november 2004 n°72 · paris, novembre 2004 cp-72.qxp 02/12/2004 14:12 page 8. introduction martin...

Chaillot Paper

Global views on theEuropean Union

n°72November 2004

Amitav Acharya, Marcel F. Biato, Babacar Diallo,Francisco E. González, Toshiya Hoshino, Terence O’Brien,Gerrit Olivier and Yi Wang

Edited by Martin Ortega

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) beca-me an autonomous Paris-based agency of the EuropeanUnion. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July2001, it is now an integral part of the new structuresthat will support the further development of theCFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provideanalyses and recommendations that can be of use andrelevance to the formulation of the European securityand defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it alsoacts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.

Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questionswritten either by a member of the ISS research team orby outside authors chosen and commissioned by theInstitute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a semi-nar or study group of experts convened by the Instituteand publication indicates that the paper is consideredby the ISS as a useful and authoritative contribution tothe debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the viewsexpressed in them lies exclusively with authors. ChaillotPapers are also accessible via the Institute’s Website:www.iss-eu.org

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Chaillot Paper

Global views on theEuropean UnionAmitav Acharya, Marcel F. Biato, Babacar Diallo,Francisco E. González, Toshiya Hoshino, Terence O’Brien,Gerrit Olivier and Yi WangEdited by Martin Ortega

Institute for Security StudiesEuropean Union Paris

n°72November 2004

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Institute for Security StudiesEuropean Union Paris

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

© EU Institute for Security Studies 2004. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EUInstitute for Security Studies.ISSN 1017-7566Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) byCorlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

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Contents

Préface Nicole Gnesotto 7

Introduction 9

Martin Ortega

South Africa. The EU, South Africa and the search for stability in Africa 13

Gerrit Olivier

• The EU and the struggle against apartheid 14

• How is the European integration process perceived in South Africa,the Southern African Development Community andthe African Union? 14

• The EU and sub-Saharan Africa 20

• Some ideas on the type of relationship that the EU should establishwith South Africa and the rest of Africa 21

• Should the EU make a greater impact on global order and themaintenance of peace and security? 24

Sénégal. La coopération euro-africaine, vue d’Afrique 27

Babacar Diallo• Bref rappel historique des relations euro-africaines 28

• Un bilan mitigé de la coopération au développement et despréférences commerciales 30

• Vers un nouveau partenariat : l’Accord de Cotonou 31

• Perception africaine de la coopération économique de l’UE 33

• Recommandations relatives au renforcement du dialogue politiqueet du partenariat Afrique -UE 36

• Conclusion 40

Brazil. The European Union: a rising global power? 43

Marcel F. Biato• International trade and finance: the road to a fairer globalisation 44

• Collective security 46

• The Latin American experience 48

• Towards global governance 51

• Conclusion 54

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Contents

Mexico. Mexico’s future international orientation: the EU as a modeland influence 55

Francisco E. González

• What the coming together of European countries means in Mexico 57

• EU-Latin America summits 59

• Strengthening the EU-Mexico relationship in the twenty-firstcentury 61

• EU-Mexico cooperation in strengthening multilateral diplomacyand international peace 64

• Conclusion 68

Chine. La Chine et l’UE : vers une coopération stratégique 71

Yi Wang• Les caractéristiques de la coopération stratégique 71

• Une nouvelle coopération stratégique 74

• Obstacles dans la relation 76

• Perspectives d’avenir 78

• Conclusion 82

Japan. A Japanese view on the global role of the European Union 83

Toshiya Hoshino• How is the European integration process perceived in Japan? 84

• An assessment of the EU-Japan relationship 87

• Recommendations in the security field 88

• The EU, Japan and the global order, including the maintenance ofinternational peace and security 89

An Asian perspective. Regional security arrangements in a multipolarworld: the EU’s contribution 93

Amitav Acharya• Strategic multipolarity and normative multipolarity 94

• Security through regional arrangements 97

• Security partnerships between the EU and other regionalorganisation 99

• Conclusion 102

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New Zealand. Does distance lend enchantment? 103

Terence O’Brien• The United Kingdom’s accession to the EC 103

• Security issues 105

• Improving EU-New Zealand relations 106

• Pacific regional context 109

• The global security agenda 110

• Multilateralism 113

Conclusion. ‘Region-building’ in Europe and across the world 117

Martin Ortega• How the EU defines its global role 117

• A positive perception 119

• The EU and the future of ‘region-building’ 122

• A new approach to ‘multipolarity’ 125

• Appendix 129

Annexes 131

• About the authors 131

• Abbreviations 134

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Nicole Gnesotto

V ue d’Europe, l’affirmation de l’Union européenne comme acteurglobal est à la fois une aspiration relativement ancienne et une touterécente réalité. L’aspiration est confirmée par toute une série de

sondages d’opinion qui témoignent, depuis longtemps, d’une très fortedemande d’Europe de la part des sociétés européennes, renforcée encore par lacrise transatlantique créée en 2003 par la guerre en Irak. La réalité nouvellen’est autre que la revendication par l’Union elle-même d’un rôle global sur lascène internationale, tel que le postule la Stratégie européenne de Sécuritéadoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2003. Une ambition certes dif-ficile à mettre en oeuvre, parfois contestée de l’intérieur, parfois dénigrée del’autre côté de l’Atlantique, mais néanmoins constitutive des évolutionsrécentes acceptées par les Etats membres en matière de sécurité et de politiquede défense commune.

Mais vue d’ailleurs ? Quelle image projette aujourd’hui l’Unioneuropéenne sur des continents et des partenaires très éloignés de cette sphèreeuro-atlantique sur laquelle se concentre encore l’essentiel des prioritéseuropéennes ? A quoi ressemble l’Acteur « politique » européen vu de Preto-ria, de Beijing ou de Mexico ? C’est cette curiosité – renforcée par la rareté desétudes ou des enquêtes d’opinion sur ces perceptions lointaines de l’Union –qui fut largement à l’origine de ce Cahier de Chaillot.

Les essais réunis dans ce volume n’ont certes pas la prétention de con-stituer une étude scientifique et exhaustive de l’image de l’Union dans lemonde. Réunis et dirigés par Martin Ortega, chercheur à l’Institut et spécia-liste du droit international et des questions multilatérales, les auteurs de ceCahier de Chaillot viennent d’horizons professionnels différents,témoignent d’expériences et d’attentes différentes à l’égard de l’Union, maisleurs analyses apportent un éclairage tout à fait intéressant sur ce que devien-nent, vus de l’extérieur, l’identité et le « modèle » européens.

Le premier constat est plutôt rassurant : alors que la morosité, voire ledoute, dominent souvent la scène intérieure européenne, l’appréciation cheznos lointains partenaires est largement plus positive, voire enthousiaste. Vusde loin, et en quelque sorte épurés de leurs difficultés quotidiennes, les réali-sations et les progrès de l’Union au cours des dix dernières années prennenten effet l’allure de progrès historiques indéniables.

Le deuxième constat est plus surprenant. L’image extérieure de l’Unionest, dans une très large mesure, positive – la perception dominante est celle

Préface

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Préface

de l’Union comme modèle de réconciliation politique régionale – mais para-doxalement décalée : alors que les Européens tentent désormais d’agir sur lapacification de zones extérieures à l’Union, à travers notamment la PESCet la PESD, c’est encore le processus d’intégration et de pacification intra-européennes que retiennent essentiellement les essais réunis dans ce vo-lume. La Stratégie européenne de Sécurité, l’action de l’Union dans lemonde, les opérations en Afrique, aucune de ces réalités n’est bien évidem-ment ignorée et chacune d’elle fait l’objet d’une évaluation plutôt positive.Certains auteurs vont même jusqu’à instrumentaliser simplement l’Uniondans leur propre évaluation de la stratégie américaine. Mais, pour l’essen-tiel, la politique extérieure et de sécurité de l’Union ne semble pas encoreavoir atteint la masse critique pour faire l’objet, à l’extérieur, d’une visionglobale qui s’ajouterait à l’image traditionnellement véhiculée par ladynamique économique de l’Union. Faute de cohésion politique suffisante ?Sans aucun doute : les divisions européennes sur l’Irak ont été relevées parles plus lointains de nos partenaires. Faute de stratégie de communicationadéquate ? Très certainement : nombre d’auteurs soulignent la méconnais-sance des réalisations politiques de l’Union sur leur continent.

Enfin, les relations que l’Union entretient et tente de développer avecl’ensemble des autres organisations régionales – Mercosur, Unionafricaine, Asean, etc. – prennent souvent, vues de ces différents continents,une valeur politique qui va bien au-delà de leur contenu commercial ouéconomique spécifique : parce que l’Union européenne représente précisé-ment la forme la plus achevée d’intégration et de réconciliation politique,son dialogue avec les autres institutions régionales est, en lui-même, un fac-teur d’influence majeur sur l’évolution de ces ensembles régionaux. Par cestemps difficiles pour les principes et les valeurs du multilatéralisme, on seplaît à rêver que cette influence par l’exemple ira croissante.

Paris, novembre 2004

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IntroductionMartin Ortega

Over the last 25 years, the European regional integration processhas advanced very quickly on four different fronts. During the1980s, the Common Market and its associated freedoms (freemovement of goods and of persons, the right to establish and free-dom to provide services) were completed. The Maastricht Treaty onEuropean Union (TEU) of 1992 added a second dimension, when itset up a monetary union and established a European Central Bankand shared budgetary rules – a development that was eventuallyconfirmed by the introduction of the euro in January 2002. Also inthe 1990s, as a result of the creation of the European Union, whichwas born on 1 November 1993, a third, political dimension wasdeveloped. The Union entailed inter alia a leading role for the Euro-pean Council and the various councils of ministers, some coordi-nation of member states’ foreign policies through a CFSP, and thegrowing importance of the European Parliament, which graduallyenlarged its areas of competence.

Finally, a security and defence dimension has been added dur-ing the last five years.1 The Kosovo crisis of 1999, the need to sta-bilise the Balkans and the fight against international terrorismafter the abhorrent attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March2004 have led to the establishment of significant cooperationschemes within the EU, working hand in hand with NATO, forboth internal and external security purposes. Although some EUmembers do not participate in all those developments and even ifsuccessive enlargements in the last 25 years have implied consider-able challenges to the integration process, today the EU consti-tutes a unique experience of ‘region-building’ in the world.

This fourth dimension required the creation of common ESDP(European Security and Defence) structures, which are able tomount EU peacekeeping, peace support and police operations, aswell as the definition of a European Security Strategy (ESS). Inthat strategy, prepared by Javier Solana and adopted by the Euro-pean Council in December 2003, the Europeans have put forward

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Global views onthe European Union

1. See Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EUsecurity and defence policy. The first fiveyears (1999-2004) (Paris: EU Insti-tute for Security Studies, 2004).

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a common world-view and spelt out the EU’s possible contribu-tion to the overall security of the European continent and to theimprovement of world order.

In the opening paragraphs of the ESS, the EU declares, for thefirst time, its global vocation:

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing aquarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with awide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union isinevitably a global player . . . Europe should be ready to share inthe responsibility for global security and in building a betterworld.

The conclusion of the same document contains a lofty declara-tion of principles:

An active and capable European Union would make an impact onglobal scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective mul-tilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Suddenly, unexpectedly, the European Union realised that ithad an important role to play at a global level –not only in the com-mercial and economic fields but also in the security and politicaldomains. Indeed, the EU’s declared global scope supplementsand, in more than one way, transcends its member states’ respec-tive global roles. EU member states continue to implement theirown foreign policies but, in addition, they now share a sort of‘super’ – albeit hesitant – foreign policy, which is possible onlybecause they are united. They can now do, or at least plan to do,together, what they can hardly do alone. One cannot think of anymember state, however powerful, that would be in a position toundertake by itself the ambitious programme contained in theEuropean Security Strategy. Equally, one cannot imagine anymember state, however small, making such ambitious pronounce-ments on the global order except via the Union. Through a longprocess of permanent dialogue and a myriad mutually enrichingcontacts, all EU member states have reached a broadly sharedworld perspective, which has allowed for the formulation of acommon strategy concerning global issues. The ESS is thus thebirth certificate of the EU’s global role.

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The idea of publishing the present volume was born in the EUInstitute for Security Studies (EUISS) in autumn 2003. After welcoming a first version of the strategy drafted by Javier Solana,the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 requested that anew version be submitted to the December council and suggestedthe organisation of a public debate to which experts, academics,diplomats, journalists, etc. from the members of the Europeanfamily could provide their inputs. During the preparation of aseminar (which took place in Paris on 6-7 October 2003) to thatend, we at the EUISS were surprised to find that experts and diplo-mats from other countries, including international actors verydistant from the European continent, expressed an interest in par-ticipating. Bearing in mind that the whole exercise was public andopen, the Institute therefore decided to invite participants fromthose countries.

It was at that moment that, in the same spirit of openness, wethought that it would be very relevant for the development of theEU’s new global role to know in detail how this role was perceivedacross the world. Indeed, the European Union was claiming a globalprojection and a share in the resolution of the problems, notablythose related to security, afflicting the world, so it was important toexplore whether the rest of the world agreed with that new role.

With this idea in mind, the Institute invited distinguished aca-demics and diplomats from a number of countries to write shortcontributions to this volume. Given that the EU and its memberstates maintain strong political ties with the United States andother NATO members, and have established fruitful political dia-logues with Russia and other former Soviet states as well as withMediterranean partners, the objective of the project was to collectviewpoints from other regions. This collection deliberately didnot include contributions from the EU’s allies, neighbours andmore immediate partners, with which there exist more regularpolitical exchanges, or from the greater Middle East because of thecomplexities of this part of the world. The editor of this volumeselected the countries and names of the authors, trying to strike ageographical balance and include contributors with varied back-grounds. Authors from Africa (Senegal, South Africa), LatinAmerica (Brazil, Mexico), Asia (China, Japan) and the Pacific (NewZealand), as well as one author who adopts an overall Asian perspective, have contributed to this volume.

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Martin Ortega

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Introduction

The following questions, inter alia were put to contributors:How is the European integration process perceived in your

country/region? Are there any lessons to be learned?What is your assessment of the current relationship

between the EU and your country/region?What type of relationship, in your view, should the EU

establish with your country/region in the future? Do you haveany specific recommendations to make in this regard?

What role should the European Union play in the pursuitof global order and the maintenance of international peace andsecurity?

What is your assessment of the European Security Strat-egy and the development of a European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP)?

Nevertheless, each author was free to interpret those questionsas he thought fit and, in fact, each contribution has a differentinternal structure – although all are very pertinent in theirresponse to the above-mentioned queries.

Contributors write here in a personal capacity and do not rep-resent any organisation or institution. The editor has obviouslyrevised and edited the manuscripts; however, he cannot takeresponsibility for the accuracy of affirmations and data, whichremains the authors’.

In her letter of invitation to contribute to this volume, theDirector explained that the Institute’s working languages are Eng-lish and French. Two contributors decided to send their texts inFrench and six wrote in English. Chapters are here presented intheir original languages.

The editor’s conclusion attempts to highlight the most salientaspects of each chapter and presents a framework for analysing theimpact that the European Union might have on global order in thefuture.

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South Africa

The EU, South Africa and thesearch for stability in AfricaGerrit Olivier

South Africa’s connection with Europe dates back to the discoveryof the sea route around the Cape by the Portuguese navigatorBartholomew Dias in 1488, and more particularly, the establish-ment of a Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.From that time and up to the second half of the twentieth century,European involvement shaped the modern future of South Africalike no other single force.

This involvement had two main overarching and far-reachingdimensions: exploitative and developmental/modernising. It wasexploitative in the sense that a high price was exacted from manygenerations of black South Africans through institutionalisedand informal social, political and economic exploitation; develop-mental and modernising in the sense that South Africa’s status asa developed and modern nation reached an unparalleled level ofsophistication in the broader African context. Today South Africahas, by a very wide margin, the greatest military, industrial andeconomic might on the African continent. After the Second WorldWar, Europe’s influence in South Africa declined because ofapartheid as issues like national self-determination, racial dis-crimination and human rights abuses acquired global saliency.South African policies went totally against the grain of interna-tional opinion. As a consequence, the longstanding kith and kinspecial relations between South Africa and European countrieslike the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlandscame to an end and a process of alienation set in. This only came toan end in 1994, when democratic rule was introduced in SouthAfrica. As for Africa as a whole, Europe’s influence after the Sec-ond World War was redefined by factors such as the decline of thecolonial powers; the proliferation of liberation movements incolonial territories; the end of colonialism; national self-determi-nation; the Cold War and East/West competition; and the presentNorth/South dichotomy. But in the end, European interest in and

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influence over the African continent remained the highest of allcountries or regions in the world.

The EU and the struggle against apartheid

The European Union and its antecedents (the EEC and then theEC) became involved in the South African apartheid issue at a fairlylate stage. In fact, the issue was only taken up when South Africa’spariah status in the world already constituted an indisputable real-ity, and for Brussels, at that stage, the choice of policy wasinescapable and fairly clear cut: to follow the international trend, tosupport United Nations sanctions against South Africa and toimplement its own particularistic sanctions regime. These sanc-tions, introduced in the mid 1970s against the South African gov-ernment, were intensive and broadly targeted and were only liftedin the early 1990s when apartheid was scrapped and a democraticGovernment of National Unity was introduced in South Africa.Concurrently with the sanctions regime, the EU introduced a spe-cial programme to assist the victims of apartheid in 1984, spending450 million ECU up to 1994 on the improvement of education,training, health, welfare, rural and agricultural development, com-munity building, good governance, job creation and legal assis-tance. After the regime change, formal relations between the EUand South Africa were fully normalised. The EU entered into aTrade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) withSouth Africa, the country became a qualified member of the LoméConvention, presently the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, andthe EU became South Africa’s single biggest trading partner andthe biggest donor of development assistance.

How is the European integration process perceived inSouth Africa, the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity and the African Union?

Regional integration is an important dimension of African devel-opment and African security and foreign policy. Apart from theAfrican Union (AU), which is a pan-African organisation, varioussubregional schemes exist in Africa: the Southern African Develop-ment Community (SADEC) and the Southern African Customs

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Union (SACU); in West Africa the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) and Communauté Economique etMonétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), in North Africa theArab Maghreb Union (AMU), and in Eastern and Southern Africa,the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Although the integration processes in Europe and Africa havetheir own unique circumstances, conditions and dynamics, thereare some overarching similarities, particularly as far as the teleo-logical dimensions of integration are concerned. These aspectscould be summarised as a quest for permanent peace, security andwelfare for an entire geographical region. As the ‘idea of Europe’has always been a strong historical, intellectual and emotionaldriving force behind the integration of Europe, so has been the‘idea of Africa’ in the integration of Africa. This idea is reflected inPan-Africanism, African unity and African solidarity, and findsinstitutional manifestation in the AU. While it took Europe manycenturies of turmoil and conflict to come to the point where a newparadigm was introduced to ensure peaceful coexistence, prosper-ity and security, Africa started on a similar quest immediately afterthe demise of colonialism with the formation of the Organisationof African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Even so, while European integra-tion produced a peaceful and prosperous security community,progress in Africa has been slow and erratic and the continent stillhas to transform itself into a zone of peace where democracy,human rights, good governance, economic prosperity and the ruleof law prevail. Although the conditions and principles of volun-tary regional economic and political integration are fairly univer-sal, the success of European integration since the establishment ofthe European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 has ren-dered it the most successful experiment the modern world has yetwitnessed, and for this reason it serves as a benchmark in the busi-ness of regional integration.

The reason for Africa’s slow progress can be ascribed to theuniqueness of African politics, particularly because of the enig-matic way in which interstate relations are conducted and theimperatives of African fraternity and African unity. In comparisonto the European experience, one can only talk about limited inte-gration in the AU and subregional organisations. In this context,the success of the integration process in Europe constitutes anattractive (and perhaps the only) example for Africa in its seem-ingly never-ending struggle against political conflict, poverty,

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underdevelopment, instability and decay. During the establish-ment of the African Union (AU), to supersede the largely dysfunc-tional OAU in 2001, some African leaders made particular refer-ence to the EU as the best example to follow.1 Similar sentimentswere expressed at the time of the formal approval of the AU’s planfor the Pan African Parliament (PAP) in 2004.

Although there are various superficial similarities betweenAfrican regional organisations and the EU, notably on the aspira-tional, structural or institutional-bureaucratic levels, the politicaldynamics and the normative bases are very different. Regionalintegration in Africa follows the state-centric paradigm verystrictly, while EU integration reflects a syncretic paradigm, withelements of both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.2In African integration, there is minimal pooling of sovereignty:member states, except in some extreme cases,3 are immune toexternal interference by the AU or other subregional African bod-ies. Moreover, because of the imperative of African unity and fra-ternity, all states can easily join regional bodies. Only a simplemajority among the participating states is required. In the Africanintegration process, a notion similar to the EU’s acquis communau-taire, or something equivalent to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria foraccession, do not exist as conditions for membership. The domes-tic affairs of member states are regarded along strictly traditionalWestphalian principles of national sovereignty, rendering domes-tic affairs of member states – however immoral, undemocratic ordestructive – sacrosanct. Although controversies about sover-eignty are very much part of the debate on European integration,much progress has been made to bring member states to followand respect common rules of behaviour, whether in the field ofhuman rights, economic policy, fiscal discipline, environmentalpolicy or good governance. In the African context conflict, humanrights abuses, maladministration, corruption and the like are notregarded as disqualifications for membership of regional bodies.With the introduction of the New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-opment (NEPAD)4 in 2001, much hope was pinned on a PeerReview Mechanism, to enforce common standards of moral, polit-ical and economic behaviour on African states, but so far only asmall number of states (all of them with good or improving trackrecords) have acceded to the code of conduct, while those stateswith the worst performances still prefer not to be judged by themechanism.

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1. Gerrit Olivier, ‘Regional integra-tion and African Survival’, AfricaInsight, vol. 31, no.3, September2001, p. 45.

2. Michael O’Neill, The Politics ofEuropean Integration (London:Routledge, 1996), pp. 81 et seq.

3. Gerrit Olivier, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

4. Gerrit Olivier, ‘Is Thabo MbekiAfrica’s Saviour?’, in InternationalAffairs, vol. 79, no. 4, July 2003,p. 818. See general information athttp://www.nepad.org.

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Assessment of the current relationship between SouthAfrica and the European Union

The current relationship between South Africa and the EU can becharacterised as mutually beneficial, substantial and amicable, butalso businesslike and competitive. A special relationship does notexist, mainly because of the ideological predilections of the SouthAfrican government towards Afro-centrism and Third Worldcauses in the context of the North-South dichotomy. However, likethe EU, South Africa views those relations as an important elementof its overall foreign policy architecture, and for this reason it iscommitted to preserving and protecting them.

South Africa was never a beneficiary of EC overseas develop-ment aid programmes under the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreementsand, because of apartheid, sanctions against the country wereapplied with increased severity from 1977 onwards. The EC’s ‘Spe-cial Programme to Assist the Victims of Apartheid’ distributedonly through non-governmental organisations softened the blowof sanctions somewhat and, when the new democratically electedgovernment took over in 1994, sanctions were lifted and a newchapter of EU-South African relations could begin.

While the EC’s assistance programme for the victims ofapartheid was characterised by rather lavish spending and altruis-tic largesse, the new approach after 1994 was frugal, controlledand businesslike. From here onwards EU economic self-interestbecame more dominant and the relationship developed a strongcompetitive dimension. From the outset, the South African gov-ernment was keen to enter into a Lomé-based trade agreement,particularly to get access to the general trade provisions enablingpreferential market access to the EU market, rather than settlingfor a reciprocal free trade agreement. However, the EU suggested atwin-track approach, specially tailored to South Africa’s uniquecircumstances. In view of its higher level of economic develop-ment, it was not regarded as a ‘developing’ country like otherAfrican, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) members of Lomé, and itstextile and agricultural exports were also seen as posing a potentialthreat to sensitive EU sectors. The twin-track approach entailedqualified membership5 of Lomé and a bilateral trade, develop-ment and cooperation agreement (TDCA) between the EU andSouth Africa. After a long and at times acrimonious negotiating

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Gerrit Olivier

5. Qualified membership in-cluded all benefits under Lomé(and Cotonou) but excludingnon-reciprocal trade preferencesand access to the European Devel-opment Fund financial resources.South African companies are al-lowed to tender for projects inACP countries under the 8th Euro-pean Development Fund.

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process that started in June 1995 and concluded in March 1999,the TDCA was finalised, taking effect in January 2000.

The guiding principles of the trade part of the TDCA wereasymmetry and differentiation, support for regional integrationin Southern Africa, WTO compatibility, protection for sensitivesectors, and the integration of the South African economy into theglobal economy. The TDCA established a Free Trade Area betweenSouth Africa and the EU, liberalising about 90 per cent of the tradebetween them. In terms of the Agreement, 95 per cent of SouthAfrican exports will enter the EU market duty-free within ten yearsand 86 per cent of EU exports will enter the South African marketduty-free within twelve years. Apart from a Free Trade Area, theTDCA also provides for economic, development, political, cul-tural and scientific cooperation. The prospect of such an Areaimmediately and substantially stimulated bilateral trade betweenthe EU and South Africa. In 2000, South African exports to the EUgrew by 35 per cent, while EU imports into South Africa grew by20 per cent. This trend continued over subsequent years, althoughby a smaller margin. The EU is currently South Africa’s biggesttrading partner, accounting for 40 per cent of its imports andexports and 70 per cent of its foreign direct investment. The EU isalso South Africa’s development aid benefactor, accounting for40.81 per cent of total foreign aid coming into the country at a rateof €125 million per year.6

As summarised by the then Head of the European CommissionDelegation in South Africa, Michael Laidler: ‘The prize is great forboth sides: for Europe a privileged economic and political part-nership with the powerhouse of the Southern African region; forSouth Africa, the strategic and economic medium to long-termadvantages of a special relationship with the world’s largest econ-omy.’7 Taking into account the debilitating legacy of isolation andsanctions in a country blighted by the policy of apartheid, the EU’scontribution and role in the normalisation and reconstruction ofSouth Africa’s external trade and economic relations hasundoubtedly been significant. The fact that the EU directed sub-stantial humanitarian and development aid to alleviate povertyand the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and to improve social services andeducation and good governance, was also a clear indication of thehigh premium it placed on good relations with the new demo-cratic South Africa.

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6. Michael Lake, ‘Delegation ofthe European Commission An-nual Report 2001’, p. 2.

7. Michael Laidler, ‘South Africaand the European Union: The freeTrade Agreement and Lomé-What can South Africa Expect’,Seminar Report of Centre for European Studies, 1-2 October1998 (Konrad AdenauerStiftung), p. 50.

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With the legal architecture of the bilateral relationshipbetween South Africa and the EU in place, it seems that a mutuallybeneficial relationship for the years to come has been firmlycemented. But it will not be a relationship of a special kind. The EUseems keen to develop such a relationship in view of South Africa’simportance as a trading partner, its new global status, its regionalstrength and Third World leadership, although the South Africanresponse has not been all that encouraging. For instance, while EUaid policy towards South Africa places fairly heavy stress on the do-good, benevolent-altruistic dimension of its commitment to thecountry,8 the latter’s response is somewhat muted. This has prob-ably mainly to do with, firstly, the shift in the ideological focus ofSouth African foreign policy under the new ANC government, andsecondly the schizophrenic role the EU plays when it comes totrade and aid respectively. The utterly competitive way, sometimesbordering on pettiness,9 in which the EU conducted itself duringthe negotiations for a Free Trade Area came as a surprise to itsSouth African negotiating partners. Moreover, while the TDCArepresents a convergence of economic interests between SouthAfrica and the EU, other overarching foreign policy or ideologicalinterests influence the texture of their relationship. No doubt,self-interest, motivated mainly by domestic considerations partic-ularly in the field of agriculture and trade advantages, stronglyinfluences EU trade and development policies. On the SouthAfrican side, the ANC government represents a shift of the centreof gravity away from Euro-centrism to Afro-centrism and South-South priorities. This is borne out by the high-profile role ofSouth African President Thabo Mbeki’s championing of Africa’scase at meetings of the G-8 and the World Trade Organisation, aswell as South Africa’s prominent role in the AU and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Government’s close ideologicalties with Western bêtes noires like Cuba and Zimbabwe, and its giv-ing succour to the discredited former Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.10 Of course, because of South Africa’s eco-nomic dependence on the EU, the Government will always becareful to keep relations with it on a sound, amicable level,although a special or warm relationship does not seem possible.The best way to depict the present relationship between the EUand South Africa is that it is probably as good as it can get, but notperfect.

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8. A typical justification of EU aidpolicy is: ‘The European Unionhas made a commitment to main-tain and even strengthen its sup-port to South Africa’s political,economic and development’; Eu-ropean Commission, ‘CountryStrategy Paper for South Africa’,December 2002.

9. Negotiations for an EU-SouthAfrican Free Trade Area were al-most scuttled because of SouthAfrican use of regional brandnames like ‘sherry’, ‘Port’, ‘ouzo’and ‘grappa’. The Financial Timeseditorial of 24 February 1999 re-ferred to this as ‘commercial hag-gling by wealthy Europeans’.

10. Gerrit Olivier, ‘Costly Allure ofthe Pied Piper of Ideology’, Busi-ness Day (Johannesburg dailynewspaper), 13 February 2004.

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The EU and sub-Saharan Africa

Stability in Africa is of global interest. However, this stability isthreatened by conflict, underdevelopment, poverty, the HIV/AIDSpandemic as well as other diseases, and bad and undemocratic gov-ernance in many of Africa’s 53 states. The EU wants to play animportant role in changing Africa into a better place, because it isalso in its own interest to do so.

The EU’s Africa role is manifested mainly by way of the Coto-nou Agreement, of which the majority of African states are mem-bers. The trade and developmental association dates back to thetime of the Treaty of Rome and the conclusion of the YaoundéConventions (1963-74) and four Lomé Conventions (1975-2000),and the present Cotonou Agreement, which is in line with the aimsof the EU development policy as restated in the Maastricht andAmsterdam Treaties:

sustainable economic and social development of the developingcountries;smooth and gradual integration of the developing countriesinto the world economy;combating poverty in the developing countries.

A parallel development was the launching of the NEPAD byAfrican states under the leadership of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria,Senegal and South Africa in 2001. Both NEPAD and Cotonoudeparted from the previous development paradigm by placingstrong emphasis on democracy, good political economic and cor-porate governance as essential and necessary conditions for sus-tained development. From the very outset, the EU welcomed andsupported NEPAD, regarding it as a basis for a productive part-nership in its own efforts to make Cotonou more of a success thanits predecessors had been. The overarching aim is to reach the UNtarget of halving the number of people in Africa living in extremepoverty and suffering by 2015.

Since NEPAD’s inception, the EU has established a dialoguewith Africa to translate the NEPAD/Cotonou vision into concreteactions. Various G-8 summits have also enthusiastically endorsedthe NEPAD idea, and ample financial support has been promisedbut parsimoniously distributed. Even so, great expectations wereraised with the African initiative and the resolve to claim owner-ship of and responsibility for its own future development rather

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than relying on hand-outs as in the past. The EU saw NEPAD as abridge to overcome the deficiencies of its own development poli-cies of the past. According to the Ambassador of the EuropeanCommission in South Africa: ‘NEPAD can now become the miss-ing link in the EU development policies’.11

Will these initiatives produce the required results in Africa? Ofcourse, it is much too early to tell, but a word of caution should beraised against too high expectations. Grand plans to deliver Africafrom its perennial decay and misery are nothing new. Since the1960s there has been a proliferation of these ‘rescue plans’. So far,all of them have been nothing more than good opening moves,and their proliferation may seem to indicate a form of aspirationalescapism – not knowing how to deal immediately and practicallywith the urgent and mundane present needs of the ever-sufferingAfrican masses. Only time will tell whether the Cotonou/NEPADlink-up will make a meaningful difference to the sorry plight ofAfrica’s poor and suffering peoples. The most obvious problemwith the NEPAD and Cotonou initiatives is that they are too com-prehensive, too bureaucratic, too amorphous, too sweeping, tooinclusive and too far removed from the people on the ground.Moreover, Africa’s incapacity to deal with internal conflicts andaberrations like Zimbabwe discourage donor assistance fromindustrialised nations.

