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246 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFNESE ANALYSIS

North Korea: The Present and the Future

Dae-Sook Suh

The present state of North Korea by any standard of measurement is a period of transition. It is the transition not simply from Kim II Sung to his son Kim Jong-il, but from the old-guard partisans to the younger generation of leaders. During the past five years from 1988 to 1993, North Korea has made many political changes in the domestic scene, adjusting itself to improve relations with South Korea. It has also amended its constitution to insure the survival of its own style of socialism.

In the changed international scene North Korea witnessed the collapse of its traditional allies and saw Russia and China lured away by South Korea. In an effort to adjust itself in the new world, it has joined the United Nations, tried to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, and opened a meaningful dialogue with the United States. In 1992 it finally signed the Nuclear Safeguard Agreement and accepted the inspections of the IAEA.

To more hawkish North Korean leaders, however, all these conciliatory measures seem futile, and their efforts ended without any visible benefit. They withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on March 12, 1993, and they seem to show definite signs of retreating from the new world beginning in September 1992. The North Korean decision was not an abrupt decision by an impetuous young leader fearing the revelation of its secret nuclear weapons program. Rather, it was a decision based upon the culmination of frustrations in dealing with South Korea, Japan, the United States, and the international community during the past five years. It was also a decision emanating from political changes in North Korea,

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more specifically from the rise of the militant and hawkish group to support Kim Jong-il.

Within the foreseeable future, this conservative group of military persuasion will influence the course of North Korean politics. It is projected that Kim Jong-il will be successful in assuming the leadership position after his father dies. The constitutional amendments of April 1992 that separated the role of the President and the role of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces may allow him to adopt a collective leadership system, controlling the military and the party while assigning the administration of the government to a person whom he can replace at will.

There is little doubt that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons, if it has not already done so. The growing political, economic, and military imbalance between North and South almost forces it to produce nuclear weapons for security and for survival. The appropriate question is not how to stop North Korea from going nuclear but how to deal with nuclear North Korea while it is still in the embryonic stage. The way to prevent North Korea from building a stockpile of nuclear weapons and deploying them is not to apply relentless pressure but to help solve their most urgent needs. The relationship between the North and South will be strained for some time to come, but it is hoped that South Korea under its new civilian administration will not repeat the mistakes of its military predecessors.

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North Korea: The Present and the Future

Dae-Sook Suh

In his capacity as the Supreme Commander and Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Jong-il issued Order No. 0034 on March 9, 1993, to alert the entire North Korean armed forces for any eventuality and to put the entire nation and the people on a semi-war footing. This order, of course, was in response to the resumption in 1993 of the Team Spirit military exercises by the combined American and South Korean forces. Such mobilization orders are not uncom- mon in North Korea, but it is significant that the order was issued for the first time not by Kim II Sung but by Kim Jong-il. In his order, Kim Jong-il said that we do not want war, but we do not beg for peace when our nation’s dignity is trampled upon. If challenged, we will fight to keep our dignity and the glory of heroic Korea.’

Three days earlier, both Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-il appeared before the nationwide conference of the Rear Support Units of the North Korean armed forces, and encouraged them to be loyal to the country and to be prepared.* Three days later, on March 12, 1993, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that it had joined in 1985. Whatever the justification may have been for

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For the military order, see Nodong Shinmun, March 9, 1993.

This conference was attended by North Korean Vice Marshals (Ch’oe Kwang, Yi UI-sol, Ch’oe In-dok, Yi Tu-ik), Generals (Kim Yong-yon, Yi Pyong-uk, Yi Pong-won), and Colonel Generals (Won Myong-gyun and Hyon Ch’ol-hae). Nodong Shinmun, March 7 , 1993.

62 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

resuming the 1993 Team Spirit, and however irrational may have been the North Korean overreaction to the American and South Korean military exercise, the events of March 1993 have contributed much to the erosion of mutual trust of the Korean people and to the revival of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The present state of North Korea by any standard of measurement is a period of transition. It is the transition not simply from Kim II Sung to his son Kim Jong-il, but from the old-guard partisan cham- pions of the Cold War of yesteryears to the younger generation of leaders who earnestly seek to establish workable relations with South Korea in the new world. During the past five years from 1988 to 1993, North Korea has made many political changes in the domestic scene, adjusting itself to improve its relations with the South by agreeing to eight high-level government-to-government dialogues, unprecedented in the history of divided Korea. It has replaced political leaders in important positions with new leaders of the younger generations, and it has amended its constitution to insure its survival. In an effort to counter its economic difficulties, it passed numerous joint-venture laws to induce foreign investments to North Korea, though without much success.

