MATTER OF R-D-E-

Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office

DATE: OCT. 20,2016

APPEAL OF SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA FIELD OFFICE DECISION

APPLICATION: FORM I-601, APPLICATION FOR WAIVER OF GROUNDS OF INADMISSIBILITY

The Applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). A foreign national seeking to be admitted to the United States as an immigrant or to adjust status to lawful permanent residence must be admissible or receive a waiver of inadmissibility. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may grant this discretionary waiver if refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifYing relative or qualifYing relatives.

The USCIS Field Office Director, San Bernardino, California, denied the Form I-601. The Director concluded that the Applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act for crimes involving moral turpitude, specifically for two' convictions of Inflicting Corporal Injury to a Spouse/Cohabitant. The Director then determined that the Applicant had not established that denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to his spouse. The Director further determined that the Applicant had not established that he merited a favorable exercise of discretion.

The matter is now before us on appeal. On appeal, the Applicant submits additional evidence and claims that the Director erred by not addressing the hardship factors cumulatively and not considering hardship to the Applicant's stepson. The Applicant further claimed that the Director erred in weighing the adverse and positive factors. '

Upon de novo review, we will sustain the appe(ll. The record establishes that the Applicant has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime. As a result, he must show the existence of extraordinary circumstances that warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. Such circumstances may exist where denial of admission would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The evidence submitted, in totality, establishes that denial of the waiver would result in such hardship and that the positive factors in his case merit a favorable exercise of discretion.

I. LAW

The Applicant is seeking to adjust status to lawful permanent resident and has been found inadmissible for a crime involving moral turpitude, specifically for Inflicting Corporal Injury to a Spouse/Cohabitant. Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A), provides that any

Matter of R-D-E-

foreign national convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements, of a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime is inadmissible.

Individuals found inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act may seeks a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Section 212(h)(l)(B) of the Act provides for a discretionary waiver if denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter.

Decades of case law have contributed to the meaning of extreme hardship. The definition of extreme hardship "is not ... fixed and inflexible, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999) (citation omitted). Extreme hardship exists "only in cases of great actual and prospective injury." Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (BIA 1984). An applicant niust demonstrate that claimed hardship is realistic and foreseeable. I d.; see also Matter of Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968) (finding that the respondent had not demonstrated extreme hardship where there was "no showing of either present hardship or any hardship ... in the foreseeable future to the respondent's parents by reason of their alleged physical defects"). The common consequences of removal or refusal of admission, which include "economic detriment ... [,] loss of current employment, the inability to maintain one's standard of living or to pursue a chosen profession, separation from a family member, [and] cultural readjustment," are insufficient alone to constitute extreme hardship. Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted); but see Matter of Kao and Lin, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing Matter of Pilch on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which the qualifying relatives would relocate). Nevertheless, all "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 882 (BIA 1994) (citations omitted). Hardship to the Applicant or others can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. Matter of Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 471 (BIA 2002).

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Applicant claims that his spouse and son would experience extreme hardship if the waiver application is denied. The Applicant does not contest the finding of inadmissibility for crimes involving moral turpitude, a determination which is supported by the record. 1 We also find

1 The record establishes that in 1998, the Applicant was convicted under California Penal Code (Cal. Penal Code) § 273.5(a) of Inflicting Corporal Injury to a Spouse/Cohabitant. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and probation for 3 years. In 2008, he was convicted under Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a) of Inflicting Corporal Injury to a Spouse/Cohabitant. The court sentenced him to 60 days in jail and probation for 36 months. Although not addressed by the Director, in 2007, the Applicant was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. However, as the Applicant is inadmissible due to his other convictions, we will not address whether this 2007 conviction qualifies as one for a crime involving moral turpitude.

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the Applicant has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime and thus must establish extraordinary circumstances warranting approval of the waiver. The Applicant asserts that he has shown such extraordinary circumstances insofar as denial would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and he further claims that the positive factors in his case, including evidence of his rehabilitation, warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.

The record consists of statements from the Applicant' s spouse, family members, and former partner; marriage and birth certificates; letters of support from family and community members; employment documentation; school records; certificates; medical and psychological records; tax and financial records; and reports on Mexico. The record also contains copies of immigration documents, photographs, insurance documents, divorce documents, and criminal records.

After considering all the evidence in the record, we find that the Applicant has established that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship, that denial of the waiver would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and that there are sufficient positive factors in his to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.

A. Hardship

The Applicant must demonstrate that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative or qualifying relatives, in this case, the Applicant's spouse and stepchild. The Applicant claims that his spouse and child would experience extreme hardship whether they remained in the United States without him or relocated with him to Mexico.

