Hypatia vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall 2012) by Hypatia, Inc.

Subjected Subjects? On Judith ButlersParadox of Interpellation

NOELA DAVIS

Judith Butlers theory of the constitution of subjectivity conceptualizes the subject as aperformative materialization of its social environment. In her theory Butler utilizes LouisAlthussers notion of interpellation, and she critiques the constitutive paradoxes to whichits tautological framing leads. Although there is no pre-existing subject, as it is consti-tuted in the turn to the interpellative hail, Butler nonetheless theorizes a guilt and com-pulsion acting on an individual that compels his or her turn to answer the hail. Thereis a price to pay for subjectivity in Butlers schema: the reprimand of the interpellativelaw that punishes at the same time as it constitutes. But a return to Althussers textfinds that he does not rely so much on coercion and guilt in his explanation of the sub-jects answer to the hail. Althusser can instead be read as suggesting that we are alreadyan instantiation and enactment of power-ideology and, to paraphrase Michel Foucault,are already the principle of our own subjection. This contests the notion that we arein any way compelled to submit to an external, punitive force to become subjects. Assubjects, we are always-already the embodiment of the field of society-power-ideology.

Judith Butlers work presents a continuing challenge to the notion of the subjectas a given and self-contained, bounded entity that somehow internalizes anexternal social system. She instead proposes a subject as a performative (re)mate-rialization of its social environment. Through this she offers the possibility forre-envisioning subjects as intimately entangled within their contexts as performa-tive materializations of social values and norms. In her investigation of the per-formative materialization of the subject and its entry into intelligibility, Butlerexamines Louis Althussers notion of interpellation as, she notes, it still underliesmuch contemporary theorization of subject-formation (Althusser 1971; Butler1997b, 106). Indeed, a theory of interpellation forms the basis for her own workon performativity and subjectivity.

Butlers account of Althussers work will be examined, along with my reread-ing of Althussers own figuring of the interpellative process. Butler presents avision of the subject in Althussers work as a subjugated being, compelled intosubmission and the acceptance of its subjectifying conditions: paradoxically, atonce the site of subordination and, from this, of agency. By going back toAlthussers work, can we find a way to conceptualize subjectivity without thenecessarily negative and restrictive vision that is found in Butlers narrative? Cana reconsideration of Althussers essay shed light on what Butler has identified asthe constitutive paradoxes of subjection? I argue here that ambiguities in Althus-sers text enable it to support an alternative view of subjectivity to that of Butler.In so doing, it can allow us to theorize a materialization of subjectivity that doesnot depend on the notions of subjugation, guilt, and submission that are atten-dant on Butlers rendition, one that offers a more open, welcoming view of whatit is to be a subject.

THE INTERPELLATION OF THE SUBJECT

The potential of interpellation as the basis for a performative theory of subjectiv-ity lies in its being a naming that constitutes the subject it so names. There is nosubject before this naming; that is, interpellation does not describe a pre-existingor given subject which then internalizes or appropriates its subjectifying condi-tions. Instead, interpellation gives an account of the genesis of the subject; thatis, of the subject as an already subjectified, and thus social, being.

In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler examines Althussers scenario of interpel-lation, aiming to give a symptomatic reading of his text, a reading that willshow the invisible within it (Butler 1997b, 113). The scene of interpellationthat Butler critiques in Althusser describes a hailing that transforms individualsinto subjects (Althusser 1971, 174). In his example, a policeman in the streetcalls out Hey, you there! The mysterious qualities of this call are revealed asAlthusser observes that the one so hailed turns around in response, and ninetimes out of ten it is the right one who turns. In turning, the respondentbecomes a subject by recognizing that the hail was really addressed to him(17475; original emphasis). In her reading, Butler highlights the enigmatic nat-ure of such a suggestion, noting the paradoxical elements of these processes ofsubject-formation (subjectivation) (Butler 1997b, 1). This arises because, indescribing this scene, we must speak as if there is something that responds andturns to answer the hail, yet because interpellation constitutes the subject, thereis no subjectno whoto hear and respond to the call. In giving this accountwe must thus refer to what does not yet exist (4), and are confronted with thedifficulty of explaining what turns to answer, how it recognizes the call, andwhy it turns.

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This paradox is found in the very words we must use to talk of subject-forma-tion. The term subjection (or assujettisement)the process of becoming a sub-jecthas a double meaning. Butler explains that:

assujettisement means both subjection (in the sense of subordina-tion) and becoming a subject. It seems as well to contain the par-adox of power as it both acts upon and activates a body. If theword subjection (assujettisement) has two meanings, to subordinatesomeone to power and to become a subject, it presupposes thesubject in its first meaning, and induces the subject in its second.Is there a contradiction here, or is it a paradoxa constitutiveparadox? (Butler 2002, 1617; see also Butler 1997b, 83)1

This problem retains a contemporary relevance as it still recurrently structuresthe debate of subject-formation (Butler 1997b, 10); Butler herself examines anduses such an interpellative scenario in her theorizations of the performative nat-ure of subjectivity.

