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Version Dated 11116112

Office of Inspector General

Inspection of the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of

Investigations and Counterintelligence,Special Investigations, Criminal

Investigations, & Computer Investigations And Forensics Divisions

Report Number ISP-I-XX-XXX, Month 2012

NOTICE - DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED

This draft report, prepared by the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General,

is subject to revisions before its final form is released to the public. This draft isprovided to Department or Broadcasting Board of Governors officials solely fortheir official review and comment. Recipients of this draft report are notauthorized to make further distribution or to release this information except forofficial review and comment.

The final report will be posted on OIG's public Web site after it is reviewedand redacted as appropriate in accordance with the Freedom of InformationAct (FOIA). Department and BBG officials are encouraged to provide inputfor OIG's consideration concerning any information in this draft theyconsider to be Sensitive But Unclassified that may adversely affect the foreignpolicy or other interests of the United States and that should therefore be withheld from public disclosure.

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGYOF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection

and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and

Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for

the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of BBG, and

Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and

BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980;

• Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively

achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and

whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.

• Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with

maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions

and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.

• Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets

the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal managementcontrols have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the

likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and

whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated,

reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and

reviewed tlie substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices,

individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.


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Table of Contents

Key JudgmentsContext

J-lxecutivc Direction

The need for independenceProfessional Standards

Other Topics - Addressed on a Division by Division BasisSpecial Investigations Division (SID)

Criminal Investigations Division (CR)

Computer Investigations and Forensics Division (CIF)DS Information Technology SystemsIJst of Recommendations

List of Informal Recommendations

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Key Judgments

An immediate restructuring of the Special Investigations Division (SID) is necessary to

prevent senior Department and Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) officials from influencing investigations in which subjects are DS Special Agents or are Departmentofficials at the GS-14/FS-02 level and above. Inspectors received several examples ofundue influence from within DS and from the top floor of the Department, raising seriousconcerns about the quality and integrity of some internal investigations. Inspectorsforwarded specific information to OIG/INV for follow-up.

As SID is presently configured, the chiefs grade is too low, with an extended reportingchain. That opens opportunities for influence, gossip, and the leak of sensitiveinformation, especially in cases involving DS agents. Increasing the SID chiefs grade toFE-OC and establishing a direct reporting link to the A/S for Diplomatic Security would

improve the situation.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security lacks a comprehensive investigations manual withapproved policies and guidelines on how to conduct investigations. Instead, inspectorsfound ad hoc templates, policies, and procedures. In SID, a lack of clear procedures foropening and pursuing cases allegedly resulted in differences in approach, including amore aggressive investigation of some DS personnel.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security reportedly has never sought a peer review of itsinvestigative divisions, though such reviews are common in the federal investigativecommunity and can provide valuable guidance for correcting flaws and adopting best

practices.

Id's Foreign Service (FS) Special Agent investigator contingent experiences frequentturnover due to two-year assignments. That, combined with few GS-1811 investigatorpositions and the complexity of many criminal investigations, negatively affects thequality of investigations and the continuity of expertise. DS should establish three-yearFS tours, increase the number of GS-1811 positions, and consider a specializedinvestigator career track.

The Criminal Investigations Division (CR) is too large and unwieldy. The Bureau ofDiplomatic Security should make the Criminal Fraud Investigations (CFI) portion a newdivision within ICI.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs should completeseveral long-pending Memoranda of Understanding.

The Computer Investigations and Forensic (CIF) Division has the personnel and logisticsto contribute more to cyber-crime investigations. DS should advertise that capability.

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• In general, the inspectors found personnel in the three ICI divisions to be proudlyprofessional and dedicated to their important jobs. The recommended improvements willhelp those personnel fulfill their expectations.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at lengthon areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between October 1 and November 16, 2012.Ambassador Larry M. Dinger (team leader), Christopher Mack (deputy team leader), Craig S.Cheney, Aurelia Fedenisn, Andrea M. Leopold and Robert W. Mustain conducted the inspection.

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Context

This inspection addresses three divisions within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)

Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence (ICI): the Special Investigations Division (SID);the Criminal Investigations Division (CR); and the Computer Investigations and Forensics

Division (CIF). ICI has two other divisions: Counterintelligence, inspected in 2011, and Field

Offices, which has the single largest number of ICI personnel.

SID's mission is to conduct administrative and criminal investigations of alleged

misconduct related to Department of State employees wherever they are located and to all other

personnel under Chief of Mission authority overseas. A memorandum of understanding between

SID and the Office of the Inspector General Office of Investigations (OIG/INV) roughly

apportions the two office's responsibilities, leaving areas of potential overlap. The range of SID

investigations is diverse, from substance abuse, to domestic violence, deaths, discharge of a

firearm, sex crimes, and other conduct that may merit criminal or administrative discipline. SIDhas 29 personnel and a budget of $479,000.

The CR Division mandate relates to crimes involving the consular function. The Criminal

Fraud Investigation (CFI) branch investigates allegations of malfeasance involving visa and

passport fraud, complex visa and passport crimes spanning multiple jurisdictions, and human

trafficking. The Criminal Investigative Liaison (CIL) branch coordinates investigative requests

from federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, facilitates fugitive returns, and

has liaison officers in several agencies plus INTERPOL. The Overseas Criminal Investigations

branch supports the Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator (A/RSO-I) program. The

Special Projects (SP) branch specifically targets H and L employment-visa fraud, working with

DHS/ICE Document and Benefits Task Forces and the Kentucky Consular Center. SP also

conducts training. The Criminal Intelligence and Research (CIR) branch conducts consular

fraud-related research and analysis including financial forensic efforts directed at asset forfeiture

and seizure, manages the DS evidence program, and oversees all DS database-access programs.

Significant CR funding comes from Machine Readable Visa fees and H&L visa funding. CR has

277 personnel and a total budget of $22,942,303.

CIF, established in 2004, provides DS and others in the State Department technical

assistance for computer-evidence recovery and analysis and for internet and network

investigations. Within CIF, the Computer Investigations Program looks into cyber crimes, carries

out related security functions, and provides support for collection of evidence from electronic

devices. The Digital Forensics Program provides laboratory support related to such evidence.

The Technical Surveillance Program provides equipment, operational support, and training to DS

investigators and staff. CIF has 57 personnel and a budget of $8,678,940.

Nearly 88 percent of staff in the three divisions filled out OIG personal questionnaires, a

remarkably high total. Most personnel were complimentary of their supervisors and expressed

satisfaction that they were endeavoring to accomplish important work. In interviews, the

inspection team was impressed by the candor, devotion to duty, and professionalism evident in

each division. Where criticisms arose as elaborated below, it was inevitably in the context of3 - !


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wanting to make the system better and to increase the ability of good people to do their jobsmore effectively.

Executive Direction

The SID and CR division chiefs transferred in the summer of 2012, and the former SID

chief moved up to become overall Director for ICI. The CIF chief, a GS-15 civil servant,

remained in place. Given the degree of supervisory turnover, the reality that the ICI director is

new in his job, and the diverse roles the three divisions play, supervisory issues are dealt with indiscussion of the various topics below.

The Need for Independence

Inspectors learned in conversations with Department employees who utilize SID Reportsof Investigation (ROIs) in disciplinary matters and in later interviews with agents inside SID whoundertake investigations that in some cases superiors in DS and in senior levels of the State

Department have prejudiced the commencement, course, and outcome of SID investigations.

