As 8 November nationwide election draws nearer, the speculation, on how the ethnic political parties wouldfare and simultaneously able to address and achieve their people’s aspirations, have been pushed further tothe forefront, at least for the non-Bamar ethnic population, if not the whole length and breadth of thecountry.

Generally speaking, the political clout of the ethnic parties have not beenconsidered to be such an important deciding factor in national-level politicalconfiguration. Regarding contemporary political development, domestic andas well international eyes were only normally trained on the two majorBamar parties – National League for Democracy (NLD) and Union Solidarityand Development Party (USDP). But this might be changing, for with therising political awareness and available political space, the ethnic parties arenow aiming to be a king-maker or a coalition partner and become part of thenational political player, on the same level as those unelected militaryparliamentary representatives, that have 25% allotment, according the

military-drafted, 2008 Constitution.

This means in case the two major parties failed to gather enough votes to form a government, they mighteither have to turn to the ethnic parties to form a coalition or to the the military faction.

Ethnic alliance parties

There are two ethnic alliance parties, fielding sizeable candidates for the upcoming November elections –United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) and National Brotherhood Federation (NBF).

The UNA has been around since 1990 nationwide election, headed by Khun Htun Oo of Shan NationalitiesLeague for Democracy (SNLD), when the Aung San Suu Kyi led National League for Democracy (NLD) won alandslide victory, in 1990 elections, coming out first and the SNLD second most winning party, but wererefused to form government by the then military regime.

The UNA is comprised of 12 political parties that were formed before the 1990 elections, including   ShanNationalities League for Democracy, Kayan National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Mon NationalParty, the Rakhine National Party, the Kachin National Democracy Congress, Karen National Party, and ShanState Kokang Democratic Party, among others.

November election through ethnic lensSep 7, 2015Opinions

Three more parties have asked to join UNA, officials said, naming them as the Chin League for Democracy,Danu National Democracy Party and Rakhine Patriot Party, according to Myanmar Times report of 30 July2015.

The NBF is a newly formed ethnic alliance coalition, founded in the aftermath of 2010 elections, with 5ethnic member parties joining the fray and has grown to 23 ever since.

The NBF is made up of Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), Chin Nationalities Democratic Party,Phalon-Sawal Democratic Party, Arakan National Party, All Mon Regions Democracy Party, Federal UnionParty (FUP), Kachin Democratic Party, Tai–Leng (Red Shan) Nationalities Development Party and so on.

It has also formed Federal Union Party (FUP) in 2013, in an attempt to unite the country’s ethnic groupsunder one banner.

The NBF elected members include 158 of the 188 ethnic party lawmakers across the country, including 24seats in Naypyidaw’s Upper House and 42 in the Lower House.

Spokesman for NBF, Saw Than Myint, said that the party intended to capture a quarter of Naypyitaw’s 664seats in November 8 poll. He was said to be confident that all the ethnic parties would win in their regionsand the previous election results are the best example. Adding ” Every ethnic party won in their regions andnone of them can be defeated now, especially in Shan, Mon and Arakan”, according to The Irrawaddy reportof 22 July 2015.

The latest report on 2 September by DVB said the NBF alliance would field 710 seats nationwide; 381 inStates and Regions, 116 National Assembly, 184 People’s Assembly and 29 Ethnic Affairs Minister post.

U Hla Saw of the Arakan National Party said: “ We believe that neither USDP nor NLD could not windecisively in Pyidaungsu Parliament. We, ethnic parties, are convinced that we will be strong enough in paras the USDP and NLD.”

He further stressed that since Sai Mauk Kham from USDP is now the Vice-President. The next Vice-Presidentshould also be the one from powerful ethnic parties. Apart from that, during the 2010 election the ethnicparties had won 160 seats and that this time around the NBF believed it would win more.

The two umbrella ethnic organizations have tried to work out a compromise on how to avoid theoverlapping of competition in elections, but were unable to do so. The same also goes for ethnic partiesunder the banners of NBF and UNA in trying to resolve this kind of overlapping competition among eachother, across the country. As a result, ethnic alliance members would have to work out among themselves inareas where such overlapping exist during the election campaign.

Saw Than Myint of the NBF said that the alliance had entertained the idea of avoiding potential overlap inconstituencies contested by its member parties, a decision was ultimately taken to allow member parties tocontest freely rather than compromising, according to The Irrawaddy 7 August report.

“If we were to negotiate, there could be difficulties from each side,” he said, without elaborating.

