapabilities�, intelligence gathering is identified asespecially vital in a newly uncertain strategic envi-ronment. It is identified as a strategic asset and anessential part of French defence strategy. The WhitePaper identifies a series of procurement objectivesthat must be met in order to equip France with thenecessary intelligence gathering capability:

As concerns investment in technical and equipmentresources, the main orientations are the following:

� support the development of space assets withthe HELIOS family of optical observationsatellites, as well as associated electronicsystems;

� engage in programmes of radar and listeningobservation satellites;

� renew electronic warfare assets at three levels[listed above];

� follow through the modernisation anddevelopment of intelligence organisations.9

The role of the new intelligence capabilities is toprovide early warning of crises and intelligence dur-ing crises to allow France to act independently.Further, they will be used to allow France to verifyimplementation of arms control and disarmamenttreaties.

For the twenty-year perspective of the White Paper,the intelligence effort will be a national one. There is

no merging of European capabilities foreseen. How-ever, as in all else in the White Paper, there is aEuropean perspective, which would see

the development of co-operation already underwaysuch as common construction and use of space,aerial, sea and terrestrial assets in the fields ofelectromagnetic observation, transmission and,perhaps in the future, interception.10

These new priorities in defence policy have led toa shift in budgetary priorities. In short, although theFrench defence budget has remained roughly stable,money allocated to the procurement of nuclearweapons has declined, while that allocated to theresearch, development, and procurement of space-based intelligence assets has dramatically increased.For example, the budget for Research, Developmentand Studies for Space increased by more than 60%between 1991 and 1996 to 3.9 billion francs (US$624million). Similarly, the procurement budget increasedin leaps and bounds � by 17.5% in 1992, by 13.3% in1993, by 13.8% in 1994, and by 11.7% in 1995-96.11

Having fallen during 1997 because of general defencecuts, the budget is growing in 1998 by 10%.

France recently deployed HELIOS I, a visual obser-vation satellite, and will soon launch HELIOS II, aninfrared observation satellite, and then the HORUSradar observation satellite. These are all co-operativeprogrammes, notably with Italy, Spain, and Ger-many. Staff at the Western European Satellite Centreat Torrejon have said that the HELIOS satellite greatlyincreased their capabilities.

Since 1989, this decline in the procurement bud-get for nuclear weapons has been of the order of56.6% in constant 1997 francs. The reorientation toincreases in the space budget began in 1992. It shouldbe noted that this is not a straight swap of money.The nuclear budget remains much larger than thespace budget, at some 11 billion francs (US$1.76billion).

3.3 French nuclear forces

France is downsizing and modernising its nuclearforces, both to allow it to match the doctrine andposture requirements described above, and to pro-vide a nuclear force that France can afford.Programmes are constantly being delayed and pro-curement numbers reduced. It is likely, for budgetary

21

reasons, that this trend will continue. It is worthnoting that since France entered the nuclear arena,no projected five-year military procurement plan hasbeen fulfilled. Even at the height of the Cold War,spending was below projections. However, this doesnot mean that France will abandon nuclear weaponsin the near future. In a 1997 defence budget report,Jean Michel Boucheron (the rapporteur and a mem-ber of the majority Socialist Party) explained why:

Since it is impossible to foresee the evolution of thegeostrategic situation in Europe over the next fifteenor twenty years with sufficient reliability, it istherefore necessary to preserve thecredibility of our deterrence for this periodand beyond. It is therefore essential topreserve our capability to develop andmaintain a credible deterrent in thevery long term, including warheads, vehicles(missiles), and launch platforms (nuclear poweredsubmarines).12 [Author�s original emphasis.]

Strategic Missile Submarines

France is currently deploying a new submarine-launched ballistic missile system, Sous-marins Lanceursd�Engins de la Nouvelle Génération (SNLE/NG) aspart of its Strategic Ocean Force (la FOST). The firstsubmarine, Le Triomphant, entered service in 1997. LeTéméraire and Le Vigilant are scheduled to enter servicein 1999 and 2003 respectively, with the fourth andfinal submarine entering service in 2007.13

The first three submarines will be equipped ini-tially with the M45 missile, armed with up to sixTN75 warheads. It is believed that the submarinescarry fewer nuclear warheads than their maximumpotential load, and instead may carry electroniccounter-measure packages and dummy warheads.The fourth submarine will be the first to be equippedwith the M51 missile, with a range of 6,000 kilometres(compared with the M45�s 4,000 kilometre range),and armed with a new nuclear warhead, the TNN(Tête Nucléaire Nouvelle). 14 This warhead, also re-ferred to as the Tête Nucléaire Océanique (TNO), willbe the first warhead to be developed entirely fromscratch without the aid of a testing programme, andits deployment will be vital to the French ability tomaintain a nuclear force in the long term.15 Eachsubmarine can carry up to 16 missiles.

Three of France�s older Le Redoutable class sub-marines, each armed with 16 M4 missiles, remain in

service. These will be retired as the SNLE/NG arebrought into service. France intends to retain fourSNLEs in its Strategic Ocean Force, enabling two to bemaintained at sea if necessary.16

Airborne Nuclear Forces

France also currently deploys an aircraft carrier,equipped with 24 Super-Étendard aircraft armed withthe Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP) missile. TheASMP has a range of between 80 and 300km, depend-ing on launch altitude. In addition, France has threesquadrons of Mirage 2000N aircraft also armed withthe ASMP. From around 2008, France intends toreplace the ASMP with a longer-range version of themissile � ASMP-1, which will have a range of 100 to500km depending on launch altitude. The ASMP-1(or amélioré � improved) will carry a new warhead,as yet unnumbered. The ASMP was to have beenreplaced by the ASLP � Air-Sol Longue Portée � butafter the UK refused to share in the £3 billion esti-mated cost for this missile, the project had to beshelved. The ASLP was to have a range of up to1300km, so the ASMP-1 is much less capable thanASLP would have been.

France intends to replace the Mirage 2000N andthe Super-Étendard with Rafale aircraft by 2015.17 Theaircraft carriers deployed in 2002 will carry Rafale.There is currently some doubt as to whether by 2015,France will deploy one or two aircraft carriers, andtherefore as to the number of nuclear armed NavyRafales that will be deployed. The air force willdeploy 45 Rafale aircraft in three squadrons, a directreplacement for the Mirage 2000Ns currently in ser-vice.

Force Reductions

While France continues to modernise actively itsnuclear forces, it took some significant decisionsconcerning reductions of force levels during the1990s. France constructed a small triad of air-, sea-,and ground-based forces, mirroring the force struc-tures of the nuclear superpowers. However, with thedecision in 1993 not to deploy the Hades missile toreplace the retiring Pluton, and the 1996 decision toretire the ICBMs of the Plateau d�Albion withoutreplacement, France abandoned the land-based legof the triad.

France destroyed the Hades surface-to-surfacemissiles, and is dismantling their warheads. The

22


retrieved fissile material is being added to the mili-tary stock to be used for future warheads for the M51and the ASMP-1 missiles. The S-3D inter-continentalballistic missiles, formerly based at the Plateaud�Albion, were taken out of service in September1996, and their destruction and the dismantlementof their warheads will be complete in 1998.

3.4 A European Nuclear Deterrent?

The brief flurry of interest in the �Eurobomb� inthe mid-1980s soon died down, perhaps indicatingthat the idea was not viable during the Cold War.French ideas for European co-operation in the nuclearweapons field were never accepted by its neighbours.Typical was the suggestion in 1986, by PresidentMitterrand, that France was ready to consult with theChancellor of Germany on the use of tactical nuclearweapons by France on German soil, and even to coverGermany officially with the nuclear umbrella. Suchsuggestions were rebuffed by the German govern-ment.

As the European Union (EU) was created and itsmember states began to look at closer co-operationin the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),the possibility of a Common European DefencePolicy was also raised. Clearly, French and Britishnuclear weapons are central to such a debate, viewedas an asset by some, by others a liability preventingcloser co-operation. In January 1992, PresidentMitterrand asked, �Only two of the twelve havenuclear forces. For their national policies they have aclear doctrine. Is it possible to conceive a Europeanone?�18

In 1993, UK Secretary of State for Defence MalcolmRifkind spoke of the need to improve UK-French co-operation. However, he placed it firmly in a contextof strengthening NATO and �the specific Europeancontribution to the deterrence which underpins thecollective security of the whole Alliance�.19 He listeddeterrence, nuclear doctrines, anti-missile defences,arms control and non-proliferation as essential areasfor this co-operation.

During 1994, the Assembly of the Western Euro-pean Union (WEU), the body nominated in theTreaty on European Union to implement decisions ofthe European Council with defence implications,produced a report by Mr. De Decker of the DefenceCommittee on The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons.

The report notes, inter alia, that it would be �totallyillogical to start implementation of the CFSP withoutexamining the role of the French and British nuclearforces in the definition of a common defence policyof the EU�.20

The French 1994 White Paper on Defence was quiteexplicit on the potential European role of French andBritish nuclear forces. In a section entitled �EuropeanConstruction and Contributing to International Sta-bility�, the paper puts French defence policy �in thenew perspective of the �common defence� of thefuture, affirmed in the Treaty on European Union.�21

Further, the paper states that �this European choiceis made necessary for economic and strategic rea-sons... this progressive construction is leading to theaffirmation of a political identity which will beincomplete if it is not expressed in the area of defenceas in other areas.�22

3.5 Concerted Deterrence

During 1995, officials began a new debate on theEuropean contribution to nuclear deterrence in Eu-rope. There was a desire to avoid the ideas that Francecould provide an alternative nuclear umbrella to theNATO one, or somehow make all the strategic choices,but consult with allies at the moment of use. Theseideas were seen as being unrealistic. Equally, if acommon European force was the aim, then a methodfor co-operation had to be found that did not violatethe Non-Proliferation Treaty. This led to the sugges-tion by Prime Minister Alain Juppé in January 1995 ofthe concept of Concerted Deterrence.

This concept was built on foundations such asthose laid down by Bruno Tertrais, a French DefenceMinistry official, in L�Arme Nucléaire après La GuerreFroide. In a chapter on European deterrence, heexamines the possibilities for a common Europeanpolicy, should the US withdraw its nuclear forcesfrom Europe. Tertrais outlines options which includethe possibility that the vital interests of France, theUK, and other members of the European Union couldbecome so intertwined that the deterrence policy ofthe two nuclear powers would be widened to includetheir neighbours, without any declaration or partici-pation of other European states. A second suggestionis that there could be a declaration that a wideneddeterrence covered some or all of the Europeanpartners of France and the UK, and that those who

23

wished could participate in some nuclearprogrammes, while France and the UK retained theright to act independently.23

Juppé described concerted deterrence as goingbeyond the �paternalism� of widened deterrence,where France would simply guarantee the security of,for example, Germany. In a speech in January 1995 hemooted the idea of concerted deterrence for the firsttime:

In the long term we need to think about the stagesof development of a defence Europe, including themission � a sensitive subject � of national nuclearforces. Paradoxically, the end of the Cold Warseems to make the nuclear question less urgent,while on the other hand, it has removed sources oftension between Europeans particularly on thequestion of tactical weapons. Therefore, a Europeanconsensus can and must be maintained on thebasis of a reaffirmed doctrine of deterrence. Followingthe elaboration of a common doctrine by Franceand the United Kingdom, should our generationfear thoughts of, not shared deterrence, but at leasta concerted deterrence with our principal partners?I ask the question: Can the Single Currency and theadoption of a new Franco-German contact have noeffect on French perceptions of our vital interests?24

In September 1995, Juppé made another speechon the same topic, putting his thoughts on concerteddeterrence in greater detail. He presented concerteddeterrence as,

necessitating a dialogue between equal partners,on a subject which concerns their common future.... In a world where nuclear weapons will continueto play a necessary role, even if only because ofalready existing arsenals, this engagement [thatGermany will remain non-nuclear] makes the needto guarantee German security even moreimportant.25

Juppé goes on to state that,

French vital interests have been defined morepolitically than geographically for several years.This is one of the principal results of fifty years ofreconciliation and mutual dialogue. It is also theresult of European construction... The futureEuropean defence will not be built without, in oneway or another, the French � and British � deterrentsplaying a role.26

In this model therefore, concerted deterrence wouldhave the UK and France working together withcountries such as Germany or Spain to construct amodel of deterrence for the European Union. Thenuclear weapons would remain under national con-trol, but doctrines for their use would become Euro-pean. The definition of �vital interests� would also beEuropean.

Coming as it did at the height of the furore aboutthe new series of French nuclear tests, this speech andthe concept of concerted deterrence were not wel-comed. Most observers saw the speech as an attemptto deflect European opposition to the tests. It was notuntil two months later that the UK even made anofficial declaration of support for the French tests.The speech was generally judged to be ill-timed, notleast because it went together with statements thatthe French testing programme was being carried outin the European interest. Many European politiciansquestioned this, noting that if this was the case thenEuropean nations should have been given a saybefore the tests started.

However, a renewed debate about a future Euro-pean deterrent is now launched, even if it remainsextremely controversial. Some influential figures onthe European scene, such as former Belgian PrimeMinister Leo Tindemans, have strongly supportedthe concept. Despite this, no parliament or parlia-mentary assembly has formally supported concerteddeterrence. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty revisingthe Treaty on European Union places the future ofEuropean defence very firmly in a NATO context. Aslong as France chooses to remain outside the inte-grated military structure of the Alliance, and mostparticularly outside the Nuclear Planning Group,concerted deterrence is likely to remain little morethan a concept.

3.6 Involving the Germans

Attempts at nuclear weapons co-operation be-tween France and Germany have a long history.During the 1950s the two countries drafted an agree-ment on �Common Research and Utilisation ofNuclear Energy for Military Purposes�, but progressin this direction was firmly blocked by ChancellorAdenauer and President De Gaulle in 1958. In morerecent years France increased its efforts to involveGermany in discussion of nuclear policy. There werepress reports during 1995 that some talks of the

24


Franco-British Joint Nuclear Commission have in-volved German officials. These were neither con-firmed nor denied.

There have also been moves by France to involvethe Germans in bilateral dialogue on nuclear weap-ons. France wished to include nuclear forces andco-operation as a subject for the Franco-GermanSummit in the autumn of 1995, but Germany refused.However, at their December 1996 Nuremberg Sum-mit the matter was raised. In the �Franco-GermanCommon Security and Defence Concept� the twocountries expressed their readiness to �start a dia-logue on the role of nuclear deterrence in Europeandefence policy.�27 However, in mid-1998, the Germangovernment stated that neither the details nor theparticipants for the dialogue had yet been decided.Indeed, the German government argued that thisdialogue should be held in the NATO context, toallow participation of the UK.28 Any movementwould be hampered by the French insistence onremaining outside the NATO framework as Germanywishes any nuclear weapons policy to be co-ordinatedthrough NATO with the sanction of the US, not byEuropean nations alone acting through the WEU.

25

Four

Nuclear Co-operation

4.1 US-UK Nuclear Co-operation

Since the 1950s, the UK nuclear programme hasbeen closely linked with the US programme. Nuclearco-operation between the two countries is conductedunder the 1958 Agreement for Co-operation on theuse of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.This agreement provides for the exchange of classifiedinformation concerning nuclear weapons to improvethe recipient�s �design, development and fabricationcapability�.1

The Mutual Defence Agreement provides the basisfor co-operation including British use of the NevadaTest Site; joint work at Lawrence Livermore, LosAlamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; the saleof US Trident missiles to Britain; and extensive USassistance with all aspects of the British nuclearweapons programme. In addition there is a US-UKPolaris Sales Agreement that has been amended tocover arrangements for Trident.

