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NIE 11-1-73

SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

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CONTENTS

.PRECIS

THE ESTIMATE ........ .

I. GENERAL RATIONALE AND EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS . . . . . . ...... .

II. PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Reconnaissance ...... . Surveillance ........ . Communications Weapons Support ..... Weapons

III. ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS

IV. PRESTIGE PROGRAMS

Problems to be Overcome Cooperation in Space Programs

Prospects for Prestige Programs ... Manned and Related Space Stations

Space Shuttle ... Unmanned Lunar Exploration Manned Lunar Landing Planetary Exploration

V. FUTURE PRIORITIES

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Page

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5

5

6

6 7 8 8 9

9

10

10 13 15 15 16 16 16 l7 I

I 17

I i i ~ ~ ' !

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SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

PRECIS

The USSR will continue to undertake space programs for a variety of reasons:

- Supporting strategic military objectives by using existing mili­tary space support systems, and by developing new appli­cations.

- Enhancing the image of Soviet scientific and technical prowess by undertaking prestige space endeavors, such as manned, lunar, planetary, and scientific programs.

- On a lower priority, increasing the use of space for missions with more immediate economic benefits, such as communica­tions relay and earth resources surveys.

Currently, some three-fourths of Soviet activity in space (as meas­ured by number of launches) is in support of strategic-military ob­jectives. The strategic-military space programs have been generally successful, while some of the civilian prestige programs have run into major problems. \Veil over 90 percent of the military missions have been successful over the past 6 years, but only some 75 percent of the prestige missions have accomplished their objectives. Moreover, the

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effort devoted to the strategic-military programs has been growing relative to civilian programs.

Military space programs, which continues to rely heavily on proven military hardware, are extensive in scope. The major Soviet space effort in support of strategic objectives is the collection of intelligence

data by photographic and other satellite reconnaissance systems. A second very important area is communications satellites. Other pro­grams include navigation, geodetic, and meteorological systems. The

USSR has developed a satellite interceptor and a fractional orbital bombardment system.

Performance of military space systems will improve as later genera­tion spacecraft become operational. These are likely to include tactical

as well as strategic applications. New systems for warning, intelligence collection, and communications are being developed.

By contrast, Soviet manned space and other prestige programs re­quiring advanced technology have run into disastrous problems, and the USSR has lost its coveted image of predominance in space. In the prestige programs, problems have cropped up throughout the cycle of development and in many technical areas. These problems do not result from inattention or inadequate effort. Rather, they seem to be a consequence of inadequate design, fabrication, instrumentation, and quality control, and of attempting to cover up, rather than to address and solve, fundamental problems. These are failures of technology in the first instance, but they are more fundamentally failures of man­agement inherent in the Soviet system.

In this situation, the Soviets have entered into more extensive co­operation with the West to enhance the image of Soviet prowess in space and to gain technological know-how. Soviet participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), which has been entered into also as one element of the broader policy of detente, will be handicapped by secrecy and bureaucratic lethargy, but we believe that, as long as detente is attractive, the Soviets will find ways to keep ASTP alive. The USSR will continue and perhaps expand somewhat its program of politically-rewarding but relatively uncomplicated cooperative ven­tures in space with countries other than the US.

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We expect more manned Soyuz flights, and a continuation of Salyut flights, in near earth orbit over the next few years. \Ve believe such advanced space endeavors as a manned lunar landing and a large manned space station continue to be Soviet objectives, but progress toward them will be slowed by the weaknesses in the USSR's technical and managerial base, and they are unlikely to be achieved until the 1980s. For the remainder of the 1970s, the Soviets will also con­duct various unmanned missions to the moon, Mars, Venus, and per­haps Mercury. They could attempt a Jupiter or Jupiter /Saturn fly-by as early as about 1975, and a more ambitious series of Jupiter missions in the early 1980s.

After a period of rapid growth in the 1960s, Soviet funding of space programs is estimated to have leveled off in the 1970s, and will probably continue at approximately present levels for the next few years. As other elements of the Soviet economy make increasing claims on high-quality technical resources, space programs-particularly the prestige programs-may not enjoy their past favored position in com­peting for these resources. But Soviet space programs almost certainly will not suffer significant long-term cuts in funding.

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Figure 1

Surveillance SL -6

Growth of Soviet Space Programs I ~~"-•'t<!" .·,: •j,.._,_. ·.!

Phologroph~-<ebted Sl-4 I 'tS'..'JtA~-t..£~~:,_ .... ,.:.:

Space Weapons

Dual Purpose; Eco~omic/Military

[I=· :;:::=:;:;::;::;=:;;.::::'-·' MilitaryiSirategic Support Manned, lunar, Planetary, Scienlilic-Prestige

Sl numbers refer to space launch vehicle designators, using boosters as indicated:

Sl Vehicle Sl-3, 4, 6 Sl-7 Sl-8 Sl-11 Sl-12, 13 c ]

Booster SS-6 SS-4 SS-5 SS-9 New New

Environmenlal SL-8

lhird Genmlion Elinl Sl-3 I-'")';·_ .. , ...... ~--.. ·~··'*~.,,,~, ..... ~.·.<:.~: ... ~··_,_.) ...

~. ]oevelopmenl

Radar Reconnaissance Sl-11 ,, .. _•:-'!·;.•;.--.'.~··:--·-·· ;:: ;;.·--~_,, ................. • ,.. .. :, .... - ... ~.--•• -:.:~ _,

ASAI Sl-11

Solyul SL-13

Pbnelory SL-12 --·, ... ;

Lunar Sl-12

Sl-9 & SL-12 Oevelripmenl

fOBs Sl-11

L4etsats Meteor Sl-3

Probable Store/Oum~ Communications SL-8 j·:;!"-"~W%-.':..'o;~!<>~L!<.;f~~ .. "!f·~·m;;:~Jo:fi;:~;~~~:;.:-.v.;.:i:!" .. \.>...'!~:~~Jo:<-.-...":::!;:.,;_~~~>J--~'+..:.-<:~:o;:!4l~:-.;r._,~ :~·--!