“[Some parties] will negotiate in some areas. Not at the arrangement of the NBF, but based on closeness.For example, in Mon State, the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party and All Mon Region Democracy Party cannegotiate with their own plan,” Saw Than Myint added.

UNA would be going into the game with an aim to amend the constitution, while the NBF would strive forat least one quarter of the seat in the parliament, so that it could also become a “king-maker” in par withthe 25% unelected, military bloc within the parliament.

The SNLD is a prominent member of the UNA, while the SNDP is also one of the leading member in theNBF. Apart from that the two groups also don’t have a common framework for political dialogue.

Another political alliance, Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA) is made up of 13 political parties, includingnon-ethnic party like National Democratic Force (NDF), Democratic Party (Myanmar), Union DemocraticParty etc., while the five ethnic parties are Kayin People’s Party, Chin National Democratic Party and so on.As NBF is seen by some parties as too confrontational and oppositional, meaning perhaps to the USDP-Military regime, according to the report titled “Myanmar’s Ethnic Parties And The 2015 Elections”, written byMarie Lall, Nwe Nwe San, Theint Theint Myat and Yin Nyein Aye and funded by European Union. This pavedway for the formation of FDA by those parties who were uncomfortable with NBF’s political stand. FDA isconsidered as an alliance to be keen in cooperating, rather than confronting the USDP-Military regime.

According to Thu Wai, chairman of the alliance member Democratic Party (Myanmar). Thu Wai downplayedthe possibility of its members fielding competing candidates, however, according to 7 August report of TheIrrawaddy.

He further said: “We might have a little overlap in Irrawaddy Division, but we can’t do anything about that.We might have to compete, with understanding.”

Although FDA also strive for federalism like the NBF and UNA, it is not considered an ethnic coalition party,even five of its members are ethnic, due to the participation of Bamar opposition parties.

Union Election Commission (UEC) participation list and election bird’s eye view

Myanmar Times report of 2 September, reflecting on the UEC’s 170 pages complete candidate list predictedthat the voter turn-out is bound to be high, with 32 million people eligible to cast ballots at 46,000 pollingstations. But given the sheer scale of the event – 93 parties, 1171 constituencies and 6189 candidates –tracking the most interesting match-ups will prove a challenge for even the most dedicated political junkie.

The same Myanmar Times report listed a total of 93 political parties, which is a big jump up when only 36parties enter the elections in 2010. Among this year’s total, 46 parties were established after the 2012 by-election, while 11 parties were established between the 2010 and 2012 polls.

The following facts are a condensed version of the same Myanmar Times report on 2 September.

A quarter-century old parties are the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD); the Mon NationalParty (MNP); the National League for Democracy (NLD); the Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DPM); and theNational Unity Party (NUP). Other than the NUP, however, all were declared illegal under the military juntaand were re-established and re-registered only during President U Thein Sein’s term.

One other party worth highlighting is The Women Party (Mon) is the only party to comprise only women.

Aside from the voters, the election’s main protagonists are the candidates themselves, who number nearly6200 according to the Union Election Commission (UEC).

The NLD is fielding the biggest team, with 1151 candidates, with the USDP trailing behind with 1134.Another large bid comes from the National Unity Party, fielding 763 candidates.

A new party with a strong slate of candidates is the National Development Party (NDP), which will be onlyfive months old by election time, fielding an impressive 354 candidates, ranking the fourth-most candidateparticipation of any party. The party is led by former adviser to the president, U Nay Zin Latt.

Across Myanmar, 1171 constituencies are up for grabs. But it’s not, strictly speaking, a national election, asno votes will be cast in parts of Shan State: Four townships controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA)and one controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) will have to wait stilllonger for the transition to democracy to reach them.

While the NLD, apart from the above mentioned no voting areas, would not run in Teddim township, ChinState, honouring a long-standing agreement with Pu Chin Sian Thang of Zomi Congress for Democracy, theUSDP will not compete in Yangon’s South Dagon for the Pyithu Hluttaw; 14 places in Shan State; and eightplaces in Kachin State. The USDP has also chosen not to contest against the Union Pa-O NationalOrganization and the Lahu National Unity and Development Party (LNUDP), which suggests an alliance withthese parties.

The military’s representatives in parliament – 25% of seats – are not decided by the public, but itsinfluence also spreads into the parties and their candidates. Of the four biggest parties – the NLD, theUSDP, the NUP and the NDP – all have substantial ex-military representation.

The NLD is usually portrayed as being in opposition to the military, but many ex-soldiers joined the party inits early days. U Tin Oo, U Aung Gyi, U Aung Shwe (party chair before Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) and U Lun Tin– former high-ranking military figures all – took the lead roles when the party started. Now, the party’scentral executive committee (CEC) includes former soldier and sitting MP U Win Htein, while the chair ofthe central campaign committee for the 2015 election, U Tin Oo, is a former minister for defence.

