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Terrorismin

Southeast Asia

No 3, September 2003

nytt

Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

Asia Insights

ASEAN and theIssue of TerroristThreats

Terrorism inIndonesia

Terrorism andCounter-Terrorism inSoutheast Asia:Which is theGreater Threat?

Counter-Terrorism inThailand: A NewDirection?

InternationalTerrorism and theWeak State in thePhilippines

Is There an alQaeda Networkin SoutheastAsia?

NIASnytt no. 3, 20032

NIASnytt is published by the NordicInstitute of Asian Studies and appears4 times yearly with 2,500 copiesdistributed worldwide.

Editorial and productionNordic Institute of Asian Studies(NIAS), Leifsgade 33, DK-2300Copenhagen S, DenmarkTel: +45 3532 9502Fax: +45 3532 9549Email: [email protected]: http://www.nias.ku.dk

Online versionEconomic necessity forces us to printfewer copies of NIASnytt than aredemanded. However, we also produceNIASnytt in a web version at http://www.nias.ku.dk/nytt

Responsible editor(under the Danish press law)Jørgen Delman

Coordinating editorLeena Höskuldsson

Guest editor for this issueTimo Kivimäki

Editorial committeeJørgen DelmanLeena HöskuldssonGerald JacksonTimo KivimäkiMarianne E. NielsenErik R. Skaaning

Language editorJanice Leon

Coming Issues in 2003

4 (Dec): deadline 1 November

Cover: Amrozi – the smiling terrorist,convicted of the Bali bombings

(Photo: POLFOTO)

Printed in Denmark byHerrmann & Fischer

ISSN 0904–4337

Asia Insights

ContentsTerrorism in Southeast Asia • Timo Kivimäki 4

Is There an al Qaeda Network in Southeast Asia? • PHAR Kim Beng 6

ASEAN and the Issue of Terrorist Threats • Anak Agung Banyu Perwita 8

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Which is the Greater Threat? • RubenThorning 10

Counter-Terrorism in Thailand: A New Direction? • Michael Tivayanond 12

Terrorism in Indonesia • Timo Kivimäki 15

International Terrorism and the Weak State in the Philippines • Herman Joseph S. Kraft 19

Also in this issue

Editorial • Jørgen Delman 3

General NIAS information 22–23

‘Terrorism and the Resurgence of Military Power in Indonesia’ • Sukardi Rinakit 21

NIAS Grants 24

Staff News 25

Recent Visitors 25, 28–29

‘Deforestation and Climate Change: A Nineteenth-Century Issue’ •Jeya Kathirithamby-Wells 30

New Books from NIAS Press 31–32

“NIAS, together with its network of experts in political violence, recently conducted aninvestigation into the causes of terrorism and into the possibility of Danish developmentcooperation using its instruments in the containing of the root causes of terrorist violence.The final report was published by the Danish Foreign Ministry and launched in aninternational conference in Copenhagen at the beginning of September. Even though all theauthors of articles in this NIASnytt participated in the investigation, NIASnytt readers arereferred to the report (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Development cooperation as aninstrument in the prevention of terrorism. Research Report edited byTimo Kivimäki. Copenhagen 2003. More on p. 5) because the present issue of NIASnyttdoes not reveal the contents of the report; instead, it focuses on the special problems ofSoutheast Asia in relation to terrorism.”

Timo Kivimäki (see p. 4)

Call for papers.ISSCO V New Chinese

Migrants – Globalisation ofChinese Overseas Migration

See p. 26

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NIASnytt no. 3, 2003 3

Jørgen Delman

Editorial

These days, important negotiations are being undertaken in Beijing regarding North Korea’s nuclearprogramme and the future of East Asian security (an issue dealt with earlier this year by NIASnytt).Elsewhere, the terrorist threat in South and Southeast Asia is more visible than ever, with attacks,counter-attacks and arrests of terrorist leaders filling the headlines of the national and internationalmedia. The current issue of NIASnytt takes a closer look at the situation and offers fresh insights oftennot found in the international media.

Meantime, away from the media spotlight, 1,200 academics from all over the world – including pastand present staff from NIAS – recently met at the Third International Convention of Asia Scholars(ICAS 3) in Singapore, one of the biggest international conferences for Asia scholars (http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/icas3/). The conference showed that the academic interest in Asia is unswerving, inAsia as well as outside.

Events and developments in Asia, whether those reported by the media, or the vibrant, day-to-daythud of busy and dynamic Asian societies, force us – as researchers – to constantly rethink and improveour own ways of looking at Asia as well as our position in relation to the Asia research scene. We alsoneed to find out how we can be of more use to our stakeholders and users. If we misread or fail to noticethe relevant signals, we shall fail or fossilize. NIAS is not the only institute that on a continuous basismust stay attuned to the needs and desires of its ‘customers’.

Which brings me to that ongoing issue, the future of NIAS. Not only at ICAS but also in recentmonths at many other conferences and meetings, NIAS staff have met Nordic and internationalcolleagues who ask: ‘Is NIAS about to be closed? When is this going to happen?’

We are not entirely certain whether these questions are the sad consequence of lack of clearinformation from us or rather the result of hearsay being passed on. All too often, rumour andspeculation are the currency of an environment in flux and where the destination is still unclear. This iswhat we and many other research institutions face today. Change is on the agenda for each and everyone of us. We do not complain; such demands are what fuels our progress. We just have to make surethat we make our position clear to the outside world.

Asia does not stop, and this is exactly the reason why we do not intend to stop either. However,changes that are probably more important than what we have experienced in the past are imminent atNIAS. We have already informed you before that our current owners – the Nordic Council of Ministers– intend to find new owners for NIAS, while continuing to provide part of the core financing so that wecan maintain our Nordic mandate.

At this stage, the Nordic Council of Ministers is scrutinizing a report from a consultant who hasbeen hired to make proposals for a new ownership structure. Most likely, the next step will be theestablishment of a working group with representatives from a number of Nordic universities plus ourcurrent Board. The group will have to design the new ownership while also reviewing our strategy,services and activities. It is our hope that some Nordic universities will play a strong role in the newownership, since currently they are our main partners and stakeholders.

At the end of the process, we hope that we will maintain our independence, that we will bestrengthened in terms of research capacity, and that we will maintain the crystal-clear Nordic mandatethat we have today.

In the last issue we appealed to our Nordic readers to make their opinions about the future of NIASknown to those with interest and influence in their countries. We are still flying the ‘appeal flag’. Weneed your backing to move on. You may also consult our website ‘The Future of NIAS’ (http://www.nias.ku.dk/who/future/default.htm), where you will find a concept paper discussing our ideas.

Closure is not on the agenda. When the next issue of NIASnytt is on the street at the end of this year,there will have been more headlines from Asia. We shall also be able to tell you more about our ownfuture. In the meantime, we look forward to a busy autumn calendar.

I hope that you will find this issue of NIASnytt pertinent and interesting. Enjoy your reading! ■

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Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Terrorism in Southeast Asiaby Timo Kivimäki

Terrorism has become an Asian phenomenon. Last year three out of four casualties of terrorwere caused in Asia. It has been claimed that the focal point of terrorist activities is movingfrom the Middle East to Southeast Asia. In 2002, Indonesian incidents alone were responsiblefor almost one third of global deaths due to terrorism. Yet the direct victims of terrorism inSoutheast Asia are just the tip of the iceberg. The strike in Bali on 12 October 2002 alonewas estimated to have caused a million Indonesians to lose their jobs while counter-terroristmeasures in Southeast Asia have claimed further lives and endangered the rights and freedomsin the fragile democracies of Southeast Asia. Terrorism has become a challenge that Asianstudies need to respond to.Connections of Southeast Asianterrorism are an interestingsubject, which has been widelyspeculated on in the media.However, the media coveragehas not been entirely fair aboutthe regional efforts both amongSoutheast Asian terrorists andcounter-terrorism officials.Southeast Asian terrorism andcounter-terrorism are not led byforces outside the region, butinstead the regional input hasbeen crucial in both camps. Oureffort is to be more balanced onthis issue. While Kim PharBeng’s article attempts to bringnew, perhaps unexpected in-sights and interpretations to thediscussion on internationalconnections of Southeast Asianterrorism, Banyu Perwita looks

into the regional approach tothe prevention of terrorism.

We also seek a balanced viewon violence caused by terrorism,as well as authoritarianism thatuses counter-terrorism as anexcuse. This balance deserves aseparate examination which hereis conducted by Ruben Thorning,who also maintains a database onterrorist organizations. This datasource can be accessed from theon-line edition of this journal.

In addition to analyses of theregion, the main regionaltrouble spots deserve someattention, too. Singapore andMalaysia have been hasty inaccepting their terrorist threatsand they have acted swiftly toavoid terrorist incidents. Thishas been explained as a reasonfor the fact that these twocountries have so far escapedmajor incidents. However, bothcountries – but perhapsespecially Singapore, whichrepresents capitalism, non-Islamic values and wealth in theregion – could in the futurebecome a major target forregional terrorism.

However, the main problemcountries are now Indonesia, thePhilippines and Thailand.Terrorism in the Philippines isof an older origin and is verymuch mixed with separatism.Indonesia is often seen as themain regional trouble spot, whileThailand has recently developedinto an important juncture for the

regional terrorist organizations.These new hubs of regionalterrorism are analysed in separatearticles by Michael Tivayanondand by Timo Kivimäki, while theolder terrorist problem of thePhilippines is analysed byHerman Kraft.

It has not been our intentionto select the writers of this issueon the basis of nationalrepresentation, but perhaps thefact that the most suitable writersfor this issue, in fact, can befound from Malaysia, Indonesia,Thailand, the Philippines,Finland and Denmark, testifies tothe fruitfulness of Nordic–Asiancollaboration. In the field of re-search on this Asian phenomenonof terrorism, Nordic tradition inpeace research and softer ap-proaches to security can offeralternatives and new insights tothe tougher approaches and morestraightforward perceptions of theAnglo-American countries. At thesame time, it is clear that theregional analysis often succeeds toilluminate the socially constructedreality of political violence moreaccurately than the analysis ofoutsiders. This is why we hopethat our readers appreciate ourNordic and Southeast Asianchallenge to the mainstreamperception of terrorism inSoutheast Asia. ■

Timo Kivimäki

Terror can also beused by the state.

This picture ofAcehnese victimsof state terrorismwas given to the

autor by a memberof Free AcehMovement.



Development Cooperation as an Instrument in thePrevention of Terrorism

New NIAS study on aid and terrorism now available

NIAS recently undertook a study for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs onthe causes of terrorism and on the opportunities for Europe and Denmark to usedevelopment cooperation to address these causes. Some of the causes of terrorismidentified were:

• Considerable groups in developing countries and some of the more developedArab countries are economically, socially and politically deprived and terroristsoften perceive them as their ‘constituencies’.

• From an international comparative perspective, Islamic people are ofteneconomically deprived; Islamic terrorists and their supporters are, on average,better off than their compatriots.

• Certain states lack ability or willingness to control the opportunities thatterrorists or violent groups may exploit for political purposes.

• There is a lack of opportunity for non-violent political participation and/orprotest.

• The ‘underdog’ has no opportunity to challenge the opponent(s) by usingconventional military means.