Sources referred to DS sometimes circling the wagons to protect favored DS rising stars from criminal charges or from embarrassing revelations that could harm a promising career. One case,

which triggered outraged comment from several SID sources, relates to allegations that a

Regional Security Officer engaged in serious criminal conduct including sexual abuse of localembassy staff during a series of embassy postings. Sources also reported that a senior DS officialsuccessfully protected some agents on the Secretary's Detail from investigations into

misbehavior while on official trips. Such DS interventions reportedly are not the norm, but theyapparently do take place often enough that several sources in the Department who regularly see

SID cases summed the situation up with almost identical words: DS should never investigateDS. (The inspection team has referred all specific allegations to OIG/INV for follow-up.)

Unfortunately, the worry is still broader. Sources reported that a senior "7"^ Floor"Department official ordered DS to stop the investigation of an ambassador accused of pedophilia,and another such senior official had DS stop an investigation of an ambassador-designate.

Reportedly, such top-level intervention is rare, but it has taken place once or twice a year. (Theinspection team has referred all specific allegations to OIG/INV for follow-up.)

The specific allegations, the variety of sources, and the credibility of those sources raisevery serious concerns. Hindering such cases can result in counterintelligence vulnerabilities and

can allow exploitive criminals to continue their activities. From interviews in SID, it is apparentthat such interventions frustrate, even demoralize, agents who as dedicated law enforcementofficers aspire to investigate serious cases fully.

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) standards andprinciples make clear that "in all matters relating to investigative work, the investigative

organization must be free, both in fact and appearance, from impairments to independence; mustbe organizationally independent; and must maintain an independent attitude." Such

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independence is essential "so that decisions used in obtaining evidence, conducting interviews,and making recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial byknowledgeable third parties." The credibility of the State Department's disciplinary system depends on that independence, yet the perception clearly exists among knowledgeable partiesthat external influences have negatively affected SID investigations in at least some particularcases. \

A key concern in considering SID's independence is what CIGIE refers to as

"organizational impairment," the investigative office's "position within the hierarchical structure

of the subject Government entity. To achieve maximum independence, the investigative functionshould be positioned outside the staff or reporting line of the unit or employees underinvestigation." Another key CIGIE concern regarding independence is any "external

impairment," including "influence on the extent and thoroughness of the investigative scope, the way in which the investigation is conducted, the individual(s) who should be interviewed, theevidence that should be obtained, and the content of the investigative report." In DS, SID is

positioned in the regular hierarchy, one of many offices that report up a regular chain to theDirector, Domestic Operations. FS special agents in SID, most of them rather junior in rank, FS-04s and FS-03s, ordinarily serve only one tour as an investigator. Fairly often, subjects of theirinvestigations are more senior DS agents, and sometimes-hostile witnesses for interviews are

other senior DS agents. As noted, in some instances senior Department officials have reportedly

intervened with DS to stop investigations from proceeding. During inspection interviews, nearlyevery SID special agent admitted being aware that one or more suspects or witnesses or senior

Department officials could one day serve on a promotion board or on a DS assignment panel that will decide the investigator's career prospects. In the interviews, most investigators added that

they themselves had not yet experienced pressure from above in any particular cases; but somehad indeed felt such pressure (as reported above). Most had heard reports of such, and some

predicted that colleagues in SID who had gained a reputation for being firm appliers of properinvestigative standards would have difficult career paths ahead. Several special agents in SID

observed that Civil Service agents with sufficient rank are less susceptible to pressure, since theircareers do not depend on DS assignment panels or Foreign Service promotion boards.

In meetings with Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and U.S. SecretService investigative offices, inspectors learned that various models exist for creating an

"independence" firewall to insulate sensitive internal investigations from high-level interference

and the perception thereof SID's current structure in which the vast majority of investigators arerelatively junior DS agents likely to have just one investigator experience and in which thesupervisors also are in the DS mainstream subject to regular "up or out" assignment and

promotion processes is at least unusual and may be unique. That structure does not fosterindependence from career pressures. It does create significant potential for undue influence,favoritism, and potential retribution. Various corrective mechanisms may be possible; but thestructure surely must at a minimum include removing from the normal DS reporting chaininvestigations of employee malfeasance and criminal cases involving all DS special agents andall Department employees at the GS-14/FS-02 level and above and placing responsibility forsuch investigations in an entity independent from the mainstream Department of State hierarchy.

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Recommendation 1: The Secretary should empower senior U.S. Government investigative

experts from outside the Department to restructure the investigative responsibilities currentlyassigned to the Special Investigations Division. At a minimum, the outcome of that restructuringshould build a firewall to keep senior Department and Diplomatic Security officials from havingthe ability to influence the commencement, course, or outcome of any investigation in which thesubject is a Diplomatic Security Special Agents or a Department official at the GS-14/FS-02level or above. (Action: S)

SID investigators repeatedly expressed concern that they and many of the DS employeesthey investigate all work in the same Department annex, SA-20. Investigators noted that thesubjects of investigation, who receive administrative discipline, including DS agents withfirearms, often return to work. Some SID investigators pointedly carry their own firearmsconstantly while in SA-20, fearing a nasty elevator confrontation. Several recommended that, solong as SID includes in its portfolio DS Special Agents as suspects, SID's physical locationshould be away from SA-20, both in the spirit of investigative independence and to remove thethreat of violent confrontations.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should locate any SID-like entity thatconducts investigations against DS agents to a site separate from the bulk of Diplomatic SecurityWashington D.C. activities. (Action: DS)

The SID division chief is an FS-01 position, which a number of observers commentedleaves any hard-charging DS agent who aspires to reach the Senior Foreign Service vulnerable topressure from above. The inspectors received suggestions that the three current bureaucraticlayers between the SID chief and the DS Assistant Secretary open sensitive cases to multiplepossibilities of interference and the leaking of information.

Recommendation 3: At present (pending the restructuring of SID responsibilities recommendedabove), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resourcesshould increase the grade of the SID division chief position to FS/OC and have that positionreport directly to the DS Assistant Secretary on all allegations regarding sensitive cases

involving DS agents and high-level Department officials. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Professional Standards

A second concern arising from the inspection is that DS lacks clearly stated professionalstandards for investigative functions, with the result that DS agents often must make decisionsabout procedures and cases in an ad hoc way.

A Diplomatic Security In vestigators' Man ual

Interviews made clear that DS currently has no manual of established procedures forconducting investigations. A new agent taking on investigative duties has to seek on-the-jobguidance from colleagues, who presumably are already busy with their caseloads. CIGIE statesunequivocally that as a foundational standard "organizations should establish written

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investigative policies and procedures via handbook, manual, directives, or similar mechanisms

that are revised regularly according to evolving laws, regulations, and executive orders." SID

leadership appears to have recognized the need and is, on an ad hoc basis, compiling relevant

documents on an Intranet site. SID is also drafting proposed revisions to the Foreign Affairs

Manual for a few issues. CR created a handbook on passport and visa investigations for use in

the Basic Special Agent Course but that handbook appears to be at least eight years out of date

and reportedly is not readily available for DS agents to access once they eventually arrive in CR.