Regarding hardship from relocation, the Applicant's spouse asserts that his stepson, born in is being treated for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and in Mexico they would not be able to afford his treatment. The Applicant submitted a letter from a physician stating that his stepson receives treatment for ADHD. He also submitted evidence stating that his stepson had gone from special education classes and failing school to obtaining good grades in mainstream classes, but

In Mora/es-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a conviction for corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant under Cal. Penal Code § 273.5 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, as the statute reaches acts against individuals with a broad range of relationships to the perpetrator, some of wh ich "are more akin to 'strangers or acquaintances, which ... [does] not necessarily [trigger] a crime involving moral turpitude." ' Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that a modified categorical inquiry is required to determine if an offense under California Penal Code § 273.5 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. The modified categorical · inquiry looks to the limited, specified set of documents that comprise what is known as the record of conviction - the charging document, a signed plea agreement, jury instructions, guilty pleas, transcripts of a plea proceeding and the judgment - for the purpose of determining which alternative element formed the basis of the conviction. See Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1294, 1300-02 (9th Cir. 20 14). Here, the indictment for the Applicant' s 2008 conviction charges him with inflicting corporal injury on his spouse. The infliction of bodily harm upon a person society views as deserving of special protection, such as a domestic partner, is considered an aggravating circumstance that supports a finding of moral turpitude. See, e.g. , Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996) (willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or parent of the offender' s child).

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that his grades have fallen again since the Applicant's waiver was denied. The Applicant asserts that his stepson would suffer emotional hardship if he relocates to Mexico because he was born and raised in the United States, is unfamiliar with Mexico, and is not fluent in Spanish. In support of this hardship claim he cites Matter of Kao and Lin, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 50 (BIA 2001). In that case, the Board oflmmigration Appeals (the Board) found that a 15:..year-old child who lived her entire life in the United States, who was completely integrated into the American lifestyle, and who was not fluent in Chinese, would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Taiwan. !d. We find that the Board's decision is relevant here. The Applicant's year-old stepson has lived his entire life in the United States and would be uprooted at a critical stage in his education and social development and required to survive in a Spanish-only environment in Mexico. When considered cumulatively, the evidence in the record therefore demonstrates that the Applicant's stepson would experience extreme hardship ifhe relocates to Mexico.

B. Discretion

A favorable exercise of discretion is limited for applicants who have been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), which codified for purposes of section 212(h)(2) of the Act the discretionary standard first applied to section 209( c) waiv~rs by the Attorney General in Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002), limits the favorable exercise of discretion with respect to those inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) of the Act on account of a violent or dangerous crime,, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which denial of the application would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The regulation provides further that depending on the gravity of the underlying criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act.

The words "violent" and "dangerous" and the phrase "violent or dangerous crimes" are not further defined in the regulation or case law. A "crime of violence" is an aggravated felony pursuant to section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16. However, the Attorney General declined to reference either section oflaw or the definition of"crime of violence" in 8 C.F.R. § 212. 7( d). In the interim rule, the Department of Justice noted that while individuals convicted of aggravated felonies generally would not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion, the rule would not contain an explicit connection to avoid "unduly constraining the ... discretion to render waiver decisions on a case-by-case basis." 67 Fed. Reg. 78675, 78677-78 (Dec. 26, 2002).

Pursuant to this discretionary authority, we understand "violent or dangerous crimes" according to plain and common meanings of the terms "violent" and "dangerous." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), for example, defines violent as 1) "[ o ]f, relating to, or characterized by strong physical force," 2) "[r]esulting from extreme or intense force," or 3) "[v]ehemently or passionately threatening." It defines dangerous as "perilous, hazardous, [or] unsafe," or "likely to cause serious bodily harm." In determining whether a crime is a violent or dangerous crime for purposes of discretion, we are not limited to a categorical inquiry but may consider both the statutory elements

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and the nature of the actual offense. See Torres- Valdivias v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 114 7, 1152 (9th Cir. 2015); Waldron v. Holder, 688 F.3d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 2012).

We find that under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), the crime of Inflicting Corporal Injury to a Spouse/Cohabitant is a violent or dangerous crime. In 1998, at the time of the Applicant's first conviction, section 273.5 of the California Penal Code provided that:

(a) Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or any person who willfully inflicts upon any person with whom he or she is cohabiting, or any p~rson who willfully inflicts upon any person who is the mother or father of his or her child, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony ....

(c) As used in this section, "traumatic condition" means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force.

At the time of his second conviction, the statute provided that:

(a) Any person who willfully inflicts upon a person who is his or her spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of his or her child, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony ....

(c) As used in this section, "traumatic condition" means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force.

The statutes require the willful use of physical force and infliction of a wound or injury to the body. As stated above, 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is triggered by crimes that may cause serious harm or are otherwise unsafe or hazardous. From the statute itself, there is ample reason to conclude that the Applicant's convictions were, at a minimum, for .crimes that were hazardous, unsafe, or dangerous and therefore subject him to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d).