Radar Calibralio.n Sl-7 1--:~. -"'~:'""~K.,Z:"' ;-~-:--n~:.c':Y"~l;ioJ.iO;.-·,,,,," .. ,; ... ~v,;-:.;-~:"'-;.;.:.,~ -:~:cy;,r-_.:~·i.:t•.'.,.·-...:r;~-~:~Y~'!' .:.-.::.}:::·~- ...J

L(olniya _2 SL-6

Development l.lotniyH Sl-6

HH)h Resolution Reconnoissance Sl·l @~A<;;;t.,_,v..,...a<.~~*'·.p:..,rr.u·."<;<..,.~- .£tp@ti~~.;u=~~-.- +&k?Y~~@§:;:@f!~.-q.g~o;:N

Later Reconnaiss~nce Low Resotution Photo & Hint Sl-4 Earl Reconnaissance Low Resolution Photo and Elint Sl-3 ~~~~&-Jv.,:;~·k-$Q~ .. ;t.·;w~.'f'il;f'YS:t::~;.~;.\J6.\%,..;~.~~·<!f.~-~B

-~· ~~-~- .•.. i;;i~~~~"'

Sputniks ~

58 59

Vosloks Sl-3

Early luniks SL-3 c:::J

6! 62 63

Voskhod Sl-4 l''•'·''·c··>.f

64 65

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Scientific-fnvironmentaf Sl-7

Planetary Sl-6

Soyuz Sl-4 '"·.. • .: ~·':·I' ~j:;,::_{;,,;.<f,:.:.•-0....<> ~:t_:~~ <-,•,'< •• '

66 67 69 70 71 72 1973

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THE ESTIMATE

I. GENERAL RATIONALE AND

EMPHASIS OF SOVIET SPACE

PROGRAMS

l. In the early years, Soviet space programs used hardware already available and relied entirely on boosters developed as ballistic mis­siles. Missions were predominantly those­such as the manned, lunar, and planetary flights-that could be and were publicized. There were also scientific programs for ex­ploration of space near the earth. (Figure 1, opposite, portrays the growth of the major Soviet space programs as represented by their flight history. Current Soviet space launch ( S L) vehicles are shown in Figure 2 on page 10). This approach provided a series of space flights that simultaneously made headlines, had a high probability of success, and held costs down. The clear intent, for the most part, was to enhance an image of Soviet scientific, technical, and military prowess, and the earlier missions were a key element in the growth of Soviet prestige.

2. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets broadened their earlier approach by launching, for practi­cal military and economic uses, satellites that were much more '""idely based in technology and objectives. Some of these programs, such as those for communications and weather re­porting, were not amenable to extensive pub­licity. Some could not he publicized at all­such as those for photographic and ELINT reconnaissance, radar calibration, intercept­ing satellites, and providing navigational sup-

port. These satellites co.ntinued to use mili­tary boosters that had been well-proven; well over 90 percent of the missions have been suc­cessful in the past six years. Since .the mid-1960s the majority of Soviet space launches have been for satellites with military- and in­telligence-related missions, with the result that today some three-fourths of Soviet ac­tivity in spa·;e (as measured by number of launches) supports the USSR's strategic mili­tary objectives. These programs are currently being supplemented by newer programs now in the development cycle-such as a radar reconnaissance satellite and what may be a high altitude surveillance spacecraft.

3. In order to move beyond their earlier publicized successes in space, the Soviets had in the late 1960s to develop larger and more complicated space boosters and spacecraft. This new hardware had serious performance problems, and Soviet prestige programs conse­quently did not move forward as expected. Only some 75 percent of the prestige missions have achieved their objecti\·es in the past six years. The US was at the same time suc­ceeding in its advanced programs-especially Apollo--with the result that the USSR lost its early image of predominance in space.

4. In addition to its strategic military and prestige aspects, the Soviet space effort has had economic objectives, but so far these ap­pear to have a much lower priority. The pro­grams that provide economic benefits do so for both military and civilian users.

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5. Soviet expenditures for space programs reflect these priorities and years of growth. Total Soviet annual spending for space is esti­mated to have increased from the equivalent of about $800 million in 1960 to the equiva­lent of about $8 billion in 1971. 1 The growth of the military-strategic share from about 15 percent of the total in 1960 to about 40 per­cent today reflects the growing importance of strategic programs. 2 For the most part,

strategic-military systems have used existing

hardware and technology in standardized pay-

' The estimated Soviet space costs given here in­clude the costs of hardware, launch operations, con­struction of facilities, tracking and data acquisition, administration, and research and development for both military and civilian programs. These costs rep­resent the cost of producing similar systems in the US. Generalized cost models were used, which at­tribute US development<il practices and techniques to the Soviet systems. Thus there are major uncer­tainties in the absolute costs of the overall Soviet space program, and these values should be used with cau­tion. We have far more confidence in the overall trends.

Revised estimates of the pace and timing of Soviet space programs, necessitated by the stretchout of some major elements of the Soviet effort, have re­sulted in a somewhat lower estimate of annual out­lays than in the past. The stretchout has been only partially balanced by Soviet development 0f some programs (geodetic, radar reconnaissance, and photographic-related) not previously estimated and by higher launch rates (two Salyut-class satellites and four Mars probes in 1973). The estimates appear higher, however, because they are now expressed in 1972 dollars, representing an inflation of some 20 percent over 1968 dollars used previously.