The successful model of European integration was based on apiecemeal, step-by-step approach, starting with six members andthe European Coal and Steel Community. Africa could learn fromthis approach. It was probably a mistake not to focus on andutilise the various existing regional organisations in Africa as thebasic building-blocks from which developmental spillover couldtake place. As is the case with the Africa Union, the law of the low-est common denominator will probably also dictate the future ofNEPAD.

Some ideas on the type of relationship that the EU shouldestablish with South Africa and the rest of Africa

The fact that the EU is politically restricted as an internationalactor, and that it must be contented to punch below its weigh in theworld political arena, obviously creates the perception that it is aless weighty or serious role player in comparison with the major

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11. Michael Lake, ‘Putting thepartnership into NEPAD’, Unpub-lished paper delivered at a work-shop of the Centre for EuropeanStudies, Pretoria, 22-23 May2003.

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powers in the world. From a South African perspective, the EUseems unable to translate its economic influence into diplomaticleverage the way it wants to. Trade, trade policies and practices anddevelopment aid constitute the essence of EU diplomacy. In thecontext of South Africa’s needs these are very important in improv-ing national development. However, in spite of the EU’s major roleand contribution, it cannot be completely satisfied with thereturns it gets in terms of influence over policy and directions ofchange in South Africa and the rest of the region. The EU wouldlike to see greater recognition for its present role in South Africaand the Southern African region, that its economic investmentshould translate into more influence on policy-making and direc-tions of change in South and Southern Africa, that trade benefitsshould increase further, and that Cotonou live up to expectations.

The EU introduced the element of ‘political dialogue’ and part-nership in the Cotonou Agreement, apparently in order to be more‘hands-on’, effective and relevant in ACP countries. In SouthAfrica’s case, ‘political dialogue’ forms part of the TDCA.12 Thedialogue’s agenda includes human rights, democracy, rule of law,elimination of poverty and conditions for racial equality andminority rights. It is significant that NEPAD also introduced whatis called a Peer Review Mechanism with a broadly similar agenda.However, this innovation is not welcomed by errant states inAfrica who regard it as a post-colonial remnant. In fact, thestaunchest supporters of the rigid application of the sovereigntyrule and non-intervention in Africa are usually those governmentswhich show little or no respect for democracy, human rights andthe rule of law.

This causes a serious dilemma for diplomacy in Africa. Well-intentioned diplomatic intervention against badly run, undemoc-ratic and corrupt African states can often become utterly counter-productive. So, while the idea of political dialogue is a sound one,the test lies in its application. While in principle South Africa andthe EU are ad idem concerning political review of some kind, bothact tentatively, warily or not at all against worst-case scenarios inAfrica. South Africa, for example, tolerates the political aberra-tions like those of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe with remark-able patience. An exception is the conflict in Africa’s Great Lakesarea, where the EU contributes generously towards South Africa’speacekeeping efforts. Also, EU, French-led forces conductedOperation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in

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12. The EU Commission, ‘Part-ners in Progress; The EU/SA TradeDevelopment and CooperationAgreement for the 21st century’,p. 18.

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summer 2003, in order to contribute to the UN peacekeepingefforts there.13 Apart from its role in ending the Burundi conflict,the EU’s most incisive political intervention so far has been theimposition of soft sanctions on South Africa’s wayward neigh-bour, Zimbabwe. But this policy is neither here nor there, beingneither popular in Pretoria nor effective in Harare. A wide gap stillexists between aspirations and reality.

Similarly, the political dialogue between South Africa and theEU is a muted affair. Big and threatening issues such as the SouthAfrican government’s controversial policy on the HIV-AIDS pan-demic, the time bomb of South Africa’s huge unemployment situ-ation and the abject poverty of the masses, and the very high levelof criminality, seem to be the subject of only polite inconsequen-tial diplomatic conversations. The priority or impact of theseaspects and issues is usually played down in assessments of thetotal landscape of EU-South African relations. Both sides seemanxious to project an image of normality and ‘business as usual’ asfar as their relations are concerned.

However, without upsetting the diplomatic balance, there arestill some areas where the EU could consider raising its profile inSouth Africa. Adjustments could at least be made without puttingat risk the existing general tenure or climate of bilateral relations.For instance, the EU’s style of diplomacy, the selection of targetsand the way that the EU promotes its image in South Africa can beimproved. The present EU style comes over as too technocratic,bureaucratic, élitist, generally abstract and removed from publicparticipation. Mainly because of these circumstances, the goodintentions and good work being done by the EU are not suffi-ciently noticed or appreciated by the broader sections of the popu-lation, civil society organisations and the local media, and there-fore policy-makers need not concern themselves unduly withpublic opinion influence or pressure regarding EU relations. Infact, public awareness of the EU’s role in South Africa or elsewhereon the continent remains at a constant low level. Few universitiesin the region present full courses on European integration or rela-tionships with the EU, while, for its part, the EU does very little toencourage such studies or to develop an intellectual interest in itsexistence. There is, for instance, no EU cooperative programme fortraining and education in European affairs aimed at Africa,14 andthere exists only one Centre for European Studies in the entiresouthern African region. Also, the local press pays only sporadic

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13. See Fernanda Faria, ‘Crisismanagement in sub-SaharanAfrica, The role of the EuropeanUnion’, Occasional Paper 51 (Paris:EU Institute for Security Studies,April 2004); editor’s note.

14. The Commission maintainscooperative programmes in edu-cation and training with Centraland East European countries, theUnited States, Canada, Japan and‘other industrialised countries’,but not with Africa; see http://eu-r o p a . e u . i n t / c o m m /education/policies/coopera-tion/cooperation_en.html.

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attention to the activities or relevance of the EU. When Europeanleaders visit South Africa, the EU is rarely, if ever, mentioned in dis-cussions or communiqués, and senior South African leaders veryseldom show up in Brussels. Moreover, when trade issues areraised, particularly EU policies on trade subsidies, the latter aregenerally depicted as the villain of the piece. This situation needsattention for the simple reason that the EU, because of its relativecontribution to welfare and stability in South Africa, ought to betaken more seriously as an external player, apart from the fact thatit deserves a better image than is presently the case.

The EU should also try harder to get more mileage out of itssubstantial development and humanitarian programmes inSouth Africa. It could, for instance, improve its cutting edge byselecting development aid targets more strategically and by moni-toring and propagating the real impact of its programmes morecarefully. Presently the EU spends considerable sums of ODAmoney on a vast array of projects in South Africa,15 but withoutnoticeable or dramatic impact on the public mind. Questionscould also be asked about the efficacy of some of these pro-grammes. On the input side, the quantitative dimension of thedevelopment aid looks impressive and, in its annual reports andinformation publications, the emphasis is mainly on the magni-tude and comparative ranking (vis-à-vis other donors) of the aidgiven. Very little is divulged, however, about what happens on theoutput side: in other words, about the real impact or contributionof the aid in terms of the goals to which it has been applied.

Should the EU make a greater impact on global order andthe maintenance of peace and security?

As the biggest trading bloc in the world, representing 25 developed,generally prosperous and democratic countries and 450 millionpeople producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product,as is pointed out at the beginning of the European Security Strat-egy,16 the EU obviously has the potential to be a more powerfuland influential role player than is presently the case. Defenders ofthe status quo will be quick to point out that the EU is indeedactive in a number of areas such as combating terrorism, helpingto stop the clandestine spread of weapons of mass destruction,playing an honest broker role in regional conflicts and building

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15. According to the EC Delega-tion in South Africa 2002 AnnualReport, some 57 separate proj-ects were being implemented at abudgeted cost of €800 million.

16. Javier Solana, ‘A secure Europein a better world. European Secu-rity Strategy’, document adoptedat the European Council, Brus-sels, 12 December 2003, p. 4.

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security in its own neighbourhood. However, viewed from abroader perspective, this role is still inadequate and should beexpanded and strengthened.

And yet the EU’s response to the Iraq crisis has demonstratedthat on critical foreign policy and security issues it is still a housedivided. Individual member countries like the United Kingdom,Germany and France, following their own preferences, seem toexercise more influence on their own on those issues than Brus-sels. This is, of course, far from a perfect scenario, and the debili-tating effects of these divisions on the EU’s role in global peace andsecurity are obvious. Neither France nor Germany could stop theUnited States and the United Kingdom from dealing with theIraqi crisis unilaterally in their own way, while it was fairly obviousthat a united Europe, being stronger than any of its individualmembers, could have played a meaningful role in avoiding thepresent disaster in Iraq.

Of course, the imperfections of EU diplomacy are self-inflicted,a situation which might only change if or when its new draft Con-stitutional Treaty is ratified by member states. But whatever hap-pens in future, the axiomatic truth is that a united Europe as a sin-gle actor in world politics could act with far greater assurance,legitimacy and impact than any of its single members. A moreunited Europe would have the real potential to become a com-pelling countervailing force in the contemporary unipolar worldand to play a meaningful role in helping to shape the future of theplanet. As Javier Solana has pointed out: ‘No single country is ableto tackle today’s complex problems on its own.’17

The pity of it all is, of course, that in spite of convincing argu-ments in favour of a stronger EU’s global role, the unfortunatetruth is that the 25 member states will probably never relinquishtheir monopoly on foreign policy-making. Although the presentconstitutional parameters may change in future, the ideal of theEU acting as a single actor in foreign policy matters will remain aremote one. It took the catastrophe of the Second World War toeventually convince Europe to unite and make a new beginning.However, the process that started with the Treaty of Rome will notbe completed as long as states still jealously cling to the anachro-nistic Westphalian paradigm of sovereign nationhood. With anEU of 25, it will probably even be harder to move to the kind of ‘federal paradigm’ that will obviate the nationalism that stillstalks the politics of some of the leading EU member states.

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17. Ibid., p. 3.

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New realities that strongly and immediately impact on futurepeace and security are inter alia global terrorism, Third Worldpoverty, the unpredictable behaviour of rogue states, fundamen-talist ideological crusades and weapons of mass destruction.18 Sofar, international responses to these challenges have been far lessthan adequate, owing to: the division among key state actors as tothe best remedies and strategies to apply; the seemingly inevitableprevalence of a debilitating ‘pax Americana’; high-cost, avoidablemistakes by key role players; and the current inadequate role of theUnited Nations, the EU and other regional organisations.

Now, a dangerous new crisis in world politics is playing outbefore our eyes. As time and again proven by history, state-centricpolicies driven by nationalism and patriotic fervour cannotresolve any major world crisis. The EU has a crucial role to playbecause it has most of the right ingredients, except political lead-ership and concerted political will. Without this leadership andwillingness, the EU will be shaped by events rather than vice versa,and this could well be the harbinger of inevitable decline.

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18. Ibid., pp. 3-10.

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La coopération euro-africaine,vue d’AfriqueBabacar Diallo

Malgré les liens historiques séculaires qui unissent l’Europe etl’Afrique, le dialogue formel au niveau continental entre les deuxentités n’a été lancé qu’en avril 2000 au Caire lors du premier som-met UE-Afrique. Ce dialogue vise à bâtir un partenariat stratégiqueentre les deux continents, fondé sur des objectifs partagés et desvaleurs communes, en complément des grands sommets UE-ACP.Les mutations profondes du contexte mondial imposent derepenser les relations entre l’UE et l’Afrique pour en mesurer lesenjeux et leur permettre, avec une nouvelle ambition, de relever lesdéfis géostratégiques actuels. La période post-coloniale et après-guerre froide est révolue. L’UE et les pays africains ont des intérêtscommuns à développer et une opportunité stratégique à saisir,dans une vision plus ambitieuse et plus prometteuse.

A un moment crucial des relations UE-Afrique, le moment estvenu de se poser les questions suivantes : quelles perceptions a-t-on de l’intégration européenne depuis l’Afrique, quelles leçons lecontinent africain pourrait-il en tirer, quelle évaluation de ladynamique de la coopération euro-africaine et, enfin, quel parte-nariat pour la prévention et la résolution des conflits en Afriquepour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité dans le monde ?

L’histoire de l’intégration européenne est étroitement liée à laproblématique de la recherche de la paix en Europe. Le but premierdes initiatives de l’unité européenne était d’établir une paix défini-tive entre les Etats de leur continent. Par l’intermédiaire dedémarches lentes et pragmatiques, orientées vers la finalisationd’objectifs simples bien identifiés et correspondant à la profondeaspiration des populations des différents pays qui découvrent pro-gressivement leur communauté de valeurs, l’intégration va sepoursuivre jusqu’à la forme actuelle de l’Union européenne desvingt-cinq après des élargissements successifs.

Ce processus d’intégration est perçu en Afrique comme le mo-dèle le plus achevé du point de vue de son excellence et des résultatstangibles qu’il offre au reste du monde. Du reste, la quasi-totalité

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des pays des autres continents cherche à s’inspirer du modèleeuropéen. L’Afrique, paradoxalement, tout en étant fascinée par lemodèle européen, n’est parvenue qu’à mal l’imiter. En effet, toutel’Afrique s’est constituée en union, mais en utilisant la démarchetotalement inverse de l’Union européenne (en commençant parl’union politique). Pour un continent aussi massif, quatre foisplus grand et deux fois plus peuplé que l’Europe, avec des pro-blèmes d’une inextricable complexité, force est de se demander sila voie suivie est la meilleure. N’eût-il pas été plus judicieux, ainsique le préconisait le président Senghor, de cheminer vers l’Unionafricaine (UA) selon la méthode des cercles concentriques, en ren-forçant et en s’appuyant sur les communautés économiquesrégionales, dont la fusion ultime et maîtrisée dans le temps et dansl’espace aboutirait à une forme d’union viable ?

Bref rappel historique des relations euro-africaines

L’Europe reste pour l’Afrique un point de référence à la fois positifet négatif. C’est un exemple d’intégration mais l’Europe est aussi lamémoire d’un passé colonial. Il faut rappeler et saluer ici les effortscontinus des peuples d’Afrique pour défendre leur autonomie etleur dignité, tout en maintenant avec l’Europe des relationsd’échange et de coopération exemptes de l’esprit de revanchequ’auraient pu induire les anciens rapports coloniaux1.

Après le douloureux épisode de la traite négrière, le partage del’Afrique par quelques pays européens aboutit, pendant ladernière décennie du 19ème siècle, à un nouveau découpage du con-tinent qui affecta sensiblement ses relations économiques avec lemonde extérieur, celles-ci s’effectuant jusqu’alors dans le cadred’unités politiques locales de nature diverse (royaumes, cités-Etats, communautés lignagères, etc.), les espaces coloniaux étantréduits. A la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, il ne subsistaitplus de ces structures indépendantes que deux Etats : l’Ethiopie etle Libéria. Partout ailleurs, les gouvernements métropolitainsavaient organisé les territoires à mesure qu’ils en effectuaient laconquête.

A partir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à l’influenceeuropéenne vont s’ajouter les influences des Etats-Unis et del’URSS en Afrique. Mais, alors que la présence européenne dans ledomaine militaire était fondée sur les Etats européens, les pro-

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1. Pendant les deux derniers siè-cles, l’Afrique a été maintenue enl’état de réservoir de richessespour l’Europe, et écartée de faitdes progrès de l’humanité et dudéveloppement, avec pour con-séquence qu’elle a « payé » à l’Eu-rope bien plus de richesses qu’ellen’en n’a jamais reçues.

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grammes d’aide économique vont de plus en plus se transformerpar le biais de la Communauté européenne. La politique commu-nautaire de coopération au développement trouve ses originesdans l’association des Pays et Territoires d’Outre-Mer à la Com-munauté dès 1957, à l’issue d’un compromis entre les Etats mem-bres favorables à une approche mondiale du développement, et lesEtats membres favorables à une relation Europe-Afrique pri-vilégiée. L’association a été conçue comme une approche globale,couvrant à la fois le régime commercial et l’aide au développe-ment.

Après les cinq premières années du régime d’association prévupar le Traité, de nombreux pays avaient accédé à l’indépendance, etles motivations de la coopération n’avaient pas fondamentale-ment changé. Les pays européens, dans un esprit de solidarité etsoucieux d’assumer leurs responsabilités, préoccupés aussi depréserver leurs intérêts économiques et géopolitiques dans le con-texte de la guerre froide, et les jeunes Etats indépendants, désireuxde continuer à bénéficier des préférences commerciales et desfinancements de projets de développement, ont dès lors décidé depoursuivre leurs relations de coopération dans le cadre des deuxConventions successives de Yaoundé (1963-1969 et 1969-1974),qui s’inscrivaient dans la continuité directe de l’association. Aucours de cette période euro-africaine 1957-1974, l’aideeuropéenne s’est essentiellement concentrée sur l’Afrique noirefrancophone.

Au milieu des années 1970, avec l’évolution du contexte inter-national, le souhait de plusieurs Etats membres de développer unepolitique mondiale de coopération ainsi que l’adhésion du Roy-aume-Uni à la Communauté ont induit une profonde réorienta-tion de la politique communautaire de coopération. Les préoccu-pations européennes liées au premier choc pétrolier, à savoir la peurde manquer de matières premières et le souci de préserver desmarchés extérieurs privilégiés, se sont ajoutées aux intérêts géo-stratégiques et au sentiment de responsabilité découlant du passécolonial qui prévalait encore largement, pour motiver le premieraccord de partenariat entre la Communauté et les pays ACP. C’estainsi que la première Convention de Lomé signée en 1975 a étéouverte aux pays africains du Commonwealth, et à quelques paysdes Caraïbes et du Pacifique, ainsi qu’à d’autres pays d’Afrique sub-saharienne désireux de se joindre à cette première négociation degroupe à groupe, qui, au total, a concerné quarante-six pays ACP.

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La première Convention de Lomé a constitué à l’époque, unmodèle unique de coopération internationale. Les conventionssuccessives ont permis aux partenaires d’adapter les objectifs et lesinstruments de la coopération, sans pour autant jamais remettreen cause ni le cadre global ni la stratégie poursuivie. Ces adapta-tions ont néanmoins permis de tirer concrètement et progressive-ment les leçons des succès et des échecs du passé, et de traduire, enpartie du moins, l’évolution intervenue dans la philosophie dudéveloppement. La politique de coopération dans le cadre deLomé a ainsi été progressivement réorientée pour tenir compte dela conception du rôle de l’Etat. Cette Convention a aussi été l’undes premiers accords de coopération comportant une dimensionpolitique explicite par l’introduction d’une clause relative aurespect des droits de l’homme, étendue depuis 1995 à l’applicationdes principes démocratiques, à la consolidation de l’Etat de droitet à la bonne gestion des affaires publiques, sans oublier lesréformes au niveau de la coopération financière.

Un bilan mitigé de la coopération au développement et despréférences commerciales

Le bilan des accords d’association, d’assistance, puis de partenariaten vigueur depuis le Traité de Rome, avec les signatures successivesdes Conventions de Yaoundé, puis de Lomé, est à ce jour assez déce-vant. L’aide financière n’a pas eu l’efficacité escomptée, tandis queles avantages commerciaux consentis par l’Union européenneétaient progressivement érodés par la baisse généralisée des tarifsdouaniers mondiaux.

Bien que la coopération représente un apport important pourun grand nombre de pays ACP, il est difficile d’en apprécier l’im-pact et l’efficacité en termes d’amélioration des conditionséconomiques et sociales dans les pays africains. Les performancesau plan social restent largement invisibles, la pauvreté augmen-tant de façon alarmante. Même s’il existe certains facteursexogènes et endogènes (gestion instable des politiques,économiques et sociales en Afrique), à laquelle l’aide ne saurait sesubstituer, l’efficacité des instruments de coopération audéveloppement est largement mise en doute.

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En ce qui concerne l’impact des préférences commerciales deLomé, celles-ci n’ont en règle générale pas été suffisantes pour promouvoir la croissance et la diversification des exportations.Les performances des pays ACP en matière d’exportations et pourattirer les investissements étrangers directs se sont détériorées aucours de la période pendant laquelle ils bénéficiaient le plus de cespréférences. Au cours des Conventions de Lomé, les pays ACPn’ont pas réussi à augmenter ni même à maintenir leur part demarché dans l’UE, alors que des exportateurs ne jouissant pas depréférences sont parvenus à augmenter leur part de marché. Lemarché de I’UE est resté relativement important pour les pays ACPqui dépendent encore de l’Union pour environ 40% de leursrecettes d’exportation. La dépendance commerciale vis-à-vis del’Europe varie selon les régions ACP et est plus élevée pourl’Afrique (46%) que pour les Caraïbes et le Pacifique (respective-ment 18% et 23%). Les ACP n’ont pas réussi non plus à diversifierleurs exportations de manière significative et la plupart d’entreeux se concentrent toujours sur quelques produits primaires.

Vers un nouveau partenariat : l’Accord de Cotonou

Selon des analyses, les faibles performances globales en matièred’exportations et de croissance des pays ACP, en dépit de l’ampleuret de la profondeur des préférences de Lomé, s’expliquent par unemultitude de raisons. L’absence en Afrique de facteurs essentielstels que l’infrastructure, l’esprit d’entreprise, les faibles niveaux decapitaux physiques et humains, les faibles niveaux d’épargne etd’investissement, ainsi que des secteurs financiers non développés,ont limité les profits qu’auraient pu générer les préférences. En ter-mes généraux, les Africains se sont trop complus derrière lespréférences, négligeant tout effort de diversification des produitset de leur compétitivité. La dépendance élevée par rapport à un cer-tain nombre de produits de base sujets à des fluctuations de priximportantes et la dégradation substantielle des termes deséchanges sont également des facteurs importants.

Dressant le constat de ces insuffisances, le « Document vert »(Green Paper COM(96)570) publié par la Commission européenneen novembre 1996, a ouvert la voie aux négociations qui ont mené

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à la signature, le 23 juin 2000, de l’Accord de Cotonou, entré envigueur en avril 2003. Ce dernier, par les innovations apportées,marque un tournant dans le partenariat UE-ACP2.

Dans le domaine commercial, l’Accord de Cotonou met pro-gressivement fin au système de préférences non réciproques, de-venues incompatibles avec les règles de l’Organisation mondialedu Commerce (OMC). Il renforce la dimension politique du parte-nariat et ambitionne d’y associer la société civile. L’Accord deCotonou introduit, par ailleurs, une réforme de la coopérationfinancière afin d’en renforcer l’efficacité et de responsabiliserdavantage les Etats bénéficiaires avec une participation accrue desacteurs non étatiques. Les Accords de partenariat (APE) en coursde négociation avec les pays ACP regroupés au sein de blocsrégionaux ont pour finalité la mise en place de zones de libre-échange entre les l’UE et ses partenaires ACP. Les négociationsentamées en septembre 2002 devront se poursuivre jusqu’en 2008et la mise en œuvre des APE sera étalée entre 2008 et 2020. Les APEcomprennent d’autres dimensions liées au commerce : les règlesd’origine, les mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires, les services, laconcurrence, la propriété intellectuelle, les investissements, etc.

Cette nouvelle coopération euro-africaine suscite des avispartagés parmi les Africains, qui en soulignent, les uns, les aspectspositifs, et, les autres, les limites et les incohérences.

Parmi les aspects positifs, il faut souligner que le nouvel accorddéfinit clairement une perspective qui combine la politique, lecommerce et le développement. Il se fonde sur cinq piliers inter-dépendants : une dimension politique globale, la promotion desapproches participatives, une concentration sur l’objectif de laréduction de la pauvreté, l’établissement d’un nouveau cadre decoopération économique et commerciale, et une réforme de lacoopération financière. La dimension politique inclut notam-ment un dialogue sur le respect des droits de l’homme, desprincipes démocratiques et de l’Etat de droit. Il existe aussi unengagement mutuel quant à la bonne gestion des affairespubliques et la lutte contre la corruption3.

Par ailleurs, les apports financiers de l’UE constituent des com-pléments budgétaires significatifs pour les économies africaines.Dans le domaine politique et de la promotion de la démocratie,l’Afrique a bénéficié d’un transfert important des valeurs poli-tiques et démocratiques européennes, sans oublier le transfert destechnologies et de l’expertise scientifique européenne en Afrique.

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2. Pour de plus amples informa-tions sur l’Accord de Cotonou,voir http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/in-dex_en.htm.

3. Pour un bilan général de l’Ac-cord de Cotonou, voir http://eu-ropa.eu.int/comm/develop-ment/body/cotonou/overview_fr.htm (note de l’éditeur).

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En ce qui concerne les aspects négatifs de la coopération del’UE, si l’on part du principe que l’Europe a une lourde respon-sabilité historique vis-à-vis de l’Afrique, l’appui de l’Europe audéveloppement du continent noir n’est pas un simple acte degénérosité, il est un véritable devoir. Or, pour l’Africain ordinaire,le système actuel de coopération avec l’Europe est insuffisant.

Le fonctionnement actuel du Fonds européen de développe-ment (FED) est notoirement déficient : les lourdeurs procéduraleset la méfiance des décideurs conduisent à des décaissements beau-coup trop lents et à l’accumulation des reliquats, ce qui constitueun des grands motifs d’insatisfaction de la politique d’aide de l’U-nion. Dans un discours prononcé en novembre 2002, Poul Niels-son, commissaire européen chargé du développement et de l’aidehumanitaire, a exprimé sa préoccupation au sujet de la lenteur desdécaissements des ressources FED et a mentionné le chiffre de11 milliards de dollars engagés mais non décaissés. Le Commis-saire Patten, dans son rapport sur les problèmes de gestion del’aide communautaire, a lui aussi souligné des faiblesses simi-laires.

Perception africaine de la coopération économique de l’UE

D’une perspective africaine, l’on peut adresser les remarques cri-tiques suivantes par rapport à la coopération économique de l’UE.

Un système de ratification des accords qui allonge les délais. L’ac-cord de Cotonou signé en 2000 n’a été ratifié que trois ans plus tard.Le mécanisme de ratification des accords est très lent. L’accordn’est applicable que lorsqu’il est ratifié par la totalité des Etatseuropéens et au moins deux tiers des Etats ACP. Le nombre d’Etatseuropéens augmentant, il faut s’attendre à des délais encore pluslongs de ratification.

Incohérence de la politique commerciale européenne avec lesspécificités des économies africaines. Les APE tels qu’envisagésdans l’Accord de Cotonou suscitent de vives inquiétudes chez lesAfricains. D’abord, la perte des préférences qui sera préjudiciablepour les produits et les pays africains qui en dépendaient (Maurice,Sénégal, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.). Ensuite, l’ouverture totale des marchésdes pays ACP aux produits européens et la mise en concurrence

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risque d’avoir des effets très négatifs pour les producteurs africains,compte tenu de leur faible niveau de productivité et des contraintesinternes auxquelles ils doivent faire face (facteurs de production,infrastructures, instabilité économique et politique). Un partena-riat suppose l’égalité des forces en présence. Ce qui est loin d’être lecas entre l’Europe, première puissance commerciale du monde, etl’Afrique qui ne représente pas grand chose sur le plan commercial.L’application des APE dans un délai immédiat mérite d’êtrelogiquement revu.

La question de la subvention des produits agricoles européens,qui rend la concurrence plus redoutable pour les produits africains,constitue l’une des incohérences de la politique d’aide audéveloppement de l’Europe en faveur de l’Afrique. La réduction dela pauvreté suppose aussi l’équité dans les termes de l’échange etdes prix et rémunérations réalistes aux producteurs africains quisont pauvres4.

Incohérence entre une politique d’immigration trop restrictiveet les accords de libre-échange (une libre circulation des biens etservices doit s’accompagner d’une facilitation des mouvements despersonnes). Comment peut-on défendre l’équité dans l’ouverturetotale des marchés quand un opérateur économique européenpeut facilement se déplacer vers l’Afrique alors que de multiplescontraintes et mesures restrictives empêchent son homologueafricain d’aller vers l’Europe ?

Exportations de produits parfois sans valeur commerciale versl’Afrique. Souvent, les Européens laissent exporter vers les marchésafricains des déchets alimentaires, parfois sans valeur commer-ciale, qui concurrencent fortement les produits locaux.

Pillage des ressources halieutiques. Les Accords de Pêche entrel’UE et certains pays africains ont des aspects qui contribuent aupillage des ressources halieutiques des côtes africaines. Les com-pensations financières versées souvent après de longues négocia-tions ne sauraient atténuer les lourds dommages causés à l’envi-ronnement marin africain. Ces accords répondent souvent à deslogiques commerciales qui ne respectent pas les conventions uni-verselles de repos biologique de certaines espèces. Les Etats

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4. Les Africains comprennent malla proposition européenne defaire dépendre l’arrêt des subven-tions de réactions similaires desautres pays développés.

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africains n’ont aucun moyen de vérification des quantités et desqualités pêchées.

Multiplicité des normes qualité et des mesures phytosanitairescomme barrière aux produits africains. Ce ne sont pas les mesuresphytosanitaires et les normes de qualité qui inquiètent lesAfricains, mais plutôt la vitesse à laquelle ces normes sont établieset surtout le fait qu’elles soient élaborées de manière unilatérale entenant compte seulement des réalités européennes. A peine mis àniveau pour une génération de mesures, le producteur africain doits’adapter à une nouvelle série de normes souvent conçues avec uneimagination très fertile.

Sur un plan plus politique, la perception africaine de l’actioneuropéenne dans le continent noir estime qu’à certaines occasions,il existe un soutien aux régimes dictatoriaux et corrompus. La cri-tique formulée contre certains pays européens concerne l’appuique ces derniers apportent à certains régimes corrompus enAfrique. Or la corruption a souvent été à l’origine du détournementde fonds destinés au développement. Réduire ce risque ne peutqu’avoir des effets positifs. L’existence de ces régimes fait que lespopulations concernées n’ont été que rarement consultées sur lespriorités et les modalités de l’aide octroyée.

Par ailleurs, la vente et l’exportation d’armes en provenanced’Europe vers l’Afrique seraient à la base des foyers de tension et deconflit à travers tout le continent. Certains commentaires cri-tiques soupçonnent les Européens de se transformer en « sapeurspompiers » après avoir allumé et attisé le feu.

Enfin, en dépit de la réforme que constitue l’adoption de l’ac-cord de Cotonou, la question se pose de savoir si les pays ACP con-stituent encore une priorité pour l’Union européenne : la mise enœuvre d’une politique étrangère européenne, l’élargissement (soncoût et les relations des PECO avec le reste du monde), la nouvellepolitique de voisinage permettent d’en douter. Par contraste avecles ACP, la plupart des autres régions du monde ont vu leur part decommerce, voire d’aide communautaire s’accroître dans lesannées 1990. Ce redéploiement géographique de l’aide commu-nautaire traduit non seulement le changement d’échelle d’unepolitique désormais conçue comme « mondiale », mais aussi uneadaptation qualitative aux mutations géopolitiques et

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géo-économiques qui ont caractérisé l’environnement interna-tional de l’Europe ces dernières années5.

Toute la difficulté consiste donc à mettre en œuvre une poli-tique d’aide au développement dans un contexte qui ne s’y prêteguère. La lutte contre le terrorisme international, menée par lesEtats-Unis, oblige à trouver des alliances avec les Etats occiden-taux. La mondialisation de l’économie oblige les Etats à chercherla position la plus compétitive, la plus rentable. Or les pays ACP neprésentent guère d’intérêt sur un plan strictement économique oupolitique : inadaptés au nouveau contexte économique interna-tional, n’ayant pas su ou pas pu se sortir de la périlleuse situationdans laquelle ils étaient, ces pays se trouvent aujourd’hui « enmarge » de l’économie et de la politique internationales.