Since the Applicant has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime, he must show that "extraordinary circumstances" warrant approval of the waiver. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). Extraordinary circumstances may exist in cases involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or if the denial of the applicant's admission would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. !d. Finding no evidence of foreign policy, national security, or other extraordinary

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equities in this case, we will consider whether he has "clearly demonstrate[ d] that the denial of ... admission as an immigrant would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." !d.

In Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001), the Board determined that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship "must be 'substantially' beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country." However, tbe applicant need not show that hardship would be unconscionable. !d. at 60-61. The Board stated that in assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, it would be useful to consider the factors considered in determining extreme hardship. !d. at 63. Those factors include, but are not limited to, a qualifying :t:elative's family ties in the United States and in the country to which he or she would relocate; the conditions in the country in the country of relocation; the financial consequences of departing the United States; and significant medical conditions, especially where appropriate health care services would be unavailable in the country of relocation. Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999); see also Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596, 597-98 (BIA 1978).

In Monreal-Aguinaga, the Board provided additional examples of the hardship factors it deemed relevant for meeting the higher standard of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship:

[T]he ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives. For example, an applicant who has elderly parents in this country who are solely dependent upon him for support might well have a strong case. Another strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school. A lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. As with extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

23 I&N Dec. at 63-64. The Board has also noted that "the relative level of hardship a person might suffer cannot be considered entirely in a vacuum. It must necessarily be assessed, at least in part, by comparing it to the hardship others might face." Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). Even where an Immigration Judge has found that a respondent's children "would suffer hardship of an emotional, academic and financial nature," and would "face complete upheaval in their lives and hardship that could conceivably ruin their lives," id. at 321, the Board has held that such hardships "are simply not substantially different from those that would normally be expected upon removal to a less developed country." !d. at 324.

However, in Matter of Gonzalez Recinas, the Board clarified that "the hardship standard is not so restrictive that only' a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief." 23 I&N Dec. 467, 470 (BIA 2002). The Board found that the hardship factors presented by the respondent-including her "heavy financial and

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familial burden ... the lack of support from her children's father, [her U.S.] citizen children's unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, the lawful residence in this country of all of [her] immediate family, and the concomitant lack of family in Mexico"-cumulatively amounted to exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her qualifying relatives. !d. at 4 72. The Board emphasized that the case was "on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in which the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard will be met." !d. at 470.

Because this finding was not addressed in the Director's decision, we informed the Applicant in a notice of intent to dismiss (NOID) letter that evidence in the record demonstrated that his convictions were for violent or dangerous crimes. In the NOID, we explained to the Applicant that he would have to show hardship rising to the higher level of exceptional and extremely unusual. We informed him that the existing record did not meet this higher standard and consequently provided him the opportunity to submit additional evidence to rebut our determination. The Applicant responded to our NOID with new evidence of his rehabilitation and of his family's current financial, legal, psychological, and educational circumstances. As previously stated, we have considered all the evidence in reaching our decision.

In response to the NOID, the Applicant submitted court records showing that his 2008 conviction was set aside under Cal. Pen. Code§ 1203.4, which provides that:

(a)(1) In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any other case lin which a court, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time after the termination of the period of probation, if he or she is not then serving a sentence for any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged with the commission of any offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he or she has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and, in either case, the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as noted below, he or she shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code ....

Under the current statutory definition of"conviction" set forth in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, "a state action that purports to abrogate what would otherwise be considered a conviction, as the result of the application of a state rehabilitative statute, rather than as the result of a procedure that vacates a conviction on the merits or on grounds relating to a statutory or constitutional violation, has no effect in determining whether an alien has been convicted for immigration purposes." Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 527 (BIA 1999). Any subsequent rehabilitative action that overturns a state conviction, other than on the merits or for a violation of constitutional or statutory rights in the

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underlying criminal proceedings, does not expunge a conviction for immigration purposes. See id. at 523,. 528; see also Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003) (reiterating that if a conviction is vacated for reasons unrelated to a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the alien remains "convicted" for immigration purposes), reversed on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).

Section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code does not remove the immigration consequences of a conviction and sentence: relief is conditioned, in part, on the absence of charges, sentences, or terms of probation for any other offense, and relief does not remove all the consequences of the conviction. See Ramirez-Castro v. INS., 287 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A]ssuming that some state expungement statutes could eliminate completely the immigration consequences of a state conviction, California Penal Code section 1203.4 is not such a statute . . . because it does not eliminate all consequences of a conviction even under California law."). Further, the record does not indicate that the conviction was set aside on account of an underlying procedural or constitutional defect in the merits of the case. Finally, the Applicant' s 1998 conviction for the same offense remains undisturbed. Consequently, the Applicant' s evidence that his 2008 conviction was set aside does not rebut our determination that he has been convicted of~ violent or dangerous crime, and he must show that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship would result from denial of his Form 1-601.