The USDP, NUP and the newly formed NDP are overwhelmingly all former military people, including theelection referee, the UEC, comprises retired military officials, including chair U Tin Aye.

Ethnic Alliance the real third force?

The actual fourth ranking candidate participation party might be the NBF, which is fielding 710 candidates,rather than the NDP, with 354 candidates, as the UEC suggested. But if the breakdown as individual party isapplied, then NDP would be correctly placed as the fourth-most candidate fielding party.

If one would do a simple arithmetic, according to the latest available data from UEC, the three sizeableethnic parties combined would have a total of 489 candidates with 7.4%. The actual breakdown for theparties are SNDP with 211 candidates – 3.2%, SNLD with 156 – 2.4%, and Karen Pyithu Party (KPP) 1.8% –122, respectively.

Furthermore, the NBF alliance 710 candidates, most likely drawing from the category of “ Other politicalparties with less than 100 candidates”, of which most small ethnic parties are categorized, would be aformidable force to reckon with, even if SNDP’s 211 candidate count is deducted. SNDP is the leadingmember of the NBF.

But whether the NBF and UNA could keep their respective alliance members intact after, perhaps, winningthe elections would be crucial to project their common ethnic aspirations. A further cooperation betweenthe NBF and UNA would also be needed, if the ultimate goal of realizing a genuine federalism is to beachieved.

Thus, all will boil down to the fact on how the ethnic alliances would fare in the elections, in theirrespective areas, nationwide and to what extent they could cooperate and coordinate – between the NBFand UNA – to fulfil their people’s desire and aspirations.

Ethnic Armed Organization (EAOs)

In the same vein, the EAOs are also as divided as the two ethnic political alliances – the NBF and the UNA.But the good thing about it is that the EAOs have been able to iron out their differences to a certain extentand still continue to strike a bargain with the regime, where the issue of “all-inclusiveness” is concerned.

The Karen National Union (KNU) led soft-liner group has been at odds with the Kachin IndependenceOrganization (KIO) led hard-liner faction within the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) 16members, which has been negotiating with the government for the past four years.

The so-called soft-line faction is made up of KNU, Karen Peace Council (KPC), Democratic Karen BenevolentArmy (DKBA), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and later joined by the All Burma StudentsDemocratic Front (ABSDF) and Chin National Front (CNF), while the hard-liners are generally speaking, therest of the 16 NCCT members. RCSS and ABSDF are not members of the NCCT.

The soft liners want to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as soon as possible, so that politicaldialogue could begin, according to their argument. But the hard-liners desire to extract more politicalguarantee of agreeing to a national state-based federalism, before signing the ceasefire agreement.

In the end, as the government side is not prepared to yield more political concession and stick to itsargument and vague position – “ a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism”, whichcould mean everything from the minimal to maximal devolution of the present presidential unitary systemof governance, continuing with the present unitary structure, to the actual ethnic nationalities’ demand offully-fledge, national state-based federal set up.

It now seems, all these will be discussed only at the Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) and laterthrashed out at the actual political dialogue phase. In other words, the most crucial core issue of nationalstate-based federalism won’t be included in the NCA, to be signed.

The last hurdle to sign the NCA is the issue of “all-inclusiveness”, meaning from the point of the ethnic, thatthe regime accept all the NCCT members, plus ABSDF. The government, however, is still refusing six of theNCCT members to include as signatories, giving various reasons from not qualifying as armed groupsaccording to its criteria, not having any armed engagement and infringing in national sovereignty. The saidEAOs are Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army/ PalaungState Liberation Front (TNLA/PSLF), Arakan Army (AA), Wa National Army (WNO), Arakan National Congress(ANC), and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU).

The high-level five ethnic leaders – KIO, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Shan State ProgressParty (SSPP), KNU and New Mon State Party (NMSP) -, together with the three Ethnic Armed Organizations-Senior Delegation (EAOs-SD) collective team is, at this writing, on its way to Naypyitaw to iron out thepressing issue.

If the NCA could be signed before the 8 November election, the election climate could improveconsiderably, also lending President Thein Sein and his USDP more positive outcome and better credentialto go into the election campaign.

But for the ethnic, the no-vote areas of four townships controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) andone controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) will remain unchanged. Andmost EAOs won’t interrupt the election process, even though they don’t agree with the 2008 Constitutionand seeking to amend or rewriting it. For most see it as practice of democratization process, if not withinthe mould of their genuine federalism they aspire.