'There is much overlapping and sharing of hard­ware, facilities, and outputs between military and civilian components of the Soviet space programs. All applications programs-for civilian or military users-use military boosters, bases, and personneL The allocation of resources to military or civilian programs in this Estimate is based on whether a similar program in the US would be funded under the Department of Defense or NASA, except in the case of Molniya and Meteor satellites, whose costs have been divided 2,6 military, 1,6 civilian. The allo­cation docs not attempt to estimate just how much is actually funded by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

loads and boosters and thus cost less per launch than the publicized systems. Many of the publicized systems-such as Salyut and Lunokhod-have used hardware and tech­nology which required heavy investment in research and developmcnt.3

6. Annual Soviet space launches have leveled off at close to 1971 levels of some 90 launches a year, and estimated annual ex­rcnditures have remained close to the equiv­alent of about $8 billion. By far the largest annual outlays since 1971-about $3 billion­have been for man-related progran1s (civil and military) and the associated boosters. Salyut­class space stations have absorbed the greatest portion of this totaL The next largest outlays were for existing photographic and ELINT reconnaissance programs, which absorb about one-third as much, followed in order by planetary, lunar, and earth applications pro­grams.

II. PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

7. The major Soviet space effort devoted to military and strategic objectives, involving some· 40 launches a year, is the collection of intelligence data from other nations and areas of the world through the use of re­connaissance satellites. A second, very im­portant area is the continuing development and maintenance of reliable communications satellites. Additional major strategic roles are navigation support for Soviet ships and the collection of worldwide weather data.

Reconnaissance

8. The Soviets have several types of satel­lites for the collection of photographic and

'Several recent prestige efforl~ have been quite e;pensive. compared to slrate~· su~ort activities. The Salyut. 1-.!ars probes, and _Jare estimated to ha vc cost on the order of times as much per launch as a photoreconnaissancc satellite.

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electronic data, and they arc working on a new radar satellite system. The photographic reconnaissance systems arc used to keep track of foreign military forces and installations, as well as for close monitoring of crisis situations such as the Pakistan/Indian conflict in 1971 and the latest Mideast war, during which the Soviets launched 6 photorcconnaissancc satel­lites in 17 days. Since the satellites have rela­tively short life times, abo[It 30 are launched each year. Such frequent launches provide flexibility, because the mission targeting can be optimized for specific targets, and a satel­lite can be recovered after a short period with­out giving up coverage. But the relatively small amount of film carried in each mission limits coverage and the rapidity with which previously unknown developments can be identified. Moreover, the resolution of the sensors-even on the high-resolution system­may limit the usefulness of the imagery for detailed technical intelligence. Soviet photo­graphic reconnaissance satellites are expected to improve in resolution, and perhaps in film recovery flexibility, in order to meet require­ments to cover Communist China, crisis situ­ations, and-above all-US weapons develop­ments and compliance in strategic arms agree­ments.

9. Soviet ELINT satellites are more clearly understood than in previous years. Second generation ELINT satellites now monitor pre­

dominantly ocean and coastal areas. Third gen­eration ELINT satellites-still in developmen­

tal testing-are now used mostly over land areas, but are expected to be used mostly over ocean areas in the future. These satel­lites appear to be able to contribute directly to detecting and, in the case of the most modern system, locating foreign naval ships. ~·!arcover, they monitor various early warning radars. !v!ajor anticipated advances include ex­panded coverage and refinement of the tech­nical data that they collect on radar targets

so as to improve identification and technical analysis.

10. The Soviets in the past few years have been testing a radar reconnaissance satellite. The spacecraft uses a side-looking radar that can detect large surface ships, such as air­craft carriers. This system has a potential for providing targeting data to combatants at sea. The -combination of data from such a system with data from other sources, such as ELINT satellite data, would be highly useful in targeting antiship missiles. The flight tests of the radar satellite to date more than likely represent developmental work, as opposed C qualification of an operational system.

\But the Soviets probably will attempt to ~lop a version of this satellite that could be used operationally to obtain information on small ocean areas, and may be able to do so by the 1975-1977 period. If the Soviets choose to develop a more capable radar re­connaissance satellite or a radar surveillance satellite for broad continuina ocean coverage it probably could not appe:r until later. '

Surveillance 4

11. The characteristics of a satellite launched in late 1972 and of another launched early in November, 1973, suggest the Soviets may now be working on a high altitude, sur­

veillance-type satellite. The most logical

choice of mission-based on our perception

of Soviet needs and the probability that the

Soviets have conducted missile launch detec­tion experiments-would be a system for

'A surveillance satellite provides broad, wide-range­ing, and continuous or frequent· coverage of a portion of the earth. A reconnaissance satellite on the other hand, provides limited coverage of a' small area of the earth, and may not do so frequently.

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detection of missile launches. However, until we better understand this program, we arc

not able to gauge its true mission, its signifi­

cance, or its time schedule. In any case, we

believe that the Soviets will develop and in­

troduce early warning satellites. Other areas

of possible Soviet advances include ocean sur­

veillance (with greater coverage and longer

mission times than the radar reconnaissance

system now under development), detection of

nuclear detonations, and SIGINT surveillance.

The latter two types of satellites would work best in high altitude orbits.