We previously_ determined that the Applicant's stepson would suffer extreme hardship if he were to be relocated to Mexico and required to survive in a Spanish-only environment at this critical stage in his education and social development. However, we explained in' our NOID that the existing record contained insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the child's hardship would rise to that of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. We also stated that the Applicant had not demonstrated that he would be unable to afford his son' s ADHD treatment in Mexico. In response, the Applicant submitted a letter from a psychologist licensed and practicing in Mexico, which describes her recommended evaluation and treatment plan for the Applicant's son. The plan includes 3 to 6 months of therapy to address the intellectual, emotional, and conduct (behavioral) aspects relating to the child's ADHD, at a total cost of78,000 Mexican pesos, or approximately $4,144. The Applicant also submitted recent statements from his savings account. In our NOID, we stated that the savings account held approximately $20,000, which could help ease the family ' s transition to Mexico. However, the Applicant's most recent statement shows that the account now holds only $4,626. His spouse states that they have withdrawn from the account to cover household expenses since the Applicant has been unable to work. The Applicant has also submitted documentation showing that his son's current treatment for ADHD is subsidized by School records submitted in response to the NOID show that his son's grades have declined significantly since the Applicant' s Form I-601 was denied. In totality, the evidence indicates that the Applicant's son has already experienced hardship as a result of the denial of the Form I -601, that his condition is exacerbated by the stress of the Applicant's uncertain immigration status, and that his family-already unable to afford private treatment in the United States-would be unable to afford the recommended treatment for his condition if they relocated to Mexico. Accordingly, the record shows that the Applicant's son would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the waiver is denied.

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Having found extraordinary circumstances, we must balance the adverse factbrs evidencing the Applicant's undesirability as a lawful permanent resident, taking into account the gravity of the violent or dangerous crime, with all factors presented, including the extraordinary circumstances, to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion is in the best interests of the United States. See generally Matter of Mendez-Moralez, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 300 (BIA 1996).

The negative factors in the Applicant's case are serious, as he has been convicted of a violent or dangerous crime for inflicting corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant, as previously discussed. The nature of the offense, including the protected class of victim and its classification as a felony, is evidence of its severity. Moreover, the Applicant was convicted of this offense on two separate occasions over a 10 year period. The Applicant ,also has a conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor, as noted above. Other unfavorable factors include the Applicant's periods of unauthorized presence and employment in the United States and prior placement into removal proceedings ..

The Applicant also presents evidence of mitigating and positive factors which he asserts offset the negative factors. Regarding his crimina] convictions, the Applicant submitted an affidavit from his former partner, who was the victim on each occasion. In her affidavit, she states that the two incidents leading to his arrests were the only times that the Applicant was violent towards her, that the Applicant was remorseful, and that they continued to live together after each incident. His ex­partner's affidavit provid~s no details of the Applicant's actions or the resulting injuries and does not absolve him of the violence that he inflicted. However, his ex-partner's willingness to submit an affidavit on behalf of the Applicant, in support of his efforts to remain in the United States, constitutes at least some evidence in his favor. The Applicant also provided records of the order setting aside his 2008 conviction under a rehabilitative statute, as previously discussed. Further, the Applicant has submitted other substantial evidence of his rehabilitation, including letters from his current spouse and her children and parents. The letters state that the Applicant has always been kind to his spouse and her family, and that he has never shown anger or aggression towards them. The Applicant has documentation of his certification as a and his registration in the State of California Department of

process, and letters of support describe his involvement with

Other positive factors include the Applicant's ties to his spouse and her family. In their letters, they describe other ways in which he has positively impacted their lives, such as supporting his spouse and step-daughter's educations, helping his father-in-law control his drinking, and being a father figure to his stepson and other stepchildren. The Applicant also provided evidence of his community ties with letters of support on his behalf of from friends, former employers, and his church. The letters describe him as responsible, helpful, and trustworthy. He has also continued his own education, as shown by records of his emollment and participation in GED and ESL programs as well as Bible studies.

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The evidence as a whole shows that the Applicant has made ongoing and successful efforts to control the factors that contributed to his past bad conduct, to serve his family, and to help others in his community. There is no evidence indicating encounters with law enforcement or aggressive conduct since his arrest in 2008. After weighing all the factors presented, including the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship that would result if the application is .denied, we conclude that a favorable exercise of discretion is merited.

III. CONCLUSION

The Applicant has the burden of proving eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility. See section 291 of the Act. The Applicant has met that burden. He has shown that denial of the waiver would result in not merely extreme, but exception and extremely unusual hardship, and that he has made successful efforts to rehabilitate himself and to contribute to his family and his community, meriting a grant of relief.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

Cite as Matter of R-D-E-, ID# 121652 (AAO Oct. 20, 2016)

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