4.2 Ongoing US-UK Co-operation

To facilitate exchanges of information betweenthe US and the UK, the UK runs Atomic Co-ordinatingOffices in London and Washington. There are cur-rently five UK personnel stationed in the US under the1958 Agreement. In addition, three Atomic WeaponsEstablishment employees are in the US on short-termappointments, and a further 15 British personnel arethere as part of the Polaris Sales Agreement as amendedfor Trident.2 There are also four US employees in theUK as part of the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amendedfor Trident.3

In 1958, a Joint Atomic Information ExchangeGroup (JAIEG) was established in the US. Its remit isto review and determine the transmissibility of allproperly sponsored exchanges of information onnuclear weapons between the various US agencies,including the Department of Defense and the Depart-ment of Energy, and other nations and regionaldefence organisations, including the UK, France,NATO, and NATO member states. The JAIEG is partof the US Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerlythe Defense Nuclear Agency).

Information is exchanged in a variety of ways,including Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) andExchanges of Information by Visit and Report (EIVRs).A number of Joint Working Groups currently operateunder the terms of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agree-ment. These exchange technical information on acomprehensive list of subjects:

Radiation Simulation and Kinetic EffectsTechnology

Energetic MaterialsTest MonitoringNuclear MaterialsWarhead Electrical Components and

TechnologiesNon-Nuclear MaterialsNuclear Counter-Terrorism Technology FacilitiesNuclear Weapons EngineeringNuclear Warhead PhysicsComputational TechnologyAircraft, Missile and Space System HardeningLaboratory Plasma PhysicsManufacturing PracticesNuclear Weapon Accident Response TechnologyNuclear Weapon Code DevelopmentNuclear Weapon Environment and Damage

Effects.4

In addition, separate arrangements are in placefor exchanges under the Polaris Sales Agreement, asamended for Trident. The Joint Steering Task Groupoperates under this agreement, supported by theTrident Joint Re-Entry Systems Working Group andthe Joint Systems Performance and Assessment Group.5

Clearly, co-operation with the US is underway onall aspects of the British nuclear programme.

4.3 UK-French Nuclear Co-operation

Active co-operation in the field of nuclear weap-ons between the UK and France came to wider publicattention when President Chirac and Prime MinisterMajor held their annual Franco-British Summit on29-30 October 1995. The furore over French nucleartesting was then the backdrop to ongoing UK-Frenchdiscussions on nuclear weapons co-operation. Major

26


4.4 Ongoing UK-French Co-operation

Most of the activities of the Joint Nuclear Com-mission remain classified. The Labour Government,despite occasionally criticising their Conservativepredecessors for excessive secrecy in this area, hasrefused to divulge many details of the work of theCommission or to place any of its reports in theHouse of Commons Library. Despite this, some de-tails are known of the Commission�s discussions,principally because of French government backgroundbriefings to the media.

Early discussions in the Joint Nuclear Commis-sion centred on drawing up a comparison of Frenchand British approaches to deterrence, nuclear doc-trines and concepts, anti-missile defences, arms con-trol, and non-proliferation. In particular, during1993 there was a deep comparison of the deterrencedoctrines of the two countries which, according toone French participant, showed that there were noinsurmountable differences between the two nations�approaches. Indeed, at the end of 1993, Rifkind wasable to say publicly that there �are no differencesbetween France and the United Kingdom on thefundamental nuclear issues�.9

This level of political co-operation is built onincreasing practical co-operation between the twonations. An excellent example of such links is the newcompany Thomson Marconi Sonar (TMS) createdand owned by the French Thomson-CSF companyand GEC Marconi in the UK. This company supplies,among other things, the sonar system for the UKVanguard-class submarines of the UK Trident fleet.

In 1994, the Joint Nuclear Commission studiedthe European contribution to deterrence and, despitethe UK decision to abandon the ASLP, sources saythat agreement was reached on the �utility� of an airlaunched missile component to deterrence. (On ASLP,see Chapter 3.3 on p.19.) At the 1994 ChartresAnglo-French Summit, defence ministers held talkson nuclear issues, although they did not featuremuch in the main discussions between Major andMitterrand. The two countries also used the opportu-nity to co-ordinate their approach to the renewal ofthe Non-Proliferation Treaty. At a press conference,Major and Mitterrand agreed that, �Nuclear deter-rence is at the base of European security. A Europeansecurity policy without nuclear deterrence would bea feeble policy indeed�.10

expressed support for the French tests as the twoleaders agreed on a wide-ranging series of defence andforeign policy co-operation measures, with enhance-ment of the Anglo-French nuclear relationship as thecentrepiece. These were announced in a documentscalled �Global Partners�, �Background Note on De-fence Co- operation� and �Joint Statement on NuclearCo-operation�. The Joint Statement reads:

We have talked about nuclear co-operation, andnoted considerable convergence between our twocountries on nuclear doctrine and policy.

We do not see situations arising in which the vitalinterests of either France or the United Kingdomcould be threatened without the vital interests ofthe other also being threatened.

We have decided to pursue and deepen nuclearco-operation between our two countries. Our aim ismutually to strengthen deterrence, while retainingthe independence of our nuclear forces. The deepeningof co-operation between the two European membersof the North Atlantic Alliance who are nuclearpowers will therefore strengthen the Europeancontribution to overall deterrence.

We have instructed our Joint Nuclear Commissionto take this forward.6

In November 1993, the existence of the JointNuclear Commission referred to above was madepublic by Malcolm Rifkind. The Commission meetsat the level of senior civil servants from Foreign andDefence Ministries. It was established in November1992, formalised and made permanent in July 1993.Rifkind defined the Commission�s purpose as being�to strengthen the specific European contribution tothe deterrence which underpins the collective secu-rity of the whole Alliance [NATO]��.7

The Commission is the main basis for UK-Frenchnuclear co-operation, but there are other elements.The present Secretary of State for Defence, GeorgeRobertson, told the House of Commons that hisdepartment has,

regular contacts with members of the French ArmedForces and French officials on defence nuclearmatters. These include meetings of the Franco-British Joint Nuclear Commission, biannual stafftalks and visits to the United Kingdom on an ad-hoc basis.8


27

Since 1995, discussing how deterrence can face thenew security challenges has been the main order ofbusiness. In particular, how should Europe answerperceived emerging threats from new countries devel-oping weapons of mass destruction?

There is confusion over whether talks have beenheld concerning the possibility of combined or co-ordinated missile submarine patrols. According tomedia reports, this was discussed in the 1992-1993period, but then nothing more was heard of thesubject for some time. At a press briefing at the 1995Summit, UK officials said that no such co-operationwas possible while France remained outside the NATOintegrated military structure, as the UK Trident isallocated principally to NATO. At the time it seemedlikely that France would soon rejoin the structure,but this move was ruled out at the July 1997 NATOSummit in Madrid. Notwithstanding, in January1998 the French Defence Minister Alain Richard wasquoted as saying that discussions concerning jointsubmarine patrols were ongoing.11 Confusingly, in awritten answer to a question by Robert Key, MP, onJanuary 22, UK Secretary of State for Defence GeorgeRobertson stated that there �have been no discus-sions on the issue of joint UK/French deterrent pa-trols.�12 Thus, the status of the proposal is unclear.

4.5 Co-operation between UK and FrenchNuclear Weapons Laboratories

Research co-operation between French and Britishnuclear weapons laboratories has begun to come tolight over the last few years, although details are stillvery sparse. This co-operation has also included theAmericans.

In the context of the Anglo-French Defence Re-search Group (AFDRG) there are thirteen workinggroups which co-ordinate the two countries� militaryresearch efforts. Working Groups relevant to nuclearco-operation include: WG03 � Nuclear, Biologicaland Chemical Defence; WG07 � Energetic Materials;WG10 � Nuclear Blast Effects; and WG13 � DirectedEnergy Technology. There may be more, but avail-able evidence does not establish a nuclear connectionfor other working groups. Furthermore French andBritish scientists regularly visit each other�s facilities.

In May 1995, the UK MoD submitted a memoran-dum to the House of Commons Defence Select

Committee which stated that technical discussionshad been held with France on such questions ashydrodynamics experiments, laser plasma physics,computer simulation and possible arrangements forpeer review. These discussions have involved a num-ber of reciprocal visits.13

The frequency of contacts between French andBritish nuclear weapons scientists has remainedroughly stable since 1993. (See Table One below).

However, while in 1993-1995 these visits were splitbetween the sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield, inrecent years they have been concentrated atAldermaston. It appears that early contacts exam-ined both operational and research and develop-ment aspects of nuclear weapons. Since 1995, thereappears to be an increasing emphasis in the relation-ship on nuclear weapons research and development,perhaps particularly because of co-operation on stock-pile stewardship in a post-nuclear testing environ-ment.

The information that the UK government hasbeen prepared to release concerning visits by Britishpersonnel to France is less specific. The only informa-tion that has been given to the House of Commonsconcerns visits to French facilities by personnel fromAtomic Weapons Establishments. No breakdown asto which establishments these personnel were fromwas given. Further, although visits to facilities ofboth the Commisariat a l�Énergie Atomique (CEA)and the Délégation Générale de l�Armement (DGA)are recorded, there is no specific information given asto which sites were visited. (See Table Two, p. 27.)

Table One

French Scientific Visits toUK Nuclear Facilities

Financial Alder- Burgh- Cardiff Foulness Year maston field

1993-1994 4 3 0 01994-1995 3 1 0 11995-1996 4 3 0 11996-1997 8 0 0 0April 1997 6 0 0 0 to 21 Jan. �98

Source: House of Commons, Official Report, 26January 1998, Col. 29.

28


Despite the lack of information, it is possible tosee from this that the level of co-operation betweennuclear weapons lab personnel is significant. Thereare reciprocal visits on average once every two weeks.

4.6 US-French Co-operation

In 1961 a nuclear co-operation agreement wassigned by the US and France.14 However, it was not asfar reaching as the US agreement with the UK. It wasnot until 1985 that the French agreement was amendedto include information exchanges concerning weapondesign, development, and fabrication. Unlike theBritish agreement, these exchanges are limited to thepurpose of optimising the �safety and security of therecipient�s nuclear activities or installations�.15

However, this is far from the full story of French-US nuclear weapons co-operation. The extent of co-operation between the two began to come to light inan article by Richard Ullman in Foreign Policy in1989.16 Ullman conducted extensive interviews withUS and French officials and politicians on the US-French relationship, and provided an overview of US-French co-operation.

His primary revelation was the co-operationthrough the practice of giving �negative guidance�.French scientists would consult their colleagues inthe US concerning nuclear weapons developments,and when the US scientists were able to tell that theirFrench counterparts were making an error, theywould tell them they had made a mistake. One of theweapons developed by this method was the neutronwarhead that France used with the never-deployedHades short-range missile. Reliable sources have con-firmed that this relationship continued until at leastthe mid-1980s and may continue today.

As early as the late 1950s and through the 1960s,the US assisted French nuclear weapons design with

the sale of high power computers. France has alsopurchased supercomputers from the US for nuclearweapons work, notably a Cray 1S, a Cray X/MP 416,and two Control Data Cyber 860s in 1987. Francepurchased Cray T3 computers to carry out simula-tion of nuclear explosions in 1996, and will followthis buy with two further computer purchases in2001 and 2005, as part of the PaSEN (formerly PALEN)programme. (See Chaper 4.7 on p. 28 below).

US archives reveal that the US assisted France witha wide range of subjects including missile design,safety of nuclear materials, and gaseous diffusiontechnology. It should be noted that, from the verybeginning, this co-operation was a two-way process.France provided a variety of information to theUnited States, notably in recent years when datafrom the last series of French nuclear tests wassupplied to the US. This continued a tradition of co-operation on testing results which has existed since1960. Nonetheless, co-operation between the US andFrance has been less extensive than that with the UK.

In 1996, the US and France signed a Memorandumof Agreement (MOA) on Co-operation ConcerningNuclear Safety and Security. The MOA is far moreexplicit than previous agreements between the USand France. A section on Stockpile Stewardshipauthorises co-operation on �theoretical, numericaland experimental simulation methods�. A sectionentitled �Nuclear Safety and Security� covers ex-change of information on aspects of nuclear weaponsdesign including research, development, testing, fab-rication, transportation and disassembly of thenuclear and explosive components. It also estab-lishes an agreement on �use of facilities� and �longterm visits or assignments of technical personnel toparticipate in joint projects�.17

Enhanced nuclear co-operation between the USand France also opens new opportunities for co-operation between Britain and France. In the past,this was restricted by the 1958 US-UK Mutual DefenceAgreement, which requires US consent before the UKcan communicate any information acquired underthe Agreement to a third party and vice versa. Withenhanced official US-French co-operation, it seemslikely that US consent has also been given to in-creased information transfers between the UK andFrance.

There is now no obstacle to three-way co-opera-tion, or for one of the parties to act as a conduit for


Table Two

UK Scientific Visits toFrench Nuclear Facilities

Financial Year CEA DGA

1996-1997 12 3April � December 1997 10 2

Source: House of Commons, Official Report, 12 January1998, Col.136.

29

information transfer to another. Data from the threenuclear weapons programs can therefore be pooled,enhancing resources for weapons designers from allthree countries.

4.7 Current Projects

With the signing of the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, the focus of US, UK, and French nuclear co-operation is now stockpile stewardship � maintain-ing nuclear arsenals without testing. Stockpile stew-ardship is also a major component of the 1996 MOAbetween the US and France.

France

France�s Préparation a la Limitation desExpérimentations Nucléaires (PALEN) programmewas originally designed to reduce the number ofnuclear tests conducted. It is now intended to de-velop the means and techniques necessary to main-tain the credibility of France�s nuclear deterrent in apost-test environment, and as such the programmehas renamed Programme de Simulation des EssaisNucléaires (PaSEN).

The French nuclear simulation programme isintended to guarantee both the safety and reliabilityof its current nuclear weapons and those that replacethem, along with assuring the long-term reliability ofits deterrence policy. Simulation will allow evalua-tion of the effects of ageing on the weapons and helpto maintain the lifetime of the weapons.18 Simula-tion will be used, together with data from the lastFrench testing campaign, to complete the warheadsfor the ASMP Plus missile and for the M51 missile.19

The first warhead to be developed entirely withouttesting will be the version of the TNN for the M51missile, otherwise known as TNO (see above). TheFrench National Assembly Defence Budget report for1997 stated that,

a transfer of expertise is planned between thoseolder staff who have participated in tests, andthose younger ones who have only worked withsimulation programmes. The success of the transferof expertise is one of the key points of our simulationprogramme. A failure, if it happened, would onlybecome detectable in around fifteen years time, bywhich time it would be irreparable andunchangeable.20

France is building a number of new facilities for

stockpile stewardship including a Megajoule laser,which will be located at Barp, in Gironde, for researchin the thermonuclear field. The Megajoule laser willallow nuclear fusion of very small quantities ofmaterial in order to measure the physical processes atwork. The first tests of the Megajoule laser are notexpected until 2006.21

Recent analysis of the National Assembly reportconcerning nuclear waste at French nuclear weaponsestablishments shows that it is likely that scientists atMoronvilliers, in Champagne, have been conductinghydrodynamic or hydro-nuclear explosive labora-tory experiments at the plant. France is also buildingthe AIRIX radiographic machine at Moronvilliers,which will study the non-nuclear functioning of theweapons, with the help of experiments in which thenuclear materials will be replaced by inert material.AIRIX is expected to be operational in 1999, operat-ing on one axis with the second axis of analysisbecoming available in 2003. 22

The 1996 US-French MOA gives US and Frenchscientists extensive access to each other�s laboratories,so US scientists will have access to both the AIRIX andthe Megajoule laser. In return, French scientists willbe able to use US facilities such as the Nevada Test Siteand the proposed National Ignition Facility. TheNational Assembly noted in 1997 that although thetwo programmes are currently on an equal footing,the US programme will begin to pull ahead of Francefrom early next century for budgetary reasons.