In the changed international scene, North Korea witnessed the collapse of its traditional allies, such as East European Socialist countries and the Soviet Union, and saw Russia and China lured away by South Korea. In an effort to adjust itself in the new world, North Korea has joined the United Nations, almost against its will, compromising its traditional stance, and it has tried to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and open a meaningful dialogue with the United States. In 1992, it finally signed the Nuclear Safeguard Agreement that it was supposed to sign shortly after it became a member to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, thus accept- ing the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) six times during the year.

However, to more hawkish North Korean leaders, all these conciliatory measures seem futile, and their efforts ended without any visible benefit to North Korea. North Koreans seem to show definite signs of retreating from the new world, beginning in September 1992, and they seem to be returning to their traditional position of

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self-reliance, holding high the juche idea. The resumption of the Team Spirit military exercises seems to have reaffirmed their suspi- cion that they can not trust South Korea and the United States. In place of its lost allies, North Korea seems to want to develop its own nuclear weapons for its survival. This short article is an effort to assess the present transitional period of North Korea and make rational conjectures about its future.

The Present: The Transitional Period

Efforts at Reconciliation

From the time when Yon Hyong-muk was appointed Premier of the Administration Council of North Korea in December 1988, to the time when he was replaced by Kang Song-san at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly in December 1992, North Korea has seen many changes both at home and abroad. This period of Yon’s tenure as Premier can best be characterized as the transitional period in North Korea. On the domestic front, Yon took the task of effecting gradual and smooth transfer of political power from Kim II Sung to Kim Jong-il. While Yon took on the daily administrative chores of the government, Kim Jong-il made changes in the leadership of the party and the government, replacing old leaders of his father’s generation with younger leaders of his own generation. At every plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) from the Fifteenth Plenum in De- cember 1988 when Yon was appointed to the Twentieth Plenum in December 1992 when he was relieved, the question of personnel changes (organizational problems) in the party was entertained.3

Although there was no economic miracle to improve the livelihood of the people, North Korean society during Yon’s administration was much more relaxed than before. After the 13th Socialist Youth Festival in Pyongyang to offset the Seoul Olympics, the country

3 See Nodong Shinmun December 13, 1988 for the 15th Plenum; June 10, 1989 for the 16th Plenum; January 10, 1990 for the 17th Plenum; May 24, 1990 for the 18th Plenum; December 25, 1991 for the 19th Plenum; and December 11, 1992 for the 20th Plenum.


seems to have maintained a festive mood. North Korea was in the middle of its Third Seven-Year National Economic Plan, 1987-1 993, but the people were not mobilized to perform the hard labor to which they have become accustomed during the time of similar plans during the 1970s and the 1980s.

North Korea opened its doors to foreigners, though only to a selected few, to visit North Korea, and its scholars seem to want to engage in a dialogue. North Koreans have also shown interest in traveling abroad to non-socialist countries to observe what they have been taught to hate. Those who were able to visit capitalist countries did not approve of a non-socialist system for their own nation, but they came to the painful realization that the outside world had far outpaced their own and had developed beyond their imagination.

Yon also personally conducted a high level, government-to- government dialogue with South Korea, and he personally visited the South, trying to ease the tension between the North and the South. The North and South Korean negotiators were able to agree on many important issues and produced a historic document, the Agree- ment on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South,4 stipulating eventual reunification of the divided people. This was the farthest that the governments of North and South Korea ever went to reconcile their differences during nearly five decades of division. North Korea continued its usual anti-South Korean propaganda campaigns and espionage activities in the South, but there were no overt terrorist activities emanating from Yon’s government.

North Korea negotiated with the South even when the South Korean government made efforts to lure away its allies. South Korea successfully concluded diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union before its collapse, promising a loan of three billion dollars. On the international scene, North Korea had to face a hard reality when nearly all East European Socialist countries collapsed and aban- doned socialism. The former Socialist countries in Europe then

4 For the text of the agreement in English, see the South Korean policy series, Bridging the Chasm (Seoul: Korea Overseas Information Service, February 1992), pp. 5-10; also Korea Herald, February 20, 1992.

DAE-SOOK SUH 65

established new diplomatic relations with South Korea, all but aban- doning their former ties with North Korea. In August 1992 South Korea announced that it has completed negotiations to conclude diplomatic relations with China, the only remaining ally and perhaps the closest comrade-in-arms of North Korea in times of war or peace. This was the ultimate blow by the South Koreans to the North Korean alliance system.