Especially in investigative entities like SID and CR/CFl in which most positions are currently

filled by inexperienced agents, a systematic, priority effort to create comprehensive written

guidelines is necessary. Other USG investigative entities, including OIG/INV, have such manuals and handbooks, which DS could draw on to create its own manual.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should create a comprehensive

investigators' manual of standard policies and procedures, with annexes or handbooks containing

specific nuances applicable to particular offices including the Special Investigations Division and

the Criminal Investigations Division's CFI Branch. (Action: DS)

Workmanship

Recipients of SID Reports of Investigation (ROIs) in HR expressed concern that too

many such reports contain flaws, which require follow-up corrective actions. Estimates of flawed

ROIs varied from just a few to up to 25 percent. SID management reportedly realized the

problem several years ago and has attempted to regularize the ROI process, including by

establishing regular dialogue with HR/CSD, HR/DG, and HR/G and by establishing informal

guidelines for ROI production which now include SID discussion of the "Douglas factors" used

in administrative discipline decisions, inclusion of SID judgments about whether the investigator

has found sufficient evidence to "substantiate" or "not substantiate" alleged facts, and discussion

of "venue" elements. Nonetheless, complaints from ROI users continue.

A partial explanation for flawed ROIs relates to supervisor oversight. SID has historically

not had a clear policy that supervisors will consult with each subordinate on pending cases on aregular basis. In many cases, feedback on ROI preparation only took place after completion of

the case file; and feedback sometimes was cursory or targeted at spelling and grammar, not

substance. Reportedly, SID is now endeavoring to regularize supervisor feedback to agents on a

weekly basis.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institutionalize in the Special

Investigations Division a practice of rigorous and frequent mentoring sessions, with the

supervisor in each unit discussing each pending case with each investigator, and should include

that requirement in all supervisor work requirement statements. (Action: DS)

Inspectors heard concerns that SID ROIs sometimes do not contain all relevant

information that an adjudicator might find helpful. In particular, ROIs do not always contain at

least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a case. Absent such information,

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adjudicators may question if potentially relevant interviews, not evidenced in the file, ever tookplace. :,

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the Special

Investigations Division to include in its standard operating procedures that investigators includein the Report of Investigation at least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a case.(Action: DS)

Holding Diplomatic Security Agents to a Higher Standard

Sources perceive that SID investigations attempt to hold most DS agents to a higherstandard than is expected of the other Department employees. Reportedly, DS agents realize theymay one day have to work closely with other agents in pressure situations, and they want to weedout problem performers before that day. In conversations with SID agents, many confirmed thatSID does believe the U.S. Government should hold DS agents to a higher ethical standard. Some

recalled supervisors digging relentlessly to try to build a case, even when initial charges couldnot be proven. AFSA and some in HR who adjudicate DS cases respond that the Foreign AffairsManual does not establish a higher standard of conduct for DS agents. They argue that aninformal presumption of a higher standard does not provide sufficient warning to employees topermit punishment. (Inspectors have forwarded specific complaints to OIG/INV for follow-up.)Deciding the merits of that dispute is beyond the parameters of this inspection; however, a FAMrevision that would clearly establish the higher standard is reportedly in the works.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Human Resources, in conjunction with theBureau of Diplomatic Security, should clearly establish if a higher ethical standardapplies to Diplomatic Security Special Agents. If such a standard exists, the Bureau of

Human Resources should publish it to provide fair notice.

Standard Operating Procedures

The Inspectors became aware that several DS investigative entities lack necessarystandard operating procedures (SOPs), hindering performance.

SID Case Opening and Pursuit

The inspectors heard reports that at times individual SID supervisors have pursuedinvestigations excessively against other DS agents. That possibility likely increases when SID

has not promulgated standard operating procedures for when to open and how to pursue cases.Absent clear guidelines, individual preferences rule the day. That lack of clear standardshistorically has allowed supervisors to open cases on everything that comes in the door, whichreportedly has resulted in caseloads clogged with issues like alleged work place violence thatDepartment managers, per 3FAM 4150 and 3FAM 4156.2, should ordinarily attempt to handlevia counseling or other informal means. A number of SID investigators reported that having todeal regularly with such matters affected their morale. SID management reports an effort is

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under way to limit SID's caseload and push issues that managers elsewhere should handle backto those managers.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately promulgate a

threshold for when the Special Investigations Division should and should not open cases and

should lay out guidelines for how investigations should proceed, making clear that open-ended

expeditions are not acceptable. (Action: DS)

Standard Operating Procedures

The Inspectors became aware that several DS investigative entities lack necessary

standard operating procedures (SOPs), hindering performance.

Standards of Workmanship.... Mentoring; brief summary...

CR Branch SOPs

The Consular Integrity (CID) unit in the CR Division has two agents and one analyst who

work in the Consular Affairs Consular Integrity Division and who, within DS, report directly to

the CR division chief. CID monitors the passport application process and visa processing

worldwide. Through data mining, CID identifies anomalies and possible fraud indicators. TheDS agent in charge acts as a DS liaison with CA on a number of issues including DS access to

consular databases and works closely with other CR elements. Unfortunately, no SOPs currently

exist for the operations of the CID investigative unit, and that contributes to disagreement on

how the CA and DS elements will interact and divide the work. The current agent in charge hasmade strides in resolving the conflicts.

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with the Bureau of

Consular Affairs, should create standard operating procedures for the Consular Integrity Divisioninvestigative unit. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Also, DS and CA have not signed the memorandum of understanding intended to governoperations of the investigative unit of CID.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs

should complete and sign the memorandum of understanding for the Consular Integrity Division.(Action: DS in coordination with CA)

The Overseas Criminal Investigations Branch (OCI) of CR supports Assistant Regional

Security Officer-Investigators (A/RSO-Is) in embassies abroad. The A/RSO-I program operatesunder a memorandum of understanding between DS and CA, last signed in 2004. The MOU isoutdated and has been under revision for three years. DS and CA should complete it as soon as

possible to give necessary clarity to the program and to resolve outstanding issues such as the

proper rating and reviewing officers and the A/RSO-Is' access rights to the Consular

Consolidated Database (CCD). (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

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. should rapidly complete revisions to the A/RSO-I MOU and sign it. (Action: DS with CA)

Performance of the A/RSO-Is has been uneven. Some agents are extremely successfuland other less so. Many factors contribute including: the level of cooperation of the consular

section; the relationship with the RSO; the relationship with local law enforcement and host

government; and the experience and skills of the incumbent as a criminal investigator. An

updated MOU can resolve some of the problems regarding coordination of consular section andRSO approaches to the program; but a clear set of operational guidelines is also important. DSand CA have recommended that each post establish standard operating procedures. Many posts

have not done so. DS has made model SOPs available; but they are not satisfactory and were notcreated in cooperation with CA.


should collaborate on model standard operating procedures and require that all A/RSO-I postsuse the models to create post-specific procedures. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

As noted, DS is actively seeking to create new A/RSO-I positions up to a total of 125.

No clear standards have been established to judge the effectiveness of an A/RSO-I position in

meeting the goals of the program, and to date, the Department has never abolished a position asineffective. Some consular sections resist establishing a position and some wish to have an

existing position abolished. At least a few A/RSO-Is believe that their positions are unnecessaryand should be abolished.

Recommendation 12: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for judging

whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the performanceof the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Embassy Baghdad and Kabul Investigative Units

Embassies Baghdad and Kabul have separate investigative units located within the

Regional Security Offices and reporting to the RSOs. The DS agents assigned to those offices

conduct a variety of investigations, including specialized cases for which SID provides support.Some in SID expressed concern that those embassies' RSOs choose not to pursue some

politically sensitive cases or do not ensure proper procedures in such investigations. Examples(referred to OIG/INV for follow up) reportedly include allegations of drug abuse by contract

security employees and reports of abuse of authority by some RSO personnel. The currentsupervisory arrangement appears to leave SID without sufficient ability to oversee properhandling of potentially criminal cases.