The United Kingdom

In 1996, the UK Ministry of Defence reported thatthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had necessitatedchanges in the way in which it sustained,

confidence both in our underwriting of in-serviceweapons and in our ability to develop new warheadswhich may be required in the future... we are nowlooking to a further enhancement of �above ground�experiments and computer simulation to providethe necessary confidence.23

In 1994, MoD Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser(Nuclear) Tony Quigley told the House of CommonsDefence Committee that the MoD was �talking ac-tively with the Americans, and with the French... onhow to co-operate effectively in the use of... [stockpilestewardship] facilities�.24 This work includes aboveground experiments involving the use of explosives

30

Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction Nuclear Co-operation

but no nuclear yield, lasers, or computer simula-tions.25

In 1995, the MoD reported its capabilities:

we have for many years employed a range oftechniques such as above ground experiments,work with lasers and computer simulation inaddition to underground testing to underwrite thesafety and reliability of our weapons stockpile. Inthe absence of testing we intend to develop ourexperimental techniques and facilities in suchareas, and also to exploit the large quantities ofdata that we have acquired from past undergroundtesting and other work. These will be progressivedevelopments, undertaken in continuing co-operation with the United States, which willcontribute to the safe stewardship of Tridentthroughout its service life as well as to sustainingcapabilities to meet future requirements. We havealso had some discussions with the Frenchauthorities on issues related to nuclear weaponsstewardship...26

One US project that will be of particular interestto the UK is the SLBM Warhead Protection Program(SWPP), a collaboration between the US Navy andthe Department of Energy.27 The SWPP was estab-lished to �maintain the capability to jointly developreplacement nuclear warheads for the W76/Mk4 andW88/Mk5 should new warheads be needed in thefuture�.28 Given that the UK Trident warhead isthought to be based on the US W76/Mk4, the UK islikely to be following this programme closely.

4.8 Conclusion

The extent of nuclear co-operation between theUS, France, and the UK on stockpile stewardshipindicates the commitment by all of these govern-ments to retain their nuclear weapons programmesfor the near future.

Of the two European nuclear-weapon states, Francehas by far the more ambitious programme. Despiteratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it plansto build a number of new facilities and aims todevelop and deploy at least two further nuclearwarheads over the next decade. The UK is investingless in stockpile stewardship, but is clearly keen towork with the US and France. It presumably wants tokeep its options open, either to extend the life of its

existing Trident warhead or for the development of areplacement or an upgrade for Trident in the future.

These programmes highlight the difference be-tween the stated goal of the European nuclear-weaponstates to make systematic and determined efforts toreduce nuclear weapons globally, and their actualintentions to retain their own nuclear arsenals in thelong term.

31

Five

NATO Europe

first case, US nuclear free-fall bombs will continue tobe deployed in Europe and assume additional mili-tary functions, such as in countering proliferation. Inthe second, they might be withdrawn or eliminatedas part of future arms control measures.

5.1 US Nuclear Deployments in Europe

The United States continues to deploy a maxi-mum of up to 180 B-61 nuclear bombs in NATOEurope.1 They are stored in seven European coun-tries, six of which are nominally non-nuclear weap-ons states. As part of withdrawing most of the nuclearweapons from Europe, all but 13 nuclear weaponsstorage sites in Europe were closed down. Nine ofthese sites are used to store nuclear weapons duringpeacetime. Four are in a caretaker status � no weap-ons are stored, but the facilities are available for useduring crisis and war. All 13 storage sites are on airbases. NATO built modern, more secure storagefacilities on each base during the 1990s. Today, in alllikelihood, all nuclear weapons are stored in these�Weapons Storage and Security Systems� (WS3) vaults� small underground bunkers built into the floor ofhardened aircraft shelters. NATO no longer needs theseparate nuclear weapons storage sites it formerlyused. Table Three on p. 31 lists the locations and thenumber of vaults built at each Air Base.

The US also continues to deploy dual-capableaircraft � F-16s and F-15Es � in Europe. US F-16 aircraftare deployed at Aviano Air Base (AB) in Italy andIncirlik AB in Turkey, and F-15E Strike Eagles arebased at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom.Spangdahlem AB in Germany also hosts US F-16aircraft, but it is not clear whether nuclear tasks areassigned to flying squadrons of the 52nd Fighter Wingstationed there.2 Six NATO non-nuclear weaponsstates (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Nether-lands and Turkey) each maintain one unit fullytrained to join the US in employing nuclear weaponsin times of war.

Two countries, Germany and Turkey, operateadditional units at lower levels of readiness. Theseunits are on air bases operating on a nuclear caretakerstatus. NATO wings prepared to operate nuclearweapons are shown in Table Four on p. 32.

The United States first introduced nuclear weap-ons into Europe for its own forces. Beginning in thelate 1950s, however, additional US weapons weredeployed to equip allied forces of some NATO coun-tries. At the height of the Cold War, the total of USnuclear weapons stored in Europe exceeded 7,000warheads. Today, there are fewer than 180 US nuclearbombs in Europe. While all weapons are under UScustody, in times of war they could be used by bothUS and Allied air forces.

The mid- to long-term future of these remainingweapons will be decided in the months to come.Several political processes will influence the outcomeof this decision:

� NATO is rewriting its �Strategic Concept�, whichis the strategic rationale for the Alliance. NATOwill have to decide on the future role of itsnuclear weapons and posture. Russia is alsodeveloping a new military doctrine and will haveto decide about the role of its nuclear weapons.

� NATO has come under a two-fold attack: fromthe nuclear members of the Alliance, for notmeeting their disarmament commitments underArticle VI of the NPT; and from NATO membersparticipating in the Alliance�s nuclear sharingprogrammes, for violating their commitmentsunder Articles I and II of the same treaty. NATOwill have to respond to this criticism within theNPT review process, either at the 2000 ReviewConference or sooner.

� Next year NATO will welcome new members. Atsome point, the Alliance will have to decidewhether and how to continue enlarging. Furtherenlargement raises questions about the involve-ment of new members in extended deterrence.

It is also possible that formal US-Russian talks onSTART III could begin, or the current backgrounddiscussions about the framework for future nucleardisarmament could become more official. If either ofthese happen within the timeframe of the above threeprocesses, it greatly increases the chances that NATOnuclear policy head towards one of two options:either NATO will have to re-emphasise the role of itsnuclear weapon posture, or it will be reduced. In the

32


NATO policy still requires the Alliance to �main-tain adequate nuclear forces in Europe�.

A credible Alliance nuclear posture and thedemonstration of Alliance solidarity and commoncommitment to war prevention continue to requirewidespread participation by European Alliesinvolved in collective defense planning in nuclearroles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on theirterritory and in command, control and consultationarrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe andcommitted to NATO provide an essential political

and military link between the European and theNorth American members of the Alliance.4

5.2 NATO: Nuclear Weapons for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

Since the 1950s, a significant portion of the arse-nal of US-controlled tactical nuclear weapons inEurope have been allocated and deployed for use bynon-nuclear NATO member states. This remains truefor a portion of the remaining weapons. In the event

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latoT latoT latoT latoT latoT detarepO-OTAN detarepO-OTAN detarepO-OTAN detarepO-OTAN detarepO-OTAN 412 412 412 412 412

latoT latoT latoT latoT latoT detarepO-KU detarepO-KU detarepO-KU detarepO-KU detarepO-KU 4343434343 c

a According to the Department of the US Air Force, completion of these bases was scheduled for April 1998, but thishas not yet been confirmed in publicly released documents. The Headquarters of the US Air Forces in Europe, ininformation released on 12 February 1998, lists Ghedi Torre as operational but not Araxos, Akinci, Balikesir or Incirlik.However, it is believed that installation is now complete at all bases.

b According to the Department of the US Air Force, these sites are in caretaker status. Apparently, no weapons arecurrently stored at these sites.

c By April 1998, the Royal Air Force had removed from service its WE-177 nuclear free-fall bombs. By August 1998,the last British free fall bombs were dismantled. NATO command and the UK have declared that the RAF sites at Brüggenand Marham are no longer needed and will be deactivated. The RAF plans to withdraw entirely from Brüggen by 2002.

d Does not include one additional training vault.

Table ThreeNATO Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites (1998) 3

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33

of war, these weapons could be deployed on aircraftbelonging to the non-nuclear-weapon states hostingthe weapons. As early as 1964, a formerly top secretdescription of US policies on nuclear weapons byCharles E. Johnson of the National Security Council,outlined the consequence of this policy: �As a resultof NATO�s commitment to the nuclear mode ofdefence, the non-nuclear NATO partners in effectbecome nuclear powers in time of war�.5 In 1969,after a number of countries had already signed theNPT, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a unilat-eral statement to the US Senate. The statement de-

scribed the US interpretation, explaining that the USand its European allies considered the �transfer ofnuclear weapons or control over them� illegal underthe Treaty �unless and until a decision were made togo to war, at which time the treaty would no longerbe controlling�.6 The statement was published in therecords of the US Senate and thus assumed to beknown to all signatories.7 However, Leonard Meeker,working at the Office of the Legal Advisor in theDepartment of State at the time, warned in 1966:�Should we decide to leave the wartime exceptionimplicit we would want to make it perfectly clear at

Table FourNATO Wings Maintaining Nuclear Weapons 3

a Caretaker status, reduced readiness in peacetime

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34


Geneva what we were doing, lest we later be accusedof having negotiated a treaty under false pretences�.8

Many nations doubt that NATO could rightfullyclaim a wartime exception from obligations underthe NPT and thus consider NATO nuclear sharing andespecially the wartime exclusion a violation of theTreaty. At an April 1998 NPT meeting, the 113member states of the Non-Aligned Movement recom-mended that all nations should �refrain from, amongthemselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, andwith States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharingfor military purposes under any kind of securityarrangements�.9 NATO doctrine is the only instanceof nuclear sharing.

Six non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT� Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,and Turkey � have full-fledged �nuclear sharing�arrangements with the US. They are thus are preparedto become nuclear-weapon states in time of war. Eachof these countries has a bilateral nuclear co-opera-tion agreement, known as Programs of Co-opera-tion, with the US. The Programs of Co-operationprovide for communication of classified informationfor

A) the development of defence plans;

B) the training of personnel in the employment of anddefense against atomic weapons and other militaryapplications of atomic energy;

C) the evaluation of the capabilities of potentialenemies in the employment of atomic weapons andother military applications of atomic energy; and

D) the development of delivery systems compatiblewith the atomic weapons which they carry.10

All NATO members are parties to the 1964 �Agree-ment between the Parties to the North Atlantic treatyfor Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information�.Bilateral agreements contained in secret notes ex-changed between the US and NATO governmentshosting US nuclear weapons described both sides�responsibilities. These notes were not made availableto national parliaments by the governments in-volved. The host country provides the delivery sys-tems, external security during transport and storage,land for storage sites, and infrastructure for USpersonnel. The US furnishes personnel for mainte-nance, custody and safety of the weapons on alliedbases.11

Secret notes exchanged between the US and thehost nation as well as classified NATO guidelinesgovern the process of nuclear planning and consulta-tion and the authorisation for the use of nuclearweapons in NATO. NATO�s nuclear planning andconsultation process is guided by �Political Prin-ciples� last updated during the Glenneagles meetingof the Nuclear Planning Group in October 1992. Itencompasses guidelines for nuclear planning, selec-tive use of nuclear weapons and major nuclear re-sponse, consultations, and considerations for theemployment of nuclear weapons. These include pro-visions that the views of those allies whose territoryor forces would be most seriously affected by the useof nuclear weapons should be given special consider-ation.

Today, all members of NATO can play a role in theAlliance�s nuclear decision-making through partici-pation in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and itssubordinate bodies, since full-fledged participationin all aspects of nuclear sharing is no longer aprerequisite for participation. Thus NATO non-nuclear-weapon states are eligible in nuclear plan-ning and consultations during peacetime, crisis andin the context of military exercises.

5.3. The Effects of NATO Enlargement

NATO�s extended deterrence will cover new mem-bers and they are eligible to participate in NATOnuclear sharing. Both Russia and critics of NATOnuclear sharing have expressed concern about thisaspect of enlargement. Russia fears that NATO couldretain the option to threaten its territory with nuclearweapons deployed closer to Russian borders. On theother hand, non-nuclear-weapon states have notedthat expansion will increase the number of countriesdependent on nuclear deterrence.12

NATO frequently reiterates that it has �no plan,no reason and no intention� to deploy nuclearweapons on the territory of its new members. How-ever, it has been unwilling to make this commitmentlegally binding.

Negotiations between NATO Secretary-GeneralJavier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister YevgeniPrimakov led to the �Founding Act on Mutual Rela-tions, Co-operation and Security between NATO andthe Russian Federation�. During the negotiations, USSecretary of State Madeleine Albright set out the US

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35

position on its nuclear weapons in Europe for the USSenate Armed Services Committee:

As you know, Russia would also like us to makeabsolute commitments in the charter about thedeployment of nuclear and conventional forces onthe territory of new members. But we will notcompromise on this issue.

All we have done, and all we will do, is to restateunilaterally existing NATO policy: that in thecurrent and foreseeable security environment, wehave no plan, no need, and no intention to stationnuclear weapons in the new member countries, nordo we contemplate permanently stationingsubstantial combat forces.13

However, Russian concerns continued, focused onthe possibility of infrastructure preparations for crisisand wartime deployments of nuclear weapons. As aresult, within the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATOelaborated slightly on its position. The Alliancestated �it has no intention, no plan, and no reason toestablish nuclear weapons storage sites on the terri-tory of those members, whether through construc-tion of new nuclear storage facilities or the adapta-tion of old nuclear storage facilities�.14

During Senate hearings on ratification of NATOenlargement, Albright and US Secretary of DefenceWilliam Cohen added some additional �no�s� to thefirst three. Both confirmed that there are no plans to:

� train new members states� pilots in nuclear mis-sions during peacetime,

� nuclear certify these countries� aircraft, or

� transfer equipment or infrastructure to supportthese countries� dual-capable aircraft in a nuclearrole.15

Furthermore, they stated that the US does notintend to conclude bilateral Programs of Co-opera-tion with the new member states.16 Finally, Albrightand Cohen made clear that new members would notbe required to buy nuclear-capable aircraft.17 Intotal, these politically binding commitments pro-vide Russia with some reassurance that NATO has nooption for a quick breakout from the self-constraintsentered under the Founding Act.

