Note

Richard Emerson Harmer was interviewed on 23 September 1944. This

copy of the interview was part of his collection of documents and

pictures he kept of his service in the US Navy.

Richard Harmer also kept a diary which I will share starting in 2018.

I will add to the document some images taken either from his collection

of images or from the Internet.

Interview

R.E. HARMER, USN

Formerly C.O. VF(N) 101

23 September, 1944

Commander R.E. Harmer, USN, was Commanding Officer of the first U.S.

carrier-based night fighter squadron, VF(N) 101.

Collection Richard Harmer

This squadron originally was part of VF(N) 75 which was commissioned at

Quonset Point, R.I. in April 1943.

Quonset Point, R.I

Source Internet

In the summer of 1943, six experienced pilots of VF (N) 75 were sent to

operate, from land bases in the Pacific and the rest, under Lt. Cdr. Harmer,

remained at Quonset as the second unit of VF(N) 75. Ultimately, in January

1944, this unit was commissioned as VF(N) 101 and all of its carrier duty

was as squadron VF(N) 101. He discusses in detail the training, combat,

experiences, and operations of his squadron.

Collection Richard Harmer

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

Working at Quonset, we received our first planes, F4U-1s, in June of

1943. We did not have any radar gear until July, when we received one set

of XAIA, followed shortly by five more sets. However, when the first unit,

under Comdr. W.J. Widhelm, left for the Pacific, it took all of the radar

equipped planes. Consequently, we were reduced to night flying drills and

day gunnery missions in F4U-1 airplanes.

F4U-1

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Occasionally, there was some opportunity for practice with fleet units

serving as the enemy.

At this stage of training, we had fourteen pilots, thirteen of whom

were ensigns. Most of the ensigns had not even had operational training and

they had to get time in F4Fs F4Us. This amounted to about ten hours of

night work and sixty hours of day work. We procured a radar-equipped SNB

in September which proved valuable for training and familiarization flights.

Beechcraft SNB

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This radar set was later installed in an F4U-2.

F4U-2 Corsair

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A short course in radar work and the probable capabilities of the equipment

was set up for the squadron's use. In October we received an SNB with AIA

equipment and, later that month, an additional SNB and six F4U-2s. The

pilots flew the F4Us after having about ten hours in the SNB. Receipt of

these planes allowed us to speed up the training until, by December 1st

1943, we were in fair shape and all of the pilots had received carrier check-

outs at Norfolk, but we had not had any night carrier landings The training

given those pilots amounted to 125-150 hours of night flying in the F4U,

during which time we, were able to average only about six practice

interceptions each in the F4U-2. About 75% of all practice interceptions

were not GC1 controlled, but were controlled by a flying FDO in an SNB.

Beechcraft SNB

Source Internet

Just before leaving Quonset for the west coast, a lieutenant with

considerable flight experience in multi-engined planes was added to our

complement, so we then had a lieutenant commander (my rank at the time),

a lieutenant, and twelve ensigns (one having been lost in training). We had

acquired ten F4U-2s. One plane was lost in a crash landing in the desert on

the way to the coast, but the pilot was unhurt. Another plane was damage in

unloading at Pearl Harbor, leaving us with only eight planes since we

stripped the damaged plane to get material for a second radar test bench. We

had been told that our squadron was going to be split into two groups.

USS Enterprise

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During the first week in January at Pearl, we received day bounce drills,

followed by ten day landings on ENTERPRISE, then another week of night

bounce drills, followed by two night landings each on ESSEX.

USS Essex

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On January 16, I took six ensigns and four planes aboard ENTERPRISE

with me and the rest of the pilots went aboard INTREPID with Lieutenant

C.L. Kullberg.

USS Intrepid

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This second unit had a short cruise but no night fighter action, and

subsequently was retained in the training unit at Pearl.

Henceforth, this discussion concerns itself with seven men, four plane team

which was aboard ENTERPRISE. Our non-flying personnel had been

divided between the two units our controller, Ens. F. Burgess, was aboard

ENTERPRISE with me. On occasions he handled planes from other carriers

in the Task Group.

