196

Notes

1 Introduction: Lessons from Gettier

1 . See Hazlett (2010) for examples. Contrary to a misinterpretation one some-times encounters, Hazlett only draws the more modest conclusion that linguistic arguments for factivity aren’t to be trusted.

2 . For a recent example, see Kornblith (2009), and see Kornblith (2009: 5fn1) for references to some other deniers of the justification requirement.

3 . It’s only very recently that philosophers have really tried to spell out how the thought experiment feeds into a refutation of the account; see, for example, Williamson (2007: chapter 6) and Malmgren (2011).

4 . See Hawthorne (2004: 32–6) for a recent discussion of how to best formulate a closure principle for knowledge.

5 . There are other, perhaps more demanding, conceptions of infallibilism that are not entailed by this characterization. For example, Unger (1975) argues that one cannot know P unless one is absolutely certain that P, and this might be regarded as a variety of infallibilism.

6 . Littlejohn (2012) offers a battery of arguments designed to show that justi-fied belief is factive.

7 . See Goldman (1976: 772–3), though he credits the example to Carl Ginet. As Goldman describes the case, it’s specified that Henry has not yet encoun-tered any of the barn façades, but DeRose has suggested that the example is stronger if we instead stipulate that Henry has already mistakenly believed a number of the façades in the region to be barns (2009: 23fn24).

8 . I’m somewhat sympathetic to the modal account of luck defended in Pritchard (2005), though I don’t think that it’s problem-free as it stands.

9 . The causal condition is often presented as a replacement for the justification condition, rather than as a supplement to the JTB account. This complica-tion won’t matter here.

10 . Jenkins (2006: 140–4) argues convincingly that earlier explanation-based accounts were too weak, succumbing to simple variants of Gettier’s original examples.

11 . Also worth considering in this connection is Harman’s (1973: 143–4) well-known case involving a subject who reads of a political assassination in a reli-able newspaper, and only by luck misses the massive cover-up that follows, which includes an insincere retraction by that newspaper.

12 . In particular, any serious overview of this debate would give some attention to defeasibility theories, reliabilist theories, and sensitivity theories. For discus-sions of these, see the references at the end of this paragraph in the main text.

13 . This label comes from Vogel (1990). We will also occasionally consider variants in which the draw hasn’t even taken place yet (for example, in Chapter 5), but in general I’ll avoid these since they raise complications about how knowledge of the contingent future is possible.

Notes 197

14 . The claim that lottery beliefs can be justified is a premise of one version of the so-called lottery paradox. Avoiding this paradox while keeping the premise looks like it forces one to give up a closure principle for justification that applies to inferences with more than one premise: a ‘multi-premise’ closure principle, in now standard terminology. This might be reckoned a significant cost, not least because it’s unclear that one can coherently give up multi-premise closure for justification while retaining the single-premise restriction adopted in the introduction (see DeRose 1999: 23fn14 and Lasonen-Aarnio 2008). These are important issues, but they will have to wait for a more appropriate occasion.

15 . For endorsements, see, for example, Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000), Pritchard (2005), and Manley (2007).

16 . Williamson (2000) holds that the relevant notion of closeness cannot be understood except in terms of knowledge.

17 . For this kind of treatment of the problem raised by necessary truths, see Williamson (2000), Pritchard (2009), Manley (2007), Horvath (2008), and McGlynn (2012b). See Roland and Cogburn (2011) for an objection. Sainsbury (1997) and Weatherson (2004) offer a similar but more radical proposal, which we will discuss in Chapter 7.

18 . See, for example, Brueckner and Fiocco (2002), Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004), Comesaña (2005), Kelp (2009), and Bogardus (2014).

19 . For a recent terrific overview of the debate, see the first chapter of Littlejohn 2012.

20 . As mentioned in the preface, I don’t here consider these issues about how content is fixed here, but see McGlynn (2012b) for an extended discussion.

21 . Ichikawa has made this point a number of times in talks and on his blog; see also Ichikawa and Jenkins (in progress).

22 . This aspect of the knowledge first approach has its roots in Unger (1975), and also in Stoic responses to the Sorites paradox, which were a big influence on Williamson’s own response – on the latter, see the discussion in the first chapter of Williamson (1994).

23 . I’m not suggesting that any of these authors deny the sixth thesis. Rather, my claim is that it doesn’t seem to figure at all centrally in their conception of the knowledge first approach.

2 Belief

1 . I discuss two exceptions in McGlynn (2013: 402n6). See also Comesaña (2009: 7), which only came to my attention after I had written that paper.

2 . Compare Pritchard (2008: 439–40) and Comesaña (2009: 7). 3 . Unfortunately, this point was nowhere near as clear as it should have been in

McGlynn 2013; indeed, the section on the so-called Russellian Retreat may have been positively misleading in this respect. I should note that some of the positions we will discuss (for instance, Douven and Lackey’s norms of assertion discussed in Chapter 5) are stated in terms of reasonableness or rationality, but where no contrast seems to be intended with justification. I’ll flag this terminological issue again when I discuss them.

4 . Nelkin (2000) argues that to believe a lottery proposition is to thereby be guilty of a failure of rationality, but I don’t consider her view below since

198 Notes

her reasons for adopting this position don’t connect with the issues about the relationship between belief and knowledge which are the focus of this chapter. See McGlynn (2013: 403n9) for criticism of Nelkin’s position

5 . See Adler and Hicks (2013: 149fn18) for a reply to this worry, as it was expressed in McGlynn (2013). Since it’s not my main point here, I won’t push it any further.

6 . As noted above and in Chapter 5, there are reasons to think that what Douven calls rationality is just what is more commonly called justification, but I will ignore this here.

7 . For further criticism of Huemer’s premise, see Littlejohn (2010: 92–3 and 2012: 173–5). Huemer further defends his thesis in his 2011; see McGlynn (2013) for criticism.

8 . For explicit endorsements, see Williamson (2000), Adler (2002), Bird (2007), Hindriks (2007), Sutton (2007), Bach (2008), Stanley (2008), Ball (2013), and Littlejohn (2013b). Bird is very careful to distinguish norms of judgment from norms of belief, but he endorses the knowledge norm for each. I mostly gloss over this distinction in what follows to simplify my discussion.

9 . This is one place where Bird actually speaks of ‘judging’ where I speak of ‘believing’, but this doesn’t make any difference to the points made in the text.

10 . For more discussion of arguments for the knowledge norm of belief, see Littlejohn (2010 and 2012: chapter 5) and the discussions of Sutton (2007) referenced at the start of the next chapter.

11 . An earlier version of this argument can be found in Williams (1978: 44–5). Smithies (2012b) also argues that belief aims at knowledge; see McGlynn (2012c: 364fn9) for criticism. See Littlejohn (2010 and 2012: chapter 5) for further criti-cism of the claim that belief aims at knowledge (though, as we have just seen, Littlejohn himself has recently changed his mind on these issues).

12 . This should be relatively uncontroversial, and I argue for it at length in 2013: 397–8. Some qualifications may be necessary to accommodate the kinds of example discussed in Turri (2010a) and elsewhere, though I won’t discuss such complications here.

13 . As I already hinted above, some epistemologists think that there can be congruous doxastic Moorean beliefs; see, for example, Douven (2006: 474), Lackey (2007: 613–6), Coffman (2011: 486), and Turri (2010 a). While it is true that I have here defended the claim that epistemic Moorean beliefs are not inherently incongruous by contrasting such beliefs with doxastic Moorean beliefs, the principal point can be cast in the following more neutral way: even if one is willing to grant the assumptions needed to argue that doxastic Moorean beliefs are inherently incongruous, arguing the same point for their epistemic counterparts requires further, much less plausible principles (of the sort I argued against in Sections 2.3 through 2.6).

3 Justification

1 . Whitcomb (2014) considers and criticises a number of other proposals, which I don’t discuss because they’re implausible and they haven’t been advocated by anyone.

Notes 199

2 . The phrase originally comes from Sutton (2007: 10), but it is co-opted by Bird (2007: 83). Hossack (2007: 26–7) also proposes a version of this kind of account similar to Bird’s, but he doesn’t really offer any arguments or details, and so I don’t engage his discussion here. Smith (2010) defends an alternative devel-opment of the idea that justification is ‘would be’ knowledge, though unlike Bird’s, it’s not developed within the knowledge first approach. In McGlynn (2012c), I note that a proponent of knowledge first epistemology might appropriate Smith’s account, and I question the account and its motivations. Ichikawa (forthcoming) has defended an account which is similar to Bird’s, but which replaces the appeal to mental states in ( JuJu ) with an appeal to intrinsic states. Unfortunately, Ichikawa’s article appeared too recently for me to discuss it here or to consider whether it avoids all of my objections to Bird.

3 . A similar issue arises for Reynolds’s account, discussed below, and he simply says he’s not offering an account of ‘justification as a matter of degree’ (2013: 368), without addressing how this shortfall might be made up.

4 . Again, I won’t worry about the distinction between belief and judgment here. Bird does distinguish these (2007: 96–7), but the distinction doesn’t play a significant role in his discussion, and generally he seems pretty happy with moving back and forth between them fairly freely.

5 . The parallel isn’t exact, in particular since it’s not a feature of Williamson’s alertness case as described that one’s existential belief that someone is alert is true. But that’s a very shallow difference. First, at any given moment there probably is a witness for that belief. More seriously, the crucial point is that even if one’s belief is true, one lacks knowledge since it’s merely a matter of luck that one’s belief is true.

6 . Reynolds (2013: 375) hints that he’d prefer a different treatment of lottery propositions, but his proposal isn’t defended or spelled out in sufficient detail for it to be possible to engage with it.

4 Evidence

1 . See Williamson (2000: chapter 10) for his account of evidential support, and see Whitcomb (2008a) for helpful discussion, as well as criticism, of Williamson’s proposal. Jackson (2012) argues that we should endorse E = K but not the claim that knowledge is what justifies.

2 . Dougherty and Rysiew (2014a and 2014b) develop an alternative picture of evidence, and epistemology more generally, taking appearances rather than knowledge to be ‘first’, and this turns crucially on taking evidence to be prima-rily non-propositional (though they allow that some propositions may be counted as evidence in a derivative sense). So I certainly don’t want to suggest that the debate just side-stepped lacks any genuine bearing on our assess-ment of Williamson’s position. However, I lack space to discuss Dougherty and Rysiew’s alternative here.