The main focus of the report was on terrorism justified by Islam or embracedby Muslim communities. The report found that conflict and terrorism havepotential and real links. It was recommended that development cooperation maycontribute to the reduction of some of the causes of terrorism and may also shiftthe focus away from support for terrorism in Muslim communities. A set ofdetailed recommendations were proposed.

Dr Timo Kivimäki, Senior Researcher at NIAS, was the editor of the report.The research project behind it involved worldwide research networks.

The report was presented at an international conferenceorganized by the Foreign Ministry on 4 September 2003.The conference was opened by the Danish Minister forForeign Affairs, Dr. Per Stig Møller, and the concludingremarks were made by Ambassador Carsten Stauer, StateSecretary of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to Dr Kivimäki’s presentation of the researchresults, Dr. Olivier Roy, Research Director of the CNRS,Paris, Dr. Jørgen Bæk Simonsen of the Danish Institute inDamascus, Prof. Clement Adibe of the De Paul University(Chicago, USA), Professor Mats Berdal of the King’sCollege (London, UK) and Sheikh Fawzy Fadel IbrahimEl Zafzaf from Al-Azhar University (Egypt) were amongthe scholars who presented their professional viewpoints onthe topic.

The report can be downloaded or orderedfrom the Foreign Ministry’s website –www.um.dk

An expert panel answering questions: (from left) Dr Timo Kivi-mäki, NIAS, Dr Olivier Roy, Research Director of the CNRS,Paris, Dr Jørgen Bæk Simonsen of the Danish Institute inDamascus.

http://www.um.dk



Is There an al Qaeda Network in SoutheastAsia ?by PHAR Kim Beng

Southeast Asia is the home to more than 200 million Muslim believers. Since the September11th attacks, followed by the October 12th bombings in Kuta, the region has come under acloud of suspicion as a haven for terrorist activities. Now that the military campaign in Afghanistan has wound to a close, there have beenreports of Southeast Asia becoming the ‘second front’ of the war on terror.

To compound matters, prior tothe September 11th attacks, theperpetrators had met inMalaysia and other parts of theregion, leading to the fear thatSoutheast Asia may be thespringboard of terrorism. An alQaeda recruit was also arrestedin Malaysia, posing as a studentof the International IslamicUniversity in Kuala Lumpur.

Justified or not, theAssociation for Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) has alreadybeen accused of failing torecognize the ‘forces of jihad’ inits midst when Filipino alQaeda operatives like RamziYousef and Abdul HakimMurad helped coordinate thefirst World Trade Centerbombing in 1993.

Subsequent investigationsalso revealed that local militantMuslim groups have met withoperatives of Al Qaeda before.While such preliminary contactsdo not necessarily imply theexistence of a far-flung terroristnetwork in the region, theirmeetings do raise serious alarm.

On the part of terrorists,they point to plausible efforts tocement their tenuous links. Ifleft unchecked, the spectre of afull-blown international terroristbrotherhood that supercedes allother affiliations and loyaltiescannot be ruled out. Invariably,such a network vitiates theprocess of nation-building, a keypriority to many governments inthe region. But does such anetwork really exist?

Network or Nest?

In contemporary analyses of theterrorism problem in SoutheastAsia, especially of the postSeptember 11 variant, thetendency has been to connectseemingly unrelated dots to forma vast network. Senior MinisterLee Kuan Yew has come out thestrongest in making the claim thata network exists:

‘Osama Bin Laden has successfullytwined together a broad range oflocal groups, each with its ownhistory of struggle for its ownobjectives into a common univer-sal jihad against the enemies ofIslam. In the region (SoutheastAsia), the groups include theMoral Islamic Liberation Front,Abu Sayaff, KumpulanMujahidden Malaysia and JemaasIslamiah. Al Qaeda has cooptedthem into a larger common jihad.’(Speech at the Shangri La Dia-logue, June 2002).

It is this ‘network’ thatprovides material sponsorshipand spiritual succor, argues oneschool of thought, to permittheir numerous attacks onWestern targets. Somescholars, together with policymakers in Singapore and thePhilippines have subscribed tothis notion.

This belief is only partiallycorrect. To begin with, terrorismis used as the conceptual blue-print to explain religious andpolitical violence in parts ofIndonesia and the Philippinestoo. Yet, the two may notnecessarily be related, as theconflicts emerging from places

such as Moluccas, Mindanao oreven Aceh, have localized roots.

Extremism or terrorism is aconsequence of the aggravatedlocal conditions; rather thaninspired by the pan-Islamicideology and the machinationsof al Qaeda. Thus, in affirmingthe existence of a terroristnetwork in Southeast Asia,analysts of this school ofthought are guilty of latching onto circumstantial evidence,rather than that based on trueverification.

Indeed, true verification hasto come from rigorous research,rather than from the confessionsof Muslim clerics extracted fromthe state. The quality of theconfession is further subject todoubt to as most were givenunder coerced conditions.

Secondly, there is alsoanother line of thought that pre-supposes the historicalantecedents of West Asia (i.e.Middle East) and SoutheastAsia, especially those occasionedby trade and marriages, aresufficient precursors of aterrorist network based onYemeni ‘connection’.

That is to say since mostYemeni traders had traded inSoutheast Asia before, ergo,these links provide them withthe infrastructure to plan theirterrorist operations here, andwith the local Muslim cells. Suchan argument is problematic ontwo counts. The Yemeni con-nection cannot be easily revivedfor criminal ends. Nor is there

Dr PHAR Kim Beng

is a Senior ReserachAssociate at the CityUniversity of HongKong



such a thing as a Yemeniconnection in the first place.

Indeed, while it is true thatmost of the September 11thterrorists were of Yemeni origin,including Osama Bin Laden, thealleged lead sponsor, theterrorist operations were alsoplanned in parts of Europe too.That there was no Yemeni‘connection’ in Europe to easethe planning should imply thatterrorists were neither guided bygenealogy nor geography whenthey devised their plans. Rather,they chose to exploit the leewayafforded by liberal and opensocieties.1

The composite character ofthe religious groups in SoutheastAsia further complicates thepicture. Laskar Jihad of Indo-nesia, for instance, proclaims apeaceful three part missionwhich includes social work,Muslim education and ‘securitymission’. Its membership atteststo the sense of Islamic identity itprovides to otherwise alienatedMuslim men. The group fulfilsits social missions by providingmedicine and food to refugeesand teaching the Koran toMuslims.

Moreover, Laskar Jihadcontinues to receive the supportof the highest level of the Indo-nesian military to ensure itssurvival. Sympathizers within

TNI (Tentera National Indo-nesia) are believed to provide thegroup with cash, and possiblyarms, and to order officials inMolucca, where Laskar Jihad aremost active in waging a waragainst Christian residents, notto crack down on Laskar Jihadmembers.

Indeed, according to Westernintelligence sources, Laskar Jihadwas actually founded with thecovert backing of military hard-liners who wished to destabilizethe post-Suharto reformistgovernment of AbdulrahmanWahid. Jaffar Umar Thahb, theleader of Laskar Jihad, brandedformer president Wahid as ananti-Islamic.

Granted that Islam isintegral to the social andpolitical fabric of Indonesia,Malaysia and Brunei, a pan-Islamic ideology can pose adirect risk to the integrity ofeach regime, in turn affectingthe fate of ASEAN.

Investigators in Singaporeand Malaysia have shown thatmilitant Muslim operatives inSoutheast Asia have spoken ofcreating a ‘Darul IslamNusantara’. This is a pan-Islamicstate linked from one end ofMindanao to Aceh.

But despite such activities, itis one thing to affirm theexistence of al Qaeda and yet

another to attest to its network.In fact, such a loose definitionmay even be paradoxical, asterrorist cells are by naturehyper-exclusive. They are basedon high level of internal trust toforestall the possibility of beingarrested. Networks on the otherhand imply swift exchange ofinformation, even jointplanning. But if such groups doindulge in these networkingactivities, their existence wouldbe unduly compromised.

ConclusionIn any event, if al Qaeda’s brandof fundamentalism is allowed totake further root in the region,the political fall-outs in a regionknown for its heterogeneitywould be severe.

In Thailand, the ThaiMuslims could be stirred intotaking a more activist role inPattani. Nor are the Muslims inBrunei immune to thepossibility of politicization, tothe detriment of the monarchy.In such a scenario, ASEANwould be left more hapless thanbefore due to the policy of non-interference.

Note

1. This argument is made by ZachAbuzar in his forthcoming work onAl Qaeda in Southeast Asia. ■

NIAS Library and Information Centre (NIAS LINC) has compiled a

bibliography on Terrorism in Southeast Asia. The bibliography is in the

form of a searchable database and is accessible at http://www.niaslinc.dk/

gateway/terrorism.htm. Here you will also find a database of Terrorist

Organizations.

http://www.niaslinc.dk/gateway/terrorism.htm




ASEAN and the Issue of Terrorist Threatsby Anak Agung Banyu Perwita

Following the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States and the Bali bombing inOctober 2002, one of the crucial political security agendas of ASEAN is undoubtedly tocontain the spread of terrorist threats in the region.

Dr Anak Agung BanyuPerwita is a lecturer atthe Department ofInternational Relations,Parahyangan CatholicUniversity, Bandung,and a consultant to theIndonesian ForeignMinistry on securityissues.

Basically, this issue, which hasbroadened the security agendaof ASEAN in the post-Cold Warera from traditional securityissues to non-traditional securityissues, is not entirely new. Therealities of the current globalpolitics have re-emphasized thepotential calamity of terroristthreats to humankind. In thisera, the relationship betweenterrorism and globalisation issignificantly complex. Theglobalisation has facilitatedterrorism by making theborderless world, informationand communication moreaccessible, and the transfer offunds is easier around the world.

In most cases, terrorist threatsemanate from the revival of ethnicand religious nationalism (ethnic-religious terrorism). VamikVolkan argued that it refers ‘to asituation in which terrorist leadershave excessive attachment to theirlarge-group identity and seek toenhance it through widespreadviolence and to perpetuate itunder improved political con-ditions’ (p. 157).

The region itself has ex-perienced many armed separatistrebellions. Further, most of thearmed separatism in SoutheastAsia has had a considerableexternal dimension. In otherwords, they tried to international-ise and to attract financial,political and military supportfrom other parts of the world.The armed separatist movementsin Aceh and Southern Philip-pines which expressed theirpolitical activities in Islamicreligion, for instance, hadinvited wider internationalIslamic solidarity and support.In this context, the region’s

many fragmented and fractiousethnic and religious groups canpossibly provide a political basisfor international terrorists tospread their activities. A leadingterrorism specialist, RohanGunaratna, even argues thatsince the 1990s, the centre ofgravity of terrorism has shiftedfrom the Middle East to theAsia Pacific.

Conceptually, terroristthreats can be classified into a‘grey area phenomena’. Non-stateactors and non-governmentalprocesses and organizations canbroadly define these phenomena,according to Peter Chalk, whofurther argues that these threatsmanifest in an aggressive mannerand are usually associated with theactivities of non-state actors.