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review the staffing,procedures, and reporting chain of the investigative units at embassies Baghdad and Kabul andcorrect any problems of expertise, independence, and integrity. (Action: DS)

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Human Resources Issues that Hinder Performance

Several aspects of the DS approach to investigative assignments do not promote day-to-day

professionalism and development of investigative personnel over the long haul.

FS-2501 Special Agents Tours of Duty and Proper Mixture versus GS-1811 's

The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) sets as the first

general standard for investigative organizations: "individuals assigned to conduct the

investigative activities must collectively possess professional proficiency for the tasks required."

CIGIE elaborates that investigative agencies should ensure "all investigators, commensurate with

grade level, possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities." CIGIE adds that such basics

should be followed by a "systematic, progressive, and documented plan" to maintain requisite

knowledge, skills, and abilities. All three ICI divisions have a mixture of career Civil Service

(GS) and career Foreign Service (FS) positions. (CR and GIF also hire contractors.) DS hires GS

investigators, designated "GS-1811s," based at least in part on past investigative credentials. The

FS agents whom DS assigns to investigative positions are DS agent generalists, designated "FS-

2501 s." In some cases, the 2501s have significant investigative experience from pre-DS jobs. In

many cases, the 2501s lack such experience, though DS provides all agents basic training

(BSAC) which includes a small investigative element, and most agents did a smattering of

investigative work when serving a first tour in a domestic DS field office. Some bid for SID, CR,

and CIF jobs aspiring to build an investigative specialty or at least to gain a knowledge base that

could prove occasionally useful in future assignments. DS force-assigns some others.

Assignment panels reportedly utilize only general DS criteria in deciding which FS-25() Is to

assign to investigative positions, with timing rather than any special skills or experience being

key.

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of

Human Resources, should have assignment panels take into account the Council of Inspectors

General on Integrity and Efficiency standards, or their equivalent, including agents' histories as

investigators, in deciding which FS-2501 agents should receive assignments in investigative

offices. (Action: DS in coordination with HR) .

In SID, CR, and CIF, new FS-2501 agents receive some formal training within their first

six months on the job, including basic FLETC courses. For the longer term, corridor wisdom in

DS is that the brightest career paths are via protection and security assignments. Those who

aspire to specialize in an investigator career path with "systematic, progressive" follow-on

training have to scramble to achieve that goal, and few succeed in making a career of DS

investigative assignments. CIGIE notes: "the training of an investigator should be a continuing

process.... A continuous career development program should be established to provide the

proper preparation, training, and guidance to develop into professionally qualified investigators

and supervisors." Currently in SID and CR investigative offices, none of the FS-2501

supervisors have experienced such a continuous process, with the result that both supervisors and

staff usually face sharp learning curves on arrival.

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Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should recognize "investigator" as a

specialized career path for FS-2501s (or should establish a separate numerical designator) withthe result that FS supervisors in investigative offices in the future, at least up to the rank of FS-01, will have significant investigative experience and will have systematic, progressive training

for that path. (Action: DS)

All FS-2501 agents in the three ICI divisions currently receive two-year assignments, with the possibility to extend for a third year. Being a full-time DS investigator is an important

responsibility. The outcome of a case can dramatically affect a suspect's career and can result insevere criminal penalties. Unfortunately, ICI supervisors currently can count on only 12 to 15productive months from a newly arrived FS-2501. Initially, that agent-investigator requiresspecialized training, a month or more in classroom and on-the-job. That is true for SID criminalinvestigators, CR passport- and visa-fraud investigators, and CIF agents entering the world ofcomputer forensics. Apart from training, DS routinely calls on FS-2501s in ICI for temporaryduty in diplomatic-protection work, often during the UN General Assembly period but at other

times as well. Finally, when a FS-2501 receives an onward assignment, language training andother preparation for that assignment can consume up to six months, subtracted from the two-year tour. Those realities keep DS from reaping full benefit from training and experience. Theproblem is particularly acute when an investigation involves a vulnerable victim or is movingtoward a federal prosecutor who values continuity. The solution in the three ICI divisions hasbeen to encourage FS-250rs to extend for a third year. Many in SID and CR/CFl did so in 2012;some others did not. DS has created some three-year domestic positions, as allowed underStandard Operating Procedure A-03, but has resisted doing so in ICI.

Recommendation 16: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should change the normal assignmentlength for FS-2501 Special Agents in DS/ICI/SID, CR, and CIF to three years, recognizing the

specialized skills required of DS investigators and the unusual continuity requirements of thepositions. (Action: DS)

SID and CR investigative staffs are heavily weighted toward FS-2501s, with a smallminority of GS-1811 civil-service investigators. Out of SID's 24 currently filled investigatorpositions, 21 are FS-2501s. Only one supervisor and two staff investigators are GS-1811s. ForCR/CFI, the numbers are: 21 FS-2501s and 2 GS-1811s. GS-1811 investigators can be a benefit.

They can stay indefinitely, in the best cases providing valuable continuity and high-quality

expertise; though reportedly they sometimes either burn out from endlessly dealing with stressfulcases or retire in place. On the positive side, many in ICI/SID, CR, and CIF report that assigningFS-2501S to ICI investigative positions and then circulating those agents to the field, including to

Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) positions in embassies, improves the ability of thefield to be first responders when incidents arise. On balance, the frequent turnover of FS-2501 sin SID and CR investigative units currently is not sufficiently buffered by the number of GS-1811s in place. Extending FS-2501 tours to three years, per above, would help with continuity;but increasing the portion of GS-1811s would better guarantee long-term stability for sensitivecases and specialized expertise during the inevitable FS-2501 transitions. Some in the ICIleadership have urged a dramatic increase in the number of investigator positions, particularly inSID. However, interviews at lower levels in ICI suggest that, while cases are sometimes

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unevenly distributed, the total caseloads are manageable with the current staffing levels. In that

light, increasing the number of GS-1811 investigators in ICI should be compensated by a

reduction in the number of FS-2501 investigators, bringing the net cost of that transition to nearzero.

Recommendation 17: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should increase the number of GS-

1811 investigators in the Special Investigations and Criminal Investigations Divisions to ensure

continuity and expertise are ever-present in both divisions. Having at least two GS-1811s in each

investigative work unit seems a reasonable initial goal. The bureau should convert current FS-

2501 positions in the tv/o divisions to create the added GS-1811 positions. (Action: DS)

Vance Memo and Admin Subpoena

The inspectors heard repeated complaints that two unresolved procedural issues, beyond

DS control, hinder investigators' ability to pursue cases effectively.

In 1977, Secretary of State Vance issued a memorandum requiring all Department

officials to obtain the advance written consent of all persons to be involved in any conversation

monitored or recorded. Any deviation requires approval by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.

Several DS/ICI supervisors and agents believe the Vance requirement impedes investigations

involving serious criminal allegations. They argue that the Department is unusual if not unique in

continuing to impose such a consent requirement in federal investigations. DS is seeking

Department approval to allow the recording of investigative interviews without the subject's

permission. Judging the merits of the issue is beyond the scope of this inspection.