3 . Hughes (2014) argues that the negations of Gettierized propositions seem inconsistent with one’s evidence even though one doesn’t know those propo-sitions, and so they cannot be part of one’s evidence according to E = K. If that’s right, then Williamson’s test for when a proposition is part of one’s evidence yields results that conflict with the view he uses that test to support.

200 Notes

4 . Thanks to Dylan Dodd and Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa for discussion here. 5 . The locus classicus for this kind of view in the recent literature is Maher

(1996). Littlejohn (2011a, 2011b, and 2012) defend the claim that evidence is non-inferential in nature.

6 . Thanks to Nick Hughes for suggesting this interpretation of Williamson’s argument.

7 . Brown (2013) argues that this commitment is much more problematic that Williamson and others have recognized. I won’t consider this objection here – not because it’s not interesting or relevant, but rather because if it raises a genuine problem, it does so for a number of different accounts of evidence and evidential support. So detailed consideration of Brown’s objec-tion belongs to a broader discussion of these issues, which I can’t offer here.

8 . Bird (2004: 256–7) offers a second argument, based on the idea that one might lose one’s non-inferential knowledge in a case with the relevant struc-ture by acquiring a defeater, rather by forgetting. This argument too conflates one’s evidence for one’s inferential knowledge with the premises one used to reach that conclusion (2004: 257). In Williamson’s reply to a talk based on this chapter, he suggested a better example for Bird’s purposes, in which one infers that the substance in jar 1 is soluble on the basis of observing it dissolve, and then one forgets one’s initial evidence. Consider now the proposition that the substance is jar 1 is soluble and the substance in jar 2 is also soluble. It is natural to say that one retains some very weak evidence for this conjunction even after one’s memory fails, namely the known proposi-tion that the substance in jar 1 is soluble. However, this known proposition cannot be evidence, if evidence is restricted to the noninferential, and there are no other candidates. I won’t try to evaluate this suggestion here, though it strikes me as a promising line for the defender of E = K to pursue.

9 . Unger (1975: 209–10) offers virtually the same argument, and my response will be the same. Unger (1975: 208–9) also argues that P must meet various necessary conditions for one knowing that P if P is one’s reason, considering truth, belief, and absolute certainty (which almost nobody today regards as necessary for knowledge), and he suggests that this provides ‘pretty fair evidence’ for his conclusion. I don’t see how this is evidence at all.

10 . Hughes (forthcoming) defends a similar reply to Hyman. 11 . See Whitcomb (2008b: 145) for an apparent counterexample. This issue is

related, but not identical, to the controversial issue of whether one sees that the structure is a barn in barn-façade county. We will take up this issue a little in the final chapter, though we will not be able to give it the attention it merits.

12 . For further criticism of Williamson’s account of perceptual knowledge, see Conee and Feldman (2008: 103–4) and Kvanvig (2009: 158–9).

13 . Dodd himself will not see this as a remotely decisive objection to Williamson’s account. See his 2011 for relevant discussion.

14 . I take this statement of the argument from Littlejohn (2012: 118–20); see also Littlejohn (2011a: 493–9) for more extended discussion. As we’ll see shortly, Littlejohn doesn’t endorse the argument.

15 . Actually, Littlejohn doesn’t quite present things this way. Rather, he seems to suggest that he can accept the platitude that rational thinkers respect their evidence, while resisting the claim that every failure to respect one’s evidence

Notes 201

counts as a failure of rationality (2012: 120). I doubt anything really hangs on this, and I find the way of presenting things in the text a slightly more perspicuous way of bookkeeping.

16 . This formulation of the thesis comes from Littlejohn (2011a: 480). Silins (2005: 381) offers a weaker formulation that doesn’t strike me as any more plausible, and which isn’t obviously sufficient for the purposes of the argu-ment he offers.

17 . This is the moral usually drawn from Putnam’s (1975) famous ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment. In fact, Putnam himself only drew a conclusion about the contents of our utterances from his example, but it has been common since the work of Burge (in particular, Burge 1979) to take the moral to carry over to mental content too. See Kallestrup (2012) for an up to date and acces-sible introduction to semantic externalism and the philosophical issues it raises.

18 . See Silins (2005: 384) for references, and Kallestrup (2012: chapter 5) for an overview of different responses to McKinsey’s argument.

19 . Littlejohn (2011a and 2012: 116) argues against Armchair Access. I don’t find those arguments entirely convincing, but since I’m not ultimately placing any weight on the argument from Armchair Access, I won’t pursue the point here. Littlejohn (2012: 117–18) also offers a similar argument against E = K from a weakening of Armchair Access that he finds more plausible; but like the argument Silins offers, this argument would be blocked by a number of the standard responses to the McKinsey paradox.

20 . Fantl and McGrath also seemed inclined towards this view. See their 2009: 100–5, and see Littlejohn (2013a) for critical discussion of their position.

21 . See Leite (2013: 87–91) for further discussion of Joyce and his error-theory objection.

22 . While the particular formulation and deployment of the point here is mine, this reply is due in all essentials to Martin Smith (p.c.). See Littlejohn (2013a) for further critical discussion of Arnold’s objection.

23 . Littlejohn (2013a: 151) offers an argument that it cannot be part of one’s evidence.

24 . Rizzieri offers two more arguments for the thesis that falsehoods can justify, but the one considered in the text is his strongest, and I lack space to consider the others here.

25 . Comesaña and Kantin (2010: 450–1) also suggest that E = K runs into trouble because it conflicts with the ‘intuition’ that two subjects with the same non-factive mental states have the same evidence. They’re right that there’s a clash here, but we examined whether the ‘intuition’ in question could be backed up with argument in Section 4.2.3, and the results were not encouraging.

5 Assertion

1 . Following Searle (1969), by ‘speech acts’ I’ll mean what Austin called illocu-tionary acts.

2 . I’m paraphrasing a little, but only a little. Austin actually talks of stating, describing, and reporting, but it’s natural to think that asserting covers all of these.

202 Notes

3 . Williamson actually more often speaks of rules of assertion rather than norms, and this will be reflected in some of the passages I quote from him in this chapter. I’ll treat these terms interchangeably, but following the termi-nology dominant in the recent literature, I’ll talk in terms of norms.

4 . The list of defenders is formidable, and the following list is designed to be representative rather than comprehensive: Adler (2002 and 2009), Benton (2011; 2012; and 2013), Blaauw (2012), Blome-Tillmann (2008a), DeRose (2002a and 2009), Hawthorne (2004), Milne (2012), Reynolds (2002), Sosa (2011), Stanley (2005), Sutton (2007), Turri (2010b and 2011), and Littlejohn (forthcoming). Matthew Benton has quite rightly emphasized to me that a number of opponents of knowledge first philosophy also endorse the knowl-edge norm.

5 . See Montgomery (forthcoming) for criticism of Cappelen’s arguments. 6 . Maitra (2011) argues that the analogy to games casts no real illumination on

norms of assertion. I’m sympathetic to that general point, though I’ll take issue with some of the specifics of Maitra’s discussion below when discussing predictions.

7 . The point had already been made by Lackey (2007: 610 and 2008: 126–7). Williamson (2000: 268) also touches on the issue.

8 . Blaauw and de Ridder (2012) argue that the cases Turri takes to motivate the move to the express knowledge norm of assertion can be explained away. I don’t find their explanation very compelling, but since I’m not here advo-cating Turri’s norm I won’t discuss this issue further.

9 . Williamson’s own explanation appeals to the knowledge norm’s consequence that epistemic Moorean assertions cannot be warranted (2000: 253). Unger’s version given in the text seems better placed to account for the absurdity of such assertions, and not just their impropriety.

10 . The express knowledge account of assertion also avoids Pelling’s (2013a) objection that biconditional versions of the knowledge norm run into trouble with paradoxical assertions such as ‘This very assertion is improper’, at least as he states the objection. As stated, the objection relies on the claim that biconditional versions of the knowledge norm entail that one’s asser-tion that P cannot be improper if one knows that P (Pelling 2013a: 978), and this clearly does not follow from the express norm of assertion even if it is taken as offering a sufficient condition on proper assertion. In any case, it is plausible that the defender of the standard knowledge norm can appeal to standard moves from the literature on the semantic paradoxes (such as that generated by the liar sentence ‘This very sentence is false’) to avoid the objec-tion (Snapper 2012).

11 . A related point is reported by Douven (2006: 472fn33). Matthew Benton (p.c.) suggests an interesting reply, namely that in gossip we mimic the conversa-tional patterns found in normal conversation, but since these are contexts in which we’re relaxed, we should expect to find people responding to chal-lenges in ways that we would deem unsatisfactory in normal circumstances. However, it’s not clear that this suffices to see off the worry. The question is; can we take how we challenge assertions as evidence that our practice of swap-ping assertions is governed by the knowledge norm? And the worry is that in large swathes of conversation, we find the same kinds of challenges and yet what we seem to expect of our conversational partners is not knowledge,

Notes 203

but only that they be able to cite reasons for their assertion (which may or may not put them in a position to know). Given this, what reason do we have for thinking that we expect any more of our conversational partners in more serious exchanges? In any case, I think we should be wary of the idea that gossip doesn’t count as ‘normal’ conversation; it’s apt to seem about as normal as conversation gets, unless one has a rather demanding conception of what normal conversation requires of its participants.

12 . Sosa (2009) likewise argues that there are other variants of Moore’s paradox that involve knowledge but which the knowledge norm doesn’t explain unless it is supplemented with further controversial principles: for example, ‘P, but I don’t know whether I know P’. See Benton (2013) and Montminy (2013a) for critical discussion. McKinnon and Simard Smith (2013) suggest that the knowledge norm cannot explain the absurdity of assertions of the form ‘P, but P isn’t warrantedly assertable’. This is puzzling; as Williamson presents the knowledge account, it merely spells out what it takes for an assertion to be warranted (2000: 242–3), or what it takes to have epistemic authority to assert (2000: 257). Now, it’s true that the identification of warrant and possession of epistemic authority with knowledge plays no role in explaining why McKinnon and Simard Smith’s conjunction is absurd. But it’s not clear why it needs to, and the example doesn’t seem to justify their contention that the knowledge norm’s treatment of Moore’s paradox is ‘incomplete’ (2013: 827).

13 . This formulation of the norm demands what is typically called subjective certainty, which Stanley characterizes as having ‘the highest degree of confi-dence in its truth’ (2008: 35). Stanley also proposes that assertion is governed by an epistemic certainty norm, where P is epistemically certain for one just in case ‘one knows that p (or is in a position to know that p) on the basis of evidence that gives one the highest degree of justification for one’s belief that p’, and, in fact, takes this norm to be more fundamental (2008: 52). Despite this, I’ll follow the literature in focusing on subjective certainty in what follows.