However, the new members to NATO will,

contribute to the development and implementationof NATO�s strategy, including its nuclear

component. New members will also be eligible tojoin the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and itssubordinate bodies (NPG Staff Group, High LevelGroup, and the Senior-Level Weapons ProtectionGroup), and to participate in nuclear consultationsduring exercises and crisis.18

In addition, NATO has made it clear that �Newmembers will be expected to support the concept ofdeterrence and the essential role nuclear weaponsplay in the Alliance�s strategy of war prevention as setforth in the Strategic Concept.�19 It is therefore notsurprising that the candidates for NATO membershiphave been some of the most determined opponents ofproposals for a Central European Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

5.4 Current NATO Nuclear Doctrine

NATO�s Strategic Concept of 1991 requires �wide-spread participation by European Allies involved incollective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peace-time basing of nuclear forces on their territory and incommand, control and consultation arrangements.�20

The remaining US tactical nuclear weapons deployedin Europe now play a �political� rather than amilitary role. They symbolise the US commitment toWestern Europe as well as European countries� com-mitment to share the risks and roles of extendeddeterrence. In the Strategic Concept of 1991, this linkbetween US nuclear weapons and its commitment toEurope is expressed as follows: �The presence of NorthAmerican conventional and US nuclear forces inEurope remains vital to the security of Europe, whichis inseparably linked to that of North America�.21

US officials make two arguments for maintainingUS tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. First, the USwill not withdraw its remaining nuclear weaponsunless US troops are also withdrawn. Second, USnuclear weapons cannot be withdrawn from NATOEurope because of the opposition from non-nuclear-weapon states who perceive these weapons as theultimate guarantee of extended deterrence. The samerationale was reflected in MC 400, the new militarystrategy NATO approved in December 1991.22

At the North Atlantic Council meeting on 3 June1996, NATO approved a revised version of thatmilitary strategy, called MC 400/1. MC 400/1 com-mits the Alliance to maintain a reduced, but moreflexible, nuclear posture for the foreseeable future. It

36


neither mentions nor revokes NATO�s long-standingpolicy of retaining the option of �first-use� of nuclearweapons. It also does it commit NATO to usingnuclear weapons only as a �last resort�, a positiontaken during the London Summit in 1990 but neverrepeated. Nuclear weapons are described as havingan essential stabilising role in Europe, guardingagainst uncertainties (such as risks resulting fromproliferation of weapons of mass destruction) andserving as a hedge, in case a substantial militarythreat to NATO re-emerges.23

NATO will no longer maintain detailed nuclearwar plans for the use of nuclear weapons in specificscenarios. Instead, like the US, it is developing a so-called �adaptive targeting capability�.24 This capa-bility is designed to allow major NATO commandersto develop target plans and nuclear weapons em-ployment plans on short notice, during a contin-gency or crisis, from pre-developed databases con-taining possible targets.

5.5 NATO�s Future Nuclear Doctrine

Within the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed inMay 1997, the Alliance promised to review its 1991Strategic Concept, NATO�s principal guiding docu-ment. During the July 1997 Summit the Alliancelaunched the review. NATO�s Foreign Ministers meet-ing in December 1997 set out the terms of reference forthe update and substantive work began in early 1998.During the first half of 1998, ideas were collected fornecessary changes. Actual drafting of new text beganin September by NATO�s international staff, with afirst draft distributed at the meeting of DefenceMinisters in Portugal that month. Some in the Alli-ance had hoped to have agreement on the newConcept ready as early as NATO�s Autumn Ministerialsin December 1998, but this now seems unlikely. Thisis particularly true in view of the statements byGerman officials for the need to examine NATO'sfirst-use policy. NATO Heads of Government willapprove the updated Strategic Concept at their nextsummit in April 1999.25 Before that, NATO intends tobrief Russia on the new strategy in the framework ofthe NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.26 How-ever, NATO did not offer to consult with Russia aboutit. Instead, the Alliance is waiting to see whetherRussia proposes putting the Strategic Concept on theagenda of the Permanent Joint Council.

5.6 US Perspectives on NATO NuclearStrategy

The US is creating new roles for nuclear weapons.Based on the Nuclear Posture Review and the 1997National Security Strategy, the newest version of theNational Military Strategy foresees a change in therole of NATO-deployed nuclear weapons. Strategicnuclear forces serve,

as a vital hedge against an uncertain future, aguarantor of our security commitments to ourallies, and a deterrent to those who wouldcontemplate developing or otherwise acquiringtheir own nuclear weapons. Strategic weaponsremain the keystone of US deterrent strategy. A mixof forward deployed non-strategic nuclear andconventional weapons adds credibility to ourcommitments.27

The rationale for maintaining non-strategic nuclearweapons is shifting. While NATO still perceives nuclearweapons� function to be primarily a link between theUS and its European allies and a symbol of intra-alliance solidarity, US armed forces increasingly per-ceive the arsenal deployed in Europe as a mere add-on to the role of US strategic forces.

Changes in the role of nuclear weapons in the USnational strategy have led to this difference. Accord-ing to the new US doctrine, �the fundamental pur-pose of US nuclear forces is to deter the use ofweapons of mass destruction� (nuclear, chemical,and biological) and their means of delivery by hostilegovernments.28 The objective is to enhance freedomof action for US and allied forces in out-of-areamissions as well as to protect US and allied territories.The mission also includes retaliatory strikes onceopponents have used weapons of mass destruction.29

Often maintaining the �first-use� option is justi-fied as the logical consequence of deterring andpossibly retaliating against the use of biological andchemical weapons by actors who do not possessnuclear weapons. However, US proponents do notexclude the pre-emptive use to eliminate enemyWMD and their delivery means and supportinginfrastructure �before they can be employed againstfriendly forces. For these reasons, offensive opera-tions against enemy WMD and their delivery systemsshould be undertaken once hostilities become inevi-table or commence�.30 The first-use of tactical nuclearweapons is now considered an option within offen-

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37

sive counter-proliferation missions and as part of anemerging doctrine for managing crisis. PresidentClinton�s Presidential Decision Directive 60 also re-flects the increased role of US nuclear weapons inoffensive counter-proliferation.31

Recent changes in the role of sub-strategic (andstrategic) nuclear weapons in the US national strat-egy also indicate that the US no longer limits thethreat to use nuclear weapons against states orgovernment-controlled targets. Numerous officialUS documents highlight the dangers of non-stateactors acquiring and threatening to use weapons ofmass destruction.32 These non-state actors (such asterrorists, organised crime, transnational companiesor fanatic religious groups) have come to the atten-tion of US military planners. The US military�s list of�likely targets� for US sub-strategic weapons, includ-ing US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe,now includes �nonstate actors (facilities and opera-tion centers) that possess WMD�, along with under-ground facilities or WMD owned by enemy govern-ments.33

To the authors knowledge the United States is theonly nuclear-weapon state considering the use nuclearweapons against non-state actors. Even though thelikelihood of use against terrorist targets is remote,the change is significant. It encourages military plan-ners to study such options and to present them topoliticians for consideration. In addition, non-stateactors generally operate on state territory. The JointChiefs of Staff do not explain whether this fact wouldlegally limit the use of nuclear weapons to US terri-tory, or whether targeting against other countrieswould be considered as well.

5.7 European Perspectives on NATONuclear Weapons

While the US has moved its national doctrinaldevelopments a long way towards integrating nuclearweapons into offensive counter-proliferation mis-sions, its European NATO allies have been morecautious. Since 1994, two senior NATO bodies havestudied counter-proliferation. Their recommenda-tions, as well as a special set of NATO force goalsagreed in late 1996, focused only on improvingintelligence capabilities and defensive military andnon-military measures against the threat from weap-ons of mass destruction. No requirements for actionon new conventional or nuclear offensive military

capabilities were developed. This clearly reflects themore cautious course of action in the EuropeanNATO countries.

Most European countries are hesitant to followthe US path of active engagement in offensive counter-proliferation, especially if nuclear weapons are in-volved. European countries still perceive nuclearweapons as a tool of deterrence or a last resort;almost all cannot imagine giving these weapons arole in counter-proliferation. This is particularly truein the case of targeting non-state actors with WMDcapabilities. In fact, serious European questions aboutthe future of US nuclear weapons in NATO may beraised by US pressure to include such options intoNATO�s officially acknowledged and agreed militaryoptions.

However, throughout the Alliance�s history, itsdoctrine and strategy development have been drivenby changes to the national US strategy, especially inthe nuclear field. The changing role of non-strategicnuclear weapons in US doctrine thus might cause theinitiation of a new round of discussions in thecontext of NATO�s strategy review. European fears ofUS-led changes in doctrine may have contributed tomost European NATO member states� initial effortsto avoid discussions about any changes to NATO�snuclear policy.

5.8 Perspectives on NATO�s NuclearPosture

NATO�s strategy review will have to address anumber of issues relating to nuclear weapons, includ-ing NATO�s future approach to arms control and therole of nuclear weapons in NATO�s political andmilitary strategy. NATO last revised its StrategicConcept in 1991, when the Soviet Union still existed.The strategy review therefore is the Alliance�s firstopportunity to address many aspects of its nuclearpolicy and posture comprehensively in the context ofthe new security environment in Europe.

However, several European officials have indi-cated that many nations initially wanted to leave thenuclear sections of the Strategic Concept untouched.34

Diplomats feared that even considering changes wouldopen a Pandora�s box. For example, in the earlysummer of 1998, Dutch officials expressed the opin-ion that NATO should maintain the nuclear para-graphs in the Strategic Concept. Most analysts also

38


doubted that NATO would rework its nuclear strat-egy.35

However, it is more likely that NATO will finallyreview the nuclear sections of its strategy. Somealready point to this option. The new German gov-ernment stated, for example, that during future workon the Strategic Concept �the nuclear component� ofNATO�s strategy �will be examined, too�.36 Germanofficials have also raised the Alliance�s policy ofretaining the right of first-use as an issue for discus-sion. (See Chapter 6.4 below.) In background inter-views, diplomats from other NATO countries haveexpressed similar points of view. There are severalreasons why a review is likely:

� NATO�s new strategy process is a window ofopportunity for change. After the review is com-pleted, no new major change to NATO�s posturecan be expected for the short to midterm;

� Both the proponents of giving the Alliance�s nuclearposture a stronger role in offensive counter-prolif-eration and the proponents of reaching a US-Russian agreement on verifiable disarmament ofnon-strategic nuclear weapons will seek the reflec-tion of their position in NATO�s strategy. Neitherwill want a doctrinal freeze;37

� NATO countries are interested in reducing therisks resulting from Russian tactical nuclear weap-ons. They also would like to discourage Russiaboth from officially adopting a �flexible response�strategy based on a first-use doctrine, and fromtrying to counter-balance conventional inferior-ity with tactical nuclear weapons;

� NATO�s nuclear members, especially the US, willneed to address or pre-empt the criticism they arefacing for violating their commitments underArticles I, II and VI of the NPT. All NATO membersare interested in safeguarding the NPT after thenuclear tests in South Asia;

� There is a clear alternative for the future. EitherNATO�s European-deployed nuclear posture as-sumes new tasks and missions or it will be elimi-nated because it no longer provides the Alliancewith a necessary or unique capability.

It remains to be seen whether the US will pushNATO to agree to widened nuclear tasks within thenew Strategic Concept or whether those more inter-

ested in arms control and verifiable disarmament willprevail. The debate will be complicated. However,elements in the US military support reducing the roleof non-strategic nuclear weapons. Air Force GeneralEugene Habiger, commanded-in-chief of US StrategicCommand, stated in March 1998, �It is time for us toget very serious about tactical nuclear weapons. Ifyou look at the gross numbers of tactical nuclearweapons that are in Russia today, we must begin toparlay that element into START III, and I have everyexpectation that we will�.38 See Chapter 6.3 below fora more detailed discussion.

5.9 Conclusion

The number of US nuclear weapons deployed inEurope has fallen to a Cold War low in the last tenyears. NATO acknowledges that these weapons nolonger play a primarily �military� role. The Alliancenow faces a major choice: Will European-deployedUS nuclear weapons assume new roles and missionssuch as offensive counter-proliferation operations, orwill these weapons be removed in the interest ofrenewed emphasis on nuclear arms control? Thedecline in nuclear weapons� numbers and their mili-tary value in the European security context have leftEuropean NATO nations sceptical about their futurerole.

The US has clearly outlined that NATO�s newmembers are unlikely to have US nuclear weaponsdeployed on their territory. There will be no nuclearco-operation agreements nor training and infrastruc-ture for aircraft to carry out nuclear roles. Nuclearweapons are evidently no longer required to cementthe relationship between the US and NATO�s Euro-pean members. Thus, the idea that the US nuclearpresence in Europe provides the ultimate guaranteeof the US commitment to NATO Europe is finallybecoming outdated, nine years after the end of theCold War.

Previously, nuclear arms control has been left tobilateral negotiations between the US and Russia.The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and itsnuclear experts working group provide the first op-portunity for the UK, France, and the NATO non-nuclear-weapon states to participate alongside theUS and Russia in a permanent forum for discussion ofnuclear weapons issues.

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39

Six

Nuclear Risk Reduction in Western Europe

five nuclear-weapon states committing themselvesby 2000 to, in the next five to ten years, negotiatingdeep cuts in their nuclear arsenals down to the lowhundreds, with ultimate prohibition remainingthe goal. In this context, India and Pakistan wouldbe expected to reverse their programs and eventuallyjoin the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. It isessential for the preservation of the Treaty that thenumber of nuclear-weapon states not exceed five.2

India, Pakistan, and Israel remain outside the NPTregime. Unless nuclear weapons are delegitimised asa means of providing security, there is a real dangerof erosion of the international non-proliferationregime.

To strengthen that regime, Western Europe shoulddevelop and promote a strategy that will create anon-nuclear security regime. Increasing reliance onnuclear weapons does not answer concerns about thespread of weapons of mass destruction � nuclear,chemical and biological. Instead, Western Europeshould help to develop a verifiable internationalregime to control and eliminate all weapons of massdestruction, contribute to the costs of disarmamentand to address security needs through co-operativearrangements rather than military force.

There are six essential steps that Western Euro-pean states need to take to create a more secure, non-nuclear Europe. France and the UK, Europe�s nuclear-weapon states, must play the lead role in implementingthese steps. However, Western Europe�s non-nuclear-weapon states will have to make substantial contri-butions, including pressuring the nuclear-weaponstates and working in NATO. Implementing theserecommendations would begin to create a trulysustainable disarmament process and contribute tothe development of a co-operative security regime.

These steps are:

1. Commit to and take programmatic action to-ward the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons;

2. Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons;

3. End the deployment of non-strategic nuclearweapons and give up the option of wartime

Nuclear weapons� role in Western European secu-rity must be re-examined. The nuclear tests in SouthAsia demonstrate the failure of Western non-prolif-eration policy and the need for urgent action. Therevision of NATO�s Strategic Concept, to be com-pleted by April 1999, and the first NPT ReviewConference under the Treaty�s strengthened reviewprocess in 2000 provide specific opportunities forimproving nuclear policies. The driving force forchanges in nuclear doctrine and posture in WesternEurope, as well as for support for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, should be a calcu-lated strategy of risk reduction.