Recommandations relatives au renforcement du dialoguepolitique et du partenariat Afrique-UE

L’Accord de Cotonou constitue un bon point de départ, mais il fautapprofondir le partenariat inter-régional entre l’Europe etl’Afrique à tous les niveaux. D’abord, le dialogue Afrique-UE doitavoir pour objectifs principaux : (i) le renforcement des relationspolitiques, économiques et socioculturelles ; (ii) l’éradication de lapauvreté et la réalisation des objectifs de développement du millé-naire en Afrique, ainsi que la mise en œuvre des engagements prisrécemment dans le cadre des conférences internationales (Doha,Monterrey et le sommet mondial pour le développement durable) ;et (iii) la promotion des droits de l’homme, de la démocratie et del’État de droit en Afrique.

Plus spécifiquement, le dialogue UE-Afrique doit s’articulerautour de huit thèmes prioritaires afin de parvenir à des résultatsconcrets6 :

les droits de l’homme, la démocratie et la bonne gouver-nance ;

la prévention et la résolution des conflits ;la sécurité alimentaire ;le sida et autres pandémies ;l’environnement ;l’intégration régionale et le commerce ;la dette extérieure ;la restitution des biens culturels exportés illicitement.

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5. Les régions qui ont bénéficiéd’un asccroissement de l’aidecommunautaire sont l’Europecentrale et orientale, les Etats de laCEI et les pays de Méditerranée.

6. Ces thèmes sont le produit d’unlarge consensus, que partage l’au-teur.

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1. Droits de l’homme, démocratie et bonne gouvernance. Le dia-logue dans ces domaines devra être articulé autour des droits del’homme, de l’appui aux institutions africaines et de la lutte con-tre la corruption. Le partenariat devra contribuer au respect desprincipes de droit et de la bonne gouvernance. Par ailleurs, l’UEdevra approfondir sa coopération avec l’Afrique dans ledomaine des ressources humaines, en particulier la généralisa-tion de l’enseignement primaire pour les garçons et les filles, quiest un élément essentiel de la promotion d’une bonne gouver-nance.

2. Prévention et résolution des conflits. Le partenariat euro-africain devrait accorder la priorité à la prévention et à la gestiondes conflits, en appui à la décision prise par l’UA en juillet 2002d’instituer un Conseil de paix et de sécurité pour l’ensemble ducontinent ainsi que l’adoption d’un programme de travail sur lapaix et la sécurité par tous les membres de l’UA. Les initiatives dela France, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis dans ce domaine,d’une part, et le nouveau rôle de l’Union européenne dans la ges-tion de crises, comme l’a démontré l’opération Artemis à l’été2003, de l’autre, sont les bienvenus7. Le projet de décision duConseil de l’UE sur le financement par le Fonds européen deDéveloppement (FED) d’une Facilité de paix pour l’Afriquedoit également être salué. Cela répond à une demande du som-met de l’UA qui s’est tenu à Maputo en juillet 2003. Cette ini-tiative, destinée à soutenir les institutions africaines et lesmesures prises en faveur du maintien de la paix, exigera notam-ment une coopération entre l’UA, les organisations régionalesafricaines, l’UE et les Nations unies. Il faut trouver le bon équili-bre entre les organisations régionales et les Nations unies pourla gestion de crises en Afrique, et l’Union européenne peut faireune contribution dans ce sens.

Pour être beaucoup plus proche des réalités africaines enmatière de prévention et de résolution des conflits, et pour opti-miser son soutien, l’UE devrait créer en Afrique, en partenariatavec d’autres institutions qui existent déjà et œuvrant pour lamême cause, un Institut de recherche sur la paix, la sécurité et laprévention des conflits en Afrique.

En outre, il apparaît prioritaire d’inclure des mesuresvisant à améliorer la bonne gestion des ressources naturellesdans le cadre du dialogue UE-Afrique sur la prévention des

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7. Voir, entre autres, FernandaFaria, « La gestion de crises enAfrique sub-saharienne : le rôle del’Union européenne », OccasionalPaper 55, Institut d’Etudes deSécurité de l’UE, Paris, novembre2004 (traduction et actualisationde l’Occasional Paper 51 intitulé« Crisis management in sub-Saha-ran Africa - The role of the Euro-pean Union » et publié en anglaispar l’IES en avril 2004 ; ndlr).

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conflits. En effet, des guerres sont déclenchées pour s’assurer dela mainmise sur des ressources lucratives. De même, cesressources naturelles, qui pourraient être exploitées pour rap-porter de l’argent aux caisses publiques, ont souvent été util-isées pour financer et prolonger des conflits armés. Cephénomène est aujourd’hui reconnu comme étant l’une descauses majeures des conflits en Afrique.

3. Sécurité alimentaire. Le dialogue Afrique-UE devra refléterune vision commune de la sécurité alimentaire et du rôle del’aide alimentaire comme base pour le développement d’actionsdans les domaines de la biotechnologie, des normes sanitaires etphytosanitaires, des maladies animales et de la recherche agri-cole. Le dialogue futur devrait se concentrer davantage sur lesdimensions politiques de la sécurité alimentaire, en s’attaquantaux questions relatives à l’accès aux ressources productives(terre, eau) et à l’équité.

4. Lutte contre le sida et autres pandémies. L’Union et les paysafricains devront s’accorder sur la nécessité de renforcer les sys-tèmes de santé dans les pays africains au moyen d’un cadrecomplet de prévention, de traitement et de soins, et d’aug-menter le financement des services de santé par les gouverne-ments nationaux et par la communauté et les donateurs inter-nationaux. Ils s’entendront également sur la nécessité d’uneapproche conjointe en matière d’application de prix différen-tiels, de transfert de technologie et de production locale afind’améliorer l’accès aux médicaments à des prix abordables.

5. Environnement. Le plus urgent est la lutte contre la sécheresse etla désertification. Mais il existe aussi d’autres priorités dans cedomaine :

la gouvernance internationale en matière d’environ-nement ;

la coopération pour la préparation de stratégiesnationales ;

le lien entre pauvreté et environnement ; la dimension régionale des questions d’environnement ; le renforcement de la capacité des pays africains à négocier

et à appliquer les accords internationaux concernant l’environ-nement ;

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la recherche commune des moyens d’améliorer la Facilitémondiale pour l’environnement ;

la gestion intégrée des ressources en eau ; la prévention des catastrophes naturelles.

Le partenariat devra exploiter l’initiative européenne pour l’eauqui propose, notamment, la création d’un « Fonds européenpour l’eau » afin d’aider les populations des pays ACP à accéderà l’eau potable et à des conditions d’hygiène satisfaisantes. L’ini-tiative de l’UE « Énergie pour l’éradication de la pauvreté et ledéveloppement durable » démontre l’engagement de l’UE enfaveur de la mise en place de services énergétiques adéquats,abordables et viables. La prise en compte systématique desaspects environnementaux dans les actions de lutte contre lapauvreté devrait être une règle de base de la coopérationAfrique-UE, en partant du principe que la protection de l’envi-ronnement n’est pas une contrainte qui limite le développe-ment mais la condition même d’un mode de vie durable.

6. Intégration régionale et commerce. Depuis le premier sommetUE-Afrique en 2000, l’UE a renforcé son soutien à l’intégrationrégionale dans la mesure où celle-ci contribue à l’intégration despays africains dans l’économie mondiale. Cet effort doit êtrepoursuivi en faveur d’une consolidation des blocs économiquesrégionaux, préalable et nécessaire à la formation et à la survie del’UA. L’Union et l’Afrique devront renforcer leur coopération etleur dialogue régulier sur les questions relatives à l’OMCnotamment dans le contexte de l’Agenda pour le développe-ment de Doha et dans un souci d’intégrer la dimension dudéveloppement dans tous les domaines de négociation.

7. Dette extérieure. Le partenariat euro-africain devra veiller à ceque l’Europe puisse appuyer les efforts de réduction du fardeaude la dette des pays africains très endettés par un soutien signifi-catif à l’initiative en faveur des pays pauvres très endettés(PPTE).

8. Restitution des biens culturels exportés illicitement. Un ensemble deprincipes directeurs et de recommandations concrètes d’actiona été formulé dans le cadre du dialogue UE-Afrique. L’Europedevra travailler à la mise en place d’un inventaire préliminaire detoutes les activités de coopération pertinentes en cours entre

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l’UE et des acteurs africains. Le dialogue devra encourager l’ad-hésion de tous les pays de l’UE et de l’Afrique aux conventionsinternationales en la matière, en particulier à la Convention del’UNESCO de 1970 sur les mesures à prendre pour interdire etempêcher l’importation, l’exportation et le transfert de pro-priété illicites de biens culturels et la Convention UNIDROITde 1995 sur les objets culturels volés ou exportés illégalement.

Conclusion

Les crises politiques multiples, les guerres, les déchirements eth-niques ont des effets désastreux pour les populations localesentraînées dans des aventures mortifères aux conséquenceseffrayantes tant pour leur bien-être que sur la déstructuration dutissu socioculturel et environnemental. Telles crises permanentespeuvent être interprétées comme les dérives absolues d’un conti-nent devenu ingérable. Toutefois, la même notion de désespoir etl’histoire de la première moitié du 20ème siècle en Europe devraientaussi faire réfléchir Africains et Européens sur le fait que toute criseporte en elle les germes d’un devenir.

L’Europe, pour sortir de deux guerres fratricides, a eu besoin detoute l’énergie conjuguée des résistants antifascistes, des alliésextérieurs et de tous ceux que la lutte contre le racisme et la xéno-phobie pouvait mobiliser pour construire une société fondée surun nouvel espace européen de citoyenneté dont l’Europe des 25constitue aujourd’hui la belle illustration.

L’Afrique, pour sortir du marasme dans lequel elle se trouveaujourd’hui, a besoin du soutien de l’Europe. Les Européens et lesAfricains doivent définitivement prendre conscience qu’ils appar-tiennent à une même communauté de destin. L’Europe, pourprospère qu’elle soit aujourd’hui, ne pourra jamais poursuivre sondéveloppement en ayant sur ses contreforts une Afrique en proie àla pauvreté et aux conflits de toutes sortes. Les flux migratoiresillégaux témoignent de ce rapport incontournable. C’est la raisonpour laquelle l’Europe doit renforcer son aide à l’Afrique tout en larationalisant et en privilégiant l’approche régionale.

Bien que la voie empruntée pour la construction de l’UA noussemble aléatoire, les Européens doivent prendre en compte lesdemandes formulées par les responsables de cette Union, notam-ment en matière de prévention et de résolution des conflits qui

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minent tous les efforts de développement du continent. Lacoopération pour la gestion des crises et pour le maintien de lapaix serait une première démarche très utile.

En contribuant à ce que les Africains deviennent les acteursautonomes de leur propre développement économique et social,et en les préparant à la gestion des crises, les Européens doiventcomprendre que toute aide fournie à l’Afrique est une forme d’in-vestissement à long terme qui doit jeter, pour les deux continents,les bases d’une stabilité et d’une prospérité durables.

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Brazil

The European Union: a risingglobal power?Marcel F. Biato

Under the government of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,Brazil’s foreign policy has continued to focus on changing theinternational status quo in areas critical to achieving the country’sdevelopment goals. Two interlinked issues are essential in thisregard: reform of the international trade and finance regime andthe aggiornamento of global collective security arrangements. Thegrowing assertiveness of the European Union on these issues isseen in Brazil as something to be welcomed and encouraged.

The gradual consolidation of the EU over recent decades hasgiven new impetus to the longstanding ties Brazil maintains withEU member states.1 The sheer economic, commercial and politicalsynergies that these countries can together bring to bear offer vastopportunities for cooperation that Brazil has been keen toexplore. The Joint Declaration adopted in Brasilia in May 2002 setout a common vision of the way ahead, as the EU enlarged to com-plete and consolidate its unification. The possibilities for jointaction are described in the Commission’s Country Strategy Paper2002-2006, which provides for activities totalling €64 million overthe period.

EU cooperation programmes in Brazil provide financial andtechnical support in crucial fields such as public administrationreform (examples include modernisation of state enterprises, taxcollection, human rights protection). Equally important are tech-nological partnerships in computer science, industrial develop-ment, job creation and telecommunications. Improving urban liv-ing conditions, sustainable development in poor communitiesand setting up micro-enterprises are additional goals focusing onsocial questions. Similarly research and development in bio- andspace technology, and deforestation reduction are further exam-ples of the wide range of bilateral cooperation projects coming onstream. Special mention should be made of the Pilot Project forthe Brazilian Tropical Forests (PPG-7) in which a group of Euro-pean nations provide vital financial support for ongoing

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1. The European Union representsroughly a quarter of Brazil’s for-eign trade, standing at approxi-mately $26 billion in 2004 (Jan-Aug). In 2003, of the 20 countrieswith the largest stock of capital in-vestment in Brazil, 9 were Euro-pean.

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programmes geared to the sustainable development of thesestrategic natural environments. Sustainable development – as wellas avoiding climatic disasters – is also the motto behind Brazil’sand the EU countries’ decision to cooperate in bringing the KyotoProtocol into force as soon as possible.

However, relations between Brazil and the EU have acquired anew strategic depth as a result of two defining forces moulding thebeginning of the twenty-first century: the accelerating pace of eco-nomic globalisation, on the one hand, and the ushering in of apost-Cold War security framework, on the other.

International trade and finance: the road to a fairer global-isation

Mercosur was created by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguayin March 1991, with the objective of creating a common marketbetween them. In 1994, the Treaty of Ouro Preto improved theinstitutional structure of Mercosur and initiated a new phase in therelationship between the participating countries, with a view tocompleting a transition phase (1995-2006) leading to the commonmarket.2 The arrival on the scene of Mercosur has brought newdynamism to the commercial ties between its member states andthose of the EU. Both groups are engaged in processes of deep inte-gration based on close economic and political cooperationbetween member states, and even different forms of sovereigntysharing. Understandably, their common origin as trade blocshelps to explain that most of the attention has initially beenfocused on developing this side of the relationship (whereas thepolitical side is more developed in the EU).

Negotiations on an Interregional Association Agreement tocreate the largest free trade area in the world between the EU andMercosur are at an advanced stage. It is expected that tariffs on alarge range of goods and services will be eliminated or stronglyreduced, boosting investment opportunities and lowering costsand consumer prices. The end result will be higher productivity inboth regions and generally more competitive economies in theglobal marketplace.

However, the partnership should go far beyond this. Despitedifferences, which were clearly on display at the 2003 Cancúnsummit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Mercosur and

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2. Mercosur is the acronym forCommon Market of the South, acustoms union bringing togetherArgentina, Brazil, Paraguay andUruguay, with Bolivia, Chile, Peruand Venezuela as associate mem-bers.

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the EU have a pivotal role to play in paving the way for a more bal-anced international trade environment. A final agreement on lib-eralising trade between the two groups, once achieved, would pro-vide a powerful incentive for other major players to displayflexibility at the negotiating table. In fact, leading members ofMercosur together with the EU Trade Commissioner were instru-mental in achieving a crucial breakthrough during talks last July,in Geneva. Hopes revived for a successful outcome to the DohaDevelopment Round as a whole. With the added incentive ofrecent decisions handed down by WTO panels outlawing certainfarm subsidies, the EU has shown an increased awareness thatdeveloping countries must be allowed to exploit their competitiveedge in agricultural commodities if free trade and sustainabledevelopment for all are to be more than pious promises.

Brazil is confident that the EU will be equally open to progressin other areas crucial to empowering developing countries to helpthemselves. These include intellectual property rights, conces-sionary treatment for highly indebted countries, increased officialdevelopment assistance (ODA) and support for achieving the UNMillennium Goals. European willingness to engage Africathrough the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)opens an avenue for joint action with Brazil. We are enthusiasticabout the opportunities that this mechanism offers to Africans, inpartnership with the international community, to disarm thevicious cycle of grinding poverty and endemic strife that hasplagued the continent.

An additional area where the EU could play an important roleis by helping to push through urgent reforms of the BrettonWoods institutions, including measures to make their decision-making more transparent and representative. Brazil is presentlylobbying the International Monetary Fund on two specific pro-posals concerning its accounting rules and procedures vis-à-visdeveloping countries. Firstly, we believe that productive publicsector investments should not be entered as expenditure onnational accounts. This further restricts the already meagreresources available for growth stimulus to countries such as Brazilthat have a proven track record in prudent economic manage-ment. Secondly, we propose that the IMF make available to fiscallyresponsible developing countries an emergency credit line thatcould be drawn on at very short notice. By avoiding the complexand time-consuming requirements normally demanded before

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IMF disbursements, financial authorities in affected countriescould better counter unforeseen threats to economic stabilityresulting from massive speculative capital flows that are a hall-mark of global capitalism.

It would be hard to underestimate the influence that Europeanunification has exerted on Latin American and the Caribbeanendeavours to foster regional integration since the 1960s, culmi-nating with President Lula’s proposal for a South American Com-munity of Nations.3 There is, however, another side to the part-nership between Mercosur and the EU that is just as important astheir trade ties. Although these blocs have taken on a largely com-mercial persona, both were conceived as a means to overcome cen-turies of political and military rivalry between member states.Both came to life under the aegis of peaceful coexistence. It wasrightly assumed that building up institutional and economiclinks between nations would generate such a degree of mutualinterdependence that further warring would become politicallyinconceivable and economically irrational. The 1951 EuropeanCoal and Steel Community, under the leadership of France andGermany, was held up as model and inspiration for the 1994Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Control and Accounting(ABACC)4 on nuclear materials. Following the European inspira-tion, ABACC was created with the purpose of institutionalisingcomplementarity and dependency in sectors of fundamental eco-nomic and military significance. As in Europe, strategic rivalrybetween the two South American neighbours gave way to militarycooperation on a scale that to this day is presented as a model forbringing détente to areas of conflict throughout the developingworld.

Collective security

From this viewpoint, just as impressive as the EU’s achievements inthe economic and trade fields are its increasingly ambitious moveson the way to becoming a major actor on the wider stage of inter-national affairs, as enshrined in the European Security Strategyand the draft Constitutional Treaty. Signs that the EU is bringingto issues of international security its well-regarded prowess in forg-ing multilateral dialogue and providing cooperation are to bepraised. By giving the Union a legal personality and by designating

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3. It is hoped that on the founda-tions of the agreement being ne-gotiated between Mercosur andthe Andean Community a conti-nent-wide free trade and invest-ment area can be formed.

4. Under this agreement Braziland Argentina voluntarily reaf-firmed their renunciation of anyattempt to develop explosive nu-clear devices and put in place asystem of bilateral inspections.

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a Minister for Foreign Affairs, the draft Constitutional Treaty pro-posed this year will ensure that the institution has a sharper inter-national identity. The new constitutional framework is a decisivestep in overcoming the glaring failures on display during thehumanitarian crises in the Balkans during the early 1990s. Thisspurred the European Union into acquiring the hard power capa-bilities required to become an effective force in conflict andhumanitarian crisis management within the European continent.

The European preference for negotiated and consensual solu-tions is clearly visible in the strengthening of the EU’s deliberativebodies and their rule-setting procedures, especially as it seeks tomeet the challenge of enlargement. A political and legal frame-work has been established that enables the Union to act in anincreasingly wide and potentially controversial range of scenarios,which might even involve the use of force. Europe is preparingitself to answer many of the security challenges that increasinglyaffect us all. Globalisation has brought new values, ideas andgoods to out doorstep – but it has done so at the cost of doing awaywith the protection that boundaries and border controls tradi-tionally afforded. The attacks of 11 September 2001 forced manyin the international community to come to grips with what Euro-peans have long learnt from having to tackle domestic terrorism:security is never absolute. We must learn to work together in pro-viding global answers to the challenges of globalisation, albeit indiffering forms. Yet we must do so without sacrificing fundamen-tal beliefs and values.

As Brazil and its Latin American neighbours join the debate onglobal governance and world democracy, we should encourageEurope to redouble its efforts in favour of stability and peacewithin its borders and beyond. We join in welcoming a moreassertive European Union as it moves outside its natural frontiersto engage constructively in a wider arena, beginning with Centraland Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the southern Mediter-ranean.

We fully share the EU’s vision of fostering international peacethrough multilateral diplomacy, dialogue and respect for humanrights, as set forth most recently in the European Security Strat-egy. In particular we endorse the holistic approach to conflict pre-vention enshrined in the CFSP, which brings together humanitar-ian, political, economic and social perspectives.

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Latin America and the Caribbean share this view of security asa continuum of evolving factors and conditions that play them-selves out in the form of threats to orderly life at the local, regionaland global levels. Security must not be divorced from the socialinstability and economic uncertainty that plagues the lives of mil-lions. This is by no means to suggest that major threats, most espe-cially international terrorism, can be reduced to an expression ofpoverty and/or political oppression. Yet we must be willing – asrepeatedly underscored by the United Nations – to remedy theroot causes of these phenomena if we are to deal effectively withthe scourge of terrorism.

This complex set of issues that globalisation increasinglybrings to the fore underscores the need to see security in terms ofsustainable development, a notion that captures more preciselythe seamless linkages between individual wellbeing and collectivesecurity.5

The Latin American experience

There is no better example of this inextricable link than the history,past and present, of Haiti. An unending sequence of social and eco-nomic disruption, aggravated by repeated bouts of foreign inter-vention, helps to explain the country’s present prostration in theface of continued rounds of political strife and natural calamities.A vicious cycle of failure has led to endemic instability for which nosingle cause – or response – is to be found. The challenge facing theinternational community is to develop an ambitious mix of eco-nomic, social and security policies to help the country and itsstricken population gradually edge back towards sustainabledevelopment. For this reason, Brazil hopes to count on EU supportfor proposals to have the UN Security Council coordinate moreclosely with the United Nations Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) in developing integrated policies to deal with the mul-tipronged challenges besetting countries such as Haiti. Brazil’sdecision to accept the challenge of leading the UN mandatedpeacekeeping mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH, from April 2004) –the first headed by Brazil – was motivated by a desire to help makesuch a multidimensional effort a reality. We count on the EU’s andits member states’ material as well as political support to prove thepoint that post-conflict nation building is not only possible but

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5. We prefer this concept to that of‘human security’ and its varia-tions, which we believe carry un-desirable military and interven-tionist undertones.

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also inescapable if we are to avoid the failed 1994 intervention inHaiti. Otherwise, the barren hills that cover the Haitian country-side will continue to provoke catastrophic flooding in Gonaïvestime and again. And illicit transnational activities that find in thepolitical and economic chaos that is Haiti today a convenient stag-ing ground will continue to pose an ever-increasing threat to thestability of the Caribbean region.

It is from this overarching perspective that Latin America hasengaged in the challenge of defining and then engaging thethreats before it. Like politics, all threats, no matter how global,are ultimately local. In the Americas, establishing a well-definedhierarchy of threats and risks is made almost impossible by thesheer variety in geography, historical background, ethnic mix, mil-itary strength and size of the countries involved. For this reason atthe 2002 General Assembly of the Organisation of AmericanStates (OAS) and later at the 2003 Hemispheric Security Confer-ence at Mexico City, the understanding prevailed that security inLatin America must be understood as a multidimensional phe-nomenon. Given the enormous variations in local conditions, it isleft to individual states to define their perceived security threatsand to develop appropriate responses to the motley combinationof drug trafficking, terrorism, natural catastrophes, environmen-tal degradation and political unrest that harasses much of thecontinent.

In determining appropriate responses to security issues, LatinAmerica is heavily conditioned by its pioneering role in developinga coherent body of international law geared to non-intervention inthe domestic affairs of neighbouring countries and to restraint inthe use of force. While this is not to suggest that Latin America hasnot had its share of boundary disputes and military skirmishes,these have been mostly of low intensity and short duration, rarelyleading to major interstate clashes.

This outlook was born largely of the struggle in nation build-ing among the fledgling nation-states that emerged from the sud-den and wholesale decolonisation of most of Latin America in theearly nineteenth century. Imprecise boundaries and social andpolitical unrest at home, as well as the gathering neo-imperialistforces, which would eventually converge on Africa, help explainthe region’s distinct perspective on issues of security and defence.Latin America’s conscious renunciation of weapons of massdestruction6 and its low levels of expenditure on armaments rest

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6. The 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty en-shrined the principle that LatinAmerica and the Caribbean are anuclear weapon-free zone.

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not on a rose-tinted or starry-eyed vision of human nature and itsfoibles, but rather on the hard lessons of history – a long narrativeof political unrest and endless boundary disputes that oftenserved as a pretext for outside intervention. Security, we havelearnt, can never rest on mutual fear, but rather must be the out-come of common purpose as expressed through the rule of inter-national law.

While it is understood that development and improved stan-dards of living are the ultimate guarantors of peace, peace cannotprevail outside the rule of law. Over the last 25 years almost allmajor border disputes involving Latin American countries,including the border disputes between Argentina and Chile andbetween Ecuador and Peru, have been settled through diplomaticchannels and regional mediation efforts. No rigid framework wasrequired, only a loose network of high-level summits, regionalconfidence-building mechanisms and a healthy awareness of thedamage that political instability can wreck on efforts to fosterregional economic integration and attract foreign investment. Infact regular conferences on security issues have been extremelyuseful in developing a shared understanding and providing a plat-form for regular dialogue on emerging and traditional threats. Incontrast, the rigid framework for collective security set out in theSecond World War-vintage Inter-American Treaty of ReciprocalAssistance (TIAR) has proven unworkable.7

No doubt the most important confidence-building measuredeveloped in the region is the so-called democratic clause, adoptedby Mercosur in 1996,8 and included in the Inter-American Demo-cratic Charter, adopted, ironically enough, on 11 September 2001.This, rather than terrorist attacks, was Latin America’s answer tothe challenge of modernity. In both cases it is decreed that stateswhere legitimate government has been unlawfully toppled will besuspended from the OAS until democratic conditions have beenrestored. This provides a powerful incentive for opposition forcesto seek office or the settling of their political grievances throughconstitutional means. The threat of triggering widespread eco-nomic and political ostracism has shown itself to be highly effec-tive in dissuading takeover bids in the region, sometimes at thebehest of interested parties in neighbouring countries.9

Such regional arrangements seem much more effective inensuring political stability than the setting up of rapid deploy-ment forces for use within Latin America and the Caribbean.10

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7. One of the very few times theTIAR was invoked was immedi-ately after the 11 September at-tacks, at Brazil’s behest, as an es-sentially symbolic gesture ofcollective solidarity with theUnited States, but with no practi-cal consequences. It is noteworthythat since then Mexico has de-cided to leave the treaty.

8. The concept was formally en-shrined in the 1999 Ushuaya Pro-tocol.

9. Recent instances are: (1) the re-turn to power of President Chávez,in Venezuela, after a failed civilian-military takeover attempt in 2002;(2) the inauguration of the dulyelected Vice-Presidents Noboa inEcuador (2000) and Mesa in Bo-livia (2004) after the respectiveheads of state stepped down un-der overwhelming political pres-sure; and (3) the constitutionaltransition of power in Paraguayfrom President Cubas Grau toLuís Gonzalez Macchi (1999).

10. Proposals for a Brigade of theAmericas or a Joint Naval Forcehave been put forward from timeto time at the OAS.

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Intervention forces, i.e. military missions sent to member stateswithout the full approval of local authorities, should be a measureof last resort preferably left to the purview of the UN SecurityCouncil, which holds ultimate legitimacy to authorise such oper-ations.11

Similarly we see room for the OAS as well as the Inter-AmericanDefense Council, at a more technical level, to develop as forumsfor discussion and cooperation on hemispheric security issues.The recent adoption of an inter-American terrorist convention is agood example. In more practical terms, Latin American armedforces regularly take part in joint exercises and operations, oftenwith partners from outside the region. More to the point, coordi-nation on regional threats is developing significantly, most partic-ularly in dealing with transnational crimes such as drug and smallarms trafficking. Brazil for its part is presently making its radar-based monitoring service of the Amazon basin available to itsneighbours as part of a regional effort to eradicate these illicitactivities.

The European experience in this context is invaluable in help-ing Latin America build on what it has already achieved. The lackof full-blown integration in the field of law and order has not ham-pered effective intra-European cooperation in dealing with com-mon threats, including transnational illicit activities, in particularafter the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March2004. Following in Europe’s footsteps, Latin America looks for-ward to creating its own region-wide ‘common space of liberty,security and justice’. Measures are being coordinated regionally tostreamline judicial cooperation, especially as regards organisedcrime and terrorist activities. At the same time regional initiativesare being set up to exchange best practices in fostering greatersocial and economic inclusion.

Towards global governance

Brazil believes that the approach, as well as the underlying values,which guide this line of strategic thinking offer room for fruitfulcooperation with the EU. This convergence of perceptions is on dis-play in the various documents adopted in the dialogue that the EUmaintains with both Mercosur and the Latin American andCaribbean region. The concrete commitments set out in the 2004

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11. MINUSTAH is a case in point,in contrast to the military missionsent by a group of OAS memberstates at the behest of Ecuadorand Peru to monitor the cease-firebrokered after their 1995 borderskirmish.

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EU-Latin American and Caribbean Guadalajara summit concern-ing social cohesion, multilateralism and regional integrationdescribe the range of shared goals and values uniting the tworegions.

Past cooperation offers a useful framework for future jointoperations. Through the Franco-German sponsored San José Dia-logue, along with other European states’ efforts, Europe helpedgenerate the necessary political momentum and economic incen-tives for a lasting solution to the Central American civil wars of the1980s. In turn, Latin American troops took part in the UN peace-keeping operation that helped put an end to the conflicts in theBalkans. In 2003 two Brazilian C-130 Hercules transport planeshelped airlift EU military cargo and troops to the DemocraticRepublic of Congo in a bid to restore order to the Bunia region.Brazil saw this invitation as recognition of its communality ofpurpose and of the potential for enhanced security cooperation inareas where it shares interests and capabilities. Brazil looks for-ward to new opportunities for cooperation. An idea to explore inthis respect would be some kind of dialogue between High Repre-sentative Javier Solana, ESDP bodies and EU defence ministerswith the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, whosesixth meeting took place in Quito, Ecuador, in November 2004.

Exchanges between the EU and Latin American authorities willalso be an opportunity to better acquaint ourselves with Europeanperceptions of global security issues in the post-11 September2001 era. Latin American experts expect above all to gauge thepractical implications of the European Security Strategy ofDecember 2003. We look forward in particular to the EuropeanParliament’s evaluation of this document in the expectation thatit will help dispel misgivings that the debate on global security isbeing hijacked by a narrow focusing on the ‘unholy alliance’ ofinternational terrorism, so-called failed states and weapons ofmass destruction in the hands of non-state actors.

The EU’s apparent desire to come out from under NATO’s‘shadow’ is significant in that it suggests a willingness to take on afull range of activities and responsibilities that must not be dele-gated to circumstantial coalitions of the willing. Most importantof all is the assurance that, unlike NATO, it will only act under aUN mandate. This will ensure that the EU sees itself acting strictlyin compliance with international law –never as a law unto itself.The answer to emerging threats is not to be found in pre-emptive

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military strikes but rather in pre-emptive monitoring and activeengagement at all stages to prevent a restive situation snowballingout of control. Brazil is confident that these are the principles thatwill guide the EU as it gains confidence and capabilities to enlargeits radius of action in the name of global security.