The narrative of subject-formation is thus a circular one that must assumethe subject that it seeks to explain (Butler 1997b, 11). To help illuminate thisperplexing situation, Butler cautions that we must not suppose that the sub-ject is substitutable for the individual or the person (10). Individuals mustbe first established in language to be intelligible; that is, they must becomesubjected/subjectivated through the interpellative process (11). The interpella-tive naming is, for Butler, the individuals entry into intelligibility and its guar-antee of existence and legibility. Accounts of interpellation present animpossible scene, that of a body or individual that is, strictly speaking, notaccessible to us, but that nevertheless becomes accessible on the occasion ofan interpellation that does not discover this body, but constitutes it funda-mentally (Butler 1997a, 5). Individual is thus not a term we can reallymake sense of as individuals acquire their intelligibility by becoming sub-jects (Butler 1997b, 11). Any mention of individuals presents this impossiblesituation, where we must implicitly presume, in advance, the subjects they willbecome.

In extensive analyses of the interpellative scenario in her works, Butler ablydemonstrates the workings of these self-referential circuits in which we becomeentangled when using a theory of subject-formation based on such a scene. Shegives an informed and well argued examination of the difficulties and impossibili-ties encountered when giving this account of subjection; for Althussers scene isenigmatic, and Butler explains its implications with great facility. However, whatI want to question in Butlers analyses are the reasons that she puts forward inresponse to the problem of why the subject turns to answer the call, and of whatshe sees as implicit in the nature of the naming that constitutes the subject insubjection.

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In her reading of interpellation, Butler concentrates on the implications ofthe policemanthe lawhailing the passer-by in the street. She considers thatAlthusser casts the hail as a unilateral act that harnesses the power and forceof the law to compel fear at the same time that it offers recognition at anexpense (Butler 1993, 121). There is a price to pay for our interpellation as sub-jects, and it is reprimand and subjugation. Butler asks, does this subjectivationtake place as a direct effect of the reprimanding utterance or must the utterancewield the power to compel the fear of punishment and produce a complianceand obedience to the law? (12122).

Butlers account conceives the hail as an external, compelling force thatcomes to us from the law, and constitutes us in subjection and compliance. AsAlthusser uses the scenario of a policeman hailing, Butler further considers thatthe call is an authoritative demand to align oneself with the law through theappropriation of guilt (Butler 1997b, 107). Why, though, are we guilty and whywould we accept this guilt? And is this guilty imperative necessary to a readingof Althusser? He places much less emphasis on the role of guilt, intimating thatinterpellation is a much more mysterious operation than simple guilt would sug-gest (Althusser 1971, 174). Butler herself notes that Althusser does not give rea-sons as to why the individual turns around (Butler 1997b, 5); the suppositionthat guilt underlies this turn arises in Butlers own symptomatic reading.

In working through the problem of why we turn, Butler proposes that thereexists a prior readiness or desire whereby the subject-to-be is already in complic-ity with the law that brings it into being. She asks [w]hat kind of relationalready binds these two such that the subject knows to turn. .. a prior complicitywith the law without which no subject emerges? (Butler 1997b, 107). Butlerwants to see the motivation for the turn in response to the call as a function ofcircuits of a prior guilt, in a readiness to accept guilt and retribution as the priceof the conferral of identity. Her insistence on this leads her to theorize a found-ing submission (111, 112) based on this guilt, and it is from this acceptance ofguilt that, for her, subjectivity and identity arise.

To build her argument for the role of guilt, Butler addresses the failure ofinterpellationmisrecognitionand the circuits of desire that this encompasses.Misrecognition is always a possibility of the interpellative processes: we may mis-hear, not hear, fail to turn, turn when it is not us that is called (Butler 1997b,95). After all, Althusser only vouches that nine out of ten responses are correct(Althusser 1971, 174). The importance of misrecognition for Butler is twofold:the totalizing desire it initiates is necessary for our continued subjectivity; andbecause we can never be the totalized and completed subject promised by inter-pellation, the agential gap that is opened by this constitutive failure of inter-pellation enables not just continued attempts to confirm the interpellation, butalso resistance to this naming. The very processes that demand our submission atthe same time enable our resistance, with our agency being produced within this

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system of subjection, misrecognition, and desire (Butler 1997b, 12; see also But-ler 1993, 122).