At present, the conventional wisdom in WesternEurope is that the continued possession of nuclearweapons by France, the UK, and NATO does notaffect either proliferation or non-proliferation. Thequestionable nature of this �wisdom� is increasinglyapparent, highlighted by the nuclear tests by Indiaand Pakistan. Unless the nuclear-weapon states makesubstantial changes, the future of the entire non-proliferation regime is at stake. Ambassador JayanthaDhanapala of Sri Lanka, President of the 1995 NPTReview and Extension Conference, and now Under-Secretary General for Disarmament at the UnitedNations, has said, �Unless there is substantial progress� evidence in the nuclear disarmament field � we aregoing to have very serious erosion of the confidenceof states parties to the Treaty�.1

Ambassador Thomas Graham, former SpecialAdvisor to President Clinton for Arms Control andDisarmament and the person who led the successfulUS campaign to make the NPT permanent, recentlyput the case even more strongly:

In my judgement, we are approaching a crossroadsfor the continued viability of the NPT. One coursewould be continued lack of progress in nucleardisarmament and de facto recognition of Indiaand Pakistan as nuclear-weapon states. If thiscourse of action is followed, it is likely that by the2000 Review Conference the NPT will begin tocome apart and, over the next decade or so, 15-20additional nuclear-weapon states will appear.Alternatively, there is another course of action thatcould save the NPT regime. It would involve the

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nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weaponstates;

4. Halt first-use policies by France, the UK, andNATO;

5. Include commitments by France and the UK onthe future of their nuclear arsenals in the STARTIII context;

6. Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduc-tion Programme.

These steps outline a comprehensive nuclear riskreduction strategy for Western Europe. The list be-gins with the most important and broadest steps,and proceeds to less far-reaching initiatives. Mostimportantly, the last five steps would all follow froma sincere undertaking of the first.

The six steps closely correspond to many of thecrucial provisions in the New Agenda Coalition�sJune declaration and UN First Committee resolution.That resolution exposed a growing debate in NATOover the Alliance�s nuclear doctrine. (See Chapter 1.3on p.8 for a description of the resolution.) Thatdebate, between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weaponstates, may be exposed during the discussions overthe Alliance�s Strategic Concept. (See Chapter 5.5 onp.35.)

Not included in the list are the traditional, yetimportant, items on the nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament agenda. These include furtherprogress on the bilateral START process, ratificationand entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, and agreement on treaty on a fissile materialproduction cut-off at the Conference on Disarma-ment. Each of those steps is significant, but does notfully address the implications of the end of the ColdWar. Those goals also already have near universalendorsement � only time and some political will arerequired to achieve them.

The six steps also focus on options for WesternEurope, rather than for all states or all nuclear-weapon states. Russian ratification of START II is theone step in the current regime that would do the mostto advance disarmament. The proposals outlined inthis report would aid and support Russia in takingthat step, but are also critical to creating a newsecurity environment that will allow further progress.

Each step is described in detail below. Whereverpossible, the political factors that will influencedecisions to implement the steps are also outlined.

6.1 Commit To and Take ProgrammaticAction Toward the Rapid Eliminationof Nuclear Weapons

The five nuclear-weapon states party to the NPTare legally committed to nuclear disarmament underthe Treaty. That commitment was strengthened atthe 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in thePrinciples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferationand Disarmament. That document called for a�programme of action� that included the �deter-mined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of sys-tematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclearweapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminat-ing those weapons�.3 The International Court ofJustice, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on nuclearweapons, reconfirmed this commitment. The Courtunanimously found that there is an �obligation topursue in good faith and bring to a conclusionnegotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in allits aspects under strict and effective internationalcontrols�.4

The importance of the commitment

A series of studies and initiatives have repeatedlyhighlighted the need for a clear commitment tocomplete elimination. For example, the high-levelCanberra Commission on the Elimination of NuclearWeapons, convened by the Australian government,emphasised the importance of this step:

This commitment would change instantly thetenor of debate, the thrust of war planning, and thetiming or indeed the necessity for modernisationprograms. It would transform the nuclear weaponsparadigm from the indefinite management of aworld fraught with the twin risks of the use ofnuclear weapons and further proliferation, to oneof nuclear weapons elimination.5

More recently, eight nations led by Ireland issueda call for rapid progress on nuclear disarmament. Theeight nations � Ireland, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, NewZealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden � sought�a clear commitment to the speedy, final and totalelimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear

Nuclear Risk Reduction

41

weapons capability� from both the nuclear-weaponstates and the nuclear-weapon-capable states.

As described in Chapter 1.3 on p.8 above, the Junedeclaration led to a UN First Committee resolution.Voting on the resolution showed a clear split betweenthe nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon statesin Europe. Every non-nuclear-weapon state in NATOexcept Turkey abstained, despite heavy pressure fromFrance, the UK and the US to vote against it. The firstoperative paragraph of the resolution called on thenuclear-weapon states to make an �unequivocal com-mitment to the speedy and total elimination� of theirnuclear arsenals.

Studies on elimination

A natural result of that commitment would begovernment programs and studies, from the highestlevel on down, on the practicalities of elimination. Asdiscussed earlier, in its Defence Review the UnitedKingdom announced its intention to develop exper-tise in verification of the reduction and eliminationof nuclear weapons. This is just one of the technicalissues that will require detailed research before thegoal of elimination can be achieved.

Both France and the UK should undertake studieson how to reach elimination. These studies couldtake place before making a commitment to rapidelimination.

The European Council should mandate the Euro-pean Commission to conduct a similar study, high-lighting contributions that each EU member canmake to elimination. Important topics that need tobe researched include: the transition from low num-bers of weapons to zero; permanent maintenance ofthe verification regime; storage and/or destruction ofnuclear materials; and how to handle break-out if itoccurs.

Multilateral discussions on elimination

As part of the �programme of action� on nucleardisarmament called for in the Principles and Objectivesfor Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, thenuclear-weapon states should agree to multilateraldiscussions on disarmament. In view of their NPTcommitments and the demands from the vast major-ity of countries around the globe � both friendly andnon-aligned � the nuclear-weapon states should join

discussions on elimination, even without a commit-ment to that goal. These discussions would notnecessarily begin with negotiations. They wouldserve as a forum for raising ideas and highlightingconcerns, a place where the nuclear-weapon statescould report on their progress toward disarmament,and all states could propose new initiatives.

These discussions can and should take place inthree different forums, each of which would serve itsown purpose. None should or would detract frombilateral negotiations between Russia and the UnitedStates on START III or other disarmament steps.

At the Conference on Disarmament

The first forum for discussions is at the Conferenceon Disarmament in Geneva. At the 1997 NPT Prepa-ratory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2000Review Conference, South Africa called for the cre-ation of an ad hoc committee at the Conference onDisarmament to discuss nuclear disarmament.6 NewZealand, Canada and others supported similar ideas.7

In January 1998, South Africa formally submitted tothe CD a draft resolution to create such a committee�to deliberate upon practical steps for systematicefforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as toidentify if and when such steps should be the subjectof negotiations in the Conference�.8 The draft wascarefully worded to avoid calling for negotiations ona treaty eliminating nuclear weapons in the CD, asthis frequent non-aligned proposal has been firmlyresisted by the nuclear-weapon states. The SouthAfrican proposal was quickly welcomed by a widevariety of states, including New Zealand, Brazil,Ireland, and Japan. Canada proposed a similar com-mittee connected with negotiations on a fissile mate-rial production ban.9 Belgium has proposed that theCD create �a framework where nuclear disarmamentissues could be explained, followed, questioned andanswered�.10 The previous German government con-sidered it �appropriate and legitimate that discus-sions should take place in the multilateral forumsdevoted to disarmament on how member states cancontribute to effective measures in the field of nucleardisarmament�.11 The new government is presumablyeven more supportive of the idea.

The European Union should endorse the SouthAfrican proposal. The current UK position, to in-clude its nuclear arsenal in disarmament negotia-tions when �satisfied with verified progress towards

42


our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weap-ons� does not conflict with the idea of a committeeto discuss efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.12 Theproposal does not commit any state to commencenegotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons.It simply proposes a forum for discussions, for raisingproposals, and pursuing ideas for disarmament.

In light of these many demands, in March 1998 thetroika of past, present, and upcoming Presidents ofthe CD was charged with undertaking �intensiveconsultations� on nuclear disarmament. UK Ambas-sador to the CD Ian Soutar, who was the President ofthe last 1998 sessions and thus leader of the finaltroika, has stated that no consensus emerged on anyof the proposals. He noted that the Non-AlignedMovement strongly endorsed establishing an ad hoccommittee on disarmament in some form, but thatsome states opposed this idea, particularly the nuclear-weapon states. He recommended, however, that thetroika resume consultations when the CD opens in1999.13

When confronted with proposals for an ad hoccommittee or similar forum, the nuclear-weaponstates typically make one of two objections. The firstis to highlight the continued need for bilateral progressbetween the two states with the largest arsenals:Russia and the United States. The nuclear- weaponstates point to the substantial progress already made,and express their view that this is the only path tofurther disarmament.

The second objection is to note that there alreadyexist forums for discussions on disarmament, in theUN�s General Assembly and First Committee, at theDisarmament Commission, and in the NPT context,for example.

Neither of these objections are sufficient groundsto continue to refuse such discussions. The proposalsput forth do not seek to interrupt the bilateral US-Russian progress. A forum for discussions at the CDwould be supplement that process. Negotiations ondisarmament would not take place, unless all partiesfelt there were worthwhile objectives that could beobtained. Nor would the proposal duplicate otherforums. The General Assembly is a forum for consid-ering resolutions, and can indicate support for par-ticular approaches, but is not an open-ended forumfor discussions. The Disarmament Commission is notdesigned to provide the long-term focus that discus-

sions on the elimination of nuclear will require. Andto date, the nuclear-weapon states have refused to usethe NPT enhanced review process as a forum fordiscussing next steps in the disarmament process. TheCD has none of these problems.

In the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council

The second forum for discussion on elimination isthe NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. TheJoint Council has already established a workinggroup on nuclear weapons that has three items on itsagenda. Adding a fourth � discussions on the elimi-nation of nuclear weapons � is both feasible andlogical. More importantly, the existence of this work-ing group demonstrates that nuclear-weapon statesare willing to discuss disarmament issues in a multi-lateral forum, even one that includes non-nuclear-weapon states. Unlike the broader mandate for theConference on Disarmament, the Joint Council shouldfocus on the specific issues facing Europe. The JointCouncil also has the capability to reach agreementsmore quickly than is normally feasible at the Confer-ence on Disarmament. Two of its agreed areas of work� tactical nuclear weapons and President Yeltsin�sstatement on de-alerting nuclear weapons � shouldbe among the next steps to the disarmament processas a whole.

Talks among the five

A final forum is five-power talks among the nuclear-weapon states, perhaps with the inclusion of a UNobserver to provide reports to other states whenappropriate. Unlike the Permanent Joint Council,this would have the advantage of including all thedeclared nuclear-weapon states. At the same time,discussions in a five-power forum would be simplerthan the 60-plus states that could be involved at theCD.

This forum would allow the nuclear-weapon statesto discuss the necessary conditions for the elimina-tion of nuclear weapons. This is perhaps the bestforum to further discussions on verifying eliminationof warheads and creating sustainable storage regimesfor fissile materials. At present, the nuclear-weaponsstates consider much of this information highlysecret, as details about building weapons can berevealed during the destruction process. Discussionsin this forum could create a regime that could lead toan open process of elimination without giving awaynuclear secrets.


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A final forum should also be mentioned. Asdescribed in Chapter Four, the UK and France haveused their Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy andDoctrine to discuss non-proliferation policy. Theyshould now use it to co-ordinate their early entry intothe START process.

6.2 Reduce the Alert Status of NuclearWeapons

On 25 January 1995, the routine launch of a USscientific rocket off the western coast of Norway setoff alarms in Russia, and almost led to global disas-ter. The first reports from Russia�s early warningsystem indicated the rocket was potentially a Tridentsubmarine-launched missile aimed at Russia. For thefirst time ever, President Yeltsin activated his nuclearsuitcase. Russia was literally minutes away fromdeciding whether to order a retaliatory strike. Fi-nally, Russian officials correctly determined that themissile would land hundreds of kilometres out to sea,and the emergency passed.14 In 1997, reports in theUS media indicated that deteriorating Russian com-mand and control systems might have led to missilesswitching to �combat mode� without warning.15 USsystems have made similar errors in the past. Theseincidents demonstrate the dangers of maintainingthe high alert status typical of the Cold War era.

Earlier De-alerting Steps

NATO has already taken steps to reduce the alertstatus of some nuclear systems, particularly for tacti-cal weapons. Thousands of warheads have beencompletely withdrawn and are being destroyed orstored in the United States. Aircraft no longer sit onQuick Reaction Alert, with their electronics pre-heated and loaded with nuclear weapons, ready forimmediate take-off.

As described in Chapter 2, in its Defence Reviewthe UK announced that Trident submarines will nowbe �routinely at a �notice to fire� measured in daysrather than the few minutes� quick reaction alertsustained throughout the Cold War�. At present, fewdetails are available on how this �notice to fire� statuswas implemented. Comments from UK officials indi-cate this is operational or procedural change, ratherthan a technical one. For example, crews will notconstantly be on stand-by alert, and there will be lessemphasis on being in constant communication. As a

safety measure to reduce the likelihood of accident ormiscalculation, this step is praiseworthy. Franceshould immediately declare and implement an iden-tical policy.

According to UK officials, however, this step is nota de-alerting measure. It will not be verifiable exter-nally. Instead, the UK views it as a confidence-building measure, similar to the agreements to detargetnuclear missiles reached with Russia. Those agree-ments are also unverifiable.

Because the �notice to fire� status is not verifiable,its benefits are minimised. Outside parties cannotconfirm the status, so there is no way to ascertain ifit was abandoned for a higher level of alert. Russianofficials have already stated that they will be unwill-ing to place their nuclear forces on reduced alertstatus unless it can be confirmed that British, French,and Chinese forces are de-alerted.16

This raises difficult but not insurmountable is-sues. Both France and the United Kingdom relyprimarily on a single submarine at sea at a time � itis the latter�s only nuclear force. This makes verifyingthe status and location of the submarine more com-plicated, as this could make the submarine vulner-able to attack. For the United States, it is feasible toreveal the location and status of one submarine at atime in a force of four to six at sea.

Next Steps

Solutions to this dilemma are available. For ex-ample, US submarines en route to their launchstations are on a modified alert status from which ittakes approximately 18 hours to bring the submarineto full alert, ready for launch within minutes.17

British and French submarines could maintain thisstatus indefinitely, and it is possible to verify thisstatus externally without revealing the submarine�slocation. One aspect of modified alert is that themissile launch tubes are blocked until the floodplates are removed. It is possible to place an elec-tronic seal on the flood plate. This seal would com-municate with a buoy that would be released by thesubmarine. After a sufficient time delay to disguisethe location of the submarine, the buoy broadcastsinformation confirming that the seals are still inplace.18

Similar verifiable steps that could be taken in-clude removing guidance systems from missiles, or

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shutting down power to the missiles.19 These wouldincrease the amount of time required to delivermissiles to their targets by hours or days.