COMBAT TOUR

We went aboard the ship January 16, 1944 and shoved off for a six months

cruise during which we went through the Marshalls landing, raids on Truk,

Hollandia, Palau, and finally, the Marianas landing. We returned to the

States July 22, 1944 where the squadron was disbanded and the personnel

assigned to other duties. The squadron had a record a five Japanese planes

destroyed, two others probably destroyed, and two damaged in night actions.

I believe that our work, together with that of other fighter carrier-based

squadrons, has demonstrated the need for an abundance of well trained night

fighter pilots who can carry on a variety of missions against sea or land

targets. Our squadron had only limited opportunities; we had ten night

contacts and engaged in numerous rescue missions and searches for lost

planes. But the whole field of intruder work, night bombing by radar

equipped planes, and large scale night interceptions were types of missions

not available to us. I am sure that these could be performed very well by

carrier-based night fighters. During our tour of duty we averaged about ten

hours flying per month per pilot. Most of this was during the daylight on

such missions as leading 0S2U rescue planes to downed pilots.

0S2U

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On one occasion, we flew CAP over the troop transports from 0415 until

sunrise when we were relieved by a the day fighter CAP.

A Our first real contact resulted in a "probable" This came early in

the morning of February 19 when our force was off Truk. This "probable"

could have been turned into a kill except that the fighter director brought the

plane in above the bogey, and the pilot overshot on two occasions. When

visual contact was finally obtained a red glow was noticed immediately aft

of the right engine following a short burst, but contact was lost as the target

appeared to be going in a step spiral. The pilot failed to place his target on

visual before opening fire and had dropped so far back he lost visual contact

after the fire went out.

More than two months passed before we got another chance. This time

the results were more favorable. Contact was established on radar (after

several radical changes of vectors) at two miles range, 30 degrees to port.

Visual contacts were established by both planes; the tail gunner opened fire

on me at 250 yards. After once losing contact, I regained it on the scope and

closed to about 300 yards at which position both the tail and dorsal gunners

fired at me. I slid back on his tail and gave him another long burst at less

than 150 yards and after another S turn to reduce speed I closed in again

until I was close behind him and at less than 100 feet altitude. He was flying

so low that the prop wash foamed the water. Consequently I had to depress

my nose in order to hit the target. Anyhow, he finally went down after I had

used 950 rounds.

That expenditure was unfortunate because a few minutes later I ran

into the chance of a life time -- a Jap bomber formation flying at night with

lights on. The indications on the scope showed the presence of at least five

targets but only three seemed to be showing lights. The faulty ammunition

was to fail me again because the guns worked for only half a second and

then stopped. The plane I fired at dropped his left wing and flashed a row of

four vari-colored lights along the upper surface of each wing. The other two

planes followed suit. A little later I got one working and as soon as I had

fired three it stopped. The plane I fired at turned on his vari-colored lights

and the whole formation again followed suit. I never did figure out what

those lights were for unless they thought I was a friendly plane trying to join

up on them and they were trying to identify themselves. I believe that the

plane I had knocked down was their 'snooper' and they thought I was he

returning to the formation.

Nearly two months passed before we had another real chance. That

time Lt.(jg) R.F. Holden, Jr. and I ran into the large formation of two-engine

planes escorted by a flight of Tojos.

Nakajima Ki-44

Source Internet

Holden, knocked one off my tail and it disappeared from view at 1,500 feet,

headed down in a tight spin. It was rated as another probable.

Little more than a week later we hit the jackpot. As a raid was

approaching the task group, Holden was catapulted. He went off on the

vector immediately and climbed to 10,000 feet, established contact and was

ready to fire all within 10 minutes. He was none too fast, either, because just

as the break-off order was going to be passed (he and the bogey were

approaching the task force) we could see his tracers going into the Jay plane,

which fell in flames in the midst of the fleet. That put us back in the good

graces at everyone and set the stage for the next night when we had a record

evening.

Once again, Holden was catapulted and established contact at 1,000

feet altitude. The range was three miles and he closed until he had a visual at

800 feet. He closed to 200 feet dead astern and fired a short burst, hitting the

starboard wing stub.

Mitsubishi G4M Betty

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The Betty blew up with such a terrific explosion that Holden could feel the

heat from the flames. A short time later he was given another vector to a

low-flying bogey and, after a long chase, he watched his incendiaries hit the

Betty, which burned fiercely as soon as it hit the water. One very important

feature of this kill was that obviously the Betty knew Holden was around

and, although it took radical evasive action, it was unable to get away from

his radar and visual contacts.