Communications

12. The Soviets have in the past few years

greatly expanded, in space and on the ground,

their use of satellite systems for the relay of

communications. The use of the Molniya 1

high altitude system has expanded with the

development of a Moscow-Washington hot

lineC

13. Each Molniya 1 satellite has a limited

relay capability, and a large deployment

of satellites is required to fulfill the above

functions in addition to growing civil com­

munications requirements. \Ve believe that

Molniya 2 satellites, now in the early op­

erational stages, will eventually take over the

bulk of Soviet civil and military satellite com­

munications and provide orders of magnitude

increases in satellite relay capacity within the

USSR. Tactical applications might appear by

the 1975-1977 period. When the geostationary

satellite Statsionar becomes operational, per­

haps by about 1975, it will furnish another

major level of communications support.

14. The Soviets now have also deployed ex­

tensively small satellites that probably store

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communications until they are "clumped" to a specific constmwr.

Weapons Support

15. Other types of Soviet satellites support deployed weapons systems.

-[

-The Soviets have relied, at least in part, on the mapping capabilities of their satel­lite reconnaissance cameras for geodetic data for targeting missiles. Over the last few years, the Soviets have deployed optical sites at various locations in the USSR, and at research sites in Antarctica. One purpose of these sites is accurate tracking of a series of satellites specifi­cally developed for geodetic purposes.

-Special satellites are also used as targets, probably for the calibration[

-Weather satellites-named in the Meteor

series-collect meteorological informa­

tion, presumably from all over the world.

The information was probably first re­

ceived by military installations, but the

Soviet H ydromcteorological Service now receives weather data for civil use.

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Weapons

16. The USSTI has developed a satellite in­terceptor and a fractional orbital bombard­ment system (the SS-9 Mod-3).

"' .. .. .. .. .. 17. The number of launches per year in

support of strategic goals has leveled off in the 1970s, after a rapid growth in the 1960s. While these systems will continue to e•·1joy the same priorities as the military weapons systems, the general level of launch activity is not expected to pick up in the 1970s. In fact, the prospects are that, as satellites grow in capability (more time in orbit and more film time per reconnaissance mission, for ex­ample), the number of military space launches may decline while the number of active satel­lites in orbit will grow. New military ap­plications and systems will continue to be developed, however, in the areas of recon­naissance, surveillance, communications, and weapons support. These are likely to include tactical applications. The total effort in terms of resources expended is likely to remain about the same.

Ill. ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS

18. Although Soviet activities in space have had relatively little influence on the Soviet economy, the potential economic benefits have gro\vn. It is probable that current eco­nomic applications will continue and that new ones will be introduced. The future extent and value of these applications of space tech­nology, however, are not clear. The Soviets are likely to utilize satellites even more ex­tensively as a means for improving communi­cations, predicting weather, and studying earth resources. The Soviets may try to utilize economic applications-especially earth re­sources studies-in their relations with less developed nations.

19. The potentially most rewarding area is the use of satellites to conduct studies of the

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earth's surface and its natural resources. This has already been done to a certain extent in the manned pr~gram, and may have been done as well-to a very limited degree-with a special series of photographic-related satel­lites. Such studies have application for, among other objectives, locating new mineral de­posits, understanding earthquake phenomena. and identifying fishing areas and the effects of pollution. They also can be used to survey forests, arable land, crops, water resources,

and to upgrade estimates of national re­sources. The Soviets probably have also used photoreconnaissance satellites to provide in­

formation of the breakup of ice in the northern sea routes.

20. Satellites used in support of strategic

goals also _play an importa~t econorpic role.

-Weather observations based on satellite data are more comprehensive and timely, and cover greater geographical areas, than ground facilities. Satellite data are especially useful to agriculture and shipping as well as in warning of severe storms. The Soviets clearly are following the West's lead in this area and will con­tinue to use weather information from non-Soviet sources as well as their own.

-Communications satellites provide a much less expensive means of relaying long distance communications in all forms, and are particularly attractive within the USSR, where the distances between settled areas-especially east of the Urals-are great. About 80 per­cent of the country is north of the US­Canadian border, and in many areas severe winter weather precludes the use of most ground-based relay systems. The Soviets have been using relay satellites for years[._

J We expect the volume of data to increase in the next 10 years,

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Current Family of Soviet Space Launch Vehicles·

Manned Photo­

reconnaissance 14,000 lb Communications

Planetary 2,000"4,000 lb

Scientific Communications Radar

Calibration Scientific

400 lb

A

Eliot Reconnaissance Navigation ASU Geodetic 5,000-9.000 lb

1.500 lb

a

I

'launch Vehicles No longer Used Are: SL-1. Sl-2, Sl-5, SL-9, and SL-10

Note: Missions and weights cited are typical.

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lunar Planetary

•.ooo-1o.ooo lb

A

figure 2

S6:WU1-lCCIA

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especially as technical cooperation with other nations grows.

21. There has been scant evidence of spin­off of Soviet space technology into the civilian economy. There is growing emphasis on the usc of space-as well as space technology-in the economy, but the one example touted so far (some medical applications) is not sig­nificant. Tj1e Soviets clearly are trying, how­ever. We expect to see sorTie examples of the utilization of space technology in the civilian economy over the next 10 years, but the secrecy surrounding the space program will limit this process more than in the West.

IV. PRESTIGE PROGRAMS

22. Although the strategic, economic, and scientific applications programs contribute to the image of the USSR as a modern and tech­nologically advanced nation, this reputation rests largely on the highly publicized suc­cesses in their early manned space, lunar, and planetary programs. Soviet accomplish­ments in these areas, however, relative to the US, have been steadily less impressive since the mid-1960s. At the same time the US successes in space-especially the Apollo and Skylab programs-have enhanced the US image, a very poor Soviet record has con­tributed to the decline of theirs. Soviet leader­ship in space is no longer the accepted public judgment, as it once was, even in the USSR.

23. The USSR thus is in a difficult position. Given the earlier successes, it cannot afford to allow the US to appear to become pre­dominant in all areas of space endeavor, yet it cannot now compete with the US because of severe technical and managerial limitations.