14 . Unger notoriously takes this impression to be misleading, suggesting that once we abstract away from the distorting pragmatic effects of pronouncing things with flat intonation, we will realize that a knowledge attribution entails the corresponding certainty attribution (1975: 84–7). See Stanley (2008: 42–5) for trenchant criticism.

15 . Perhaps there’s something wrong with asserting P when one doesn’t know that one knows in cases in which the stakes are high, as Brown suggests (2008: 101–2). However, this would, at best, help explain the absurdity of asserting ‘P, but I’m not certain that P’ in such high-stakes circumstances, but assertions of such conjunctions seem just as absurd when the stakes are low.

16 . Blaauw offers an example that involves repetition rather than stress (‘I am very lazy, I know, I know!’), which one might suggest also serves to add emphasis.

17 . Benton and Blaauw have work in progress clarifying and defending their argument, and responding to McKinnon and Turri’s objection.

18 . Adler (2009) offers what he bills as a further argument in favour of the knowledge norm, but he really offers a criticism of a rational credence norm such as the one defended in Douven (2006), as Whiting points out (2013a:

204 Notes

850fn12). I have also left to one side the argument for the knowledge norm offered in Sosa (2011), since Sosa’s approach to epistemology is so different to the knowledge first approach under consideration here.

19 . I use ‘implicature’ here and throughout exclusively to refer to what Grice called conversational implicatures. He distinguishes these from conventional implicatures generated by conventions associated with particular expres-sions. Consider ‘She’s poor but she’s honest’, which we might suggest impli-cates that poor people typically aren’t honest due to conventions associated with the word ‘but’.

20 . See Davis (1998) for trenchant criticism of Grice’s theory of implicature. 21 . Weiner (2005: 233–4) responds to Williamson’s other objections. Weiner

agrees that of Williamson’s points, the objection I focus on in the text ‘raises the most profound issues’.

22 . I have altered Weiner’s numbering here and throughout. 23 . Following Davis (2003) (and Grice), I take implicating P to be a way of

meaning that P, and like Davis (but unlike Grice) I think that one can mean that P without intending to communicate that P, for example, when one speaks to a prelinguistic child. So, theoretically, there’s space for implicating P without intending to communicate P in the kind of view I favour (and I do think this in fact happens). But typically when one implicates that P, one has an intended audience, and intends to communicate P to that audience. I lack space to defend these views here, though see Davis (2003).

24 . I lack space to discuss the point fully, but I note in passing that jettisoning the idea that we’re dealing with an implicature here has a further advan-tage, namely that it allows us to bypass the worry that Weiner’s implica-tures cannot be cancelled in the manner Grice took to be characteristic (e.g., Williamson 2000: 248; Whiting 2013a: 854). Weiner himself has another escape route available here since he has argued that Grice was wrong about cancellability (2006), but this position is controversial (see Blome-Tillmann 2008b).

25 . See Wilby (2010) for a recent defence of a more psychologically realistic version of Schiffer’s account of mutual knowledge. Bach and Harnish’s ‘mutual contextual beliefs’ (1979: 5–6) are invoked to play similar roles in their theory of communication, but for reasons we won’t go into here they are too undemanding to serve as accounts of mutual recognition . Similar remarks might be targeted at Stalnaker’s ‘common ground’ (1999; 2002), though the issue is complicated since when focusing in on ‘normal’ – information-swap-ping – conversations, Stalnaker tends to identify the common ground with what’s taken to be common knowledge in the conversation (see, for example, 1974: 51 and 1978: 84). Notice what’s common ground in such conversations is what’s taken to be common knowledge, not what is common knowledge; I won’t try to determine whether this is an important difference here.

26 . Lackey revises this norm slightly in the course of her discussion (2008: 137), and suggests that the revised norm may be ‘subsumed by or at least akin to’ Grice’s maxims of Quantity (2008: 135–6). The revision won’t matter for the discussion here, and so I work with Lackey’s original formulation.

27 . I happily concede that an appeal to non -Gricean pragmatic theories, which tend to be more popular outside of philosophy, may well fare better. However, there is no remotely worked out proposal of this sort in the literature on the knowledge norm of assertion as things stand. A further objection to appeals

Notes 205

to Grice in this context is articulated in Benton (forthcoming). Benton argues that Grice’s theory, in fact, accords a central place to a version of the knowl-edge norm. I hope to have a chance to engage with this topic on another occasion.

28 . This norm is often formulated in terms of what one reasonably or rationally believes one knows, and as a result it is often known as the RBK norm (for example, Williamson 2000: 261 and Brown 2008a). In order to avoid confu-sion with the notion of reasonableness in play in Chapter 2, I follow Neta (2009) (who defends the parallel norm for action) and Madison (2010) in speaking here of justification.

29 . A similar strategy would involve adopting a justification norm of assertion but invoking either Bird’s or Reynold’s account of justification discussed in Chapter 3. Such a norm would yield very similar verdicts to the JBK norm. Since I have already discussed such accounts of justification at length, I won’t consider this strategy further here.

30 . As we saw in Chapter 3, Williamson would now qualify this claim. However, the proponent of the JBK norm will hold that one can justifiably believe false-hoods (since otherwise the norm is more demanding here than the knowledge norm), and so Williamson can still use this commitment against them.

31 . Thanks to Matthew Benton for pushing me on this. 32 . See Littlejohn (2012: chapter 7) for criticism of this kind of view. 33 . Those who feel that I have underestimated the conversational considerations

cited in favour of the knowledge norm may wish to consider whether the JBK norm offers plausible rival explanations of those too.

34 . Douven (2006) offered a different, very problematic treatment of epistemic Moorean assertions. However, in his more recent paper (2009) Douven recog-nizes the problems with his earlier proposal and tries to offer a better one, namely the proposal that I discuss in the text.

35 . Kvanvig (2011) discusses the relationship between these two notions of justi-fication in much more detail.

36 . In Chapter 3, I raised a similar point against a similar argument due to Littlejohn (2010 and 2012: 179). I didn’t raise the point against Kvanvig’s argument above since his notion of epistemic justification is stipulated to be related to knowledge in such a way that the point made in the text here gets no grip.

37 . Littlejohn (forthcoming) argues that the move from reasons to warrants is problematic for Whiting’s strategy, since there’s no analogue of the distinc-tion between there being a reason and one’s having a reason when it comes to warrant.

38 . Thanks to Daniel Whiting for discussion. He takes this objection to fail once we understand the commitments of the truth norm properly, though he agrees that more work needs to be done to spell this point out (a task that he intends to take on in future work).

39 . Further proposals concerning lottery assertions and epistemic Moorean asser-tions can be found in Coffman (2011) and Hinchman (2013). I’m inclined to think that these are rather less plausible than the attempts I consider in the text, but I lack space to defend that here.

40 . Compare the film crew case discussed by Williamson (2000: 257). 41 . Worries of this sort can be found in Douven (2006), Hill and Schechter

(2007), Lackey (2007 and 2008), Brown (2008a), Koethe (2009), Kvanvig

206 Notes

(2009), Gerken (2011), and McKinnon (2013). Littlejohn (2012) argues the point for assertions made in Gettier cases, but resists the claim that false-hoods can be appropriately asserted.

42 . See Littlejohn (2012: chapter 7) for an interesting attempt to move us past the impasse, in favour of the thesis that the norm of assertion demands truth.

43 . This feature of Lackey’s example is sometimes missed (Kvanvig 2009: 236) or claimed not to matter (Reynolds 2013: 380 and Turri [2014]).

44 . See also Turri (2014) for further critical discussion of Lackey’s objection. 45 . Benton and Turri (forthcoming) suggest that sometimes one can predict that

P without ‘outright asserting’ that P, and responding with ‘How do you know that?’ might be inappropriate when one does this (forthcoming: 2). However, a reply along these lines seems to invite the worry recently tabled, namely that the corresponding epistemic Moorean conjunctions still sound absurd, and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot be invoked to explain this.

46 . Note that the purported counterexamples to the sufficiency claims discussed in this section all arise even if we suppose that the assertions in question express the asserter’s knowledge, in the sense of Section 5.1.2. I’m not going to discuss a well-known case due to Levin (2008: 374–5) since it’s not a coun-terexample to the sufficiency claim as stated. I don’t mean to suggest that Levin is under any illusion about this; she advertises it as a case in which it is ‘normatively inappropriate’ to assert something that one knows, and something may well be normatively inappropriate without being epistemi-cally unwarranted (as Levin’s own case plausibly shows).

47 . Littlejohn (2012: 159–60) takes a similar line. For discussion of various other responses to Brown’s argument, including ones that appeal to the idea that it gets harder to know or harder to be correctly attributed ‘knowledge’ as the stakes rise, see Brown (2010: 557–61). For further recent criticism of Brown’s argument, see Coffman (2011).

48 . Carter and Gordon (2011) suggest that what’s missing in some of these cases is a certain sort of understanding .

49 . Likewise, it is often suggested that aesthetic knowledge by testimony is diffi-cult or impossible to come by; see Robson (2012) for a recent useful overview of this issue. It is worth noting in this connection that Lackey’s other example in her judgments category, ‘Movie’, involves an aesthetic judgment. See Lackey (2013) for arguments against such ‘pessimistic’ views of aesthetic testi-mony; I assume she would take a similar line concerning matters of taste.

50 . Lackey considers some general strategies for explaining away her examples, such as an appeal to the idea that they all involve misleading implicatures or that they involve sufficiently high-stakes that the asserters, in fact, lack knowl-edge of what they assert (2011: 262–71). For the reasons given in the text, I agree with Lackey that no such strategy is likely to work for all the cases.

6 Action

1 . Notice that neither of these theses are the same as the Unger-Hyman thesis discussed in Chapter 4, since these norms concern the conditions under which it is permissible for one to treat a proposition as a reason, not the conditions under which P is one’s reason (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008:

Notes 207

579fn7; Brown 2008b: 187n4; Locke forthcoming: 10fn21). See Neta (2009: 684–5) for discussion of further differences.

2 . As I discuss below, Stanley (2005) appeals to cases put forward by epistemic contextualists in order to support the knowledge norm of action, and he draws a parallel to the way that Moore’s paradox reveals an intimate connec-tion between knowledge and assertion (2005: vii, 11). I don’t deny that there may be an interesting parallel here, but it’s clear that this isn’t any kind of direct correlate of the paradox for assertion.