As it moves into the uncharted waters of the twenty-first cen-tury, Brazil hopes that the unfolding chaos in Iraq, as well as omi-nous signs that nuclear proliferation is gaining momentum (indirect proportion to the lack of any movement on the larger issueof general nuclear disarmament), will give pause for thought.Brazil is confident that the EU will find in a sober analysis of theseworrisome trends the strength and the common purpose to over-come internal divisions and assume its rightful place at the headof a concerted alliance to rekindle long-held multilateral princi-ples and core values of international coexistence. In these times ofheightened terrorist alert, we must forge ahead on an interna-tional agenda that promotes collective security through what theSolana document calls ‘effective multilateralism’.

At the core of this agenda must be the reinstatement of theUnited Nations as the cornerstone of global governance. To thisend Brazil – and Latin America and the Caribbean – looks forwardto working with the EU on building what some have called a formof multi-regionalism that reinvigorates the UN’s global reach andeffectiveness. Joint action is called for in strengthening respect forinternational law, in particular by upholding the need for fullobservance of human rights and by combating all forms ofimpunity by inter alia ensuring the effectiveness of the Interna-tional Criminal Court. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a case inpoint where Brazil believes the United Nations should be moreactively engaged in developing a lasting solution. The meetingthat Brazil’s Special Envoy to the Middle East held with JavierSolana in October 2004 provided an opportunity to explore howthe international community can work together to enforce the UNresolutions that help to implement a ‘road map’ towards lastingpeace in the region.

Equally crucial is the reform of the UN system if our collectivesecurity regime is to regain credibility and effectiveness. Theexpress support for Brazil’s candidature for a permanent seat onthe UN Security Council from the two EU member states that arepermanent members of the UNSC paves the way for constructivecoordination at the highest level on defence and security issues.

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Conclusion

Be it at the national, Mercosur or regional level, Brazil wishes to fur-ther develop its relations with the EU. The opportunities for coop-eration are vast but two fields stand out because of the possibilitythey offer to forge a strategic alliance in the shaping of the new‘security’ paradigm ushered in by the winds of economic globalisa-tion, the global security challenges and the unstable solipsism ofthe remaining superpower.

On the one hand, Brazil is at present intensely involved in nego-tiations on a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU,in the expectation that these will add momentum to global effortsto push through a more equitable international trade regime, onethat helps leverage development among the world’s poorest popu-lations. There is no greater global challenge than eradicatingpoverty. After all, what stake does a small-scale farmer in a devel-oping country have in a world that denies him the dignity of mak-ing an honest living from his work? What use does he have for asystem that makes a mockery of the rhetoric of free trade and self-improvement?

On the other hand, the search for a fairer and therefore moreeffective global economic system is at the centre of present-daycollective security efforts to deal comprehensively with large-scaleoutbreaks of political oppression, social unrest and economicdeprivation throughout the world. The willingness of the EU totake on a prominent role both at home and abroad in promotingthe rule of law and in conflict prevention in the internationalarena commensurate to its economic clout is an auspicious water-shed.

Brazil will continue to engage with the EU, in the expectationthat Europe really wishes to contribute to building a truly globalgovernance, one that is centred on a strengthened multilateralismthat fosters a more balanced and legitimate use of power, be it military or economic.

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Mexico

Mexico’s future internationalorientation: the European Unionas a model and influenceFrancisco E. González

A part of Mexico’s modern character is European. Between the six-teenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, wars, trade, immigration,arts and science predominantly of European provenance forgedMexico’s heritage. This does not mean, however, that Mexico enjoysa special historical relationship with Europe, because similar claimscan be made about the other 25 independent republics of continen-tal Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, in the words of the lateBrazilian intellectual and diplomat José Guilherme Merquior, LatinAmerica as a whole is ‘the other West’.1 Two remarks can be addedin this context. Firstly, the Western (European) world was trans-formed by its contact with the indigenous cultures of the NewWorld. Secondly, the Iberian pedigree of Latin America can be dis-tinguished from the English (and to a lesser extent the French)pedigrees that came to dominate North America.

Today the Europeans are perceived differently in Latin Amer-ica. Thanks to the great process of European integration that hastaken place since the end of the Second World War, the differencesbetween the Iberian, British, French, Dutch and other Europeancountries’ experiences in the New World have been at least partlysubsumed under a broader ‘European’ perspective. This broaderperspective has its institutional basis in the European Union,from which flow across the Atlantic Ocean new ideas, as well ashuman, financial, technical and cultural resources of great impor-tance for Latin America. Unfortunately, a similar process of con-structive trans-national integration, capable of bringing the secu-rity, peace, prosperity and higher chances of a better future forsuccessive generations that the European Union has created for itsmembers’ populations, will not occur in the Americas in the nearfuture. The main reason for this is the presence of deep intra- andinternational economic, social, ethnic, and political cleavages inthe American continent. Even though perfect homogeneity is notin theory a strict prerequisite for bringing together and assimilat-ing populations successfully, the magnitude of polarisation (be it

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1. José Guilherme Merquior, ‘Elotro Occidente (un poco defilosofía de la historia desde Lati-noamérica)’, Cuadernos Ameri-canos, 13, 1989, pp. 9-23.

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between individuals or groups in the same country or between dif-ferent countries) is such in many parts of the New World that it ishard to imagine how they could emulate the transnational Euro-pean experiment.

One of the deepest and most problematic cleavages in theAmerican continent is the one highlighted by Merquior himself. Itis represented physically by the 3,000-km border between Mexicoand the United States, and its historical significance lies in itsbeing the fault line where Latin and Anglo America meet. I argue inthis essay that Mexico and the EU’s mutual interest lies first andforemost in this fault line. Both need to cooperate with the UnitedStates in such important areas for their future as the military,technology, the economy, diplomacy and politics, and thereforecooperation between the EU and Mexico is also crucial.

First, for Mexican leaders the European Union will remain theideal that the much humbler North American Free Trade Agree-ment (NAFTA) should aspire to. Second, Mexico is keen tostrengthen its ties with the EU, as was evinced by the Third Sum-mit of heads of state and government of Latin America, theCaribbean and the European Union (ALCUE), which took place inGuadalajara, Mexico, in May 2004. However, it was also evidentthat more good intentions and pronouncements than concretepositions and commitments resulted from this and previous sum-mits. Third, and as a consequence of last point, Mexico remainskeen to activate strong ties with the EU and with its leadingnation-states in areas such as trade (after all, the free trade agree-ment that both parties signed, and which came into effect on 1 July2000, has been one of the most comprehensive ever negotiated bythe EU2), postgraduate education, and science and technology.Finally, Mexican as well as most other Latin American leadersstrongly believe that the EU has (and should have) a strong impacton the international order through the promotion of multilateraldiplomacy, the strengthening of the United Nations system, andthe championing of peaceful conflict resolution and the mainte-nance of international peace. Mexico has supported these posi-tions consistently since the creation of the UN. As a leading coun-try in Latin America, it can cooperate with the EU by garnering andstrengthening support for such shared positions throughout thesubcontinent and in international forums.

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2. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/mexico/index_en.htm.

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What the coming together of European countries means inMexico

Ideally, for Mexican and Latin American leaders European integra-tion means the possibility of spreading peace, security, develop-ment and prosperity across national borders. In practice, thetransnational European experiment has shown to both govern-ments and intellectuals of developing nation-states the possibilityof transcending borders between unequal partners. It is importantto see that the countries of the continent that instigated and wasthe main theatre of two World Wars in the twentieth century havemanaged to transform their domestic and international orienta-tion, prioritising peace, security, cooperation, and political andeconomic integration in less than fifty years.

Mexicans of the time were very conscious about conflictive,war-torn Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. In turn,today’s Mexicans admire and aspire to the high living standards(in such different areas as peace, security, rule of law, democraticgovernance, economic growth and social justice) seen in the EU’s‘old’ member countries – or for that matter in the neighbouringUnited States. During the First World War, Mexico was acutelyaware of the destruction of Europe, the country being in the gripof a decade-long revolution that destroyed it economically andkilled more than 10 per cent of its population. It was not onlyEuropean international conflicts that captured Mexicans’ atten-tion, but also civil wars, above all, the Spanish Civil War. The Mex-ican government under Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) supported theSpanish Republic and welcomed a host of transterrados, an apt con-cept used by Spanish philosopher José Gaos to refer to exiledSpaniards’ capacity to develop two national identities. Gaos andmany others made Mexico their second patria, settling there forgood.3 It would be difficult to quantify the enormous benefit thatMexican society, particularly Mexico’s universities, publishinghouses, medical and legal professions, and arts’ scenes havederived from welcoming thousands of exiled Spaniards. Subse-quently, Mexican leaders were aware also of the horrors of the Sec-ond World War and the destruction, once again, of Europe. Thecountry’s government was firmly behind the Allies’ cause, and itpromoted and participated in the founding of the United Nations.Since then, Mexican leaders and public opinion have come toadmire the progressive expansion of European integration. If

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3. Leopoldo Zea, ‘Lecciones deJosé Gaos’, in Leopoldo Zea, ElNuevo Mundo en los retos del nuevomilenio, 2003; at http://www.en-sayistas.org/filosofos/mexico/zea/milenio/2-1.htm.

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there was ever need of a historical example of past conflict,destruction and human misery followed by apparently irreversiblepeace, progress and human development, this surely is Europe’stwentieth century history. And if the historical model is valid, thenMexicans would like to emulate it.

This is where their most important international relationship,that with the United States, comes into play. Mexicans would havefound it difficult to believe one of its presidents calling for Mexi-can/United States integration along EU lines. However, thatunlikely call has became a real policy line since the signing andcoming into effect of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 with theUnited States and Canada. Thus it happened that Mexico’s Presi-dent Vicente Fox (2000-06) began one of his early visits to theUnited States in 2001 by affirming his government’s interest indeveloping NAFTA more widely and deeply by following theexample of the EU. Despite the fact that many commentators inboth Mexico and the United States highlighted the point thatEurope’s integration success since the 1950s had been due in largemeasure to the relative equality and common interests of thecountries involved, this is an argument that has to be qualified.After all, first, the EU has been successful in integrating politicallyand economically, in successive waves, countries such as Greece,Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which started well below the humandevelopment average of the Community’s early members. Second,the great Eastern expansion of the European Union in 2004, whichincreased the number of member nation-states from 15 to 25 (andthe prospect of Turkey’s accession in the future), encompasseseconomic, social and political asymmetries that are not very dif-ferent in magnitude and complexity from those that would entailthe wider and deeper integration of Mexico, Canada, and theUnited States under NAFTA.

In the light of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washing-ton, DC on 11 September 2001, and subsequent internationalrealignments, American foreign policy changed from the appar-ent early interest of president George W. Bush in addressing themassive problem of migration that exists between the two coun-tries to benign neglect since then. President Fox’s proposal wentunheard, which was unfortunate particularly given his emphasison one key feature of the EU’s legal arrangements that wouldtransform the Mexico-US bilateral relationship: the free move-ment of persons across national borders (and not only of goods

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and services, as is the case with NAFTA). This is a measure that can-not be overemphasised. The two countries are in desperate need ofa new migratory regime (the last one they had was the so-calledBracero Program for temporary agricultural workers between1942 and 1964). Fox’s proposal, based on the European example,was an attempt to engage the United States bilaterally. In turn, theBush government only committed itself to, on the one hand, theestablishment of a Border Partnership, whose aim is to secure theMexico-US border from potential terrorist incursions into Ameri-can territory and, on the other, a unilaterally defined temporaryworker programme (whose ratification in the US Congress seemsunlikely).4 The United States has thus kept its migratory policyvis-à-vis its southern neighbour as an internal, unilateral ratherthan a shared, bilateral concern. Successive Mexican governmentswill most likely keep voicing and supporting the more liberal, pro-gressive alternative as seen in practice between the EU’s memberstates. Thus, the free movement of persons will remain one of thefundamental arrangements that the European model of integra-tion offers to Mexican leaders and policy-makers in their constantdealings with their counterparts in the United States.

EU-Latin America summits

Latin American/Caribbean heads of state in general, and Mexicanones in particular, have embraced enthusiastically the threeregional summits they have had with their European counterparts(Rio de Janeiro, 1999; Madrid, 2002; Guadalajara, 2004). The pur-pose of these summits has been to strengthen the political, eco-nomic and cultural bonds of both regions with the aim of creatinga ‘bi-regional strategic association’ capable of responding to thechallenges of globalisation. The first two summits produced docu-ments whose intentions were the establishment of the ‘bi-regionalstrategic association’. These documents were ratified last May inGuadalajara. An important document on shared values and posi-tions between the two regions was also drafted and adopted. Fifty-eight heads of state and government (or their personal representa-tives) participated in the Guadalajara summit. It was the firstinternational event in which the 25 heads of state and governmentof the enlarged EU participated. Notwithstanding the great effortthat has gone into the organisation of these summits, Mexican and

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4. Gustavo Mohar, Mexico-UnitedStates Migration: A Long Way to Go(Washington, DC: Migration Pol-icy Institute, 1 March 2004);http://www.migrationinforma-tion.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=209.

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other Latin American countries’ leaders, the regional media andpublic opinion have thus far concluded that these encounters haveonly produced good intentioned pronouncements and declara-tions without any great substance.

In fairness, rhetoric has not been the only output of the sum-mits. After all, as a consequence of the Guadalajara summit the 58representatives pledged to condemn the abuse, torture and inhu-mane treatment (a propos the abuses committed by US soldiersagainst Iraqi prisoners of war) of people wherever they occur; tosupport the International Criminal Court; to come out strongly infavour of the strengthening of the UN; and to advise and cooper-ate in fostering a process of economic integration in Latin Americaand the Caribbean. Even though the representatives of bothregions found important common interests, key differencesremained. For Mexican and other Latin American leaders one ofthe most important differences with their European counterpartswas the issue of immigrants’ human rights. Whereas Latin Amer-ica is and will remain a region one of whose key exports is humanlabour, the European Union is and will remain a net importer ofhuman labour and exporter of capital. Given the problems derivedfrom illegal immigration into EU countries (i.e., human smug-gling, drug trafficking, illegal weapons’ sales, prostitution), EUleaders in Guadalajara were reluctant to include references to thisissue, being wary that they might soften conditions for these typesof activities to keep flourishing. In contrast, Latin American lead-ers are keen to create international guarantees for their emigrantcitizens, millions of whom leave their countries annually for, first,the United States, but also increasingly for European Union coun-tries such as Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Thesummit concluded with a joint declaration about the importanceof an approach that should be ‘integral’ to the problem of immi-gration, but without proposing concrete measures.

Despite the Mexican government’s effort in the promotion ofthe third summit, in Guadalajara, it was clear to the Mexicanmedia that important differences continued to exist between thelevel of energy, resources and intelligence devoted to this summitvis-à-vis summits with the United States. Mexico’s main interestslie north rather than across the Atlantic. If Mexico was capable ofstrengthening its links with the EU, no doubt this would be usedalso to gain leverage vis-à-vis future negotiations with the UnitedStates. On the other hand, as was visible during the Guadalajara

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summit, Mexico aligned with the European mainstream concern-ing the endorsement of multilateral diplomacy and the peacefulsolution of international conflicts. Although the Europeans weresplit between countries that supported and those that opposedthe US-led war against Iraq in 2003, it was particularly importantfor two Latin American countries, namely, Mexico and Chile, tohave some European support in the UN Security Council. In therun-up to the war, these two non-permanent members of the UNSecurity Council did not agree with the attempt by the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom and Spain to pass a resolution thatwould have given international legal sanction to the armed inter-vention.

Strengthening the EU-Mexico relationship in the twenty-first century

The Guadalajara summit showed that Mexico is interested instrengthening and deepening its relations with the EU. Mexicanleaders would like Europe to look on Mexico as the Latin Americangateway to the United States. Mexican leaders, who had been scep-tical until the early 1990s about the United States’s contribution tothe country’s development, changed their tune, and now prioritisethat relationship. It would be a positive development if EU-Mexi-can cooperation could enhance their efforts in strengthening theirrespective key relationships with the United States.

The questions that arise are: how might EU-Mexican relationsbe strengthened in the near future, and can concrete recommen-dations be made? One area in which both parties have put in placelegal instruments and expertise since the year 2000 is the promo-tion of free trade. The European Union is Latin America’s secondtrading partner (it is the main trading partner for Mercosur, Chileand the Andean Group, but not for Mexico).5 Despite the publi-cised endorsement of the Mexican free trade agreement with theEU by the then Mexican government under President ErnestoZedillo, concrete results thus far have been disappointing. This isparticularly the case if the trading profile of Mexico with the EU iscontrasted with NAFTA. Tables 1 and 2 show the percentage ofMexico’s imports/exports with both blocs since 1994 (the yearNAFTA came into effect).6

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5. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/lac/in-dex_en.htm.

6. Tables elaborated by the authorwith data from Mexico, Secretaryof Economy, Trade Intelligence,2004; http://www.naftaworks.org/ls23al.php?s=24&p=2&l=2#.Included European countries’ per-centages do not add up to EU to-tals because Mexico also trades(though on an even smaller scale)with other EU countries such asItaly, the Netherlands, Swedenand Ireland.

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Mexico

Imports from: 1994 1997 2000 2003

United States 70.0 74.5 73.3 62

Canada 2.0 1.5 2.3 2.0

NAFTA total 72.0 76.0 75.6 64.0

Germany 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.6

Spain 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.3

France 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.1

United Kingdom 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7

EU total 11.4 9.0 8.4 10.5

Rest of the world 16.6 15 16 25.5

Table 1: Mexico’s imports from NAFTA and the EU1994-2003 (percentages)

Exports to: 1994 1997 2000 2003

United States 85.0 85.4 89.0 89.0

Canada 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.0

NAFTA total 87.4 87.2 91.0 91.0

Germany 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0

Spain 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.9

France 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2

United Kingdom 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3

EU total 5.0 3.6 3.4 3.4

Rest of the world 7.6 9.2 5.6 5.6

Table 2: Mexico’s exports to NAFTA and the EU1994-2003 (percentages)

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An overwhelming proportion of Mexico’s trade has been con-ducted with the United States during the last decade. Out of Mex-ico’s total imports, between two-thirds and three-quarters havecome from that country. Even more, out of Mexico’s total exportsduring the last decade, between 85 and 90 per cent have beenplaced in the United States. Whereas there is no clear trend forMexican imports, the proportion of exports going to the UnitedStates has increased. In marked contrast, Mexico’s commerce withthe EU has been frustratingly low. Not more than 11.4 per cent ofMexican annual imports have come from the EU, while not morethan 5 per cent of Mexican annual exports have been placed inEurope.

The existence of the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement sinceJuly 2000 should have created incentives to increase bilateraltrade. It is still probably too early to make a serious judgementabout the success or failure of that agreement. Trade benefits fromcumulative experience whereby partners improve and find newopportunities as they engage with each other, gather information,build trust and establish links that can then be deepened. Giventhat the legal instruments, the expertise and some infrastructureare already in place, increasing EU-Mexico trading links appears tobe a concrete possibility for mutual gain.

Other practical areas in which a deepening relationship can beestablished between Mexico and the European Union are highereducation, science and technology. Compared with developedcountries, Mexico’s annual expenditure on science and technol-ogy as a percentage of its GDP is low. For example, in 2001 Swedenspent 3.8 per cent of its GDP on science and technology, theUnited States 2.8 per cent, Germany 2.5 per cent, France 2.2 percent, Britain 1.8 per cent and Spain 1 per cent. In contrast, Mexicospent only 0.4 per cent.7

This does not mean that Mexico is not interested in strength-ening its science, and in cooperating with more advanced coun-tries to enhance its and their international position in the world.Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT)has established both bilateral and multilateral cooperation agree-ments with governments and scientific institutions around theworld. In particular, it has established bilateral cooperation pro-grammes with nine EU member countries (Belgium, CzechRepublic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and theUnited Kingdom)8 and multilateral cooperation programmes

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7. See http://www.conacyt.mx/d a p / i n d i c a d o r e s / i n d i -cadores_2003.pdf.

8. See http://www.conacyt.mx/dai/cop_bilateral/index.html.

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with international scientific institutions located in EU countriessuch as Italy, Spain and Sweden.9

An area of strategic importance for the strengthening of eco-nomic, cultural and political links between Mexico and the EU ispostgraduate education. CONACYT has financed thousands ofyoung Mexicans to do postgraduate studies abroad since the early1970s. While the largest proportion of these students used tochoose universities in the United States to complete their educa-tion, since the second half of the 1990s Mexican students’ demandfor universities in European countries has increased. WhereasCONACYT financed 1,261 postgraduate students to go to theUnited States in 1997, these numbers dropped to 1,087 in 2000and 927 in 2002. In contrast, CONACYT’s financing of Mexicanstudents to European universities increased steadily in the sameperiod. The largest recipients of Mexican postgraduate studentshave been universities in Britain (491 in 1997, 674 in 2000 and 764in 2002), France (287 in 1997, 386 in 2000 and 425 in 2002), andSpain (297 in 1997, 332 in 2000 and 387 in 2002).10 Several rea-sons account for these trends. For instance, the United States hastightened all its visa procedures as a consequence of 9/11, andMexican students are facing much higher entry costs to the UnitedStates than to EU countries.

EU-Mexico cooperation in strengthening multilateraldiplomacy and international peace

Mexico has been a long-term advocate of national self-determina-tion, non-intervention, multilateral diplomacy and the peacefulresolution of international conflicts. During the League ofNations years, Mexican diplomat Genaro Estrada formulated adoctrine – which subsequently came to be known as the DoctrinaMexico or Doctrina Estrada – whose basic tenet was the non-recogni-tion of foreign governments. From this perspective, foreign gov-ernments’ recognition amounted to intervention in the domesticaffairs of a nation-state. Such intervention curtailed national gov-ernments’ self-determination and sovereignty. Since then, Mexicangovernments have not recognised any governments. Rather, theyhave simply sent or recalled ambassadors and diplomatic staffwithout pronouncing on the legality or legitimacy of particulargovernments worldwide. Among other things, this doctrine

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9. See http://www.conacyt.mx/dai/cop_multilareral/index.html.

10. See http://www.conacyt.mx/d a p / i n d i c a d o r e s / i n d i -cadores_2003.pdf.

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allowed successive Mexican governments to navigate successfullythe treacherous waters of international affairs during the ColdWar.

Since the year 2000, Mexico has embraced a more active role ininternational affairs by, for example, holding a non-permanentseat in the UN Security Council and making formal pronounce-ments against the domestic political practices of some countries,most prominently state-sponsored human rights abuses in Cuba.Even though to many domestic and international observers thisnew stance means that Mexico has dumped the Estrada doctrine,this view has to be qualified. The Mexican foreign affairs estab-lishment keeps supporting (and will continue to support)national self-determination, multilateral diplomacy and thepeaceful resolution of international conflicts. Given the country’sturbulent international history and its geopolitical position, theseprinciples will continue to be the backbone of Mexican foreignpolicy.

Unfortunately, Mexico’s accent on non-intervention has ledsuccessive governments to a rather lukewarm attitude vis-à-viscontributing to peacekeeping operations – although this mightchange in the future.

Most Latin American governments opposed war in Iraq with-out UN sanction. The perceived unilateral military strategy of theUnited States divided Europe much more than it did Latin Amer-ica. After all, five leading European countries split into opposingcamps (Britain, Italy and Spain vs. France and Germany), whosedifferences could not be reconciled. Latin American nations, par-ticularly since the wave of democratisation that swept the subcon-tinent in the 1980s and 1990s, have embraced multilateral diplo-macy and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Thelarge Latin American contingent of nations will probably con-tinue to come out in support of these positions in internationalforums. This should be good news for those leading Europeancountries (and the EU authorities) which are trying to do the same.

Mexican and Latin American authorities in general agree withthe European Security Strategy (ESS) launched by Javier Solana atthe end of 2003. Such agreement includes both broad points con-tained in the EU’s new global security strategy, such as a renewedemphasis in the use of effective multilateralism, and more focusedand specific points such as the assessment of risks and challengesderived from international terrorism since 2001. With respect to

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the broader point, democratically elected Latin American govern-ments of both the right and left have consistently supported theuse of multilateral initiatives to solve international conflicts sincethe end of the Cold War. A measure of how little official supportthere was for unilateral intervention in Iraq was not only the nega-tive vote by Mexico and Chile in the UN Security Council, but alsothe fact that out of the 23 independent republics in Latin Americaand the Caribbean only 4 small ones joined the so-called ‘coalitionof the willing’. Thus, 361 Salvadoran, 367, Honduran, 115Nicaraguan and 302 Dominican troops joined the Spanish mili-tary contingent of 1,300 in Iraq. The fact that it was among thesmallest and most economically dependent countries in theregion that support for the US invasion of Iraq originated, stressedhow marginal backing for unilateral action was, and how broadand unanimous were the repeated calls in support of effectivemultilateralism by the governments of the larger countries in theregion.

It is more difficult to generalise about the level of agreement byMexican and Latin American authorities with respect to the risksand challenges posed by international terrorism. As pointed outabove, authorities throughout the subcontinent agree with theESS’s assessment of international terrorism as a key challenge tothe contemporary international system. Most authorities wouldwelcome the coordination and sharing of information, as well asthe discussion of complementary tactics and strategies to combatthis problem. However, each Latin American country faces a par-ticular geopolitical challenge as well as specific domestic circum-stances, which might not be easy to accommodate within a grandtransnational strategy. For example, neighbouring countries suchas Colombia and Venezuela have very different positions withrespect to the persecution and eradication of terrorism. For theformer country this has meant welcoming the full cooperationand support of the US government and military in combating left-wing guerrillas, while in the latter country American interventionin the name of the fight against terrorism or any other goal is per-ceived suspiciously and as part of a neo-imperialist strategy. Thecurrent governments in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuadorand Uruguay, though not as radical as Venezuela’s, also remainsuspicious of the ‘war on terror’ and its potential for sanctioningunilateral interventionism. Mexico’s policy, though not as clear-cut as Colombia’s, also comes closer to a strategy of cooperation

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with the United States. As noted above, at the insistence of theBush government, both governments signed the Border Partner-ship, whose aim is to secure the 3,000-km Mexico-US border frompotential terrorist incursions into American territory. With newsand political sources in Washington currently repeating the asser-tion that the United States’s southern border is a ‘soft spot’ in the‘war on terror’, we can expect the pressure on Mexican govern-ments for closer cooperation with Washington on this point toremain high.

It should therefore not come across as surprising that Mexicanauthorities believe that the European Union is one of the onlyinternational actors capable of throwing its weight against unilat-eral and military solutions in international affairs. The EU, and itsdefence of effective multilateralism, is a key counterweight to thegrowth of the bilateral Mexico-US (though clearly driven by theUnited States) relationship with respect to security and terrorism.In this light, it is also important to emphasise the fact thatnational interests and bilateral agendas sometimes keep trump-ing the support of principled international positions by all ormost of the countries of Latin America and the European Union.

A recent illustration during the Guadalajara summit was dis-agreement over the case of Cuba. Even though in principle all par-ticipants were in favour of issuing a joint declaration against theunilateral and extraterritorial application of national laws (a prac-tice that hurts, among other things, international law and inter-national trade), differences arose when the Cuban delegation andsupporting delegations from other countries tried to include anexplicit reference to the Helms-Burton law, through which theUnited States has hardened a long-term economic embargo (ablockade according to Cuba) against the island. The end resultwas that the, in principle, honourable condemnation of extraterri-torial application of national laws had to be dropped due to indi-vidual countries’ positions vis-à-vis the United States.

Despite this and other instances of international policy differ-ences, Mexico is strongly in favour of cooperating with and sup-porting a strong EU presence in international forums, particularlywhen this presence translates into the reaffirmation of Mexico’smost cherished international principles such as national self-determination, multilateral diplomacy, and the peaceful resolu-tion of international conflicts.

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Conclusion

Mexico’s future international orientation will be crafted primarilyaccording to how its relations with the United States evolve. How-ever, Mexicans recognise that an important part of their heritage isEuropean, and that the great process of European integration issomething worth emulating. Thus, the European Union willremain a very strong model, whose economic, cultural, diplomatic,and technological influence on Mexico, and vice versa, will dependon the political willingness of both parties’ authorities to deepenthe relationship. The formal mechanisms that keep Latin Ameri-can/Caribbean and European leaders in touch are already in placethrough the ALCUE scheme and through bilateral meetings ofindividual or groups of Latin American/Caribbean countries withEU delegations. Within the Latin American concert of nations,Mexico would like Europe to see it as the gate to the United States.If this were the case, then both parties might work together to cul-tivate their most important international relationship in a mutu-ally supportive way.

The European Union can also engage Mexico, a country with105 million inhabitants, more closely in concrete future-enhanc-ing areas such as free trade, science and technology, and postgrad-uate education. In all these cases, the legal arrangements, expert-ise, infrastructure, and mutual interest already exist. Good andimproving results have been seen, for example, in the increasingnumber of Mexican students who choose European universities tocomplete their education at the postgraduate level. This growingrelationship is precisely the type that could yield the solid, newunderstanding and long-term cooperation which both LatinAmerican and European leaders and intellectuals keep advocatingas an antidote to the pitfalls and dangers of globalisation.11

Finally, Mexico’s continuing support for national self-determi-nation, multilateral diplomacy, and the peaceful resolution ofinternational conflicts cannot be overemphasised. SuccessiveMexican governments and public opinion admire the capacity ofthe concert of European nations in putting their long-term,destructive differences behind them and embracing peace, secu-rity and prosperity in less than half a century. Mexicans believethat the EU, particularly after the development of its common foreign, security and defence policy and the publication of theEuropean Security Strategy, is a key international actor capable of

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11. See, for example, PatriciaGaleana (coord.), Latinoamérica enla conciencia europea. Europa en la con-ciencia latinoamericana (Mexico:FCE, 1999).

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utilising its weight in support of multilateral diplomacy and themaintenance of international peace. From their own position, onthe northern fault line of ‘the other West’, Mexicans will continueto support these principles and the countries and internationalactors that do so too.

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Chine

La Chine et l’UE : vers unecoopération stratégiqueYi Wang

Depuis 1975, l’établissement de relations officielles entre la Chineet la Communauté économique européenne a servi les intérêts dechacune des deux parties. Lors de leur premier sommet en 1998, larelation sino-européenne pour l’avenir a été définie comme « unerelation de partenariat constructif stable et à long terme face au21ème siècle » ; cinq ans plus tard, cette relation se développait àgrand pas, et entrait dans une nouvelle période de coopérationstratégique.

Les caractéristiques de la coopération stratégique

L’année 2003 a été un tournant pour la relation sino-européenne.L’UE a en effet publié son 5e document concernant sa politique àl’égard de la Chine, et la Chine a rendu public son premier docu-ment de politique vis-à-vis de l’étranger : le « Document sur la poli-tique de la Chine à l’égard de l’UE » ; les deux parties ont ainsi décidéd’inclure une coopération stratégique dans la relation sino-européenne. Cette coopération a les caractéristiques suivantes :

La notion de « coopération stratégique » a été acceptée par laChine et l’UE

Dans son cinquième document, A maturing partnership : shared inter-ests and challenges in EU-China relations, qui a été rendu public le10 septembre 2003, l’UE a proposé : « The EU and China have ever-greater interest to work together as strategic partners to safeguardand promote sustainable development, peace and stability »1. Le12 octobre 2003, le gouvernement chinois a publié son premierdocument sur sa politique vis-à-vis de l’UE, dans lequel il entend« renforcer sa coopération globale avec l’UE en faveur d’undéveloppement régulier et durable des relations sino-européennes ». A la fin du même mois, alors que les dirigeants

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1. Commission européenne, « Amaturing partnership: shared in-terests and challenges in EU-China relations », 10 septembre2003, p. 3.