24. The Soviets have attempted to maintain an aura of success about their space program

by exaggerating the success of their ventures

and by playing clown or ignoring their failures.

Even internally, they have shown a tendency

lo try to leapfrog failures in order to push on. Only in the most obvious of cases, such as the cosmonauts' deaths in Soyuz 11, have they admitted difficulties. In order to enhance this image of success, the Soviets use the Cosmos name to cover most aspects of their space programs. \Vherc the mission is not obvious, the spacecraft is given a number, and the announcement provides little or no informatio>:~ as to its mission. This system of nomenclature has been used to cover not only military-related launchings, but also fail­ures as well. It has created an image of an active, successful program, when in fact there are many problems. Even in programs which are open, and where it would seem desirable, or at least harmless, for the Soviets to release technical information, they have been histor­ically reluctant to do so. This reluctance stems partly from the Soviet practice of security

and compartmentation, and partly from a de­sire to hide their limitations.

Problems to be Overcome

25. The problems plaguing Soviet manned space, lunar, and planetary programs during the past few years have appeared largely in just those programs which were trying to re­furbish the Soviet image and to advance the frontiers by using new space launch vehicles and spacecraft. (See Figure 2, opposite.) The problems crop up throughout the cycle of pro­gram development-in planning, design, ma­terials production, test, and evaluation-and in general program management.

26. That these problem areas are so perva­sive is, in general, a result of the fact that So­viet technology l"gs the West, in most of the areas related ~o space activities, by some five years. In part!cular, the problems stem from the manner in which Soviet space programs evolved. Early Soviet successes, using large cryogenic boosters, which were built to carry unminiaturized nuclear weapons,

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did not force the early development of im­proved boosters with high energy upper stages and of the lightweight, small size technology that the US developed. These advances in propulsion, electronics, and materials, which characterize US programs, now furnish the basis for the US lead in prestige programs.

27. Limitations at each stage in the de­velopment cycle, and in many technologies, compound the problems of the Soviet prestige space programs, but design limitations are certainly fundamental. These are best ex­emplified by problems in Soviet spacecraft. From the beginning their spacecraft designs have been oversimplified, and they have failed to develop separate redundant systems to provide alternatives for inflight emergen­cies. Soviet spacecraft are crudely con­structed, have limited instru•;nentation, and, for manned vehicles, reflect little concern for crew comfort. Even after many years, the Soviets still use outmoded technology, and their techniques and materials have become inadequate for the complex tasks now being attempted.

28. But the designers have to use the tech­nology and materials available. In this con­

text, flight knclware must be differentiated

from laboratory equipment. Soviet scientists

and engineers have a high degree of compe­

tence Ill developing advanced technology

items in the laboratory, but production

items frequently lack the quality of original

single-piece hardware. Lack of quality control

in manufacluri11t( nops up specifically in So­

viet clcv(·lup:;li'lll of those technologies which

ha\'(~ CJJ:thk,! th.: l'S to push ahead in high

e11ergy prup;J!,i(lll ;111d in miniaturized elec­

tronics .. SIJ,,I :,·c11ni11.!'.\ ill the latter are felt

across d Illiill 1!l'r (ll" vital areas-not only in

hardware- l<l ,.,11t!r<d l)(]oslcrs and spacecraft,

ht1t iii p:lrlic·,,!;,r i11 the sensors, instrumc:nl:J­

Iion. C:OIIllllli!Ji<·;il icHJS, ;JIHI data process in!~

that allow the causes of failures to be pin­pointed.

29. The Soviets' relative lack of refined in­strumentation to determine the cause of fail­ures-together with inadequate quality con­trol-arc the prime reasons that complex new flight test programs have had repeated failures before successes are achieved. The SL-12/13 space booster, used for the Salyut launches and the Mars probes, went through a series of failures before it became reliable. It ap­pears that ground testing has tended to be more of a go/ no-go affair with potential fail­ures rcmammg undiscovered until actual flight. This results in an "onion peeling" effect, in which the solution of one problem only reveals another. The Soviets arc now attempt­ing to correct this situation with improved telemetry systems and procurement of more simubtion equipment, but they are late in doing so.

30. In addition to the problems of design, fabrication, and test instrumentation, prob­lems show up in the management and control of the spaceflight itself. These are most ap­parent in manned missions-probably because of their scope and complexity and their re­quire:nent for quick resolution of problems.

.31. Limitations arc also found far back up the program mana)~emcnt ladder from space­flight operations. ll is very difficult in the USSH to i11trod1tCc new types of production cr radically new materials into existing facili­ties, but this had to be clone if the Soviet space inclustn· '''nr· to c:-;pand beyond the few origin:~! declic:llcd facilities with the top choicl' nf r'Il)~iJJr·crs and workers. Compouncl­iJI.l~ the· prohln11, supportin~ industries aclc­(jiJatc· l<> provide tlw special equipment, parts, ;u,d a(k;tiwcd kc:hlli\·al k11o\•:-how arc in rela­tivch sl1rl!l Stipp!)" i11 tl1c L'SSH.. Soviet proh­lr'IJJ:< ,·;III pnl1aps lw laid. in part, lo their failll!,' tu tak(· ;ulv;uilage, i11 the prestige space pr<lgr;llllS, of" \ll!ll<' of tlw ;Jclvanced mauagc-

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ment concepts and techniques used in the West.

32. More fundamentally, they have failed to make the Soviet space program work as well as it should because they had to work within the Soviet system. For example, Soviet management is often done by committee. Members are from various parts of the Soviet power structure, they appear to each other as approximate equals, and there is no apparent mechanism for the enforcement of solutions once a problem is recognized and resolved.