3 . The other widely discussed example in this literature is Cohen’s bank case, which differs from the bank cases in involving different speakers making attributions about the same subject (Cohen 1999: 58).

4 . Gerken (2011: 535fn9) suggests that Neta isn’t primarily concerned with the conditions under which one can treat a proposition as a reason for action, in the sense that animates the other participants to this debate. I’ll ignore this potential complication here. See Littlejohn (2009b) and Locke (forthcoming: 13–6) for criticism of Neta’s norm.

5 . Gerken briefly touches on the empirical issues in a footnote (2011: 539fn15). He also discusses two fallback positions that evade his objection; I lack space to discuss these here, though I agree with Gerken that they are both problematic.

6 . The qualification is that the choice between available courses of action be P dependent , where a choice between options X 1 … X n is P dependent if and only if the most preferable of X 1 … X n conditional on the proposition that P is different to the most preferable option conditional on not-P (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008: 578).

7 . Here is one place where we again need to be careful here not to overstate the similarity to the assertion debate, since Fantl and McGrath (2009: 69–76) have offered an interesting argument for a version of the sufficiency thesis, and their argument doesn’t have any obvious correlate for assertion. I lack sufficient space to discuss this argument here.

8 . Brown (2008b: 176–8) also uses examples she raises in the assertion debate against the sufficiency thesis for action (though she offers some other cases too). For additional attempted counterexamples to sufficiency, see Hill and Schechter (2007: 115), Neta (2009: 688), and Reed (2010: 228–9). See Fantl and McGrath (2009: 60–2) for discussion of Brown and Reed’s examples.

9 . Recall that we considered a similar thesis about the role of beliefs in our discussion of Reynolds in Chapter 3. The claim under consideration here is much more plausible.

10 . Consider again Lackey’s cases of selfless assertion. Notice that I’m agreeing with Lackey that one can gain knowledge from a selfless assertion; I already explained in the previous chapter that I don’t accept her further claim that such assertions are proper. Thanks to Matthew Benton for prompting this clarification.

11 . See McKenna (2013) for criticism. 12 . Actually, Gerken distinguishes between two interpretations of commonality,

and concedes there’s a sense in which the norms of assertion and action may display a kind of ‘structural’ commonality, even if the commonality thesis I consider in the text fails.

13 . See the taxonomy of accounts of assertion in MacFarlane (2011).

208 Notes

7 Luminosity

1 . Greco (forthcoming) offers a very recent and interesting argument in defence of the KK principle; I hope to discuss Greco’s argument in future work.

2 . Thanks to Elia Zardini here for discussion of Williamson’s argument. I’m also heavily indebted to his discussion of this argument in his 2013b.

3 . Zardini (2013b: 382) puts the argument in terms of admissible sharpenings. These are sharpenings that respect the clear cases of application of the expres-sions in question, as well as certain logical and semantic principles governing those expressions (the penumbral connections, in the terminology of Fine 1975). This complicates the argument somewhat, and Williamson is explicit (2000: 104) that he thinks a version of his argument that doesn’t introduce these complexities suffices for his purposes, so I’ve kept things as simple as possible in the text. The appeal to admissible sharpenings is important to Zardini since he goes on to suggest that the defender of luminosity treat luminosity as a penum-bral connection that ‘coordinates the extensions of “knows” and “feels cold”’, and he argues that sharpenings that respect this connection render (REL) wildly implausible (2013b: 384–6). This is an interesting suggestion, but Zardini’s argu-ment is complex and I won’t try to do it justice here; in any case, as he himself stresses (2013b: 386), one still needs to engage with Williamson’s argument for (REL). See Vogel (2010) for further critical discussion of Williamson’s claim that the anti-luminosity argument isn’t a Sorites argument.

4 . See Steup (2009: 230–1) and Williamson (2009: 373) for discussion of the possibility of the example. Williamson’s point is reminiscent of the version of the problem of the speckled hen that Sosa has presented to certain versions of foundationalist internalism (2003).

5 . In addition to Brueckner and Fiocco, see Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004), Comesaña (2005), and Bogardus (2014). See Cohen (2010: 729–30) for a related objection. With the exception of Cohen, these critics fail to note that the version of safety Williamson appeals to isn’t the standard one, though it’s plausible their counterexamples raise a challenge for Williamson’s non-standard version of the principle too.

6 . Vogel (2010) also pursues this kind of strategy. However, there’s little plau-sibility to the version of safety that his argument relies on; see Srinivasan (forthcoming: 7–8), and see Manley (2007) and McGlynn (2012b) for related discussion.

7 . Weatherson actually has ‘worlds’ instead of ‘cases’, but this change won’t affect the discussion to follow.

8 . Berker does try to support the claim that such constitutive connections obtain a little (2008: section 5).

9 . The same point holds for the kind of constitutive accounts mentioned in passing by Berker (2008: 8–9fn12).

10 . The literature’s confusion over the precise form of the safety principle Williamson is appealing to can be largely traced back to Williamson’s own presentation; as Berker notes (2008: 6, 10), Williamson often sounds as if he has a more standard formulation of a safety principle rather than C-Safety in mind, even in his presentation of the anti-luminosity argument.

Notes 209

11 . Compare also Mendola (2007: 157–8). Ramachandran (2009: 667–70) refuses to endorse this objection, arguing instead that C-Safety hasn’t been well motivated.

12 . Zardini derives this claim from the least number principle, according to which every non-empty set of positive numbers has a least number.

13 . Recall that a case is a triple <w, s, t>, and Williamson’s series of cases involves a fixed world and subject.

14 . The similarities should not be overstated. See Zardini (2013b: 408–9fn39) for a detailed discussion of the differences. Zardini goes on to offer a formal model of the possibility of ‘ reliable knowledge at the limit ’ (2013b: 395, italics in original) – at the boundary between the cases in which one believes that one feels cold and the cases in which one doesn’t. See section 8 of Zardini (2013b).

15 . I should note that Zardini and Srinivasan’s papers were written about the same time, and neither refers to the other; this attempt to bring them into contact is mine.

16 . For a response (which I’m pretty sympathetic to) to Conee’s argument, see Steup (2009: 233–4).

17 . For further – and considerably more sophisticated – discussion of the cozi-ness proposal, see Zardini (2013a).

18 . Though I lack the space to argue the point, I suspect that the proposal in Reed (2006) has similar limitations.

19 . An interesting question is how being in a position to justifiably believe relates to the more familiar notion of propositional justification. A natural thought is that these are one and the same, though the matter probably merits further consideration.

20 . I have renamed and slightly reworded this principle to bring it more in line with the rest of the chapter. Greenough calls this principle (JM), for Justification Margin for error principle .

21 . Greenough’s reasoning here is a little involved, and this endnote can be skipped without much loss by those willing to take his claim that the simi-larity principle and (LUM) yield a tolerance principle on trust. Presumably, Greenough is assuming here that one’s not feeling cold is also a lustrous condition (an assumption I’ll challenge in endnote 24). Suppose one feels cold in A i . Then (LUS) tells us that one is in a position to justifiably believe that one feels cold in A i . Since by Williamson’s description of the series A i+1 is similar to A i , it follows by the similarity principle that one is not in a position to justifiably believe that one feels cold in A i+1 . Now, if one didn’t feel cold in A i+1 , one would be in a position to justifiably believe that one didn’t (since we’re assuming that not feeling cold is also a lustrous condition). As we have just concluded that one isn’t in a position to justifiably believe this, it follows that one feels cold in A i+1 . So if one feels cold in a case A i , one also feels cold in its successor in the series A i+1 , just as (TOL) states.

22 . Greenough does derive (REL-J) from two other principles, but one of them is a ‘weaker safety’ principle for justification, which is very similar to (REL-J) and stands in just as much need of supporting argument as (REL-J) itself.

23 . Thanks to Aaron Cotnoir for this observation. 24 . Smithies (2012b: 728–32) offers a very involved argument that also aims

to show that justified belief obeys a (REL)-like principle. However, in

210 Notes

constructing his argument, Smithies quickly switches to considering the proposal that some conditions are ‘ strongly lustrous ’ (2012b: 728), which adds that whenever the condition in question does not obtain, one is in a position to justifiably believe that it does not obtain. This isn’t obvi-ously what Berker had in mind (see 2008: 20–1), and, as Smithies argues, this seems to have the effect of making justified belief that the condition in question obtains factive, since if it is not factive there will be cases in which one justifiably believes that the condition obtains even though it does not, and these will also be cases in which one is justified in believing that the condition does not obtain (and hence justified in believing contra-dictories). Why can’t we simply resist the shift from lustrousness to strong lustrousness? Smithies offers only one consideration, namely that on some views (for example, that of John McDowell) certain factive mental states may be lustrous, too, and so an appeal to lustrousness won’t ground a contrast between the factive and the non-factive. This seems unlikely to move anyone who finds (LUS) considerably more plausible than McDowell’s views on perceptual knowledge (though see Pritchard 2012 for a recent defence of the latter). In any case, as I argue in the text below, it’s not clear how Smithies’s alternative proposal avoids his own objection here, if it’s a genuine problem.

8 Is Knowledge a Mental State?

1 . French (2012) offers an interesting semantic response to Turri, while Moon (2013) convincingly undermines Bernecker’s arguments. Williamson (2009: 364) casts doubt on Sosa’s claim to have produced a genuine FMSO. I’m inclined to think a similar objection can be pushed against Reed, though Reed has an argument to the contrary. There’s a further interesting attempt to offer a counterexample to Williamson’s thesis tucked away in Hyman (2006: 912fn8).

2 . Here’s one issue that’s worth mentioning: one might wonder whether Williamson has just provided an analysis of knowledge, in some sense. See Cassam (2009: 23–5) and Williamson (2009: 286–90) for discussion of this issue.

3 . Bird (2007) also endorses this argument. See Leite (2005: 167–9) for further criticism.

4 . See Leite (2005: 168–9) and Fricker (2009: 44–5) for versions of this point. Williamson (2009: 299–301) responds to Fricker’s version.

5 . Whitcomb (2008b) makes related points. 6 . Moreover, insofar as proponents of knowledge first philosophy are willing to

endorse the usual claims about which conditions are necessary for knowing (as Williamson certainly is; see Fricker 2009: 46 for a list), they’ll face the familiar apparent counterexamples to those.