To further this argument, Butler draws analogies with the misrecognition ofthe (Lacanian) mirror stage, that desire for the false totalization that she consid-ers is essential to, and initiates, our sociality (Butler 1997b, 112). This desire isfor the totalization offered by the law. It is, Butler claims, Althussers implicationthat social existence can be guaranteed only by the law. Interpellation is the callof/from the law: by this reasoning it was thus not accidental that Althusser chosethe policeman to illustrate his account. For Butler, this means that social exis-tence is purchased only through a guilty embrace of the law (112). We arewilling to suffer reprimand and accept subjection in return for the intelligibilitythat subjectivity brings us. As it is the law that makes social existence possible,we, already desirous of existence, will pay the price and admit our guilt (by turn-ing in response to the call). This admission ensures that the law must interveneand so guarantee our existence. We thus must be guilty. Our plea to the lawmust be heard so that our subjectivity and intelligibility is granted.

Has Butler adequately made her case that we must pay a price for the confer-ral of our subjectivity? In other works Butler also examines our (non) compliancewith the terms of our interpellation, and a brief overview of these can illuminatethe operations of resistance in her theorizations. It must be stressed that it is notthe notion of performativity and resistance per se that is being questioned. But-lers notion of performativity extensively examines the important possibilitiesthat its reiterative nature allows for theorizing disobedience, resistance, and non-conformitythat is, nonacceptance or redirecting of the interpellative naming(see Butler 1993; 1997a; 2004). Butlers argument that precisely because the sub-ject does not perform any iteration exactly allows the subject to embody itselfdifferently is one of the strengths of performativity as a theory of subjectivity.

What I want to open to question is Butlers assumption that force, coercion,and totalizing normative imperatives (for instance, the guilty embrace of thepunitive law in the Psychic Life of Power or compulsory heterosexuality in BodiesThat Matter) necessarily accompany the terms of the hailing and, thus, its perfor-mative re-enactments. I would further suggest that the guilt, force, and compul-sion that Butler finds in Althusser is not something essential to his text, butcomes from Butlers overall investments in her theory of the performative pro-cesses of subject-formation.

The idea that subjectivity comes at a price is reiterated in works such as BodiesThat Matter (1993) and Undoing Gender (2004) where Butler gives us accounts ofthe lived experience of being subjected to a subjugating regime. In these books,Butler again talks of the coercive nature of the norms that constitute us (that is,name or authorize us and make us intelligible) and at the same time constrain us.Gender norms, she says, have a constitutive and compelling status throughwhich the materiality of sex is forcibly produced. Sex, too, is a normative and

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regulatory practice that produces bodies as it governs them. It is forciblymaterialized through time in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexualimperative (Butler 1993, 12). Such normative regulations impose compulsoryheterosexuality (74). Indeed, the embodying of norms is a compulsory practice(231); it compels the directionality of sexuality and subjectivity such thattheir productive power is never fully free from regulation (95).

Whereas Butler presents an account of norms as productive of, and indeedessential for, our social existence, she sees normativity as having a double mean-ing, as norms both enable and constrain life. As well as guiding and orientingour aims and aspirations, norms are also, for Butler, imbued with a necessarilynegative side: they normalize, govern, and compel us; they do us a constitutiveviolence. Norms define what is intelligible and provide coercive criteria for nor-mal men and women. If we defy these norms, Butler claims, it is unclearwhether we are still living (Butler 2004, 206).

For Butler, the norms that constitute us are regulatory and law-like standardsthat force compliance by the threat of punishment for noncompliance. Thosewho successfully approximate the standards, or submit to the law, matter (bothmaterialize and have meaning); that is, they are intelligible subjects. Thosedeemed to be not properly gendered, for instance, fail to approximate these normsclosely enough to matter. So within this regime only some bodies come to mat-ter, and this mattering is produced by the repeated and violent circumscriptionof cultural intelligibility as it works within heterosexual hegemony (Butler 1993,xxii). It is this that gives subjectivity its constitutive violence for Butler. Yet it isnot only those who do not matter properly who suffer it. According to Butlerslogic, not-mattering, or abjection, is the constitutive exclusion that gives defini-tion to our (acceptable) subjectivities within the norm. We cannot dissociate our-selves from the brutality of abjection because it is constitutive of our own being.We matter because another does not. The price we pay for our subjectivity is tolive as coerced beings with violence at the core of our selves.

Butler thus theorizes norms as repressive and somehow purposeful interpellat-ing actions that impinge on the subject and direct subjectivitys development tothe norms own violent and constraining purposes. They designate in advancewhat will and will not be a livable existence (Butler 2004, 206). The suggestionthat there exists a prior aim in these subjectivating actions raises another ques-tion to consider in rereading Althussers text: is there any sense of determinationinherent in his elaborations of interpellation?