But the night was not over. I was sent off to run a practice interception

on Holden as he returned toward the task group. After the practice was over,

we joined up and were coming home when the fighter director told us

another plane was in our formation. The other plane, of' course, was another

bogey. I was sent after it, closing on a radar contact to half a mile. I dropped

down to 500 feet (he seemed to be at 900) and side stepped to the down-

moon side of the target. I continued the close in, all of this time being on

radar, until I made a visual at 400 foot range. After slowing down, I pulled

up to the target and sent a half-to-one-second burst into the port wing root.

The plane exploded immediately and hit the water.

These three kills in one night came toward the end of June and shortly

afterward we headed toward home. On the way, we had our last contact.

Two of our planes were sent after some high-flying Japs but unfortunately

we had at that time the only radar failures of the entire trip. A fleeting visual

contact was established by means of expert GCI but it was not sufficient for

the kill.

LAUNCHING

Virtually all of our launchings were by catapult and we found this method

much more satisfactory than fly-offs. The radar gear was not affected. The

catapults worked excellently and we had no trouble at all in taking

launchings entirely on instruments without benefit of reference lights. I had

no accidents in catapult launchings, but other planes on the carrier did have

some trouble with fly-offs.

At the beginning of our tour, we were not launched until the last

minute when an attack was coming in. Consequently, we were on the

intercept vector as soon as we cleared the carrier, and usually we had to

hurry to make the interception before the raid could reach the Task Group.

While we did not shoot down all of our opportunities, we are very proud of

the fact that no ship under our protection was damaged in a night raid.

Several enemy formations, evidently bent on attacking our Task Group,

were broken up by our mere presence even though we didn't shoot the planes

down.

JAP TACTICS

There seemed to be no uniformity in the attack methods used by the

Japanese, except, of course, that they would use a snooper plane to pick up

and track our formations if possible and then the attack group would home

on the snooper. As we get closer to the Empire, however, I believe we must

be prepared to repel large scale night attacks, which are coordinated.

Only on one occasion did the Japs use a fighter escort for their night

attackers.

P1Y Ginga "Frances"

Source Internet

Not long before we came home, we were attacked by twelve to fifteen

bombers, probably Frances or Bettys, escorted by fighters, some of which

certainly were Tojos. Just as two of us were making a pass at the bomber

formation we were jumped by four Tojos. This attack was just at dusk after

the day CAP had been landed, and there was no evidence that the Japs had

airborne radar in any of these planes. We were lucky to have some clouds

around in which to hide, particularly after a 20 mm had shorted my

formation lights and I couldn't get them to turn off. All of the bombers got

into the Task, Group and eight were shot down by AA. No damage was

caused by the planes.

NIGHT FIGHTER TACTICS

As for our own interception tactics, we had to adjust them to the

situation. A stern approach is preferable under most conditions, but the stage

of the moon is a very important controlling factor. We found that it was

important to keep the bogey between ourselves and the moon as the

interception progressed. It was satisfactory for the approach to be made by

radar and by visual contact from directly astern, but if the moon's phase and

position were of possible assistance, we preferred an approach out to the side

so as to get the bogey directly up-moon from us. This position gave the

fighter the advantage in making visual contact before being spotted by the

bomber crew. After a visual is obtained a standard approach starting from.

directly below and dropping back to the tail position, is made. We found that

a completely open hood, regardless of the wind and noise, was an asset in

establishing and maintaining visual contacts because the plexiglass on the

hood will reduce vision about 30%. A clear view was important since the

Japs had excellent flame dampeners and it was not to be expected that

exhaust flares would be of any assistance to us. On a few occasions after

visual contact had been made, we did see sparks from the Jap engines as the

pilot changed throttle settings.

We used our dive brakes to slow us down during interceptions. The

Hellcat could a advantageously use some simple form of air brakes to serve

the same purpose. Over-running the target is a very common error in making

an interception.