The activities of terroristgroups, either to achieveeconomic or political purposes,primarily prepare and executelimited and sporadic tacticsbased on several characteristics,namely: using psychology offear, inexpensive methods thatcan achieve relatively effectiveresults, and conducting acts thatare designed to invite optimumpublicity.

The implications of terroristactivities in the region can bebroadly divided into two levels:national and regional levels. Onthe first level, it could not onlyjeopardize the national resilienceof the member states, but moreimportantly it could trigger thenational disunity of the members.Regionally, terrorism couldbecome a source of regionalinstability and insecurity.

Terrorism also involves othercrucial activities such as armssmuggling, drugs trafficking and

illegal immigrants. The mainaccess for these activities is theopenness of sea lines of com-munication in the region.

Considering the abovecharacteristics and the possibletrans-national network ofterrorist groups, what stepsmight ASEAN take to eradicateor at least to minimize theterrorist threats in the region?

There are at least two cruciallevels of containing terroristthreats in the region: nationaland regional level. At thenational level, each member ofASEAN should have boardinter-agency operations. Theseoperations will not only includethe ministries of foreign affairs,defence forces and the policebut will also involve otheragencies concerned with socialwelfare and home affairs. Theinitiative to establish a nationallyintegrated structure such as anational committee on terrorismcan be seriously considered as aneffort to better coordinate theinter-agency operations.

Considering the trans-national dimension of terrorism,ASEAN as a regional groupingshould also consider to initiateregional or even multilateralcooperation, including fosteringthe maritime cooperationamong the members. Thenature of this multilateralcooperation should principallylie in formal and legalisticapproaches to non-traditionalsecurity planning in order topromote a collective response toterrorism in the region. ASEANalso needs to re-consider itsnon-interference principle incombating terrorism due to thenational, regional and inter-



national implications of terroristactivities.

Regional initiatives tocombat terrorism in the regionneed to be coordinated under acomprehensive and codifiedform of agreement of all ASEANmembers. As has been stated inASEAN Leaders Declare JointAction to Counter Terrorism themembers agreed to:

(1) review and strengthennational mechanisms tocombat terrorism;

(2) call for the early signing/ratification of or accession toall relevant anti-terroristconventions including theInternational Convention forthe Suppression of theFinancing of Terrorism;

(3) deepen cooperation amongfront-line law enforcementagencies in combating terror-ism and sharing ‘bestpractices’;

(4) study relevant internationalconventions on terrorism withthe view to integrating themwith ASEAN mechanisms oncombating internationalterrorism;

(5) enhance information/intelligence exchange to facili-tate the flow of information, inparticular, on terrorists and ter-rorist organizations, their move-ment and funding, and anyother information needed toprotect lives, property and thesecurity of all modes of travel;

(6) develop regional capacitybuilding programs to enhanceexisting capacities of ASEANmember countries toinvestigate, detect, monitorand report on terrorist acts;

(7) discuss and explorepractical ideas and initiativesto increase ASEAN’s role inand involve-ment with theinternational community tomake the fight againstterrorism a truly regional andglobal endeavour;

(8) strengthen cooperation atbilateral, regional and inter-

national levels in combatingterrorism in a comprehensivemanner and affirm that at theinternational level the UnitedNations should play a majorrole in this regard.

The significance of theabove joint declaration and theregional cooperation on thecombat of terrorism are due topolitical and security impli-cations of terrorist activities tothe region and the changingcharacteristics of internationalterrorism from the traditional tothe more modern andsophisticated terrorist group.

Further, according to StevenSimon and Daniel Benjaminthere are at least four develop-ments which mark the advent ofa new form of internationalterrorism: the significant rise ofreligion as the main impetus forterrorist attacks; the increasinglethality of attacks; the increasingtechnological and operationalcompetence of the terrorists; andthe desire of some terrorist groupsto obtain weapons of massdestruction. Operationally, theASEAN Secretariat can be theanchor of the regional initiativeson terrorism.

To sum up, any initiativestaken by the ASEAN Summit

should be holistic and proactivein combating terrorism in theregion. The multilateralcooperation on this non-traditional security issue will notonly enable ASEAN to preventthe spread of domestic andinternational terrorists but itwill also enable ASEAN toattain its claim to be a securitycommunity in the region. Thiscould become a very significantpolitical-security achievement ofASEAN in its 36th anniversarythis year.

Muslims have beenamong the biggestlosers in SoutheastAsian terrorism. Thisphoto af a mosqueburnt by Laskar Kristenwas sent to T. Kivimäkiby a member of LaskarJihad.

References

ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism attheir 7th summit on 4-5 November 2001 held in BandarSeri Begawan, Brunei.

Chalk, Peter (1997). ‘Grey area phenomena in SoutheastAsia: piracy, drug trafficking, and political terrorism’.Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 123.Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ResearchSchool of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian NationalUniversity, p. 5.

Gunaratna, Rohan (2002). ‘Terrorist Trends and Patterns inthe Asia Pacific’. In Tan, Andrew, Ramakrishna, Kumar eds.The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies.p.129–149.

Simon, Steven & Benjamin, Daniel (2000). ‘America and thenew terrorism’. Survival. The IISS Quarterly. Vol. 24. No. 1.p. 66.

Volka, Vamik (1997). Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride toEthnic Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press. ■



Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism inSoutheast Asia: Which is the Greater Threat?by Ruben Thorning

The Bali bombings killed 202 people, and underlined claims that Southeast Asia was tobecome ‘the second front’ in the war on terrorism. The tragedy resulted in increasing outsidepressure, primarily from the U.S., on the region, to clamp down on local cells and cooperatemore effectively on counter-terrorism measures. However, these counter-terrorism strategiesrisk escalating local conflicts and stimulating instability rather than tightening security in theregion.

Southeast Asia in the post-911 WorldAlthough initially denied by theGovernment of Indonesia,significant evidence nowsupports allegations that aSoutheast Asian regional terroristnetwork, the Jemaah Islamiyahgroup, exists and is centred inIndonesia. More than 50 allegedmembers of the network havebeen arrested in six SoutheastAsian countries. However, theissue of counter-terrorism inSoutheast Asia goes beyond thetargeting of prominent groupssuch as Jemaah Islamiyah and thePhilippine Abu Sayyaff and MILF(Moro Islamic Liberation Front).The governments of Indonesiaand the Philippines have consist-ently labelled domestic insur-gency groups as terrorists,causing the emergence of anumber of ‘terrorist’ groups,which have a large local supportbase (e.g. Gerakan Aceh Mer-deka – The Free Aceh Move-ment and Organisasi Papua Mer-deka – Organisation for PapuanIndependence in Indonesia).

The danger of this strategy isthat Southeast Asian govern-ments could use the war onterrorism to target politicalopposition violently throughdraconian security bills. The waron terrorism could provide acloak of legitimacy for measuresof political suppression. InIndonesia, separatists in Aceh

and Papua are consistentlylabelled as terrorists althoughnone of the groups are known todeliberately target civilians. InMalaysia, the government’sallegations against the Muslimopposition party, PAS, tooqualify as an example of thistrend. The problem with thiscategorisation is that it giveslegitimacy to campaigns againstmany groupings that, in adifferent time, would have beencategorised as legitimatepolitical opposition.

Furthermore, governments’cooperation with the U.S.military adds to the discontent ofparticularly Muslim populationsin Southeast Asian states. Bysending military advisors andtroops to the Philippines andreinvigorating cooperation withthe Indonesian military, the U.S.is damaging their already poorimage in those states, becauseAmerica is being linked to failedmilitary reform and authoritar-ianism. Thus, the war on terror-ism and the policies it generateshave a highly significant impacton both domestic and regionalsecurity structures of the South-east Asian security complex.

When, in August 2001,Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesiaand the Philippines were dis-cussing Islamic extremism in theregion, they were particularlyconcerned with the many youngMuslims from the region who

returned from Islamic religiousschools in Pakistan andAfghanistan after having beeninfluenced by ‘hard-line Islamicteachers’. However, it has beenstressed before and needs to bestressed again; radical Islam doesnot have a large following inSoutheast Asia. The fearnevertheless, for seculargovernments and parts of themoderate majority, is that anIslamisation process, takingplace in both Indonesia andMalaysia, will increase thepower of Islamist groups, andeventually threaten their ‘secularand democratic values’.

Islam has certainly featuredas a significant component inseveral of the most violentconflicts in the region. InIndonesia, GAM (Gerakan AcehMerdeka – The Free AcehMovement) has been fightingfor an independent Islamic statein North Sumatra for decadesand the Muslim militia, LaskarJihad has been deeply involvedin several violent conflicts. Inthe Philippines, focus is on theMILF, the New People’s Armyand the Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG). In Malaysia, Singaporeand, to a lesser extent, Thailandand Cambodia, the focus hasbeen on local cells of JemaahIslamiyah and, to some extent,the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia(KMM)1.

Ruben Thorning is aStud. MA InternationalPolitics & Security,Dept. of Peace Studies,University of Bradford,UK



Political OppositionThe groups outlined above allhave Islamic identification incommon while their modusoperandi and motives diverge.However, one thing they allseem to share is an anti-government stance.

It is a widespread assumptionthat terrorism in Southeast Asia is,at least partly. stimulated byauthoritarian politics, politicalcorruption and marginalisation ofethnic or religious groups. Suchfactors have caused social andeconomic deprivation which hasfostered a general perceptionamong local populations thattheir governments are incapableor unwilling to govern for thecommon good of the majority ofits citizens. While separatistmovements in Indonesia and thePhilippines generally have beenmet by military force, the predica-ments of the two countries differsomewhat on the issue of Islamicdiscontent. As a predominantlyChristian country, it is easier forthe Philippine government toclampdown on Muslim dissi-dents. However, the case is quitedifferent for the Megawatigovernment in Indonesia, whichis highly dependent on a fragileMuslim support. Malaysia isalso facing an Islamicopposition, which has beenstrengthened over the past years.

Anti-AmericanismWhile the Arroyo governmentworries less about widespreadMuslim upsurge in the Philip-pines, her government is widelycriticised domestically becauseof its pro-U.S. stance. Thisapplies even more to Megawati’sgovernment; Indonesia sawsome of the world’s largest anti-war/anti-U.S. demonstrations inresponse to the campaigns inAfghanistan and Iraq. TheMuslim outrage does not onlystem from feelings of fraternity,many moderates are alsoangered because they feel

targeted and demonised by thecounter-terrorist focus onIslamic threats. The situation ismade even more problematic bythe temptation of the financialrewards offered by the U.S. andAustralia for compliance in thewar on terrorism. As politicalanalyst Rizal Mallarageng soaptly put it: ‘We have millionsof people who are living inpoverty, and we have aneconomic crisis. So why don’twe ask for help in return for ourloyalty and our partnership?’The paradox is, that in order toget funds that could possiblyreduce political instability, thegovernments must risk furtherinstability by going against thewill of the majority of thepopulation.

American StrategiesAccording to Dana RobertDillon and Paolo Pasicolan,Washington ‘should helpimprove the counter-terrorismcapabilities of militaries in theregion through training andequipment …’. These phrases fitwell with the State Department’swording in The NationalStrategy to Combat Terrorism,which states that the U.S. willsupport weak states in building‘institutions and capabilitiesneeded to exercise authorityover all their territory’ (p. 12).