7 . I’ve changed Williamson’s numbering and notation throughout. Recall from the previous chapter that Williamson’s cases are what are standardly called centred worlds in the literature, following David Lewis.

8 . However, I noted there that Bird (2007: 87–88) offers a way of potentially defusing the first of Williamson’s counterexamples.

Notes 211

9 . One may not think that (iv) simply restates (iii). In that case, the transition from (iii) to (iv) will already be problematic. However, I have a hard time seeing what (iv) means if it doesn’t simply restate (iii).

10 . I discovered after writing this chapter that I have been preempted on this point by Leite (2005: 173–4). I think his alternative formulation of Williamson’s opponent’s claim is intended to be more or less the same as my (5), but the latter strikes me as more perspicuous.

11 . Since every case of rational belief is a case of belief, (1) implies that if one rationally believes a proposition P in a case, then there’s a case in which one knows P while being in the same total mental state. And that’s just what (3) says.

12 . Suppose that the proposition Q and a particular pair of cases provide witnesses to (6), so that one merely rationally believes Q in one case, knows Q in another, and is in the same total mental state in each. Then Q and the same pair of cases are witnesses to (5), since if one rationally believes Q in a case, then one believes Q in that case. So (6) entails (5). Similarly, (7) entails (6), given that a necessary condition on justifiably believing a proposition is that one rationally believes that proposition.

13 . See Brueckner (2002: 198). Compare Fricker (2009: 51fn46), though she puts the point a little differently. For examples of the conflation, see Bird (2007: 82, 84, 98).

14 . Compare Magnus and Cohen (2003: 43–4). Brueckner (2002) makes a similar point, though he frames it as a challenge to Williamson’s argument that knowing is prime, complaining that Williamson mischaracterizes what distinguishes those who deny that a condition is prime from those who accept it. Jackson (2009: 121) offers much the same reply as Brueckner. I take this difference to be terminological. For further discussion of Williamson’s primeness argument, see Leite (2005).

15 . One consideration I won’t discuss in any detail is the evidence that strongly suggests children start using ‘knows’ and its cognates much earlier and much more frequently than they do with ‘belief’ and ‘think’ and other non-fac-tives (Nagel 2013: 292–5). It’s hard to dispute the direction that this evidence points in, but it’s also hard to see its relevance to the debate.

16 . For an accessible and recent overview of the relevant tasks and data, see Apperly (2011: chapters 2 and 3).

17 . See Roessler (2013: 325–7) for related discussion. 18 . I intend to develop these overly condensed remarks much more fully in

McGlynn (in progress). 19 . For further criticism of Nagel’s argument, see Butterfill (2013), Roessler

(2013), and Rysiew (2013). 20 . See Shepherd (2013) for a convincing reply to some of Carruthers’s examples,

though he has many, many more. 21 . For Williamson’s other cases, see 2000: 86, 87, and 101–2. 22 . See Williamson (2000: 60–1 and 65) for rather inexplicit statements of the

objection. What follows draws on Yablo (2003) and Nagel (2013: 289). 23 . For interesting proposals, see Yablo (2003) and Nagel (2013). 24 . Gibbons (2001: 580, 599) suggests that the correctness of this verdict gives us

positive reason to accept that knowledge is a purely mental state. However, his argument isn’t very well developed, and virtually everyone else in the

212 Notes

literature disagrees (see Leite 2005: 175fn10; Fricker 2009; Sosa 2009: 210–1; Butterfill 2013: 310; and Rysiew 2013: 336–7). I am with the majority here (and I see no reason to think that Williamson is committed to dissenting).

25 . Moreover, the so-called ‘paradox of analysis’ mentioned in Chapter 1, which suggests that a conceptual analysis can only be true if it is trivial, rests on a number of assumptions about meaning and understanding that are now widely taken to have been discredited. For a recent example, see Sainsbury and Tye (2012: 74–5). Williamson (2000: 96) notes that some of these assump-tions are casualties of his anti-luminosity argument.

213

Bibliography

Adler, Jonathan. (2002) Belief’s Own Ethics . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Adler, Jonathan. (2009) ‘Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm.’ Analysis

69: 407–11. Adler, Jonathan and Hicks, Michael. (2013) ‘Non-Evidential Reasons to Believe.’

In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Apperly, Ian. (2011) Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of ‘Theory of Mind’ . Hove and

New York: Psychology Press. Arnold, Alexander. (2013) ‘Some Evidence is False.’ Australasian Journal of

Philosophy 91: 165–72. Austin, J. L. (1975) How to Do Things With Words (Second Edition). Harvard:

Harvard University Press. Austin, J. L. (1979) ‘Performative Utterances.’ In J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock

(eds), Philosophical Papers (Third Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bach, Kent. (2008) ‘Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology.’ Philosophical Issues 18:

69–88. Bach, Kent and Harnish, Robert. (1979) Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts .

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ball, Brian. (2013) ‘Knowledge is Normal Belief.’ Analysis 73: 69–76. Benton, Matthew. (2011) ‘Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion.’

Analysis 71: 684–7. Benton, Matthew. (2012) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Predictions.’ Analysis 72:

102–5. Benton, Matthew. (2013) ‘Dubious Objections from Iterated Conjunctions.’

Philosophical Studies 162: 355–8. Benton, Matthew. (Forthcoming) ‘Gricean Quality.’ Noûs . Benton, Matthew and Turri, John. (Forthcoming) ‘Iffy Predictions and Proper

Expectations.’ Synthese . Berker, Selim. (2008) ‘Luminosity Regained.’ Philosophical Imprint 8: 1–22. Bernecker, Sven. (2009) Memory: A Philosophical Study . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Bird, Alexander. (2004) ‘Is Evidence Non-Inferential?’ Philosophical Quarterly 54:

253–65. Bird, Alexander. (2007) ‘Justified Judging.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 74: 81–110. Blaauw, Martijn. (2012) ‘Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion.’

Analysis 72: 105–8. Blaauw, Martijn and de Ridder, Jeroen. (2012) ‘Unsafe Assertions.’ Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 90: 797–801. Blome-Tillmann, Michael. (2008a) ‘The Indexicality of “Knowledge”.’ Philosophical

Studies 138: 29–53. Blome-Tillmann, Michael. (2008b) ‘Conversational Implicature and the

Cancellability Test.’ Analysis 68: 156–60.

214 Bibliography

Bogardus, Tomas. (2014) ‘Knowledge Under Threat.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 289–313.

Boghossian, Paul. (1989) ‘The Rule-Following Considerations.’ Mind 98: 507–49. Brown, Jessica. (2008a) ‘The Knowledge Norm for Assertion.’ Philosophical Issues

18: 89–103. Brown, Jessica. (2008b) ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm

for Practical Reasoning.’ Noûs 42: 167–89. Brown, Jessica. (2010) ‘Knowledge and Assertion.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 81: 549–66. Brown, Jessica. (2012a) ‘Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent

Epistemic Standards?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 123–57. Brown, Jessica. (2012b) ‘Words, Concepts, and Epistemology.’ In Jessica Brown

and Mikkel Gerken (eds), Knowledge Attributions . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, Jessica. (2013) ‘Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics.’ Analysis 73: 626–35.

Brueckner, Anthony. (2002) ‘Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing.’ Analysis 62: 197–202.

Brueckner, Anthony. (2005) ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 436–43.

Brueckner, Anthony. (2009) ‘E = K and Perceptual Knowledge.’ In Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brueckner, Anthony and Fiocco, M. Oreste. (2002) ‘Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument.’ Philosophical Studies 110: 285–93.

Burge, Tyler. (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.

Butterfill, Stephen. (2013) ‘What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel, “Knowledge As a Mental State”.’ In Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4 . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cappelen, Herman. (2011) ‘Against Assertion.’ In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carruthers, Peter. (2008) ‘Cartesian Epistemology: Is the Theory of the Self-Transparent Mind Innate?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 15: 28–53.

Carruthers, Peter. (2010) ‘Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80: 76–111.

Carruthers, Peter. (2011) The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carter, J. Adam and Gordon, Emma. (2011) ‘Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.’ Philosophia 39: 615–35.

Cassam, Quassim. (2009) ‘Can the Concept of Knowledge Be Analysed?’ In Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Herbert H. (1979) ‘Responding to Indirect Speech Acts.’ Cognitive Psychology 11: 430–77.

Clark, Michael. (1963) ‘Knowledge and Grounds: A comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper.’ Analysis 24: 46–8.

Bibliography 215

Coffman, E. J. (2007) ‘Thinking about Luck.’ Synthese 158: 385–98. Coffman, E. J. (2010) ‘Is Justified Belief Knowledge? Critical Notice of Jonathan

Sutton, Without Justification .’ Philosophical Books 51: 1–21. Coffman, E. J. (2011) ‘Two Claims About Epistemic Propriety.’ Synthese 181:

471–88. Cogburn, Jon and Roland, Jeffrey. (2013) ‘Safety and the True-True Problem.’

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 246–67. Cohen, Stewart. (1999) ‘Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.’

Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57–89. Cohen, Stewart. (2010) ‘Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites.’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 81: 718–30. Comesaña, Juan. (2005) ‘Unsafe Knowledge.’ Synthese 146: 395–404. Comesaña, Juan. (2009) ‘What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?’ Pacific

Philosophical Quarterly 90: 1–20. Comesaña, Juan and Kantin, Holly. (2010) ‘Is Evidence Knowledge?’ Philosophy

and Phenomenological Research 80: 447–54. Conee, Earl. (2005) ‘The Comforts of Home.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 70: 444–51. Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard. (2001) ‘Internalism Defended.’ Reprinted in

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard. (2008) ‘Evidence.’ In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cook, Roy. T. (2013) Paradoxes . Cambridge: Polity Press. Crane, Tim. (2011) ‘The Singularity of Singular Thought.’ Proceedings of the

Aristotelian Society Supplementry Volume 75: 21–43. Dancy, Jonathan. (2000) Practical Reality . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dancy, Jonathan. (2004) Ethics Without Principles . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Dancy, Jonathan. (2011) ‘Acting in Ignorance.’ Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6:

345–57. David, Marion. (2002) ‘Content Essentialism.’ Acta Analytica 17: 103–14. Davis, Wayne. (1998) Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure

of Gricean Theory . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, Wayne. (2003) Meaning, Expression, and Thought . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. DeRose, Keith. (1992) ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.’ Philosophy

and Phenomenological Research 52: 913–29. DeRose, Keith. (1999) ‘Introduction.’ In K. DeRose and T. A. Warfield (eds),

Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader . Oxford: Oxford University Press. DeRose, Keith. (2002a) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.’ Philosophical Review

111: 167–203. DeRose, Keith. (2002b) ‘Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits .’ British

Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53: 573–7. DeRose, Keith. (2009) The Case for Contextualism . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Dodd, Dylan. (2007) ‘Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic.’ Philosophical Quarterly

57: 635–49.