Further steps

More far reaching steps are also possible. In itsDefence Review, the British government reportedthat it considered removing warheads from missilesand storing them separately ashore, and ending thepermanent patrol of Trident submarines. The Reviewrejected both options: �Either step would underminethe stabilising role that Britain�s nuclear deterrentforces would otherwise play in a developing crisis�.20

One of the primary arguments used against thesesteps is that it would lead to a �race to re-alert� thatwould be more destabilising than the current situa-tion. For example, deploying a nuclear-armed sub-marine during a time of tension could be perceived asa provocative act that might lead to further escala-tion.

This argument fails in two important respects.First, if both countries began re-alerting their forces,the end result would merely be a return to the presentstatus � a fully alerted and deployed force. Neitherside could have confidence that it had re-alerted itsforces sufficiently to launch a disarming first strike, soneither would attack.

More importantly, a substantive and verified de-alerting regime would allow both sides to know howlong and what steps it would take to re-alert forces.Both sides would know when the other began re-alerting, and would have ample time to follow suit ifnecessary.

Thus, both France and the UK should take addi-tional steps to reduce the alert status of their nuclearweapons, and develop ways to make that statusverifiable. If permanent patrolling of the submarinesis ended, both countries could announce when andif a submarine was going on a training missionpatrol. It could allow for verification by nationaltechnical means (NTM) that either no missiles or nowarheads are on board. This would serve as a confi-dence-building measure, and indicate the reducedimportance of nuclear weapons to European secu-rity.

It is important to note that de-alerting should notbe seen as a substitute for further disarmament. It is

merely one step to reduce the immediate danger ofaccidental, inadvertent or mistaken nuclear launch.The ultimate goal must remain the elimination ofnuclear weapons.

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council coulddiscuss each of these steps and agree implementingmeasures.

6.3 End the Deployment of Non-StrategicNuclear Weapons and Give Up theOption of Wartime Nuclear WeaponsUse by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

Various estimates place the total Russian tacticalnuclear arsenal at between 7,000 and 22,000 war-heads.21 According to an unofficial Russian source,13,700 of Russia�s 21,700 tactical nuclear weapons areto be eliminated under the program resulting fromthe 1991 unilateral reductions taken by RussianPresident Gorbachev, following earlier steps by USPresident Bush.22 Another estimate puts operationalRussian tactical nuclear weapons at 4,000, a level thatcould fall to the hundreds over the next decade asweapons reach the end of their service lives.23 TheUnited States maintains less than 1,000 tactical nuclearweapons in its operational arsenal, of which approxi-mately 180 are in Europe.24 The United States alsomaintains a �hedge� stockpile of warheads that couldbe re-deployed should circumstances warrant. Tacti-cal nuclear weapons make up a portion of the 2,500warheads in the hedge.25

The West has three concerns about tactical weap-ons. First, the number, location, and operationalstatus of the remaining Russian warheads are un-known. Second, Russia�s ability to maintain com-mand and control of its nuclear arsenal is, by mostaccounts, deteriorating. Finally, there is the dangerof a sharp turn for the worse in the Russian politicalsituation. US concerns, combined with Russian aware-ness that its tactical forces are deteriorating evenfaster than its strategic arsenal, were the drivingfactors in the language on tactical nuclear systems inthe 1997 Helsinki agreements outlining a frameworkfor START III.26 On the other hand, the deteriorationof its conventional forces drove Russian doctrinalchanges and increased reliance on forward basing oftactical nuclear forces. NATO enlargement exacer-bated this concern. NATO should make strenuousefforts in the CFE process to reduce Russian concerns


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by cutting the Alliance�s conventional forces, andenhancing related confidence-building measures.

Current talks in the NATO-Russia PermanentJoint Council

NATO and Russia have begun discussions on non-strategic arsenals in the NATO-Russia PermanentJoint Council. However, Western countries are dis-satisfied with the initial exchanges, and concernsabout the Russian non-strategic forces remain. InJune 1998, NATO�s Defence Planning Committee andthe Nuclear Planning Group called �upon Russia tofurther review its tactical nuclear weapons stockpilewith a view toward making additional significantreductions�.27

On the other hand, Russia continues to object toNATO expansion and links its reliance on tacticalnuclear weapons to NATO�s enlargement. NATO�sstatements that it will not deploy nuclear weaponson the territory of new Alliance members providesome reassurance, yet Russia�s demand that thispledge be put in a legally-binding form has not beenmet. Russia has also proposed the withdrawal of allnuclear weapons to national territory. Only US nuclearweapons deployed in Europe do not already meetthat objective.

Several proposals have been set forth to addressthe continued presence of tactical nuclear weapons inEurope. They include the creation of a Central Euro-pean Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), withdrawalof weapons to national territory, and complete elimi-nation of tactical nuclear weapons. Both the CanberraCommission and the New Agenda Coalition calledfor ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclearweapons. Each of these proposals has merit, but lacksthe critical support of one or more essential players.

Two options are described below: including tacti-cal nuclear weapons in START III, and reciprocalunilateral steps by Russia and the US to reducenuclear weapons. Both options need to be consideredand pursued as appropriate.

Option One: Include tactical nuclear weapons inSTART III

One of the best approaches would be to includetactical weapons in the next round of the STARTprocess. Broad support is mounting for this option.

In the Helsinki agreements, the two countries agreed�that in the context of Start III negotiations theirexperts will explore, as separate issues, possible mea-sures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launchedcruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to in-clude appropriate confidence-building and transpar-ency measures.�28 The head of U.S. Strategic Com-mand, Air Force General Eugene Habiger, has statedthat he anticipates that START III will place limits ontactical nuclear weapons.29 John Deutch, former USCentral Intelligence Agency head, and Ashton Carter,former US assistant secretary of defence, proposed anarms control regime that would set limits on totalholdings of nuclear warheads, including non-strate-gic weapons.30 A recent study by the National De-fense University and Los Alamos National Laborato-ries comes to the same conclusion.31 The authors ofthis report have long advocated such a regime.32

In the simplest model, START III would set anaggregate total for all active and inactive strategicand non-strategic warheads. Within the limitationsset, the agreement would allow the freedom to mixwarheads of different categories, according to na-tional needs and plans. The United States couldchoose to eliminate all or almost all its tacticalweapons, while Russia could maintain several hun-dred or more, thus meeting its concerns about smallernuclear neighbours. In any scenario, in exchange forthe withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe,Russia would agree in a legally binding manner tofurther substantial reductions in its tactical nucleararsenal. The agreement would end the deployment ofnuclear weapons off national territories. Finally,mutual transparency would become mandatory,through an accounting regime would provide infor-mation on the numbers and locations of warheads.

There are many advantages to tackling bothtactical and strategic weapons in one framework.First, as outlined in Helsinki, START III will take onthe transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inven-tories and the destruction of strategic nuclear war-heads. It is advantageous to apply new rules fortransparency and verified warhead dismantlement toboth tactical and strategic weapons. Second, such anapproach would avoid the duplication and addi-tional time that would be necessary to reach separateagreements. Third, dealing with tactical and strategicweapons under the same treaty will allow increasedflexibility to address asymmetries in Russian and US

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postures.Fourth, it would address Russian concernsabout US forward-based systems. Finally, it wouldeliminate the artificial US-Russian arms control dis-tinction between tactical and strategic weapons,which has become increasingly superficial since theend of the Cold War.33 The integration of strategicand non-strategic nuclear weapons under joint limi-tations will promote irreversibility of reductions andincrease confidence on both sides in the regime.

Additionally, an agreement of this type could givethe force of international treaty obligation to thereductions in tactical nuclear forces already carriedout unilaterally by Russia and the United Statesduring the course of the 1990s. The West has longbeen concerned about Russian implementation ofthe commitments to reductions made by Gorbachevand the Russian military. A treaty would verifyreductions on both sides.

In parallel, France and the United Kingdom coulduse the agreement on verification of warhead destruc-tion to substantiate the reductions they have under-taken in recent years. For example, the United King-dom, even without a formal treaty, could allowRussian inspectors the same access that they will getfrom the United States under START III. Russia couldthen verify the destruction of the UK�s withdrawnWE-177 gravity bombs. In exchange, Russia couldallow the UK to access the data gathered by theUnited States when it verifies Russian reductions.

This does not mean, however, that agreement willbe easy. In response to its declining conventionalforces, Russian military officials frequently reaffirmthe need for stronger reliance on nuclear weapons.Some European states may be reluctant to supportthe withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe,fearing that it will indicate a decline in US commit-ment to the continent. New NATO members inparticular may fear the potential revival of the Rus-sian threat.

Furthermore, the regime to verify dismantlementand destruction of strategic and tactical warheadswill require far more intrusive and specialised inspec-tions than under any present treaty. Once destroyed,the two sides must create a verifiable storage regimefor the residual components.

However, there is strong support for a START IIIthat includes non-strategic weapons. From GeneralHabiger on down, the US military is committed to

that goal. US officials have hinted that the ClintonAdministration is seeking to create its arms controllegacy by getting the first agreement on verifiedwarhead destruction. The US Department of Energyalready has a substantial program with Russianscientists on this topic. The Russian military, aware ofthe rapid and almost inevitable decline of their ownforces, may be more willing than it appears to agreeto a broad START III that includes non-strategicweapons and verified elimination of warheads. TheChemical Weapons Convention provides some use-ful parallels for intrusive inspections, but a great dealof work needs to be done in this area.

Option Two: Reciprocal Unilateral Steps

A second option to end the deployment of tacticalnuclear weapons is for Russia and the United States toundertake a series of reciprocal unilateral, but verifi-able, actions for all nuclear weapons. This initiativewould be similar to the unilateral steps taken byPresidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. Unlike theBush-Gorbachev reductions, however, these stepswould include verification of the reductions and ofthe storage of the leftover fissile materials. Thisoption has several benefits.

First, it can be done quickly. Rather than themonths or years that agreeing a full treaty can take,the two countries can begin to take steps immedi-ately, and continue rapidly. Second, it should appealto both countries. Russian forces are expected todecline to a level of 1,000-1,500 in the next decade,regardless of the US arsenal. Thus, Russia will want toensure US forces move toward the same levels, whilethe US will want to verify the Russian reductions.

Third, it would avoid the complications of parlia-mentary approval that bedevil or have bedeviled theChemical Weapons Convention, START II and theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and so on. The USSenate and Russian Duma frequently have held uptreaties for reasons unrelated to national security andin opposition to national interest. To compensate forthe lack of parliamentary approval, both Presidentswould provide detailed information, preferably inunclassified form, on the reductions made and on thestatus of verification.

Fourth, it would provide a simple way to includeFrance and the United Kingdom in the process, andpotentially China as well. Each of the five could


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provide information on the status of their forces,detail reductions taken, and verify cuts by the others.Each would have to provide information on andaccess to their forces to be able to verify others�reductions. While this step would not be necessary inthe early stages of the US-Russian reductions, itwould become vital as their forces approached thelevel of 1,000.

Finally, it would be a seamless way to integratestrategic and non-strategic forces. The verificationprocedures apply equally well to warheads of anytype, as well as to the safe storage of fissile materials.Ideally, the verification procedures would allow Rus-sia and the US to confirm the unilateral reductionstaken by both Bush and Gorbachev.

The role for Western Europe

Under either START III or a reciprocal step ap-proach, Western Europe�s crucial role would be tosupport of the removal of US tactical nuclear weap-ons from Europe. The new German government isknown to be considering indicating that it couldsupport withdrawal. The UK is confident that itsTrident system can fulfil the sub-strategic role tradi-tionally taken by gravity bombs. The British effort,announced in the Defence Review, to study verifica-tion of reductions in nuclear arsenals, can also con-tribute to either approach.

European nations have traditionally argued thatfull integration of NATO nuclear planning and theexistence of nuclear sharing programmes demon-strate a serious American commitment to the defenceof Europe. They have also feared that a nuclearwithdrawal would be followed by a US conventionalpullout and the end of NATO. Others argued thatEurope and North America must equally share therisks and burdens of nuclear defence. With the end ofthe Cold War and the disappearance of any militarythreat to NATO, these arguments are no longer valid.

Ending the deployment of US tactical nuclearweapons in Europe would also end the most provoca-tive aspect of NATO�s nuclear sharing: the prepara-tions for and the possible use of nuclear weapons bynon-nuclear-weapon states during times of war. Asdiscussed above, at the 1998 PrepCom, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for the first time formallyobjected to NATO�s nuclear sharing policy and rec-ommended ending it.

End nuclear training programs and removeinfrastructure

Thus, along with withdrawing US nuclear weap-ons, NATO should stop training pilots from non-nuclear-weapon states for nuclear missions and re-move all associated infrastructures for those states�territories. As described in Chapter 5, each countryhas one wing of fighter aircraft trained to use nuclearweapons in war, as well as facilities for storing nuclearweapons.

As NATO recently made clear, nuclear weapons��fundamental purpose is political: to preserve peaceand prevent coercion and any kind of war.�34 Themilitary role for US tactical nuclear weapons de-ployed in Europe is absolutely minimal. There is noneed for forward deployment, and the political costsfar outweigh the benefits. The withdrawal of suchweapons would neither weaken US commitment toEurope, nor encourage Russian military adventurism.

6.4 Halt First-Use Policies by France, theUK, and NATO

As the UK stated in its Strategic Defence Review,

the collapse of Communism and the emergence ofdemocratic states throughout Eastern Europe andin Russia means that there is today no directmilitary threat to the United Kingdom or WesternEurope. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of sucha threat.35

NATO conventional forces in Europe are vastlysuperior to any conceivable threat, including theslim possibility of a reconstituted Russian army. Forthese reasons, the two nuclear-weapon states in Eu-rope and NATO should declare no-first-use policies.

In practice, any state that used nuclear weaponswould gravely damage its national interests andposition, generating massive international and pub-lic opposition. The political and economic cost ofbeing the first to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state would be particularly high. Inthe present environment, any NATO state that did sowould become a pariah, shunned by the interna-tional community.

NATO needs to translate its 1991 commitmentonly to use nuclear weapons as a last resort into amilitary doctrine that precludes first-use. It is in-

48


conceivable, in all but the most extreme circum-stances, that a non-nuclear-weapon state could mounta conventional attack that would threaten the exist-ence of a nuclear-weapon state. Even Israel has alwaysmanaged to repel conventional attack without re-course to nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, any use of nuclear weapons, espe-cially first-use, would damage the international non-proliferation regime permanently. Further use ofnuclear weapons would be seen as an option, anddozens of states would reconsider their non-nuclearstatus.

Militarily, there is increasing recognition thatnuclear weapons are ineffective in achieving strategicobjectives. US General Colin Powell revealed thatalthough the military considered nuclear use, noviable option could be found during the 1991 GulfWar.36

It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which itwould be in the interest of the France, the UK, orNATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. InNATO�s case, the question of whether to use nuclearweapons in a wartime scenario would put extremepressure on the Alliance, as member states wouldhave differing ideas about whether nuclear use wasappropriate or not.