The militaristic approachhas been most visible in thePhilippines and in Indonesia, andthe intended strategy outlinedabove sparked significant contro-versy because many objected tothe U.S. renewing ties with theIndonesian Armed Forces.Nevertheless, the U.S. in Januaryreinstituted a programme to trainIndonesian officers in the U.S.The U.S. is also in close cooper-ation with the Philippine ArmedForces. Initially 650 Americanmilitary advisors were sent to thePhilippines to assist the govern-ment troops in their fightagainst ASG. Furthermore,

American forces have beenengaged in training exercisesand security assistance in thetroubled regions of the SouthernPhilippines.

Non-violent strategiesadopted by the U.S. includeintelligence sharing andenhanced communication withregard to terrorism relatedmatters. However, with regardto the war on terrorism ingeneral, very little attention isgiven to counter-terrorismstrategies at the communitylevel, for example bystrengthening local NGOsworking with local conflictissues. Or, at a higher level,appropriating more money topoverty alleviation anddevelopment programmes.

In a potential non-violentcategory lies an importantaspect of American counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia,namely the strengthening of theNational Police Force throughtraining and assistance program-mes and supporting thecountry’s legal and regulatoryregimes. The U.S announced inAugust 2002 that it would giveIndonesia US$ 50 m to combatterrorism. Of these, $31 m weredesignated for ‘police training’.Strengthening the police forcecould, if implemented wisely, bethe most important start in along-term approach to counter-terrorism and communalviolence in Indonesia in general.

ConclusionIt is clear that the war onterrorism has provided aneffective instrument forgovernments in Southeast Asiato target political opposition.However, this is actually morelikely to increase than decreasethe potential for violence in theregion. The military strategiestraditionally employed againstinsurgency in the region have

continued on p. 18



Counter-Terrorism in Thailand: A NewDirection?by Michael Tivayanond

Thai authorities have recently made several high profile moves in the field of counter-terrorism. Previously, the Thai government had been very hesitant in admitting any terroristinfiltration on its soil. The question facing many observers of the region is whether the currenthigher profile is indicative of a new direction of counter-terrorism in Thailand?

In June 2003 the Thai authoritiesarrested three individuals sus-pected of being involved with theJemaah Islamiyah group. Arrestswere made based on intelligenceinformation supplied by thegovernments of Singapore and theUnited States, and after concur-ring with the evidence provided.These three were implicated by amember of the Jemaah Islamiyah,from Singapore who was arrestedin Thailand (and thus deportedback to Singapore) during theprevious month. Directly linkedto this was the recent apprehen-sion of a suspected arms dealer inThailand, who had in his posses-sion thirty kilograms of cesium-137, a radioactive substancewhich could be used to con-struct a ‘dirty bomb’ – a con-ventional explosive device whichcould kill or injure through theinitial blast and then by air-borne radiation contamination.Additional intelligence reportshave suggested that this materialwas intended for use for attacksby Jemaah Islamiyah on embassiesin Bangkok, and during the up-coming APEC summit inOctober 2003.

For the Thai government,the affirmation of JemaahIslamiyah members operatingon Thai soil has represented anissue of key concern. Thegovernment had always declaredthat such elements were notoperational in Thailand. Never-theless, such arrests have beenconsidered an importantdevelopment in the country’sreinforced counter-terrorismprogrammes. They have also

been highly praised by thesecurity services of the UnitedStates, who claim that theoperation itself was the result ofnine months of investigationbetween the two countries. TheThai authorities have beenquick to add that such arrestswere not the result of anyrequests from any country andthat they were acting on credibleevidence, which, according toThai authorities, cannot bedisclosed at the moment forsecurity reasons. Several critics,including Muslim leaders inThailand, have suggested thatthese arrests have lacked any realevidence and that they havebeen orchestrated by the UnitedStates for the purpose of draggingThailand into its inspired war onterrorism. Though such a positionmay be tempered by a history ofpolitical violence and the griev-ances of the Muslim ethnic mi-norities in the southern provincesof Thailand, the Thai author-ities have been adamant thattheir intelligence work in thiscase, has been exact.

Since the terrorist attacks of11 September 2001 in theUnited States, and that of 12October 2002 in Bali, theASEAN governments have wellpublicised their gesture to putextra effort into fine-tuningcounter-terrorism policies in theregion – after all, with theireconomies so dependent onforeign tourism, it was onlyobligatory that such a declar-ation be made to proclaim thesafety of Southeast Asia. In thisconnection, travel warnings to

Southeast Asia issued by Westerngovernments have been severelyrebuked by the ASEAN members.But it would also appear that thelatest counter-terrorism initiatives,taken up by Thailand, have beenheavily influenced by thecampaign to purge a particulartype of terrorist grouping, and bythe desire of the United States todevelop a more substantial in-telligence presence in the region.As many regional observers havepointed out, the problem withthis is that such a direction inpolicy is perhaps too suggestiveof how the United States hasbeen able to influence many ofthe ASEAN members’ recentcounter-terrorism programmes.Though it is debatable whetherthis will result in the UnitedStates conducting potentiallycontroversial counter-terroristactivity in Thailand, there areseveral concerns for Thailandthat should be acknowledged.First, will such an approach tocounter-terrorism bode well forthe political and securitysituation in Thailand, andsecond, will the forthcomingtechnical assistance and militarytraining provided by the UnitedStates have an effect in thesuppression of politicalgroupings in the region whomay have been inappropriatelylabelled as terrorists?

A look into Thailand’s mostrecent counter-terrorism pro-grammes would indeed revealincreased cooperation with someof its ASEAN neighbours to dealwith transnational militantIslamic groupings, and increased

Dr. Michael Tivayanondis a Senior Consultantat the Henry DunantCentre. He wasformerly an officer inthe Royal Thai Navy,and a visiting scholar atthe University of Lund.



cooperation with the UnitedStates in intelligence operations.So far, Thailand has taken on thefollowing measures as part of arevamped counter-terrorismprogramme:

• A counter-terrorism agreementwith Indonesia, Malaysia, thePhilippines and Cambodia thatestablishes a framework of co-operation and inter-operability ofprocedures for handling borderand security incidents.

• Bilateral counter-terrorismagreements with Australia and theUnited States.

• The signing of an ASEAN-sponsored Declaration ofCooperation with the UnitedStates on counter-terrorism.

• The establishment of an inter-agency financial crimes group tocoordinate counter-terrorismfinance policy.

• A re-affirmation of the commit-ment to accede to the remainingseven of the twelve UnitedNations anti-terrorism conven-tions (Thailand is currently partyto four of the twelve).

Further to this, Thailand hasbeen active in cooperating withthe United States in bilateralmilitary exercises with significantcounter-terrorism components.As for Thailand’s counter-terrorism ventures under ASEANtutelage, it is unclear at the mo-ment how ASEAN’s multilateralinitiatives will spell out. Thoughthe organisation has listed avariety of initiatives for its mem-ber states – such as advancedregional intelligence sharing pro-cedures, an anti-terrorism taskforce to be set up in each country,and procedures for freezingterrorist assets – ASEAN’s trackrecord in multilateral securitycooperation has been limited. Itis unlikely that the memberstates will fully cooperate oncertain transnational terroristissues if such an issue is directlyrelated to an internal politicalconflict of another member state.

But when considering theextent to which Thailand’scounter-terrorism approach hasbeen predisposed by the UnitedStates, it is important to con-sider first that the Thai author-ities have articulated an in-clination to approach counter-terrorism from an opportunityrather than motive platform.That is, more focus has beenplaced on dealing with theopportunity for terrorist activityin Thailand rather than themotive for it. Though it isessential when consideringcounter-terrorism policy that bothagendas should be addressed, it issuggested that for Thailand,limiting the opportunity forterrorist activity has become amore urgent policy option. Thedebate over the motives vs.opportunity approach to counter-terrorism is not new. Whenconsidering a comprehensivepolicy to manage politicalviolence, it is essential that theroot causes of a political grievancebe addressed. In other words,terrorism has a political purposeand, in this case, the reasoning touse violence against a civiliantarget for the purpose ofdelivering a political message isseen as a rational act. There isno doubt, however, thatpinpointing terrorist motives isa complex task. It is not alwayseasy to see how the motivesbehind an act of terrorism derivefrom religious, ideological, ethnic,historical, socio-economic, ornationalistic tensions. And it isnot easy for governments to agreewith how such factors validate alegitimate political grievance. Forinstance, it is not often the casethat a state will recognise thepolitical grievances of a groupthat has been at the receivingend of its own corruption orethnically and religiouslydiscriminating policies.

For the time being, it wouldbe fair to say that restricting thecapability for terrorist activityhas become the central

framework of operation for theThai authorities. As securityservice personnel are beingbrought up to date on non-conventional terrorist activity(such as nuclear, biological,chemical or cyber terrorism),the practices of investigatinginto illegal arms and weaponstransfers, monitoring possibleterrorist elements with externallinks, protecting highly-valuedpotential terrorist targets, and en-hancing civil defence operationswill continue, with or withouthelp from the United States orany other country for that matter.They are also working on theinformation that in SoutheastAsia, the majority of terroristactivity has come in the form ofbomb attacks on civilian targets,perpetrated by a terrorist groupwith extra-regional linkages. Inall such programmes, intelligencework is critical – a factor that theThai authorities have beenparticularly confident of, givenyears of military involvement innational administration. Thoughcritics of this approach havewarned of the security servicesbeing able to compromise certaincivil liberties in their pursuit ofsuch tasks, the authoritiesthemselves have not beenreluctant to stress the deterrentvalue of appearing hardline. Forthem there is every reason to doso. For one thing, the APECsummit in Bangkok, set forOctober of 2003, will bringtogether twenty-one heads ofstate from the Asia-Pacificregion, not to mention the firstvisit by the President of theUnited States to Southeast Asiasince the attacks on 11September 2001, and in Bali on12 October 2002. Given thisand a substantial and sustaineddrop in tourist numbers broughton by the previous terroristincidents and the recent SARS-scare, it is clear for the Thaiauthorities how their counter-terrorism techniques areunequivocally warranted. ■


Terrorism in Southeast Asia- ADVERTISEMENT -



Terrorism in Indonesiaby Timo Kivimäki

The intensification of Islamic terrorist activities in Indonesia has surprised many students ofIndonesian culture and religion. Did Indonesian religious practices not represent the mostrelaxed and tolerant form of Islam? For an international relations and conflict specialist,however, the Marriott Hotel bomb and the strike in Bali in October 12, last year seemedmore predictable. In fact, such predictions were actually made, for example, in a backgroundstudy on Indonesian and East Timorese political violence for the Finnish government in1999: ‘Violent Indonesian Jihad could easily in the future be targeted against internationalfinancing institutions, and in the worst case also against international investments,companies and individuals, most notably tourists.’ 1

The rise of terrorism in Indonesiacould be foreseen and it can beexplained by Indonesia’s conflicttradition and by changes in Indo-nesia’s international setting. Thespecial features of Indonesia’sconflict tradition can be seen as acondition that makes Indonesiamore vulnerable to terroristmilitia activities, while the inter-national changes offer violentgroups a direct motivation forterrorism.