ALTHUSSERS PERFORMATIVE

I will also approach Althussers text in a symptomatic way to see if it can suggestanother way of theorizing subjectivity, one without an inaugural moment that is

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necessarily of compulsion, authorization, and purpose. While Althussers essaydoes, as Butler points out (Butler 1997b, 116), speak of subjects having to besubmitted to the ruling ideology to reproduce or materialize their social circum-stances, Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), the instruments of interpellation,work massively and predominantly through ideology rather than coercion. Thatis, although there may be repression associated with an ISA, it can also be verysubtle in its actions (Althusser 1971, 14546). And as Althusser goes on torefine his notion of ideology, ideologys own identity, action, and locationbecomes open to question.

How, then, does Althusser narrate the mysterious events that surround theresponse to the policemans hail? He knows that the hailing sets up an impossi-ble scene, one that leads to the paradoxical situation that Butler has pointed out(Butler 1997b, 1, 4; see above). As it is his contention that the subject is consti-tuted in the turn (Althusser 1971, 174) and thus cannot pre-exist the call, howdoes he explain the scene of interpellation?

His resolution begins with the observation that the sequential appearance ofhis narrative was of the nature of a sleight of hand, necessary for our understand-ing of the initial setting of the scene:

[n]aturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoreticaltheatre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence,with a before and an after, and thus in the form of a temporalsuccession. But in reality these things happen without any suc-cession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpella-tion of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.(Althusser 1971, 17475)

This, obviously, is not the end of the discussion, as this statement on its owndoes not elaborate on the terms of interpellation, and the paradoxical scene thatButler critiques has not been fully illuminated. This declaration still makes men-tion of an individual, and there is still the need to explain what ideologythisthing that interpellates usis. So to better understand Althussers position, weneed to takes several steps back in his argument, to trace how he weaves thesevarious terms into his theory. The performative nature of his conceptualization isalso shown as he works through his arguments.

What we find in Althussers extended thesis is a continuation of the self-referential circularity of the original scene of interpellation, where there is atautological character to his elaborations as he refines his definitions of theterms. His conceptualizations confound any ordinary notion of causalsequence, just as was found in the scene of the policemans hailing of thesubject. What is given to us is a performative account of the subject and itsinterpellation by ideology, but without yet a definition of what Althussermeans by these terms.

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To arrive at a closer notion of the subject and ideology, Althusser starts withideas. These, we find, are not ideal or spiritual (Althusser 1971, 165) but have amaterial existence; that is, they exist in the actions and ritual practices of thesubject said to have these ideas. This, however, is not simply to suggest thatthe subject has an idea and then acts on it, for this is to write a clear causalchain into the formulation. Instead, ideas are the subjects material actionsinserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves definedby the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject (16869; original emphasis). There is no one-way causality in this account, as eachpart of the description already anticipates or assumes its other parts, and each isintimately entangled within the other.

Althussers strategy of defining topics of enquiry in terms of other suchtopics enables him to leave terms out. In further refining his account, he cannow leave ideas out of the discussion, for ideas have been restated in termsof actions. Ideas, he now claims, exist in the actions and practices of a sub-ject. A subject acts his ideas as he is acted by them: the subject acts insofaras he is acted by the system [of] ideology existing in a material ideologi-cal apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual,which practices exist in the material actions of a subject (Althusser 1971,16970).

Althusser has now brought us to the point where we can determine what ide-ology is: it is the rituals and institutions (ISAs) of a society, and its function isto interpellate individuals/subjects into its society; that is, to make them mem-bers of their society. But again, it is not a causal sequence of events that leads tothe subjects being interpellated: as ideology constitutes the social subject, so thesubject constitutes the ideology of its society. There is a mutual and double per-formative iteration whereby the subject and ideology are materialized by,through, and as the practices of each other:

the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar asall ideology has the function (which defines it) of constituting concreteindividuals as subjects. In the interaction of the double constitutionexists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing butits functioning in the material forms of existence of that function-ing. (Althusser 1971, 171; original emphasis)

Althusser explicitly states the total and productive entanglement of subjects andideology within each other. They are each mutually reconstitutive of the other;they rematerialize in and through each other. In this dynamic cycle we canappreciate the resemblances between ideology and (Foucauldian) power. Bothare fields of action, not entities or possessions; they exist and are continuallymaterialized by and through the practices of the subjects constituted by themand constitutive of them (see, for instance, Foucault 2004, 29).