On the other hand, North Korean efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Japan had broken off after several years of hard-nosed negotiations. North Korean efforts to enter into the capitalist world were not simple. Japan demanded a nuclear-free North Korea, and asked North Koreans to abide by the rules and regulations of the international community by returning Japanese nationals in North Korea. North Korea tried to engage the United States in a meaningful dialogue, but the United States did not respond. When the North Koreans tried to upgrade the level of talks with the United States, the American response was to encourage dialogue with South Korea.

In an effort to alleviate its difficult international position, North Korea even joined the United Nations in September 1991, compromising its traditional stand calling for North and South Korea to join the world body as one country. North Korea busily concluded diplomatic relations with former Soviet republics that became indepen- dent, and by early 1992 had decided to sign the Safeguard Agreement. After the agreement was ratified by the Supreme People’s Assembly on April 8, 1992,5 North Korea accepted inspections by the IAEA.

There is little doubt that during the period of Yon’s administration, whether at his own will or at the command of his bosses, the North Korean government tested a conciliatory policy toward the South as well as toward its allies. Indeed, North Korea has fallen into a difficult position due to the collapse of the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and it has also suffered at the hand of aggressive South Korean diplomacy toward China. For these

5 It was the third item of the Assembly agenda to discuss the ratification of the Safeguard Agreement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It was ratified along with amendment to the North Korean constitution. For details, see Nodong Shinmun, April 9, 1992.


conciliatory efforts North Korea received nothing in return, and Yon Hyong-muk was replaced.

Reforms and Adjustments

It is not difficult to understand that North Korea at present is undergoing a significant political change. Because the country was ruled by one all-powerful leader, the change is that much more difficult and significant, even if the successor is his own son, vowing to continue the work of his father. The current North Korean change is of the same magnitude as the combined South Korean political changes of the April 19th student demonstration that replaced Syngman Rhee’s government, the May 16th military coup that brought the South Korean military into politics, and the 1993 elec- tions that brought a civilian democratic government back to South Korea. South Korea, at least, confronted these changes in intervals under the watchful eyes and protection of the United States, but North Korea is making the change alone. The change comes for the first time in more than four decades, and it comes at a time when its relationships with its closest allies are somewhat strained.

When speaking of the changes in North Korea, even the most informed commentators at times speculate on its imminent collapse, pointing out its dire conditions of poverty and its difficulties with its allies. However, such speculation is unrealistic and unwarranted. The North Korean system that Kim I I Sung built is a resilient system that is capable of instituting reforms to strengthen itself. North Korea seldom makes abrupt adjustments or instant changes. Instead its changes are measured to last over time, and its reforms do improve the system.

It is safe to assume that the political power of North Korea has been transferred from Kim II Sung to Kim Jong-il, even though Kim II Sung still holds the top ceremonial positions in the party and the government. The elder Kim has been engaged in writing his personal memoirs these days,6 and Kim Jong-il effectively took over all

6 Kim II Sung has written, so far, three volumes of his memoirs. Kim II Sung, Hoegorok, Segi wa toburo [Memoirs, Along with the Times of the Century] (Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang ch’ulp’ansa, 1992-1 993). He will no doubt

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aspects of the operation of the party and the government. This process began in 1972 and has taken two decades to complete. The most important step in this process is the amendment to the North Korean constitution codifying the reforms.

The North Korean constitution of 1948 that founded the regime was completely rewritten in December 1972, and that constitution was revised for the first time in April 1992.’ If the 1972 North Korean constitution was tailor-made for Kim II Sung’s rule, the 1992 amendments to the constitution seem to have been made for Kim Jong-il. It created ways for Kim Jong-il legally to assume the position of Supreme Commander of the North Korean armed forces. Kim Jong-il was appointed Supreme Commander at the 19th Plenum of the 6th WPK on December 24, 1991, in violation, at the time, of Article 93 of the old constitution, which stipulated that the President of the Republic be the Supreme Commander. The amendments to the constitution separated the role of the President as the head of the government from that of the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, thus creating ways for Kim Jong-il to control the military while his father is still the President of the Republic. The amendments included a new provision that gave the Supreme People’s Assembly the right to recall the President of the Republic before his terms expires (Article 91, paragraph 5).’

There are a number of other amendments that need closer scrutiny, but the most important seem to be the amendments dealing with the North Korean military. New amendments were added to the old constitution about the importance of the national defense, a separate chapter on the military (Chapter 4, Articles 58-61), and

continue to write his memoirs in the future to cover his times as the leader of North Korea.