During my first two contacts I had no tracer ammunition in my guns

and found it difficult to hold a point of aim or to know when I was on the

target. Later I had one inboard gun loaded so that every 15th round was

tracer and it helped considerably in correcting point of aim. There was no

effect of muzzle flash on the F4U, but the F6F definitely needs flash guards

in order to protect the pilot's night vision.

BuAer Comment: The majority of night fighters use no tracers. Loading

some tracer and with-holding those guns when not desiring tracer is a

questionable practice.

When a night fighter was in the air, the squadron’s radar crews,

plotters and controller took over aboard the ship and handled the

interceptions. The FDO could have AA fire withheld in any sector of the

screen during the time it was necessary for the night fighter to be in that

sector. In our Task Group, AA always had precedence over the fighter on an

incoming raid and the accuracy and intensity of fire they could throw out

was deadly.

The use of window by the Japs against a night fighter is not effective.

A well trained radar operator can tell almost immediately that window is

being used.

EQUIPMENT

Our planes were satisfactory. The carrier CASU was responsible for plane

maintenance and for the radio equipment in the planes, while our few

squadron personnel handled the maintenance of the radar equipment. At one

time we were reduced to one plane by accidents and normal wear and tear,

but by means of some borrowing from the Marines at Majuro and a few

replacements from Pearl, we were able. to keep enough planes available for

our immediate needs. One thing should be remembered; we were flying

Corsairs from a carrier and future night fighter squadrons will not be

equipped with them. We found that the Corsair was a splendid plane for the

purpose and it could out-perform the F6F-3. My limited experience with the

F6F-5 seems to indicate that its performance will be all that can be expected

from a single plane, single engine night fighter. Certainly, its performance is

sufficient to combat any of the Jap night flying planes we are likely to

encounter.

LANDING PROCEDURE

Our landing procedure was adapted to the Corsair and with alight

modifications it would suit the Hellcat. We did not put our wheels down

until we were ready to start the down-wind leg of our approach because the

engine would heat up too rapidly. In the F6F, the cooling system would

prevent such over-heating and the wheels and flaps could be lowered such

earlier.

Too many lights rather than not enough, was our problem on landing.

By that I mean it was felt we needed some types of lights when we actually

didn't. When the carrier and several other ships were showing lights the

danger to the fleet was increased, but our landings were not made easier.

After we had convinced the fleet that we could land with a minimum of

lights, we became of greater value because we could be used under more

conditions without endangering the fleet. Our landing procedure was

comparable to that used by VF(N) 76 and VF(N) 77. It is shown

diagrammatically on 6.

We had been trained in anticipation of becoming land based and when

it was decided that we go aboard carriers, we had to refresh our meager day

carrier landing experience get checked out in night carrier landings.

Consequently, none of us was thoroughly experienced for night carrier

operations, and this led finally to our sending two of the unite back to Pearl

because they were not getting enough practice to keep them adequately

trained for night operations. In the future, when night operations are more

frequent, I think this difficulty will not exist. One thing pilots in training

should remember and remember always - becoming proficient in making

night interceptions is only part of the equipment of the night fighter. You

have to be good as a night carrier pilot. Night carrier operations require the

greatest of flying skill and ceaseless practice. Night fighter pilots do not

have to be super-aviators, but they should be skilled fliers with a definite

desire and liking for this type of work.

Aboard ship, especially in that long period when we had little to do

because confidence in our ability was not too great, we did get the

opportunity for daylight missions, either as escort for rescue planes or as

participants in regular CAPs. For some of these missions we used borrowed

F6F's and on others we used our own planes. We did not get the opportunity

to participate in intruder missions, but I think this type of mission is going to

be in the forefront of jobs in the future.

FUTURE OPERATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION

While I think that a two place, two engine plane is the ideal for night

fighting, None is now available suitable for carrier operation. An F7F-2

would dislodge two and a half TBFs or four F6F-5Ns from a large carrier.

The F7F will really have to prove itself before that can take place, or another

two-place smaller plane will have to be developed.

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BuAer Comments As regards two-seat night fighters, the F7F-2 is the

nearest thing that we have in point of time in that line. It does have the

handicap of being a large plane, but it is believed that on the newer CVBs it

may possibly be just what is desired. Its performance and handling qualities

should be about tops. However, it is still equipped with a low-power radar

and would be only of limited use on missions other than accurately

controlled interceptions. The SB2C is now going to the fleet with ASH

radar.