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However, Althusser has not yet given any clues as to who or what the indi-vidual is, and at this point the term is still in his narrative. In recognition thathis argument still appears to contain a causal sequence, Althusser then makes itclear that this is not an individual that pre-exists the subject. He is not suggest-ing that ideology seizes an already existing individual and compels his or herturn to subjectivity. For Althusser declares that in reality these things happenwithout any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpella-tion of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing (Althusser 1971, 175,emphasis added). To consolidate his argument and to dispel the notion thatthere is an individual prior to, or separate from, the subject, Althusser stressesthat individuals are always-already subjects (176, original emphasis).2

Individual was a term that was necessary to enable Althusser to express theprocesses of interpellation in a manner that we could grasp, and because of itsuse, we may have thought that there was an individual before the subject, anindividual that became a subject in the turn. It is now revealed that there is onlyever the subject. What is more, in this account Althusser does not speculate onwhy or how the turn works (as Butler notes; see Butler 1997b, 5). He does notintroduce notions of submission, guilt, and reprimand, of force and coercion, asButler does, to explain interpellation. For him, it appears that interpellation justis, or just does. It remains enigmatic, and after reading this section of Althussersessay we still dont really know why, how, or if we submit to our subjection,other than it appears to be the way we are; this is what it is to be a subject.

SUBJECTED SUBJECTS?

Butlers description of interpellation as a compulsion, an appropriation of guilt,and a reprimand carries the implication of an external power forcibly acting onthe subject-to-be and extracting submission as the price of the bestowal of sub-jectivity. She paints a grim and overly pessimistic (Mills 2000, 276) pictureof a mixed-up and ground-down subject (Macherey 2004, 12), a heavily bur-dened and essentially subjected subject (Magnus 2006, 83; original emphasis).Butler paints human life, the life of the subject, as one of subjugation andoppression. However, what credible reason is there for us to give in to an exter-nal, coercive imposition? The question again arises: does a subject have to be asubjugated being?

Vicki Kirby suggests that the operation of interpellation cannot be an exter-nal force that commands the individuals obedience because if power is trulyalien to the individual before its enforcement then the individuals compliantconfirmation of powers intention (to subject him) would not be possible (Kirby2006, 89). Michel Foucault, too, insists that subjects are never the inert or con-senting targets of power. Power/ideology circulates by and through subjects; it is

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not applied to them (Foucault 2004, 29; emphasis added). If we argue that weare not compelled and forced by a prior, complicitous desire for a punitive law,then how can we use Althusser to account for our apparent obedience to ideol-ogy and the law? Can his work allow us to propose a different answer to thequestion of what draws us to answer the policemans hail?

Althusser further elaborates on the workings of interpellation in the final sec-tion of his essay, An Example: The Christian Religious Ideology (Althusser1971, 17783). He explains that, as the structures of all ideologies are the same,he has chosen religion, as it is accessible to everyone (177). Although Butlergrants this claim, she is nonetheless critical of Althussers choice of example. Toher it suggests that all ideology is necessarily theological, such that the divinepower of naming structures the theory of interpellation. By claiming that socialideology works in the same way, Althusser assimilates social interpellation tothe divine performative and so institutes a regime of sovereign authorization forall subjectivity (Butler 1997b, 110).

Butler contends that it is the divine naming that makes the hail compellingand authoritative. As divine, it is a voice almost impossible to refuse in itscommand that we must submit. The significance of this, for Butlers critique, isthat this divine authorizing power manifests through each and every interpella-tive apparatus. State authorities and ISAs such as the law and its representative,the policeman, are conduits for the divine voice. That is, the hailing of the pas-ser-by is a divine imperative made secular, and it works through the same, non-refusable command as the voice of God (Butler 1997b, 110).

This now raises more questions: does interpellation operate through the secu-larization of a divine authorizing voice? Can Althussers example of religious ide-ology be read without Butlers supposition of the prior and anticipatory doctrineof conscience, the prior complicity with the law, the prior compulsion to turn tothe law, that feature in her analysis? And can we interrogate the authority ofthe voice of God, which Althusser does indeed introduce?

Althusser describes the voice of God addressing a human individual3 andgiving him his name: this is who you are: you are Peter! This is your place inthe world! This is what you must do! (Althusser 1971, 177). It is a process thattells you God exists and that you are answerable to Him (177). In Althussersexplanation of this scene we can see that there are apparently the mechanismsof compulsion and submission on which Butler dwells. Althusser does, it seems,describe interpellation as a naming whose terms we cannot resist, but does itactually play out in these terms in Althussers further elaborations?