The amendments to the constitution were made at the Third Session of the 9th Supreme People’s Assembly on April 8, 1992, and were reported in Nodong Shinmun on April 9, 1992. See the full text in Gekkan Chosen shiryo (Vol. 33, No. 2, February 1993), pp. 8-24. This is a monthly publication published by Chosen Mondai Kenkyusho, a North Korean front organization in Japan. The Korean language version is available in T’ongil munje yon‘gu (Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1992), pp. 254-72.

The old constitution of 1972 gave the Supreme People’s Assembly the right to recall only Vice Presidents and not the President of the Republic (Article 76).


others on Politics, Economics, and Culture. Article 60 codified the longstanding North Korean military policies of arming the entire people, of fortifying the entire country, of training every soldier to become cadre, and of modernizing the military.g

Furthermore, the constitutional provisions governing the National Defense Commission (Articles 11 1-1 16) were given prominent position in Chapter 6, which dealt with the State Organizations. They were described even before those provisions governing the highest administrative organization of the state, the Central People’s Committee. This is an important change from the earlier constitutional provisions that had the National Defense Commission work within the Central People’s Committee.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-il has virtually no military experience, and heavy emphasis on the control of the armed forces may not be unusual. After his appointment as Supreme Commander in Decem- ber 1991, Kim Jong-il seems to have taken control of the military. On the alleged 60th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army in April 1992,’’ Kim Jong-il received a pledge of absolute loyalty from the entire North Korean armed forces, and he became the Marshal of the Korean People’s Army. Kim II Sung was given the title of Grand Marshal, and 0 Chin-u, the Minister of North Korean People’s Armed Forces, was also given the title of Marshal. In a festive mood, eight generals were promoted to Vice-Marshal and a host of generals were promoted to a higher rank.”

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The four military policies were adopted as early as the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Fourth Workers’ Party of Korea held in December 10-14, 1962. For a detailed explanation of the policies, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press,

The Korean People’s Army was founded on February 8, 1948, but since 1978, North Korea dates the origin of the North Korean army to the first organization of Kim I 1 Sung’s partisans in Manchuria on April 25, 1932. Counting from 1932, it is the 60th anniversary, but in truth, it is the 44th anniversary.

Ch’oe Kwang, Yi UI-sol, Chu To-il, Ch’oe In-dok, Paek Hak-nim, Yi Tu-ik, Kim Pong-yul, and Kim Kwang-jin were promoted to Vice-Marshals. Kim Jong-il also promoted 16 to the rank of General, 28 to Colonel General, 96 to Lieutenant General, 524 to Major General. See the editorial on the subject in Nodong Shinmun, April 25, 1992.

1988), pp. 211-23.

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What seems to have been signaled in the second half of 1992 was the gradual rise of the military. After the Third Session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly in April 1992, the military went along with Yon Hyong-muk’s conciliatory policy on domestic affairs and his efforts to work with international organizations, including the IAEA, by approving the Nuclear Safeguard Agreement, but the relaxed and more conciliatory policies brought nothing for North Korea. It seemed to have aroused unnecessary disturbances and unwarranted aspirations of the people at home and brought increas- ing difficulties abroad. At the 20th Plenum of the WPK in December 1992, some profound changes were made. Yon Hyong-muk was removed as Premier and replaced with Kang Song-san. Also appointed were a new President of the Central Court, Ch’oe Won-ik, and a new Procurator General, Yi Yong-sop. North Korea began to refuse foreign visitors, and restricted its citizens from traveling abroad. It also stopped dialogue with South Korea.

In an effort to strengthen Kim Jong-il’s rule, as well as to bring their regime back to more conservative footing, the North Koreans launched more than a few ideological campaigns. In December 1992, a huge conference of North Korean intellectuals was held to remind them that their fate in society depended upon the success of the North Korean style of socialism. The conference reminded them in no uncertain terms, stating that death awaits them if they abandon socialism.’* There were other conferences; one for North Korean Legal Workers in April 1992 to urge the people to observe the laws of the state, a clear warning against any dissident group. Another conference was held for education workers in September 1992, and still another for members of revolutionary families in October 1992. In an effort to save the North Korean young people from falling into the decadence of capitalism, the Eighth Congress of the League of the Socialist Working Youth (LSWY) was convened in February 1993. Delegates to the Congress representing five million members of the LSWY pledged their loyalty in support of the Kim Jong-il style of ~ocial ism.’~

12 For the proceedings of the conference, see Nodong Shinmun, December 10-14, 1992.

13 Less than four months earlier in October 1992, the League of the Socialist


North Korean Nuclear Weapons

The North Korean decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonprolif- eration Treaty on March 12, 1993, should be analyzed in the context of developments over at least the past five years in North Korea. It was not, as commonly alleged, an abrupt decision by an impetuous young leader of North Korea, fearing the revelation of its secret nuclear weapons program. It is a decision based upon the culmination of North Korean frustrations in dealing with South Korea, Japan, and the United States during the past five years. It is also a decision emanating from political changes in North Korea, more specifically from the rise of the militant and hawkish group to support the new political atmosphere in North Korea and its own brand of socialism under Kim Jong-il. It is also due to the failure on the part of the more conciliatory group to produce any meaningful results beneficial to North Korea from its negotiations with the South and other capitalist countries.