33. The Soviets are certainly aware of the damage that failure to solve these problems does to their national image. There is evidence that extensive basic research supports the space effort. Manned space, lunar, and plane­tary programs receive the best support from the technical institutes, and they have been generously funded. The failures thus have not come as a result of inattention or inadequate effort. Rather they seem to have been a conse­quence of attempting early on to continue to achieve success with minimum effort, and to cover up, rather than adequately to address and solve, fundamental problems. These fail­ures are failures, in the first place, of tech­nology, but more fundamentally they are fail­ures of management inherent in the Soviet system.

Cooperation in Space Programs

34. The problems the Soviets have en­countered in their manned space programs have caused them to be increasingly more open in their approach to space efforts that do not have a strategic impact and to look more favorably on cooperation with other countries. With the example of the US before them, the Soviets have released pictures, models, and actual hardware at an increasing rate. This trend has been a function of increas­ing numbers of cooperative programs, of the need felt by Soviet scientists to demonstrate

their competence, and of the growing sophisti­cation of the average person regarding space matters.

35. The first US-USSR agreement on co­operation in space was for exchange of weather data and was arrived at in 1962, but the US received little Soviet data until the launch of the Meteor l satellite in 1969. Actual exchange of information has also lagged .in other areas covered by agreements, such as in a long over­due joint review of space biology and medi­cine, and in erratic cooperation in the explora­tion and use of o.uter space. The thaw in East­West relations over the past few years has, however, reduced the political barriers to co­operation.

36. The US-USSR agreement on coopera­tion in space, signed at the Moscow Summit in i\1ay. 1972, to conduct a test docking mission in earth orbit in July 1975, marked a new level

of potential cooperation. As the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) is now conceived, a

US-designed docking mechanism will be in­stalled on a docking module which will also

serve as an airlock and transfer corridor be­

tw~en the US and Soviet spacecraft. During the docking period, which may last as long

as two days, the crews will visit each others' spacecraft and perform a few experiments.

37. Such cooperative activities in space must appear attractive to Moscow for a variety of reasons:

-As a part of the broader policy of detente, the ASTP and other cooperative agree­ments are indications of easing East­West tension.

-The ASTP project contributes to the pub­lic image of Soviet technological equality with the US by suggesting that, despite the absence of manned lunar expeditions, the ussn is on a scientific and technical par with the US in its space programs.

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-Space programs in general arc a subject of world-wide popular interest, and co­operative activities promote a favorable image of the ussn in general.

-The US is the source from which the So­viets can learn a great deal in terms of scientific, technological, and managerial know-how, so that they can attempt to close the gap between the space pro­grams of the two countries. The USSR also lags behind other Western countries in most of these areas.

38. Nevertheless, the Soviet decision to en­gage in the project probably was contested, and approved only when it could be demon­strated that it held more advantages for the USSR There were certainly strong arguments in the Kremlin against such an undertaking, as well as the usual extensive bureaucratic problems of resolving policy questions among divergent scientific, industrial, military, and political interests. Cooperative activities must appear unattractive for at least some of the following reasons:

-The USSR remains sensitive about dis­closing most of the details of its space programs, which remain classified in the USSR, largely because of the close link­ages between the military and civilian space efforts.

-They are aware of their technical short­comings, reluctant to expose them, and reluctant to risk public failure in such undertakings.

-If the venture is a success, credit will have to be shared with political enemies.

39. These bureaucratic problems have not been disposed of; they have merely been pushed into the background. Moreover, the technical and managerial problems experi­enced by the Soviets in their space programs

in general, and in the Salyut mission in par-

ticular, will not be solved easily. All these problems will crop up to present practical ob­stacles in achieving agreement, and in meeting schedules and goals. But we believe ASTP stems from detente, and as long as detente is attractive, the Soviets will find ways to keep ASTP alive. The specific problems will have to be worked through, and the Soviet leader­ship will certainly see to it that ASTP gets the necessary priorities in tenns of technical and managerial talent.

40. Moreover, even though there still arc problems with the Soyuz spacecraft, Soyuz technology is no longer at the forefront of Soviet space research. It is the Salyut and related programs which are most in trouble in the USSR, not Soyuz. The Soyuz program is now over six years old, and Soyuz 12 retested some of the old approaches. In addition, the ASTP mission plan and hardware development have been steadily changed to take technical and managerial pressure off the Soviets. The most important new hardware development in ASTP is the docking module, and this is the responsibility of the US. The Soviets thus are taking minimum risk to achieve maximum gain.

41. If Soviet- US cooperation goes beyond ASTP to more advanced projects, the Soviets will be pressed closer to the limits of their technical and managerial talents. It is likely, however, that the Soviets will learn from the

US as they go, keep the projects within their capabilities (or alter them as necessary), and

continue to benefit as much as possible from US know-how and world publicity while giv­ing a minimum in return. Until they can under­

take major new projects successfully on their own-and their technology to do this is now at least five years behind that of the US­the Soviets need a US cooperation program

to help bolster their technology and prestige, and will continue to promote such cooperation.

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42. In addition to its dealings with the US, the ussn has in the past sought, and continues to seck, space cooperation with other non­communists states:

-The extensive Franco-Soviet program, in­cluding placement of a French laser re­flector on the moon, is one such effort. Again, political as well as scientific con­siderations were important.

-The USSR has been similarly engaged in cultivating scientific and political ties with India. A forthcoming Soviet project to launch an Indian scientific satellite in 1974 will serve to further that end.

- The Soviets also are beginning coopera­tive programs with the European Space Research Organization ( ESRO), West Germany, and Sweden. These efforts are still small but are likely to grow. It is quite possible that cooperative efforts with still more nations will begin in the future.