In Shan State, SSPP is morally backing the SNLD, while the RCSS said that it won’t take side. But the wayRCSS is related to SNDP, which is sympathetic and also participates in the drawing of FPD, under the RCSS,KNU headed team and endorsed by President Thein Sein initiated Deeds of Commitment signatories on 12February this year, the RCSS neutral claim could be doubtful, even if this could really be the case.

Other than that the EAOs won’t be able to involve directly in the November election process, much less toenter the political arena as political parties. For this have to wait until the next legislature period, which is2020, depending on how the political dialogue progress plays out and if the second last phase political roadmap of “Pyidaungsu Accord” could be signed. Then the final phase of security reintegration, also known asdisarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), will beimplemented, according to the outcome of the political dialogue. And only after this, the entrance of the

EAOs into political arena, either as civilian or part of the union defence apparatus, could be worked out,according to the agreed procedures. In short, for now, the ethnic political parties would have the ethnicpolitical space for themselves, without worry until 2020.

The Aung San Suu Kyi factor

To the dismay but not a surprise to the ethnic political alliance, particularly the UNA, Aung San Suu Kyidecided to go it alone, despite the hope given earlier that the NLD won’t compete in its old alliance,Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP), constituencies. NLD has declared not to competewith Pu Chin Sian Thang, leader of the Zomi Congress for Democracy, in Teddim township, Cin State,honouring its long-standing agreement. Apart from that the NLD has no strategic deals with ethnic partieselsewhere, as some expected they would.

Recently, according to DVB 5 September report, Aung San Suu Kyi while campaigning in Pa-O self-administrative area of Hsi-Hseng, in southern Shan State said: “ We, the NLD, compete in this electionalmost in all places; in states and regions. Concerning this some ethnic people have questioned us why theNLD has to contest in ethnic areas with their representatives and don’t cooperate with them. In reality, wecontest for we want to cooperate. Please let me explain. To make it short, if we want to change this countryto a democratic system, NLD have to become government.”

The VOA 5 September also report that Aung San Suu Kyi explained, why the NLD has decided to compete inthe whole country, including all ethnic areas. She said: “ It is like this, for the whole country 70%, 75% couldbe a secure base. The NLD has to compete in ethnic areas also because of this. We need altogether at least70%.”

Khun Htun Oo, leader of the SNLD, as if responding to the situation told SHAN, on 1 September, his partywill not form a political alliance with other parties contesting in Burma’s upcoming general election. Hesaid: “ In the past, we used to wait for NLD [National League for Democracy], for the possibility of forming acoalition, as we had the same goal to fight for democracy in our country. But now, we have made thedecision that we are not going to make a coalition with any party. We will serve as an opposition party andstand on our policy in fighting for the rights of the citizens.”

But toning down his “go it alone” stance later, in an interview with Myanmar Now, on 4 September, whenasked what his perspective is on cooperating with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy Party[NLD] in this election and beyond, he replied: “We used to work together with the NLD. We even joined theCommittee Representing the People’s Parliament formed by the NLD in 1998 [as the army ignored the 1990election results]. The cooperation with the NLD benefited us. Some NLD leaders even recently informed methat the party wouldn’t field candidates in areas where we are contesting in light of our comradeship. I wasgrateful for that as it is inappropriate for the NLD to take it all, since this would generate misunderstandingon the part of the ethnic parties. The NLD might do well to take the UNA [United Nationalities Alliance, acoalition of 12 ethnic parties] into account; my advice for the NLD is to collaborate with the UNA in thefuture.”

Khun Htun Oo further stressed the NLD contesting in all ethnic constituencies, including those in ShanState, as follows: “That’s part of being a democracy. If we say ‘you can’t come and compete in our areasbecause we want no rival,’ then that is not genuine democracy. We also need to care about the public’sfreedom to choose [a party]. We need to open up choices for the public. There are many [ethnic politicians]who tend to complain about the NLD’s plan to compete in their areas. But nobody is blaming the rulingUnion Solidarity and Development Party [USDP] in the same way.”

Ethnic Alliances perspective

Looking at the situation of the two ethnic alliances, the UNA and NBF, it almost seems that their sympathyand loyalty are anchored on two major Bamar opposing, parties of NLD and USDP. But the reality might bemore complex than this kind of assumption.

First, the SNLD led UNA, although sympathetic to the NLD is not totally committed to the coalition to it,partly for the NLD thought that it could manage better to win majority vote by going it alone thandepending on an ethnic coalition partner like SNLD, even though 1990 elections had shown that it cameout first in Shan State and second nationwide, just after the NLD.