As to North Korean nuclear weapons, the heads of the two largest intelligence networks in the world, the United States and Russia, have already made statements to the effect that North Korea either already possesses or will have nuclear weapons in the near future. Evgeni Primakov, the head of the Russian KGB, in his news conference on January 28, 1993, emphasized that North Korea has the potential to develop nuclear weapons and will soon become a nuclear power. R. James Woolsey, new director of the American CIA, testified before the United States Congress that North Korea has produced enough plutonium to make at least one nuclear bomb, but it is hiding the production from international inspect~rs. ’~

It is futile to engage in a debate as to whether North Korea has produced one nuclear weapon or not. It is sufficient to follow the advice of the intelligence chiefs of the United States and Russia and

Working Youth held its 21st Plenum. It is unusual to see the League hold its Congress so soon after the Plenum. For the proceeding of the conference, see Nodong Shinmun, February 19, 1993.

14 Associated Press report from Washington, reported in Honolulu Star-Bulletin, February 24, 1993.

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assume that if North Korea does not have it already, it will have one in the near future. Everyone agrees that North Korea certainly has the potential to produce a nuclear device within the very near future. It takes only six to nine kilograms of plutonium to produce a nuclear bomb, and they have already admitted that they have produced a small amounj of plutonium. In addition, the North Korean nuclear program is self-supporting, and it has a long history. The nuclear plant at Yongbyon began as early as 1967, and North Korea does not need to import uranium, because their mines produce enough uranium to make bombs. In addition, they are currently building a large “Radio-chemical laboratory,” large enough to treat reprocessed uranium to produce pl~tonium.’~

The purpose of the IAEA special inspections, and of the American and South Korean proposal for mutual inspection, seems to be to determine whether North Korea at present possesses nuclear weapons or not. However, this determination alone is -not important if the United States, South Korea, or for that matter, the IAEA or even the United Nations, cannot stop the country from manufacturing the nuclear weapons. The more pertinent question is not whether North Korea has nuclear weapons or not but why they want to acquire them.

There are several issues related to this nuclear program that need to be clarified. The first is the imperfect world system that tries to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” With those who advocate the noble cause of peace in the world and denounce nuclear weapons or destructive weapons of any kind, North Korea could not agree more. If the family of nations in the world denounce the North

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For the history of North Korea’s nuclear program, see Tai Sung An, “The Rise and Decline of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Korea and World Affairs (Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1992), pp. 670-84. For the South Korean account of the North Korean nuclear facilities and capabilities, see a brief but succinct article by Yong Sun Song, North Korea’s Potential to Develop Nuclear Weap- ons, Vantage Point(Vo1. 14, No. 8, August 1991), pp. 1-10.

For an informative article on the subject, see Kim Tae-Woo, “Haek ui segye wa hanbando pihaekhwa ui ho wa sil,” T’ongil munje yon’gu (Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1991), pp. 187-223.


Korean nuclear program, they should also denounce those nine countries that already have nuclear weapons.

Why is it safe for countries such as Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa, for example, to possess nuclear weapons and not North Korea? How is it safe for the world as a whole for the big powers, such as the United States, England, and France, to continue to test in the atmosphere or underground and improve on their already huge stockpiles of nuclear armaments? While many may advocate nuclear-free zones in Asia, the countries that occupy the absolute majority of the land area of Asia, such as China, India, and Russia, already have nuclear weapons. How is this safe for the nearly half of the people of the world who live in Asia? To those who advocate a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons, it may be redundant to remind them that the United States had its nuclear weapons in South Korea for the past three decades or more, withdrawing them only in October 1991. Why is it that the question of a nuclear free Korean peninsula was not even raised during all that time? Why is it that American nuclear weapons are permissible on the Korean peninsula and not Korean nuclear weapons in Korea itself? These questions are raised not for the purpose of advocating or justifying the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, but to point out how imperfect the world system is in controlling potential nuclear proliferation in such other countries as Brazil, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in the future.