43. The USSR's cooperation in space has also included ventures with the Warsaw Pact nations, beginning in the late 1960s. These started as technically trivial efforts at public relations, but recently have grown and have embraced other Socialist nations as well. The overall effort now is to the point that specific satellites-named in the Intercosmos series­are launched in cooperative projects. Eleven of these launches have occurred. This effort, too, has political, as well as technical and pub­lic relations aspects, although there is less potential Soviet gain in cooperation with Pact nations than with the West. Nonetheless, we expect the effort to continue for the foresee­able future at about the current level.

44. The outlook for cooperation in general is for a continuation of the trend that has seen the Soviets become increasingly open with respect to space activities, including the han­clling of their own space program and their

dealings with other natious. Cooperative efforts with countries other than the US, as well as with the US, will continue and ex­pand to some degree in the future. We do not believe, however, that the ussn will try to undertake truly complex space programs with countries other than the US. The cost alone of major space efforts limits the participants, and the US is the only nation with a major space program of potential usc to the USSR.

Prospects for Prestige Programs

45. As has been noted above, the Soviets arc hindered by the fact that the ussn has not created the necessary technical and man­agerial base to keep up with the US in the prestige programs. These limitations will fur­ther delay schedules for manned space sta­tions, manned lunar landings, and planetary exploration.

Manned and Related Space Stations

46. The disastrous Salyut 1/Soyuz ll mis­sion, which ended in the death of three cosmo­nauts, and the three successive failures of other Salyut type spacecraft have set the Salyut program back at least two years. Investiga­tions carried on Salyut 1 included earth re­sources surveys, astronomical studies, medical and biological studies, atmospheric and mete­orological investigations, and other scientific experiments. These were designed to test the feasibility of the station for a variety of uses. Salyut 2 was different from Salyut 1, had[

l a larger area of solar arrays. While the s'Otiets could de­velop and operate separate civil and mili­tary space stations, as might be suggested by Salyut 1 and 2. it seems equally likely that the competition for space resources might eventually result in an amalgamation of missions.

47. Although a successful ASTP will shore up the Sm,iet space image to some extent, it

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will not in fact demonstrate Soviet technical parity with the US in manned space flight. The Soyuz is a remnant from the early­to rnici-19GOs Soviet technology. While it is being modified as well as possible, it is primi­tive compared to Apollo. And although the Soviets touted Salyut as the doorway to manned orbital spaceflight in the 1970s, it is technically far behind th~ US Skylab, and.has yet to fly a wholly successful mission. We ex­pect to see continuing Salyut missions, to re­solve Soviet problems in manned space sta­tions, over the next couple of years. We also expect to see more manned Soyuz space flights with specific, limited objectives that can be used to demonstrate an on-going Soviet capa­bility before ASTP. Thereafter Salyut will probably be the focus of Soviet manned space flight until about 1977, and perhaps longer.

48. A persistent theme in Soviet public statements and literature has been that inter­mediate ( Salyut) size orbital stations will be used to build a larger station by linking modules in orbit. But before this can be done, there are severe technical problems to be re­solved which require additional developmental advances and substantial overall improve­ments in systems reliability. With optimum speed and success in resolving these problems, a manned station of Salyut-like linked mod­ules, maintaining successive 6-9 man crews for several months at a time, could be in opera­tion by 1980. Soviet performance to date does not, however, engender conHdence that these problems will be resolved soon enough to meet that date.

Space Shuttle

49. Some Soviet space officials have ex­pressed interest in a US-type reusable space

shuttle and have indicated a desire for such a program. But the USSH is many years from

achieving such a shuttle-so far in fact that we cannot predict when a reusable shuttle of

the US type might appear. The electronics, materials, and system test problems arc be­yond Soviet capabilities now. Any attempts to bui lei a reusable shuttle would be plagued by problems. Between now and the 1980s, the Soviets will continue to use ferry spacecraft and existing launch vehicles. But the Soviets also may introduce spacecraft and/ or booster components that arc reusable after a fashion, call the combination a "space shuttle", and claim another space first. A desire to reduce the cost per launch and the Soviet commitment to a manned space station program may make . development of a truly reusable shuttle at­tractive to the Soviets during the 1980s.

Unmanned Lunar Exploration

50. The Soviet unmanned lunar program­almost completely preempted by tlie Apollo program prior to its termination-is expected to continue at its current low level for several years. The success of the two lunar rovers, Lunokhods 1 and 2, might prompt the So­viets to try more ambitious unmanned lunar ventures. These flights-such as a dual mis­sion of a rover and a sample return payload­might occur in the mid-1970s using two SL-12s. Such lunar missions as the Soviets attempt will allow more complex missions and ad­vances in scientific exploration, as well as op­portunities to demonstrate technical compe­tence. The low level effort will grow as the Soviets make progress toward their own manned lunar landing.

Manned Lunar Landing

51. It still appears that the Soviets will make an effort to land men on the moon and return them. But the failures, long slippage, and ap­parent low priority conne~ted with the pro­

gram make it unlikely that a specific schedule exists. The liming of a manned lunar mission

hinges on the success of [ J If the [ J launches over the next few years are

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success[ ul, and the Soviets attach a high priority to the program, a manned lunar mis­sion could still take place by the end of the 1970s. But any major failures of[ J will almost certainly push the mission into the 1980s. The present priorities appear to em­phasize the development of manned space stations.

Planetary Exploration

52. The impact of the planetary and lunar efforts in the early space program were enormous. They intensified the feelings that the Soviets were the dominant space power in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the US program developed, however, Soviet deep space feats had relatively less ~mpact on the world. After a long series of failures and partial failures, the Soviets, during 1972, finally achieved a landing on Venus with a spacecraft which transmitted multiple measurements that could be read and interpreted.