216 Bibliography

Dodd, Dylan. (2011) ‘Against Fallibilism.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 665–85.

Dodd, Dylan. (2012) ‘Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries.’ Erkenntnis 77: 95–120. Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. (2014a) ‘What is Knowledge-First

Epistemology?’ In Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. (2014b) ‘Experience First.’ In Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Douven, Igor. (2006) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Rationality.’ Philosophical Review 115: 449–85.

Douven, Igor. (2009) ‘Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.’ Philosophical Studies 144: 361–75.

Edwards, Douglas. (2013) ‘Truth As a Substantive Property.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91: 279–94.

Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. (2009) Knowledge in an Uncertain World . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. (2011) ‘Pragmatic Encroachment.’ In Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology . New York: Routledge.

Feldman, Richard. 1988. Epistemic Obligations. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 235–56.

Fine, Kit. (1975.) ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic.’ Synthese 30: 265–300. French, Craig. (2012) ‘Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?’

Theoria 78: 115–27. Fricker, Elizabeth. (2009) ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against.’ In

Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gazzaniga, Michael. (1995) ‘Consciousness and the Cerebral Hemispheres.’ In Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences . MA: MIT Press.

Gerken, Mikkel. (2011) ‘Warrant and Action.’ Synthese 178: 529–47. Gerken, Mikkel. (2014) ‘Same, Same But Different: the Epistemic Norms of

Assertion, Action, and Practical Reasoning.’ Philosophical Studies 168: 725–44. Gertler, Brie. (2011) Self-Knowledge . Oxon: Routledge. Gettier, Edmund. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23: 121–3. Gibbons, John. (2001) ‘Knowledge in Action.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 57: 579–600. Goldman, Alvin. (1967) ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing.’ Journal of Philosophy 64:

355–72. Goldman, Alvin. (1976) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.’ Journal of

Philosophy 73: 771–91. Goldman, Alvin. (2009) ‘Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence.’ In Patrick

Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greco, Daniel. (Forthcoming) ‘Could KK be OK?’ Journal of Philosophy . Greco, John. (2007) ‘Worries About Pritchard’s Safety.’ Synthese 158: 299–302. Green, Mitch and Williams, John. (2007) ‘Introduction.’ In Mitch Green and

John Williams (eds), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bibliography 217

Greenough, Patrick. (2003) ‘Vagueness: A Minimal Theory.’ Mind 112: 235–81. Greenough, Patrick. (2012) ‘Discrimination and Self-Knowledge.’ In Declan

Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (eds), Introspection and Consciousness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greenough, Patrick and Pritchard, Duncan, (eds), (2009) Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grice, H. P. (1975) ‘Logic and Conversation.’ Reprinted in H. P. Grice. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haddock, Adrian. (2010) ‘Knowledge and Action.’ In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harman, Gilbert. (1973) Thought . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hawthorne, John. (2004) Knowledge and Lotteries . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Hawthorne, John. (2005) ‘Knowledge and Evidence.’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 70: 452–58. Hawthorne, John and Stanley, Jason. (2008) ‘Knowledge and Action.’ Journal of

Philosophy 105: 571–90. Hazlett, Allan. (2010) ‘The Myth of Factive Verbs.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 80: 497–522. Heathcote, Adrian. (2004) ‘KT and the Diamond of Knowledge.’ Philosophical

Books 45: 286–95. Hill, Christopher and Schechter, Joshua. (2007) ‘Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and

the Nature of Belief.’ Philosophical Issues 17: 102–22. Hinchman, Edward S. (2013) ‘Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge.’ Noûs 47:

613–46. Hindriks, Frank. (2007) ‘The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion.’

Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 393–406. Hogrefe, G. Juergen, Wimmer, Heinz, and Perner, Josef. (1986) ‘Ignorance versus

False Belief: A Developmental Lag in Attribution of Epistemic States.’ Child Development 57: 567–82.

Horvath, Joachim. (2008) ‘Testimony, Transmission, and Safety.’ Abstracta 4: 27–43.

Hossack, Keith. (2007) The Metaphysics of Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huemer, Michael. (2007) ‘Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief.’ In Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huemer, Michael. (2011) ‘The Puzzle of Metacoherence.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82: 1–21.

Hughes, Nick. (2014) ‘Consistency and Evidence.’ Philosophical Studies 169: 333–8.

Hughes, Nick. (Forthcoming) ‘Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ for the Reason that P?’ Episteme .

Hyman, John. (1999) ‘How Knowledge Works.’ Philosophical Quarterly 49: 433–51.

Hyman, John. (2006) ‘Knowledge and Evidence.’ Mind 115: 891–916. Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. (Forthcoming) ‘Justification is Potential Knowledge.’

Canadian Journal of Philosophy .

218 Bibliography

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Jenkins, C. S. I. (In progress) ‘On Putting Knowledge “First”’. For inclusion in a volume on knowledge-first philosophy edited by Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis.

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Steup, Mattias. (2012) ‘The Analysis of Knowledge.’ In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/knowledge-analysis/

Jackson, Alexander. (2012) ‘Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 353–69.

Jackson, Frank. (2009) ‘Primeness, Internalism, Explanation.’ In Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, C. S. I. (2006) ‘Knowledge and Explanation.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36: 137–63.

Joyce, James. (2004) ‘Williamson On Knowledge and Evidence.’ Philosophical Books 45: 296–305.

Kallestrup, Jesper. (2012) Semantic Externalism . Oxon: Routledge. Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter (eds) (1998) Vagueness: A Reader . Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press. Kelp, Christoph. (2009) ‘Knowledge and Safety.’ Journal of Philosophical Research

34: 21–31. Kelp, Christoph. (2011) ‘Not Without Justification.’ dialectica 65: 581–95. Klein, Peter. (2008) ‘Useful False Beliefs.’ In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology:

New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koethe, John. (2009) ‘Knowledge and the Norms of Assertion.’ Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 87: 625–38. Kornblith, Hilary. (2009) ‘Knowledge Needs No Justification.’ In Quentin Smith

(ed.), Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2009) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.’ In Patrick

Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2011) ‘Norms of Assertion.’ In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lackey, Jennifer. (1999) ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.’ Philosophical Quarterly 49: 471–90.

Lackey, Jennifer. (2007) ‘Norms of Assertion.’ Noûs 41: 594–626. Lackey, Jennifer. (2008) Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge .

Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lackey, Jennifer. (2010) ‘Acting on Knowledge.’ Philosophical Perspectives 24:

361–82. Lackey, Jennifer. (2011) ‘Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge.’ In

Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lackey, Jennifer. (2013) ‘Deficient Testimonial Knowledge’. In Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (eds), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work . Oxon: Routledge.

Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. (2008) ‘Single Premise Deduction and Risk.’ Philosophical Studies 141: 157–73.

Lehrer, Keith. (1965) ‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.’ Analysis 25: 168–75.

Bibliography 219

Leite, Adam. (2005) ‘On Williamson’s Arguments That Knowledge is a Mental State.’ Ratio 18: 165–75.

Leite, Adam. (2013) ‘But That’s Not Evidence; It’s Not Even True!’ Philosophical Quarterly 63: 81–104.

Leitgeb, Hans. (2002) ‘Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits .’ Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 195–205.

Levin, Janet. (2008) ‘Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 359–84.

Levy, Neil. (2009) ‘What, and Where, Luck Is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 489–97.

Lewis, David. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lewis, David. (1979) ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se .’ Philosophical Review 88: 513–43.

Lewis, David. (1996) ‘Elusive Knowledge.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549–67.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2008) ‘From E = K to Scepticism?’ Philosophical Quarterly 58: 679–84.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2009a) ‘Must We Act Only On What We Know?’ Journal of Philosophy 106: 463–73.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2009b) ‘On Treating Something As a Reason For Action.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1–4.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2010) ‘Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 79–100.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2011a) ‘Evidence and Armchair Access.’ Synthese 179: 479–500.

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2011b) ‘Evidence and Knowledge.’ Erkenntnis 74: 241–62. Littlejohn, Clayton. (2012) Justification and the Truth-Connection . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. Littlejohn, Clayton. (2013a) ‘No Evidence is False.’ Acta Analytica 28: 145–59. Littlejohn, Clayton. (2013b) ‘The Russellian Retreat.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 113: 293–320. Littlejohn, Clayton. (Forthcoming) ‘Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion

and Truth.’ Erkenntnis . Locke, Dustin. (Forthcoming) ‘Practical Certainty.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research . Luzzi, Federico. (Forthcoming) ‘What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction

Require of its Premises?’ Episteme . Lynch, Michael. (2009) Truth As One and Many . Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacFarlane, John. (2011) ‘What is Assertion?’ In Jessica Brown and Herman

Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Madison, Brent. (2010) ‘Is Justification Knowledge?’ Journal of Philosophical Research 35: 173–91.

Magnus, P. D. and Cohen, Jonathan. (2003) ‘Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation.’ Philosophical Studies 116: 37–52.

Maher, Patrick. (1996) ‘Subjective and Objective Confirmation.’ Philosophy of Science 63: 149–74.

220 Bibliography

Maitra, Ishani. (2011) ‘Assertion, Norms, and Games.’ In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malmgren, Anna-Sara. (2011) ‘Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.’ Mind 120: 265–327.

Manley, David. (2007) ‘Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy 104: 403–23.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. (1986) Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGlynn, Aidan. (2012a) ‘The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals.’ Analysis 72: 276–85.

McGlynn, Aidan. (2012b) ‘Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization.’ Philosophical Studies 160: 391–405.

McGlynn, Aidan. (2012c) ‘Justification As “Would-Be” Knowledge.’ Episteme 9: 359–74.

McGlynn, Aidan. (2013) ‘Believing Things Unknown.’ Noûs 47: 385–407. McGlynn, Aidan. (2014) ‘On Epistemic Alchemy.’ In Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

(eds), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification . Oxford: Oxford University Press. McGlynn, Aidan. (In progress) ‘Mindreading and the Recognition of Knowledge.’

For inclusion in a volume on knowledge-first philosophy edited by Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis.

McKenna, Robin. (2013) ‘Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed By the Same Norm.’ Logos & Episteme 4: 457–64.

McKinnon, Rachel. (2012a) ‘How Do You Know That “How Do You Know?” Challenges a Speaker’s Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 65–83.