Militias as a positive thingMilitias are normally associatedwith something negative. Evenin Indonesia, a conflict scholarwould easily conclude thatmilitias are the main securitythreat and the ‘least unlikely’cause of Indonesian disinte-gration. However, the history ofIndonesia has taught Indonesiansto respect militias.

In some cases militias havebeen used as supplements to theofficial coercive apparatus. MostIndonesian political parties, forexample, have their own militiasto secure their activities and partymembers. But militias have alsobeen very important for thenational cause. Indonesian in-dependence was won by militiasin 1945–49. The colonial master,the Netherlands, was able tocapture top political and mili-tary leaders of the nationalistrepublican forces, but the fightcontinued because of the factthat the army was based on

relatively independent militias.In the 1950s Indonesia

obtained US support by claimingthat without sympathetic policiesin the West, communist militiascould take over. In 1961–2Indonesia won (back) West Irianby using militia fighters. Thepresident could not be heldresponsible or be persuaded byforce since the force againstcolonialism in West Irian wasbased on spontaneous militiaactivity rather than coordinatedefforts by the national Indo-nesian defence forces. Indonesiaalso fought against the establish-ment of Malaysia by usingnationalist militias. Again theIndonesian president could not beforced to withdraw the militias,simply because he did not haveenough control over them. Indo-nesia’s defence against separatismhas also secretly used army-trained militias.

Militias were also usedextensively in the suppression ofthe communist opposition ofPresident Suharto’s ‘New order’regime in the 1960s. By usingmilitias harsh measures have notcaused as much internationalcondemnation as they wouldhave, had Indonesia used itsown military forces for theseoperations.

Militias have thus not beenso much a challenge to themonopoly of legitimate lawenforcement for the Indonesiangovernment. Instead, they have

been allies to the state. Militia-men are often considerednational heroes. Therefore, itwas not surprising, when radicalIslamic movements started toemerge at the turn of themillennium, that Indonesianswere not alarmed by the factthat these movements also hadarmed wings of their own. Infact, up until the Bali incident,many Indonesian politiciansopenly supported movementsthat were already labelled asterrorist by the United States.Indonesia’s Vice President Ham-zah Haz visited the Afghanistan-trained leader of the LaskarJihad, Jaffar Umar Thalib, afterthe latter was arrested for amurder. In a press conference,Hemzah Haz called the convicthis brother. Hamzah Haz alsoappealed for the release of AbuBakar Bashir, the suspectedleader of the infamous JamaahIslamiyah, and referred to himas his teacher.

Humiliation of Islam andIndonesiaAnti-Western terrorism does notoriginate from religious circles.Many organizations want tokeep religious teachers upfrontfor the sake of credibility, butthis does not mean that Islamicterrorists are committed toIslamic teachings. Rather,religion comes to the picture inthe definition of group interests:group interests of Islamic people

Timo Kivimäki



Time Place Target Casualties Suspected perpetrators

1999–2000 Moluccan Islands Terror campaign against > 5,000 Laskar Jihad; Laskar

mosques, churches, Christians, Kristen; various organized

Moslems and spontaneous groups

2000–2002 Poso, Sulawesi Terror campaign against mosques, ~ 1000 Laskar Jihad; Red Army

churches, Christians, Moslems Christian Militia; Moslem

Defence Front; al Qaeda

13.9. 2000 Jakarta Bomb in the Jakarta Stock Exchange car park 15 Jamaah Islamiyah?; al

Qaeda?; Gerakan Aceh

Merdeka?; Pro-Suharto forces ?

24.12.2000 9 cities in Java Simultaneous bomb attacks against churches 19 Jamaah Islamiyah; al Qaeda

19.9. 2002 Palu, Central Bomb in a Christian school 0 ?

Sulawesi

23.9. 2002 Jakarta Car bomb near a US Embassy building 1 ?

12.10.2002 Manado, North Bomb near the Philippine Consulate 0 Miners angered over a licence row

Sulawesi

12.10.2002 Kuta Beach, Bali Car bombs near a night club 202 Jamaah Islamiyah; Laskar Jihad

Young Turks?; al Qaeda

27.4. 2003 Jakarta Bomb near the Sukarno-Hatta Airport 0 Jamaah Islamiyah; al Qaeda

5.8.2003 Jakarta Marriott Hotel 14 Jamaah Islamiyah; al Qaeda

Terrorist strikes and campaigns in Indonesia

motivate terrorism more thanIslam itself. It is known thatviolent Islamic radicalism ismuch more common in secularIndonesian universities than inreligious universities. Further-more, anti-Western terroristorganizations tend to have theirheadquarters in Java, the islandwhich is known for its limitedcommitment in Islam. TheMuslim Defence Front (FrontPembela Islam, FPI) becameinfamous for its raids of nightclubs and discos mainly becausea lot of alcohol was not destroyed,but rather consumed during theoperation. Laskar Jihad militia-men, again, are known for theirmass rapings after successfuloperations against Christians.

Instead of religious motiv-ations, Indonesian terrorism isprimarily motivated by hatredcaused by the Western humili-ation of Indonesia. After thecollapse of the Soviet Union theUnited States has not had anystrategic interest in pleasing

Indonesians. As a result, duringthe economic crisis after 1997,Indonesia had to crawl in frontof the USA and the Westernfinancial institutions to get help.Indonesia had to make manyconcessions that it consideredhumiliating. Many Islamicmilitiamen interviewed for theNIAS project on Aid andTerrorism, said that they feltthat Indonesia was especiallyhumiliated by the pressuresagainst Suharto to step downand by the diplomacy to‘separate East Timor’ fromIndonesia. Thus it was notsurprising that the youthorganization of NahdatulUlama, the biggest Islamicorganization in Indonesia,declared the first Jihad againstAustralians and Americansshortly after the East Timorreferendum. The feeling ofhumiliation and loss of dignityis also used to justify terroristmeans: ‘When they humiliate usand take away our dignity as

human beings, they are in fact,inviting reactions that are nothumane.’2

While Indonesia’s nationaldevelopment helps to explainwhy most of the victims ofterrorism in Indonesia are Aus-tralians and not Americans,similar experiences as a memberof the Islamic community mightexplain why Indonesian terror-ism has taken an Islamic track.

Islamic people areobjectively economically andpolitically deprived, both indomestic and in theinternational economy andpolitics. Islamic people alsoreceive a smaller allocation ofinternational aid than theirshare of the third worldpopulation would justify. Warsin Afghanistan and Iraq haveconfirmed in the minds ofIndonesians that this unfairnesscannot be fought by using non-violent or conventional military

continued on p. 18



Violent Islamic Militias in Indonesia

Jamaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic group), Est. 1993, linked with Laskar Jundullah (Legion of the Jundullah), Indonesian Mujahidin Council(MMI), Anti-American Terrorist Soldiers and Brigade Hizbullah.

• Prime US suspect to Bali Bombing, Bombing of Churches on Christmas Eve 2000; harassment of US tourists in Solo. Abu BakarBashir’s MMI involved in killings of religious war in Maluku.

• Alleged spiritual leader: Abu Bakar Bashir, the leader of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). Denies his links to JI.

• After 911 Malaysia and Singapore have detained 50 alleged Jamaah Islamiyah operatives.

• Links al Qaeda to South East Asia; coordinates cooperation between radical Islamic militias in Southeast Asia and al Qaeda

• Vice President Hamsah Haz & former Parliamentary Speaker Abkar Tanjung have publically defended Abu Bakar Bashir

Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Muslim Defence Front), est. 1997

• Raids against discos, brothels and bars in Central Jakarta; extraction of protection money

• Leader: Habib Rizieq Shihab

• Number of members unknown

• Al Qaeda sympathies (wearing Osama T-shirts)

• Supporters until Bali blast: Muhammadiya, Amien Rais (Chair, People’s Consultative Council)

Laskar Jihad (Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah), Est. 1998

• War against Christians in the Moluccan Islands; raids of discos in Jakarta, Yogyakarta; harassment of Christian missionaries andseparatists in Papua. Young turks of LJ possibly involved in Bali blast

• Leader: Jaffar Umar Thalib

• 10,000 members. Laskar Jihad is dispersing the bulk of its forces from Sulawesi and Maluku

• Leaders have no sympathy towards al Qaeda, but many of the followers have, training in Afganistan, possibly also by theIndonesian military. Cooperates with MILF

• Alleged protectors: former Def. Min. Wiranto, Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) commander Djaja Suparman & former JakartaPolice Chief Nugroho Jayusman; after Bali, they dropped their support. Vice President Hamsah Haz has publicly supported theleader of the organization

Indonesian Muslim Workers Brotherhood (PPMI),

• Organized paid demonstrations and civilian militias that terrorized Jakartans after the downfall of Suharto 1998

• Leader: lawyer Aggy Sudjana (defended LJ leader)

• Weak support base

• Takes distance from al Qaeda, condemned Bali blast as an un-Islamic act

Banser (Barisan Serba Guna = Multi Purpose Front), Est. 1965. Militia of the Nahdlatul Ulama, NU, Indonesia’s largest Islamicmovement. NU has 40 million followers

• Very extensive violence against Communists after the alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965.

• NU’s former chairman was Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia’s former president, and is currently led by Hasyim Muzadi,presidential candidate who visited Denmark in August this year

• Strong support base

• Strongly against the terrorist Moslems, committed to religious freedom. Backed Anti-Terror Decree’s after 18.10. 2002

• National Awakening Party, PKB, Abdurrahman Wahid

Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (KOKAM, Vigilance Command of Muhammadiyah Youths), Military wing ofMuahammadyah, which has 30 million supporters

• Involved in the anti-Communist killings in Indonesia after the alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965.

• Current leader: Syafii Ma’arif

• Formerly supported the FPI/FDI, after Bali demands their arrest. Backed Anti-Terror Decrees after 18.10. 2002

• National Mandate Party, Amien Rais (Chair, Peoples Consultative Council)



means. In these wars inter-national law and the rights ofstates have been pushed asideand military power has ruled. Asa consequence, there is a generalperception among Indonesiansthat the world is divided be-tween the Islamic people and theWest, and that in this divisionnon-violent political means andmeans utilizing existing laws arenot applicable for the underdog.Even conventional wars lead tohumiliating defeats. Accordingto an opinion poll published thisyear by the famous PEW pollingcentre, a majority of Indonesians,as well as a majority of Islamicpeople in most of the othercountries studied, felt thatterrorist means against Westerncivilians are sometimes justifiable.

Culture of tolerance towardsterrorismA culture of tolerance towardsterrorism in Indonesia has beena result of three factors. On theone hand, militias have apositive association in Indonesia.

Secondly, people feel a justifiedanger for the marginalizedposition of their country andthe Islamic population of theworld. Thirdly, they perceivethat there are no fair means tochallenge the global top dog. Inthis kind of a climate it is notsurprising that a small numberof frustrated young men feelthat they have to do somethingdesperate for the defence of‘their constituencies’; Indo-nesians and Muslims.