Administrative subpoena authority allows a federal law-enforcement agency to issue a

compulsory request for documents or testimony without prior approval from a grand jury, court,or other judicial entity. Many agencies with the mandate to conduct criminal investigations have

that authority. DS does not. According to agents and senior managers, that lack of authority

significantly hampers agents' ability to conduct investigations quickly and efficiently. Sources in

DS advised that the Department has submitted a formal request for this authority to Congress,

which has yet to act.

Recommendation 18: When the appropriate authorities decide the Vance Memo and

administrative subpoena issues, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately

incorporate any new guidelines into standard operating procedures. (Action: DS)

Peer Reviews ,

Many USG investigative organizations periodically invite a non-affiliated entity to

conduct a thorough review of policies, procedures, and activities. If DS has undertaken such

reviews in the past, it is not within the memory of current SID, CR, or CIF personnel. Such

reviews offer a fresh perspective on what works and what does not, based on generally accepted

standards such as those of CIGIE. Given the series of issues which the inspection has observed,

the time is ripe.

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Recommendation 19: The Bureau Of Diplomatic Security should on an urgent basis requestCouncil of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to assign an independent and highlyrespected entity to undertake reviews of the Special Investigations, Criminal Investigations, andComputer Investigations and Forensics Divisions' investigative policies, procedures, andactivities. (Action: DS)

Other Topics - Addressed on a Division by Division Basis

Special Investigations Division (SID)

Personnel

The three SID branch chiefs are at the FS-02/GS-14 level. SID has no formal deputydivision chief position, although one branch chief is a de facto deputy without formal authorityover personnel outside his specific branch. With 20 investigators and three unit heads, SID needsa formally designated deputy division chief position.

Recommendation 20: DS should create a deputy SID division Chief at the FS-01 level.

Violent Crimes and General Investigations Units: Expertise and Morale

Most SID investigators complained about the current sub-division of SID staff into oneViolent Crimes Unit (VCU) and two General Investigations Units (GIU). The portfolio of VCU,

with a chief and six subordinates, includes rape, child/spousal abuse, deaths, and sexual abusecases. The GIUs, each with a chief and seven subordinates, take on other SID cases. Nearlyeveryone in SID perceives VCU to be the varsity, with GIUs the second string. Per above, allSID agents in their first six months receive a portion of formal training, but VCU agents withspecific and technical portfolios like child sexual abuse or deaths receive special training. Allagents perceive that VCU agents are much more likely to receive foreign-travel opportunitiesthan GIU agents are. Many agents perceive that VCU investigators receive cases that are moreinteresting in general and that GIU agents with less challenging cases often have their talentsunderutilized. SID agents generally aspire to assignments as ARSOs in embassies abroad oneday; but GIU agents worry that lack of experience in handling specialized cases will leave them unable to meet embassy front office expectations. Agents complain that SID choices of agents

for VCU are not transparent; yet the VCU combination of training, travel, and intriguing casesallows those agents to document experience for more compelling employee evaluations than GIUagents. In sum, most agents in SID believe the current VCU/GIU arrangement is deeply unfairand has a hugely negative impact on agent morale.

A rapid increase in SID agent numbers in recent years necessitated splitting the divisioninto three units, and the reality that some types of cases require specialized expertise means thatagents leading the investigation of such cases have particular training needs. However, given the

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extremely negative consequences on morale of the current VCU/GIU arrangement, SID isreportedly rethinking its approach to achieving its requirements. A sensible alternative could beto retain three units but remove the current prejudicial titling, spreading the variety of casesacross the entire division. Presuming that providing all agents training in all sub-specialties would not be cost-effective, the SID chief should designate individual agents for such training.Designating one GS 1811 civil servant to receive such training in each such specialty, therebyprovide long-term continuity, would seem sensible, with 2501s also receiving such training asneeds dictate. Allowing as many SID agents as possible to be back up on at least one suchspecialized case during a tour would help meet the DS goal of preparing future RSOs for thevariety of investigative duties.

Recommendation 21: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the SpecialInvestigations Division to abolish the VCU/GIU distinction, replacing it with an apportionmentof responsibilities across units that ensure a sufficient cadre of agents always has the expertiserequired for specialized cases and at least one GS 1811 agent has training for each such specialty

to assure continuity of expertise. To the extent possible, all agents should receive exposure to thevariety of SID cases, at least in a back up capacity. (Action: DS)

The Special Investigations Division Relationship with U.S. Attorneys

Many agents expressed unhappiness that Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) accept fewSID criminal cases for prosecution. "Venue" issues for suspects on assignment abroad play arole, but reportedly, the content of the case files can also be an issue. SID has useful relationships

with some offices in the Department of Justice. It does not appear that SID has routine liaisonrelationships with AUSAs, though one source reported that the Eastern District of VirginiaAUSAs have such relationships with other USG law-enforcement entities and have even

established one-year internships for investigators from some agencies. SID might explorecreating such an internship and sending a GS 1811 agent to fill it, thereby building a potentiallylong-term relationship with those AUSAs who most often handle cases concerning Departmentemployees and adding particularly useful expertise to the division.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should explore a one-year internship for a GS 1811 with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern District ofVirginia.

The Special Investigations Division Relationship with the Bureau of HumanResources/Conduct, Suitability and Discipline

Some HR/CSD personnel proposed addressing Report of Investigation (ROI)-relatedissues via up-front training, requiring each new SID agent to have a day or two of orientation inHR/CSD at the onset of the investigative assignment. Past quarterly meetings have fallen to the wayside, perhaps because particular issues do not arise on a quarterly schedule but do needimmediate attention. Ad hoc conversations can address particular ROI problems but do notprevent the problems from arising in the first place.

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Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should have the SpecialInvestigations Division, in conjunction with the Bureau of Human Resources/Conduct,Suitability and Discipline implement an orientation for each new investigator that includes atleast one full day consulting with HR/CSD adjudicators. If helpful, HR/CSD staff should

undertake reciprocal orientation days in the SID office. (Action: DS in coordination with 1IR)

Administrative Support

SID currently has four support staff: an investigative assistant and three investigativeanalysts. The inspectors heard repeated complaints that the incumbents are not at all overworked,but they do not consider most day-to-day administrative tasks to be within their positiondescriptions. As a result, supervisors assign investigator agents to handle such tasks asoverseeing vehicle usage, managing information systems issues, etc.

Recommendation 23: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of

Human Resources, should recalibrate the position descriptions of SID support staff to include thevariety of routine office-management responsibilities, freeing SID agents to focus on theinvestigative responsibilities in their own position descriptions. (Action: DS)

Vehicle Policy

Inspectors received reports that some in SID had abused the DS Home to Work (HTW)policy, routinely using official vehicles for home to office transport. The inspectors note that anSID Standard Operating Procedure issued on October 10, 2012, now makes clear that SIDemployees may use official vehicles for HTW only in the sort of limited circumstances that theDS HTW policy permits.

Criminal Investigations Division (CR)

This division's focus on criminal activity involving the consular functions of the State

Department brings it into close relationships with the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), theDepartment of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and other agencies. CR funding issufficient and comes primarily from Machine Readable Visa (MRV) revenues and fees derivedfrom H and L work visas.

CR has expanded rapidly. Last year one branch, OCI, grew from one employee and twocontractors to eight employees. Another branch, CFI, is bigger than some divisions. DS has

located some functions in CR to serve the entire bureau, including the property and evidenceprogram and responsibility for the informant and monitoring programs. The size and diversity ofthe division make it difficult to manage and restricts the rank of sub-unit managers. Two unitsreport directly to the division chief.