McKinnon, Rachel. (2012b) ‘What I Learned in the Lunch Room About Assertion and Practical Reasoning.’ Logos & Episteme 3: 565–9.

McKinnon, Rachel. (2013) ‘The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 50: 121–35.

McKinnon, Rachel and Simard Smith, Paul. (2013) ‘Sure the Emperor Has No Clothes, But You Shouldn’t Say That.’ Philosophia 41: 825–9.

McKinnon, Rachel and Turri, John. (2013) ‘Irksome Assertions.’ Philosophical Studies 166: 123–8.

McKinsey, Michael. (1991) ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.’ Analysis 51: 9–16.

Mendola, Joseph. (2007) ‘Knowledge and Evidence.’ Journal of Philosophy 104: 157–60.

Millar, Alan. (2010) ‘Knowledge and Recognition.’ In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (eds), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Milne, Peter. (2012) ‘Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.’ dialectica 66: 331–49.

Molyneux, Bernard. (2007) ‘Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality.’ Philosophical Studies 135: 255–77.

Montgomery, Brian. (Forthcoming) ‘In Defense of Assertion.’ Philosophical Studies .

Montminy, Martin. (2013a) ‘Explaining Dubious Assertions.’ Philosophical Studies 165: 825–30.

Bibliography 221

Montminy, Martin. (2013b) ‘Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 57–68.

Moon, Andrew. (2013) ‘Remembering Entails Knowing.’ Synthese : 2717–29. Myers-Schulz, Blake and Schwitzgebel, Eric. (2013) ‘Knowing That P Without

Believing That P.’ Noûs 47: 371–84. Nagel, Jennifer. (2013) ‘Knowledge as a Mental State.’ In Tamar Gendler and

John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4 . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nelkin, Dana K. (2000) ‘The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.’ Philosophical Review 109: 373–409.

Neta, Ram. (2008) ‘What Evidence Do You Have?’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 89–119.

Neta, Ram. (2009) ‘Treating Something as a Reason for Action.’ Noûs 43: 684–99. Neta, Ram and Rohrbaugh, Guy. (2004) ‘Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.’

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 396–406. Onishi, K. H. and Baillargeon, R. (2005) ‘Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand

False Beliefs?’ Science 308: 255–8. Pelling, Charles. (2013a) ‘Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.’

Erkenntnis 78: 977–8. Pelling, Charles. (2013b) ‘Assertion and Safety.’ Synthese 190: 3777–96. Pitt, David. (2004) ‘The Phenomenology of Cognition or What Is It Like to Think

That P? ’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 1–36. Plantinga, Alvin. (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Pritchard, Duncan. (2005) Epistemic Luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, Duncan. (2007) ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology.’ Synthese 158: 277–97. Pritchard, Duncan. (2008) ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology.’ In

John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pritchard, Duncan. (2009) ‘Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?’ Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 33–45.

Pritchard, Duncan. (2012) Epistemological Disjunctivism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Putnam, Hilary. (1975) ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”.’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7: 131–93.

Radford, Colin. (1966) ‘Knowledge: By Examples.’ Analysis 27: 1–11. Ramachandran, Murali. (2009) ‘Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies.’

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 659–73. Reed, Baron. (2005) ‘Accidentally Factive Mental States.’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 71: 134–42. Reed, Baron. (2006) ‘Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless.’ Synthese 148: 303–8. Reed, Baron. (2010) ‘A Defense of Stable Invariantism.’ Noûs 44: 224–44. Reynolds, Steven. (2002) ‘Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals.’

Philosophical Studies 110: 139–61. Reynolds, Steven. (2013) ‘Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.’

Philosophical Studies 163: 367–83. Rizzieri, Aaron. (2011) ‘Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies

153: 235–42.

222 Bibliography

Robson, Jon. (2012) ‘Aesthetic Testimony.’ Philosophy Compass 7: 1–10. Roland, Jeffrey and Cogburn, Jon. (2011) ‘Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary

Truths.’ Philosophia 39: 547–61. Roessler, Johannes. (2013) ‘Knowledge, Causal Explanation, and Teleology.’ In

Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4 . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Russell, Bertrand. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy . London: Williams and Norgate.

Russell, Bertrand. (1948) Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits . London: Allen & Unwin.

Rysiew, Patrick. (2013) ‘Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?’ In Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4 . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sainsbury, R. M. (1997) ‘Easy Possibilities.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 907–919.

Sainsbury, R. M. and Tye, Michael. (2012) Seven Puzzle of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schiffer, Stephen. (1972) Meaning . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schiffer, Stephen. (1987) Remnants of Meaning . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Searle, John. (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. Searle, John. (1975) ‘Indirect Speech Acts.’ Reprinted in John Searle, 1979,

Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shepherd, Joshua. (2013) ‘The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.’ Philosophical Explorations 16: 18–30.

Shope, Robert. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Silins, Nicholas. (2005) ‘Deception and Evidence.’ Philosophical Perspectives 19: 375–404.

Slote, Michael. (1979) ‘Assertion and Belief.’ In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Papers on Language and Logic . Keele: Keele University Press.

Smith, Martin. (2009) ‘Transmission Failure Explained.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 164–89.

Smith, Martin. (2010) ‘What Else Justification Could Be.’ Noûs 44: 10–31. Smithies, Declan. (2012a) ‘Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.’ Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 90: 723–41. Smithies, Declan. (2012b) ‘The Normative Role of Knowledge.’ Noûs 46: 265–88. Snapper, Jeff. (2012) ‘The Liar Paradox in New Clothes.’ Analysis 72: 319–22. Sosa, David. (2009) ‘Dubious Assertions.’ Philosophical Studies 146: 269–72. Sosa, Ernest. (1999) ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.’ Philosophical Perspectives

13: 141–53. Sosa, Ernest. (2003) ‘Beyond Internal Foundations to External Virtues.’ In

Lawrence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa (eds), Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues . Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Sosa, Ernest. (2011) Knowing Full Well . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sperber, Dan and Wilson, Deidre. (1986) Relevance: Communication and Cognition

(Second Edition). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bibliography 223

Srinivasan, Amia. (Forthcoming) ‘Are We Luminous?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research .

Stalnaker, Robert. (1974) ‘Pragmatic Presupposition.’ Reprinted in Robert Stalnaker, 1999, Context and Content . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, Robert. (1978) ‘Assertion.’ Reprinted in Robert Stalnaker, Context and Content . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, Robert. (1999) Context and Content . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, Robert. (2002) ‘Common Ground.’ Linguistics and Philosophy 25:

701–21. Stanley, Jason. (2005) Knowledge and Practical Interests . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Stanley, Jason. (2008) ‘Knowledge and Certainty.’ Philosophical Issues 18: 35–57. Steup, Mattius. (2009) ‘Are Mental States Luminous?’ In Patrick Greenough and

Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sutton, Jonathan. (2005) ‘Stick to What You Know.’ Noûs 39: 359–96. Sutton, Jonathan. (2007) Without Justification . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Turri, John. (2010a) ‘Refutation by Elimination.’ Analysis 70: 35–9. Turri, John. (2010b) ‘Prompting Challenges.’ Analysis 70: 456–62. Turri, John. (2010c) ‘Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?’ Theoria 76: 197–206. Turri, John. (2011) ‘The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.’ Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 89: 37–45. Turri, John. (2014) ‘You Gotta Believe.’ In Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds),

Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Unger, Peter. (1968) ‘An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy 65: 157–70.

Unger, Peter. (1975) Ignorance . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vogel, Jonathan. (1990) ‘Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?’

In M. Roth and G. Ross (eds), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism . Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Vogel, Jonathan. (2010) ‘Luminosity and Indiscriminability.’ Philosophical Perspectives 24: 547–72.

Walters, Lee. (Forthcoming) ‘Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly .

Warfield, Ted. (2005) ‘Knowledge From Falsehood.’ Philosophical Perspectives 19: 405–16.

Weatherson, Brian. (2004) ‘Luminous Margins.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 373–83.

Weiner, Matthew. (2005) ‘Must We Know What We Say?’ Philosophical Review 114: 227–51.

Weiner, Matthew. (2006) ‘Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancellable?’ Analysis 66: 127–30.

Weiner, Matthew. (2007) ‘Norms of Assertion.’ Philosophy Compass 2: 187–95. Whitcomb, Dennis. (2008a) ‘Williamson on Justification.’ Philosophical Studies

138: 161–8. Whitcomb, Dennis. (2008b) ‘Factivity Without Safety.’ Pacific Philosophical

Quarterly 89: 143–9.

224 Bibliography

Whitcomb, Dennis. (2014) ‘Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?’ In Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz (eds), The Ethics of Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whiting, Daniel. (2013a) ‘Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.’ Erkenntnis 78: 847–67.

Whiting, Daniel. (2013b) ‘Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.’ In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilby, Michael. (2010) ‘The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge.’ Philosophical Explorations 13: 83–100.

Williams, Bernard. (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry . Sussex: Harvester Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (1994) Vagueness . Oxon: Routledge. Williamson, Timothy. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits . Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Williamson, Timothy. (2004) ‘Replies to Commentators.’ Philosophical Books 45:

313–23. Williamson, Timothy. (2005a) ‘Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism

and Knowledge of Knowledge.’ Philosophical Quarterly 219: 213–35. Williamson, Timothy. (2005b) ‘Replies to Commentators.’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 70: 468–91. Williamson, Timothy. (2007) The Philosophy of Philosophy . Oxford: Blackwell

Publishing. Williamson, Timothy. (2008) ‘Why Epistemology Can’t Be Operationalized.’ In

Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (2009) ‘Replies to Critics.’ In Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (2011) ‘Knowledge First Epistemology.’ In Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology . New York: Routledge.

Williamson, Timothy. (2014) ‘Knowledge First’ In Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wright, Crispin. (2001) Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations . MA: Harvard University Press.

Wright, Crispin. (2004) ‘On Epistemic Entitlement: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?).’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 167–212.

Wright, Crispin. (2014) ‘On Epistemic Entitlement II: Welfare State Epistemology.’ In Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zardini, Elia. (2013a) ‘Luminosity and Determinacy.’ Philosophical Studies 165: 765–86.

Zardini, Elia. (2013b) ‘Luminosity and Vagueness.’ dialectica 66: 375–410. Zagzebski, Linda. (1994) ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.’ Philosophical

Quarterly 44: 65–73.