Indonesian terrorists are notthemselves impoverished, poorlyeducated or marginalized. Onthe contrary, like most terroristsin the world, they are well edu-cated and wealthy. Their eliteposition is the very reason forthe fact that they feel that it isup to them to act: ‘I did not getinvolved in fighting because Iwould be poor, but because I amone of a people who is poor.The fact that I am not poor anduneducated means that I havecertain political responsibilitiesfor the poor people of Indonesia.’3

However, poverty and marginali-zation of Indonesians and Mus-lims together with the culture oftolerance towards terrorism hascreated opportunities for young,frustrated elite members to provetheir heroism for an oppressedpeople. These opportunities,much more than serious religiouscommitment, motivate youngIndonesian terrorists.

ConsequencesIn conflict situations there is atendency for each party toexaggerate the homogeneity ofthe opponent as an agent:punishment of just any of theWesterners is seen to hurtequally the Westerner that is theintended target of the punish-ment. Likewise, the bad in-tentions of one of the Westernersare seen by terrorists as beingshared by all Westerners. Thus,when other means of protestand combat are not available,targeting of civilians is seen as

an option. However, as we haveseen, anti-American terrorismhas given a new rationale for theUnited States to strengthen itsinternational leadership position,and the existence of Islamicterrorism has given an additionalreason for some people todiscriminate against Muslims.

Also Indonesian terrorismhas bounced back and furtherhurt the already humiliatedIndonesians. Tourism employsabout 8 million Indonesians andcontributes US$ 5.4b to thenational economy. The Bali bombeffectively crippled the Indonesiantourism industry for some timeand the Marriott bomb did notimprove the situation. Merelybecause of the Bali incident, eco-nomists estimate an increase ofone million in the official numberof jobless people in Indonesia.The number of underemployedwill also grow proportionally.Terror in Indonesian has been astrategy that rises out of weak-ness and helplessness, but as suchit has only further weakened andmarginalized the ‘terroristconstituencies’. The young militiaheroes have become anti-heroes.

Notes

1 Translated from Timo Kivimäki1999. KonfliktipotentiaaliIndonesiassa ja Itä-Timorilla.[Conflict potential in Indonesiaand East Timor]. Report to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, CTS-Conflict Transformation Service,Helsinki. 2 This citation is from a civilservant (!) and he referred to us asthe Muslim population. Thisstatement was related to the war inIraq and its effects on terrorism. Itis interesting to note, how theperception of sides (Islam againstthe US) in many interviews inIndonesia (conducted by Kivimäkiin April 2003) was the same amongradicals and people who weresupposed to feel ownership for thecommon effort to clamp down onterrorism. 3 Interviewed by the author inJakarta, February 2000. ■

continued from p. 16

continued from p. 11

only made the violence more durable, and it isunlikely that demonising political oppositionfurther, will bring stability to the volatile regions ofSoutheast Asia.

If the Southeast Asian states and the U.S.continue to focus on military solutions, thestrategies applied will only treat the symptom, notthe disease. A report on Development Cooperation asan Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism recentlyproduced for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairsby a research team at NIAS concluded that militarysolutions in counter-terrorism should be carefullytargeted and efficiently, and democraticallymonitored: the use of counter-terrorism as alegitimation for human rights violations could makethe medicine more deadly than the disease.Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia could learnfrom this conclusion.Note:

Data on these groups can be found at the NIASproject’s database at http://www.niaslinc.dk/gateway/terrorism.htm. ■





International Terrorism and the Weak Statein the Philippinesby Herman Joseph S. Kraft

This article looks at the linkage between the Philippines involvement in the ‘global war onterror’ and the stability of the country. It is argued that instability in the Philippines is due tothe weakness of the Philippine state. The growth and persistence of terrorism in the country is,in fact, indicative of the weak Philippine state. At the same time, however, terrorismexacerbates the inability of the Philippine state to enhance the stability of the country. Dr Herman Joseph S.

Kraft, Research Fellow,Institute for Strategicand DevelopmentStudies and facultymember, Departmentof Political Science,University of thePhilippines.

While the Philippine involve-ment in a campaign againstterrorism pre-dates the Septem-ber 11 attacks on the WorldTrade Center and the Pentagon,evidence of the intensificationof cooperation between armedgroups in the country opposedto the government and theJemaah Islamiyah (JI), theSoutheast Asian chapter of alQaeda, has changed the natureof the terrorist war in thePhilippines. The main issue thathas emerged is the question ofthe extent to which theinternationalization of this warin the Philippines affects thestability of the country. A directresult of the internationalizationof the war against terrorism inthe Philippines is the re-emergence of Philippine–USsecurity relations, somethingthat had lain moribund for along time. As such, its criticshave argued that the Philippinegovernment’s unquestioningsupport for the United States-led international coalitionagainst terrorism, has made thecountry more open to terroristattacks, especially involvingforeign terrorists. Supporters ofthe policy on the other hand,have said that US assistance infighting the Abu Sayyaf hasbeen instrumental in the gainsthat the government has hadagainst terrorism in the Philip-pines. This debate misses out onan important point – terrorismper se is the not the main cause

of instability in the Philippines.On 14 July 2003, Fathur

Rohman Al-Ghozi escaped fromthe maximum security prisoninside the Philippine NationalPolice Headquarters at CampCrame. Al-Ghozi had admittedto being involved in the 30December 2000 bombing of theBaclaran train station of the LightRail Transit in Manila. He wasable to get through a number ofsecurity checkpoints together withhis fellow fugitives, Abdul MukimEdris and Meran Abante. Theirescape, particularly the ease withwhich it was apparently per-petrated, has rightly been a sourceof great embarrassment to thePhilippine government and raisedquestions both within and outsidethe country regarding its ability tocounter terrorist activities. Thisimpression was further reinforcedin a less direct way by the militaryrebellion conducted by more than350 officers and enlisted person-nel of elite military combat unitson 26–27 July 2003. Althoughbloodshed was eventually avoidedwith their surrender, the clearindication of restiveness withinthe military and the uncertaintyof how deep this restiveness goeswithin the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) onlyemphasized the fragility of thestability of the country and howthis was constantly threatenedby the linkage between domesticarmed threats to the govern-ment and internationalterrorism.

By and large, it is theweakness of the Philippine statewhich stands as the critical issueof stability that any politicalleadership in the country willhave to first contend with. In oneof the major works which firstexplored the conception of theweak state, Joel Migdal describedit as a state whose capabilities inpenetrating society, regulatingsocial relationships, and extractingand appropriating resources areextremely limited. At the turnoverceremony of the Chief of Staff ofthe Armed Forces of the Philip-pines in 2002, President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo pointed to theproblem of the weak Philippinestate as the principal reason forthe country’s continuing malaise.She was quoted by Philippine Staras saying that the ‘state is weak ifdominant classes or sectors con-trol it or shape governmentpolicies, especially those dealingwith the economy’. The widegap between the rich and thepoor, a political system based onpatronage that breeds corruption,and an over-preoccupation withpolitics were alluded to as thesymptoms that show the weaknessof the state in the Philippines.These factors all impact on theability of the government in itsfight against internationalterrorism.

In the Philippines, the issue ofterrorism begins with the AbuSayaff, a group which emergedout of the Afghan resistanceagainst the Soviet occupation of



the country. It was first noticedby the AFP in 1992 when itbegan to engage in activitiesprimarily involving the kid-napping and killing of Christiansand the bombing of Christianplaces of worship in WesternMindanao. Their connection tointernational terrorism wasinitially established when it wasdiscovered that they had helpedRamzi Ahmad Yousef (who wastaken into custody by the UnitedStates for complicity in thebombing of the World TradeCenter in 1994) move in and outof the Philippines. Since then,there have been a number ofreports of foreigners training withthem and the MILF, Moro Is-lamic Liberation Front, (especiallywhen Camp Abubakar was stillunder its control) and even takingpart in their operations.

The involvement of foreignersadded a new dimension to theterror equation in the country.The 30 December bombing ofthe Light Rail Transit train boundfor Baclaran killed 22 people andinjured scores of other com-muters. At first, the attack wasthought to have been thehandiwork of the Abu Sayyaf.Later, however, Al-Ghozi, anIndonesian, was arrested andheld in connection with thebombing. Al-Ghozi was identi-fied as having been seen in CampAbubakar when it was still underthe control of the MILF.

In the investigation whichfollowed the September 11attacks, the linkage between theAbu Sayyaf, al-Qaeda and theJemaah Islamiyah in Indonesiabecame clearer. At the initialstages of the development of theAbu Sayyaf, bin Laden had senta brother-in-law to coordinatewith them. Money was providedand an attempt was made toarrange a merger between theAbu Sayyaf and the MILF. Therelationship never reallydeveloped though there werereports of joint operations in

Zamboanga and joint trainingin Camp Abubakar. Eventually,these connections between theAbu Sayyaf and the JemaahIslamiyah were revealed after thecapture of Al-Ghozi.

The internationalization ofthe terrorist war led to the in-volvement of United Statesmilitary forces in the Philippines.650 troops were committed to thePhilippines to train local forcesand join patrols against Muslimrebels. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had declined an offer fromPresident George Bush of directUS military support in thePhilippines but accepted $90M inmilitary aid. President Arroyo hasopenly set her government on theside of the Americans in its waragainst terrorism. At the sametime, nationalists have alreadyexpressed their concerns over theincreased military relationsbetween the two countries andthe possibility of increased U.S.military presence in the country.As Barry Wain points out in FarEastern Economic Review, the USaction may destabilize fragileadministrations and disturbreligious and ethnic sensitivities.

The backlash from the directinvolvement of the Philippinegovernment in the internationalwar on terror has alreadybecome evident. Hamsiraj Sali,one of the five leaders of theAbu Sayyaf on the US wantedlist of terrorists, warned that thePhilippine government’s supportfor the US-led global war onterror and its new militaryagreement with the US makesthe country a prime target forterrorist attacks. The December2000 bombing of the Light RailTransit train showed that this isnot an idle threat.

At the same time, the weak-ness of the Philippine state multi-plies the impact of terroristactivities. The bombings on 19and 20 October 2002 in Zam-boanga and Manila exposed thevolatility of the peso and the

stock market as both droppedsignificantly.

The military rebellion thattook place on 27–28 July 2003further complicates the situation.The possibility of a coup d’etat bythe AFP has been rumoured sincethe military withdrew its supportfor President Joseph Estrada. Inearly November 2002, formerAFP Chief of Staff LisandroAbadia declared that the slowimplementation of a pay hike forsoldiers was causing unrest in themilitary ranks and fueling fears ofa military coup. Abadia notedthat recruitment of those willingto join the coup is gaining groundbecause of issues against theArroyo administration. He saidthat recruitment is ‘going on inthree Army divisions, the Army’sSpecial Operations Command,Philippine Marines and the AirForce Strike Wing’, reaching upto the level of Colonel (fieldcommand level). While therumors of military restiveness inlate 2002 are different in naturefrom what took place in July2003, both indicate theenvironment of uncertaintyunder which the Philippinegovernment is operating.

Terrorism has a destabilizingeffect but this should be man-ageable to a state which hascomplete control of its domain.In the case of the Philippines, theimpact of the war on terror ismultiplied by the weak Philippinestate. The effect of a heightenedterror campaign, especially ifconducted in Metro Manila,would definitely place the weakPhilippine state in crisis.

References

Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States:State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in theThird World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress).