DS Representation on the FBI International Organized Crime Intelligence and OperationsCenter (IOC-2)

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DS has one agent and one analyst detailed to the OIOC-2. The center focuses entirely on

organized crime and coordinates the efforts of federal law enforcement agencies, deconflicting

tiicm when necessary. The presence of the DS agent gives State a voice and provides access to

valuable intelligence while improving cooperation with other agencies.

CR management has not clarified a telework policy for the division although at least one

employee teleworks full time and others have occasionally done so. Employees have expressed

the desire to telework and the Department encourages this.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should formulate and

disseminate a policy on teleworking for the Criminal Investigations Division.

CR has made relatively little use of the Department's awards program, and awards

nominations are unevenly spread among the several branches. This misses an opportunity to

encourage good performance, and uneven distribution of awards can hurt morale.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should encourage

managers in the Criminal Investigations Division to make better use of the awards

program.

Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch (CFI)

CFI investigates cases of criminal fraud involving U.S. passports and visas, specifically

including allegations of employee malfeasance involving consular operations that would

otherwise go to SID. The visa and passport cases are typically complex fraud schemes involving

both overseas and domestic criminal activities crossing jurisdictional lines. The branch also

investigates cases of human trafficking, especially those involving diplomatic A and G visadomestic servants.

The CFI branch now includes 29 positions, bigger than several divisions in DS. The

branch chief is an FS-02 and the unit chiefs are also FS-02s. The supervisor should be a moresenior. *

Recommendation 24: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should split off the Criminal Fraud

Investigations responsibilities from the Criminal Investigations Division to create a new division.

(Action: DS)

The CFI branch has three units, each led by a supervisor. DS assigns agents to the branch,including supervisors, without consideration of previous investigative experience, and even

supervisors typically spend a significant portion of their tour, 2 or 3 months, in training.

Currently only three of the twenty CFI investigator positions and none of the three unit chief

positions are designated as GS 1811s. Agents complain about the lack of continuity and note tlic

problems that this causes in working with AUSAs in prosecuting cases. The few 1811 agents

often serve at the continuity in cases but have no career path above their current positions. The

agents believe experienced 1811 unit chiefs would help them perform more effectively.

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Recommendation 25: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate at least one unit

chief position in the Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch as Civil Service. (Action: DS)

CFI shares the l^"" floor of SA-20 with the other branches of the Criminal InvestigationsDivision. That floor has no access control beyond general building access. Once on the floor,agents, other employees, and visitors can move freely. The CFI agents have cubicles as workspaces. CFI has active cases involving DS personnel, and on at least one occasion DS assigned

an employee under investigation to a job in another unit on the IZ"" floor. DS should restrictaccess to CFI workspaces just as it has restricted access to SID spaces elsewhere in SA-20.

Recommendation 26: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should restrict access to CFI

workspace by reconfiguring the SA-20 12' floor or moving CFI elsewhere. (Action: DS)

CFI supervisors currently assign cases individually to an agent, while encouraging agents

to partner with other agents during investigations. Case loads and extensive travel, bothinvestigative and for TDY assignments, often mean that the lead agent is absent from

headquarters. Assigning cases to investigative teams would address this problem.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should considerrealigning Criminal Fraud Investigations personnel into teams under the current unitsupervisors and assigning cases to those teams.

The operations assistant in CFI is responsible for coordinating and obtaining clearancesfor ail undercover, surveillance, and monitoring operations for DS headquarters and field offices.In his absence an agent fills the position.

Informal Recommendation 6: Criminal Fraud Investigations should designate and trainan employee to regularly be backup for the operations assistant position.

The Overseas Criminal Investigations Branch (OCI)

DS established what became the ARSO-I program in 1996 to put special agentinvestigators in consular sections with a mandate to fight international terrorism, augment

consular efforts to combat visa and passport fraud, and assist international and domestic

prosecutions. DS created OCI to support the A/RSO-I program, which has expanded rapidlyfrom fewer than 20 positions to over 100 today and a projected 123 by 2014. A/RSO-Is are to

spend 80% of their time on consular fraud related activities. The RSO and consular chief at postsupervise the agents jointly. The agents have an independent budget. The program is generally

judged a success, though it has experienced growing pains as posts, DS, and CA have struggledto clarify A/RSO-I roles.

In 2012 OCI expanded from one agent and two contractors to five agents and three Civil

Service support personnel in response to the rapidly expanding ARSO-I program in the field.Four desk officers now divide the world regionally to provide logistical and investigative

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support. The branch also periodically conducts a program review of each A/RSO-1 position.Two administrative assistants and one investigative analyst add support, and the branch is hiringa new program analyst.

Rapid expansion has brought problems. All but one of the four agents assigned as deskofficers lack overseas experience. They are at a disadvantage when conducting program reviews

which require interaction with senior embassy officials, and they are ill prepared to adviseA/RSOTs who are often on their first overseas assignment.

Recommendation 27: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign only agents withoverseas experience, preferably as A/RSO-Is, to be desk officers in OCI. (Action: DS incoordination with HR)

The branch chief currently manages the overseas program, including the establishment ofnew positions, while also supervising the new branch without a single experienced employee.

He has devoted much of his time to the overseas program and has traveled with each desk officeron at least an initial site visit. He has not devoted equivalent attention to management of OCIitself. The position descriptions for all positions in the office are inaccurate, and employeesexpressed frustration at not having clearly defined roles. The distribution of work is uneven and,at times, inequitable.

Recommendation 28: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish an accurate positiondescription for each position in OCI. (Action: DS)

A key OCI function is performing program reviews of each A/RSO-I position. DSprovides a report of this review to post management, CA, and DS. The stated goal is to review

each A/RSOT approximately midway through the assignment, about fifty trips each year. Thesereviews are useful and should be performed, though the frequency may need revisiting as theprogram matures. OCI may already be too small to meet the current ambitious program-reviewgoal.

Recommendation 29: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should determine whether OCIrequires an additional desk officer position. (Action: DS)

As noted, DS is actively seeking to create new A/RSO-I positions up to a total of 125.No clear standards have been established to judge the effectiveness of an A/RSO-I position inmeeting the goals of the program, and to date, the Department has never abolished a position asineffective. Some consular sections resist establishing a position and some wish to have anexisting position abolished. At least a few A/RSO-Is believe that their positions are unnecessaryand should be abolished.

Recommendation 30: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for judging whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the performanceof the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

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DS and CA have not established clear criteria to determine where to establish additional

A/RSO-I positions. The only definite criterion offered is that DS wants to have an A/RSO-I atevery post where DHS has a visa security unit, although the nexus between the two is unclear.

Recommendation 31: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould establish clear criteria for creating new A/RSO-I positions and ensure that post requestsmeet the criteria before seeking NSDD38 authority to create the positions. (Action: DS incoordination with CA)

Currently, FSN investigators whom the A/RSO-Is employ do not have the same CCDaccess as FSN investigators who work for fraud prevention managers in the consular section.Both positions perform essentially the same functions and should have the same access.

Recommendation 32: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should grant A/RSO-I FSN investigatorsthe same Consular Consolidated Database access it grants to Consular FSN investigators.