Althusser continues with the observation that there can only be such a mul-titude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is aUnique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God (Althusser 1971, 178, originalemphasis). This new Subject should be written with a capital S, to distinguish itfrom ordinary subjects (us) (178). There is again in Althusser the (apparent)

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invocation of a divine performative as he contends that religious ideology, innaming people, recognizes that they are always-already interpellated as subjectswith a personal identity it interpellates them in such a way that the subjectresponds: Yes, it really is me! it obtains from them the recognition that theyreally do occupy the place it designates for them as theirs in the world, a fixedresidence (178; original emphasis). The Subject gives a name and a place tothe subject, and so performatively produces this subject as this name and asoccupying this position in the world. And more significantly, the subject is con-stituted as embracing the fact that this is his or her name and place. But thedemand and compulsion are so subtle that we apparently do not even recognizetheir force, and in fact seem to welcome them. What chance, then, do we haveto resist their positioning of us? As Althusser expands his account, he confirmsthat to be a subject is indeed to submit without question, to be a free subjectand a subjected being at one and the same time:

In the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a freesubjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible forits actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher author-ity, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freelyaccepting his submission. This last note gives us the meaning ofthis ambiguity the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject inorder that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject,i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in orderthat he shall make the gestures and action of his subjection allby himself. (Althusser 1971, 182; original emphasis)

Althusser suggests that subjects are constituted as always-already subjected, andwithin this same movement is the recognition of this subjection: Godinterpellates his subject, the individual subjected to him by his very interpella-tion (Althusser 1971, 179). This is Althussers account of the double meaning ofsubjection (assujettisement), and it matches Butlers account, examined in a pre-vious section. However, although it is still a mysterious process, it is not entirelyevident that subjection does occur through the compulsion that Butler ascribes toit, as Althusser does not offer any conjecture as to why a subject would submit.

In Butlers analysis, subjects work because they are coerced by a sovereignvoice with which they have a prior complicity, a prior desire for reprimand.Althusser claims that subjects, although apparently commanded, work all bythemselves, because this is what it is to be a subject. To stress his point thatthere is no prior complicity required to explain subjection, Althusser rewords hiscontention: [t]here are no subjects except by and for their subjection. That is whythey work all by themselves (Althusser 1971, 182; original emphasis). Subjectsfreely submit, not through guilt or a desire for reprimand, but because subject-for-mation is at one and the same time a constitution of the subject as subjected. It

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is an enigmatic process, and it appears that no explanation we could devisewould be adequate to explain it.

Butler contends that interpellation revolves around a self-identical subject(Butler 1997b, 108) as, it would appear, does Althusser. He claims that theinterpellating God defines himself as the Subject par excellence, he who isthrough himself and for himself (I am that I am) (Althusser 1971, 179). Butcan this assertion of a centered, self-present Subject remain uncontested underscrutiny within the context of Althussers extended account of interpellation?

Althusser does, as Butler stresses, give a central place to the divine voice, butdoes his further elucidation of the processes of interpellation reveal it to be thesovereign, unilateral naming that Butler suggests? And is it thus the animatingmisrecognition that Butler contends?

Contra Butler, the workings of this system call into question the absolute self-identity and exteriority of the Subject. Althusser describes movements of mirror-ing, reflection, and recognition in his commentary. Interpellation is a mirrorstructure doubly speculary where the Absolute Subject interpellates themultitude of individuals around it in a double mirror-connexion such that itsubjects the subjects to the Subject (Althusser 1971, 180; original emphasis).Inversely, in the Subject each subject can contemplate its own image (180).Althusser claims that we are made in the image of God; we are his mirrorsand reflections. Additionally, God needs men, the great Subject needs subjects.Althusser also recites a fundamental tenet of theology, that those who have rec-ognized God, and have recognized themselves in Him, will be saved (17980).This can lead us to question whether, if the Subject were self-identical, absolute,and exterior to us, as Althusser says, could we recognize ourselves in it, andwould it need us? Could we mirror something so incommensurable with our pro-fane selves as the divine Subject reportedly is?

Althusser further elaborates his position and contends that subjects are caughtin a quadruple system of interpellation, a duplicate mirror-structure of ideology[that] ensures simultaneously their interpellation as subjects and their subjec-tion, as well as the guarantee that this is their position in life. A crucial stepin Althussers description is the mirroring whereby we note the mutual recogni-tion of subjects and Subject, the subjects recognition of each other, and finallythe subjects recognition of himself. It is this mutual and simultaneous recogni-tion that provides the guarantee of interpellation, and as long as subjectsrecognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right:AmenSo be it (Althusser 1971, 18081; original emphasis). It is the workingsof this quadruple system that Althusser describes that call into question the abso-lute separation of the identities of subject and Subject.

Kirby, in her analysis of Butler, notes the similarities between Althussers sce-nario of interpellation and Hegels MasterSlave dialectic. Kirby argues that theinterpellative scene does not require two people or a temporal separation, as the

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lesson from Hegel is that any appeal to a discrete and autonomous entity [iscompromised] because every identity secretly incorporates the differenceagainst which it defines itself (Kirby 2006, 90). She suggests that, in view ofthis implication of self within other, Althussers policeman need not be seen asa separate subject who pre-exists the one who responds or, indeed, as someonewhose action corresponds to coercion (90). This, however, deepens the mystery.If, as Butler contends, the policeman serves the same function as the Subject (insecular form) and, if the policeman also need not be a separate subject, howthen is the subject interpellated? What implications does this Hegelian interven-tion into the scene have for the processes of interpellation?