Miranda, Felipe B. et al, 1992. ‘The Post-AquinoPhilippines: In Search of Political Stability’, (QuezonCity: Social Weather Stations, September).

Philippine Star, 2 November 2002, p. 1.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 January 2002, p.20. ■



The Western view, especially fromthe United States, on civiliangovernment in the developingcountries has shifted since its de-claration of war against terrorismafter the 11 September 2001terrorist attack. Issues like demo-cratization and the military’s with-drawal from the political arena areno longer on her foreign policyagenda. In fact, the United Statesis disappointed with civilian gov-ernments in developing countriesfor being too slow and weak inresponding to terrorist threats.

In the Indonesian case, suchUnited States disappointmentwas exemplified by the strongcriticism of Indonesia by DeputySecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfo-witz. He criticized the Indonesiangovernment for doing nothing tosuppress terrorism in the countryand stated that the United Statestook a dim view of the countryfor not supporting her efforts intackling terrorism (Kompas, 11October 2002). Following hiscomments, United States militaryaid to Indonesia was postponedtemporarily.

As head of a country wherethe majority of the populationare Moslems, it was not easy forPresident Megawati to take firmaction against the Islamic organ-izations that were considered tobe radical groups. The attitude

of most Islamic leaders in thecountry, particularly from thoseIslamic political parties that sup-ported the Islamic organizationsidentified as radical, caused moredifficulties for the governmentto take action against them.

The slow response of civilianleaders, as shown by the Indones-ian government, has opened upthe possibility for the UnitedStates to reconsider the return ofa military regime in the country.The firm attitude of Pakistan’smilitary regime under GeneralMusharraf in fighting terrorismfurnished evidence for the UnitedStates on how effective a militaryregime can be in supporting USforeign policy, compared tocivilian regimes. Therefore, asmentioned earlier, there is apossibility that the United Stateswould consider Indonesia’sreturn to a military regime.

If the United States proceedswith that, Indonesia is fertileground for the military to make acomeback for power in the future.This is because the Indonesianmilitary, like the Turkish Army,traditionally prefers secularismto sectarianism. The emergenceof radical Islam in the country hasdispleased the military; its dis-pleasure is even greater since theleaders of political parties are busypursuing their own interests. In

such a situation, the United States’support will determine whetherthe military will maintain its roleas guardian of the state or seizepower for itself. The direction, ofcourse, will be determined by theyounger generation of the military,most of whom are disappointedwith their seniors because thelatter conducted internal reformsof the military.

However, it is difficult to pre-dict which scenario is likely tohappen in the future. Besides theUS role, four other indicatorswill determine the future role ofthe military. These are the matur-ity of civilian politicians, thesuccess of the civilian regime indeveloping economics and politics,the development of a civil societyin the Republic, and the abilityof the civilian government toprovide for the military’s budgetand modernize its equipment andweapons. If these four indicatorstake place, the idea of civiliansupremacy will win and themilitary will have to return to itsbarracks. In contrast, if these fail,the military will take over. ■

Terrorism and the Resurgence of MilitaryPower in IndonesiaSukardi Rinakit

Although the situations in the Philippines and Indonesia are quite different, there are thosewho argue that (just as in the Philippines) the weakness of the Indonesian state – or at least ofits civilian politicians – has hampered the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Since the endof the Suharto regime, the military has had a greatly reduced presence in Indonesian politicsand society – a situation that has not pleased many in the military. Especially, there had beenconcern about the death of Pancasila as the state ideology and consequent resurgence of cleavagesand conflicts in society. The Bali bombing confirmed these fears and stiffened the military’sresolve to act in defence of national unity. The result has been increased military involvement inday-to-day politics. This shortened excerpt from Sukardi Rinakit’s forthcoming book on TheIndonesian Military after the New Order explores the possibility that terrorism could leadto the military’s return to power. Here, the changed attitude of the United States is significant.

As a former ghostwriterat the IndonesianMinistries of HomeAffairs and Defence,Sukardi Rinakit hasbeen privy to the in-ternal dynamics of themilitary and haspersonally intervieweduntouchable figuressuch as former Pre-sident Suharto. He nowworks as a researcher atthe Centre for PoliticalStudies in Jakarta.

Please note that theextract published here inNIASnytt is based on acopyedited version of thetext that the author hasnot yet had the chance tosight or approve.

The Indonesian Military after the New OrderSukardi Rinakit

NIAS, November 2003, 256 pp., illus.Hbk • 87-91114-05-5 • £40Pbk • 87-91114-06-3 • £15.99

Book Extract


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Guest Researcher Scholarships for Nordic ScholarsThis type of scholarship is designed for senior researchers and doctoral candidatesbased in the Nordic countries. It offers researchers an opportunity to work at NIAS asan affiliated researcher for 2 or 4 weeks. A scholarship includes inexpensive travel toand from Copenhagen and accommodation with full board in a NIAS room at NordiskKollegium. The guest researcher enjoys full access to the Institute’s library services andresearch tools, computer facilities, contact networks and scholarly environment. Staysare arranged subject to a time schedule administered by NIAS.

The application form is available athttp://www.nias.ku.dk/activities/supra/NIASNordicGuestResearcherSch.doc

Contact Scholarships for Nordic Graduate

StudentsThese scholarships are designed to make NIAS’s library and other resources accessibleto graduate students in the Nordic countries. A scholarship covers inexpensive travel toand from Copenhagen and accommodation with full board in a NIAS room at NordiskKollegium for a period of two weeks. Stays are arranged subject to a time scheduleadministered by NIAS.

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Øresund ScholarshipsResearchers and students from Lund and Roskilde universities are invited to apply forNIAS’s ‘Øresund Scholarships’. The candidate will be seated in the library’s readingroom and will be offered the same extended library services as the regular holders ofcontact scholarships. Only transport costs are covered by the scholarship.Accommodation costs and incidental expenses are not covered. Stays are arrangedsubject to a time schedule administered by NIAS.

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Staff News

Recent Visitors

Li Narangoa (Nara)held a GuestResearcher Scholarshipin 14 April – 9 May.Nara is working on abook project togetherwith Ole Bruun.

Morten KjærsgaardRetoft joined the NIAS

team for June–Septemberas a trainee to assist John

Christensen with theaccounts. He is a student

at Niels Brock BusinessSchool.

Nis Høyrup Christensen,Department of Political Science,University of Copenhagen, has astudieplads at NIAS until 18February 2004. He is working on aMA thesis on Capitalism in China.Nis has formerly been employed atDUPI (now Institute forInternational Studies) and hasworked for half a year as a traineein the political section of theDanish Embassy in Beijing

The seminar on ‘Tibet Just Now’ was organised by NIAS in collaboration with theDanish newspaper Politiken on 3 June: From left: Prof. Mette Halskov Hansen,University of Oslo, Dr Tsering Shakya, Research Fellow, SOAS, University ofLondon, and Ms Heidi Fjeld, PhD Student, University of Oslo. The seminar wasorganised on the occasion of the visit to Denmark of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Stine Lykke Nielsen,University of Aarhus,held a ContactScholarship in May.Stine Lykke Nielsen isworking on an MA-thesis on ChineseInterpretations ofSustainable Development.

Carol Richards, originallyfrom Canada, joined theInstitute on 1 September towork in the accounting andadministration departments,and NIAS Press. She alsotakes care of the Reception.

We bid a fond farewell to LizBramsen who graced both staffand visitors with her gentlecharm. She was a key person inthe development of NIAS’spublication programme andthe launch of NIAS Press. Ourauthors especially appreciatedhow she saw their booksthrough to publication in afriendly but capable manner;for Liz it was always the personthat came first. Not least willwe miss her warm smile, richlaughter and haunting singingvoice.


ISSCO V

“New Chinese Migrants – Globalisation of Chinese OverseasMigration”

The Department of Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen, and the Nordic Institute ofAsian Studies, Copenhagen, are pleased to announce the Fifth Conference of the

International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas (ISSCO V).

Date: 10–14 May 2004Venue: LO-School, Elsinore (Helsingør), DenmarkWebsite: http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/Key-note speakers: Professor Wang Gungwu, National University of Singapore, and Professor RonSkeldon, University of Sussex

The primary objective of the Fifth International ISSCO conference is to examine the implications ofglobalisation and the recent phenomenon of increasing out-migration from the People’s Republic ofChina. The process of globalisation accelerated by transnational financial and commercialdevelopments and innovations in transportation, Internet technology and telecommunication hasincreased human mobility. Chinese migration is taking new forms by which new types of migrantsfrom a variety of geographical and socio-economic backgrounds are on the move to new destinations.

These developments suggest that scholars need to re-address their studies about migration from China.New paradigms for migration studies and processes have to be worked out to understand thesignificant political, economic, social and cultural consequences of migration from China. The 5thinternational conference of ISSCO should strive to serve this purpose.

Sub topicsTopics within social sciences, history, literature, and the arts related to Chinese migration.

Call for papers, panels and postersThe ISSCO V Organising Committee invites proposals for organised panels, individual papers and posterpresentations relating to the main topic of ‘New Chinese Migrants – Globalisation of Chinese OverseasMigration’ or any other topic within social sciences, history, literature, or the arts relating to Chinesemigration. For details on registration, see the conference website, http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/.

Conference languageEnglish and Chinese. No official interpretation will be provided.

Exposition, displays and salesSpace will be allocated in front of the main hall to allow participants to bring materials for displayand/or sale.

Organising CommitteeMette Thunø, PhD, Associate Professor, Dep. of Asian Studies, University of CopenhagenJørgen Delman, PhD, Director, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), Copenhagen

Conference SecretariatAnders Højmark Andersen, student assistant, NIASPhone: +45 35 32 95 15E-mail: [email protected]

ISSCO, the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, was established in 1992 as ascholarly, non-political and non-profit professional society of individuals and institutions interested inand committed to the study of Chinese overseas. The primary purposes of the society are to advanceresearch and scholarly exchange in the study of Chinese overseas, to provide means for research andpublications, and to organise and support national and international conferences

http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/

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NUMBER 6 NOW AVAILABLE

Social Science Research on Southeast AsiaRecherche en sciences humaines sur l’Asie du Sud-Est

ARTICLES

Gerben Nooteboom & Pande Made Kutanegara‘Will The Storm Soon Be Over? ’ Winners and Losers in the 1997 Crisis in Rural Java

Jan OvesenIndigenous Peoples and Development in Laos: Ideologies and Ironies

George DuttonVerse in a Time of Turmoil: Poetry as History in the Tay Son Period

Olivier TessierFondateurs, ancêtres et migrants : mobilité et espaces au Nord Viêt-nam

NOTES

Pierre Le RouxIn memoriam. Albert Marie Maurice

Laurent Dartigues & Gilles de GantèsLes fonds d’archives sur l’Asie dans le Var

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Recent Visitors

Erika Wasserman, UppsalaUniversity, had a ContactScholarship in May. She is workingon an MA-thesis on Foreign Ideas ina Local Context (Laos).

Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen,theUniversity of Aarhus, held a ContactScholarship in May. She is working onan MA thesis on The Security Situationin Northeast Asia – Optimistic Trendsbut Near-term Challenges.