5

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chinois rencontraient les représentants de l’UE venus participerau sommet sino-européen, le président chinois Hu Jintao aapprouvé la proposition européenne de développer le partenariatglobal de la stratégie sino-européenne ; une relation jugée mûre,solide et stratégique par le premier ministre chinois Wen Jiabao.Dans la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité intitulée « Une Europesûre dans un monde meilleur », la Chine était considérée commel’un des principaux partenaires stratégiques2. L’établissement dela notion de la coopération stratégique par les dirigeants des deux par-ties signifie qu’ils ont fait le choix juste qu’imposaient les besoinsdu développement et la situation internationale.

Le contenu de la stratégie est précis et concret

Ces dernières années, la Chine et l’Union ont trouvé de nouveauxthèmes de coopération dans le domaine de la « sécurité étendue »,c’est-à-dire, la sécurité de l’économie, des finances, de l’environ-nement, des ressources, de la lutte contre le SRAS ainsi qu’en ce quiconcerne la sécurité traditionnelle telle que la lutte contre le terror-isme, la lutte contre les immigrations illégales et la prévention de laprolifération des armes de destruction massive. La Nouvelle Con-ception de Sécurité chinoise lancée en 1996 et fondée sur la confi-ance mutuelle, l’intérêt réciproque, l’égalité et la concertation3, leLivre blanc sur sa politique ainsi que les mesures sur la préventionde prolifération récemment prises par le gouvernement chinoisont été largement appréciés par l’UE. La Chine attache, quant àelle, beaucoup d’importance à la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité.L’accord de coopération sur Galileo et l’accord de coopération spa-tiale signés par la Chine et l’Union sont des initiatives stratégiqueset technologiques visant à se débarrasser du contrôle américainsur le système GPS. La Chine et l’Union ont beaucoup de pointscommuns sur les grands problèmes internationaux : l’une etl’autre sont favorables à la coopération multilatérale sous le lead-ership de l’ONU, à la démocratisation des relations interna-tionales et à la multipolarisation mondiale ; elles préconisenttoutes deux la résolution pacifique des conflits, une « gestion inté-grée »4 des affaires mondiales grâce au soft power, une consultationstratégique accrue ainsi qu’une liaison téléphonique, ou « lignerouge » sur les crises internationales les plus graves.

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2. Javier Solana, « Stratégie eu-ropéenne de Sécurité : Une Eu-rope sûre dans un mondemeilleur », Institut d’Etudes deSécurité de l’Union européenne,décembre 2003, p.26.

3. Sur la Nouvelle Conception deSécurité chinoise, voir : « China’sposition paper on the New Secu-rity concept » , site internet de laMission permanente de laRépublique populaire de Chineauprès des Nations unies,ht tp://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t27742.htm.

4. Différente de la gestion par lehard power des Etats-Unis, la « ges-tion intégrée » demande, pourmieux gérer les affaires interna-tionales, une gestion globale àtravers tous les moyens néces-saires, y compris politiques,diplomatiques, économiques,culturels, policiers, juridiques et,enfin, militaires.

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Les bases de la coopération stratégique ont été définies

Cette coopération se fonde sur la relation sino-européenne avecl’Union, et sur les relations de la Chine avec les pays membres del’UE. Dans le communiqué conjoint publié lors du premier som-met sino-européen en avril 1998, les deux parties ont exprimé leurintention d’établir « une relation de partenariat constructive, sta-ble et durable à l’aube du 21ème siècle » et ont décidé d’institution-naliser une rencontre annuelle. Cette consultation sino-européenne a officiellement débuté en 2002. Le communiquéconjoint du sommet en octobre 2003 reconnaissait l’établissementd’une coopération stratégique sino-européenne. Jusqu’au mois demai 2004, la Chine et la France, l’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni et l’Italie ont également établi des relations de partenariatstratégique. Ces différents niveaux de coopération entre ministreset principaux départements des gouvernements chinois eteuropéens, et entre la Chine et l’Union, ont permis de mettre enplace une consultation périodique et utile.

Mise en œuvre de la coopération stratégique

La Chine et l’Union ont commencé à utiliser la coopérationstratégique aux niveaux aussi bien bilatéral que multilatéral. Dansle premier domaine, pour des questions sensibles telles que lesdroits de l’homme, Taïwan, le Tibet, la vente des armes à Taïwan,etc., les deux parties ont réglé les problèmes à travers le dialogue etla consultation, choisissant l’échange plutôt que l’affrontement, ets’accordant mutuellement plus de compréhension et de tolérance.Au niveau des Etats européens, la Chine a renforcé sa coopérationavec l’UE, ainsi qu’avec la France, l’Allemagne et le Royaume-Unisur les questions régionales et internationales ; les différentes par-ties s’appuient mutuellement et coordonnent même leurs effortssur d’importants dossiers internationaux, du jamais vu dans l’his-toire sino-européenne. Au début de la crise irakienne, la Chine, laFrance et l’A1lemagne ont, à travers une consultation étroite, jouéun rôle important à l’égard de la résolution 1441 du Conseil desécurité de l’ONU sur l’Irak5. Avant l’attaque des Etats-Unis contrel’Irak, la Chine s’est résolument rangée aux côtés de la France, del’Allemagne et de la Russie pour déjouer l’intention des Etats-Uniset du Royaume-Uni de voter une motion à l’ONU en vue de

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5. Grâce aux efforts de la Chine, dela France et de la Russie, le Conseilde sécurité de l’ONU a adopté àl’unanimité la résolution 1441 ennovembre 2002. Cette résolutionréaffirme la souveraineté et l’in-tégrité territoriale de l’Irak duKoweït et des Etats voisins, décided’accorder à l’Irak une dernièrepossibilité de s’acquitter des obli-gations en matière de désarme-ment, demande au gouvernementirakien de fournir, dans un délai de30 jours, une déclaration exacte etcomplète sur tous les aspects deses programmes de développe-ment d’armes chimiques, bio-logiques et nucléaires, et rappelleenfin que, si l’Irak continuait àmanquer à ses obligations, il au-rait à faire face à de « graves con-séquences ».

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déclarer la guerre à l’Irak. Concernant la reconstruction de l’Irakaprès la guerre, la Chine, l’UE, la France, l’Allemagne et le Roy-aume-Uni considèrent que l’ONU doit jouer le rôle principal.Après la fin de la guerre en Irak, la Chine et l’Union, utilisant aussibien leurs propres moyens multilatéraux que leur présence à latable des négociations, ont gagné les premières batailles sur l’enjeunucléaire en Corée du Nord et sur le plan nucléaire iranien. LaChine et l’UE ont démontré aux Américains que le multilatéra-lisme est plus efficace que l’unilatéralisme, et la prévention plusutile que les armes. Parmi les trois membres de « l’axe du mal »désignés par George W. Bush, l’horizon semble s’éclaircir davan-tage pour la Corée du Nord et l’Iran que pour l’Irak. Sous la con-ciliation de la Chine et de l’UE, la pratique chinoise et européennemontre que le multilatéralisme a un bel avenir.

Une nouvelle coopération stratégique

C’est à cause de profonds changements de la situation interna-tionale et bilatérale que la Chine et l’UE ont décidé de renforcer leurcoopération. Les raisons qui poussent la relation sino-européennevers une nouvelle coopération stratégique sont les suivantes :

Premièrement, les points communs entre les deux parties se multiplient.Sur les problèmes internationaux et stratégiques, tels que la con-struction d’un monde multipolarisé, le rôle essentiel de l’ONU etdes autres institutions multilatérales, la sécurité et la lutte contre leterrorisme, la « gestion intégrée » des affaires mondiales, et la diver-sité des civilisations, la Chine et l’UE ont des positions et des pointscommuns. Ayant un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité del’ONU, la Chine étendra son influence dans les affaires interna-tionales et jouera un rôle plus responsable et plus mûr. Tandis quel’Union, grâce à sa puissance, à sa position traditionnelle et à soninfluence internationale, avec deux pays (France et Royaume-Uni)membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, jouera sansdoute un rôle indépendant dans les affaires mondiales.

Deuxièmement, le besoin de la lutte en commun contre l’unilatéralisme.Après le 11 septembre 2001, les Etats-Unis ont successivementlancé la notion « d’axe du mal » et promu une politique de préemp-tion, afin de casser le système multilatéral actuel et le cadre du droit

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international, de réorganiser l’ordre mondial sous leur contrôle àtravers le hard power, sous prétexte de lutter contre le terrorisme.Face à ce nouveau défi, aucun pays seul ne parvient à endiguer lepouvoir de l’unilatéralisme américain ; ce n’est qu’à travers lacoopération internationale et le soft power qu’on peut former uneforce de « contrainte légère » pour contrebalancer l’hégémonismeet l’unilatéralisme. Dans ce contexte, la Chine et l’Union, deuxgrandes puissances ayant des points de vue différents sur la gou-vernance globale avec les Etats-Unis, empruntent la même voie.

La crise et la division de la communauté internationale engen-drées par l’attaque militaire des Etats-Unis contre l’Irak au débutde l’année 2003 a été une épreuve de force entre la multipolarité etl’unipolarité, entre le multilatéralisme et l’unilatéralisme. Aujour-d’hui, embourbés entre le Tigre et l’Euphrate, les Américains sontobligés de se tourner vers l’ONU. Grâce à l’action de la Chine, de laFrance, de l’Allemagne et de la Russie, qui ont fermement soutenules principes mêmes et le rôle de l’ONU, et encouragé l’action mul-tilatérale, la communauté internationale a pu restreindre le hardpower de l’Amérique en osant dire non à son hégémonisme et à sonunilatéralisme.

Troisièmement, les divergences entre les deux rives de l’Atlantique necessent de s’accroître. Que l’Europe et l’Amérique croisent le fer à pro-pos du fromage, de la banane ou de l’acier comme ce fut le cas autre-fois, ou qu’elles s’opposent au sujet du veto, de questions diploma-tiques ou de l’ordre mondial comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui, leurpartenariat traditionnel se heurte aux intérêts stratégiques del’autre partie. La France et l’Allemagne, pays moteurs de l’Union,prônent inlassablement la multipolarité contre l’unipolarité desEtats-Unis. Ces derniers, considérant que l’intégration européennemet en question leurs intérêts, voire les menace, renoncent àsoutenir l’Union et s’efforcent de mettre des bâtons dans les rouesen allant jusqu’à fabriquer une « nouvelle » et une « vieille » Europepour nuire au processus de l’intégration européenne. En mêmetemps, l’UE ne se satisfait plus de jouer un rôle secondaire sur lascène internationale, d’avoir le porte-monnaie généreux et de jouerles balayeurs une fois terminée la guerre menée par les Etats-Unis.En accélérant l’Union politique et de la défense, d’une perspectivechinoise, elle a l’ambition de jouer un rôle particulier dans lesaffaires internationales et de se retrouver sur un pied d’égalité avecles Américains. Il est inévitable que l’émergence de l’Union, qui

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devient le principal obstacle pour la politique hégémoniste et uni-latéraliste, mette en cause les intérêts américains. L’UE constitue eneffet une force capable d’endiguer la politique unilatéraliste améri-caine. Dans ce contexte, le développement des relations de l’UE avecles autres principaux pays du monde accroît sa marge de manœu-vre.

Quatrièmement, la maturité des relations politiques, économiques, com-merciales, sociétales, culturelles, scientifiques et technologiques sino-européennes facilite l’établissement et le développement de la coopérationstratégique. Tout en consolidant la coopération classique, les deuxparties estiment nécessaire et possible de renforcer la coopérationdans le domaine de la « sécurité étendue » et de la « sécurité non tra-ditionnelle », touchant toutes sortes de domaines : économie,finances, environnement, ressources et information, lutte contre leterrorisme, lutte contre les immigrations clandestines, non-pro-lifération des armes de destruction massive, prévention des mal-adies contagieuses, etc. Ces domaines constituent les nouveauxpiliers de la coopération stratégique des deux parties.

Obstacles dans la relation

Toutefois, étant donné leurs différences traditionnelles qu’ils’agisse de leur histoire, de leurs traditions culturelles, de leursrégimes politiques et de leur développement économique, la rela-tion entre la Chine et l’Europe n’est pas exempte de désaccords et defacteurs négatifs. Certaines questions, depuis longtemps en sus-pens, ne correspondent plus à l’atmosphère stratégique d’aujour-d’hui.

1) Les divergences qui opposent le Royaume-Uni, la France etl’Allemagne, les petits et les grands pays, la « nouvelle » et la« vieille » Europe (et le sabotage sous-jacent opéré parl’Amérique) limitent la construction d’une politique étrangèrecommune et d’une défense autonome. A l’intérieur comme àl’extérieur, l’Union ne parvient ni à parler d’une seule voix ni àformer une politique étrangère unifiée. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Allemagne ont chacune leur politique mondialepropre. A certaines occasions, la Chine se trouve dans une situa-tion gênante et ne sait pas quel comportement adopter vis-à-vis

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de l’UE et de ses pays membres ; sa politique de développementdes relations avec ces derniers a du reste été considérée comme« une tentation persistante de traiter en priorité avec les Etatsmembres, voire d’opposer ceux-ci entre eux »6.

2) Les principaux problèmes économiques sont les suivants : a)alors que l’économie de marché est très développée en Chine,l’Union refuse de lui accorder un « statut d’économie de marchéà part entière » alors qu’elle l’a fait pour d’autres pays moinsavancés dans ce domaine ; b) après l’adhésion de la Chine à l’Or-ganisation mondiale du Commerce (OMC) et l’augmentationde l’exportation des marchandises chinoises vers l’Union, les casd’antidumping de l’Union à l’égard de la Chine se multiplient ; c)l’introduction officielle de l’euro et l’élargissement de l’Unioninduisent une forme de protectionnisme ; si la Chine est exclue,cela risque de porter atteinte à l’économie chinoise et au com-merce sino-européen.

3) La relation sino-européenne peut-être gênée sur le long termepar les questions des droits de l’homme, du Tibet, de Taïwan etautres sujets sensibles ; les discussions sur les résultats« formels » et « substantiels » faisant suite aux débats concernantles questions sensibles et les pressions exercées de temps à autrepar le Parlement européen montrent qu’il existe une ombre surla relation sino-européenne.

4) La sanction prise après le 4 juin 1989 par l’Union à l’encontre dela Chine (l’interdiction de ventes d’armes à la Chine) n’est pasencore levée. En réalité, cette sanction, qui n’a plus de raisond’être, renforce l’intérêt de l’adversaire de la concurrence, etporte grandement atteinte aux intérêts de l’UE.

5) La relation sino-européenne est asymétrique : la Chine entre-tient parallèlement une relation bilatérale avec les pays membreset une relation multilatérale avec l’Union, et l’Europe en profitepour s’octroyer plus de droits et se dérober aux actes. Actuelle-ment, sous prétexte que certains pays n’acceptent pas d’accorderà la Chine un statut d’économie de marché à part entière et delever l’interdiction de ventes d’armes à Pékin, l’Union continuede laisser ces deux problèmes en suspens. Cette asymétrie et lerejet mutuel des responsabilités entre l’UE et les pays membres

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6. Hervé Dejean de la Bâtie, « Lapolitique chinoise de l’Union eu-ropéenne », Policy Paper no. 1, Cen-tre Asie-IFRI, Paris, avril 2002,p. 13.

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réduisent en réalité l’autorité et la confiance de la politiqueeuropéenne sur la Chine, et entravent la mise sur pied d’une rela-tion stratégique sino-européenne.

Dans un contexte de mutation de la situation internationale, larelation sino-européenne doit s’accommoder des points forts etdes points faibles qu’elle comporte, tout en maintenant les pointsfaibles au niveau le plus bas possible afin de garantir que lacoopération stratégique des deux parties occupe une place domi-nante.

Perspectives d’avenir

Les dix prochaines années seront, aussi bien pour la Chine que pourl’Union une période de développement accéléré et d’influencegrandissante. Compte tenu de la mutation qu’elles traversenttoutes deux, elles se sont fixé des objectifs stratégiques ambitieux etont entrepris chacune un processus de réforme et de réajustement,fournissant davantage d’espace et d’opportunités à la coopérationsino-européenne. Le « facteur chinois » et le « facteur européen »joueront des rôles décisifs sur le futur échiquier international.« Dans les vingt prochaines années, l’évolution mondiale dépendrade l’Amérique, de l’Europe et de la Chine », a affirmé l’ancien con-seiller de sécurité du gouvernement américain, Zbigniew Brzezin-ski7.

L’importance du facteur européen pour la Chine

Le gouvernement chinois considère les vingt prochaines annéescomme une période d’opportunité stratégique. « Les deux pre-mières décennies du XXIème siècle constituent pour notre pays unepériode importante et pleine d’opportunités stratégiques que nousdevrons saisir à tout prix, de manière à en tirer grand profit »8,annonce le rapport du Parti communiste chinois en novem-bre 2002. Promouvoir la relation avec l’UE correspond aux intérêtsen question, qui nécessitent à l’extérieur un contexte et une atmo-sphère internationale favorables à la Chine.

L’UE n’est pas les Etats-Unis, le Japon, la Russie ou l’Inde. Entrela Chine et l’Union, il n’existe ni problème géopolitique, ni contra-diction en ce qui concerne la sécurité stratégique, ni conflit d’in-térêt majeur ; maintenant que la rétrocession de Hong Kong et de

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7. Das Handelsblatt (Allemagne),28 janvier 2003.

8. Cf texte intégral du rapport deJiang Zemin prononcé le 8 novem-bre 2002 au XVIe Congrès du Particommuniste chinois, « Pour laconstruction d’une société jouis-sant d’un bon niveau de vie et lacréation d’un contexte nouveaufavorable à la cause du socialismeà la chinoise ». Voir http://www.china.org.cn.

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Macao à la Chine a été réglée pacifiquement, il n’existe plus de con-tentieux. Tout en s’élargissant, l’UE accélère son processus d’ap-profondissement. Cette intégration suit la voie de la multipolari-sation. A travers l’élargissement à l’extérieur et l’approfondisse-ment à l’intérieur, l’UE réalise des progrès considérables enmatière d’intégration politique, économique, de sécurité et dedéfense. Surtout après la guerre contre l’Irak, les Européens, con-frontés à une expérience douloureuse, ont tranché dans le vif enaccélérant le rythme de l’Union et l’établissement d’une défenseautonome. C’est ainsi qu’ont vu le jour la Stratégie européenne deSécurité et le projet de la première Constitution européenne. Avecson élargissement du 1er mai 2004, l’Union a pris une dimensionnouvelle, en regroupant des Etats venant aussi bien d’Europe ori-entale que d’Europe occidentale, avec une superficie de 4 millionsde km2, une population de 450 millions d’habitants et un PIBfranchissant le cap des 10.000 milliards de dollars américains.Grâce à son influence et à son attrait, l’Union constitue une puis-sance politique, économique, financière, scientifique et techniquequi rivalisera avec les Etats-Unis.

L’importance de la Chine pour l’Union

Ces dernières années, des actes terroristes, des guerres et des con-flits ont touché presque toutes les régions du monde entier, sauf laChine. Après vingt ans de réformes et d’ouverture, celle-ci est par-venue à stabiliser sa politique et à développer rapidement sonéconomie : elle devient aujourd’hui la « Terre promise » et un véri-table paradis économique pour les Européens. Les pays d’Europesont conscients de l’importance de la Chine tant pour sa nom-breuse population que pour son immense potentiel commercial, etpensent que l’Europe ne devrait pas jouer la politique de l’autrucheenvers la Chine. Bien que les mesures concernant cette dernière dif-fèrent d’un pays à l’autre, leur conscience de l’importance de laChine est la même. L’Europe s’oppose depuis longtemps à l’isole-ment de la Chine, espérant influencer le développement de ce paysà travers des contacts étroits. De plus, la Chine en tant qu’énormemarché potentiel est très attrayante pour l’Europe. Son influencegrandissante dans l’économie mondiale incite les pays d’Europe àla regarder d’un œil neuf, même si, comme dans la plupart des paysd’Europe, son économie a connu une période de stagnation cesdeux dernières années. En outre, l’Europe a hautement apprécié laparticipation de Pékin aux actions de maintien de la paix et sa façon

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de traiter la crise nucléaire coréenne. La Chine est maintenant unmembre responsable de la communauté internationale. L’Europeespère que la Chine deviendra un partenaire important de la lutteantiterroriste, de la non-prolifération et dans d’autres domaines.

Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, le sens de la coopération, de l’en-gagement et de la responsabilité s’est renforcé en Chine, devenuemoins susceptible, moins méfiante et renonçant à sa politique deprévention vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. Dans les vingt ou trenteprochaines années, la Chine pourrait occuper à l’échelle mondialela 2e ou 3e position économique. L’émergence d’une telle puis-sance économique demanderait de s’engager davantage sur lascène internationale dans les domaines diplomatique et politique,et de jouer un rôle responsable et important. Comme Chris Patten,Commissaire européen chargé des relations extérieures, l’aexpliqué au mois de septembre 2003, à l’occasion de l’adoption parla Commission d’un nouveau document sur la Chine, « les rela-tions entre l’UE et la Chine avaient connu une croissancedynamique au cours des dix dernières années et s’étaient dévelop-pées bien au-delà des domaines traditionnels que sont le com-merce, les investissements et l’assistance technique. Ces change-ments se sont traduits par une nouvelle maturité dans les relationsqui se caractérisent par une coordination de plus en plus étroite dela politique dans de nombreux domaines. La transition réussie dela Chine en un pays stable, prospère et ouvert attaché à la démo-cratie, aux principes de libre-échange et à la primauté du droitprésente pour nous un intérêt politique et économique majeur ;nous déploierons tous les efforts nécessaires pour soutenir ceprocessus de transition »9.

Les piliers de la relation

C’est dans ces conditions que le contenu de la relation de partena-riat stratégique sino-européenne a besoin de s’enrichir et de se per-fectionner sans cesse. En évitant la superficialité et l’exagération,l’encadrement de la relation stratégique doit comprendre les troiséléments suivants.

Tout d’abord, une relation d’interdépendance fondée sur l’intérêt général et la connaissance commune. Compte tenu del’évolution des relations sino-européennes, il faut un contexte sta-ble et sûr à l’extérieur comme à l’intérieur. La Chine et l’Union esti-ment que la coexistence pacifique peut assurer la paix et ledéveloppement. Elles tentent de réaliser l’Union (de l’Europe) et la

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9. Commission Press Room, « UE-Chine : la Commission adopteune nouvelle stratégie pour unpartenariat affiné », 9 septembre2003, www.europa.eu.int.

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réunification (de la Chine) grâce au développement économiqueet non par des moyens militaires. Elles recommandent la multipo-larité et la diversité du futur échiquier mondial ainsi que le ren-forcement de l’autorité de l’ONU. Elles s’opposent aux politiquesunilatéralistes et militaires de l’Amérique, en développant cha-cune aussi une relation avec les Etats-Unis. Elles recherchent unpartenariat stratégique actuel et potentiel qui corresponde à leurspropres intérêts. Enfin, en acquérant un profil et un langage simi-laires dans les domaines politique, économique et commercial,elles visent à une coopération stratégique plus pragmatique et si-gnificative. Autant de caractéristiques qui forment un fondementsolide pour la relation d’interdépendance sino-européenne. En cequi concerne les difficultés générées par les différences, il est néces-saire de rechercher les points communs tout en laissant de côté lesdivergences, à travers un dialogue spécifique et durable.

Ensuite, la relation sino-européenne doit être basée sur unmécanisme de coopération stratégique fondé sur le soutien etl’aide mutuels. Comme l’a déclaré l’ancien ministre français desAffaires étrangères, Dominique de Villepin : « Sur toutes les ques-tions, nos deux continents ont un rôle essentiel à jouer. Auxantipodes l’un de l’autre par la géographie, ils convergent par leurvision marquée par l’histoire et le souci de prendre en compte lacomplexité du monde. A nous de transformer aujourd’hui une fas-cination mutuelle, une curiosité mutuelle vieille de plusieurs siè-cles en une force de cohésion et de paix pour le monde, une force deproposition et d’action »10. La Chine, la France et le Royaume-Unisont membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU ; l’Union, en tant qu’entité, jouera un rôle majeur dans les futuresaffaires internationales. Occupant dignement les deux extrémitésdu continent Asie-Europe, une fois que les deux puissances paci-fiques se seront serré la main et auront établi un mécanisme deconsultation spéciale, tout en se soutenant mutuellement et enadoptant des actes communs à travers la consultation et le con-sensus, la Chine et l’UE mettront un frein puissant à l’hégé-monisme et à l’unilatéralisme, et contribueront largement à lapaix, à la stabilité et au développement du continent Asie-Europeet du monde entier.

Enfin, la coopération stratégique sino-européenne exige lerespect mutuel, la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures, unjeu d’avantages réciproques où l’on gagne à tous les coups, dépas-sant ainsi les différences sociales et idéologiques. Le rapport du

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10. Discours de l’ancien ministrefrançais des affaires étrangères,Dominique de Villepin, à l’Univer-sité Fudan de Shanghai, Chine, le10 janvier 2003.

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Parti communiste chinois de novembre 2002 a déclaré : « Noussommes d’avis qu’il faut préserver la diversité du monde, démo-cratiser les relations internationales et assurer la multiplicité desmodes de développement. Le monde où nous vivons est à millefacettes. Les différentes civilisations, de même que les différentssystèmes sociaux et voies de développement existant dans lemonde devront se respecter et se compléter mutuellement par lebiais de la concurrence et de la comparaison, afin de profiter tousde l’essor en recherchant les points communs et en laissant de côtéles divergences. C’est au peuple de chaque pays qu’il appartient derésoudre ses propres affaires ; les problèmes mondiaux doiventêtre réglés par les différents pays à travers des consultationsmenées sur un pied d’égalité »11.

Conclusion

La Chine, qui s’efforce de mettre sur pied une société jouissant d’unbon niveau de vie, souhaite contribuer à la création d’un environ-nement international favorable. L’Union est une grande puissancedans le monde. La coopération stratégique sino-européenne est néelors de la démocratisation des relations internationales et de lamondialisation économique. Cette relation stratégique seradynamique et durable parce qu’elle s’est construite sur l’inter-dépendance, le besoin mutuel et l’intérêt réciproque. « La Chineespère pour sa part maintenir des relations stables et durables avecl’UE », a affirmé le Premier ministre Wen Jiabao pendant sa visiteofficielle en Europe au mois de mai 2004. « Les relations bilatéralesne doivent pas être affectées par un événement unique à un certainmoment, ni se diriger vers une tierce partie »12. En renforçant lesaspects positifs et en diminuant les aspects négatifs d’une relationstratégique fondée sur des systèmes, des cultures, des voies et desniveaux de développement différents, on influencerait de manièreconstructive la relation sino-européenne et l’évolution des relations internationales dans leur ensemble.

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11. Op. cit. dans note 6.

12. www. xinhua.org, 7 mai 2004.

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Japan

A Japanese view on the global roleof the European Union Toshiya Hoshino

When the war in Iraq broke out in March 2003, Japan immediatelyfound itself in a difficult situation. Clearly, Japan had its own pol-icy priorities and politico-economic interests in this troubled partof the world. But, in determining its policies vis-à-vis Iraq, Japanhad to take into consideration many factors, both internationaland domestic. Stability in Iraq was a prerequisite for peace in theMiddle East as a whole, and the steady flow of oil from the PersianGulf area largely depended on it. The need to stop the spread of ter-rorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a key interestthat Japan shared with the rest of the world. In addition, how therelationship with the United States should be factored in was oneof the most critically important aspects to be considered.

As a strong ally of the United States, Japan wanted to demon-strate a shared sentiment and showed unequivocal support forAmerica’s action – this time essentially unilateral in nature –against Iraq. But as a nation that has long strived for, and has hada strong faith in, multilateral solutions to international issues, itwas obvious that Japan would have preferred a more multilateralapproach in dealing with Iraq’s rogue government in that strategi-cally important part of the Persian Gulf region.

It was indeed a classic dilemma for Japan. But this time, havingwitnessed the serious rift between the United States and key Euro-pean powers, mainly France and Germany, Japan appeared to becaught in between two different security visions; namely, thosetheoretically articulated in President George W. Bush’s NationalSecurity Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, on the oneside and the European Security Strategy (ESS), approved by theEuropean Council in December 2003, on the other. The episodewas the litmus test for Tokyo to find the best way to maximize itsresources in helping to resolve the issue while making full use of itsties with the United States and EU member states, as well as itscommitment to multilateralism through the United Nations. WasJapan able to pass this test?

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Combining available international expertise and resources isthe essence of diplomacy. Its significance cannot be stressed toomuch in today’s world when the wave of globalisation is expand-ing rapidly and security threats easily become transnational andborderless. What was found in the case of Iraq, however, was theenormous difficulty of taking sides vis-à-vis a collective action bythe West, when there was a gap in the various levels of threat per-ception even if interests were shared.

Notwithstanding the Iraqi crisis, the European Union has con-tinued its process of enlargement and deepening. The EU is amajor experiment of historic significance that attempts to gobeyond the traditional boundaries of the Westphalian state sys-tem. And the process of regional integration, particularly after theend of Cold War in the European theatre, is groundbreaking interms of its pace, depth and width. It is certainly a regional effort.But its perspective is admirably global. Viewed from Asia, whereconsciousness of sovereignty, historical animosities, and the rem-nants of Cold War still affect the choices of individual states in theregion, the state of affairs in Europe is not comparable to that inAsia. Although ‘community-based’ initiatives are being discussedin Asia, they are still at an embryonic stage. None the less, Japan’spolicy is to promote a community-building initiative, based onwhat is called the ‘ASEAN (the Association of South-East AsianNations) + Three (Japan, China and South Korea)’ mechanism,while maintaining a strong alliance relationship with the UnitedStates and solid support for the activities of the United Nations.

Against this background, it is important for Japan to watchdevelopments in Europe closely so as to explore potential areas ofcooperation in resolving common issues of concern at a globallevel. In this chapter, I would like to discuss the future of EU-Japanrelations by way of answering the four questions posed by the edi-tor of this volume. Through this intellectual exercise, I would liketo explore EU-Japan collaboration mainly in the area of mainte-nance of international peace and security.

How is the European integration process perceived inJapan?

The process of integration in Europe can be perceived either posi-tively or negatively, depending on which theoretical standpoint

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one wishes to adopt. From the realist perspective, which views theworld as a set of balances and struggles among powers, Europeanintegration may symbolise the formation and strengthening of oneadditional bloc that can challenge the existing power structure. Forthose who want to maintain the status quo in international order,the combined power of European countries may therefore pose athreat, since the appearance of a new rival is not usually welcomed.On the other hand, from an institutionalist perspective, whichlooks positively at the process of international institution-build-ing not just as a tool to enhance national powers but as a key avenueto increasing predictability and ending the anarchic nature ofinternational relations, integration is a natural step forward.

It is a basic tenet of the Japanese to look at international insti-tutionalisation from a positive standpoint. Therefore, the Euro-pean integration process is taken as a step in the right direction, oreven a model that Japan might envy, because of the total absence ofsuch a process – regional integration – in the region of Japan today.This does not mean that an integrated Europe does not pose anyrivalry or threat to Japan. In fact, no one can deny that, most of thetime, manufacturing industry in EU member states is in strongcompetition with that of Japan, although US dominance in theglobal market tends to be more keenly felt. Also, the growing riseof China’s economic power is important for Japan. Recalling thatChina has been the largest recipient of its ODA (Official Develop-ment Assistance), Japan views China with mixed feelings particu-larly at a time when there is a stark contrast between its prolongedeconomic recession and the rapid rise of China’s power.