(Action: CA)

Criminal Intelligence and Research Branch (CIR)

CIR is a collection of very different units all of which support the work of the otherbranches of CR. CIR provides direct case support through the Visa and Passport Analysis Unit(VPAU) and the Financial Analysis and Forfeiture Unit (FPAU). The "management andprogram analyst" currently oversees the property and evidence management program for all ofDS. The database manager controls database access, logons, and permissions to manygovernment and private databases for all DS employees. CIR also deploys analysts to othergovernment agencies and to CA to provide access to State databases and help coordinate

investigations.

FPAU contracts for forensic accountants in field offices and at headquarters to providefinancial research and analysis to identify monies which the government can seize if the origin isvisa or passport fraud. FPAU is trying to convert some contract positions to Civil Service toprovide more continuity. It is important for DS to grade the positions properly to recruit trainedaccountants.

Recommendation 33: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should complete the process ofconverting three positions in the Financial Analysis and Forfeiture Unit to Civil Service in theappropriate series at the appropriate grade. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

VPAU supports CR agents primarily with database research and analysis. VPAU uses a wide array of government and commercial databases to research the activities of targets anduncover relationships to other persons possibly involved in consular fraud. The unit alsoproduces intelligence reports on fraud trends at a broader, less case-specific level. Agents in CFIand the field want VPAU to focus more on specific case support. The branch managerunderstands the conflicting demands on the VPAU and CIR in general. She has developed a

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plan to reorganize the branch better to satisfy the various requirements and reinforce elements ofthe branch that are understaffed.

Recommendation 34: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should reorganize the Visa and

Passport Analysis Unit of the Criminal Intelligence and Research Branch to better meet thedemands on the unit. (Action: DS)

The management and program analyst oversees the DS evidence program and providestraining to all evidence custodians at headquarters and at DS field offices. The analyst also leadsefforts to develop and deploy new evidence management software. He has no backup orsubordinate. ,.

Recommendation 35: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should add a second position in theproperty and evidence support unit. (Action: DS)

At the time of the inspection the CIR database manager position, with the criticallyimportant responsibility to provide database access to all DS employees, was vacant.

Recommendation 36: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should fill the position and create aplan to provide backup whenever the incumbent is absent. (Action: DS)

Criminal Investigative Liaison Branch (CIL)

This branch takes requests for assistance from other law enforcement agencies, federal,state, local and foreign, and determines how to assist, if appropriate. Most of the requests cometo a DS online mailbox. The branch also puts DS agents in other agencies, primarily to field

requests for assistance. The current positions are with INTERPOL, DHS/ICE, the U.S. MarshallsService, and a new position with the FBI. CIL agents direct the requests to DS elements asappropriate. All CIL agents are FS 2501s, and overseas experience is a key factor in their work.DHS/ICE in particular reported its satisfaction with having a DS agent collocated at the NationalTracking Center-Passenger. Other agencies are similarly pleased.

CIL has an analyst located part time in CA/PPT evaluating hits in the passport namecheck system. This is an expanding operation and the volume of the work threatens tooverwhelm a single analyst.

Recommendation 37: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould evaluate the workload of the CIL position in CA/PPT and determine whether a secondposition is required. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

CIL operations provide a valuable link to other law enforcement entities and DS agents inthe field. CIL provides triage to requests for assistance and directs traffic so others can dealefficiently with the requests.

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CIL has recently established a DS "Most Wanted" list similar to the FBI '"lO MostWanted" list, and DS will need to judge its value over time.

CA replaced front-channel telegrams with the ACS+ application in the CCD for

embassies to report all arrests and deaths of American citizens abroad. CIL routinely consultsthe CCD but does not have access to the ACS+ application. As a result, CIL no longer seesdeath and arrest notices. This information is valuable in identifying fugitives living abroad whohave outstanding domestic warrants and in closing warrants when the subject has died.

Recommendation 38: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should facilitate access for CIL personnelto the ACS-i- application. (Action: CA in coordination with DS)

CIL also fulfills a public relations role for DS, attending law enforcement conferencesand explaining what DS can do to assist other agencies. All of the agents share this work. DShas restricted conference travel in 2012 for budgetary reasons and in response to criticism

directed at other agencies concerning conference participation.

Informal Recommendation 7: DS should ensure that CIL participates in thoseconferences which significantly further important Department goals.

Special Projects Branch (SP)

The Special Projects Branch leads the H and Lwork visas fraud investigation program.SP has deployed 14 agents and 14 investigative analysts to 18 field offices where they furtherdeploy to DHS/ICE Document and Benefits Task Force offices. The special agent in charge(SAC) at each field office directly supervises the agents and analysts, with the SP branch chief, a

GS 1811 position, adding oversight from long distance. SP also manages the investigative unitat CA's Kentucky Consular Center that primarily investigates H and L fraud. SP hasinvestigative analysts at headquarters to support agents in the field, including A/RSO-Is who areinvestigating H and L visa fraud.

The working relationship at each field office between the agent and the SAC and with theDHS/ICE taskforce director determines the effectiveness of the program. The SACs haveconsiderable autonomy, and some do not provide effective support. Some SACs are not veryfamiliar with SP's program; but they still write evaluations of SP agents and analysts, sometimesdisadvantaging promotion opportunities.

Recommendation 39: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should revise oversight proceduresfor SP agents in the field so that supervisors at DS headquarters are rater and reviewer. (Action:DS)

The above recommendation would currently require the SP branch chief to rate 34employees, too many. In any case, the branch chief already is over tasked, managing both agentsin Washington and the field and a vigorous training program that is popular, successful, and

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hierarchy and just below the GS-1811 supervisor. Having the two senior manager positions isduplicative. CACI already has a formal representative to serve the needs of its contractors inGIF. The inspection team proposes that DS convert the Contract Lab Manager position into athird DEA supervisor position, allocating the DEA personnel into three five-person groups. Withthat change, the team leaders would be more able to fulfill their CACI responsibilities to bothsupervise and undertake digital evidence analysis.

Recommendation 42: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should convert the Contract LabManager position to a Digital Evidence Analysis Team Leader, thus creating three teams each

with five members. (Action: DS)

Integration of the administrative and operational components of CIF

The administrative staff members of CIF perceive they are under-appreciated, whichaffects morale. An element in play may be the configuration of CIF spaces separating the

administrative and operational components. Integration of all personnel would promote missionunity.

Informal Recommendation 9: DS/ICI/CIF should consider integrating theadministrative and operational workforces in its upcoming renovation of the 12"' floor ofSA-14.

Lack of communication among CIF personnel

The Digital Forensics Programs consist mainly of contractors. CIF Operations consist ol'FTE personnel. Currently little professional or personal communication takes place between

these two programs as mission requirements differ. At times, it appears some CIF personnel inone program do not even recognize personnel in the other program as being in the same division.

Informal Recommendation 10: DS/ICI/CIF should hold periodic meetings for alldivision personnel so those in each of the CIF programs can better appreciate othercolleagues. ,

DS Information Technology Systems

DS has developed the computerized Investigative Management System (IMS) to trackand document investigative cases worldwide. Nearly all ICI offices reportedly use the

unclassified IMS, but SID has judged that the sensitivity of some of its cases and the ability oflocally employed staff at embassies to access unclassified systems require SID use of theclassified IMS. Unfortunately, SID agents have found the classified IMS system's lowbandwidth, small font size, instability, and lack of editing features unwieldy. Almost all SIDagents use IMS only as a repository of closed case files. SID agents currently use MicrosoftWord templates, adapted to SID needs, for all casework. They then, at the very end, scansometimes-voluminous paper files and upload them into IMS. Several agents reported that, forparticularly large files, they do not scan and upload each document, only the ones they deem

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relevant. A disadvantage of the Word template is that, unlike the IMS, it does not have case-tracking capabilities. SID has brought its IMS issues to the attention of the contractor responsiblefor the program. Software updates and adjustments, including to add consular information and toimprove search capabilities by including outside law-enforcement entities thus far have focusedon the unclassified IMS program with its higher customer base; but classified-system upgradesand increased bandwidth are due shortly. In addition, DS is introducing SharePoint websites andapplications to supplement IMS. SID plans to utilize the SharePoint option for managing cases assoon as the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) authorizes storage of personallyidentifiable information on SID-developed InfoPath forms.