SB2C Helldiver

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It is hoped that the forces afloat will give it a chance to help prove or

disprove the single-seat versus the two-seat argument. The plane is slow, but

snoopers about the fleet are not normally cruising at V-max.

I am convinced that the two-place plane is preferable. The pilot would

still have a repeater scope, but a well trained radar operator would relieve

the pilot of much work and would enable him to concentrate on the visual

contact and kill, without having to keep his eyes constantly scanning the

scope and instruments which results in lessened night vision efficiency.

BuAer Comment: For controlled interceptions in the vicinity of the Fleet the

single seat night fighter has been successfully employed. However,

occasionally enemy planes have evaded the single seat night fighter, due to

its inherent weaknesses, that probably would not have escaped if a two

seater had been in use. For long range intruder missions, interceptions

beyond accurate control of GCI, during conditions of enemy

countermeasures, and during a coordinated night attack in force, a long

range plane having high power radar is now considered necessary and would

automatically require an operator. The repeater scope for the pilot, in the

case of two seater aircraft, is, and probably always will be, debatable.

However a recent test by a night fighter group indicates that if it is employed

by the pilot during his closing run it will reduce the range of his visual

control at least half. It could be of use when homing on beacon or when

mapping, but if the operator is a trained navigator this use for it is also

unnecessary.

The radar gear in the F6F-5N is adequate for the present and I am sure

that squadron now with the Fleet, or going to the Fleet, soon will have a

proportionally greater number at kills.

F6F-5N

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Note: LSO "talks" pilot in from about start of down-wind leg, using throat or

chin mike with controls in wand handle. Aldis lamp as used by VF(N) 77c

not available, but recommended. Before responding to a cut signal, it is

imperative that the port line of deck lights be seen lined up along the

cowling. The LSO cannot always tell your directional attitude and may give

yawn cut based on your speed, altitude apparent position.

I do think that a night fighter plane should have greater firepower than

single engine planes now possess, since night kills should be made with the

first burst, if possible or else the target can take evasive action and contact

may be lost. Four 20 mm. should be a minimum, and I'd like to see

something as powerful as rockets used on them. Possibly a rocket fitted with

a proximity fuse and having a fairly wide lethal radius would be an ideal

weapon for a night fighter. Muzzle flare did not interfere with night vision

on the F4U, and I believe a rocket arrangement below the wing would not

impair the efficiency of our night vision.

BuAer Comment: We are modifying wings of all F6Fs to provide mountings

for 20 mm or .50 cal. combinations. The installation will be for 2 - 20 mm

and 4 - .50 cal. or for 6 - .50 cal. There is no reason why these cannot be

utilized for night fighter missions.

It is not necessary, or even advisable, for a controller to be attached to

a squadron. Any good night fighter director should be able to handle any

good night fighter pilot, conversely, the pilot should learn not to depend too

entirely on one voice or one set of mannerisms when making interceptions.

I look forward to the time when a TBF or some similar plane,

operating as an air-borne GCI station, can move into a target area and there

control several night fighters.

Grumman TBF Avenger

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His equipment should be able to follow friendly and enemy airborne fighters

and distinguish individual targets at sea or in the air. The controller then

could select enemy planes for some of his fighters to intercept, or targets for

his fighter-bombers or night torpedo planes to knock out. Even with gear

now available, the field of night aerial warfare is virtually unlimited, and am

sure that the ingenuity of aviators with the Fleet will devise attacks and

defenses not now conceived.

Squadron organization and utilization by the Fleet are both important

considerations in planning for the future. I believe our Task Force and Task

Group Commanders are now convinced that night fighters are important,

usable units for both defensive and offensive operations. I think, too, that

there will be less of this separation of squadrons by assigning teams to

carriers, sometimes far removed from the squadron commander. The

squadron should be kept intact aboard one ship. I believe a twelve plane

squadron would be ideal. Three such squadrons, plus TBFs, would be

satisfactory for CV operations; and two squadrons, together with half a

dozen TBFs for attack and search work, would be fine for the CVLs.

There is no reason why the faster type of CVEs could not be used for

night operations. The CVEe in the Atlantic submarine hunts have proved

this.