In retrospect, Japan’s affinity for multilateralism was essen-tially a post-Second World War product. Before that tragic war,Japan took a highly realist, and in fact imperialistic position, view-ing the world through the traditional balance of power perspec-tive. Japan left the League of Nations in 1931 in the wake ofManchurian incident and then, in 1940, became an Axis power byconcluding the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. There is noneed to explain how these misguided policies caused unbearablesuffering among the peoples of Japan and the rest of the world,and also defined an image of Japan which lingers even today. As aresult, the return to Asia and to the international community, par-ticularly through international institutions, as a peace-lovingcountry, was given a high priority in postwar Japan. By departingfrom a power-centred view to a more institutionalist one, Japan

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gained admission to the United Nations in 1956, which took overfive years in the tense Cold War environment, following ratifica-tion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, owing to the Sovietbloc’s opposition.

Obviously, any regional integration process has two aspects:the internal dynamics within the region and relations with otherregions. Japan can learn lessons from the European integrationexperiences in both respects.

Internally, Japan needs to learn how to overcome historical ani-mosities and become reconciled with neighbouring countries.The transformation of the Franco-German relationship, forinstance, and the ongoing enlargement process of EU towardsCentral and East European countries speak eloquently for inte-gration’s intraregional reconciliation effect. When in January2002 Prime Minister Juichiro Koizumi presented a vision of anEast Asian ‘community that acts together and advances together’,he intended to: (1) best utilise the framework of ASEAN+Three; (2)deepen Japan’s cooperation with China and the Republic of Korea;and (3) strengthen economic partnership in the region (such asthe initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Part-nership and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area). The proposal wasspecifically designed to obtain the support of Japan’s East Asianneighbours.

In fact, it was the first time that a Japanese prime minister hadopenly presented the bold idea of forming a regional communitysince the end of the Second World War. Japan was, in fact, in thefrontline of those establishing the APEC (Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation) forum in the 1980s and the ARF (ASEAN RegionalForum) in the early 1990s, but in both cases Japan opted not to takethe role of direct initiator in order to counter any suspicion thatJapan might be interested in reinstituting its prewar (1940) ambi-tious imperialist vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to propose a new East Asia com-munity was based on a judgment that the time was becoming ripefor Japan to envision a form of solid regional integrative initiativewithout invoking an unnecessary territorial ambition.

As to the external side of the equation, regional integrationprocesses are based on the notion of obtaining economies of scaleby combining intraregional resources to compete with others. Butit is important to point out that contemporary efforts at regionalintegration cannot and should not be isolated. In this era of glob-

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alisation, this is true in the economic sense. But it is also true in thefield of international peace and security. For this reason, it ishighly appropriate that the ESS calls the transatlantic relation-ship ‘irreplaceable’ and seeks ‘an effective and balanced partner-ship with the USA’, and the development of a ‘strategic partner-ship’ with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India, among others.Likewise, the above-mentioned Koizumi initiative stressed the‘indispensable’ role of the United States for both security and eco-nomic reasons, the importance of cooperation with South andWest Asia (including India), and the importance of cooperationwith the Pacific nations through APEC, and with Europe throughASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting).

An assessment of the EU-Japan relationship

Japan and the European Union have enjoyed a positive workingrelationship over the years. An annual dialogue with the then Euro-pean Community was officially launched in July 1991. In that year,both parties concluded a Joint Declaration in which they ‘firmlyendeavour to inform and consult each other on major interna-tional issues, which are of common interest to both Parties, be theypolitical, economic, scientific, cultural or other’. They agreed to‘strive, whenever appropriate, to coordinate their positions’ and to‘strengthen their cooperation and exchange of information bothbetween the two Parties and within international organisations’.As the preamble effectively summarised, both Japan and its Euro-pean counterpart were, among others, ‘conscious of their commonattachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and humanrights’, and affirmed ‘their common attachment to market princi-ples, the promotion of free trade and the development of a pros-perous and sound world economy’, as well as ‘affirming their com-mon interest in security, peace and stability of the world’.

That original spirit was passed on and deepened with the for-mation of the European Union. One major product of mutual col-laboration was ‘An Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation’, whichwas made public at the Japan-EU summit in Brussels in December2001. The world had changed considerably in the 10 years betweenthe end of the first Gulf War and the aftermath of the tragic 9/11terrorist attacks, and the EU-Japan relationship needed to bedeepened, Annual summits, troika ministerials and various other

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official meetings have been held regularly to discuss a wide rangeof issues of mutual concern.

The Action Plan recognised the considerable progress made inbilateral relations since the adoption of the Joint Declaration in1991 and agreed to pursue action in four main areas: promotingpeace and security, strengthening the economic and trade part-nership, coping with global and societal challenges, and bringingtogether people and cultures.

More detailed subjects of cooperation include: peace and secu-rity (United Nations reform; arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; human rights, democracy and stability; conflict pre-vention and peace-building), economic and trade (encouragingthe bilateral trade and investment partnership; information andcommunication technology cooperation; multilateral trade andeconomic issues; strengthening of the international monetaryand financial system as well as development and poverty eradica-tion), global and societal challenges (aging society and employ-ment; gender equality; education; new challenges; science andtechnology; energy and transport; terrorism, transnational crime,drug trafficking and judicial cooperation) and people and culture(in the academic world; for young people; civil society links andinterregional exchanges).

By designating the first decade of the twenty-first century as adecade of Japan-European cooperation, various consultations,mutual visits and joint events have been planned and conducted.Additionally, extensive preparation is currently under way tomake 2005 the EU-Japan Year of People to People Exchange toencourage and promote direct contacts between Japanese andEuropean peoples and civil society.

Recommendations in the security field

As mentioned above, the relationship between Japan and the EUhas been extensive and fruitful. Based on a mutual sense of admira-tion and respect, economic-business and socio-cultural ties arenoteworthy. But if I had to recommend one area that I would like tosee reinforced, it would be cooperation in the field of disarmamentand non-proliferation. As a nation that experienced the effects ofatomic bombs, Japan recognises the urgency of tackling theseissues, however difficult that may be.

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In fact, a ‘Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-prolif-eration’ by the EU and Japan was released on 22 June 2004. Thedocument recognised that ‘the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a seriousthreat to the peace and stability of the international community.’The issue was with us for many years, but it became a more imme-diate concern first in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in theUnited States and, second, by the revelation of the Khan networkthat illicitly traded WMD and highly sensitive nuclear equipmentand technology. Moreover, both sides should pay close attentionnot just to clandestine activities of the so-called ‘rogue states’ butalso to non-state actors.

According to the Declaration, Japan and the EU, by reaffirmingtheir own commitment to the international treaty system(expressing their will to promote the ‘universalisation’, imple-mentation, and strengthening of the treaties and norms in theareas of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the NPT,BTWC, CWC, CTBT, CCW, MBT, HCOC, and the IAEA Compre-hensive Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols),demonstrated their strong intent to engage in dialogue and coop-eration with other countries and international organisations toachieve their goals and intensify regional activities to that end. Indealing with these difficult matters, it is important to recognisethat both parties stressed the critical importance of duly address-ing the root causes underlying proliferation as well as emphasis-ing the need to promote disarmament and non-proliferation edu-cation. Detailed steps and priority areas for specific EU-Japancooperation have been identified, so it is to be hoped that bothpartners will jointly take the lead in actually implementing thoseprinciples wherever possible.

The EU, Japan and the global order, including the mainte-nance of international peace and security

Today, the world is faced with crises of governance and civil strife ina number of countries. It is therefore of great encouragement to seethe EU’s willingness to proactively engage in crisis managementeven outside its geographical region. The European Union has conducted major crisis management operations in such places asthe Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic

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Republic of Congo, and has been expected to play a more active rolein Bosnia and Sudan’s Darfur region, for example.

Japan, for its part, has also developed its own policies of inter-national peace cooperation, although it is largely restricted by itsConstitution, which strictly prohibits Japan from conductingcombat operations and the utilisation of the military, called Self-Defence Forces (SDF). In 1992, Tokyo implemented the Interna-tional Peace Cooperation Law to enable its SDF troops to supportUN peacekeeping operations (as in Cambodia, Mozambique, theGolan Heights and East Timor) or international humanitarianassistance (as in Zaire to help Rwandan refugees). When US andBritish-led forces started Operation Enduring Freedom inAfghanistan to counter the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation andthe Taliban regime in October 2001, Japan passed an Anti-terror-ism Special Measures Law to facilitate the dispatch of the Mar-itime SDF’s tankers to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel to thecoalition’s vessels. And finally in 2003, when the postwar recon-struction of Iraq became a critically important international issue,Prime Minister Koizumi’s government made a major politicaldecision to send Ground, Air and Maritime SDFs to Iraq to engagein humanitarian activities, invoking the Iraq Humanitarian andReconstruction Special Measures Law. All these missions werenon-combat type, mainly logistical support operations in non-combat areas.

None the less, these changes during the past ten-plus challeng-ing years were the most significant in Japan’s history of interna-tional security policy since the Second World War. The Govern-ment is currently contemplating preparation of a totally newpermanent law (and even a reform of the Constitution) that wouldcover the various contingency situations in which Japan’s SDFswill have to operate effectively and in a timely fashion, withoutobtaining authorisation through ad hoc special laws.

As the challenges in postwar Iraq and Afghanistan show, one ofthe most important missions in conflict-ridden societies is thestabilisation of local situations. These missions are commonlycalled ‘peacebuilding’ activities: the Japanese government uses theterm ‘peace consolidation and nation building’ when it refers tothese types of missions, which are comprehensive in nature in thatthey combine military and non-military assets to stabilise soci-eties. Such operations were needed in the Balkans and in many

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other parts across the world form East Timor in Asia to Haiti inLatin America and to Liberia and Sudan in Africa. These are notnecessarily combat missions, but a more robust presence andcooperation with local governments and regional organisationsare called for.

Unlike the EU and its member states, Japan’s capabilities andexperience in conducting such missions are still very limited, butJapan would be ready to work shoulder to shoulder with its Euro-pean friends to achieve sustainable peace in troubled parts of theworld. In this regard, the EU’s newly demonstrated interest in con-tributing to international peace and security in various regions ofthe world is a welcome development.

Japan and the EU share a number of basic norms and princi-ples. And if I had to point out one crucial shared value, it would betheir common interest in ‘effective multilateralism’, to use theterm coined in the European Security Strategy.

Today’s United Nations is no perfect organisation. And itsreform, including both the structure and decision-making proce-dures of the Security Council, is indeed an urgent matter to bedealt with on the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of theUN in the year 2005. It is very important for both Japan and the EUto strengthen the international authority vested in the UN, work-ing closely to make it even better.

The underlying ‘issue’ in this regard is the United States: whatoptions will the US administration choose and how will Japan andthe EU deal with them? Japan’s ‘double bind’ situation betweenUS power and UN authority can be well understood by EU mem-ber states. The EU’s and its member states’ dilemma of how best tocollaborate with NATO implies similar dilemmas, as long as theUnited States maintains the unilateral stance that became con-spicuous after the 9/11 terrorist arracks. It is in the best interest ofboth Japan and the EU, and in fact in the interest of the UnitedStates itself, to persuade Washington of the benefits of multilater-alism. Contrary to the Bush administration’s tendency to defineits national interest in narrow terms, it is illuminating to find,according to the regular opinion poll conducted by the ChicagoCouncil on Foreign Relations, that a large majority of the Ameri-can public agrees that ‘the United States should be more willing tomake decisions within the UN even if this means the United Stateswill have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice’.1

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1. An executive summary of thelatest study can be found ath t t p : / / w w w . c c f r . o r g /g l o b a l v i e w s 2 0 0 4 / s u b /usa_summary.htm.

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In conclusion, for the better management of internationalpeace and security, it would be very useful to combine the EU’s newglobal role with Japan’s more proactive international peace coop-eration, and a renewed – and most desirable – US recognition ofthe utility of multilateralism.

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An Asian perspective

Regional security arrangementsin a multipolar world: the EU’scontributionAmitav Acharya

What role can regional institutions such as the European Unionplay in managing peace and security in today’s world? This chapteranalyses the contribution that regional security arrangementsmake to global security and offers some ideas for reinforcing thatcontribution. The European experience, and more specifically therole of the EU in this respect, is used as the central example, andAsia is introduced as the most challenging test case for buildingregional security structures.1

During the Second World War, Winston Churchill sawregional security arrangements as the basis of a multipolar worldorder, which could ensure the balance of power and preventanother global conflagration. Today, however, we live in a unipo-lar world, and regional institutions are constrained by this reality.But the breakdown of international cooperation over Iraq and thegrowing anti-Americanism around the world create doubts aboutthe prospects for a stable and legitimate international order underAmerican hegemony. Hence a return to multipolarity has becomenot just a strategic aspiration of some major states, but also a nor-mative one.

In the contemporary international system, two types of actorsare seeking a return to a multipolar international order.2 One isChina, whose dramatic ascendancy poses the most serious chal-lenge to the post-Cold War balance of power. Another countryseeking multipolarity is France, which asserted its independencefrom the United States by refusing to endorse the Bush adminis-tration’s plans to invade Iraq. There are differences between thesetwo multipolarity-seeking powers though. Both see Americanhegemony as a grave threat to world order, challenging the possi-bility of achieving both peace and justice. But China is a risingpower, while France by itself is not. China’s desire for multipolar-ity is hence motivated to a greater degree by its perception of Amer-ican dominance as a threat to its own regional power ambitions.And while China’s is largely a national quest for multipolarity,

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1. Professor Amitav Acharya grewup in India, studied in Australia,worked in Canada and Singapore,and took up Canadian national-ity. Unlike other contributors tothis volume, who assume a na-tional viewpoint with referencesto their respective regions, profes-sor Acharya is adopting a regionalAsian perspective. This contribu-tion is a revised version of a paperprepared for the 4th FriedrichEbert Stiftung-Stiftung Wis-senshaft und Politik’s North-South Dialogue: ‘Global Ungover-nance or New Strategies for Peaceand Security?’, Berlin, 21-22 Sep-tember 2004 (editor’s note).

2. The implications of multipolar-ity for global peace and securityhave been the subject of much de-bate in international relations the-ory. Neo-realists such as KennethWaltz and John Mearsheimer viewmultipolarity (having in mind theEuropean multipolar order of thenineteenth century) as being lessstable than a bipolar one. In con-trast, liberals such as Karl Deutschand David Singer see multipolarityas being a more peaceful interna-tional order than bipolarity.

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France’s is framed within a ‘Euro-nationalism’,3 which calls forthe EU to become an independent actor in the world stage to coun-terbalance the United States. Despite its growing interest inregionalism, Beijing has not embraced regional cooperative secu-rity to any comparable extent, although its quest for multipolaritymay subsume a long-term quest for a regional sphere of influence.

Strategic multipolarity and normative multipolarity

But can regional arrangements contribute to multipolarity? Here, Ipropose to make a distinction between multipolarity as a strategicpursuit and multipolarity as a normative quest. The differencesbetween the two international orders are threefold. First, strategicmultipolarity is closely linked to the distribution of materialpower. The status of being regarded as a ‘pole’ is determined mainlyby one’s military and economic resources. Normative multipolar-ity, on the other hand, depends largely on one’s ‘ideational’resources, such as a forceful adherence to, and advocacy of, inter-national law and institutions, and a strong sense of collective iden-tity (national or regional). Second, and related to the above, statesoperating within strategic multipolarity maintain a strong prefer-ence for balance of power approaches to international relations.States in normative multipolarity, by contrast, accept and pursuethe principles and mechanisms of cooperative security, and seek tomaintain international order through the vigorous exercise ofwhat Joseph Nye has called ‘soft power’. Third, within strategicmultipolarity, the ‘polar’ power usually seeks out weaker partners(especially its neighbours) in order to develop a sphere of influence.This is absent in normative multipolarity, in which the dominantpower co-opts weaker states through shared rules and institutionswith a view to enhancing the capacity for collective action of all ofthem (and not just the ‘polar’ power) in pursuit of common goals atthe global level, including goals other than deterrence or defence,which are usually the chief motivations behind spheres of influ-ence.

To judge by their historical experience, regional organisationsare poor instruments of strategic multipolarity. Some regionalorganisations have been better at reflecting hegemony, ratherthan challenging it. Today, regional power blocs of the kindChurchill or Walter Lippmann envisaged may seem impractical

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3. A term used in ‘Outgrowing theUnion: A Survey of the EuropeanUnion’, The Economist, 25 Septem-ber 2004, pp. 6-9.

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and even immoral (in the sense that they would challenge theauthority of the United Nations as much as the United States).The experience of Europe and Asia in building regional institu-tions, despite being marked by differences, shows common barri-ers to building multipolarity through regional institutions.

In Asia, regional multilateral security arrangements were prac-tically non-existent during the Cold War, although the multipur-pose subregional group ASEAN operated under the conditions ofbipolarity while trying to carve out a measure of regional auton-omy in the management of local conflicts.4 The 1990s saw theemergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia’s first continent-wide regional security grouping. But from a realist point of view,the purpose of the ARF was not to strategically challenge Ameri-can dominance, but to keep the United States engaged at a timewhen there was some chance of a precipitate US military with-drawal from the region. Today, however, China, once a somewhatreluctant player in multilateralism (especially in the early 1990s),has taken an unprecedented level of interest in multilateral eco-nomic and security approaches at the regional level. Realists seeChina’s new-found interest in regional security arrangements as away of countering US power and influence in the region. China’s‘new security concept’ promotes the notion of multipolarity whileespousing regional security cooperation in Asia. Although Chinahas not linked the two in an ends and means relationship, its‘charm offensive’ in East Asia provides one example of how region-alism could be turned into an instrument in pursuit of strategicmultipolarity. But neither China nor the EU is in a position to cre-ate a multipolar world order through counter-hegemonicregional security arrangements. And despite its initial impact,China’s charm offensive is already being confronted with Japan’seconomic and diplomatic counter-postures and the ultimatereluctance of South-East Asia to bandwagon with Beijing at theexpense of the United States. While Asian regional organisationswould be meaningless without Chinese involvement, too muchChinese ‘leadership’ would also spell their doom.5

The European experience of regionalism has been differentfrom that of Asia. Cold War Europe participated in two mainkinds of ‘security’ arrangements. The principal regional securityarrangements, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were a form of ‘hege-monic regionalism’ in the sense that they were created and main-tained by the two superpowers. Today, such hegemonic regional

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4. For a historical background onthe development of Asian region-alism, see Amitar Acharya, ‘Re-gional Institutions and Asian Se-curity Order: Norms, Power, andProspects for Peaceful Change’, inMuthaah Alagappa (ed), Asian Se-curity Order: Instrumental and Nor-mative Features (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 2002),pp. 210-40.

5. Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia’sPast be Its Future’, International Se-curity, vol. 28, no. 3, Winter 2003-04.

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security arrangements are neither popular nor relevant. The War-saw Pact collapsed with the end of the Cold War. While NATO hasconfounded predictions of its demise by neo-realist scholars likeJohn Mearsheimer, it has had to embrace roles, such as peacekeep-ing, that had more in common with cooperative security organisa-tions than collective defence systems in the classical sense. Andeven then, NATO is facing a severe test of its resilience as a result ofthe unilateral US decision to invade Iraq. But even if the UnitedStates’s interest in NATO declines further, reinforced by its globalforce restructuring, it will not result in a ‘Europeanised’ NATOthat would create a multipolar world order.

The second European regional security arrangement, theCSCE/OSCE, was conceived primarily as a mechanism to dampenCold War polarisation and rivalry, rather than as a challenge tosuperpower dominance. To be sure, its underlying principle of‘common security’ and its confidence-building and arms controlagenda helped to lessen the strategic importance of hegemonicregional security arrangements that sustained bipolarity inEurope. The OSCE today remains an important vehicle for man-aging security issues in Europe. But its days of glory may be behindit, not least because both NATO and the EU have converted to theprinciples of common security and adopted many of the instru-ments that the OSCE developed. In any case, to describe it as anagent of multipolarity would be misreading its normative purposeand overstating its current or potential strategic clout.

Hence the most credible European force for multipolaritytoday is neither the OSCE, nor NATO, but a subregional groupcreated ostensibly for economic cooperation. The European Com-munity evolved under conditions of bipolarity and was supportedby the Cold War US security umbrella. However, in the 1990s theEC was transformed into a political entity, the European Union,closely associating sovereign states. More recently, the EU hasstarted to develop a security and defence dimension. There hasbeen periodic recognition from the intellectual and policy-mak-ing community of the EU’s potential to be a regional superpowercombining economic might and strategic purpose. As The Econo-mist recently put it, ‘European federalists – the heirs to Monnetand Schuman – . . . believe that a new impetus for European unitycan be provided by trying to build up the EU into a new super-power – a global force that can equal the United States.’6 In reality,such a quest within the EU may seem closer to the realist-strategic

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6. Op. cit. in note 3, p. 4.

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vision of Churchill and Lippmann than the liberal-pacifist visionof Monnet and Schuman. But it has become a legitimate quest inthe wake of the divisions produced by the Iraq war, and the dimin-ishing legitimacy of American security dominance in Europe aswell as the declining US military presence there.

Hence, a poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund foundstrong support in Europe for the idea that ‘the European Unionshould become a superpower like the United States’. Yet, suchaspirations come at a time when membership expansion has cre-ated greater diversity within the EU and made consensus on itsstrategic role even less likely than before. The discord between, onthe one hand, France and Germany, and, on the other, the UnitedKingdom and Spain, over Iraq undermined the credibility of thecommon European foreign and defence posture regionally orglobally. Moreover, a global superpower role for the EU in the con-ventional sense requires a willingness and capability for globalpower projection, whereas European societies seem less and lessinclined to resort to force to settle international problems, anddefence spending in Europe is declining. The Kantian aspirationsof the EU intraregionally are not easily reconciled with the possi-ble Hobbesian assumptions of strategic multipolarity globally.

Security through regional arrangements

Looking beyond Europe and East Asia, regional security arrange-ments geared to collective defence and operating under the securityumbrella of a great power were never very popular. The experienceof the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and CentralTreaty Organisation (CENTO) attests to this. Even collective secu-rity and defence frameworks created under the auspices of largemultipurpose regional bodies such as the Arab League and theOrganisation of American States (OAS) have never been credibleand effective. In the Third World, the term ‘regional securityarrangements’ has invariably meant mechanisms for the peacefulsettlement of disputes undertaken by multipurpose regionalgroups, rather than for alliances geared to defence against com-mon threats. As such, their ability to alter the global power struc-ture has been, and remains, minimal.

Regional security arrangements are thus poor instruments ofstrategic multipolarity. But can they help realise a normative

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multipolarity? Compared to their limited strategic dimension,normative multipolarity is a more pragmatic goal for regionalsecurity arrangements. Under certain conditions (such as whenfaced with a common threat or a common neglect) regional secu-rity arrangements have on occasion been able to achieve a degreeof autonomy from superpower dominance. This requires a robustrole in regional pacification through measures of cooperativesecurity and community-building – of which the EU has been themost accomplished regional entity – which ensures that theirintramural problems do not become sources of a wider interna-tional conflict inviting the intervention of outside powers. BothWestern and Third World regional organisations today may seeksuch autonomy by undertaking a variety of peace and securityroles. And it is in this context that some of the most importantchanges in the purpose and role of regional security arrangementsin the post-Cold War era have taken place. The following are note-worthy.

First, there has been an expansion of the purpose and role of‘original’ regional organisations, such as the OAS and AfricanUnion (formerly the OAU). The end of the Cold War has seen theirrole extending beyond peaceful settlement of disputes to peace-keeping and peace building, and the promotion of human rightsand democracy. Regional organisations today face the need todevelop capabilities for complex tasks that combine elements ofpeacekeeping, peace building and humanitarian assistance. Thisrole of regional security arrangements has been recognised andencouraged by the United Nations under the so-called ‘subsidiar-ity’ principle.

Second, entirely new regional security organisations haveemerged. Asia created its first macro-regional security groupingwith the founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. TheARF is to some extent unique as a regional security arrangement,for it is the only regional group to bring together all the majorpowers of the contemporary international system. Yet, it is at thesame time led by ASEAN, a group of its weaker members. Whilerealists see this as a structural flaw, institutionalists see it as a vin-dication of the role of soft and ‘ideational’ power in the making ofsecurity arrangements that can promote regional and interna-tional order.

Third, in a related vein, regional organisations which in thepast dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with economic integration,

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are now developing a peace and security role. The EuropeanUnion, the mother of all regionalisms, is now recognising that eco-nomic integration cannot be separated for too long from politicaland security cooperation. Because of its original normative under-pinnings and predominantly economic evolution, the EU’s peaceand security role would hopefully be guided by normative con-cerns rather than the imperatives of power politics. For the timebeing, the EU has begun to play such a role in the Balkans. In theAsia-Pacific region, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), originally created to advance trade liberalisation andmanage regional economic interdependence, has seen its eco-nomic role undermined by, among other factors, regional suspi-cions of American dominance. It is now quietly developing a rolein security management – but only as a venue for consultation onneighbourhood conflicts (such as East Timor) and as a frameworkfor promoting the idea of human security and cooperativelyaddressing the danger of transnational terrorism.

Fourth, existing multipurpose regional organisations arereorienting and retooling themselves in order to respond to newtransnational challenges. This is especially evident in the Asia-Pacific region, although the trend is by no means confined to it.7The Indonesian proposal for an ASEAN Security Community(ASC) is partly a response to transnational dangers such as finan-cial meltdowns, terrorism, and infectious diseases which havebedevilled South-East Asia since 1997. APEC’s role in transna-tional security issues has already been noted. The ARF has under-taken a programme for suppressing terrorist finance and promot-ing maritime security cooperation in East Asia. ‘New regionalism’in Latin America and East Asia, combining economic and securitycooperation, are challenging the ‘Washington Consensus’, whichmany see as a tool of American hegemony and blame for creatingthe conditions for the Asian financial crisis in 1997.8

Security partnerships between the EU and other regionalorganisations

While many of these projects involve the United States, they are notnecessarily led or dictated by it. The agenda expansion and reorien-tation of regional organisations enhances the prospects for thedevelopment of alternative ideas and approaches to world order.

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7. For details see Amitav Acharya,‘The Role of Regional Organiza-tions: Are Views Changing?’, pa-per presented to the Pacific Sym-posium, 2004, Washington, DC:National Defense University, 22-23 April 2004.

8. Amitav Acharya, ‘Regionalism:The Meso Public Domain in LatinAmerica and South-East Asia’, inDaniel Drache (ed.), The Market orthe Public Domain: Global Governanceand the Asymmetry of Power (Londonand New York: Routledge, 2001),pp. 296-318.

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And the EU can play an important role in furthering these trendsand using them to project a legitimate global security role for itself.

The EU’s unfolding security role beyond the European conti-nent has included a recent peacekeeping mission in the Democra-tic Republic of Congo. To its credit, the EU’s role in Africa acceptsthe principle of ‘African ownership’. While the EU is developing anESDP and its own rapid deployment capability, unlike the UnitedStates under President George W. Bush it categorically rejects pre-emption and accepts the ‘subsidiarity’ principle (while NATOclings to the more self-serving ‘coalition of the willing’ formulaproposed by the Bush administration), recognising the ultimateauthority of the UN Security Council. The EU agrees to keep itspeace and security missions out-of-area ‘open’, i.e. subject to par-ticipation by other regional and extra-regional states. But to givemeaning to ideas such as ‘African ownership’ and ‘open coali-tions’, the EU needs to channel more resources and expertise toregional organisations in the developing world.

This is essential because regional organisations in the develop-ing world, despite their growing interest in regional peace andsecurity in their own neighbourhood, face critical limitations ofresources and institutional capacity. In Africa, lack of regional col-lective action in managing humanitarian disasters, civil strife andinterstate conflict has less to do with the absence of political willthan with severe resource constraints. The reverse situationobtains in Asia: the growing involvement of Japan and Chinabrings in considerable new resources to peacekeeping and relatedoperations, but the resilience of sovereignty and non-interventionconcerns has made it difficult for Asia to undertake regionalpeacekeeping and humanitarian intervention operations.

Another obstacle to regional security arrangements in thedeveloping world has to do with the fear and distrust of local hege-mons. The role of such powers has been a source of both strengthand fragility of regional security arrangements. Without SouthAfrica, for example, the transition of the OAU to AU and the NewPartnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) might not havebeen possible, but South African dominance does have its critics,who see NEPAD as a ‘neocolonial’ project. Nigeria’s role was cru-cial to ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, but it also attractedresentment from other West African states. Fear of Indian domi-nance has stymied the development of the South Asian Associa-tion of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), even if it is hard to imag-

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ine any meaningful security or economic role for SAARC withoutIndian leadership. Hence, the involvement of a resource-richextra-regional actor like the EU without the pretensions or ambi-tions of a global strategic superpower can ameliorate the distrustof local hegemons.

In developing its global security role, the EU can take note ofthe changing norms of regional security organisations in thedeveloping world. While issues of sovereignty and non-interven-tion remain a barrier to regional security cooperation, there havealso been noticeable shifts.9 African regional organisations arenow more receptive to humanitarian intervention. NEPAD,strongly backed by South Africa, has sought to move beyond West-phalian sovereignty by adopting a ‘peer review mechanism’ whichencompasses areas of peace and stability, democracy and politicalgovernance, and economic and corporate governance. The Inter-American Democratic Charter is an important example of thewillingness of non-Western states to move beyond the West-phalian framework. The charter makes a normative commitmentto the promotion of democracy, as opposed to the traditionaldefence of state sovereignty, and permits collective action indefence of democracy not only in the case of coups, but also ininstances of anti-democratic and unconstitutional ‘backsliding’by elected rulers. Even in South-East Asia, despite the persistenceof the non-intervention mindset, the Indonesian proposal for anASEAN Security Community calls for the non-recognition ofunconstitutional ouster of governments (albeit without anyenforcement or sanctions mechanism), and designates democracyas the normative goal of ASEAN members. Such ideas would havebeen inconceivable a decade ago. These developments create newopportunities for partnerships between the EU and other regionalorganisations in the developing world to foster cooperativehuman security and humanitarian assistance, as well as promot-ing growth and development.

But in pursuing a global role, the EU should accept diversity inregional security predicaments and mechanisms. It is importantto note that the expansion of the regional organisations’ agendastowards new transnational threats and risks has not been a case ofthe simple diffusion of European models and approaches to theThird World. To be sure, the EU and OSCE have provided impor-tant ideas and mechanisms for regional groupings in Africa andAsia. Examples of the diffusion of the OSCE framework include

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9. For a more detailed discussion,see Amitav Acharya, ‘Regionalismand the Emerging World Order:Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity’,in Shaun Breslin, Christopher W.Hughes, Nicola Phillips and BenRosamond (eds.), New Region-alisms in the Global Political Economy(London and New York: Rout-ledge, 2002), pp. 20-32.

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the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-oper-ation in Africa (CSSDCA), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-tion (which grew out of negotiations between China and the thenSoviet Union, and featured many aspects of the OSCE), someaspects of the ARF’s confidence-building agenda, and proposedsecurity frameworks for the Mediterranean and the Middle East.But adopting formal and legalistic CBMs in non-European the-atres has proven to be difficult, and the OCSE approach has had tobe adapted and localised.10 Similarly, the EU’s ideas and approachto peace and security are not likely to be replicated in other parts ofthe world. But accepting such variations is both necessary andhealthy: the development of regional security cooperation neednot follow a single model, derived only from the European experi-ence.

Conclusion

Regional security arrangements such as the European Unionremain imperfect agents of multipolarity in its strategic dimen-sion, but they can be meaningful agents for multipolarity in its nor-mative sense. The United States remains a powerful and influentialactor in ensuring regional peace and security in many parts of theworld. But with the UN in some disarray and the global distrust ofUS strategic intentions and policies growing, regional securityarrangements have the potential to be an instrument of normativemultipolarity that could offer better prospects for stability than a‘desocialised’ American hegemony. When and where US power isexercised unilaterally and where US security guarantees are nolonger credible, regional arrangements could have an importantrole in managing peace and security in their own neighbourhood.The European Union, which has started to play this role in theEuropean continent, has the potential to support similar develop-ments elsewhere by partnering regional organisations in the developing world.