The second issue is the reasoning to acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea is launching a nuclear weapons program not because there is a loophole in the world security system but because it needs such weapons for its survival. It is important to address the cause of the problem. It is commonly alleged that North Korea, compared with South, has superior armed forces; more men in arms and more tanks and armored personnel carriers, etc.” Although these assess- ments come from official sources in the ROK and the United States, it is difficult to understand how a country like South Korea, which

17 See the accounts by the official South Korean and the United States military organizations. The Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1991- 7992 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1992). Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, October 1991.

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has twice the population and economic prowess nearly ten times that of the North, can not defend itself. It is true that the North attacked the South in 1950 to start the Korean War, but the North Koreans have not attacked for more than four decades, and the man who started the war is an old man in his eighties. South Korea is so afraid of the North that it has kept 40,000 United States armed forces stationed in the South for the past fifty years, and combined South Korean and United States forces of nearly 200,000 conducted the 1993 Team Spirit military exercises on the peninsula.

South Korea spends approximately four percent of its GNP, amounting to more than $10 billion for defense, and claim that North Korea spends nearly 30 percent of its national budget on defense. Even if this is true, the absolute amount North Korea spends on its military at 30 percent of its national budget would only be $5 billion, amounting to less than half of what South Korea spends. North Korea claims that it spent 12.3 percent of its national budget for the military in 1991, amounting to $2.1 billion, and 11.6 percent in 1992, amounting to $1.15 billion.'8 In addition, the United States provided the South with its nuclear umbrella for the past 35 years, from 1957 to 1991. In contrast, North Korea has been losing its closest allies; the Soviet Union collapsed and China was lured away by South Korea. It is the North, not the South, that is unable to defend itself now.

The third issue is the mismanagement of South Korean foreign policy, the so-called Northern Policy, of the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo. It was considered at one time a cornerstone of South Korean foreign policy, but it has contributed much to the difficulties of North Korea, leading to the unsuccessful conclusion of the North- South dialogue over the past five years from 1988-1993. It may have served the purpose of South Korean diplomacy to establish relations with socialist countries, but the South was oblivious to its impact on North Korea. South Korea applied relentless pressure during the period of its dialogues with the North, hoping that its successes with

18 The North Korean budget for fiscal 1992 was fixed at $18.5 billion. See the report in Nodong Shinmun, April 9,1992. For the details of North Korean military spending from 1972 to 1992, see Vantage Point (Vol. 15, No. 4, April 1992), pp. 22-24.


former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China will eventually bring down the regime in the North. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Blinded by its economic successes at home and by its diplomatic victories abroad, South Korea even calculated the cost of absorbing the North. In fact, what the Roh government did was to expand its diplomatic horizon in the international arena and win over the last few remaining traditional North Korean allies by promising lucrative economic rewards, including $3 billion to the Soviet Union and swift but large investments to China. The Soviet Union and the East European Socialist countries did not collapse because of the South Korean Northern Policy. The friendship of these countries could have been had without making such a negative impact on North Korea. Instead, South Korea not only failed to ascertain the changes in North Korea, but also lost golden opportunities during the past five years to deal more effectively with the conciliatory group in North Korea.

When Yon Hyong-muk signed the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea should have rewarded, not punished, the North. North Korea agreed in December 30, 1991, not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. It also pledged that it would not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. South Korea should have postponed its negotiations with China to normalize diplomatic relations, or urged Japan to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. For that matter, announcement of gradual withdrawal of the United States troops from South Korea or permanent abolition of the Team Spirit military exercises would have been constructive, but instead, Roh’s government was calculating the time until the collapse of the North Korean regime, and applied relentless pressure to open up North Korean society, trying to embarrass North Korea for its economic backward- ness. Indeed, Roh’s government wasted a golden opportunity to persuade North Korea to abandon or at least delay the production of nuclear weapons.

The fourth issue is the need. The reason for the North Korean nuclear weapons program is based on its need to survive. It is not

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to improve its power position vis-a-vis South Korea or to use nuclear blackmail in its international relations. It is not the purpose of the North Korean nuclear weapons program to engage in nuclear arms trade. Nor is it the intent of North Korea to use nuclear weapons as a “card” in negotiating with capitalist countries. North Korea thinks it needs such weapons for its survival. Therefore, the solution to the North Korean nuclear weapons program is not to apply further pressure by South Korea or the United States or the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council, but to solve the problem of North Korea’s security needs.

Compared with the South, the North is less fortunate, economi- cally backward, and its allies have either collapsed or sold out to the South Korean offer of money and investment. North Korea is in dire need of a friend who can help improve its economy and defend its policies in the international political arena. It had difficulties in the past with both the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and China in the late 1960s, but it always maintained one friend it could count on, either the Soviet Union or China. Today it has none. North Korea is incapable of attacking South Korea. In fact, the tables have turned; Kim II Sung launched an attack on South Korea in 1950 to reunify the country under communism, but his son is trying hard not to be absorbed by the South.