53. New spacecraft were launched toward Mars in July and August 1973 by the SL-12 launch vehicle. The higher energy require­ments of the 1973 Mars window compounded the weight problems, and the Soviets decided to split the missions and use sep·arate landers and orbiters; thus four vehicles were sent on their way to Mars, rather than two as in 1971. The 1975 launch window to Mars involves still greater launch energy requirements and ap­proach velocities than those in 1973. Because of this, the Soviets may forego the 1975 win­dow, but will probably use the 1977 window, which will have less stringent energy require­ments than the 1975 window.

54. The SL-6 and Venus spacecraft can be used throughout the 1970s to support a variety of Venus missions. It is more likely, however, that the Soviets will usc the SL-12. The Soviets have discussed Venus upper atmosphere probes using balloons. These might be within the present Soviet capability and might occur

during the launch windows over the balance of the decade. A public relations type attempt at a Venus swingby with flyby or impact on Mercury, could he accomplished next year. A significant scientific venture to obtain scien­tific data probably will not occur before the 1976 launch window.

55. The Soviets have shown some interest in exploration of the outer planets. But a use­ful payload requires a more capable launch vehicle, such asC --,or the SL-12 with high energy upper stages~he[ 1ws not been flown successfully and an upgraded SL-12 has yet to be launched. Attempts at a Jupiter or Jupiter/Saturn flyby using one or more high energy stages on the SL-12 could start about 1975, assuming early and successful testing of such stages. The Soviets might be ready to attempt a series of Jupiter missions in the early 1980s using[ J V. FUTURE PRIORITIES

56. We expect the Soviets to continue their prestige-related programs at about their pres­ent rate. These programs will continue to be constrained by Sodet technical and mana­gerial limitations, but the Soviets will con­tinue to try to work around these problem areas, borrow from the \Vest, and-if neces­sary-try to leapfrog them. \Ve also expect the Soviets will continue to develop new ap­plications and programs to support military­strategic objectives. \Ve do not expect Soviet limitations to be as serious in this area because they use technolog~; closer to the state of the art. Further, we believe that the Soviets will introduce satellites that will be much more useful in the economic area, so that by the late 1970s and earlv 1980s, this element of the program will become much larger than

it is today. The prospect is thus for a con­tinued high effort in the military programs,

with improved performance; a continuation

of present efforts in the prestige space pro-

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grams (a It hough probably with greater suc­cess); and sonte shifting of resources to pro­grams wi I It tnore ccottomic return.

57. As program objectives grow, there will be an increased need for advanced tech­nology, such as high energy propulsion and nuclear power sources, for nearly all mission areas. Cencrally, this advanced technology will be used first in sttpport of military-stra­tegic applications. Significant results of this technology will include extension of space­craft life and development of more multi­sensor-and multi-function-satellites. The improved performance inherent in these changes may lead to a reduction in the annual number of Soviet space launches.

58. There is little doubt that there has been and will continue to be economic pressure to reduce the resources put into some aspects of Soviet space programs. \Ve have evidence that there is some disillusionment with the Soviet manned space program. And com­plaints have been heard that space spectacu­lars deprived the military of much-needed re­sources. The new Five Year Plan in 1970 called for greater emphasis on space applica­tions-communications, navigation, and earth resources programs-which used proven hard­ware and had a demonstrable economic re­turn. But perhaps even more importantly, the new plan relied heavily on the application throughout the Soviet economy of techno­logical improvements in productivity to keep the economy growing. And this required a much greater input to the economy of the sophisticated equipment and human talent that heretofore were being devoured by the space program. A natural consequence of these developments was that funds for some programs \':ere not as easily available as in

the past and some programs were stretched

out. \ \' e be I icve, however, that economic con­

straints have not seriously affected the scope

and timing of the space programs; these have

hccn and will be much more subject to tech­nical and managerial constraints,

59. Based on currently observable programs and the assumption that there are programs in the early stages of development that are unknown to us, we believe that spending for Soviet space programs will continue through 1975 at-or slightly belo\\'-the 1971-1973 level. Thereafter the Soviets can support an active and vigorous space effort, and intro­duce several new programs each year, with­out exceeding the current levels of expendi­tures. Only if the Soviets contemplate very

expensive new programs-such as a manned

~1ars landing-would economic considerations

be likely to play a decisive role. But such pro­

grams are unlikely in 1970s, primarily for

technical reasons.

60. On the other hand, Soviet space pro­

grams almost certainly will not suffer signifi- ·

cant long-term cuts in funding. The Soviets

have a deep, wide-ranging commitment to the

exploration and use of space. Soviet leaders­

from Secretary Brezhnev to Academy of

Sciences President Keldysh-have repeatedly

stressed the importance of space from both

an economic and a scientific standpoint. The

long-term nature of the commitment is evi­

dent from the broad nature of the applica­

tions programs-both economic and mili­

tary-and froni the high priority accorded

space research facilities. And space activities

are consistently among those major accom­

plishments which the Soviets like to recite

on state occasions as demonstrative of socialist

success. In sum, the Soviets have ideological,

national, and strategic commitments to space

activity that transcend the economic and

scientific rationales they often cite. Conse­

quently, it is likely that the total effort­

military and civilian-will continue at about

the current levels.

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61. The space industry has lost some of its favored position vis-a-vis other claimants in the economy who are now in closer competi­tion for budget allocations. The growth in the space programs that each year took a large share of the technical resources of the

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USSR will not take as large a share in the future. Some of the incremental resources previously devoted to the space programs each year, during their period of rapid growth, can increasingly be used elsewhere in the economy.

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