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10. Amitav Acharya, ‘How IdeasSpread: Whose Norms Matter?Norm Localization and Institu-tional Change in Asian Regional-ism’, International Organization,vol. 58, no. 2, Spring 2004.

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New Zealand:Does distance lend enchantment?Terence O’Brien

There is no country more physically distant from the EuropeanUnion (EU) than New Zealand, whose perceptions of the Europeanintegration process date from the first enlargement of the Euro-pean Economic Community (EEC) to include the United Kingdomin 1973. The foundations were then laid for a mature, complex butvisibly unequal David and Goliath relationship. The experience ofthe first enlargement permeated NZ attitudes. Successive enlarge-ments of the Union ever since have magnified substantially the taskfor NZ of maintaining, let alone improving, a rewarding relation-ship with the EU, even as the revolution in communications tech-nology has reduced distance and abridged the tyranny of NZremoteness. Indeed, in a wired world confronted by terrorism andother transboundary scourges, NZ’s discrete geographical locationoffers it a strategic asset – and distance lends as well a certain per-spective.

The United Kingdom’s accession to the EC

The stakes involved for New Zealand when the United Kingdomopted to negotiate accession to the EEC (subsequently the EC) werenothing less than its survival as a successful grasslands farm econ-omy. Britain absorbed more than 50 per cent of total NZ exportsbut for certain key farm products (butter, cheese and sheep meat)the degree of reliance was 90 per cent or more. The ominous threatsposed by European farm policies and by outright British accept-ance of those policies as the price of European entry were readilyperceived throughout NZ’s intimate society.

The British decision exercised a profound effect upon the NZ‘sense of place’ in the world. There was an impression, in parts ofthe NZ community, of abandonment by Britain. New Zealand wascompelled to intensify efforts to diversify markets and productionover a relatively brief space of time. This process rapidly widened

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NZ foreign policy horizons as trade and the flag marched in uni-son. It was a swift coming of age for NZ diplomacy, triggered byEurope’s venture. The practical lesson for NZ from the first ECenlargement confirmed that too many trade eggs in one basketconstituted a source of real vulnerability. NZ strategic success inspreading its trade dependencies more or less evenly, over the nextthree decades, between Asia, Europe, North America, Australiaand the remainder of the world has been part good fortune, partthe tenacity of NZ diplomats and part proof of the genuine enter-prise spirit of NZ producers and traders.

New Zealand adopted a position of judicious fatalism in regardto Britain’s entry bid. It expressed formal support for Britaininside a strengthened Europe, but stressed that there were certainvital NZ interests that must be safeguarded. That tacticalapproach of low-key but unrelenting diplomatic persistence in thepursuit and protection of vital interests devised as a response toBritain’s EC entry has more or less endured as a feature of NZexternal policy conduct. The country’s absence of critical mass,along with limited negotiating leverage, means that New Zealandhad and has, in reality, little choice. Some commentators deploredthe tactics of emphasising NZ’s dependency and weakness in theenlargement negotiations.1 However, NZ negotiators viewed thetactics rather as classical small-country bargaining behaviour toleverage weakness and as the utilisation of ‘soft power’ to protectinterests. Thus to support its claim for special treatment NZemployed arguments of shared values, of kith and kin withEurope, and of its European battlefield sacrifices in two WorldWars. Appeals were made too to EC self-esteem. If Europe wereunable to accommodate the interests of a small, responsibledemocracy, this would surely not bode well for the EC’s capacity tohandle the much larger and important trade-economic challengesposed by the United States, Japan, etc. What strategic interests,moreover, were served by eviscerating a successful, efficient foodproducer in a world where malnutrition prevailed?

These ‘soft power’ arguments cut some ice in the context of thefirst enlargement negotiations. They retain some essential validityeven today. But they did not earn New Zealand a reprieve from theconsequences of British EC entry and, with the passage of time,their relevance to the NZ relationship with, and perceptions of, thecontemporary EU is harder to detect. None the less, diplomaticrhetoric still reflects the positive language of shared aspirations,

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1. David J. Lodge, quoted in JamesBelich, Paradise Reforged (Auck-land: Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd,2001), p. 433.

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and NZ wisely strives to remain a visible and relevant partner. Itssoft power, however, hardly registers with the newer EU members.Each succeeding enlargement has materially extended the chal-lenge for New Zealand.

Security issues

New Zealand’s support of the United Kingdom’s original decisionto join the EC stemmed from the conventional strategic wisdom ofthe time – that a strengthened Europe would constitute one pillarof Atlantic architecture in the Cold War. Enlargement would notconsolidate an Atlantic monolith since, in economic terms at least,it was clear even to NZ that Europe and the United States wouldremain robust competitors. The collapse of the Soviet Union andthe consequent removal of the cement that supplied Atlantic cohe-sion increased the likelihood that differences would surfacebetween the Atlantic Cold War partners. This was neither surpris-ing nor necessarily, from a NZ standpoint, deplorable. How orwhere NZ positioned itself at times of Atlantic discord woulddepend entirely upon the issue and the interests at stake.

The complexion of NZ dealings with the EC was coloured bymanagement of the actual solutions devised to mitigate theadverse trade and economic consequences for NZ of British entry.Yet the politics of international security intruded abruptly withthe decision by a newly elected NZ government in the 1980s toadopt a policy of banning nuclear weapons (and nuclear propul-sion) from its territory and harbours. This new policy amountedto a repudiation of nuclear deterrence as a doctrine for NZ itself.

In several EC capitals New Zealand was accused of threateningthe seamless web of Western security by ill-considered action.There was some rich irony there. New Zealand, like most smallstates, conceives security in a rather comprehensive way, embrac-ing economic wellbeing as well as political-military stability. It wasdecidedly paradoxical to be informed by European governmentsthat the seamless web of Western political security was endan-gered by NZ irresponsibility, while those same governments hadbeen denying absolutely the existence of any seamless web of eco-nomic security as they blithely strove to reduce NZ export tradeopportunities in the cause of European unity. That was a straight-forward lesson in European power politics for NZ.

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The British government asserted that its advocacy on NZ’sbehalf was all the more difficult to sustain as a consequence ofNZ’s non-nuclear policy.2 But British enthusiasm for the NZcause had in any case been substantially modified by the very factthat it was now inside the EC as a full member. It had, moreover,pursued, unsurprisingly, other priorities in particular the lighten-ing of the financial burdens of EC membership which were, it wasclaimed in London, imposed as part of the price of securing a spe-cial deal for NZ during the enlargement negotiations.3 This wasan arguable proposition but it was sufficient sign in itself that irre-spective of the nuclear policy, NZ had increasingly to rely first andforemost upon its own efforts to maintain its relationship withEurope.

The French government’s sabotage of the Greenpeace flagshipRainbow Warrior in New Zealand in 1985 added another vividdimension to the connection between international security andthe NZ trade arrangements with Europe. Following NZ’s captureand indictment of the French agents involved, France threatenedeconomic retribution. France’s European partners made it quiteclear privately that they would never want to be placed in a posi-tion of having to choose between France and NZ. Prearrangedmediation by the UN Secretary-General therefore permitted theprisoners to be returned to French custody, and the lifting of theFrench blockage of further extension of the NZ (butter) tradearrangement with the EU. This was another brisk lesson to NZ inEuropean power politics. The conspicuous failure of any Euro-pean government to condemn France’s action was denounced inNZ.4

Improving EU-New Zealand relations

As has been argued above, the NZ ‘sense of place’ in the world wasaltered by the EC’s enlargement to include the United Kingdom.The period of adjustment to this major change, however, coincidedfortuitously with the swift rise of those countries that comprise theEast Asian rim of the Pacific – from Japan in the north-east toIndonesia in the south-east. The advance was not uniform and set-backs occurred, but the region recorded a rate of sustained progressunequalled in modern history. The opportunities which thisopened up for NZ as a small country on the Pacific rim are consid-

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2. Bruce Brown, in NZ in World Affairs vol. 3, 1972-90, p. 29.

3. Interview with R. Denman, His-torical Archives of EU, INT 569;http://www.arc.iue.it/webpub1996.

4. NZ Prime Minister David Lange,Nuclear Free: The NZ Way (Auck-land: Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd,1990), pp.120-33.

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erable, as are the challenges for NZ diplomacy if the country is tocapitalise upon those opportunities.

For the first time in modern history, a region beyond Europeand North America without any extensive record of predominantEuropean settlement emerged to pre-eminence. The challenge forNZ was, and is, to fashion strategic relationships with countrieswhose traditions, values and ideals differ from its own, and fromthose of the European-Atlantic states with which NZ consortedfor much of its involvement with the international affairs of thetwentieth century.

As East Asian countries adapted the rational choice theories offree market economics to their own circumstances, so unjustifi-able expectations grew in Europe and North America that Asianideas, values and world-view would inevitably change and con-verge with their own. Behind this presumption were imperiousbeliefs about the superiority of European-Atlantic models forinternational behaviour. It is risky to generalise about so diverse aregion, but East Asian governments do not concede that modelsfrom elsewhere in the world necessarily apply in their circum-stances. Nor do they acknowledge that their acceptability withinthe international community shall be decided by others fromanother region in the world.5

New Zealand foreign policy in East Asia will not therefore pros-per if it strives to portray NZ as a ‘representative’ of the Atlantic-European world, or as a surrogate for political, economic, security,trading or cultural interests from beyond that require to be privi-leged in or by the East Asian region. The lesson for NZ in Asia, as itwas at the time of the first European enlargement, is that there canbe no substitute for hard campaigning by itself and for itself topromote vital interests. Already ten of NZ’s top 20 export marketsare in East Asia (there are five European markets in that category)and total export earnings from East Asia ($NZ9 billion) are doublethose from the EU ($NZ4.5 billion).

This is not to belittle the vital place of Europe amongst NZ’scritical interests.6 The EU, taken as a whole, remains NZ’s secondlargest single market – accounting for 15 per cent of NZ exportsand 20 per cent of imports. For certain key agricultural exports itoccupies the first place. The EU is a significant source of technol-ogy and ideas. It is the second largest source of foreign investmentand of tourists. It is an important source, too, of skilled migrants.In several areas of public policy, Europe is a relevant point of

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5. Andrew Hurrell, in Andrew Hur-rell and Ngaire Woods (eds.), In-equality, Globalization and World Pol-itics (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999), p. 249.

6. See NZ Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs & Trade ‘Overview Paper; Eu-ropean Enlargement’; http://www.mft.govt.nz.

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reference for NZ. And the EU’s formidable critical mass confers avital place in global institutions and multilateral negotiations. Inno sense can East Asia’s regional voice or influence yet be consid-ered comparable, although China on its own will undoubtedlyincrease its weight in the future.

However, it is a mark of the difficulty for NZ of capturing andmaintaining Europe’s attention, that it took nearly 30 years afterthe first EC enlargement for the formalisation of the country’s tieswith the EU by way of the 1999 Joint EU – New Zealand Declara-tion. The delay may also reflect the fact that NZ itself for too longviewed its relations with the EU through the single lens of agricul-tural trade. The framework declaration defines the nature of therelationship and establishes the official foundations for regu-larised consultation with the EU presidency. It builds upon arange of important consultation mechanisms at ministerial levelbetween the two parties, developed over earlier years. But thelength of time taken to finalise an overarching framework is testa-ment to Europe’s self-preoccupation over the years with ongoingenlargement, with deepening the structures of the Union and withthe understandable priority given to external relations with largeand powerful governments beyond Europe. This inevitably rele-gates the nurturing of relationships with less significant countriesto the periphery. The unsentimental conclusion must be thatthere are no convincing reasons for New Zealand to believe thatthis unpalatable fact will ever change. The international relationsrule for small countries is that they must always try harder.

Had successive NZ governments been less miserly in the pastabout committing resources to support foreign policy, some ofthese challenges might have been surmounted in respect toEurope. For its part Europe (or more particularly the EuropeanCommission) has, at the time of writing, only recently establisheda resident diplomatic presence in New Zealand, 40 years after thiscountry opened a mission in Brussels. Previously the EU had pre-ferred to manage diplomatic ties with NZ from its diplomatic postin Australia, a country with a somewhat different history of rela-tionships with the EU. Profile-building is of course a two-waystreet. The EU has contributed to the establishment of a EuropeanStudies Centre at a leading NZ university (Canterbury University).

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Pacific regional context

Close to home, New Zealand interface with the EU includes therespective relationship each has inside the Pacific Islands Region(PIR), with those small, fragile, scattered countries, which com-prise our ‘near abroad’. Cooperative relationships with developingcountries are a long-established aspect of EU external relations.Colonial attachments and historical associations, including in thePacific, define the influences that extend EU development policiesand interests globally.

By contrast, New Zealand’s aid priorities focus heavily uponthe PIR, where ethnic, cultural, historical and political links and aprofound interest in a prosperous, well disposed and stable nearabroad motivate NZ policy. The fact is, however, that variousislands have, as from the last dozen years of the twentieth century,experienced increasing instability from stress between traditionalgovernance and the demands of modernisation, from internalautonomy pressures, from manipulation by malign outside influ-ences (crime, drugs, etc.) and from economic setbacks caused byfragile single-commodity economies that are, in several instances,marginally viable. The convergence of these vulnerabilities caughtNZ, and Australia, somewhat unawares. New Zealand stops short,however, of viewing the PIR simply as one extensive ‘arc of insta-bility’ (an Australian description), and believes that differentiatedresponses are required according to each island’s distinctive chal-lenges.

Efforts over 40 years, led by New Zealand and Australia, toencourage collective regional responses to the challenges of eco-nomic and social development have confronted problems ofinsufficient capacity. Recommitment to fresh efforts at regionalcooperation by all island leaders in 2004 may mark a new begin-ning but the absolute need remains for ownership by the Pacificisland leaders themselves of indigenous ideas for greater regional-ism, rather than ideas imposed from the ‘metropolitan’ countries,namely NZ and Australia.7

Given the complexities and indeed costs of sustainable devel-opment in the PIR, NZ has long welcomed European interest andinvolvement in the region. There is none the less a clear dangerthat NZ and the EU cross wires over strategies. The 2000 CotonouPartnership Agreement between the EU and the African,Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries envisages partnerships

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7. Michael Powles, ‘Pacific Re-gionalism; Perspectives on the Pa-cific Plan’, paper presented atOtago University Foreign PolicySchool, June 2004; http://www.Otago.ac.nz/OtagoFPS.

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with ACP countries who organise themselves on a regional basis,including by means of fully reciprocal trade agreements with theEU. There are allowable exceptions in the case of least developedACP counties but the strategic objective is integral to the Com-mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objective of spreadingdemocracy and good governance, and aims to integrate the recipi-ents fully into the global economy. With that in view, acceptanceby ACP recipients of IMF-IBRD structural adjustment remedies isan important component of the economic partnership arrange-ments that Cotonou envisages.

The single template proposed by Cotonou, essentially a ‘onesize fits all’ prescription, could pose, in the view of NZ specialists,some complications inside the PIR. New Zealand developmentstrategies accept inherent limitations preventing all PIR countriesfrom embracing the full rigour of completely open markets.Accordingly, NZ has acknowledged the principle, in respect to thePacific, of non-reciprocal trade arrangements. That is a clear dif-ference with Cotonou. Equally, there are doubts over the completesuitability of IMF-IBRD structural remedies, which have come inmore generally for serious informed criticism.8 The ambitiousscope of Cotonou may therefore be unattainable, at least in thePacific region. The judgement about whether recipients measureup to the accountabilities demanded of them as the price of aneconomic partnership with the EU will be hard to make, particu-larly as suspension from the agreement altogether is the ultimatesanction.9

The global security agenda

In a world where WMD proliferation and the spread of missile tech-nology together potentially pose one of the greatest threats to com-mon security, New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy assumes a certaincompelling logic as an act of non-proliferation. It reinforces, in ourmind, the case for a strengthened arms control treaty system toconstrain proliferation. Without this, direct preventive measuresto punish transgressors who are determined none the less toacquire WMD, lack essential legitimacy and even clear purpose. Astrengthened system implies restraint upon all countries andweapons producers, actual and potential. A double standardaccording to which WMD possession is considered acceptable in

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8. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization andits Discontents (London: AllenLane/Penguin Press, 2002),pp. 18 ff.

9. M. Holland, in D. Dinan (ed.),Developments in the European Union(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-lan, 2004), Chapter 15.

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some new hands (Israel, India, Pakistan) but not in others will sim-ply perpetuate instability. The makings of such a double standardare readily observable in the Middle East, where Israel’s ambiguousposition concerning nuclear weapons constitutes a substantialobstacle to durable peace.

From a NZ viewpoint, the EU has yet to punch its undeniableweight in the area of international disarmament and arms control.Despite a stated commitment to achieving universal acceptance ofmultilateral arms control regimes in the European Security Strat-egy and other EU documents,10 the diversity of security policyamongst EU members, which ranges from two of the acknowl-edged nuclear weapon states, France and the United Kingdom, tothose EU members who choose to remain outside NATO, seem-ingly precludes a serious common security policy on arms controlat least until a single European defence policy emerges with itsown international security doctrine.

When the Cold War ended, the communist Warsaw Pact dis-banded, which was entirely in line with historical experience,whereby military alliances dissolve when the original reason fortheir existence disappears. NATO, on the other hand, was retainedand enlarged amidst some enduring doubts over its true role andactual purpose. NATO is in fact atypical. It is a fully endoweddefensive alliance but without enemies. It provides none the lessthe continued foundations for the doctrine of nuclear deterrenceand (largely at American insistence), therefore, for acceptance byEuropean NATO members of the principle of nuclear first strike.Not all Europeans are comfortable about this, but it certainlyplaces NZ and the EU members of NATO on different sides of theinternational security policy fence. Nevertheless, New Zealandworks with two non-NATO EU members (Sweden and Ireland) asfellow members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC),11 which isdedicated to re-energising the core elements of the internationalnuclear disarmament agenda.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the primepiece of world arms control legislation. It strikes the basic bargainwhereby countries without nuclear weapons undertake not toacquire them, and countries with the weapon undertake to ridthemselves through a process of international negotiation. Thisexplicit bargain has not been honoured by the five permanentmembers of the UN Security Council and nuclear weapons states(NWS) which include France and the United Kingdom, even as

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10. Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Eu-rope in a Better World. EuropeanSecurity Strategy’, documentadopted at the European Council,Brussels, 12 December 2003;available at the European Institutefor Security Studies websitehttp://www.iss_eu.org.

11. NZ, Sweden, Ireland, Mexico,Brazil, Egypt, South Africa.

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some devise coercive means, including unilateral military attack,against those other countries possessing, or merely suspected ofpossessing, such weapons (i.e. in Iraq 2003). In 1996, the Interna-tional Court of Justice (ICJ), in response to a NZ request, issued aunanimous Opinion that NWS have a legal obligation to negoti-ate nuclear disarmament in good faith and under internationalcontrol.

Both France and the United Kingdom have from time to timemodified their nuclear weapons posture for budgetary or otherpractical reasons, but neither country has ever placed its nucleararsenal upon any negotiating table. Britain has argued that itsarsenal is small and should therefore only become a negotiatingfactor once the major nuclear powers (the United States and Rus-sia) have negotiated their arsenals down to where British actioncould help make a difference. This argument comes perilouslyclose to a rationalisation for the existence of small nuclear arsenalsin the age of proliferation.

It seems from a NZ perspective that the EU is unlikely to makethe sort of contribution to improving the legal foundations forinternational arms control, which its importance in the world per-mits, unless or until its two nuclear weapons member states can bebrought round to a different viewpoint. The end of the Cold Warpresented a vital opportunity to diminish the salience of nuclearweapons. But the NWS deliberately bypassed that opportunity.Yet it was (as India and Pakistan soon demonstrated) an essentialconceit that the NWS could enforce an exclusive monopoly forthemselves over such weapons without provoking others as well toseek the weapons for themselves. History will likely repeat itselfgiven more recent moves to develop smaller, tactical, useable bat-tlefield nuclear weapons by the United States as well as Israel (and,it seems, the United Kingdom too),12 which surely extends the riskthat such weapons will also proliferate into other hands.

The fearsome potential link asserted between globalised terrorand the acquisition of nuclear or other dangerous weapons by ter-rorists serves to obscure the vital requirement for more, not lessinternational law. The production and export of missiles is notforbidden under any international law basically because the majorpowers themselves have never seen fit to pursue that objective seri-ously. This ensures their own missile development programmesare not proscribed by universal rules; but neither, of course, are thedevelopment programmes of any other state so proscribed. Con-

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12. See press article by BrianBrady in Scotland on Sunday, 23 May2004.

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sequential armed coercion by major powers to halt missile prolif-eration in the absence of evenly applied law adds substantially tothe destabilising predicament of proliferation.

Mutilateralism

New Zealand multilateral encounters with the EC after the firstenlargement centred almost entirely around the internationaltrade and economic institutions. Protocol 18 of the United King-dom’s Accession Treaty to the EC arrangements envisaged that thefull resolution of NZ problems arising from British entry to the ECwould lie in international trade arrangements, still then to be nego-tiated, to which the EC, NZ and other interested countries wouldbecome parties. It was already clear that effective disciplines on thedamaging impact of EC farm export subsidies were only likely everto be secured by and through multilateral negotiation. Despitemuch effort over three decades, such export disciplines are still notin force, although the NZ bilateral access arrangements with theEU were successfully and advantageously folded into GATT/WTOmultilateral provisions in 1993. In NZ eyes, the EU bears a lion’sshare of the responsibility for the lack of progress on export sub-sidy discipline, up until the time of writing, but the United Statesand Japan are likewise strongly protectionist.

The impact of globalisation and the need to devise collectiveresponses to a new generation of common challenges (the sustain-able use of global resources, threats from pollution, populationgrowth, illegal migration, uncontrolled spread of weapons, drugsand crime, human security, gender equality, social policy and theequitable application of international justice) materially extendedthe scope and importance of multilateralism over the last threedecades of the twentieth century. No one country, or group, nomatter how powerful, could meet many of these challenges alone.One launch pad for reinvigorated collective efforts was a series ofsummit conferences convened under the UN over that period,most notably the 2000 Millennium Summit. The practical resultswere and are, mixed. The vast multilayered process remains ‘busi-ness in progress’.

Two contrasting perceptions about the EU multilateral roleemerged more clearly over that period. One, at the purely operational level, is of a weighty participant that is often an

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obstruction to progress because of time-consuming internal policy coordination that produces inflexibility once negotiatingbegins at the conference table with other participants. The storiesof frustration over major international negotiations, kept in astate of suspended animation whilst EU delegates hammer out orrefine a common European negotiating position, are legion. Bycontrast, however, the inherent EU commitment to rules-basedorder is symptomatic of a belief in multilateralism, which in pres-ent times is profoundly important. International society owes theUnited States a considerable debt for American energy and ideasthat (with European support) inspired the creation, in the mid-twentieth century, of a rules-based order, and key institutions tosupport that order. But as a new century unfolds it is clear that theUnited States has grown disenchanted with its own creation andwith rules that are seen to constrain US freedom to act simply and,if necessary, coercively, of its own volition. Multilateralism isimperilled by such American disillusionment.

In these circumstances, the potential contribution of the EU toa revival of just and equitable multilateral order seems vital. TheEuropean Commission, with its responsibilities to defend theposition of smaller states inside the Union, can bring a particularperspective to the challenges of global governance. All this presup-poses consensus inside the EU itself, but there is as yet no commonview about how to reform or improve the multilateral system. Thechallenges are complex. To reflect the international personality ofan enlarged EU requires that individual positions occupied byindividual EU member states inside the international system besubsumed into an EU entitlement. This may seriously test themagnanimity and statecraft of key EU members that are requiredto relinquish individual entitlements to the EU.

For New Zealand, the United Nations remains the primarysource of legitimacy in international affairs. In an era when secu-rity may depend upon early action against emerging threats, legit-imacy is more important than ever. The development of inte-grated deployable European defence forces, available to supportor lead UN-mandated action, would provide vital additionalstrength for the integrity of the multilateral system.13 It wouldextend, in addition, the range of international policy securityoptions that is now being diminished by unilateralism.

The failure to strengthen multilateral institutions and the roleof international law following the September 2001 terrorist

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13. Robert Cooper, The Breaking ofNations (London: Atlantic Books,2003), pp. 165-72.

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attacks remains, at the time of writing, a grave omission. The UNsuffered serious setbacks in and over Iraq. The EU has rightlystressed the need to understand and tackle the root causes of inter-national terrorism, singling out poverty, economic failure, compe-tition for resources and the remorseless Palestine-Israel crisis.These are undeniably crucial. But other political factors inside theMiddle East itself, such as coercive persuasion to secularise politi-cal life, the increasing presence of foreign military bases, themanipulation of regimes to benefit outside interests (in whichsome European states have played a hand) and the existence of anuclear-armed Israel, cannot be ignored. The Cold War mindsetaccording to which the supervision of production and distribu-tion of Middle Eastern oil is viewed as a perpetual zero-sum gameinvolving the winning or losing of a battle for national survival,needs serious re-evaluation, given changed geopolitical circum-stances, free-market stimulus of the international oil trade andthe unsustainability of current energy utilisation.

On several parts of the global agenda, like issues of renewableenergy and climate change, human rights, strengthening theworld trade system, etc., New Zealand seeks to engage with the EU– as it tries also to broaden its bilateral links through such initia-tives as visa-free entry provisions and reciprocal visits of parlia-mentarians. The scope for interaction between the EU and NewZealand is therefore real, even if the relationship is colossallyunequal.

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Conclusion‘Region-building’ in Europeand across the worldMartin Ortega

The European Union’s newly asserted global role has not triggerednegative reactions in the rest of the world. In the years to come, theEU might commission opinion polls in key third states in order toascertain the evolution of public perception vis-à-vis the Union.But, for the time being, the EU does not appear to give rise to majorconcerns. If the collection of essays contained in this volume – writ-ten by knowledgeable academics and diplomats expressing them-selves in a personal capacity – is a good sample of what the worldthinks of the EU, the Union’s new international image is assessedpositively. In other words, ‘more European Union’ in global affairsis welcome.

How the EU defines its global role

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 claims aglobal role for the European Union, which has been confirmed bythe draft Constitutional Treaty formally adopted on 29 October2004. The ESS describes three EU strategic objectives: to tacklethreats, build security in the EU’s neighbourhood and contributeto an international order based on effective multilateralism. Allthose strategic objectives have external implications and help toexplain the meaning of the EU’s global role.

Firstly, when the EU declares that it is protecting itself againstthe key threats (i.e. fighting international terrorism and WMDproliferation, pacifying regional conflicts, stabilising failed statesand fighting against organised crime), it obviously purports to actin the wider world. As the ESS puts it, ‘with the new threats, thefirst line of defence will often be abroad’. However, for the Euro-peans military means are not the instrument of choice to deal withthe threats, since ‘none of the new threats is purely military; norcan any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a

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mixture of instruments . . . The EU is particularly well equipped torespond to . . . multi-faceted situations’.

Secondly, the EU is contributing to building security in itsneighbourhood, first of all in the Balkans. The EU’s task is ‘to pro-mote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EuropeanUnion and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we canenjoy close and cooperative relations’. In so doing, the EU recog-nises that its global role starts with good-neighbourly relations.Indeed, and logically enough, the EU is first focusing its foreignand security policy on its immediate partners and neighbours andtherefore investing most of its energy and resources in stabilisingits own region.

The third of the EU’s strategic objectives, contributing to aninternational order based on effective multilateralism, intrinsi-cally has a global scope. The vision depicted in the ESS includeswell-functioning international institutions – especially the UN –promotion of rule-based international order and internationallaw, reinforcement of regional organisations, as well as sponsor-ship of well-governed democratic states.

The draft Constitutional Treaty supplements the descriptionof the EU’s global role with a clear commitment to respect forinternational principles in the conduct of its external action. Arti-cles I-3 and III-292 very eloquently state:

The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by,and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles whichhave inspired its own creation, development and enlargement:democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for humandignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect forthe principles of the United Nations Charter and internationallaw.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partner-ships with third countries, and international, regional or globalorganisations which share the principles referred to in the firstsubparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to commonproblems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.1

Moreover, Article I-41 of the draft Constitutional Treaty speci-fies the purpose of the new EU military dimension and EU-led mil-itary operations:

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The common security and defence policy shall be an integral partof the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide theUnion with an operational capacity drawing on civil and militaryassets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union forpeacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening interna-tional security in accordance with the principles of the UnitedNations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be under-taken using capabilities provided by the Member States.2

It is here submitted that the very description of the EU’s newglobal role made so far is in itself one of the main causes why therest of the world does not disapprove of that role. In describing theglobal scope of its foreign and security policy, the EU is at the sametime implicitly saying what is not included in that policy. The EU isnot attempting to compete with other world powers, the EU is notbuilding up a military capacity independent of that of its memberstates, the EU is not trying to acquire WMD, the EU has no territo-rial claims to make, the EU does not intend to intervene militarilyto change regimes and the EU is determined to work hand in handwith the United Nations.

This conclusion’s main leitmotif is, therefore, as follows: nostate or international actor perceives the European Union as astrategic threat, because it represents a new approach to globalpolitics. That approach implies renouncement of military compe-tition, which is replaced by competition in the economic and com-mercial fields, as well as dialogue and partnership in the politicalarena. Furthermore, the new approach understands internationalrelations to be a multilateral process in which diplomatic negotia-tion, the resolution of disputes and respect for international lawand institutions are paramount.

A positive perception

This new approach explains the perceptions of the EU contained inthe preceding chapters. All contributors to this volume underscorethe dynamic nature of the European integration process, pointingout the rapid evolution from a common market and the EuropeanCommunity to the European Union during the 1990s. Indeed,authors note that the Union is defining a new global role, but theyalso observe that this role is incipient for the moment and is suffer-

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2. This article is developed in Arti-cle III-309 of the draft Constitu-tional Treaty.

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ing from some serious problems, most notably lack of coordina-tion between EU member states on critical issues, as was shown bythe Iraq crisis in 2002-03.

However, all chapters present a fairly positive assessment of theEU’s new international aspirations and of recent political devel-opments, such as the definition of a European Security Strategy.The following conclusions, all supported by two or more authors,can be drawn from the contributions to this volume.