Elina Ekoluoma,Uppsala University,will held a ContactScholarship 26May–6 June. She iscarrying out adoctoral project onEveryday Life inBalibago: Identitiesand Social Relationsin Tourist-OrientedProstitution in thePhilippines.

Delsy Ronnie (1st from right), Aceh Institute for Social Political Studies, Banda Aceh,Indonesia held a Guest Researcher Scholarship 26 May–20 June. He collaborates withTimo Kivimäki (2nd from left), NIAS. The other visitors in the photo are Robert Cribb(1st from left), ANU, Canberra, Jacob Trane Ibsen (3rd from right), Copenhagen, andMason Hoadley (2nd from left) Lund University.

Marianne Hester, University ofSunderland, UK, held a Guest Re-searcher Scholarship at the beginningof June. She is collaborating withSenior Researcher Cecilia Milwertz,NIAS.

Jang-sup Shin, NationalUniversity of Singapore,held a Guest ResearcherScholarship in May–June.His research is pertinent toNIAS’s research themes on‘Corporate Governance andThe State and the PrivateSector’ and at NIAS hecollaborated with SeniorResearcher Geir Helgesen(NIAS). Jang-sup Shin’sstay was sponsored by theSwedish School ofAdvanced Asia PacificStudies (SSAAPS).

Cesar de Prado Yepes, GuestResearcher at the Lund Centrefor East and Southeast AsianStudies, held an ØresundScholarship in May–June.

Jaana Karhilo, London School ofEconomics and Political Science, hada Contact Scholarship in April. J Shecarrying out a Ph.D. project onConflict Prevention and State-Buildingin Kosovo and East Timor.


The Asia Intelligence Service10-day free evaluation opportunity

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Ann-Louise Bäcktorp, UmeåUniversity, had a Contact Scholarship26 May–6 June. She is carrying out adoctoral project on EducationalTransformation in Laos – TheConstruction of Gender and Power.

Noralv Pedersen, NorwegianUniversity of Science andTechnology in Trondheim held aContact Scholarship in June. He isworking on an MA-thesis on TheTimorese Democracy – A Clash ofParadigms.

Gry-Irene Skorstad, University ofBergen held a Contact Scholarshipin June. Gry-Irene Skorstad isworking on an MA-thesis on TheImplementation of the FamilyPlanning Policy in China – China’sForbidden Children.

Tony Fang, Stockholm UniversitySchool of Business holds a GuestResearcher Scholarship 4 – 15August. Tony Fang is carrying out aresearch project on NegotiatingBusiness in the “United States ofChina”. Tony Fang will give aseminar presentation on Thursday14 August (details below).

Paulus Maasalo (left), University of Helsinki, and TiejunZhang, Göteborg University, both held a Contact Scholarshipin August. Paulus is carrying out a PhD project on Track-TwoDiplomacy – Managing Potential Conflicts in the South ChinaSea, while Tiejun Zhang’s PhD project is on China as a RisingPower: Security Strategy in the Early 21st Century.

Dinh Trong Thang from the CentralInstitute for Economic Management(CIEM) in Hanoi visited NIAS inJune. He was trained in the use ofelectronic resourses partly in theNIAS Library and InformationCentre and partly at the Institute ofEconomics, University ofCopenhagen.

Johan Juffermans, LundUniversity, had anØresund Scholarship inApril–May. He isworking on an MAthesis on Civil SocietyParticipation in thePlanning/FormulationPhase of DevelopmentProjects – a Road toDemocracy? A Case Studyof the VietnamComprehensive PovertyReduction and GrowthStrategy.

http://www.asiaint.com


Book Extract

Deforestation and Climate Change:A Nineteenth-Century IssueJeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells

The 2003:1 issue of NIASnytt reproduced a brief excerpt from Susan Martin’s ‘UP Saga’,describing how tough plantation life was in 1930s Malaya. But what becomes abundantlyclear in the mammoth history of peninsular Malaysia’s forests by Jeya Kathirithamby-Wells(soon to be published by NIAS Press) is that clearing the land was even more arduous. Britishefforts in this direction began in Penang, which was acquired in 1786 from the Sultan ofKedah (in return for protection against his enemies) by the English trader, Captain FrancisLight, acting on behalf of the East India Company. The story has it that, in his haste to clearland for a settlement on what was then a densely forested island, Light loaded the ship’s cannonswith silver dollars and fired them deep into the jungle so as to spur the labourers to clear theundergrowth at a quicker pace. But that was just the beginning. Although the bulk of ‘Nature and Nation’ deals with the British colonial period inpeninsular Malaysia, the book is not as such a colonial history. What makes the study such agroundbreaking work is that it goes beyond environmental and economic history to considerthe spiritual, intellectual and social forces that have shaped – and been shaped by – the forestsof Malaya. In so doing, the author makes clear to the reader that many of the environmentalissues concerning us today are not new; similar concerns were voiced and acted upon over 150years ago by scientist-administrators of the British Empire.

A former Professor ofAsian History at theUniversity of Malaya,JeyamalarKathirithamby-Wellsis a life member ofClare Hall, CambridgeUniversity; here shecontinues to lecture inAsian history. The text extract re-produced here is aslight abridgement ofher monograph,Nature and Nation(details below),described by one re-viewer as ‘a major con-tribution to the foresthistory of PeninsularMalaysia … it will longbe regarded as aground-breaking andseminal study that noone with an interest inthe en-vironmentalhistory of the regioncan afford not to read.Nothing remotely likeit exists for thePeninsular and I knowof no other com-parable work on anyother part of theTropics. It is suigeneris.’

NATURE AND NATIONForests and Development in PeninsularMalaysia

Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells

NIAS Press, late 2003, 400 pp., illus.NIAS Press, late 2003, 400 pp., illus.NIAS Press, late 2003, 400 pp., illus.NIAS Press, late 2003, 400 pp., illus.NIAS Press, late 2003, 400 pp., illus.Hbk • 87-91114-22-5 • £55Hbk • 87-91114-22-5 • £55Hbk • 87-91114-22-5 • £55Hbk • 87-91114-22-5 • £55Hbk • 87-91114-22-5 • £55

British intervention between1874 and 1888 in the mineral-rich States of Perak, Selangor,Negeri Sembilan and Pahangmarked the beginning of adramatic phase ofenvironmental change in thewest coast... The pioneerlandscape that shapedResidency rule encouraged theemergence of a class ofnaturalists-cum-administratorswho arrived at an earlyappreciation of the forestsbeyond their immediateeconomic value. Forestpreservation, imaginatively

linked by Perak’s Resident,Hugh Low, with long-termenvironmental stability, emergedas a central theme in pioneercolonial development... The ardent botanical interestsof Hugh Low, Resident of Perakin 1877–89, related to the widerdebates on of tropicaldeforestation and climatechange. His views stronglyechoed the concerns of Logansome 30 years earlier and thecontemporaneouspreoccupations of JosephHooker, Director of the RoyalBotanical Gardens, Kew.

If the general belief can betrusted, the denudation offorest land very much alters theclimate of a country, making ithotter, diminishing the rainfalland causing it to rush down themountains in floods, carryingthe surface soil with it insteadof the comparatively steadyflow of the water-courses whenprotected by the jungle.

Unlike Logan who had noofficial rank, Low was able touse the substantial powers hewielded as Resident to translatesome of his ideas into practice,taking advantage of the growingsensitivity of his superiors toforest depletion. Thegovernment’s delayed action inresponse to Joseph Hooker’srequest for reportage on colonialforests was followed by efforts toanticipate timber depletion.Introducing the idea ofsustainability, Lord Carnarvon,the Secretary of State for theColonies and a keen botanistand collector, advocatedinstituting reforestation as ameans of averting depletion inareas of concentratedeconomic activity. Lowinterpreted the government’sinterest in timber preservationas endorsement for forestprotection on a wider front,


For a more detailed account of earlyPenang, see also

TRADE AND SOCIETYIN THE STRAITS OF MELAKADutch Melaka and British Penang,

1780s–1830Nordin Hussin

fuller details in the upcoming NIASPress

‘New Books’ catalogue (out inOctober)

“A genuine pioneering studyof Malaysian urban history[...] and breaks much newground. At its best it is a fine-grained social history ofwhich we have seen so far toolittle in Southeast Asia.”(External reviewer)

Now Available

Power and PoliticalCulture in Suharto’sIndonesiaThe Indonesian DemocraticParty (PDI) and Decline of theNew Order (1986–98)Stefan EklöfNIAS, September 2003, 352 pp.Hbk • 87-91114-18-7 • £50, $60, EUR80,

DKK600

Performing the NationCultural Politics in New OrderIndonesiaJörgen HellmanNIAS, July 2003, 220 pp, illus.Hbk • 0-7007-1678-5 • £45, $67, EUR73,

DKK540

The Social Dynamics ofDeforestation in thePhilippinesActions, Options and MotivationsGerhard van den TopNIAS Press, August 2003, 352 pp., illusHbk • 0-7007-1483-9 • £45, $67, EUR73,

DKK540

Co-management of NaturalResources in AsiaA Comparative PerspectiveEdited by Gerard A. Persoon,Diny M.E. van Est and Percy E.SajiseNIAS, September 2003, 320 pp., illusHbk • 0-7007-1485-5 • £45, $67, EUR73,

DKK540

a veritable flood of new titles will be released by NIAS Press before year-enddetails at www.niaspress.dk

including its importance forclimate, hydrology and soilstability that he consideredcould be at stake.

Although Low believedthat forest loss was not likely toaffect precipitation to anyappreciable degree in Perak asin some other climes, the heavyrun on timber and waterresources by settlement andmining in Larut demandedspecial attention. To protectwater supplies drawnprincipally from Gunung Hijau(1,488 m) in the Larut Hills(Banjaran Bintang), the forestcover on the western face waspreserved by a prohibition oncultivation. These forests thathave survived into the presenttime bear testimony to one ofthe earliest conservation effortsin the Peninsula resulting fromLow’s initiative, possible onlywithin the large measure ofindependence enjoyed by theearly Residents.

http://www.niaspress.dk


Dear Gerald and Janice,

Two things. First […].

Second, I'm attaching a photo whichwe both hope you will use for thefront cover. It is of our landlady inHanoi posing with her Dream II.The title 'Reaching for the Dream'contains a pun you see. I really likethis photo: it reminds me of one ofthose very formal victorian marriedcouple poses and […] I'm sure sheloves her Dream more than[anything]!!! She is a good friend ofboth of us and would be reallychuffed to have her picture on thefront of our book. It also happens todepict the Vietnamese idea of thebourgeois life (just as those victorianphotos did).

>From your point of view, I thinkthe red/gold tones in the picture,framed by a black cover would lookvery Vietnamese. Sort of like one ofthe lacquer paintings.

Let me know what you think.

cheers,Melanie

Nice idea, can do. -- gbj

Out in OctoberREACHING FOR THEDREAMChallenges of SustainableDevelopment in VietnamEdited by Melanie Beresford and AngieNgoc Tran

NIAS Press, October 2003, 288 pp., illusHbk • 87-91114-19-5 • £55

no 3, september 2003 nytt - nias.asia copy.pdf2 niasnytt no. 3, 2003 niasnytt is published by the...

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