The Future of North Korea

It is always difficult to predict the future of the Korean peninsula. In the case of North Korea, it is difficult to analyze even the present, let alone the future. However, there are visible signs emanating from North Korea that need to be considered, and an attempt is made here to project a rational scenario, a realistic evaluation of the immediate future of North Korea.

The Future Political Atmosphere

In retrospect, the period of the past five years or so, from 1988 to the present, was the first time since the establishment of the government in Pyongyang that the North Koreans tried in earnest to open up relations with capitalist countries and tried in good faith to


negotiate with South Korea. The North may have been influenced by the collapse of the fraternal socialist countries and the visible economic changes the Chinese Communists were making to improve their economy. Also, Kim Jong-il may have wanted to try out the uncharted international waters to improve the North Korean image built by his father. Whatever the reason, the first effort seems to have ended with no visible gains, and North Korea once again shut its doors to the outside world.

Within the foreseeable future, perhaps to the end of this century, a conservative, hawkish group of a military persuasion will influence the course of North Korean politics. They will, of course, support Kim Jong-il, and wilt prepare for any disturbance caused by the death of Kim II Sung. It has been rumored already that North Korea has asked all foreigners to leave the country, and it refuses to admit anyone who is not directly related to the North Korean cause. It also restricted its own citizens from travel except for official party or government businesses.

The most important happening in North Korea within the next decade will of course be the political succession. Much speculation has been offered about the demise or the collapse of the North Korean regime once Kim II Sung dies, and the elimination of Kim Jong-il. Such speculation is wishful thinking on the part of those who oppose the Socialist system in North Korea. Kim Jong-il seems to be firmly ensconced in the leadership position in North Korea. There may be a minor disturbance when Kim II Sung dies, but Kim Jong-il will most likely succeed in suppressing any disturbances.

This conjecture is based upon several observations. First is the longevity of his father’s tutelage. Kim Jong-il was designated heir as early as 1972, and he has been an understudy for the past two decades. Second is the changes that North Korea has made to pro- mote Kim Jong-il. North Korea designated Kim Jong-il as Supreme Commander of its armed forces in December 1991 and it amended its constitution in April 1992 to accommodate his rule. Third is that most of the leaders of the party and government in North Korea have been replaced by younger leaders of the Kim Jong-il generation. It is not the partisan comrades of Kim II Sung, but their children, who are supporting Kim Jong-il to keep alive the glory of their fathers’

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revolutionary tradition. Fourth is that there are no organized opposi- tion groups in North Korea. Because Kim Jong-il has been groomed as a successor for so long, those who opposed the dynastic succession have been eliminated, and the entire people, be they intellectuals, students, or workers, are urged to support Kim Jong-il.

The constitutional amendments of April 1992 suggest that the North Korean military will regain a prominent position under the rule of Kim Jong-il. Because of the disturbances caused by the military leaders in 1968, at the time of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army and their purges shortly thereafter, the military leaders and armed forces were not promi- nently featured in the 1972 constitution of North Korea.”

The new constitution separated the role of the President and the role of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This amendment may imply that when Kim II Sung dies, Kim Jong-il may separate the role of the chairmanship of the party from that of the chief administrator of the government, thus adopting a collective leadership system in North Korea. In this way, Kim Jong-il can control the military and the party, while assigning the administration of the government to a person whom he can replace at will.

There may be other measures enabling Kim Jong-il to maintain the system. Kim Jong-il will try to improve economic conditions in North Korea to provide more and better goods for the people. The appointment of Premier Kang Song-san and the promotion of Kim Yong-sun and Kim Tal-hyon in December 1992 are indicative of Kim Jong-ills efforts to improve the North Korean economy. Also, Kim Jong-il increased the wages of laborers, technicians, and office workers 43.4 percent on his birthday in 1992.” In an effort to attract foreign investment in North Korea, Kim Jong-il passed an array of

19 For the details of the 1968 military disturbances and purges, see my earlier work, Kim / I Sung: The North Korean Leader, pp. 211-51.

20 Along with the increase in the wages of workers, welfare recipients were given a 50.7 percent increase, student scholarships went up 33 percent, and the government purchase price of rice from cooperative farms was increased 26.2 percent, while there was no change in the price of grain distribution. See, Nodong Shinmun, February 13, 1992.


joint-venture laws creating a more favorable atmosphere for foreign investors .”