The case of chemical and biological weapons

One scenario frequently suggested for using nuclearweapons is to respond, or even pre-empt, the use ofchemical or biological weapons. Former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command, General LeeButler, describes using nuclear weapons as a solutionto chemical or biological attack as an �outmodedidea�. According to Butler: �Conventional retalia-tion would be far more proportionate, less damagingto neighboring states and less horrific for innocentcivilians�.37

In addition, planning for the use of nuclear weap-ons against non-nuclear-weapon states underminesthe security assurances given to non-nuclear-weaponstates signatories to the NPT and the non-prolifera-tion regime as a whole. The discussion on securityassurances at the 1998 NPT PrepCom highlighted thecontinued importance placed on this issue by non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as the reluctance of thenuclear-weapon states to provide any additionalguarantees.

Finally, it is important to recognise that relyingon nuclear weapons to handle worst case scenarios isto rely on a weak instrument. For any imaginedscenario �requiring� nuclear use there is another evenworse case where political issues preclude nuclear use.It is these true worst cases which provide the overrid-ing imperative for risk reduction strategies and non-nuclear responses.

The likelihood of change

Politically, adopting a no-first-use policy facessubstantial obstacles. The nuclear tests by India andPakistan, in some minds, increase the need for anuclear �deterrent�. Uncertainty about Russia�s fu-ture also increases support for maintaining first-usepolicies.

At present, the United States military may be thegreatest obstacle to a NATO no-first-use policy. Asdescribed in Chapter 5, the United States has tradi-tionally led changes in NATO military doctrine,particularly in nuclear policy. There is a debatewithin the US Administration and military on first-use, but that debate is some way from changingcurrent policy. For example, during his recent visit toChina, President Clinton publicly rejected a no-first-use policy.

At the same time, no-first-use would have consid-erable support. In Germany, the coalition treatyagreed by the new government called for a �cam-paign to lower the alert status of (NATO�s) nuclearweapons and for a renunciation of the first-use ofnuclear weapons�.38 German Foreign Minister JoschkaFischer said �We must discuss [no-first-use] openly inthe alliance without creating the impression thatGermany is going its own way now�.39

Within the European Union, Ireland and Sweden,as part of the New Agenda Coalition and elsewhere,have called for no-first-use declarations. In the agree-ment forming the ruling coalition, the new Germangovernment agreed to pursue no-first-use policies,and German officials have pledged to raise the issuein NATO. As described above, the UK Labour Partycommitted in pre-election documents to pursuing ano-first-use policy on a multilateral basis with allies,but merely reiterated its previous negative securityassurances in its Defence Review. Recently, Belgianand Canadian officials have discussed the possibilityof NATO ending reliance on first-use. Largely because


49

of the advisory opinion of the International Court ofJustice on the general illegality of threat or use ofnuclear weapons, the Canadian Parliament is under-taking a review of the country�s nuclear policies,including first-use.

6.5 Include Commitments by France andthe UK on the Future of Their NuclearArsenals in the START III Context

The slow progress on START II underlines thequestion of how and when the three smaller nuclearpowers should become involved in the process. In thepast, bilateral negotiations have been justified on thegrounds that they could be completed quickly andefficiently. However, the recent impasse in US-Rus-sian negotiations and the extension of the deadlinefor full implementation of START II by five years, to31 December 2007, imply that it would be shortsighted to leave the UK, France, and China outsidethe strategic arms reduction process indefinitely.

Directly involving France and the UK in START IIIis unnecessary. The 1997 Helsinki framework agree-ment already provides the outline of a treaty betweenRussian and the United States. However, politically-binding commitments from France and the UK, forexample, to not increase the size of their arsenalswould create a more co-operative and stable environ-ment.

First, in the short term, these commitments couldhelp with the Russian Duma�s ratification of STARTII. In the longer term, they would contribute tonuclear weapon�s decreasing relevance to Europeansecurity.

Under current governments, both France and theUK should be able to commit to not increase theirarsenals. However, as described in Chapter 3, Francedoes have plans to introduce new weapons to replacemuch of its existing arsenal. At the same time, theFrench programme has already faced delays andreductions, and France is still feeling the sting ofinternational criticism following its 1995 resumptionof nuclear testing. A French commitment to cancel itsplanned new systems, particularly if made in thecontext of the Russian-US reductions, would pro-mote further bilateral reductions, and strengthen theinternational non-proliferation regime.

6.6 Initiate a European Co-operativeThreat Reduction Programme

European Union nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states can contribute to strengthen-ing nuclear disarmament and to safeguarding theinternational non-proliferation regime. One way todo so would be an integrated European Co-operativeThreat Reduction Programme, designed to paralleland add to the US Nunn-Lugar programme. Thiscould be co-ordinated through the European Union-Russia Co-operation Council.

Building on experience already gained in EU-Russia co-operation on civil nuclear programmes, aEuropean programme could assist in:

� safeguarding nuclear weapons-capable materialsand knowledge;

� strengthening Russian export control regimes;

� strengthening safety and security at nuclear fa-cilities;

� handling and converting of excess nuclear weap-ons materials; and

� contributing to disarmament.

It could also assist in similar tasks for biologicaland chemical weapons disarmament, areas beyondthe scope of this report.

While many separate projects on individual as-pects of the problems already exist in several Euro-pean countries, much remains to be done. In addi-tion, there is a substantial lack of co-ordination andintegration for European projects. Any initiative towiden European activities in this field and strengthenco-ordination is likely to find wide support through-out the foreign policy communities in Europeancountries.

The EU-Russia Co-operation Council was createdas part of the EU-Russia Partnership and Co-opera-tion Agreement in 1994. However, ratification of theAgreement was delayed, and it only entered intoforce in December 1997. The Co-operation Councilheld its first meeting in January 1998. It stressed thatthe EU and Russia are �� strategic partners for peace,stability, freedom and prosperity in Europe and thatthey share a responsibility for the future of thecontinent and beyond�.40 Subjects discussed included

50


(civil) nuclear safety, cross border co-operation, andforeign and security policies. From this, it is clearthat, in some areas, Russia can be expected to wel-come non-US-options to solve its disarmament andnon-proliferation problems.

While it involves some non-NATO nations, anysubstantial European Co-operative Threat Reduc-tion Programme would also constitute an intra-alliance burden-sharing initiative. NATO, throughthe Permanent Joint Council, should consult on andcontribute to the programme. Its budget shouldequal or exceed the US Co-operative Threat Reduc-tion Programme, and should be co-ordinated throughthe existing EU Technical Assistance to the Common-wealth of Independent States (TACIS) structures.Such a programme would be a logical developmentof existing EU co-operation in the non-proliferationfield. They would find themselves supported by thevast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon statesthroughout the world. The creation of such aprogramme would also give great depth and sub-stance to the EU-Russia partnership.

If such a programme proved feasible, the exten-sion of this programme to all EU Associated andPartner nations would dramatically strengthen itseffectiveness. This would bring virtually all centraland eastern European countries, and the states of theCIS into the regime.


51

Endnotes

Section One: Nuclear Weapons and NuclearPolicy in Western Europe1 Canberra Commission, Report of the CanberraCommission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,Commonwealth of Australia, August 1996, Canberra.Available on the web at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html.

2 Committee on International Security and ArmsControl, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,National Academy of Sciences, National AcademyPress, Washington, 1997.

3�Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons:Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assemblyof the United Nations�, International Court of Justice,Communiqué No. 96/23, 8 July 1996.

4 �Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Needfor a New Agenda�, United Nations Document A/C.1/53/48/Rev.1, 5 November 1998.

Section Two: The United Kingdom1 The five declared nuclear-weapon states are China,France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates. India and Pakistan, despite their recent nucleartests, are only nuclear-capable states, as neither hasdeployed nuclear weapons. Israel, though it has nottested, is also a nuclear-capable state.

2 House of Lords, Official Report, The Stationery Office,17 December 1997, column 684.

3 Gallup, commissioned by the National SteeringCommittee of Nuclear Free Local Authorities,conducted from 5�10 September 1997 on a represen-tative sample of 1008 people.

4 The Strategic Defence Review, Presented to Parliamentby the Secretary of State for Defence by Command ofHer Majesty, July 1998, Cmnd 3999, The StationeryOffice. Also available on the web at http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm.

5 Strategic Defence Review, �Supporting Essay Five:Deterrence, Arms Control, and Proliferation�, para.5, The Stationery Office, July 1998. Also available onthe web at: http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/essay05.htm.

6 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 62.

7 Minister of State for Defence Procurement, LordGilbert, indicated a figure of £940 million(approximatly US$1,503 million) for nuclear weaponsrelated costs in FY1997-98 (House of Lords, OfficialReport, 9 December 1997, column 4). On 10 February1995, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, NicholasSoames told Christopher Mullin, MP, in a writtenanswer, that 7.2% of the 1993/94 Defence budget(approximately £1,600 million) (US$2,560 million)was spent on maintaining and operating Britishnuclear forces. In addition, the government routinelyattributes some costs associated with Trident,including construction costs at Aldermaston, Faslaneand Coulport, to other parts of the Defence budget.

8 �Supporting Essay Five�, op. cit., para. 8.

9Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para. 62.

10 �Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996�, Cm3223, HMSO, London, May 1996, p.24, and�Supporting Essay Five�, op. cit., para. 6.


12 House of Commons, Official Report, 16 July 1998,column 237.

13 �Supporting Essay Five�, op. cit., Figure 1, Note 3.

14 The UK uses the Mark 4 Trident re-entry vehicle,which in the US is used to carry the Trident W76warhead. In 1982-83 the Joint Atomic InformationExchange Group established a �StatutoryDetermination� to allow �communication to the UKof atomic information on the MK-4 Re-entry Bodyand W-76 Warhead for the Trident Missile Systems�,Annual Historical Summary (U), Joint AtomicInformation Exchange Group, HQ, Defense NuclearAgency, 1 October 1982 � 30 September 1983,Document released under the Freedom of InformationAct.

15 Report of the missile buy in George Jones and TimButcher, �Britain adds to Trident arsenal�, The DailyTelegraph, 10 October 1997, and confirmation thatthe total purchased will be 58 in Strategic DefenceReview, op. cit., para. 65.

16 House of Commons, Official Report, 31 July 1998,para. 448.

52



18 �The British Strategic Nuclear Force: Text of Lettersexchanged between the Prime Minister and thePresident of the United States and between theSecretary of State for Defence and the US Secretary ofDefense�, Cmnd 8517, 11 March 1982.

19 Malcolm Rifkind (then Secretary of State forDefence), �UK Defence Strategy; A Continuing Rolefor Nuclear Weapons?�, Ministry of Defence, London,16 November 1993.


21 House of Commons, Official Report, The StationeryOffice, 20 May 1997, column 24.

22 See Paul Rogers, The Role of British Nuclear Weaponsafter the Cold War, BASIC Research Report 95.1,November 1995, and Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Futures:Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and USNuclear Strategy, BASIC Research Report 98.2, March1998.

23 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit.

24 House of Commons, Official Report, 4 December1997, column 577.

25 House of Lords, Official Report, 29 October 1998,column WA224.

26 For a review and analysis of US policy on this, seeHans Kristensen, op. cit.


28 Ibid., para. 12.

29 �Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996�,presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State forDefence by Command of Her Majesty, May 1996,Cmnd 3223, p.24. Available on the web at: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/mod/defence/deffc.htm.

30 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 January1997, column 27.

31 House of Lords, Official Report, 23 June 1997,column 1458.

32 Letter from the Ministry of Defence Directorate ofNuclear Policy to the Campaign for NuclearDisarmament, 23 February 1994.

33 House of Lords, Official Report, 17 December 1997,column 688.


35 The Labour Party, New Labour: because Britaindeserves better, 1997.


37 The Labour Party, A Fresh Start for Britain: Labour�sStrategy for Britain in the Modern World, 1996.

38 Robin Cook, �Bombs Away�, New Statesman andSociety, 14 April 1995.

39 Ministry of Defence, Press Release 055/97, �Britain�sDefence: Securing our Future Together�, 28 May1997.

40 House of Lords, Official Report, 10 February 1998,column 996.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., para. 15.

44 Ibid., para. 10.

45 Ibid., para. 35.

46 Ibid., para. 32.

47 �Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of theInternational Court of Justice on the Legality of theTreaty or Use of Nuclear Weapons�, Fifty-secondsession, UN First Committee, A/C.1/52/L.37.

48 U.K. Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution A/C.1/52/L.37.

49 House of Lords, Official Report, 26 January 1998,columns 7-8.

50 �Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of theInternational Court of Justice on the Legality of theTreaty or Use of Nuclear Weapons�, op. cit.

51 U.K. Explanation of Vote, op. cit.

52 �Transparency in Armaments�, Fifty-second session,UN First Committee, A/C.1/52/L.2/Rev.1.

Chapter Three: France1 �Livre Blanc sur la Défense�, La DocumentationFrançaise, 1994, p.35.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p.77.

4 Ibid., p.78.

5 Ibid., p.79.

Endnotes

53

6 Ibid., p.82.7 Ibid.8 Ibid., p.83.9 Ibid., p.107.10 Ibid.11 Figures from Armées d�Aujourd�hui, February 1992,1993, 1994. Published by SIRPA and from the Loi deFinances 1998, Rapport Général No. 85, Tome 3,Annexe 43.12 Jean Michel Boucheron, �Rapport No. 305, Projet deloi de Finances, Annexe 40, Défense�, 12 November1997, p.85.13 Maurice Blin, �Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998,adopté par l�Assemblée Nationale � Défense�, Senat,Rapport Général No. 85, Tome 3, Annexe 43, 1997.14 M. Jean Faure, �Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998,adopté par l�Assemblée Nationale � Défense �Nucléaire, Espace et Services Communs�, Senat, AvisNo. 88, Tome IV, 1997.15 See Jean Michel Boucheron, �Rapport No. 305,Projet de loi de Finances, Annexe 40, Défense�, 12November 1997. For the section on simulation ofnuclear tests, see pp. 90-1.16 Jacques Chirac, �Allocution aux Armées�, 23February 1996.17 Maurice Blin, �Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1998,adopté par l�Assemblée Nationale � Défense�, Senat,Rapport Général No. 85, Tome 3, Annexe 43, 1997.18 François Mitterand, Speech to the seminar RencontresNationales pour l'Europe, 11 January 1992.19 Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit.20 �The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons�,Assembly of the Western European Union Document1420, Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, 19 May 1994.21 �Livre Blanc sur la Défense�, op. cit., p.46.22 Ibid.23 Bruno Tertrais, �L�Arme Nucléaire après La GuerreFroide�, Economica, Paris, 1994.24 Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, Speech at the 20thAnniversary of the Centre d�Analyse et Prévision, 30January 1995.25 Prime Minister Alain Juppé, Speech to the Institutdes Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, 7 September1995.

26 Ibid.

27 �Franco-German Common Security and DefenceConcept�, 9 December 1996, para. 3.1.

28 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/10566,�Answer of the Federal Government to questions byMP�s Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, ChristianSterzing, Ludger Volmer and the Faction of Alliance90 / The Greens�, Bonn, 28 April 1998, p.7.

Section 4: Nuclear Co-operation1 �Agreement between the Government of the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland andthe Government of the United States of America forCo-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy forMutual Defence Purposes�, Washington, 3 July 1958.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., column 139-140.

5 Ibid., column 140.

6 �British-French Joint Statement on NuclearCo-operation�, issued at the Anglo-French Summit,London, 29-30 October 1995




10 Cited in Martin Butcher, �Nuclear Weapons in theEuropean Union�, CESD Issues in European SecurityNumber 5, Centre for European Security andDisarmament (CESD), Brussels, May 1996.