225

Index

Adler, Jonathan, 28, 29, 32, 198, 202, 203–4

analysis, 1–3, 15, 16–17, 60, 172–4, 195

conceptual, 2, 172, 195paradox of, 2–3, 212

Arnold, Alexander, 75–7, 78, 201assertion, see under constitutive

norms; normsAustin, J. L., 82–3, 87, 141, 201awareness, 10, 18, 62–3

Bach, Kent, 38, 82, 104, 198, 204Ball, Brian, 39, 40, 198barn case, 7, 8–9, 9–10, 12, 47, 62, 63,

112, 113, 173, 196, 200Benton, Matthew, 93–5, 100, 110,

117–18, 119–20, 122, 123–4, 202, 203, 205, 206

Berker, Selim, 149, 153–5, 163–5, 208, 209, 210

Bird, Alexander, 32–3, 35–6, 42–6, 58–9, 175, 198, 199, 200, 205, 210, 211

Blaauw, Martijn, 94–5, 202, 203Blome-Tillmann, Michael, 91, 202, 204Brown, Jessica, 104–5, 114, 125–6,

133, 135, 138–9, 195, 200, 203, 206, 207

Brueckner, Anthony, 64–5, 150–1, 182, 197, 211

Butterfill, Stephen, 184–5, 211, 212

Cappelen, Herman, 83, 88, 202Carruthers, Peter, 186, 187–9Cassam, Quassim, 171, 210certainty, 57, 66, 90–2, 95, 110–11,

125, 133, 196, 200, 203closure principle, 5–6, 11, 70, 79–80,

105, 196, 197for justification, 5–6, 79–80, 197for knowledge, 11, 70, 105, 196multi-premise, 105, 197for warranted assertibility, 105

Coffman, E. J., 11, 25, 32, 40, 198, 205, 206

Cohen, Jonathan, 191–2, 211Cohen, Stewart, 154, 207, 208Comesaña, Juan, 77, 78–80, 197, 201commonality, 138–42Conee, Earl, 16, 150, 151, 158, 160,

162–3, 200, 209constitutive norms, 18, 23, 82–3,

84–6, 86–7, 105, 108, 121content externalism, see semantic

externalismcontextualism, 90–1, 134, 207

DeRose, Keith, 31, 87, 88, 91, 100, 112, 113, 118–20, 122, 123–4, 134, 160, 196, 197, 202

Dodd, Dylan, 14, 65–6, 200Dougherty, Trent, 199Douven, Igor, 29–30, 106–7, 112, 113,

114, 115–16, 198, 202, 205, 206

excuses, 113–15, 135explanation condition, 8–10, 62–3

factivityof evidence, 70, 72, 73–80of justified belief, 6, 16, 34, 39–40,

196, 210of knowledge, 4, 134, 150, 168, 169,

171, 176, 190, 196fallibilism, 6, 54–5Fantl, Jeremy, 131, 201, 207Feldman, Richard, 16, 105, 200Fricker, Elizabeth, 170, 171, 179, 180,

181, 194, 210, 211, 212

Gerken, Mikkel, 133, 135, 140–2, 206, 207–8

Gettier cases, 1–10, 12, 16, 25, 31, 35–6, 40, 42–3, 45, 47, 54, 62, 75, 77–8, 79, 83, 104, 106, 112–15, 135, 172–4, 182, 196, 206

226 Index

Gettier, Edmund, 1, 2, 5–6, 15, 77, 79, 172

Gettier problem, 1, 3, 6, 10, 14, 172, 191, 195

Gibbons, John, 192–3, 212Goldman, Alvin, 8, 55, 57, 196Greenough, Patrick, 161, 163–4, 209Grice, H. P., 95–6, 97–8, 102–3, 104,

141, 204, 205

Haddock, Adrian, 39, 40Hawthorne, John, 7, 11, 14, 19, 25,

29, 87, 113, 125, 131, 132–6, 160–1, 162, 196, 202, 207

Hill, Christopher, 11, 88, 102–3, 108, 112–13, 134, 135, 206, 207

Huemer, Michael, 27, 30, 198Hughes, Nick, 54, 199, 200Hyman, John, 51–2, 59–63, 67, 74,

109, 168, 200, 206–7, 210

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, 3, 10, 17, 197, 199, 200

implicature, 95–9, 102–3, 104, 141, 204, 205

infallibilism, 6, 65, 196isolated second hand knowledge,

126–30, 136–7

JBK normof action, 134–5, 207of assertion, 104–6, 111, 115, 124,

130, 205Jenkins, C. S. I., 9–10, 17, 63, 196, 197Joyce, James, 55, 73–5, 201justification, 1, 3, 4, 5–6, 15–16, 17,

27, 28, 33–4, 39–50, 52, 63–4, 69, 107–8, 196, 197, 198, 199, 205, 209, 211

doxastic, 4, 33–4, 39–50internalism and externalism about,

15–16, 69, 197propositional, 4, 209

justification normof action, 133of assertion, 100–1, 106–8, 205of belief, 33–4

justified true belief account, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 16, 19, 167, 196,

Kantin, Holly, 77, 78–80, 201Kvanvig, Jonathan, 89–90, 107–8, 114,

116, 200, 205, 206knowledge from falsehood, 7, 75–7knowledge maximization, 16, 173,

197knowledge norm

of action, 17–18, 19, 132–6, 137, 139, 142, 146, 173, 207

of assertion, 17–18, 19, 23, 31, 32–3, 49–50, 82–124, 125, 130, 138–9, 146, 173, 202–6

of belief, 17–18, 19, 23, 31–5, 35, 40, 104, 146, 173, 198

Lackey, Jennifer, 83–4, 88, 89–90, 98, 100–2, 113, 114, 115–18, 125, 126–30, 136–7, 139, 140, 202, 204, 206, 207

Leite, Adam, 72, 74, 201, 210, 211, 212

Lewis, David, 25, 99, 146Littlejohn, Clayton, 27, 33–4, 39, 40,

51, 62, 66, 68, 72, 79, 114, 135, 196, 197, 198, 200–1, 202, 205, 206, 207

lottery propositions, 3, 10–14, 13–14, 24–8, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 41, 42, 43, 45, 49, 54–6, 75, 87, 88, 95–100, 102–3, 104, 106–11, 120, 123, 133, 134, 136, 197, 205

assertions of, 11, 32, 87, 88, 95–100, 102–3, 104, 106–11, 120, 123, 205

beliefs in, 11–12, 24–8, 30, 31, 32, 35, 43, 45, 49, 106–8, 109–11, 197

luck, 1, 7–8, 19, 24–6, 27, 63, 152, 190, 196, 199

luminosity, 13, 69–70, 145–66, 186–7, 189, 208, 209, 212

McGlynn, Aidan, 11, 13, 32, 36, 40, 79, 109–10, 173, 197, 198, 199, 211

McKinnon, Rachel, 89–90, 93–5, 140, 203, 206

Madison, Brent, 40, 104, 106Magnus, P. D., 191–2, 211Maitra, Ishani, 121, 202mindreading, 183–6, 187–9

Index 227

Molyneux, Bernard, 192, 193Montminy, Martin, 139–40Moore’s paradox, 27–8, 32, 37–8, 88,

90, 91, 95, 95–6, 100–2, 103, 104, 106–11, 117, 119, 122–4, 130, 132, 134, 198, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207

mutual recognition, 99–100, 104, 110, 120–4, 204

Nagel, Jennifer, 167, 171, 183–6, 191–2, 211

Neta, Ram, 56, 133, 134–5, 136, 197, 207

norms, see under JBK norm; justification norm; knowledge norm; truth norm

Pelling, Charles, 88–9, 202pragmatic encroachment, 131, 134predictions, 87, 97–9, 100, 106,

118–24, 206Pritchard, Duncan, 7, 12, 25, 196,

197, 210propriety

primary vs. secondary, 31, 112–15vs. reasonableness, 31, 112–15, 135,

173

Ramachandran, Murali, 149, 151, 153, 154, 209

Reed, Baron, 11, 170, 207, 209, 210retrodictions, 97, 98, 118, 120, 123Reynolds, Steven, 46–50, 199, 202,

206Rizzieri, Aaron, 77–8, 201Roessler, Johannes, 171, 211Russell, Bertrand, 2, 6, 43, 75, 162Rysiew, Patrick, 199, 211, 212

safety principle, 12–14, 26, 27, 43, 55, 149–55, 157–8, 162, 208–9

Sainsbury, R. M., 152, 197, 212scepticism, 6, 13–14, 40, 65–6, 69, 72Searle, John, 82–3, 84–5, 93self-knowledge, 71–2, 145–66, 186–9selfless assertions, 101, 115–18, 207semantic externalism, 44–5, 71–2,

182, 193–4, 201Silins, Nicholas, 66, 69–72, 201

Smith, Martin, 13, 15, 27, 199, 201Smithies, Declan, 164–5, 198, 210Sosa, Ernest, 13, 17, 170, 197, 202,

204, 208, 210, 212Srinivasan, Amia, 149, 153, 154–5,

158–60, 208Stanley, Jason, 19, 32, 90–1, 113, 131,

132–6, 198, 202, 203, 207Steup, Mattius, 3, 10, 208, 209stopped clock case, 6–7, 43, 75, 112Sutton, Jonathan, 16, 35, 39–40, 41–2,

198, 202

truth normof assertion, 84, 95–7, 105–6, 108–9,

121, 205of belief, 33–4

Turri, John, 87, 88, 91–2, 92–3, 94, 117, 122, 170, 198, 202, 206, 210

Unger, Peter, 7, 59–60, 83, 86, 87–8, 90, 91, 109, 122, 196, 197, 200, 203, 206–7

Vogel, Jonathan, 11, 25, 196, 208

Weatherson, Brian, 151–3, 160Weiner, Matthew, 88, 95–100, 113,

118–20, 122–4, 204Whitcomb, Dennis, 170, 198, 199,

200, 210Whiting, Daniel, 32, 36, 108–9, 203–4,

205Williamson, Timothy, 3, 12–13,

14–16, 17, 18–19, 23, 28–9, 31, 32, 36, 39–40, 41, 44–5, 46, 50–9, 60, 62–3, 64–5, 65–6, 67, 68, 70, 73, 74, 76–7, 78, 80, 81, 82–3, 84–6, 86–7, 87–91, 95, 96–7, 99, 102, 105–6, 108, 110, 112, 113–14, 119, 125, 132, 135, 145–51, 153–4, 156–8, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165–6, 167–8, 169–71, 171–83, 186, 187, 189, 190–5, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212

Zardini, Elia, 149, 155–60, 161, 208, 209