However, such economic improvement in North Korea under Kim Jong-il should not bring political unrest. There are many signs that the party (WPK) has already begun a campaign to indoctrinate young people with ideology of the North Korean style of socialism. The March Issue of Kulloja, an organ of the WPK, carried an article by Kim Jong-il extolling the superiority of socialism over capitalism.22

Nuclear Weapons and the Security

There is little doubt that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons, if it has not already done so. The growing political, economic, and military imbalance between the North and South almost forces it to produce nuclear weapons for survival and for security. It is the only alternative to guarantee North Korea’s own style of socialism and to insure the continuation of Kim II Sung’s dynasty. All the negotiations and efforts on the part of the IAEA from 1991 to 1993 notwithstand- ing,23 North Korea will produce a nuclear device. In view of the rise of the military and the more conservative elements in North Korea, the choice seems obvious.

When the IAEA asked on February 25, 1993, for a special inspection of two additional sites, North Korea considered it harass- ment, and in its editorial in the Nodong Shinmun of March 6, 1993, said that when it joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it did not hand over North Korean sovereignty and entrust the international body with its security. It deplored the fact that respectable international organizations such as the IAEA and the United Nations are being used as a tool of the American imperialists. It accused the

21

22

23

For the text of the latest version of the North Korean foreign investment laws, see Pyongyang Times, October 31, 1992.

For the full text, see Ku//oja (March 1993). The text also appeared in Nodong Shinmun, March 4, 1993.

For a good review of the progress of the North Korean nuclear program and North Korean negotiation with the outside world, see Michael J. Mazarr, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The World Responds, 1989-1 992,” Korea and World Affairs (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1992), pp. 294-318.

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United States and South Korea of trying to inspect even the non- nuclear military facilities in North Korea.

It is questionable at the present juncture whether South Korea or any international organizations, including the United Nations, will be able to stop North Korea from going nuclear. If there was any opportunity to check the North Korean nuclear weapons program, it was during the past five years from 1988 to 1993. However, during this period, South Korea and the international community exerted maximum pressure, hoping for the collapse of the North Korean regime. The international community and South Korea is still consid- ering applying more pressure to North Korea to abandon the project, for example, by applying economic and diplomatic sanctions. Such sanctions will not work. How many countries are conducting meaningful commerce with North Korea today? North Korea is poor but it is self-sufficient. The greatest impact domestically for North Korea will be on its effort to attract foreign investments, but here again, how many countries are investing in North Korea today? Under the present circumstances, any economic sanctions will further strengthen the North Korean resolve to go it alone.

On the diplomatic front, North Korea is often accused of being isolated from the community of nations. North Korea has diplomatic relations with more than one hundred countries, and it is a member of the conference of nonaligned nations. Of course, the possession of nuclear weapons will preclude North Korean hopes for establishing diplomatic relations with Japan and other capitalist industrial countries, including the United States, but North Korea survived more than four decades without establishing diplomatic relations with these countries. Applying more pressure will not bring about relax- ation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Lessons should be learned from the mistakes of Roh’s government applying relentless pressure to bring North Korea to its knees.

The more appropriate question for the future is not how to stop North Korea from going nuclear but how to deal with nuclear North Korea. It should be obvious that South Korea, Japan, and the United States should build deterrent mechanisms to contain North Korean nuclear weapons. The United States may provide enough nuclear protection to satisfy both South Korea and Japan from developing


their own nuclear weapons. South Korea and Japan should not overreact to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, because by any standard of evaluation it is in the embryonic stage.

North Korea may feel secure with one atomic bomb, but it is as yet incapable of delivering it to Japan. It certainly will not use it against China or Russia, and it will think twice using it against South Korea because South Koreans, like themselves, are Koreans. The way to prevent North Korea from building a stockpile of nuclear weapons and deploying them is to help solve their most urgent need, the security and survival of the North Korean regime. When Russia and China learn the limits of South Korean economic assistance to or investments in their economies, they may want to return to a more cordial relationship with North Korea, and thus help alleviate some of the North Korean anxieties about their security.

Within the foreseeable future, the relationship between the North and South will be strained, but the greatest hope in the Korean peninsula for the balance of this century is the launching of a civilian government in the South. It is hoped that South Korea, with all its economic success and political democratization, will be more inno- vative and benevolent in dealing with its struggling brethren in the North. The Republic of Korea under the new civilian leadership in its domestic as well as foreign policies should first consider the impact its policies will have on North Korea.

north korea: the present and the futurekida.re.kr/data/kjda/rkjd_a_9464485_o.pdf · 2016-11-27 ·...

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