If the scene of the policemans hailing is not a sequential and dyadic moment,yet nonetheless interpellates the subject, can we say that divine naming, that is,subjection by the Subject, is a similarly compromised yet interpellative scene?We see the same blurring and confusion, the same circularity, in the descriptionsof subjection by the Subject as was evident in the scene of the hailing. TheHegelian implications, contends Kirby, are that an encounter with an Other isalways a form of self-encounter as identity is precarious and paradoxicalbecause its essential being is an alien possession (I am an other) (Kirby 2006,11). This calls into question a simple reading of the apparently self-contained,self-defining claim of God/the Subject: I am that I am (Althusser 1971, 179).Kirby claims that the I is also other to itself and cannot defend itself from asupposedly alien outside. This suggests that God/the Subjects declaration couldbe recast as: I am that I am but, at one and the same time, this means that I aman other. God, the Subject, cannot be separated from his reflection, the subject.

If God/the Subject is also me, the subject, then I (who am also my other) amalso the Subject. This also means that I am also the Subject secularized as thelaw, that is, I am also the law/policeman. It is to the law that Butler suggests thesubject is compelled to submit; Althusser suggests that it is to the voice of Godthat I am subjected. However, if I, the subject, am already my otheralready thelaw, already the Subjectthen in what way can it be said that subjects submit totheir subjection; or that subjection is subjugation? The subject lives the law; thelaw is the subject; each subject is the law. Subjects work by themselves becausethey are always-already enactments of the entire system of power/ideology, lawand society. The ambiguity of assujettisement is (always) already internal to thesubject.

The significance of the suggestion that we are always-already implicatedwithin the values and norms of our particular place and time is that weobey, not because we are compelled, but because these are our constitutiveconditions. We performatively re-enact this constitution as we materialize oursocial/ideological environment. It is thus not a question of obedience or sub-mission. This amended scene of interpellation also shows a fit with theFoucauldian claim that power does not work by repression and force, but

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circulates as a dynamic of power-resistance. This power does not subjugate butinstead constitutes subjects (Foucault 2004, 28). We do not need to see thepoliceman as the sovereign Law, compelling, forcing, demanding, as does But-ler. If we instead view the policeman as an Everyman and the call as insep-arable from the response then power isnt an external force that is pittedagainst the subject because it is the internal algorithm of the subjects possi-bility and transformation if the subject is already powers reflex, its objectand agent, then power is not an instrument or repressive tool of subordinationthat bears down upon its victims (Kirby 2006, 90; original emphasis). If weare constituted as instantiations of powers/ideologys field of possibilities, weare particular exercises of the field. We enact this field as it is our very being;there is no outside compulsion that forces us.

I AM THE PRINCIPLE OF MY OWN SUBJECTION

Butler insists that interpellation for Althusser is the secularization of a divine,sovereign naming. Can it, however, be read in purely secular terms: that is, canwe question the absolute and divine nature of the Subject and read interpella-tion without any recourse to religious authorization?

In Althussers interpellative scene a multitude of subjects are set out aroundthe central Subject (Althusser 1971, 180). A structurally similar arrangementcan be found in Foucaults analysis of the Panopticon (Foucault 1991, 20009).Foucault describes a worldly system that produces results akin to Althussersscene of interpellation: the panoptic schema implies that each subject ispowers reflex. In the Panopticon, inmates are arrayed around a central towerfrom which they are always visible (200). It is a system of light and a field ofvisibility (202) where all are caught up in a power situation of which they arethemselves the bearers (201; emphasis added). Each one of us is simultaneouslyboth observer and observed: we are the principle of [our] own subjection(203). This is a power that is neither external to the subject nor coercive, butis weightless, effortless, and everywhere (206). Foucault insists the Panopticonis a model of power in general that has transformed the whole social bodyinto a field of perception (214). Panoptic power is coextensive with all ofsociety, and within it the power relation has been detached from a lodgmentin any particular person or place, and from any specific purpose (205). Thesubject is shown to be the instantiation and enactment of the field of panopticmechanisms and visibility. As panoptic power pervades all society and all sub-jectivities, there is no force, submission, or external compulsion that wouldrequire compliance or obedience. Can it be shown that Althussers religiousexample of interpellation can be played out according to this secular Foucaul-dian schema? If so, what implications does this have for Butlers contention

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that the religious example installs a divine authorization at the heart ofAlthussers theory of subject-formation?