11 �Interview�, Jane�s Defence Weekly, 14 January 1998,p.32.


13 House of Commons Defence Committee, �Progressof the Trident Programme�, HC 350 of 1994-95, 5 July1995, p.25.

14 �Agreement between the Government of the UnitedStates of America and the Government of the FrenchRepublic for Co-operation in the Operation of AtomicWeapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes�,Paris, 27 July 1961.

54


15 �Amendment modifying the Agreement betweenthe Government of the United States of America andthe Government of the French Republic for Co-operation in the Operation of Atomic WeaponsSystems to provide for Co-operation on the Safetyand Security of Nuclear Activities and Installationsfor Mutual Defense Purposes�, Paris, 22 July 1985.

16 Richard Ullman, �The Covert French Connection�,Foreign Policy, Summer 1989, Vol. 75, pp. 3-33.

17 �Memorandum of Agreement on Co-operationConcerning Nuclear Safety and Security�, Washington,4 June 1996.

18 M. Jean Faure, op. cit.

19 Maurice Blin, op. cit.

20 Jean Michel Boucheron, op. cit., p.90.

21 Ibid.

22 M, Jean Faure, op. cit., and Jean Michel Boucheron,op. cit., pp. 90-91.

23 �Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995�, Cm2800, HMSO, London, 3 May 1995, p.77.

24 House of Commons Defence Committee, �Progressof the Trident Programme�, HC 297 of 1993-94, 4 May1994, p.15.

25 Ibid.

26 �Progress of the Trident Programme�, op. cit., p.24.

27 For further information on US nuclear warheaddesign activities for naval strategic forces, seeChristopher E. Paine and Matthew G. McKinzie, EndRun: The US Government�s Plan for Designing NuclearWeapons and Simulating Nuclear Explosions under theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Natural ResourcesDefense Council Nuclear Program, August 1997.Available on the web at: http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/fppubl.html.

28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, �Nuclear WeaponSystems Sustainment Programs�, May 1997, p.18.

Section 5: NATO1 Otfried Nassauer, Oliver Meier, Nicola Butler, StephenYoung, �U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97�, BASIC-BITS Research Note 97.1, February 1997.

2 Department of the US Air Force, 11th Wing,Information obtained under the Freedom ofInformation Act by Joshua Handler, Princeton

University, released 30 January 1998; Department ofthe US Air Force, Headquarters US Air Forces inEurope, Information obtained under the Freedom ofInformation Act by Joshua Handler, released 12February 1997; Der Spiegel, No. 16/98, 13 April 1998,p.135; USAF Electronic Systems Center: Press Release,Hanscom, 18 July 1995; USAF Electronic SystemsCenter: Communication to BASIC, Hanscom, 20November 1996; US Congress, House DefenseAppropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriationsfor FY 1987, Part 5, p.216; US Congress, HouseDefense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoDAppropriations for FY 1990, part 7, p.479; Institut fürInternationale Politik: Die Atomare Planung der NATOnach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, Wuppertal, 1990.

3 No modernized nuclear weapons storage capabilityhas been built at Spangdahlem. However the air basehas an inactive Cold War-era nuclear weapons storagefacility. Nuclear Surety Inspections are taking placefor the 52nd Fighter Wing. It is not clear whether theyare limited to the 52nd Logistics Group, responsiblefor the Munitions Special Support Squadrons inBuechel, Kleine Brogel, and Volkel, or whether flyingsquadrons have been inspected as well. However,even if they were inspected, this would not necessarilyindicate the presence of nuclear weapons inSpangdahlem. They could be deployed in Ramstein.If nuclear weapons are stored in Spangdahlem, asassumed by the Natural Resources Defence Council,Spangdahlem would be the only overseas location atwhich the USAF nuclear weapons are not stored inmodernized vaults. Excess vaults were available andalready paid for in 1995, when the decision to reducethe construction program for vaults was taken byNATO�s SLOWPIG working group. Cf. William M.Arkin, Richard S. Norris, Joshua Handler, �TakingStock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998�, NuclearWeapons Databook, Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, Washington, March 1998, p.25, (availableon the web at: http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/fppubl.html), and Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit.

4 NATO, �The Alliance�s New Strategic Concept�,Rome, 7 November 1991, S-1(91)85, p.15.

5 Charles E. Johnson, �U.S. Policies on NuclearWeapons�, (formerly) Top Secret - Restricted Data,Washington, 12 December 1964, partially declassifiedin 1991 (Lyndon B. Johnson Library).

6 US Congress, Hearings before the Committee onForeign Relations, �The Non-Proliferation Treaty�,Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p. 262.

Endnotes

55

7 The Deputy Director of the US Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, Adrian Fisher, told the SenateForeign Relations Committee that Rusk�s letter was�seen by the Soviets and key members of the ENDCbefore it was made public and there was no objection.In view of the fact it is public and has been referred toin a public hearing, I assume all countries in theworld are on notice of our intention.� See ibid., p.340.

8 Leonard Meeker, �Proposed Revised Articles of USNon-Proliferation Treaty�, Memorandum (formerlyconfidential), US Department of State, Office of theLegal Advisor, Washington, 6 July 1966.

9 �Working Paper Presented by the Members of theMovement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to theTreaty to the 2nd PrepCom for the NPT ReviewConference 2000�, Geneva, 28 April 1998.

10 The agreement between the US and The Netherlandsis typical: �Atomic Energy: Cooperation for MutualDefence Purposes�, signed at The Hague, 6 May 1959,entered into force 27 July 1959.

11 For an example see: Privy Council 1963-1224,�Draft Canadian Note Concerning Nuclear Warheadsfor Canadian Forces�, Ottawa, 16 August 1963(formerly SECRET) and the secret answer by W.W.Butterworth, US-Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa, 16August 1963 as reprinted in John Clearwater, CanadianNuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's ColdWar Arsenal, Durndurn Press, Toronto/Oxford, 1998,pp. 241-245. The documents are the first such bilateralagreement to become public.

12 See, for example, �Statement by the PermanentRepresentative of South Africa, Ambassador K.J. Jele,to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons�, 8 May 1998.

13 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, �Preparedstatement before the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee, Subject: NATO Enlargement�, USDepartment of State, Washington, D.C., 23 April1997.

14 NATO/Russia, �Founding Act on Mutual Relations,Cooperationand Security between the North AtlanticTreaty Organization and the Russian Federation�,Paris, 27 May 1997, p.8.

15 �Question for the Record Submitted by SenatorHarkin to Secretary of State Albright�, SenateAppropriations Committee, Washington DC, 21October 1997. See also, �Questions for the Record

Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of DefenseCohen�, Senate Appropriations Committee,Washington DC, 21 October 1997.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 NATO, op. cit.

21 Ibid.

22 For background on NATO�s Strategy evolutionsince the end of the Cold War see Rob de Wijk,�NATO at the Brink of the New Millennium�, London/Washington, 1997 and Otfried Nassauer �Neue NATO-Strategie� in Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and Jo Angerer(eds), Siegermacht NATO, Berg am See, 1993, pp. 37-115.

23 Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit.

24 For an examination of US policy, see HansKristensen, op. cit.

25 Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of theNorth Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters,Brussels, 16 December 1997.

26 See Karl Heinz Kamp �Das neue Strategische Konzeptder NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme�, St. Augustin,August 1998, pp.5-6. The author has been recentlyworking on the NATO Strategy Review in his capacityas a member of the German Foreign Ministry PlanningStaff.

27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy,Washington, September 1997, The Joint Force.

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater NuclearOperation, JP 3-12-1, Washington, 9 February 1996,p.V.

29 For a more detailed description of thesedevelopments in US nuclear doctrine see HansKristensen, op. cit.

30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater NuclearOperations, op. cit., pp. III-8.

31 First reported in R. Jeffrey Smith, �Clinton DirectiveChanges Strategy on Nuclear Arms�, Washington Post,7 December 1997, p.1.

32 See for example: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint NuclearOperations, JP 3-12, Washington, December 1995;

56


Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations,Washington, May 1997; Department of Defense,Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, May1997.

33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater NuclearOperations, op. cit., pp. VIII, III-6, III-7. Whenquestioned, after BASIC and BITS published this factin August 1998, a DoD spokesperson replied �we areconfident that we can mount an effective response toterrorism without using nuclear weapons� but added�Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance anycapability available to us. I stress that these policieshave to do with a situation in which the US our alliesor our forces have been attacked with chemical orbiological weapons� (See DoD-Spokesperson Fax toB. Bender, 26 August 1998). To say the least, either USpolicy is deliberately highly ambiguous or the JointChiefs of Staff have a different interpretation of USstrategy and doctrine than the US Department ofDefense.

34 Interviews by the authors conducted duringSeptember-October 1998.

35 See for example: Karl Heinz Kamp, op. cit., or PaulCornish, �Die NATO vor der Jahrtausendwende -Neue Aufgaben, neue Mitglieder- neue Strategie?� inNATO Brief, No 3, 1997, pp.21-24.

36 Deutscher Bundestag, op cit., p.5.

37 Both positions exist in the US Administration aswell. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff take the positionthat sub-strategic weapons should play a role inoffensive counter-proliferation, others are moreinterested in negotiating verified disarmament forthese weapons. During the Helsinki Summit in March1997, the US and Russia decided to discuss tacticalnuclear weapons.

38 Quoted in Elaine Grossman, �STRATCOM ChiefCalls for START III Limit on Tactical NuclearWeapons�, in Inside the Pentagon, 9 April 1998, p.6.

Section Six: Nuclear Risk Reduction in WesternEurope1 Quoted in Daniel Plesch and Stephen Young, �APermanent Non-Proliferation Treaty�, BASIC ReportsNo. 45, 1 June 1995.

2 From a conversation with the authors, 25 July1998.

3 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferationand Disarmament, NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I).

4 �Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons�,op. cit.

5 Canberra Commission, op. cit.

6 �Intervention by the South African Delegation tothe First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Year2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Weapons,Disarmament, International Peace and Security, andSecurity Assurances�, New York, 9 April 1997.

7 Cluster 1: Speaking Points, Ireland, NPT PrepCom,9 April 1997.

8 Statement by Ambassador J.S. Selebi, South AfricanAmbassador to the Conference on Disarmament, 20January 1998.

9 Rebecca Johnson,�The CD Adopts Agenda, But NotYet a Programme of Work�, Geneva Update No. 38,Disarmament Diplomacy, Acronym Institute, LondonIssue No 22, January 1998.

10 Ambassador André Mernier, PermanentRepresentative of Belgium to the Conference onDisarmament, �European Security and the NPT ReviewProcess�, conference speech, 24 March 1998.

11 �Statement by Ambassador Dr. Günther Seibert,Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic ofGermany to the Conference on Disarmament at thesecond session of the Preparatory Committee of the2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons�,Geneva, 29 April 1998.

12 Labour Party, New Labour: because Britain deservesbetter, op. cit.

13 Ambassador Ian Soutar, interview with the author,27 October 1998.

14 First reported in �Norwegian scientific rocket causesglobal scare�, by Rolf Soderlind, Reuters, Oslo, 25January 1995. A more detailed description appearedin Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N.von Hippel, �Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert�, Scientific American, November 1997, p.76. Available on the web at: http://www.sciam.com/1197issue/1197vonhippel.html.

15 Bill Gertz, �Mishaps put Russian missiles on combatmode�, The Washington Times, 12 May 1997.

Endnotes

57

16 Information conveyed to the authors by Frank vonHippel from discussions he has had with Russianofficials.17 Bruce G. Blair, et al., op. cit.18 Richard Garwin and Aaron Tovish have proposedthis type of system. See, for example �Verifying the de-alert status of submarines on patrol�, in De-AlertingAlert, No. 2, January 1998. Available on the web at:http://www.fas.org/cusp/alert/dealert2.htm.19 Bruce G. Blair, et al., op. cit.20 �Supporting Essay Five�, op. cit., para.13.21 The first figure comes from �One on One�, Gen.Eugene Harbinger (Interview), Defense News, March10-16, 1997, p.70. The second is from testimony byGen. Harbinger before the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee on 31 March 1998, cited in ElaineGrossman, op. cit.22 Cited in Jurgen Dragsdahl, �NATO-RussiaCooperation Stuck in Neutral�, BASIC Reports No. 64,4 June 1998.23 William M. Arkin, et al., op. cit.24 According to Taking Stock: Worldwide NuclearDeployments 1998, 970 US tactical nuclear weaponsremain, a mixture of B-61 gravity bombs andsubmarine-launched cruise missiles. The 180 figure isbased on information received by Joshua Handler ofPrinceton University under the Freedom ofInformation Act request and other information fromOtfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit.25 Ibid.26 �Joint Statement on Parameters on FutureReductions in Nuclear Forces�, Signed by US PresidentWilliam Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin,21 March 1997.27 Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of theDefence Planning Committee and the NuclearPlanning Group on 11th June 1998, Press Release M-DPC/NPG- 1(98)72, 11 June 1998, para. 8. Availableon the web at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-072e.htm.28 Ibid.29 Elaine Grossman, op. cit.30 Ashton Carter and John M. Deutch, �No Nukes?Not Yet�, Wall Street Journal, 4 March 1997, p. 18.

31 U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look atNational Strategy and Requirements, Executive Report,

July 1998, Center for Counterproliferation Research,National Defense University, Center for Global SecurityResearch, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.Summary available on the web at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum145.html.

32 See, for example, Oliver Meier and Otfried Nassauer,�Next START by CART: Breaking the DisarmamentDeadlock�, Berlin Information Center forTransatlantic Security, February 1997. Available onthe web at: http://www.basicint.org/start_cart.htm.Also see Oleg N. Bykov and Jack Mendelsohn, �START-III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast?�, TheAtlantic Council of the United States, October 1996.

33 Under the SALT process the US and the then-SovietUnion decided that weapons with a range greaterthan 5,500 km would be called strategic and subjectto negotiations. All other weapons were excluded.While the distinction may have been a useful duringthese early arms control negotiations, it soon wascriticized as artificial. The Soviet Union consideredany weapon capable of reaching its territory strategic.Under today�s circumstances, maintaining thisdistinction creates new problems as the disarmamentprocess moves to cover all nuclear postures. MostChinese nuclear weapons aimed at Russia are non-strategic by the SALT definitions. All of India�s nuclearposture will be non-strategic for at least anotherdecade. Finally, the UK�s decision to assign bothstrategic and sub-strategic tasks to its nuclear-armedTrident missiles makes verifiable distinction betweenstrategic and non-strategic weapons impossible.

34 Final Communiqué, op. cit., para. 9.

35 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit., para 3.

36 Colin Powell, My American Journey, Random House,New York, September 1995.

37 R. Jeffrey Smith, �The Dissenter�, The WashingtonPost, 7 December 1997.

38 Quoted in Ian Taylor, �Bonn wants Nato pledge onno first nuclear use�, The Guardian, 19 November1998.

39 The quote is from Der Spiegel, cited in WilliamDrozdiak, �Bonn Proposes That NATO Pledge No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons�, Washington Post, 23November 1998.

40 Document 5273/98 (Presse 15), 27 January 1998,First Meeting of the Cooperation Council Betweenthe European Union and the Russian Federation.

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