The EU’s new global role is welcome. The EU is gradually developinga capability to act with economic, diplomatic and militarymeans, first in its neighbourhood and then in the rest of theworld, and that is perceived as a vector for stability in interna-tional relations. This is recognised in most of the chapters, inreferences above all to the EU’s actions in development aid andpeacekeeping.The respective positions of the EU and its member states are a source ofperplexity. External observers find it difficult to understand thesimultaneous – and sometimes contradictory – chorus of voicesstemming from Europe. Some authors (Gerrit Olivier, YiWang) suggest that this characteristic of European foreign pol-icy constitutes a weakness. In this respect, Gerrit Olivier affirmsthat ‘The EU has a crucial role to play because it has most of theright ingredients, except political leadership and concertedpolitical will. Without this leadership and willingness, the EUwill be shaped by events instead of vice versa, and this could wellbe the harbinger of inevitable decline’.A global role requires more global presence. Many authors point outthat the EU’s presence in their countries and regions is insuffi-cient; they therefore call for better representation and moreinvestment on the part of the EU in the improvement of its ownimage. The apparent lack of interest in cooperation pro-grammes in the fields of higher education and public diplo-macy in developing countries is repeatedly mentioned. External observers endorse effective multilateralism. All contributorssupport multilateralism as the preferred method for conduct-ing international relations in an interdependent world. Linkedwith this, more or less explicit criticisms of the US-led interven-tion in Iraq can be found in many chapters. Toshiya Hoshinodescribes the dilemma for Japan before the intervention, hav-ing both a strong alliance with the United States and a deepfaith in multilateralism and the United Nations – a dilemma

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that other countries also experienced. Francisco E. González,equally apropos the Iraqi crisis, underscores the well-knownLatin American stance in favour of international institutionsand against military intervention. On the other hand, the ideaof ‘effective multilateralism’, first enunciated in the EuropeanSecurity Strategy, is widely shared. Terence O’Brien declares:‘the potential contribution of the EU to a revival of just andequitable multilateral order seems vital’.Can the European experience be a model? While most contributorspraise the success of the European integration process, theyalso note the specific circumstances in which this process hastaken place. All authors refer to regional organisations andefforts towards integration in their respective regions, whichhave led to various degrees of cooperation in Africa, the Amer-icas and Asia. They also acknowledge that the European expe-rience has reached an unequalled level of economic and politi-cal integration. However, most authors are sceptical about thepossibility of ‘replicating’ the European model: each regionwill have, thus, to find its own way to integration. AmitavAcharya affirms that, ‘in pursuing a global role, the EU shouldaccept diversity in regional security predicaments and mecha-nisms’.There exists great potential for interregional cooperation in securitymatters. One of the most promising aspects of interregionalcooperation is cooperation in building security and stability,and more specifically cooperation in peacekeeping operations.Marcel F. Biato, Toshiya Hoshino and Gerrit Olivier point outfresh Brazilian, Japanese and South African endeavours to con-tribute to peace missions and suggest that there is great poten-tial for collaboration between those states and the EU and itsmember states in this field. Marcel F. Biato, for instance, men-tions in this connection the Brazilian contribution to the EU-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, aswell as the European contribution to the Brazilian-led opera-tion in Haiti. Trade issues. Some contributors (for instance Francisco E.González) would welcome an increase in commercialexchanges between the EU and their countries and regions. Butgenerally speaking, as far as trade issues are concerned, the EUis perceived as a protectionist bloc. Other industrialised coun-tries, such as Japan and the United States, are also labelled ‘pro-

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tectionist’, but in the case of the EU that criticism is linked tolack of consistency between the declared objectives of its for-eign policy and reality. Authors from developing countries crit-icise, rightly or wrongly, some of the EU’s commercial practices– primarily the Common Agricultural Policy – which in theirview are negatively affecting their economies. Babacar Diallo’scontribution, for instance, while acknowledging the EU’s aid tosub-Saharan Africa, affirms that neither that aid nor currenttrade agreements, including the Cotonou framework, are help-ing African countries to resolve their problems. Given the ‘his-torical responsibility’ of the Europeans stemming from thecolonial period, EU involvement in Africa is not satisfactoryaccording to that author. The nuclear debate. Several authors (Toshiya Hoshino and Ter-ence O’Brien are the most outspoken in this respect) presentstrong cases for deeper multilateral engagement on nuclear dis-armament. In their view, the current debate on WMD prolifera-tion tends to ignore the commitment, made by nuclear powersin the NPT in 1968, to negotiate measures for nuclear disarma-ment. On this issue, the EU is not making a very important con-tribution because its position is necessarily the lowest commondenominator amongst its member states. In Terence O’Brien’swords: ‘the EU is unlikely to make the sort of contribution toimproving the legal foundations for international arms con-trol, which its importance in the world permits, unless or untilits two nuclear weapons member states can be brought roundto a different viewpoint’.

The EU and the future of ‘region-building’

Although it cannot be utilised as a ‘model’, the European integra-tion process constitutes a source of inspiration for other regions ofthe world. Contributors to this volume pay tribute to the Europeanhistorical experience of the last 50 years, where not only the EC/EU,but also NATO, the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe and otherinstitutions have contributed to long-lasting peace and stability inthe continent. Cooperation and integration schemes in otherregions are also introduced and analysed. In the Americas, freetrade areas are quite developed thanks to NAFTA and Mercosur,while OAS and other regional institutions underpin sectorial

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dialogues and regimes, including for the resolution of disputes andthe definition of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. In Africa,continental dialogue and cooperation are taking place under theaegis of the African Union, and some more specific initiatives, suchas NEPAD, and subregional organisations are engaged in prag-matic cooperation in the security field, most notably for peace-keeping purposes. In Asia, the situation is more complicated partlydue to the size and the heterogeneity of the continent. However,some subregional organisations – ASEAN, for instance – are quitesuccessful, and there exists a comprehensive regional forum, ARF,where all great powers, including Australia, China, India, Indone-sia, Japan, Pakistan and Russia, as well as the EU and the UnitedStates, sit.

The existence of regional organisations in all continents intro-duces renewed complexity into international relations, sincethose relations are no longer simply ‘international’, in the sense of‘interstate’, but rather can be divided into at least three types: (1)‘interstate’, (2) mixed or ‘state-regional’, and (3) ‘interregional’relations. In addition to EU member state relations with othercountries in the world, the European Union – to give an example –has relationships with third states, on the one hand, and withother regional organisations, on the other. The EU relations withmajor powers, first of all the United States, Russia, and alsoCanada, China, India and Japan – to name a few states singled outas ‘strategic partners’ in the ESS – are crucial. However, interre-gional relations are increasingly claiming the EU’s attention.

The EU-Latin American political dialogue is well establishedthrough periodic summits – the third of these took place inGuadalajara (Mexico) in May 2004 – and contacts for the estab-lishment of a free trade zone have started; Francisco E. Gonzálezspeaks of a possible ‘bi-regional strategic association’ between theEU and Latin America, the southern part of ‘the other West’. Therelationships between Africa and the European Union are mainlybased on the Cotonou framework, but the first ever Africa-EUsummit, held in Cairo in April 2003, may well herald more ambi-tious interregional political exchanges. In his chapter, BabacarDiallo advocates the continuation of this kind of summit. Finally,at the fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that took place in Hanoiin October 2004, it was decided to pursue interregional dialogueand cooperation in three fields: political; economic; and social,cultural and intellectual.

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Interregional relations have great potential for expansion.Amitav Acharya suggests that the EU could establish partnershipswith other regional organisations in order to enhance security andstability in those regions. Regional security arrangements haveproved useful for peace-building purposes, particularly becausethey ensure the local actors’ sense of ownership. However, regionalarrangements also face some obstacles, such as lack of resourcesand fears vis-à-vis regional hegemonic powers. Given the Euro-pean experience, Professor Acharya points out, the EU can make auseful contribution to security in other regions by comparingnotes and associating itself with various regional arrangements.

Nevertheless, the added value of interregional relations for theEU lies not only in dialogue, cooperation and summitry, or evenspecific collaboration in peacekeeping and the security field, butalso and above all in the promotion of the idea of ‘region-build-ing’. By supporting interregional relations, the EU is recognisingthe inherent virtues of regional integration processes as an essen-tial element in bringing peace and security to other regions. In thelast fifty years, the European continent has transformed itselfthanks to an historical process, proudly described in the openingparagraphs of the ESS:

The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to aperiod of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to thisdevelopment. It has transformed the relations between our states,and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed todealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating throughcommon institutions . . . Successive enlargements are making areality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

What was a heterogeneous display of rival states for centuriesand up to the Second World War has been transformed into aUnion of states through an integration process that can bebroadly described as ‘region-building’. In the current interna-tional political discourse, there is much talk of ‘nation-building’and ‘state-building’, both linked to the idea of failing or weakstates. Unfortunately, similar attention is not paid to the idea of‘region-building’, despite the fact that it is probably the mostinnovative element of world history in the last half-century. If‘state-building’ is the answer to state failure, ‘region-building’

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should be the answer to ‘region failure’. Although the term‘region-building’ is not very frequently used in international rela-tions literature, the notion of ‘regionalism’ has been examinedsince the 1980s,3 and it may well be used as a theoretical point ofdeparture. Indeed, all regions in the world have attempted toestablish or revamp their own regional structures in the last 30years or so, which shows a widespread willingness to synchronisestates’ efforts at regional level.

Contributors to this volume deem it very important to proceedwith regional cooperation schemes and regional institution-building in their respective regions, utilising the European experi-ence as inspiration. One of the lessons from this collection ofessays might therefore be that regional integration is of suchimportance that the EU should include the promotion of region-building as one of its main global strategic objectives. In allregions, centripetal as well as centrifugal forces – including dis-putes and conflicts between states – can be observed. The EUshould work to prevent the latter and encourage the former.

The ESS and the draft Constitutional Treaty make it clear thatthe EU is committed to effective multilateralism, which includesthe reinforcement of international institutions and internationallaw. This will surely entail reform of the United Nations, followingthe report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel ofDecember 2004 – and the Europeans will have an important con-tribution to make to that reform. But effective multilateralismmust also include the promotion of region-building.4 The prouddeclaration about the success of the European integration processcontained in the opening paragraphs of the ESS should conse-quently be followed by a firm EU engagement to support similarintegration processes in other continents. If, after centuries ofwars, the Europeans have found a remedy to their misunderstand-ings, they should be ready to propagate the virtues of that remedyworldwide.

A new approach to ‘multipolarity’

Interestingly enough, even if letters of invitation and successiveexchanges with authors of this volume did not mention either‘multipolarity’ or the notion of global ‘strategic poles’, severalauthors have spontaneously analysed those issues. Some chapters

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3. See a succinct bibliography onregionalism in the appendix to thisconclusion.

4. In its section on ‘effective multi-lateralism’, the ESS briefly refersto regional organisations by say-ing: ‘regional organisations alsostrengthen global governance’.However, the ESS does not indi-cate how the EU can help to develop regional integrationprocesses.

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suggest that the appearance of the European Union as a globalactor will sooner or later affect the current unipolar situation,whereby the United States is the only political and military super-power. Yi Wang is perhaps the most outspoken in this respect, sincehe suggests that China and the EU should work together tocounter the US unilateralist stance on global issues.

However, the European Security Strategy does not refer toglobal ‘poles’ or ‘multipolarity’. The ESS vision is rather one ofalliance and cooperation with the United States and dialogue andcooperation with other major powers that are called ‘strategicpartners’. Nor do the draft Constitutional Treaty and other EUdocuments indicate that the Union intends to transform itselfinto a ‘pole’. True, some voices in Europe have proposed the emer-gence of a powerful European entity, with strong military clout,which would be able to implement its own foreign policy, based onits own world-view and wholly independent from that of theUnited States. This minority position, to a large extent limited to apart of the French élites,5 reached a high point during the debatesprior to the intervention and occupation of Iraq. Indeed, someexternal observers at the time suggested that, following theiropposition to the US-led Iraq war, France, Germany and Russia(and China) would create an ‘axis’ with the aim of counterbalanc-ing the United States.6 According to these interpretations, certainEuropean states (or some configuration of the EU) would be readyto play the traditional ‘balance of power’ game, in order to consti-tute an association of powers that could challenge the onlyremaining superpower.

In this author’s view, this is not a probable, or even conceivable,development. Even if there is a minority point of view in Europebacking that option, and although President George W. Bush’s re-election might lead to new US unilateral military adventures thatwould undoubtedly upset the Europeans, the EU – as we know ittoday and for the foreseeable future – will not define itself as astrategic ‘pole’ that could compete in the traditional sense (i.e. mil-itarily) with the United States or any other great power. There areat least three arguments that support this assertion. First, mostEU members deem their alliance with the United States, andNATO, to be irreplaceable. Second, the EU is a union of states, andthese states’ governments are not willing or ready to create a cen-tralised ‘super-government’ that would run the new superpower.Third, and perhaps most importantly, a majority of the European

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5. See, for instance, Hubert Védrine, Face à l’hyperpuissance :textes et discours 1995-2003 (Paris:Fayard, 2003).

6. See, for instance, Victor DavisHanson, ‘The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis needs some toughlove’, in National Review Online,2 May 2003; and Angela Stent,‘Washington, Berlin andMoscow: new alignment afterIraq?’, The National Interest Online,23 July 2003.

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public considers the very idea of building up a European militarysuperpower to be antiquated and useless. Given their rich but tur-bulent historical experience, the majority of Europeans simplyprefer a different approach to global politics.

The emergence of the European Union as a global actor cannotbe seen in terms of the old ‘balance of power’ theory; rather, it mustbe interpreted in a different light. In his contribution to this vol-ume, Amitav Acharya introduces a very useful distinction in thisrespect: ‘strategic multipolarity’ designates the old notion ofglobal military competition, whereas ‘normative multipolarity’refers to a new kind of global balance, in which ‘the dominantpower co-opts weaker states through shared rules and institutionswith a view to enhancing the capacity for collective action of all ofthem (and not just the ‘polar’ power) in pursuit of common goalsat the global level, including goals other than deterrence ordefence, which are usually the chief motivations behind spheres ofinfluence.’7 He points out that China might be today the best illus-tration of a quest for strategic multipolarity – although he alsorecognises Chinese efforts, following its New Security Concept ofthe mid-1990s, towards regional cooperation and multilateral-ism. According to Professor Acharya, the main example of norma-tive multipolarity is the European Union.

In a sense, the term ‘normative’ is well chosen, for it under-scores the declared pre-eminence of international principles andinstitutions for the ‘normative poles’. However, in another sense,the adjective ‘normative’ is misleading because these ‘poles’ do notpurport to uphold regional or ‘polar’ values and principles, butrather global or universal values and principles. In other words,‘normative multipolarity’ does not entail a clash of ‘normativepoles’ with opposing sets of rules and values – which would sooneror later lead to ‘strategic multipolarity’. The ‘normative poles’underscore instead the existence of universal international princi-ples and values that are valid for all sorts of poles.

Therefore, new terms might be introduced in the currentdebate on ‘multipolarity’. There are two options in this respect.First, given that the competition between the old ‘strategic poles’and the new ‘poles’ is primarily commercial, the term ‘strategicmultipolarity’ should be coupled with ‘economic multipolarity’.Both types of multipolarity can coexist. We would be then living ina ‘strategically unipolar’ but ‘economically multipolar’ world.‘Economic multipolarity’ will never degenerate into ‘strategic

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7. See p. 94 above.

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multipolarity’ if economic ‘poles’ choose not to develop substan-tial military strength. Second, given the importance of globalprinciples and institutions for those new actors, as well as theircooperative approach to international relations, the questionarises as to whether they can be described as ‘poles’ at all. Indeed,the nature of the well-known superpowers that are the basis of‘multipolarity’ is quite different from that of the new regional cen-tres such as the EU, which can be simply called ‘regions’ ratherthan ‘poles’. Thus, in addition to the traditional distinctionbetween ‘unipolarity’ and ‘multipolarity’, we can speak of a ‘multi-regional’ world or ‘multiregionalism’. The EU would not be pro-moting ‘multipolarity’; it would be one of the forerunners of a‘multiregional’ world.

The preceding reference to global principles and values leads toa final reflection on the importance of regional actors for interna-tional relations. Regional entities such as the EU are betterequipped than traditional powers or ‘poles’ to act in an interde-pendent world because they are multilateral by definition. Every-day multilateral endeavours to reach agreement and compromisewithin regional bodies help both regional organisations and theirmember states to understand the complexities of multilateralismat a global level. And this understanding is crucial at a time ofbuilding up international consensus – which is so much needed inthe fight against the real global threats and challenges, such asglobal warming, and in the reform of global institutions.

The essence of power is very different from the essence of legit-imacy. Power can be concentrated ad libitum, whereas legitimacy isthe product of dialogue, negotiation and persuasion. Sheer powerengenders fear and opposition. Conversely, a multilateralapproach to international relations leads to positive external per-ceptions and legitimacy. The European Union has renounced theidea that the use of armed force abroad can improve the lives ofEuropean citizens. The European Union is a new internationalactor that has decided to cooperate with neighbours, partners andother regional actors to ensure security in Europe and, at the sametime, work for a better world.

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Appendix to the Conclusion

This is a succinct bibliography on ‘regionalism’ and ‘region-building’. Further infor-

mation on this subject can be obtained from the webpage of UNU-CRIS, the United

Nations University centre in Bruges on Comparative Regional Integration Studies.

Acharya, Amitav, Regionalism and multilateralism: essays on cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003)

Breslin, S., Hughes, C., Phillips, N. and Rosamond, B. (eds.), New regionalism in theglobal political economy: theories and cases (London and New York: Routledge, 2002)

Boyd, Gavin (ed.), Regionalism and global security (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,1984)

Brenner, Michael (ed.), Multilateralism and Western strategy (New York: St Martin’sPress, 1995)

Calleya, Stephen C., Navigating regional dynamics in the post-Cold War world: patterns ofrelations in the Mediterranean area (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997)

Cottey, Andrew (ed.), Subregional cooperation in the new Europe (New York: St. Martin’sPress-Eastwest Institute, 1999)

Fawcett, Louise and Hurrell, Andrew (eds.), Regionalism in world politics (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995)

Farrell, M., Hettne, B. and Van Langenhove, L. (eds.), Global politics of regionalism(London: Pluto Press, 2004)

Francis, David, Uniting Africa: building regional security systems (Boulder, Colo.: LynneRienner, 2002)

Graham, Kennedy and Felicio, T. S., ‘Regional security and global governance: astudy of interaction between regional agencies and the UN Security Council with aproposal for a regional global security mechanism’, UNU-CRIS Policy Brief no. 1,September 2004

Grant, Andrew J. and Söderbaum, Fredrik (eds.), The new regionalism in Africa(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)

Grugel, Jean B., ‘New regionalism and modes of governance – comparing US and EUstrategies in Latin America’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no. 4,December 2004, pp. 603-24

Grugel, J. and Hout, W., Regionalism across the North-South divide (London: Routledge,1999)

Gowan, Richard, ‘The EU, regional organisations and security: strategic partners orconvenient alibis?’, Egmont Paper no. 3, Royal Institute for International Relations,Brussels, 2004

Hettne, B., Inotai, A. and Sunkel, O. (eds.), Globalism and the new regionalism (London:Macmillan, 1999)

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Hettne, B., Inotai, A. and Sunkel, O. (eds.), The new regionalism: implications for globaldevelopment and international security (London: Palgrave, 2001)

Kaltefleiter, Werner and Schumacher, Ulrike (eds.), The Rise of a multipolar world(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1998)

Knudsen, Olav F. (ed.), Regionalism and regional cooperation: Proceedings form the Japan-Europe workshop (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997)

Lake, David A. and Morgan, Patrick M. (eds.), Regional orders: Building security in a newworld (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)

Lamy, Pascal, ‘Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU’s Approach towardsthe Problem of Multilateralism vs. Regionalism in Trade Policy’, The World Economy,vol. 25, no. 10, November 2002, pp. 1399-413

Mansfield, E. and Milner, H., ‘The new wave of regionalism’, InternationalOrganization, vol. 53, no. 3, 1999, pp. 589-627

Neumann, Iver B., ‘Regions in international relations theory: the case for a region-building approach’, NUPI Research Report, no. 162, 1992

Neumann, Iver B., ‘A region-building approach to Northern Europe’, Review ofInternational Studies, vol. 20, 1994, pp. 53-74

Paasi, Anssi, ‘The institutionalisation of regions: a theoretical framework forunderstanding the emergence of regions and the constitution of regional identity’,Fennia, vol. 164, no. 1, 1986

Page, Sheila, Regionalism among developing countries (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1999)

Pelagidis, Theodore and Papasotiriou, Harry, ‘Globalisation or Regionalism?States, markets and the structure of international trade’, Review of InternationalStudies, vol. 28, no. 3, July 2002, pp. 518-35

Pugh, Michael, and Singh Sidhu, Waheguru Pal, The United Nations and regional security(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003)

Rosamond, Ben, Theories of European Integration (London: Macmillan, 2000)

Sampson, Gary, P. and Woolcock, Stephen (eds.), Regionalism, multilateralism andeconomic integration: The recent experience (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003)

Slocum, N. and Van Langenhove, L., ‘The Meaning of Regional Integration:Introducing Positioning Theory in Regional Integration Studies’, European Integration,vol. 25, no. 3, 2004, pp. 227-52

Van Langenhove, Luk, ‘Regional Integration and Global Governance’ UNU-CRISOccasional Paper, no. 2004/4

Van Langenhove, Luk, Costea, Ana-Cristina and Gavin, Brigid, ‘FromMultilateralism to Multiregionalism. What Role for Regional Integration in GlobalGovernance?’, UNU-CRIS Occasional Paper, no. 2004/5

Väyrynen, R., ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, The International Studies Review, vol. 5,no. 1, March 2003, pp. 25-51

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Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has heldacademic appointments at York University, Toronto; Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, Singapore; Harvard Asia Center; the John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment at Harvard University and the National University of Singapore.Professor Acharya has published extensively on Asian security, regionalism, andinternational relations. Among his latest books is Constructing a Security Community inSoutheast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001), and articlesin International Security and International Organization. He sits on the editorial board ofthe journals Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, European Journal of International Relations andGlobal Governance.

Marcel F. Biato entered the Brazilian diplomatic service in 1981. Between 1995 and1998, he was adviser to the chief Brazilian negotiator during the Ecuador-Perupeace process. His overseas experience includes postings to the Brazilian Embassyin London (1987-90), the Consulate-General in Berlin (1990-94) and thePermanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations (1999-2002), where he was legaladviser. Since 2003, he has been the assistant to President Luiz Ignacio Lula daSilva’s Foreign Policy Adviser. His academic background includes a Master’s Degreein Political Science from the London School of Economics. He has written articleson the settlement of disputes in South America, the International Criminal Courtand the Law of the Sea.

Babacar Diallo occupe actuellement les fonctions de Directeur général du Centred’Etudes diplomatiques et stratégiques de Dakar, l’antenne régionale Afrique duCEDS de Paris. Enseignant et chercheur pluridisciplinaire, expert-consultantinternational, M. Diallo est titulaire de diplômes universitaires en histoire, en sciencepolitique, et en science de gestion et d’administration des entreprises. Il est le Vice-président du Directoire de la Conférence des Instituts diplomatiques et stratégiquesfrancophones, membre du Comité éditorial de la revue Géopolitique Africaine,Membre fondateur et Secrétaire général du Centre Europe Afrique (CREAF, Dakar)pour la prévention des conflits et des crises internationales et professeur HonorisCausa de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes internationales de Paris. Il est l’auteur deplusieurs publications, articles et communications sur des questions degéostratégie, de géopolitique, de coopération, de terrorisme, de sécurité intérieureet internationale.

Francisco E. González, Mexican, has been a member of the University of Oxfordfaculty since 2000. He is currently a British Academy Research Fellow at NuffieldCollege, Oxford. He coordinates the project ‘Strengthening Democratic Institutionsin Mexico’ at the Centre for Mexican Studies in Oxford. Dr González is alsoProfessorial Lecturer in Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University’s BolognaCenter, Italy, where he teaches Latin American Politics and Political Economy. His

About the authors

annexes

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research interests include the political and economic transitions in Latin Americancountries since the 1980s; the problem of regime change in Latin America since theSecond World War; the challenge of reforming institutions to make democracy workin Mexico; and the national and transnational impact of Latinos in the UnitedStates and in their countries of origin. From September 2005, Dr González will beappointed Professor to the new Riordan Roett Chair of Latin American Studies atJohns Hopkins University’s SAIS, in Washington, DC.

Toshiya Hoshino is Professor at the School of International Public Policy, OsakaUniversity, Japan. BA (Sophia University, Tokyo), MA (University of Tokyo), andPh.D. (Osaka University). Before taking up his present appointment, he was aSenior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, aVisiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and aresearcher at residence at the Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC. His recentpublications (co-authored) include Cooperation Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo:DESK, University of Tokyo, 2004) and Containing Conflict: Cases in Preventive Diplomacy(Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003).

Terence O’Brien is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), NewZealand. He was Founder Director of the CSS and Teaching Fellow at graduate levelin International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington. As a former NZdiplomat, he served as NZ Ambassador to the European Community (1983-86) inBrussels and earlier as deputy head of mission during first EC enlargement. He alsoserved as NZ Ambassador to the UN Office at Geneva, including to GATT/WTO,and to the United Nations in New York, including to the UN Security Council. Hehas written and lectured extensively on NZ foreign policy and international relations.

Gerrit Olivier is Director of the Centre for European Studies in Africa, RandAfrikaans University, Johannesburg. As a career diplomat, he was Chief Director ofPlanning at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Head of the SouthAfrican Interest Office in the Soviet Union and South Africa’s first Ambassador tothe Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, a position he held until November 1995.Before entering the Diplomatic Service, Dr Olivier was Professor of InternationalPolitics at the University of Pretoria. He was a founder member and President of theSouth African Political Science Association, and the first editor of the South AfricanJournal for Political Science, Politikon. Dr Olivier is author and co-author of 10books on South African domestic and international politics, and numerous articlesin scientific journals and newspapers. His present interests and research focuses areSouth Africa’s foreign policy, global interdependence, European integration andRussian foreign and security policy.

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Martin Ortega, Spanish, is Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for SecurityStudies, Paris. He holds a Ph.D. in international law from the AutonomousUniversity, Madrid, was Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College, Universityof Oxford, and lectured in international law and international relations at variousSpanish universities. In 2001-02 he was director of INCIPE, a think tank based inMadrid. He is the author of ‘Military intervention and the European Union’, ChaillotPaper 45 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2001) and ‘Iraq: a Europeanpoint of view’, Occasional Paper 40 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2002),and editor of ‘The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East’, Chaillot Paper62 (Paris: EUISS, 2003).

Yi Wang a été jusqu’en 2004 Directeur de l’Europe occidentale dans le ChinaInstitute of International Studies (CIIS), lié au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères deChine, où il a mené des recherches sur l’Europe. Ses principales publications enchinois comprennent des travaux sur la France, et sur l’OTAN. Diplômé de l’InstitutDiplomatique de Beijing, il est à présent le premier secrétaire de l’Ambassade deChine en France. Il a été aussi en poste aux ambassades de Chine au Togo, àMadagascar et à Maurice.

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Abbreviations

ABACC Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Control and AccountingACP African, Caribbean and PacificALCUE Latin America, the Caribbean and the European UnionAMU Arab Maghreb UnionANC African National CongressAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASC ASEAN Security CommunityASEAN Association of South-East Asian NationsASEM Asia-Europe MeetingASEP Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership AU African UnionBTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons ConventionCBM Confidence-Building MeasureCCW Convention on Conventional WeaponsCEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique CentraleCENTO Central Treaty OrganisationCFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EUCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCONACYT National Council for Science and Technology (Mexico) CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropeCSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in

AfricaCTBT Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyCWC Chemical Weapons ConventionEC European CommunityECDPM European Centre for Development Policy ManagementECOSOC UN Economic and Social CouncilECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesECSC European Coal and Steel CommunityECU European Currency UnitEEC European Economic CommunityESDP European Security and Defence PolicyESS European Security StrategyEU European UnionEUISS EU Institute for Security StudiesG-8 Group of Eight leading industrialised nationsGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGNP Gross National ProductHCOC Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

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HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune DeficiencySyndrome

IAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentICJ International Court of JusticeIMF International Monetary FundMBT Mine Ban TreatyNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNAM Non-Aligned MovementMercosur Common Market of the SouthMINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in HaitiNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentNPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsNSS National Security Strategy of the United States NWS Nuclear Weapons State(s)NZ New ZealandOAS Organisation of American StatesOAU Organisation of African UnityODA Official Development AssistanceOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropePAP Pan African ParliamentPIR Pacific Islands Region SAARC South Asian Association of Regional CooperationSACU Southern African Customs UnionSADEC Southern African Development CommunitySDF Self-Defence Forces (Japan)SEATO South-East Asia Treaty OrganisationTDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation AgreementTEU Treaty on European UnionTIAR Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal AssistanceUAM See AMUUN United NationsUNSC UN Security CouncilUS United StatesWMD Weapons of Mass DestructionWTO World Trade Organisation

cp-72.qxp 02/12/2004 14:12 Page 135

Thedrane tminglobconmu

IglobacadcouAfriMexas wtive

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Cas smilfavoMoful exambutestaview

Chaillot Papers

n°71 La cohérence par la défense. Une autre lecture de la PESD Octobre 2004Philippe de Schoutheete

n°70 The Western Balkans: moving on October 2004Franz-Lothar Altmann, Judy Batt, Misha Glenny, Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox; Stefan Lehne, Jacques Rupnik, Ivan Vejvoda and Romana Vlahutin;edited by Judy Batt

n°69 Protecting the European homeland: the CBR dimension July 2004Gustav Lindstrom

n°68 One year on: lessons from Iraq March 2004Ron Asmus, Christoph Bertram, Carl Bildt, Esther Brimmer, Marta Dassú,Rob de Wijk, James Dobbins, William Drozdiak, Nicole Gnesotto,Philip H. Gordon, Charles Grant, Gustav Gustenau, Pierre Hassner,John Hulsman, Atis Lejins, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Andrew Moravcsik,Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Jiri Sedivy, Narcis Serra and Alvaro Vasconcelos;edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt

n°67 From Copenhagen Brussels – European defence: December 2003Core documents, Volume IVcompiled by Antonio Missiroli

n°66 Fighting proliferation – European perspectives December 2003Mark Smith, Bruno Tertrais and Jean Pascal Zanders,edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt

n°65 The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU December 2003Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili,Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shafferand Arif Yunusov; edited by Dov Lynch

BooksEU Security and Defence Policy — the first five years (1999-2004) 2004Martti Ahtisaari, Michel Barnier, Carl Bildt, Elmar Brok & Norbert Gresch, Robert Cooper,Judy Dempsey, Lamberto Dini, Jean-Louis Gergorin & Jean Bétermier, Philip H. Gordon,Jean-Yves Haine, Gustav Lindstrom, Antonio Missiroli, Alberto Navarro, Martin Ortega,Ferdinando Riccardi, Alexander Rondos, Burkard Schmitt, Rainer Schuwirth, Theo Sommerand Lauren Zecchini; edited by Nicole Gnesotto; preface by Javier Solana

European defence — a proposal for a White Paper 2004André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, François Heisbourg, William Hopkinson, Marc Otte,Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl, Stefano Silvestri, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Rob de Wijk;Chair: Nicole Gnesotto, Rapporteur: Jean-Yves Haine

Shift or Rift — assessing US-EU relations after Iraq 2003Nicole Gnesotto, Stanley Hoffmann, Antonio Missiroli, David Gompert,Jean-Yves Haine, Ivo Daalder, James Lindsay, Martin Ortega, Patrick ClawsonDimitrios Triantaphyllou, Daniel Serwer, Gustav Lindstrom, Brian Jenkins;edited by Gustav Lindstrom

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The European Security Strategy of December 2003 and thedraft Constitutional Treaty, adopted in October 2004, defi-ne the EU’s new global role. The European Union is deter-mined to fight against major threats and challenges globally, strengthen security in its neighbourhood andcontribute to an international order based on effective multilateralism.

In order to grasp external reactions towards that new global role, the EUISS invited a number of distinguishedacademics, experts and former diplomats from key partnercountries to present their views on the EU. Authors fromAfrica (Senegal, South Africa), Latin America (Brazil,Mexico), Asia (China, Japan) and the Pacific (New Zealand),as well as one author who adopts an overall Asian perspec-tive, have contributed to this volume.

The main conclusion is that the EU’s new global projec-tion is perceived positively. External observers praise theEU’s efforts in development aid and peacekeeping, endorsethe idea of effective multilateralism, and even desire anincreased EU presence in their respective countries andregions.

Contributions in this volume lead to further reflection,as suggested in its conclusion. By rejecting the traditionalmilitary ‘balance of power’ philosophy, the EU ratherfavours a cooperative approach to international relations.Moreover, the EU constitutes the culmination of a success-ful regional integration process, which represents a usefulexample for other regions. The EU could therefore contri-bute to other ‘region-building’ efforts, and, in particular,establish interregional dialogues on security matters with aview to sharing the lessons of the European experience.

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