The reason might be the reasoning that SNLD vote will be split between itself and the SNDP, which alsohad a good record of winning in 2010 election, coming out third nationwide after USDP and NUP. And assuch, the NLD might consider, it is safer to ride on Aung San Suu Kyi popularity, even though a bit waning,to win more votes and come out on top. But SNLD, and as an extension the UNA, has leave the door openfor eventual coalition, if the NLD win the majority or come out just in par with the USDP, producing a drawsituation after the elections, with no party able to form a government on its own.

Second, the SNDP headed NBF said that it won’t commit itself to any coalition during the pre-election time,but doesn’t also rule out that there won’t be one in post-election period. This could be out of tacticalconsideration for if it commits itself to the coalition with USDP, as many have been speculating, it couldwork against the party during the election, considering the fact that the military is being hated by thepeople. But still, even though the SNDP is near to the USDP, it is still unclear on how the rest of its alliancepartners would think about it. Statements coming out from NBF functionaries indicate a strong pro-ethnicpolitics, and as such, it is also hard to believe that it would dance only to the tune of the USDP withoutquestion.

According to a member of the USDP management team who wished to remain anonymous, the ShanNationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) and the 23-party bloc known as Nationalities Brotherhood Federation(NBF), has formed a coalition with USDP, Burma‘s ruling party. A certain SNDP representative denied this,calling such an alliance impossible, reported SHAN, on 4 September.

Whatever the outcome of the elections, the ethnic alliances and their member parties would have tonavigate the political water with great care and sophistication.

The two Bamar major parties have their advantage positions to be used in and the aftermath of theelections. Generally, the USDP has all the tools necessary to maintain the military supremacy in the presentquasi-civilian government, but has to be within the legal bound, if necessary. Just imagine the USDP is nowfully controlled by the ex-military people; 25% unelected military MPs still sitting in the parliament,national and as well states and regions; and UEC, the election referee, is made up of all ex-military men;which are advantages that would likely be used to further the military monopoly of political decision-making power, if the going proved to be rough.

The NLD, with Aung San Suu Kyi as its leader could still command popularity, which could be transformedinto victory in the upcoming elections, although various opinion have suggested that her charisma andpopularity might be waning, due to her rejection of 88 generation group to run election under NLD banner;non-committal stance in ethnic conflict, especially in conjunction with the KIO-Military armed conflict; andtotal silence on the plight of the Rohingya or Bengali as preferred by the regime.

Under this prevailing circumstances, both the ethnic alliances would need to identify themselves with theethnic people’s aspirations. And all know what the priorities are.

The short term goal would be to bring genuine peace and normalcy to the ethnic homelands, which havebeen enduring decades of armed conflict, meted out between the ethnic resistance forces and the Burmesemilitary, devastating their homelands and peoples. However, this is a two way street and as it takes two totango, one can’t perform the dance alone. As such, a compromise need to be found with the adversary, oneway or the other, in order to be able to deliver. This, in turn, calls for the need of sophistication and proper,pragmatic calculation and many believe the ethnic resistance leadership is doing a good job at that.

The medium one would be on how to cooperate between the two alliances and as well, with one of the twoBamar, major parties, so that the much talked about federalism based on national state configuration couldmaterialize. The talks of each ethnic alliance each taking side separately with two opposing major Bamarparties is not healthy and won’t do any good for the concerned ethnic electorate or people. And so, the bestoption the two ethnic alliance should take is to position themselves as non-committal, neutral stance andwait for the election outcome, while trying to iron out the differences between themselves in order to servethe same people they are said to represent and advocating for.

The long range goal is, of course, on how to really implement the strategic aims of achieving a genuinefederal form of governance and instilling harmonious living across societies and ethnic lines, under themotto of “unity in diversity”.

Thus, whether the general strategic aims of the ethnic people could be realized or not will depend solely onhow effectively cooperation and coordination between the two ethnic alliances, the EAOs as a whole and allstripes of civilian-based civil societies could be meted out, in practical terms.

Finally, a well known and famous columnist, Dr.Yan Myo Thein has recently pointed out, in 7 Day Daily, on3 September, that the military has a strategy to contain the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, so that it couldcontinue to stay on top of the political arena, but said the ethnic and democratic opposition have none.

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Perhaps, it is not too late to work out a compromised, “winning strategy”, if the opposition could agree uponcommon goal, common leadership and common strategy on how to handle the phase of election andbeyond.

 

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU)-Editor

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