Ideology is centered: the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of theCentre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals (Althusser 1971,180). However, as in the Panopticon where subjects are shown to be both obser-ver and observed, in interpellations quadruple system, its duplicate mirror-structure (180, 181), we find that recognition and reflection is a simultaneous,mutually constitutive interpellation of subject and Subject where, ultimately,subjects recognize themselves (181). We have the duplication of the Subjectinto subjects and the Subject itself into a subject-Subject (180; emphasisadded). In these double reflections, who, then, mirrors whom? Who is made inwhose image? These multiple mirrorings confound the notions of original andcopy, and cause and effect. The implications of this tautological conceptualiza-tion are that Subject and subject are implicated in the constitution of eachother, and cannot be untangled.

This also suggests that the Subject becomes completely implicated within thefield of powers or ideologys operations. The Subject, Althussers Unique, Abso-lute and Other Subject who occupies the unique place of the Centre (Althus-ser 1971, 178, 180) is shown to be dispersed throughout powers field, just as thecentral panoptic observation tower manifests in each subject. Each becomessimultaneously both Subject and subject. Each one becomes the center as theyfulfill the role of always-already constituting themselves and others as subjectswithin the circulating field of power or ideology. As with the Panopticon, anostensibly centered structure has become generalized as the field of power/ideol-ogy with no center. Or, perhaps, there is no one Center, but everywhere thereare nothing but centers, constituting and being constituted.

Interpellation does not revolve around a separate and autonomous entity, theSubject, dispensing a sovereign authorization, but is a Subject/subject entangle-ment circulating within and through the field of power-ideology. Subjects enactthe possibilities of this field and are particular instances of this system, and are thusinterpellated by, and enact, their particular social and historical circumstances. AsButler contends, agency arises within systems of subject-formation. But rather thanour agency being produced from the circuits of subjection, misrecognition, anddesire, as Butler suggests, it arises from this entangled system of possibilities. Sub-jects are thus constituted as agentialit is part of what it is to be a subject.

Agency does not rely on an inevitable failure of ideology, the norm or theinterpellative voice to totally dominate and determine us; it does not arise fromthe constitutive misrecognition that Butler suggests. The interpellative schemahas no prior purpose, no particular aim for us, so our agential resistance is notdirected against interpellations subjugating purpose, but is a performative materi-alization of the circulation of power-and-resistance that constitutes, and is consti-tuted by, us.

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This implies that our subjectivity does not have to be theorized as a submis-sion to, or subjugation by, some external, punitive constraint. We are not neces-sarily the grim and ground-down subjects of Butlers vision, wracked by a desireto be reprimanded for our implicit guilt. This does not mean, however, thatthere are no negative outcomes in this interpellative schema: the subject whodoes not matter is a real possibility. The constitutive system of subject-Subject isinclusive of all contingent possibilitiesso the cases of abjection and not-matter-ing documented by Butler retain their veracity in this rereading of subject-forma-tion. The lived experience is not altered: it is still painful. But a guilt-ridden,ground-down subjectivity found in Butler is not the only and necessary expressionof our subjective being; nor are we bent to interpellations subjugating purposes.We become subjects, not by being submitted to an impossible, external con-straint that we have difficulty resisting, but by being constituted by the contin-gencies, good or bad, that circulate in and through us and that re-produce us asthey are themselves reproduced. The interpellative system of power-ideology isus. So be it, as Althusser says.

NOTES

1. Butler is here referring to Foucaults account of subjection to power, but the for-mulation used recalls Althussers account of interpellation. This will be elaborated in alater section.

2. Always-already is Althussers expression to capture the inadequacy of causalexplanations that rely on linear notions of time (Kirby 2006, 162, n. 1).

3. Althusser explains that, although we know that individuals are always-already sub-jects, he continues to use the term to make his explanations clearer because of the con-trasting effect it produces (Althusser 1971, 178, n. 19).

REFERENCES

Althusser, Louis. 1971. Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an inves-tigation). In Lenin and philosophy and other essays. Trans. B. Brewster. New York:Monthly Review Press.

Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. New York:Routledge.

. 1997a. Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. New York: Routledge.. 1997b. The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford: Stanford University

Press.. 2002. Bodies and power, revisited. Radical Philosophy 114 (July/August): 1319.. 2004. Undoing gender. New York: Routledge.

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Foucault, Michel. 1991. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan.London: Penguin Books.

. 2004. Society must be defended: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France, 197576. Trans.D. Macey. London: Penguin Books.

Kirby, Vicki. 2006. Judith Butler: Live theory. London: Continuum.Macherey, Pierre. 2004. Out of melancholia: Notes on Judith Butlers The Psychic Life of

Power: Theories in Subjection. Rethinking Marxism 16 (1): 717.Magnus, Kathy Dow. 2006. The unaccountable subject: Judith Butler and the social condi-

tions of intersubjective agency. Hypatia 21 (2): 81103.Mills, Catherine. 2000. Efficacy and vulnerability: Judith Butler on reiteration and

resistance. Australian Feminist Studies 15 (32): 26579.

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