Informal Recommendation 11: DS should monitor efforts to improve performance ofthe classified IMS system. If such improvements remain problematic, SID should furtherexplore ways to adapt its Microsoft Word-based template and SharePoint options toaccomplish its information-management goals, including day-to-day case monitoring,closed-case record keeping, and vetting of Bureau of Human Resources promotion lists.

In July 2010, the Bureau of Information Resources Management, Operations, Office ofEnterprise Network Management, Telecommunications, Wireless, and Data Services Division(IRM/OPS/ENM/TWD) took over responsibility for all DS communications circuits. DSnetwork staff lost the ability to view configuration details and monitor performance. As a result,network problems can linger. In one case, a configuration error in Kentucky Consular Centercircuits that originated in December 2011 took many months to spot and resolve.

Recommendation 43: Recommendation: The Bureau of Information Resources Management,Operations, Office of Enterprise Network Management, Telecommunications, Wireless, andData Services Division should provide the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's network stall read¬

only access to DS circuit configuration details and allow DS to monitor its network. (Action:IRM/OPS/RNM/TWD, in coordination with DS).

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List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Secretary should empower senior U.S. Government investigative

experts from outside the Department to restructure the investigative responsibilities currentlyassigned to the Special Investigations Division. At a minimum, the outcome of that restructuringshould build a rircwall to keep senior Department and Diplomatic Security officials from havingthe ability to influence the commencement, course, or outcome of any investigation in which thesubject is a Diplomatic Security Special Agents or a Department official at the GS-14/FS-02level or above. (Action: S)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should locate any SID-like entity thatconducts investigations against DS agents to a site separate from the bulk of Diplomatic SecurityWashington D.C. activities. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 3: At present (pending the restructuring of SID responsibilities

recommended above), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau ofHuman Resources should increase the grade of the SID division chief position to FS/OC andhave that position report directly to the DS Assistant Secretary on all allegations regardingsensitive cases involving DS agents and high-level Department officials. DS should also create adeputy SID division chief at the FS-01 level. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau ofHuman Resources, should have assignment panels take into account the Council of InspectorsGeneral on Integrity and Efficiency standards, or their equivalent, including agents' histories asinvestigators, in deciding which FS-2501 agents should receive assignments in investigativeoffices. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should recognize "investigator" as aspecialized career path for FS-2501s (or should establish a separate numerical designator) withthe result that FS supervisors in investigative offices in the future, at least up to the rank of FS-01, will have significant investigative experience and will have systematic, progressive trainingfor that path. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should change the normal assignmentlength for FS-2501 Special Agents in DS/ICI/SID, CR, and GIF to three years, recognizing thespecialized skills required of DS investigators and the unusual continuity requirements of thepositions. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should increase the number of GS-1811 investigators in the Special Investigations and Criminal Investigations Divisions lo ensurecontinuity and expertise are ever-present in both divisions. Having at least two GS-18ris in eachinvestigative work unit seems a reasonable initial goal. The bureau should convert current FS-2501 positions in the two divisions to create the added GS-1811 positions. (Action: DS)

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Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should create a comprehensiveinvestigators' manual of standard policies and procedures, with annexes or handbooks containingspecific nuances applicable to particular offices including the Special Investigations Division andthe Criminal Investigations Division's CFI Branch. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately promulgate athreshold for when the Special Investigations Division should and should not open cases andshould lay out guidelines for how investigations should proceed, making clear that open-endedexpeditions are not acceptable. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institutionalize in the SpecialInvestigations Division a practice of rigorous and frequent mentoring sessions, with thesupervisor in each unit discussing each pending case with each investigator, and should includethat requirement in all supervisor work requirement statements. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the SpecialInvestigations Division to include in its standard operating procedures that investigators includein the Report of Investigation at least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a cas.(Action: DS) ,

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with the Bureau ofConsular Affairs, should create standard operating procedures for the Consular Integrity Divisioninvestigative unit. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould complete and sign the memorandum of understanding for the Consular Integrity Division.(Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould rapidly complete revisions to the A/RSO-I MOU and sign it. (Action: DS with CA)

Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould collaborate on model standard operating procedures and require that all A/RSO-1 postsuse the models to create post-specific procedures. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 16: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards forjudging whether an A/RSO-I position is important to meet program goals, distinct from theperformance of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 17: When the appropriate authorities decide the above two issues, theBureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately incorporate any new guidelines into standardoperating procedures. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 18: Given the series of issues which the inspection has observed (asdescribed throughout this report). The Bureau Of Diplomatic Security should on an urgent basisrequest Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to assign an independent and

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highly respected entity to undertake reviews of the Special Investigations, CriminalInvestigations, and Computer Investigations and Forensics Divisions' investigative policies,procedures, and activities. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 19: DS should create a deputy SID division Chief at the FS-01 level.

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the SpecialInvestigations Division to abolish the VCU/GIU distinction, replacing it with an apportionmentof responsibilities across units that ensure a sufficient cadre of agents always has the expertiserequired for specialized cases and at least one GS 1811 agent has training for each such specialtyto assure continuity of expertise. To the extent possible, all agents should receive exposure to thevariety of SID cases, at least in a back up capacity. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 21: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should have the SpecialInvestigations Division, in conjunction with the Bureau of Human Resources/Conduct,

Suitability and Discipline implement an orientation for each new investigator that includes atleast one full day consulting with HR/CSD adjudicators. If helpful, HR/CSD staff shouldundertake reciprocal orientation days in the SID office. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review the staffing,procedures, and reporting chain of the investigative units at embassies Baghdad and Kabul andcorrect any problems of expertise, independence, and integrity. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 23: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau ofHuman Resources, should recalibrate the position descriptions of SID support staff to include thevariety of routine office-management responsibilities, freeing SID agents to focus on theinvestigative responsibilities in their own position descriptions. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 24: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should split off the Criminal FraudInvestigations responsibilities from the Criminal Investigations Division to create a new division.(Action: DS)

Recommendation 25: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate at least one unitchief position in the Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch as Civil Service. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 26: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should restrict access to CFl workspace by reconfiguring the SA-20 12' floor or moving CFI elsewhere. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 27: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign only agents with

overseas experience, preferably as A/RSO-Is, to be desk officers in OCI. (Action: DS incoordination with HR)

Recommendation 28: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish an accurateposition description for each position in OCI. (Action: DS)

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Recommendation 29: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should determine whether OClrequires an additional desk officer position. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 30: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards forjudging whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from theperformance of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 31: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairsshould establish clear criteria for creating new A/RSO-I positions and ensure that post requestsmeet the criteria before seeking NSDD38 authority to create the positions. (Action: DS incoordination with CA)

Recommendation 32: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should grant A/RSO-I FSNinv

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